TITLE 24
GOVERNMENT - STATE
Cross references: For elections, see title 1; for peace officers and firefighters, see article 5 of title 29; for state engineer, see article 80 of title 37; for state chemist, see part 4 of article 1 of title 25; for offenses against government, see article 8 of title 18; for the "Uniform Records Retention Act", see article 17 of title 6.
BOOK 1
Articles 1 - 49.9
ADMINISTRATION
Art. 1. Administrative Organization Act of 1968, 24-1-101 to 24-1-138.
Art. 1.5. State Administrative Organization Board, 24-1.5-101 to 24-1.5-102.
Art. 1.7. Restructuring the Health and Human Services Delivery System, 24-1.7-101 to 24-1.7-103.
Art. 1.9. Collaborative Management of Multi-agency Services Provided to Children and Families, 24-1.9-101 to 24-1.9-105.
Art. 2. Organization of Administrative Departments, 24-2-101 to 24-2-108.
Art. 3. Agencies as Parties in Actions, 24-3-101 to 24-3-103.
Art. 3.5. Meetings of Boards and Commissions, 24-3.5-101.
Art. 3.7. Statutory Requirements for Creation of Boards and Commissions, 24-3.7-101 to 24-3.7-102.
Art. 4. Rule-making and Licensing Procedures by State Agencies, 24-4-101 to 24-4-204.
Art. 4.1. Crime Victim Compensation and Victim and Witness Rights, 24-4.1-100.1 to 24-4.1-501.
Art. 4.2. Assistance to Victims of and Witnesses to Crimes and Aid to Law Enforcement Act, 24-4.2-100.3 to 24-4.2-110.
Art. 5. Public Employment - Eligibility, 24-5-101 to 24-5-102.
Art. 6. Colorado Sunshine Law, 24-6-101 to 24-6-502.
Art. 7. State Security Officers, 24-7-100.2 to 24-7-106.
Art. 7.5. Colorado Higher Education Police Officers, 24-7.5-101 to 24-7.5-106.
Art. 8. Governor-elect - Transition to New Administration, 24-8-101 to 24-8-105.
Art. 9. Compensation of State Officers, 24-9-101 to 24-9-106.
Art. 9.5. Recall of State Officers (Repealed).
Art. 10. Governmental Immunity, 24-10-101 to 24-10-120.
Art. 11. Holidays, 24-11-101 to 24-11-118.
Art. 12. Oaths and Affirmations, 24-12-101 to 24-12-108.
Art. 13. Official Bonds, 24-13-105 to 24-13-126.
Art. 14. Liability - State and County Employees, 24-14-101 to 24-14-105.
Art. 15. Seals, 24-15-101.
Art. 15.5. Flag of the United States, 24-15.5-101.
Art. 16. Public Works Fiscal Responsibility Accounting Act of 1981, 24-16-101 to 24-16-107.
Art. 17. State Department Financial Responsibility and Accountability, 24-17-101 to 24-17-302.
Art. 18. Standards of Conduct, 24-18-101 to 24-18-309.
Art. 18.2. Demographic Information, 24-18.2-101.
Art. 18.3. Social Media Civility, 24-18.3-101.
Art. 18.5. Independent Ethics Commission, 24-18.5-101.
Art. 19. Payment of Postemployment Compensation to Government-supported Employees, 24-19-101 to 24-19-109.
Art. 19.5. Alternative Forms of Payment to the State, 24-19.5-101 to 24-19.5-105.
Art. 19.7. Recovery of Federal Reimbursement for Costs Associated with Illegal Immigration, 24-19.7-101 to 24-19.7-102.
Art. 19.8. Directive to the Attorney General to Demand Federal Enforcement of Existing Federal Immigration Laws, 24-19.8-101.
Art. 19.9. Restrictions on Travel-related Expenditures by Public Entities, 24-19.9-101 to 24-19.9-103.
STATE OFFICERS
Art. 20. Governor, 24-20-101 to 24-20-503.
Art. 21. Secretary of State - Department of State, 24-21-101 to 24-21-632.
Art. 22. State Treasurer, 24-22-101 to 24-22-118.
Art. 25. Colorado Interagency Working Group on School Safety, 24-25-101 to 24-25-104.
PRINCIPAL DEPARTMENTS
Art. 30. Department of Personnel - State Administrative Support Services, 24-30-101 to 24-30-2402.
Art. 31. Department of Law, 24-31-101 to 24-31-1401.
Art. 32. Department of Local Affairs, 24-32-101 to 24-32-3902.
Art. 33. Department of Natural Resources, 24-33-101 to 24-33-205.
Art. 33.5. Public Safety, 24-33.5-101 to 24-33.5-2810.
Art. 34. Department of Regulatory Agencies, 24-34-101 to 24-34-901.
Art. 35. Department of Revenue, 24-35-101 to 24-35-124.
Art. 36. Department of the Treasury, 24-36-100.3 to 24-36-505.
GOVERNOR'S OFFICE
Art. 37. Office of State Planning and Budgeting, 24-37-101 to 24-37-404.
Art. 37.3. Colorado Food Systems Advisory Council (Repealed).
Art. 37.5. Office of Information Technology, 24-37.5-101 to 24-37.5-905.
Art. 37.7. Statewide Internet Portal Authority, 24-37.7-101 to 24-37.7-114.
Art. 38. Government Efficiency, 24-38-101 to 24-38-305.
Art. 38.3. Office of Marijuana Coordination (Repealed).
Art. 38.5. Colorado Energy Office, 24-38.5-101 to 24-38.5-507.
Art. 38.7. Colorado Clean Energy Finance Program (Repealed).
Art. 38.8. Statewide Climate Preparedness Roadmap, 24-38.8-101 to 24-38.8-103.
Art. 38.9. Green Jobs Colorado Training Program (Repealed).
OTHER AGENCIES
Art. 40. Population Policy and the Population Advisory Council (Repealed).
Art. 40.5. Colorado Cost Containment Commission (Repealed).
Art. 41. Coordinator of Environmental Problems (Repealed).
Art. 42. Office of Transportation Safety, 24-42-101 to 24-42-104.
Art. 43. Railroad Authority Act (Repealed).
Art. 44. Commission of Indian Affairs, 24-44-101 to 24-44-108.
Art. 44.3. Colorado Student Leaders Institute Pilot Program (Repealed).
Art. 44.5. Early Childhood Council Advisory Team (Repealed).
Art. 44.7. Early Childhood Leadership Commission (Repealed).
Art. 45. Colorado Promotion Association (Repealed).
Art. 45.5. Colorado Advisory Council for Persons with Disabilities (Repealed).
Art. 46. Economic Development, 24-46-101 to 24-46-409.
Art. 46.1. Economic Development Central Information System, 24-46.1-101.
Art. 46.3. Work Force Development, 24-46.3-100.3 to 24-46.3-707.
Art. 46.5. Colorado Business Incentive Fund, 24-46.5-101 to 24-46.5-103.
Art. 46.6. Intrastate Air Service within the State of Colorado, 24-46.6-101 to 24-46.6-102.
Art. 47. Colorado International Trade Office, 24-47-101 to 24-47-103.
Art. 47.5. Colorado Energy Research Authority, 24-47.5-100.3 to 24-47.5-102.
Art. 48. Colorado Office of Space Advocacy (Repealed).
Art. 48.5. Office of Economic Development, 24-48.5-101 to 24-48.5-706.
Art. 48.6. Microenterprise Development Act (Repealed).
Art. 48.8. State Council on the Arts (Repealed).
Art. 49. Colorado Economic Development Advisory Board (Repealed).
Art. 49.5. Minority Business Office, 24-49.5-101 to 24-49.5-105.
Art. 49.7. Colorado Tourism Office, 24-49.7-101 to 24-49.7-110.
Art. 49.9. Colorado Channel Authority, 24-49.9-100.3 to 24-49.9-102.
BOOK 2
Articles 50 - 118
STATE PERSONNEL SYSTEM AND STATE EMPLOYEES
Art. 50. State Personnel System - Department of Personnel, 24-50-101 to 24-50-1204.
Art. 50.3. State Administrative Support Services - Department of Personnel, 24-50.3-101 to 24-50.3-106.
Art. 50.5. State Employee Protection, 24-50.5-101 to 24-50.5-107.
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' RETIREMENT SYSTEMS
Art. 51. Public Employees' Retirement Association, 24-51-101 to 24-51-1748.
Art. 51.1. Pension Review Commission, 24-51.1-101.
Art. 52. Deferred Compensation Plan (Repealed).
Art. 52.5. Retirement Health Savings Trust, 24-52.5-101 to 24-52.5-102.
Art. 53. Public Employees' Social Security, 24-53-101 to 24-53-111.
Art. 54. County, Municipal, and Political Subdivision Officers' and Employees' Retirement Systems, 24-54-100.3 to 24-54-117.
Art. 54.3. Colorado Secure Savings Program Act, 24-54.3-101 to 24-54.3-111.
Art. 54.5. Educational Employees' Optional Retirement Plan, 24-54.5-101 to 24-54.5-107.
Art. 54.6. Student Employees' Retirement Plan, 24-54.6-101 to 24-54.6-106.
Art. 54.7. Public Officials' and Employees' Defined Contribution Plans (Repealed).
Art. 54.8. Divestment by Public Pension Plans, 24-54.8-201 to 24-54.8-204.
FEDERAL PROGRAMS - HOUSING - RELOCATION
Art. 55. Cooperation with Federal Government, 24-55-101 to 24-55-103.
Art. 56. Relocation Assistance and Land Acquisition Policies, 24-56-101 to 24-56-121.
INTERSTATE COMPACTS AND AGREEMENTS
Art. 60. Interstate Compacts and Agreements, 24-60-101 to 24-60-5005.
Art. 61. Taxation Compact Between the Southern Ute Indian Tribe, La Plata County, and the State of Colorado, 24-61-101 to 24-61-202.
Art. 62. Intergovernmental Agreement Between the Southern Ute Indian Tribe and the State of Colorado Concerning Air Quality Control on the Southern Ute Indian Reservation, 24-62-101 to 24-62-102.
PLANNING - STATE
Art. 65. Colorado Land Use Act (Repealed).
Art. 65.1. Areas and Activities of State Interest, 24-65.1-101 to 24-65.1-502.
Art. 65.5. Notification of Surface Development, 24-65.5-101 to 24-65.5-105.
Art. 66. Planning Aid to Local Governments (Repealed).
Art. 67. Planned Unit Development Act of 1972, 24-67-101 to 24-67-108.
Art. 68. Vested Property Rights, 24-68-101 to 24-68-106.
PUBLICATION OF LEGAL NOTICES AND PUBLIC PRINTING
Art. 70. Publication of Legal Notices and Public Printing, 24-70-101 to 24-70-230.
ELECTRONIC TRANSACTIONS
Art. 71. Electronic Signatures, 24-71-101.
Art. 71.1. Government Electronic Transactions (Repealed).
Art. 71.3. Uniform Electronic Transactions Act, 24-71.3-101 to 24-71.3-121.
Art. 71.5. Uniform Electronic Legal Material Act, 24-71.5-101 to 24-71.5-112.
Art. 71.7. Electronic Filing of Government Documents (Repealed).
PUBLIC (OPEN) RECORDS
Art. 72. Public Records, 24-72-101 to 24-72-711.
Art. 72.1. Secure and Verifiable Identity Documents, 24-72.1-101 to 24-72.1-106.
Art. 72.3. Prohibiting Inclusion of Social Security Number, 24-72.3-101 to 24-72.3-102.
Art. 72.4. Revenue and Expenditure Web-based System, 24-72.4-101 to 24-72.4-105.
GOVERNMENTAL ACCESS TO NEWS INFORMATION
Art. 72.5. Governmental Access to News Information, 24-72.5-101 to 24-72.5-106.
SECURITY BREACHES AND PERSONAL INFORMATION
Art. 73. Security Breaches and Personal Information, 24-73-101 to 24-73-103.
Art. 74. Protection of Personal Identifying Information, 24-74-101 to 24-74-108.
Art. 74.1. Policies Regarding Data and Access, 24-74.1-101 to 24-74.1-103.
STATE FUNDS
Art. 75. State Funds, 24-75-101 to 24-75-1401.
FEDERAL FUNDS
Art. 76. Federal Funds, 24-76-100.3 to 24-76-104.
ACCESS TO PUBLIC BENEFITS
Art. 76.5. Access to Public Benefits, 24-76.5-101 to 24-76.5-104.
PRIORITIZING STATE ENFORCEMENT OF CIVIL IMMIGRATION LAW
Art. 76.6. Prioritizing State Enforcement of Civil Immigration Law, 24-76.6-101 to 24-76.6-103.
Art. 76.7. Prohibit State and Local Government Involvement in Immigration Detention, 24-76.7-101 to 24-76.7-103.
STATE FISCAL POLICIES RELATING TO SECTION 20 OF ARTICLE X OF THE STATE CONSTITUTION
Art. 77. State Fiscal Policies Relating to Section 20 of Article X of the State Constitution, 24-77-101 to 24-77-304.
FEDERAL MANDATES
Art. 78. Federal Mandates Act (Repealed).
INTERNET REGULATION
Art. 79. Limitations on Sources of Revenue, 24-79-101 to 24-79-102.
STATE DELINQUENCY CHARGES
Art. 79.5. Delinquency Charges Imposed by the State, 24-79.5-101 to 24-79.5-102.
STATE HISTORY, ARCHIVES, AND EMBLEMS
Art. 80. State History, Archives, and Emblems, 24-80-101 to 24-80-1401.
Art. 80.1. Register of Historic Places, 24-80.1-101 to 24-80.1-109.
ALLOCATION FOR ART
Art. 80.5. Allocation for Art (Repealed).
STATE PROPERTY
Art. 82. State Property, 24-82-101 to 24-82-1303.
Art. 82.5. Tobacco Litigation Settlement Financing Corporation (Repealed).
STATE ASSISTANCE - DENVER CONVENTION CENTER
Art. 83. State Assistance - Denver Convention Center, 24-83-101 to 24-83-106.
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY ACCESS FOR BLIND
Art. 85. Information Technology Access for Individuals Who are Blind or Visually Impaired, 24-85-101 to 24-85-104.
LIBRARIES
Art. 90. Libraries, 24-90-101 to 24-90-606.
CONSTRUCTION
Art. 91. Construction Contracts with Public Entities, 24-91-101 to 24-91-110.
Art. 92. Construction Bidding for Public Projects, 24-92-101 to 24-92-307.
Art. 93. Construction Contracts, 24-93-101 to 24-93-111.
Art. 94. Public-private Partnerships for State Public Entities, 24-94-101 to 24-94-106.
PROCUREMENT CODE
Art. 101. Procurement Code - General Provisions, 24-101-101 to 24-101-402.
Art. 102. Procurement Organization, 24-102-101 to 24-102-501.
Art. 103. Source Selection and Contract Formation, 24-103-201 to 24-103-1105.
Art. 103.5. Contract Performance (Repealed).
Art. 104. Specifications, 24-104-201 to 24-104-208.
Art. 105. Construction Contracts, 24-105-101 to 24-105-302.
Art. 106. Modification and Termination of Contracts, 24-106-101 to 24-106-109.
Art. 107. Cost Principles (Repealed).
Art. 108. Supply Management (Repealed).
Art. 109. Remedies, 24-109-101.1 to 24-109-505.
Art. 110. Intergovernmental Relations, 24-110-201 to 24-110-301.
Art. 111. Preferences in Awarding Contracts - Federal Assistance Requirements, 24-111-101 to 24-111-102.
Art. 112. Effective Date - Applicability, 24-112-101.
PRIVATE ENTERPRISE
Art. 113. State Government Competition with Private Enterprise, 24-113-101 to 24-113-104.
Art. 114. Private Enterprise Employee Protection, 24-114-101 to 24-114-103.
FINANCING OF CRITICAL STATE NEEDS
Art. 115. Financing of Critical State Needs, 24-115-101 to 24-115-118.
MISCELLANEOUS
Art. 116. Prohibition on Government Resources for Out-of-state Investigation into Legally Protected Health-care Activity, 24-116-101 to 24-116-103.
Art. 117. The Building Urgent Infrastructure and Leveraging Dollars Authority, 24-117-101 to 24-117-113.
Art. 118. Consumer Price Index for Calendar Year 2025, 24-118-101.
ADMINISTRATION
ARTICLE 1
Administrative Organization Act of 1968
24-1-101. Legislative declaration.
24-1-102. Short title.
24-1-103. Head of department defined.
24-1-104. Policy-making authority and administrative powers of governor - delegation. (Repealed)
24-1-104.1. State education standards review - review committees convened by department of education - youth participation - definition.
24-1-105. Types of entities defined - creation of new entities - transfers of existing entities.
24-1-106. Agencies not enumerated - continuation.
24-1-107. Internal organization of department - allocation and reallocation of powers, duties, and functions - limitations.
24-1-107.5. Nonprofit entities created or supported by state agencies and state-level authorities - requirements - legislative declaration.
24-1-108. Appointment of officers and employees - repeal.
24-1-109. Office of the governor.
24-1-110. Principal departments.
24-1-111. Department of state - creation.
24-1-112. Department of the treasury - creation.
24-1-113. Department of law - creation.
24-1-114. Department of higher education - creation - mission - legislative intent - definitions - repeal.
24-1-115. Department of education - creation.
24-1-116. Department of administration - creation. (Repealed)
24-1-117. Department of revenue - creation.
24-1-118. Department of institutions - creation. (Repealed)
24-1-119. Department of public health and environment - creation.
24-1-119.5. Department of health care policy and financing - creation.
24-1-120. Department of human services - creation.
24-1-120.5. Department of early childhood - creation.
24-1-121. Department of labor and employment - creation.
24-1-122. Department of regulatory agencies - creation.
24-1-123. Department of agriculture - creation.
24-1-124. Department of natural resources - creation - divisions.
24-1-125. Department of local affairs - creation.
24-1-126. State department of highways - creation. (Repealed)
24-1-127. Department of military and veterans affairs - creation.
24-1-128. Department of personnel - creation.
24-1-128.1. Office of state planning and budgeting - creation. (Repealed)
24-1-128.5. Department of corrections - creation.
24-1-128.6. Department of public safety - creation.
24-1-128.7. Department of transportation - creation.
24-1-129. Effect of transfer of powers, duties, and functions. (Repealed)
24-1-130. Actions, suits, or proceedings not to abate by reorganization - maintenance by or against successors.
24-1-131. Rules, regulations, and orders adopted prior to article - continuation.
24-1-132. Transfer of officers and employees.
24-1-133. Transfer of property and records.
24-1-134. Subsequent powers and functions - assignment.
24-1-135. Effect of congressional redistricting on boards and commissions - definition.
24-1-135.1. Effect of congressional redistricting related to 2000 federal decennial census - definition. (Repealed)
24-1-135.5. Boards and commissions - definitions.
24-1-136. "Information Coordination Act" - policy - functions of the heads of principal departments.
24-1-136.5. Long-range planning for capital construction, controlled maintenance, capital renewal - policy - heads of principal departments.
24-1-137. Effect of decrease in length of terms of office for certain state boards, commissions, authorities, and agencies. (Repealed)
24-1-138. Mandatory donation of services prohibited.
24-1-101. Legislative declaration.
(1) The general assembly declares that this article 1 is necessary to create a structure of state government that is responsive to the needs of the people of this state and sufficiently flexible to meet changing conditions; to strengthen the powers of the governor and provide a reasonable span of administrative and budgetary controls within an orderly organizational structure of state government; to strengthen the role of the general assembly in state government; to encourage greater participation of the public in state government; to effect the grouping of state agencies into a limited number of principal departments primarily according to function; and to eliminate overlapping and duplication of effort. To the ends stated in this section, this article 1 shall be liberally construed.
(2) Since the general assembly enacted the "Administrative Organization Act of 1968", which laid out the structure of the principal departments, assigned and transferred every entity into a principal department, and specified whether the entity was transferred by a type 1 or type 2 transfer or abolished by a type 3 transfer, the general assembly has determined that:
(a) The transfer language used in this article 1 is overly complicated, and the concept that a new entity obtains or retains its powers "as if it were transferred", based on a reorganization that occurred in 1968, is an awkward way of expressing the entity's status;
(b) While the status of an entity is expressed in this article 1, the type 1 or type 2 status of the entity often is not specified in the organic statute that governs the entity, which is where a reader would typically look for this information;
(c) While there were many references to type 3 transfers by which entities were historically abolished, in 2022 the terminology used in the statutes was modernized to simply identify the new entity responsible for the powers, duties, and functions of the abolished entity without the use of the archaic type 3 transfer language; and
(d) The Colorado Revised Statutes would be improved by modernizing the means by which an entity's status is designated and the way in which an entity's powers, duties, and functions are expressed in the "Administrative Organization Act of 1968" and in the organic statute where the entity is created.
Source: L. 68: p. 73, § 1. C.R.S. 1963: § 3-28-1. L. 2022: Entire section amended, (SB 22-162), ch. 469, p. 3349, § 2, effective August 10.
Cross references: For the short title (the "Debbie Haskins 'Administrative Organization Act of 1968' Modernization Act") in SB 22-162, see section 1 of chapter 469, Session Laws of Colorado 2022.
ANNOTATION
Applied in Dodge v. Dept. of Soc. Servs., 657 P.2d 969 (Colo. App. 1982).
24-1-102. Short title.
This article shall be known and may be cited as the "Administrative Organization Act of 1968".
Source: L. 68: p. 73, § 2. C.R.S. 1963: § 3-28-2.
24-1-103. Head of department defined.
When the term "head of a principal department" is used in this article, it means the head of one of the principal departments created by this article. Unless the head of a principal department is a state elected official, he shall have the title of executive director of the department or such other title as specifically designated by this article.
Source: L. 68: p. 73, § 3. C.R.S. 1963: § 3-28-3.
24-1-104. Policy-making authority and administrative powers of governor - delegation. (Repealed)
Source: L. 68: p. 73, § 4. CRS 1963: § 3-28-4. L. 81: Entire section repealed, p. 1126, § 1, effective June 29.
24-1-104.1. State education standards review - review committees convened by department of education - youth participation - definition.
By September 1, 2023, and by each September 1 thereafter, the commissioner of education shall appoint youth representatives from nominations submitted by schools throughout the state to participate in the standards development process described in section 22-7-1005, which includes community engagement. The department of education shall select youth representatives from rural, small rural, and urban school districts, as those districts are designated by the department of education. The department of education shall promote the opportunities for youth involvement to schools throughout the state and request that schools nominate youth to serve as youth representatives. Youth representatives may be reimbursed for actual and reasonable expenses incurred in the performance of their duties and may receive a stipend for participation in an amount to be determined by the department of education. For the purposes of this section, "youth" means the age of eligibility for membership in the Colorado youth advisory council, as set forth in section 2-2-1303 (1)(b)(I).
Source: L. 2023: Entire section added, (SB 23-008), ch. 113, p. 403, § 1, effective August 7.
24-1-105. Types of entities defined - creation of new entities - transfers of existing entities.
(1) The following definitions apply to every statute, unless the context otherwise requires:
(a) "Entity" means a principal department of the state or any division, institution, or part of a principal department, or any agency, board, commission, or unit of state government that is created in or assigned to a principal department of the state. "Entity" includes an individual carrying out powers or exercising duties or functions.
(b) "Type 1 entity" means an entity that is administered under the direction and supervision of a principal department established in this article 1, but exercises its prescribed statutory powers and performs its prescribed duties and functions, including rule-making, regulation, licensing, and registration; the promulgation of rules, rates, regulations, and standards; and the rendering of findings, orders, and adjudications, independently of the head of the principal department. Under a type 1 entity, any powers, duties, and functions not specifically vested by statute in the entity, including, but not limited to, all budgeting, purchasing, planning, and related management functions of the entity, are performed under the direction and supervision of the head of the principal department.
(c) "Type 2 entity" means an entity whose statutory authority, powers, duties, and functions, including the functions of budgeting, purchasing, and planning, are under the direction and supervision of the head of the principal department.
(2) When a new entity is created, the entity exercises its powers and performs its duties and functions in the principal department in which it is created as a type 1 or type 2 entity, as specified in law. When an existing entity is transferred from one principal department to another principal department, the entity exercises its powers and performs its duties and functions in the principal department to which it was transferred as a type 1 or type 2 entity, as specified in law. When an existing entity is abolished, all or part of the powers, duties, and functions of the abolished entity as well as its records, personnel, property, and unexpended balances of appropriations, allocations, or other money, may be transferred to another entity as specified in law.
Source: L. 68: p. 74, § 5. C.R.S. 1963: § 3-28-5. L. 73: p. 187, § 1. L. 74: (1) and (2) amended, p. 202, § 2, effective July 1. L. 2022: Entire section R&RE, (SB 22-162), ch. 469, p. 3350, § 3, effective August 10.
Cross references: For the short title (the "Debbie Haskins 'Administrative Organization Act of 1968' Modernization Act") in SB 22-162, see section 1 of chapter 469, Session Laws of Colorado 2022.
ANNOTATION
Annotator's note. The following annotations include cases decided under this section as it existed prior to its 2022 repeal and reenactment.
State highway commission is empowered to direct the chief engineer in the areas which will enable it to exercise its prescribed statutory powers, duties, and functions independently of the head of the principal department. State Hwy. Comm'n v. Haase, 189 Colo. 69, 537 P.2d 300 (1975).
State department of personnel does not oversee the state personnel board's activities; rather, the board reviews the actions of the head of the personnel department. Spahn v. Dept. of Pers., 44 Colo. App. 446, 615 P.2d 66 (1980).
24-1-106. Agencies not enumerated - continuation.
Any board, commission, advisory board, or other entity not enumerated in this article, but established by law within or as advisory to an existing department, institution, or other agency shall continue to exercise all its powers, duties, and functions within or as advisory to such department, institution, or other agency under the principal department and the type of transfer to which such department, institution, or other agency is transferred under this article.
Source: L. 68: p. 74, § 6. C.R.S. 1963: § 3-28-6.
24-1-107. Internal organization of department - allocation and reallocation of powers, duties, and functions - limitations.
In order to promote economic and efficient administration and operation of a principal department and notwithstanding any other provisions of law, except as provided in section 24-1-105, the head of a principal department, with the approval of the governor, may establish, combine, or abolish divisions, sections, and units other than those specifically created by law and may allocate and reallocate powers, duties, and functions to divisions, sections, and units under the principal department, but no substantive function vested by law in any officer, department, institution, or other agency within the principal department shall be removed from the jurisdiction of such officer, department, institution, or other agency under the provisions of this section.
Source: L. 68: p. 75, § 7. C.R.S. 1963: § 3-28-7. L. 73: p. 188, § 1.
Cross references: For the definition of "head of a principal department", see § 24-1-103.
24-1-107.5. Nonprofit entities created or supported by state agencies and state-level authorities - requirements - legislative declaration.
(1) The general assembly hereby finds and declares that:
(a) State agencies and state-level authorities currently benefit from working with nonprofit entities in a variety of areas, including contracting with nonprofit entities to obtain goods or services, developing working relationships with nonprofit entities to further an agency's or authority's goals and objectives, and using nonprofit entities to obtain gifts, bequests, or donations;
(b) Although state agencies also benefit from the ability to create nonprofit entities to assist them in carrying out their statutory powers and duties, the expenditure of state revenues through nonprofit entities created by state agencies hampers the general assembly's ability to adequately perform its duties of monitoring state revenues and ensuring that sufficient revenues are available for appropriations to the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of government;
(c) In order for the general assembly to carry out its duties to plan for and monitor state revenues, it is the intent of the general assembly to establish specific statutory requirements for the creation of nonprofit entities by state agencies to perform their statutory powers and duties and to establish accountability requirements for certain nonprofit entities formed for the benefit of state agencies; and
(d) It is the further intent of the general assembly to:
(I) Monitor the creation of nonprofit entities by state-level authorities where the creation of such entities could affect the purpose for which such authorities were established by imposing specific reporting requirements upon those authorities intending to create such entities; and
(II) Retain the laws applicable to the separate identity of nonprofit entities created by or on behalf of state agencies.
(2) (a) (I) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (3) of this section, commencing July 1, 1999, no state agency or employee or agent acting on behalf of such agency shall establish a nonprofit entity without specific statutory authority if:
(A) The purpose of establishing a nonprofit entity is to carry out the governmental functions of the state agency; and
(B) The state agency or an employee or agent acting on behalf of such agency has actual control over the management and internal operations of the nonprofit entity.
(II) The provisions of this paragraph (a) shall not limit:
(A) The office of the governor;
(B) State-supported institutions of higher education from using nonprofit entities, such as foundations, institutes, or similar organizations, as authorized in section 23-5-112, C.R.S.;
(C) State-supported institutions of higher education from issuing revenue bonds or pledging revenues as authorized in sections 23-5-102, 23-5-103, 23-70-107, and 23-70-108, C.R.S.;
(D) The Colorado educational and cultural facilities authority from financing facilities and capital expenditures or refunding or refinancing outstanding indebtedness as authorized in sections 23-15-107 to 23-15-110, C.R.S.;
(E) State-supported institutions of higher education from creating or using nonprofit entities to issue obligations for or assist in the financing of capital expenditures on behalf of or for the benefit of such institutions; and
(F) The Colorado school for the deaf and the blind, as provided for in article 80 of title 22, C.R.S., from using nonprofit entities, such as foundations, institutes, or similar organizations, as authorized in section 22-80-103, C.R.S.
(b) No later than September 1, 1999, each state agency shall provide to the state auditor a list of all nonprofit entities in existence on July 1, 1999, that were established by the state agency or an employee or agent acting on behalf of such agency and that meet the criteria set forth in sub-subparagraphs (A) and (B) of subparagraph (I) of paragraph (a) of this subsection (2), along with a copy of each nonprofit entity's most recent annual audit report or, if such entity has not been audited, the entity's most recent annual financial statement.
(c) The provisions of this subsection (2) do not apply to:
(I) Repealed.
(II) Any nonprofit corporation created by the board of regents of the university of Colorado pursuant to section 23-20-114 (2), C.R.S.; or
(III) Any private nonprofit corporation created by any state-supported institution of higher education, as authorized under section 23-5-121, C.R.S., for the purpose of developing discoveries and technology resulting from science and technology research at such institution of higher education.
(3) A state-supported institution of higher education may establish a nonprofit entity that would otherwise require specific statutory authority under paragraph (a) of subsection (2) of this section upon a finding by the governing board of the institution that establishing the nonprofit entity would be in the best interests of the institution.
(4) (a) (I) Except as otherwise provided in sections 23-5-112 (3) and 23-5-121, C.R.S., subparagraph (II) of this paragraph (a), and paragraph (b) of this subsection (4), any nonprofit entity created by or on behalf of a state agency under paragraph (a) of subsection (2) of this section or subsection (3) of this section and any nonprofit entities reported under paragraph (b) of subsection (2) of this section shall be subject to an annual audit by the state auditor or his or her designee as required for state agencies under section 2-3-103 (1), C.R.S.
(II) The provisions of this paragraph (a) do not apply to any nonprofit corporation created by the board of regents of the university of Colorado pursuant to section 23-20-114 (2), C.R.S.
(b) If any nonprofit entity, created for the sole benefit of one or more state-supported institutions of higher education, issues obligations to finance capital expenditures for the benefit of the institution or institutions and pledges payments to be received from the institution or institutions in repayment of such obligations, such capital financing activities are subject to the same audit requirements imposed for gifts and bequests received by a nonprofit entity under section 23-5-112 (3), C.R.S.
(5) (a) (I) Except as provided in subparagraph (II) of this paragraph (a), beginning July 1, 1999, each state-level authority intending to create or participate in the creation of a nonprofit entity shall file a statement with the state auditor regarding its intent to create such entity. The statement shall include information about the purpose and use of the nonprofit entity. The state-level authority shall file such statement at least thirty days prior to the incorporation of the nonprofit entity.
(II) For purposes of the requirements specified in this paragraph (a), the office of the governor, the university of Colorado hospital authority, created in part 5 of article 21 of title 23, C.R.S., and the Denver health and hospital authority created in part 1 of article 29 of title 25, C.R.S., shall not be required to provide notice of its intent to create a nonprofit entity or to disclose any information relating to the modification, initiation, or cessation of patient care programs if the disclosure of such information would give an unfair competitive or bargaining advantage to any person or entity.
(b) For fiscal years ending after June 30, 1999, each state-level authority shall report the annual financial activities of any nonprofit entity it has created in conjunction with the filing of its annual financial audit report with the state auditor as required under section 29-1-603, C.R.S. The reporting of such financial activities may be a part of the audited financial statements if the financial activities are separately identified or the reporting may be performed separately.
(6) (a) Except as provided in this section or other applicable law, any nonprofit entity supported by or established by or on behalf of a state agency shall not be an agency or department of state government and shall not be subject to any provisions of law affecting only governmental or public entities. The state of Colorado or the applicable state agency shall not be held responsible for any debt or liability incurred by any nonprofit entity supported by or established by or on behalf of a state agency, except as otherwise provided by law.
(b) The provisions of this subsection (6) shall apply to any nonprofit entity supported by or created by or on behalf of a state agency regardless of whether such entity is subject to the requirements specified in this section.
(7) For purposes of this section:
(a) "Nonprofit entity" means a nonprofit corporation created under the "Colorado Revised Nonprofit Corporation Act", articles 121 to 137 of title 7, C.R.S. "Nonprofit entity" may include, but is not limited to, a corporation, a partnership, a joint venture, a foundation, and an institute.
(b) "State agency" means an agency as defined in section 24-3-101 or an institution of higher education.
(c) "State-level authority" means a special purpose authority as defined in section 24-77-102 (15) and excludes nonprofit entities created by and for local governmental entities, such as municipalities, counties, city and counties, school districts, and special districts.
Source: L. 95: Entire section added, p. 460, § 1, effective May 16. L. 99: Entire section R&RE, p. 1350, § 1, effective June 3. L. 2003: (2)(a)(II)(D) and (2)(a)(II)(E) amended and (2)(a)(II)(F) added, p. 1585, § 18, effective September 1. L. 2011: (3) amended, (HB 11-1301), ch. 297, p. 1420, § 10, effective August 10. L. 2018: (2)(c)(I) repealed, (HB 18-1375), ch. 274, p.1704, § 32, effective May 29.
24-1-108. Appointment of officers and employees - repeal.
(1) Any provisions of law to the contrary notwithstanding and subject to the provisions of the constitution of the state of Colorado, the head of a principal department shall be appointed by the governor, with the consent of the senate. The head of a principal department shall appoint all subordinate officers and employees of his or her office and the head of each division under his or her department, and the head of each division shall appoint all employees in his or her division, but all appointments made by the head of a principal department and heads of divisions shall be made in accordance with section 24-2-102.
(2) In the event that the lieutenant governor is appointed during his or her term of office to concurrently serve as the head of a principal department:
(a) Acceptance or retention of such an appointment shall not result in a forfeiture of the office of lieutenant governor; and
(b) It shall be deemed that holding the office of lieutenant governor while concurrently serving as the head of a principal department is not incompatible, inconsistent, or in conflict with the duties of the lieutenant governor or with the duties, powers, and functions of the head of a principal department.
(3) Repealed.
(4) In the event that the lieutenant governor is appointed during his or her term of office to concurrently serve as the director of the office of saving people money on healthcare within the office of the governor:
(a) Acceptance or retention of such an appointment shall not result in a forfeiture of the office of lieutenant governor; and
(b) It shall be deemed that holding the office of lieutenant governor while concurrently serving as the director of the office of saving people money on healthcare is not incompatible, inconsistent, or in conflict with the duties of the lieutenant governor or with the duties, powers, and functions of the director of the office of saving people money on healthcare.
Source: L. 68: p. 75, § 8. C.R.S. 1963: § 3-28-8. L. 71: p. 103, § 5. L. 2011: Entire section amended, (HB 11-1155), ch. 90, p. 264, § 1, effective April 6. L. 2016: (2) amended and (3) added, (HB 16-1462), ch. 192, p. 680, § 1, effective May 26. L. 2019: (4) added, (HB 19-1127), ch. 310, p. 2808, § 1, effective May 28.
Editor's note: Subsection (3)(b) provided for the repeal of subsection (3), effective January 10, 2019. (See L. 2016, p. 680.)
Cross references: For the appointment of officers by governor, see § 6 of art. IV, Colo. Const.
24-1-109. Office of the governor.
The powers, duties, and functions now vested by law in the office of the governor are continued. Temporary commissions, unless otherwise provided, when established by law or by the governor, shall be units of the office of the governor. Interstate compacts authorized by law shall be administered under the direction of the office of the governor.
Source: L. 68: p. 75, § 9. C.R.S. 1963: § 3-28-9. L. 70: p. 104, § 1. L. 71: pp. 119, 1062, §§ 7, 4.
Cross references: For the constitutional powers of the governor, see §§ 2 and 5 to 12 of art. IV, Colo. Const.
24-1-110. Principal departments.
(1) In accordance with the provisions of section 22 of article IV of the state constitution, all executive and administrative offices, agencies, and instrumentalities of the executive department of the state government and their respective functions, powers, and duties, except as otherwise provided by law, are allocated among and within the following principal departments created by this article 1:
(a) Department of state;
(b) Department of the treasury;
(c) Department of law;
(d) Department of higher education;
(e) Department of education;
(f) Repealed.
(g) Department of revenue;
(h) (Deleted by amendment, L. 93, p. 1087, § 3, effective July 1, 1994.)
(i) Department of public health and environment;
(j) (Deleted by amendment, L. 93, p. 1087, § 3, effective July 1, 1994.)
(k) Department of labor and employment;
(l) Department of regulatory agencies;
(m) Department of agriculture;
(n) Department of natural resources;
(o) Department of local affairs;
(p) (Deleted by amendment, L. 91, p. 1054, § 4, effective July 1, 1991.)
(q) Department of military and veterans affairs;
(r) Department of personnel;
(s) Repealed.
(t) Department of corrections;
(u) Department of public safety;
(v) Department of transportation;
(w) Department of human services;
(x) Department of health care policy and financing;
(y) Department of early childhood.
Source: L. 68: p. 75, § 10. C.R.S. 1963: § 3-28-10. L. 72: p. 577, § 5. L. 74: (1)(t) added, p. 202, § 3, effective May 17. L. 77: (1)(t) amended, p. 950, § 14, effective July 13. L. 83: (1)(u) added and (1)(s) repealed, pp. 960, 971, §§ 2, 28, effective July 1, 1984. L. 91: Entire section amended, p. 1054, § 4, effective July 1. L. 93: Entire section amended, p. 1087, § 3, effective July 1, 1994. L. 95: (1)(f) repealed, p. 622, § 1, effective July 1. L. 2002: (1)(q) amended, p. 357, § 10, effective July 1. L. 2021: IP(1) amended and (1)(y) added, (HB 21-1304), ch. 307, p. 1846, § 2, effective July 1, 2022.
Cross references: (1) For legislative oversight of principal departments, see article 7 of title 2; for the establishment of the office of state planning and budgeting within the office of the governor, see article 37 of this title.
(2) For the legislative declaration contained in the 1995 act repealing subsection (1)(f), see section 112 of chapter 167, Session Laws of Colorado 1995. For the legislative declaration contained in the 2002 act amending subsection (1)(q), see section 1 of chapter 121, Session Laws of Colorado 2002.
ANNOTATION
Applied in Fish v. Charnes, 652 P.2d 598 (Colo. 1982).
24-1-111. Department of state - creation.
(1) There is hereby created a department of state, the head of which shall be the secretary of state.
(2) The department of state and the office of secretary of state, created in article IV of the state constitution, are type 2 entities as defined in section 24-1-105, and exercise their powers and perform their duties and functions as vested by law in the department and office, subject to the state constitution.
(3) The department of state includes the electronic recording technology board established in section 24-21-402 (1). The electronic recording technology board is a type 1 entity, as defined in section 24-1-105, and exercises its powers and performs its duties and functions as specified by law under the department of state.
Source: L. 68: p. 76, § 11. C.R.S. 1963: § 3-28-11. L. 2016: (3) added, (SB 16-115), ch. 356, p. 1477, § 2, effective June 10. L. 2022: (2) and (3) amended, (SB 22-162), ch. 469, p. 3351, § 5, effective August 10.
Cross references: (1) For the creation of the department of state and office of secretary of state, see also §§ 1 and 22 of art. IV, Colo. Const.
(2) For the short title (the "Debbie Haskins 'Administrative Organization Act of 1968' Modernization Act") in SB 22-162, see section 1 of chapter 469, Session Laws of Colorado 2022.
24-1-112. Department of the treasury - creation.
(1) There is hereby created a department of the treasury, the head of which shall be the state treasurer.
(2) (a) The department of the treasury, created in article 36 of this title 24, is a type 2 entity, as defined in section 24-1-105, and exercises its powers and performs its duties and functions as specified by law and subject to the state constitution.
(b) The office of the state treasurer is a type 2 entity, as defined in section 24-1-105, and exercises its powers and performs its duties and functions as vested by law or the state constitution in the office of the state treasurer, subject to the state constitution.
Source: L. 68: p. 76, § 12. C.R.S. 1963: § 3-28-12. L. 2022: (2) amended, (SB 22-162), ch. 469, p. 3352, § 7, effective August 10.
Cross references: (1) For the creation of the treasury department and office of state treasurer, see §§ 1 and 22 of art. IV, Colo. Const.
(2) For the short title (the "Debbie Haskins 'Administrative Organization Act of 1968' Modernization Act") in SB 22-162, see section 1 of chapter 469, Session Laws of Colorado 2022.
24-1-113. Department of law - creation.
(1) There is hereby created a department of law, the head of which shall be the attorney general.
(2) Except as otherwise provided in this article 1 or by law:
(a) The department of law, created in article 31 of this title 24, is a type 2 entity, as defined in section 24-1-105, and exercises its powers and performs its duties and functions as specified by law and subject to the state constitution.
(b) The office of the attorney general is a type 2 entity, as defined in section 24-1-105, and exercises its powers and performs its duties and functions as vested in the office of the attorney general by law or the state constitution.
(3) and (4) Repealed.
Source: L. 68: p. 76, § 13. C.R.S. 1963: § 3-28-13. L. 73: pp. 176, 1476, §§ 3, 38. L. 77: (4) added, p. 633, § 7, effective July 1. L. 83: (4)(b) repealed, p. 522, § 2, effective March 15. L. 84: (3)(c) added, p. 1047, § 2, effective July 1. L. 92: (3)(d) added, p. 1091, § 1, effective March 6. L. 93: (3)(c) repealed, p. 974, § 1, effective July 1. L. 94: IP(3) amended, p. 1725, § 1, effective May 31. L. 2017: (4)(a) amended, (HB 17-1238), ch. 260, p. 1173, § 19, effective August 9. L. 2020: IP(3), (3)(a), (3)(b), (3)(d), and (4)(a) repealed, (SB 20-063), ch. 12, p. 48, § 1, effective September 14. L. 2022: (2) amended, (SB 22-162), ch. 469, p. 3352, § 8, effective August 10.
Cross references: (1) For creation of the department of law and office of attorney general, see also §§ 1 and 22 of art. IV, Colo. Const.
(2) For the short title (the "Debbie Haskins 'Administrative Organization Act of 1968' Modernization Act") in SB 22-162, see section 1 of chapter 469, Session Laws of Colorado 2022.
24-1-114. Department of higher education - creation - mission - legislative intent - definitions - repeal.
(1) [Editor's note: This version of subsection (1) is effective until July 1, 2028.] There is hereby created a department of higher education, the head of which shall be the executive director of the Colorado commission on higher education, who shall be appointed by the governor and whose powers and duties are as specified in this section.
(1) [Editor's note: This version of subsection (1) is effective July 1, 2028.] There is created the department of higher education, the head of which is the executive director of the department of higher education, who is appointed by the governor and whose powers and duties are as specified in this section.
(1.1) (a) Beginning July 1, 2028, the department's mission is to oversee a system of postsecondary talent development that integrates postsecondary educational, training, and employment resources for Coloradans. It is the intent of the general assembly to evaluate the recommendations of the postsecondary talent development system transition advisory committee created in section 24-38-302, make any necessary statutory changes to effectuate the expansion of the department's mission to oversee a system of postsecondary talent development, and rename the department accordingly.
(b) This subsection (1.1) is repealed, effective June 30, 2029.
(1.5) [Editor's note: Subsection (1.5) is effective July 1, 2028.]
(a) As used in this section, unless the context otherwise requires:
(I) "Commission" means the Colorado commission on higher education created in section 23-1-102.
(II) "Department" means the department of higher education.
(III) "Executive director" means the executive director of the department.
(b) (I) Effective July 1, 2028, the executive director of the Colorado commission on higher education is renamed the executive director of the department of higher education.
(II) On and after July 1, 2028, as used in every statute, unless the context otherwise requires, "executive director of the Colorado commission on higher education" means the "executive director of the department of higher education".
(III) The revisor of statutes is authorized to change all references in the Colorado Revised Statutes to the executive director of the Colorado commission on higher education, as appropriate.
(2) [Editor's note: This version of subsection (2) is effective until July 1, 2028.] The Colorado commission on higher education and the office of executive director of the commission, created in article 1 of title 23, are type 1 entities, as defined in section 24-1-105, and exercise their powers and perform their duties and functions under the department of higher education.
(2) [Editor's note: This version of subsection (2) is effective July 1, 2028.] The Colorado commission on higher education and the office of executive director of the department, created in article 1 of title 23, are type 1 entities, as defined in section 24-1-105, and exercise their powers and perform their duties and functions under the department.
(2.5) Repealed.
(3) The department of higher education includes the following divisions:
(a) Repealed.
(b) The state historical society, created in part 2 of article 80 of this title 24. The state historical society is a type 1 entity, as defined in section 24-1-105, and exercises its powers and performs its duties and functions as a division of the department of higher education.
(c) The student loan division, created in article 3.1 of title 23. The division and the office of the director of the division are type 2 entities, as defined in section 24-1-105, and exercise their powers and perform their duties and functions under the department of higher education.
(d) The private occupational school division, created in article 64 of title 23. The private occupational school board, created by section 23-64-107, is a type 1 entity, as defined in section 24-1-105, and exercises its powers and performs its duties and functions under the department of higher education. The division, except for the private occupational school board, and the office of the director of the division are type 2 entities, as defined in section 24-1-105, and exercise their powers and perform their duties and functions under the department of higher education and the executive director of the department.
(4) For the purposes of section 22 of article IV of the state constitution, the following are allocated to the department of higher education but shall otherwise continue to be administered as provided by law:
(a) The regents of the university of Colorado, created by section 12 of article IX of the state constitution, and the university of Colorado, created by section 5 of article VIII of the state constitution;
(b) The board of governors of the Colorado state university system, created by part 1 of article 30 of title 23, C.R.S.; Colorado state university, created by article 31 of title 23, C.R.S.; and Colorado state university - Pueblo, created by article 31.5 of title 23, C.R.S.;
(c) (Deleted by amendment, L. 2003, p. 792, § 17, effective July 1, 2003.)
(d) The board of trustees for the university of northern Colorado, created by section 23-40-104 (1), C.R.S., and the university of northern Colorado at Greeley, created by article 40 of title 23, C.R.S.;
(e) The board of trustees of the Colorado school of mines, created by article 41 of title 23, C.R.S., and the school of mines at Golden, created by section 5 of article VIII of the state constitution;
(f) State board for community colleges and occupational education and the offices of director of occupational education and director of community and technical colleges, created by article 60 of title 23, C.R.S.;
(g) Repealed.
(h) The board of trustees for Adams state university, created by article 51 of title 23, C.R.S.;
(i) The board of trustees for Colorado Mesa university, created by article 53 of title 23, C.R.S.;
(j) The board of trustees for Metropolitan state university of Denver, created by article 54 of title 23, C.R.S.;
(k) The board of trustees for Western Colorado university, created by article 56 of title 23;
(l) The board of trustees for Fort Lewis College, created by article 52 of title 23, C.R.S.
(5) (a) With respect to the divisions of the department specified in subsection (3) of this section, the executive director shall have the powers, duties, and functions prescribed in this article for heads of principal departments.
(b) [Editor's note: This version of subsection (5)(b) is effective until July 1, 2028.] With respect to the Colorado commission on higher education and the universities, colleges, and boards specified in subsection (4) of this section, the executive director has only those powers, duties, and functions prescribed in article 1 of title 23; except that the executive director of the Colorado commission on higher education is authorized to negotiate, implement, and monitor contracts, as described in sections 23-18-201 (2), 23-18-303.5, and 23-18-304, with universities, colleges, and boards, in consultation with the Colorado commission on higher education.
(b) [Editor's note: This version of subsection (5)(b) is effective July 1, 2028.] With respect to the Colorado commission on higher education and the universities, colleges, and boards specified in subsection (4) of this section, the executive director has only those powers, duties, and functions prescribed in article 1 of title 23; except that the executive director is authorized to negotiate, implement, and monitor contracts, as described in sections 23-18-201 (2), 23-18-303.5, and 23-18-304, with universities, colleges, and boards, in consultation with the Colorado commission on higher education.
(6) The office of state archaeologist, created in part 4 of article 80 of this title 24, is a type 2 entity, as defined in section 24-1-105, and exercises its powers and performs its duties and functions as a section within the state historical society.
Source: L. 68: p. 77, § 14. C.R.S. 1963: § 3-28-14. L. 72: p. 577, § 6. L. 73: p. 1384, § 2. L. 75: (4)(c)(V) added and (4)(d) amended, p. 214, §§ 37, 38, effective July 16. L. 77: (4)(c)(III) amended, p. 281, § 29, effective June 29. L. 79: (3)(c) added, p. 823, § 2, effective July 1. L. 83: (2.5) added, p. 803, § 8, effective June 3; (4)(b) amended and (4)(c)(III) repealed, § 9, p. 2049, effective October 14. L. 85: (3)(c) amended, p. 1361, § 17, effective June 28. L. 88: IP(4)(c) and (4)(c) amended, p. 863, § 23, effective July 1. L. 90: (3)(d) added and (4)(c)(II) amended, pp. 1159, 1156, §§ 3, 14, effective July 1. L. 92: (3)(a) amended, p. 561, § 4, effective March 25. L. 93: (4)(g) added, p. 926, § 1, effective May 28. L. 95: (1) amended, p. 1102, § 34, effective May 31. L. 98: (3)(d) amended, p. 50, § 28, effective March 17. L. 99: (2.5) repealed, p. 876, § 2, effective July 1. L. 2000: (4)(g) repealed, p. 1569, § 2, effective July 1. L. 2002: (4)(b) amended, p. 1246, § 17, effective August 7; (4)(b) amended, p. 709, § 10, effective July 1, 2003. L. 2003: (4)(c) amended and (4)(h), (4)(i), (4)(j), and (4)(k) added, p. 792, § 17, effective July 1. L. 2004: (5)(b) amended, p. 718, § 6, effective July 1. L. 2005: (5)(b) amended, p. 767, § 35, effective June 1. L. 2006: (3)(a) amended, p. 1658, § 2, effective July 1. L. 2008: (3)(d) amended, p. 1482, § 26, effective May 28. L. 2010: (4)(b) amended and (4)(l) added, (HB 10-1422), ch. 419, p. 2081, § 58, effective August 11. L. 2011: (4)(i) amended, (SB 11-265), ch. 292, p. 1368, § 25, effective August 10. L. 2012: (4)(h) amended, (HB 12-1080), ch. 189, p. 761, § 24, effective May 19; (4)(j) amended, (SB 12-148), ch. 125, p. 428, § 19, effective July 1; (4)(k) amended, (HB 12-1331), ch. 254, p. 1271, § 19, effective August 1. L. 2013: (4)(b) amended, (HB 13-1300), ch. 316, p. 1680, § 46, effective August 7. L. 2014: (5)(b) amended, (HB 14-1319), ch. 169, p. 614, § 15, effective May 9. L. 2017: (5)(b) amended, (SB 17-297), ch. 210, p. 822, § 21, effective May 18; (3)(d) amended, (HB 17-1239), ch. 261, p. 1207, § 17, effective August 9. L. 2019: (4)(k) amended, (HB 19-1178), ch. 400, p. 3547, § 19, effective July 1. L. 2020: (5)(b) amended, (HB 20-1366), ch. 181, p. 835, § 17, effective July 1, 2021. L. 2022: (2), IP(3), (3)(b), (3)(c), (3)(d), and (6) amended, (SB 22-162), ch. 469, p. 3353, § 10, effective August 10. L. 2025: (5)(b) amended, (SB 25-233), ch. 119, p. 483, § 5, effective April 25. L. 2026: (1.1) added, (HB 26-1317), ch. 185, p. 1089, § 3, effective May 28; (1), (2), and (5)(b) amended and (1.5) added, (HB 26-1317), ch. 185, p. 1089, § 3, effective July 1, 2028.
Editor's note: (1) Amendments to subsection (4)(b) by House Bill 02-1260 and House Bill 02-1324 were harmonized.
(2) Subsection (3)(a)(II) provided for the repeal of subsection (3)(a), effective July 1, 2006. (See L. 2006, p. 1658.)
Cross references: (1) For the legislative declaration contained in the 2004 act amending subsection (5)(b), see section 1 of chapter 6, Session Laws of Colorado 2004. For the legislative declaration in the 2011 act amending subsection (4)(i), see section 1 of chapter 292, Session Laws of Colorado 2011. For the legislative declaration in the 2012 act amending subsection (4)(j), see section 1 of chapter 125, Session Laws of Colorado 2012. For the legislative declaration in HB 26-1317, see section 1 of chapter 185, Session Laws of Colorado 2026.
(2) For the short title (the "Debbie Haskins 'Administrative Organization Act of 1968' Modernization Act") in SB 22-162, see section 1 of chapter 469, Session Laws of Colorado 2022.
24-1-115. Department of education - creation.
(1) There is hereby created a department of education, the head of which shall be the commissioner of education, who shall be appointed by the state board of education.
(2) The state board of education, created in part 1 of article 2 of title 22, is a type 1 entity, as defined in section 24-1-105, and exercises its powers and performs its duties and functions under the department of education, subject to the state constitution.
(3) The state department of education and the office of the commissioner of education, created in part 1 of article 2 of title 22, are type 2 entities, as defined in section 24-1-105, and exercise their powers and perform their duties and functions under the department of education, subject to the state constitution.
(4) The department of education includes the state library, the ex officio head of which is the commissioner of education. The state library, created in article 90 of this title 24, is a type 2 entity, as defined in section 24-1-105, and exercises its powers and performs its duties and functions under the department of education as a division thereof, the commissioner of education, and the state board of education.
(5) The powers, duties, and functions of the department of education and the state board of education include the powers, duties, and functions of the state board of teacher certification, created in article 1 of chapter 123, C.R.S. 1963, and the state board of teacher certification is abolished.
(6) Repealed.
(7) (Deleted by amendment, L. 2003, p. 1586, § 19, effective July 1, 2004.)
(8) The department of education includes the Colorado school for the deaf and the blind, as provided for in article 80 of title 22, and the board of trustees of the Colorado school for the deaf and the blind, created in section 22-80-103. The Colorado school for the deaf and the blind and the board of trustees of the Colorado school for the deaf and the blind are type 1 entities, as defined in section 24-1-105, and exercise their powers and perform their duties and functions under the department of education.
(9) The department of education includes the state charter school institute established in section 22-30.5-503. The state charter school institute is a type 1 entity, as defined in section 24-1-105, and exercises its powers and performs its duties and functions under the department of education.
(10) The department of education includes the division of online learning and the office of the director of the division established in section 22-30.7-103. The division of online learning and the office of the director of the division are type 2 entities, as defined in section 24-1-105, and exercise their powers and perform their duties and functions under the department, the commissioner of education, and the state board of education.
(11) (a) The department of education includes the division of public school capital construction assistance and the director of the division established in section 22-43.7-105. The division of public school capital construction and the director of the division are type 2 entities, as defined in section 24-1-105, and exercise their powers and perform their duties and functions under the department of education.
(b) The department of education includes the public school capital construction assistance board established in section 22-43.7-106. The public school capital construction assistance board is a type 1 entity, as defined in section 24-1-105, and exercises its powers and performs its duties and functions under the department of education.
(12) The department of education includes the office of facility schools and the office of the director of the office of facility schools established in section 22-2-403. The office of facility schools and the office of the director of the facility schools unit are type 2 entities, as defined in section 24-1-105, and exercise their powers and perform their duties and functions under the department, the commissioner of education, and the state board of education.
(13) The department of education includes the facility schools board established in section 22-2-404. The facility schools board is a type 1 entity, as defined in section 24-1-105, and exercises its powers and performs its duties and functions under the department of education.
(14) The department of education includes the Colorado state advisory council for parent involvement in education created in section 22-7-303. The Colorado state advisory council for parent involvement in education is a type 2 entity, as defined in section 24-1-105, and exercises its powers and performs its duties and functions under the department of education, the commissioner of education, and the state board of education.
(15) The department of education includes the office of dropout prevention and student re-engagement and the director of the office, established in section 22-14-103. The office of dropout prevention and student re-engagement and the director of the office are type 2 entities, as defined in section 24-1-105, and exercise their powers and perform their duties and functions under the department of education, the commissioner of education, and the state board of education.
(16) The department of education includes the concurrent enrollment advisory board created in section 22-35-107. The concurrent enrollment advisory board is a type 2 entity, as defined in section 24-1-105, and exercises its powers and performs its duties and functions under the department of education, the commissioner of education, and the state board.
Source: L. 68: p. 78, § 15. C.R.S. 1963: § 3-28-15. L. 75: (4)(c)(V) and (6) added and (4)(d) amended, p. 681, § 2, effective July 16. L. 77: (7) added, § 4, effective July 1. L. 2003: (7) amended and (8) added, p. 1586, § 19, effective July 1, 2004. L. 2004: (9) added, p. 1649, § 58, effective July 1. L. 2007: (10) added, p. 1084, § 4, effective July 1. L. 2008: (11) added, p. 1063, § 5, effective May 22; (12) and (13) added, p. 1381, § 2, effective May 27; (6) repealed, p. 1902, § 88, effective August 5. L. 2009: (15) added, (HB 09-1243), ch. 290, p. 1424, § 7, effective May 21; (16) added, (HB 09-1319), ch. 286, p. 1322, § 12, effective May 21; (14) added, (SB 09-090), ch. 291, p. 1445, § 20, effective August 5. L. 2022: (2), (3), (4), (5), (8), (9), (10), (11), (12), (13), (14), (15), and (16) amended, (SB 22-162), ch. 469, p. 3355, § 18, effective August 10. L. 2023: (12) amended, (SB 23-219), ch. 88, p. 335, § 18, effective April 20.
Cross references: For the short title (the "Debbie Haskins 'Administrative Organization Act of 1968' Modernization Act") in SB 22-162, see section 1 of chapter 469, Session Laws of Colorado 2022.
24-1-116. Department of administration - creation. (Repealed)
Source: L. 68: p. 78, § 16. C.R.S. 1963: § 3-28-16. L. 70: p. 107, § 4. L. 71: pp. 103, 117, 119, 316, §§ 6, 1, 7, 21. L. 74: (3) repealed, p. 204, § 9, July 1. L. 75: (2)(g) added and (1)(l) and (2)(b) repealed, pp. 214, 822, §§ 39, 21, effective July 18. L. 76: (2)(h) added, p. 582, § 13, effective May 24. L. 77: (4)(b) amended, p. 1176, § 2, effective May 18; (2)(i) added, p. 1177, § 1, effective June 20. L. 79: (5) added, p. 886, § 3, effective July 1. L. 81: (2)(a) amended, p. 1286, § 3, effective January 1, 1982. L. 83: (2)(g) R&RE, p. 888, § 2, effective July 1. L. 85, 1st Ex. Sess.: p. 9, §§ 2, 3. L. 86: (3), (2)(j)(II), and (6) repealed, (1) amended, and (2)(d.5) added, pp. 757, 884, 900, 1225, §§ 13, 3, 2, 47, effective May 30. L. 87: (2)(h) amended, (8) added, and (2)(d) repealed, pp. 960, 983, 984, 1103, §§ 63, 3, 7, 2, effective July 1. L. 88: (4)(c) amended, p. 1435, § 29, effective June 11. L. 89: (2)(d.5) amended, p. 1024, § 1, effective March 9; (4)(c) and (7) repealed, pp. 491, 1646, §§ 23, 21, effective July 1. L. 90: (4)(d) amended, p. 1840, § 17, effective May 31. L. 94: (2)(d.5) amended, p. 48, § 1, effective March 11. L. 95: Entire section repealed, p. 622, § 2, effective July 1.
24-1-117. Department of revenue - creation.
(1) There is hereby created a department of revenue, the head of which shall be the executive director of the department of revenue, who shall be appointed by the governor, with the consent of the senate, and shall serve at the pleasure of the governor. The reappointment of an executive director after initial election of a governor shall be subject to the provisions of section 24-20-109.
(2) The department of revenue and the office of the executive director of the department of revenue are created in article 35 of this title 24. The executive director of the department of revenue is a type 2 entity, as defined in section 24-1-105, and exercises the director's powers and performs the director's duties and functions under the department of revenue.
(3) The powers, duties, and functions of the department of revenue and the liquor enforcement division, which is created in subsection (4)(a) of this section, include the powers, duties, and functions with respect to fermented malt beverages and malt, vinous, and spirituous liquors pursuant to the provisions of articles 3, 4, and 5 of title 44 that were formerly vested in the secretary of state.
(4) (a) The department of revenue consists of the following divisions:
(I) and (II) (Deleted by amendment, L. 2000, p. 1632, § 1, effective June 1, 2000.)
(III) Repealed.
(IV) The liquor enforcement division, which is a type 2 entity, as defined in section 24-1-105;
(V) The state lottery division, including the Colorado lottery commission created in section 44-40-108, and the director of the state lottery division, created in section 44-40-102, which are type 2 entities, as defined in section 24-1-105;
(VI) The division of racing events created in section 44-32-201 (1), the director of the division of racing events, and the Colorado racing commission, created in section 44-32-301 (1), which are type 2 entities, as defined in section 24-1-105;
(VII) The division of gaming created in section 44-30-201, the director of the division of gaming, and the Colorado limited gaming control commission, created in section 44-30-301, which are type 2 entities, as defined in section 24-1-105.
(VIII) (Deleted by amendment, L. 2005, p. 1185, § 41, effective August 8, 2005.)
(IX) Such other groups, divisions, sections, and units as the executive director of the department of revenue may create pursuant to section 24-35-103;
(X) The auto industry division, created in section 44-20-105. The division is a type 2 entity, as defined in section 24-1-105, and exercises its powers and performs its duties and functions under the department of revenue;
(XI) The state licensing authority created in section 44-10-201; and
(XII) The natural medicine division, created in section 44-50-201, which is a type 2 entity, as defined in section 24-1-105.
(b) Repealed.
(c) (I) Whenever any law of this state or any rule promulgated under the laws of this state refers to the division of enforcement of the department of revenue, such law or rule shall be deemed to refer to the department of revenue.
(II) Repealed.
(5) The motor carrier services division, created in section 42-8-103 (1), C.R.S., prior to the repeal of said subsection (1) by House Bill 12-1019, enacted in 2012, is abolished, and its powers, duties, and functions are transferred by type 3 transfers as follows:
(a) The powers, duties, and functions of its ports of entry section are transferred to the department of public safety and allocated to the Colorado state patrol.
(b) Its powers, duties, and functions relating to commercial driver's licenses and the international registration plan are transferred to the department of revenue.
Source: L. 68: p. 80, § 17. C.R.S. 1963: § 3-28-17. L. 71: p. 104, § 7. L. 73: p. 1475, § 37. L. 81: (4) amended, p. 1885, § 8, effective January 1, 1982. L. 82: (4) amended, pp. 385, 643, §§ 4, 4, effective April 30. L. 86: (1) amended, p. 885, § 4, effective May 23. L. 87: (4) amended, p. 865, § 1, effective June 20. L. 91: (4) amended, p. 1591, § 13, effective June 4. L. 93: (4) amended, p. 1783, § 53, effective June 6; (4) amended, p. 1033, § 15, effective July 1; (4) amended, p. 1237, § 6, effective July 1. L. 94: (4)(b) repealed, p. 692, § 1, effective April 19. L. 96: (4)(a) amended, p. 1545, § 1, effective July 1. L. 2000: (4) amended, p. 1632, § 1, effective June 1. L. 2005: (4)(a) amended, p. 17, § 2, effective July 1; (4)(a)(VII) and (4)(a)(VIII) amended, p. 1185, § 41, effective August 8. L. 2012: (4)(a)(III) and (4)(c)(II) repealed and (5) added, (HB 12-1019), ch. 135, p. 463, § 1, effective July 1. L. 2017: (4)(a)(VII) and (4)(a)(IX) amended and (4)(a)(X) added, (SB 17-240), ch. 395, p. 2055, § 27, effective July 1. L. 2018: (4)(a)(X) amended, (SB 18-030), ch. 7, p. 139, § 9, effective October 1. L. 2019: (3) amended, (SB 19-241), ch. 390, p. 3468, § 24, effective August 2. L. 2022: (2), (3), IP(4)(a), (4)(a)(IV), (4)(a)(V), (4)(a)(VI), (4)(a)(VII), and (4)(a)(X) amended and (4)(a)(XI) added, (SB 22-162), ch. 469, p. 3361, § 32, effective August 10. L. 2023: (4)(a)(X) and (4)(a)(XI) amended and (4)(a)(XII) added, (SB 23-290), ch. 249, p. 1389, § 18, effective July 1.
Editor's note: Amendments to subsection (4) by House Bills 93-1034, 93-1268, and 93-1342 were harmonized.
Cross references: For the short title (the "Debbie Haskins 'Administrative Organization Act of 1968' Modernization Act") in SB 22-162, see section 1 of chapter 469, Session Laws of Colorado 2022.
ANNOTATION
For the unconstitutionality of designation of executive director as a "confidential employee", see Colorado State Civil Serv. Employees Ass'n v. Love, 167 Colo. 436, 448 P.2d 624 (1968).
24-1-118. Department of institutions - creation. (Repealed)
Source: L. 68: p. 81, § 18. C.R.S. 1963: § 3-28-18. L. 71: pp. 104, 689, §§ 8, 2. L. 73: p. 394, § 7. L. 75: (5) added, p. 214, § 40, effective July 16. L. 77: (3)(n) repealed, p. 293, § 7, effective May 26; (3)(l) repealed, p. 1095, § 5, effective July 1; (3)(a), (3)(b), and (3)(m) repealed, p. 955, § 37, effective August 1. L. 79: (6) added, p. 1119, § 2, effective July 1. L. 83: (3)(d), (3)(e), (3)(f) amended, p. 1160, § 17, effective April 26. L. 85: (3)(g) and (3)(h) amended, p. 710, § 8, effective March 30. L. 86: (1) amended, p. 885, § 5, effective May 23. L. 87: (5) amended, p. 819, § 31, effective July 10. L. 88: (3)(j) and (3)(k) repealed, pp. 754, 1431, §§ 5, 10, effective June 11. L. 89: (5)(b) repealed and (5.5) added, p. 922, §§ 9, 7, effective July 1. L. 91: (3)(c) and (3)(i) amended, p. 1144, § 10, effective May 18. L. 93: (7) added by revision, pp. 1088, 1168, §§ 4, 151.
Editor's note: Subsection (7) provided for the repeal of this section, effective July 1, 1994. (See L. 93, pp. 1088, 1168.)
24-1-119. Department of public health and environment - creation.
(1) There is hereby created a department of public health and environment. The head of the department shall be the executive director of the department of public health and environment. The governor shall appoint said executive director, with the consent of the senate, and the executive director shall serve at the pleasure of the governor. The reappointment of an executive director after initial election of a governor shall be subject to the provisions of section 24-20-109.
(2) The state board of health, created in part 1 of article 1 of title 25, is a type 1 entity, as defined in section 24-1-105, and exercises its powers and performs its duties and functions under the department of public health and environment.
(3) The water quality control commission, created in part 2 of article 8 of title 25, is a type 1 entity, as defined in section 24-1-105, and exercises its powers and performs its duties and functions under the department of public health and environment. Anything in this article 1 to the contrary notwithstanding, the state board of health has no powers, duties, or functions with respect to water pollution control.
(4) Except for the state board of health, the state department of public health and the office of the executive director thereof, created by part 1 of article 1 of title 25, C.R.S., and their powers, duties, and functions are transferred by a type 2 transfer to the department of public health and environment.
(5) The department of public health and environment consists of the following divisions:
(a) The division of administration. The division of administration, created in part 1 of article 1 of title 25, except for the office of the executive director of the department of public health and environment, is a type 2 entity, as defined in section 24-1-105, and exercises its powers and performs its duties and functions under the department of public health and environment.
(b) (Deleted by amendment, L. 93, p. 1089, § 5, effective July 1, 1994.)
(c) The prevention services division, created in article 20.5 of title 25, which is a type 2 entity, as defined in section 24-1-105.
(6) The division of administration includes the following:
(a) The office of state chemist, created in part 4 of article 1 of title 25. The office of the state chemist is a type 2 entity, as defined in section 24-1-105, and exercises its powers and performs its duties and functions under the department of public health and environment as a section of the division of administration.
(b) The office of state registrar of vital statistics, created in article 2 of title 25. The office of state registrar of vital statistics is a type 2 entity, as defined in section 24-1-105, and exercises its powers and performs its duties and functions under the department of public health and environment.
(c) Repealed.
(d) The water and wastewater facility operators certification board, created in section 25-9-103. The water and wastewater facility operators certification board is a type 1 entity, as defined in section 24-1-105.
(6.3) and (6.5) Repealed.
(7) (a) The air quality control commission, created in part 1 of article 7 of title 25, is a type 1 entity, as defined in section 24-1-105, and exercises its powers and performs its duties and functions under the department of public health and environment. Anything in this article 1 to the contrary notwithstanding, the state board of health has no powers, duties, or functions with respect to air pollution other than as provided in section 25-7-111 (1).
(b) Repealed.
(c) The technical secretary of the air quality control commission, created in part 1 of article 7 of title 25, is a type 1 entity, as defined in section 24-1-105. The technical secretary of the air quality control commission exercises its powers and performs its duties and functions under the department of public health and environment and is allocated to the air quality control commission.
(8) The solid and hazardous waste commission, created in part 3 of article 15 of title 25, is a type 1 entity, as defined in section 24-1-105, and exercises its powers and performs its duties and functions under the department of public health and environment.
(9) and (10) Repealed.
(11) The office of health equity and the director of the office, created in section 25-4-2204, are type 2 entities, as defined in section 24-1-105, and exercise their powers and perform their duties and functions under the department of public health and environment.
(12) The primary care office and the director of the office, created in part 4 of article 1.5 of title 25, are type 2 entities, as defined in section 24-1-105, and exercise their powers and perform their duties and functions under the department of public health and environment.
(13) The clean fleet enterprise, created in section 25-7.5-103, is a type 1 entity, as defined in section 24-1-105, and exercises its powers and performs its duties and functions under the department of public health and environment.
(14) The nursing home innovations grant board, created in section 25-1-107.5 (6)(a), is a type 2 entity, as defined in section 24-1-105, and exercises its powers and performs its duties and functions under the department of public health and environment.
(15) The Colorado coroners standards and training board, created in section 30-10-601.6, is a type 2 entity, as defined in section 24-1-105.
(16) The emergency medical practice advisory council, created in section 25-3.5-206, is a type 2 entity, as defined in section 24-1-105.
(17) The air quality enterprise, created in section 25-7-103.5 (3), is a type 1 entity, as defined in section 24-1-105, and exercises its powers and performs its duties and functions under the department of public health and environment.
(18) The Colorado circular communities enterprise, created in section 25-16.5-109 (3), is a type 1 entity, as defined in section 24-1-105, and exercises its powers and performs its duties and functions under the department of public health and environment.
(19) The state emergency medical and trauma services advisory council, created in section 25-3.5-104 (1), is a type 2 entity, as defined in section 24-1-105.
Source: L. 68: p. 81, § 19. C.R.S. 1963: § 3-28-19. L. 70: pp. 237, 424, §§ 3, 4, 14. L. 71: pp. 104, 657, §§ 9, 2. L. 73: p. 751, § 2. L. 74: (6)(c) repealed, p. 277, § 6, effective July 1. L. 79: (7) amended, p. 1058, § 3, effective June 20. L. 82: (5)(b) amended, p. 603, § 4, effective May 2. L. 83: (7) amended, p. 2049, § 10, effective October 14. L. 84: (7)(b) repealed, p. 768, § 1, effective July 1. L. 86: (1) amended, p. 885, § 6, effective May 23. L. 92: (8) added, p. 1235, § 1, effective August 1. L. 93: Entire section amended, p. 1089, § 5, effective July 1, 1994. L. 2000: (5)(c) added, p. 586, § 13, effective May 18; (9) added, p. 1569, § 1, effective July 1. L. 2002: (6.5) added, p. 1574, § 2, effective June 7; (10) added, p. 427, § 2, effective July 1. L. 2004: (6.5) repealed, p. 862, § 3, effective May 21; (5)(c) amended, p. 113, § 1, effective August 4. L. 2006: (8) amended, p. 1138, § 25, effective July 1. L. 2007: (11) added, p. 904, § 1, effective May 15. L. 2009: (6.3) added, (HB 09-1111), ch. 396, p. 2141, § 4, effective June 2. L. 2013: (9) repealed, (HB 13-1117), ch. 169, p. 588, § 19, effective July 1; (6.3) repealed and (12) added, (HB 13-1074), ch. 150, p. 490, § 5, effective August 7; (10) repealed, (HB 13-1139), ch. 120, p. 407, § 1, effective August 7; (11) amended, (HB 13-1088), ch. 25, p. 64, § 9, effective August 7. L. 2021: (13) added, (SB 21-260), ch. 250, p. 1366, § 3, effective June 17; (14) added, (SB 21-128), ch. 302, p. 1818, § 3, June 23. L. 2022: (2), (3), IP(5), (5)(a), (5)(c), IP(6), (6)(a), (6)(b), (6)(d), (7)(a), (7)(c), (8), (11), (12), (13), and (14) amended and (15), (16), (17), and (18) added, (SB 22-162), ch. 469, p. 3363, § 39, effective August 10. L. 2024: (18) amended, (HB 24-1449), ch. 192, p. 1129, § 4, effective July 1. L. 2025: (5)(a) amended, (SB 25-300), ch. 428, p. 2448, § 26, effective August 6. L. 2026: (19) added, (HB 26-1069), ch. 303, p. 1734, § 1, effective June 2.
Cross references: (1) For employment of a technical secretary by the air quality control commission, see § 25-7-105 (3).
(2) For the legislative declaration in the 2013 act repealing subsection (9), see section 1 of chapter 169, Session Laws of Colorado 2013. For the legislative declaration in SB 21-260, see section 1 of chapter 250, Session Laws of Colorado 2021.
(3) For the short title (the "Debbie Haskins 'Administrative Organization Act of 1968' Modernization Act") in SB 22-162, see section 1 of chapter 469, Session Laws of Colorado 2022.
24-1-119.5. Department of health care policy and financing - creation.
(1) There is hereby created a department of health care policy and financing, the head of which shall be the executive director of the department of health care policy and financing, which office is hereby created. The governor shall appoint the executive director, with the consent of the senate, and the executive director shall serve at the pleasure of the governor. The reappointment of an executive director after initial election of a governor shall be subject to the provisions of section 24-20-109.
(2) The powers, duties, and functions of the department of health care policy and financing include the powers, duties, and functions relating to the "Colorado Medical Assistance Act", as specified in articles 4, 5, and 6 of title 25.5.
(3) and (4) Repealed.
(4.5) The powers, duties, and functions of the department of health care policy and financing include the powers, duties, and functions relating to the old age pension health and medical care program, as specified in section 25.5-2-101.
(5) The medical services board, created in part 3 of article 1 of title 25.5, is a type 1 entity, as defined in section 24-1-105, and exercises its powers and performs its duties and functions under the department of health care policy and financing.
(6) (Deleted by amendment, L. 2006, p. 2007, § 68, effective July 1, 2006.)
(7) Repealed.
(8) The powers, duties, and functions of the department of health care policy and financing include the powers, duties, and functions relating to programs, services, and supports for persons with intellectual and developmental disabilities, as specified in article 10 of title 25.5. Such powers, duties, and functions are allocated to the division of intellectual and developmental disabilities, created in section 25.5-10-203 (2), which division is part of the office of community living, created in section 25.5-10-101. The office of community living and the division of intellectual and developmental disabilities are type 2 entities, as defined in section 24-1-105.
(9) The Colorado healthcare affordability and sustainability enterprise created in section 25.5-4-402.4 (3) is a type 2 entity, as defined in section 24-1-105, and exercises its powers and performs its duties and functions under the department of health care policy and financing.
Source: L. 93: Entire section added, p. 1091, § 6, effective July 1, 1994. L. 94: (5) added, p. 1559, § 3, effective July 1. L. 95: (6) added, p. 501, § 1, effective May 16. L. 98: (7) added, p. 458, § 18, effective April 21. L. 2001: (7) repealed, p. 917, § 15, effective August 8. L. 2003: (4.5) added, p. 2583, § 2, effective July 1. L. 2006: (2), (4), (4.5), and (6) amended, p. 2007, § 68, effective July 1. L. 2007: (3) repealed, p. 2032, § 45, effective June 1. L. 2011: (4.5) amended, (SB 11-210), ch. 187, p. 721, § 5, effective July 15, 2012. L. 2013: (8) added, (HB 13-1314), ch. 323, p. 1805, § 34, effective March 1, 2014. L. 2017: (9) added, (SB 17-267), ch. 267, p. 1440, § 6, effective July 1. L. 2022: (2), (4), (4.5), (5), (8), and (9) amended, (SB 22-162), ch. 469, p. 3370, § 58, effective August 10. L. 2024: (4)(b) added by revision, (HB 24-1399), ch. 76, pp. 255, 260, §§ 14, 33.
Editor's note: (1) Section 34 of chapter 267 (SB 17-267), Session Laws of Colorado 2017, provides that the section of the act amending this section does not take effect if the centers for medicare and medicaid services determine that the amendments do not comply with federal law. For more information, see SB 17-267. (L. 2017, p. 1477.) The executive director of the department of health care policy and financing did not notify the revisor of statutes by June 1, 2017, of such determination; therefore, amendments to this section took effect July 1, 2017.
(2) Subsection (4)(b) provided for the repeal of subsection (4), effective July 1, 2025. (See L. 2024, pp. 255, 260.)
Cross references: (1) For the legislative declaration in SB 17-267, see section 1 of chapter 267, Session Laws of Colorado 2017.
(2) For the short title (the "Debbie Haskins 'Administrative Organization Act of 1968' Modernization Act") in SB 22-162, see section 1 of chapter 469, Session Laws of Colorado 2022.
24-1-120. Department of human services - creation.
(1) There is hereby created a department of human services, the head of which shall be the executive director of the department of human services, which office is hereby created. The governor shall appoint the executive director, with the consent of the senate, and the executive director shall serve at the pleasure of the governor. The reappointment of an executive director after initial election of a governor shall be subject to the provisions of section 24-20-109.
(2) Except as otherwise provided in title 26, the powers, duties, and functions of the department of human services include the powers, duties, and functions of the former department of social services and the former department of institutions, and the department of social services and the department of institutions are abolished.
(3) The powers, duties, and functions of the department of human services include the powers, duties, and functions of the former state board of social services, created in article 1 of title 26, which is renamed as the state board of human services. The state board of human services is a type 1 entity, as defined in section 24-1-105.
(4) Unless otherwise transferred to the department of early childhood, department of health care policy and financing, or the department of public health and environment, the department of human services exercises the following powers and performs the following duties and functions:
(a) The powers, duties, and functions relating to public assistance and welfare;
(b) and (c) Repealed.
(5) The department of human services includes the following:
(a) The Colorado commission on the aging, created pursuant to section 26-11-101, and the office of the director of the commission, created pursuant to section 26-11-104, which are type 2 entities, as defined in section 24-1-105, and which exercise their powers and perform their duties and functions under the department of human services.
(b) The Colorado veterans community living center at Homelake, created pursuant to section 26-12-203, which is a type 2 entity, as defined in section 24-1-105.
(c) The Colorado veterans community living centers, created in part 2 of article 12 of title 26, which are type 2 entities, as defined in section 24-1-105.
(d) Repealed.
(e) The powers, duties, and functions regarding the state information agency pursuant to the "Uniform Interstate Family Support Act", created in article 5 of title 14.
(f) The state office on aging, created in part 2 of article 11 of title 26. The state office on aging is a type 2 entity, as defined in section 24-1-105, and exercises its powers and performs its duties and functions under the department of human services.
(g) The adoption intermediary commission, created in part 3 of article 5 of title 19. The adoption intermediary commission is a type 1 entity, as defined in section 24-1-105, and exercises its powers and performs its duties and functions under the department of human services.
(g.5) The communication services for people with disabilities enterprise, created in article 21 of title 26. The enterprise is a type 1 entity, as defined in section 24-1-105, and exercises its powers and performs its duties and functions under the department.
(g.7) The division for the deaf, hard of hearing, and deafblind created in article 21 of title 26. The division is a type 2 entity, as defined in section 24-1-105, and exercises its powers and functions under the department.
(h) The Colorado commission for the deaf, hard of hearing, and deafblind advisory council, created in article 21 of title 26.
(i) and (j) Repealed.
(k) The board of commissioners of veterans community living centers, created in section 26-12-402. The board of commissioners of veterans community living centers is a type 2 entity, as defined in section 24-1-105, and exercises its powers and performs its duties and functions under the department.
(l) Repealed.
(m) The early childhood leadership commission created by part 3 of article 1 of title 26.5.
(6) The department consists of the following divisions, units, offices, and boards:
(a) and (b) Repealed.
(c) The juvenile parole board, created pursuant to section 19-2.5-1201. The juvenile parole board is a type 1 entity, as defined in section 24-1-105, and exercises its powers and performs its duties and functions under the department of human services as a division thereof.
(d) Repealed.
(e) The division of youth services, created pursuant to section 19-2.5-1501, and the office of the director of the division of youth services are type 2 entities, as defined in section 24-1-105, and exercise their powers and perform their duties and functions under the department of human services.
(f) The behavioral health administration established in article 50 of title 27. The behavioral health administration and its powers, duties, and functions are transferred by a type 2 transfer to the department of human services.
(7) The department of human services shall supervise and control the following institutions, all of which are type 2 entities, as defined in section 24-1-105:
(a) Colorado mental health institute at Pueblo;
(b) Wheat Ridge regional center;
(c) Grand Junction regional center;
(d) Pueblo regional center;
(e) Lookout Mountain school at Golden;
(f) Mount View school at Morrison;
(g) Colorado mental health institute at Fort Logan, in Denver;
(h) Adams youth services center at Brighton;
(i) Gilliam youth services center at Denver;
(j) Grand Mesa youth services center at Grand Junction;
(k) Pueblo youth services center;
(l) Zebulon Pike youth services center at Colorado Springs;
(m) Lookout Mountain youth services center at Golden;
(n) Mount View youth services center at Denver;
(o) Lathrop Park youth camp at Walsenburg.
(8) The Colorado developmental disabilities council, created in part 2 of article 10.5 of title 27, is a type 1 entity, as defined in section 24-1-105, and exercises its powers and performs its duties and functions under the department of human services.
(9) The Colorado brain injury trust fund board, created in section 26-1-302, is a type 2 entity, as defined in section 24-1-105, and exercises its powers and performs its duties and functions under the department of human services.
(10) Repealed.
(11) The Tony Grampsas youth services board, created in section 26-6.8-103, is a type 2 entity, as defined in section 24-1-105, and exercises its powers and performs its duties and functions under the department of human services.
(12) The office of the ombudsman for behavioral health access to care, created in section 27-80-303, is a type 1 entity, as defined in section 24-1-105, and exercises its powers and performs its duties and functions under the department of human services.
Source: L. 68: p. 83, § 20. L. 69: p. 1188, § 4. C.R.S. 1963: § 3-28-20. L. 71: p. 104, § 10. L. 73: pp. 1223, 1508, §§ 13, 14, 2. L. 78: (3) added, p. 265, § 61, effective May 23. L. 85: (4)(d) added, § 4, effective May 29. L. 86: (1) amended, p. 885, § 7, effective May 23. L. 89: (4)(b) amended, p. 1235, § 12, effective April 6; (5) added, p. 1549, § 2, effective July 1. L. 91: (4)(e) added, p. 890, § 15, effective June 5. L. 92: (5) repealed, p. 2136, § 2, effective July 1. L. 93: Entire section R&RE, p. 1092, § 7, effective July 1, 1994. L. 94: (4)(c) added, p. 2606, § 6, effective July 1; (6)(d) amended, p. 2555, § 49, effective January 1, 1995. L. 96: (6)(b) and (6)(c) amended and (6)(e) added, p. 1694, § 32, effective January 1, 1997. L. 2000: (5)(h) added, p. 1628, § 3, effective June 1. L. 2001: (4)(c) amended, p. 251, § 5, effective March 29; (4)(c) repealed and (5)(e) amended, pp. 1287, 1272, §§ 83, 28, effective June 5. L. 2002: (6)(d) amended, p. 666, § 13, effective May 28; (5)(c), (6)(d), and (8) amended, p. 1022, § 39, effective June 1; (6)(a) repealed, p. 357, § 11, effective July 1; (6)(d) amended, p. 1919, § 10, effective July 1; (9) added, p. 1609, § 2, effective January 1, 2003. L. 2004: (5)(i) added, p. 861, § 2, effective May 21; (9) amended, p. 1200, § 60, effective August 4. L. 2005: (5)(j) added, p. 599, § 1, effective July 1. L. 2007: (5)(k) added, p. 441, § 2, effective July 1; (5)(l) added, p. 1221, § 2, effective August 3. L. 2008: (6)(b) repealed, p. 1105, § 9, effective July 1. L. 2009: (9) amended, (SB 09-005), ch. 135, p. 591, § 10, effective April 20; (5)(b) amended, (SB 09-056), ch. 177, p. 785, § 5, effective April 22. L. 2010: IP(6) and (6)(d) amended, (SB 10-175), ch. 188, p. 794, § 50, effective April 29. L. 2011: (5)(b) amended, (HB 11-1303), ch. 264, p. 1163, § 53, effective August 10. L. 2012: (5)(b) amended, (HB 12-1063), ch. 149, p. 537, § 5, effective May 3. L. 2013: (5)(m), (10), and (11) added, (HB 13-1117), ch. 169, p. 588, § 20, effective July 1; (5)(k) amended, (HB 13-1300), ch. 316, p. 1680, § 47, effective August 7. L. 2014: (5)(b), (5)(c), and (5)(k) amended, (SB 14-096), ch. 59, p. 262, § 2, effective August 6. L. 2015: (4)(b)(II) added by revision, (SB 15-239), ch. 160, pp. 487, 490, §§ 4, 14. L. 2017: IP(6) and (6)(d) amended, (SB 17-242), ch. 263, p. 1256, § 16, effective May 25; IP(6) and (6)(e) amended, (HB 17-1329), ch. 381, p. 1980, § 50, effective June 6. L. 2018: (5)(h) amended, (HB 18-1108), ch. 303, p. 1836, § 9, effective August 8; (12) added, (HB 18-1357), ch. 252, p. 1551, § 2, effective August 8. L. 2019: (9) amended, (HB 19-1147), ch. 178, p. 2033, § 12, effective August 2. L. 2020: (5)(i) amended, (HB 20-1402), ch. 216, p. 1050, § 43, effective June 30. L. 2021: (10) amended, (HB 21-1248), ch. 335, p. 2167, § 4, effective September 7; (6)(c) and (6)(e) amended, (SB 21-059), ch. 136, p. 741, § 104, effective October 1; (5)(m) amended, (HB 21-1304), ch. 307, p. 1856, § 7, effective July 1, 2022. L. 2022: IP(4) amended and (10) repealed, (HB 22-1295), ch. 123, p. 842, § 61, effective July 1; (6)(d) amended and (6)(f) added, (HB 22-1278), ch. 222, p. 1505, § 49, effective July 1; (2), (3), IP(4), (4)(a), IP(5), (5)(a), (5)(b), (5)(c), (5)(e), (5)(f), (5)(g), (5)(h), (5)(k), IP(6), (6)(c), (6)(e), IP(7), (8), (9), (10), (11), and (12) amended and (5)(d) and (5)(i) repealed, (SB 22-162), ch. 469, p. 3372, § 63, effective August 10; (6)(d) amended, (SB 22-162), ch. 469, p. 3433, § 227, effective August 10. L. 2023: (6)(d) repealed, (HB 23-1236), ch. 206, p. 1051, § 5, effective May 16. L. 2025: (5)(g.5) and (5)(g.7) added and (5)(h) amended, (HB 25-1154), ch. 230, p. 1086, § 24, effective May 22.
Editor's note: (1) Amendments to subsection (6)(d) by Senate Bill 02-057, House Bill 02-1229, and Senate Bill 02-159 were harmonized.
(2) Subsection (5)(j)(II) provided for the repeal of subsection (5)(j), effective July 1, 2007. (See L. 2005, p. 599.)
(3) Subsection (5)(l)(II) provided for the repeal of subsection (5)(l), effective July 1, 2012. (See L. 2007, p. 1221.)
(4) Subsection (4)(b)(II) provided for the repeal of subsection (4)(b), effective July 1, 2016. (See L. 2015, p. 487.)
(5) Amendments to subsection IP(6) by SB 17-242 and HB 17-1329 were harmonized.
(6) Amendments to subsection IP(4) by SB 22-162 and HB 22-1295 were harmonized.
(7) Subsection (10) was amended in SB 22-162. Those amendments were superseded by the repeal of subsection (10) in HB 22-1295.
Cross references: (1) For the designation of the state department of human services as the state information agency for enforcement of support, see §§ 14-5-310 and 26-13-109; for the Colorado board of veterans affairs, see article 5 of title 28; for the Colorado commission on the aging, see article 11 of title 26; for the Colorado state veterans center, see part 2 of article 12 of title 26.
(2) For the legislative declaration contained in the 2002 act repealing subsection (6)(a), see section 1 of chapter 121, Session Laws of Colorado 2002. For the legislative declaration in the 2013 act adding subsections (5)(m), (10), and (11), see section 1 of chapter 169, Session Laws of Colorado 2013. For the legislative declaration in SB 15-239, see section 1 of chapter 160, Session Laws of Colorado 2015. For the legislative declaration in SB 17-242, see section 1 of chapter 263, Session Laws of Colorado 2017.
(3) For the short title (the "Debbie Haskins 'Administrative Organization Act of 1968' Modernization Act") in SB 22-162, see section 1 of chapter 469, Session Laws of Colorado 2022.
ANNOTATION
The executive director is a proper party defendant in a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action where the administration of rules and regulations is contested. Oten v. Bd. of Soc. Servs., 738 P.2d 37 (Colo. App. 1987).
The department of social services (now human services) is properly characterized as a public assistance and welfare organization and not as a public law enforcement agency. People v. Zurenko, 833 P.2d 794 (Colo. App. 1991).
Applied in Dodge v. Dept. of Soc. Servs., 657 P.2d 969 (Colo. App. 1982).
24-1-120.5. Department of early childhood - creation.
(1) There is created the department of early childhood, the head of which is the executive director of the department of early childhood, which office is created. The governor shall appoint the executive director, with the consent of the senate, and the executive director serves at the pleasure of the governor. The reappointment of an executive director after an initial election of a governor is subject to the provisions of section 24-20-109.
(2) The early childhood leadership commission created in part 3 of article 1 of title 26.5 is transferred to the department of early childhood. The early childhood leadership commission is a type 2 entity, as defined in section 24-1-105, and exercises its powers and performs its duties and functions under the department of early childhood.
(3) The Colorado child abuse prevention board, created in section 26.5-3-204, is a type 2 entity, as defined in section 24-1-105, and exercises its powers and performs its duties and functions under the department of early childhood.
(4) The Colorado child care assistance program, as described in part 1 of article 4 of title 26.5, is a type 2 entity, as defined in section 24-1-105, and exercises its powers and performs its duties and functions under the department of early childhood.
Source: L. 2021: Entire section added, (HB 21-1304), ch. 307, p. 1846, § 3, effective July 1, 2022. L. 2022: Entire section amended, (HB 22-1295), ch. 123, p. 842, § 62, effective July 1; (2) amended, (SB 22-162), ch. 469, p. 3379, § 80, effective August 10. L. 2023: (3) and (4) amended, (HB 23-1301), ch. 303, p. 1824, § 31, effective August 7.
Editor's note: Amendments to subsection (2) by SB 22-162 and HB 22-1295 were harmonized.
Cross references: For the short title (the "Debbie Haskins 'Administrative Organization Act of 1968' Modernization Act") in SB 22-162, see section 1 of chapter 469, Session Laws of Colorado 2022.
24-1-121. Department of labor and employment - creation.
(1) There is hereby created the department of labor and employment, the head of which shall be the executive director of the department of labor and employment, which office is hereby created. The governor shall appoint said executive director, with the consent of the senate, and the executive director shall serve at the pleasure of the governor. The reappointment of an executive director after initial election of a governor shall be subject to the provisions of section 24-20-109. The executive director shall have the powers, duties, and functions prescribed for heads of principal departments in the "Administrative Organization Act of 1968", article 1 of this title.
(1.5) The department of labor and employment includes, as part of the office of the executive director, the industrial claim appeals office, created in section 8-1-102. The industrial claim appeals office is a type 2 entity, as defined in section 24-1-105, and exercises its powers and performs its duties and functions under the department.
(2) The industrial commission of Colorado, created by article 1 of title 8, C.R.S., and its powers, duties, and functions, except those powers, duties, and functions transferred to the state board of pharmacy and the industrial claim appeals office, are transferred by a type 3 transfer to the department of labor and employment, and the industrial commission of Colorado is abolished.
(3) The department of labor and employment consists of the following divisions and programs:
(a) (I) The division of labor standards and statistics, the head of which is the director of the division of labor standards and statistics, created in section 8-1-103. The division and the division's director are type 2 entities, as defined in section 24-1-105, and exercise their powers and perform their duties and functions specified by law under the department of labor and employment.
(II) (Deleted by amendment, L. 91, p. 1338, § 55, effective July 1, 1991.)
(b) The division of employment and training, the head of which is the director of the division of employment and training, created in section 8-83-102. The division and the division's director are type 2 entities, as defined in section 24-1-105, and exercise their powers and perform their duties and functions under the department of labor and employment.
(c) Repealed.
(d) (I) The division of workers' compensation, the head of which is the director of the division of workers' compensation, created in section 8-47-101. The division and the division's director are type 2 entities, as defined in section 24-1-105, and exercise their powers and perform their duties and functions under the department of labor and employment.
(II) Repealed.
(e) The division of oil and public safety, the head of which is the director of the division of oil and public safety, which division and office are created pursuant to section 8-20-101. The division and the division's director are type 2 entities, as defined in section 24-1-105, and exercise their powers and perform their duties and functions specified by law under the department of labor and employment.
(f) The state work force development council, created in article 46.3 of this title 24. The council is a type 2 entity, as defined in section 24-1-105, and exercises its powers and performs its duties and functions under the department of labor and employment.
(g) The division of unemployment insurance, the head of which is the director of the division of unemployment insurance, created in article 71 of title 8. The division and the division's director are type 2 entities, as defined in section 24-1-105, and exercise their powers and perform their duties and functions under the department of labor and employment.
(h) The powers, duties, and functions relating to vocational rehabilitation programs, including the business enterprise program, as described in article 84 of title 8.
(i) The powers, duties, and functions relating to the oversight of independent living services pursuant to article 85 of title 8.
(j) The underground damage prevention safety commission, created in section 9-1.5-104.2. The commission is a type 2 entity, as defined in section 24-1-105, and exercises its powers and performs its duties and functions under the department of labor and employment.
(k) The office of new Americans, or "ONA", created in article 3.7 of title 8, the head of which is the director of the ONA. The ONA and the director are type 1 entities, as defined in section 24-1-105, and exercise their powers and perform their duties and functions under the department of labor and employment.
(l) The state apprenticeship agency created in section 8-15.7-102. The state apprenticeship agency is a type 1 entity, as defined in section 24-1-105, and exercises its powers and performs the duties and functions specified by article 15.7 of title 8 under the department of labor and employment and the executive director of the department.
(m) The office of future of work, the head of which is the director of the office of future of work, created in section 8-15.8-103. The office of future of work and the office's director are type 2 entities, as defined in section 24-1-105, and exercise their powers and perform their duties and functions specified by law under the department of labor and employment.
(n) The Colorado disability opportunity office, or "CDOO", created in section 8-88-102, the head of which is the director of the CDOO. The CDOO is a type 1 entity, as defined in section 24-1-105, and exercises its powers and performs its duties and functions under the department of labor and employment.
(4) The division of oil and public safety includes the following:
(a) Repealed.
(b) The division of boiler inspection, created in article 4 of title 9. The division of boiler inspection is a type 2 entity, as defined in section 24-1-105. The division exercises its powers and performs its duties and functions under the department of labor and employment and is allocated to the division of oil and public safety as a section thereof.
(c) (Deleted by amendment, L. 2001, p. 1113, § 2, effective June 5, 2001.)
(d) and (e) Repealed.
(5) The petroleum storage tank committee is a type 1 entity, as defined in section 24-1-105, and exercises its powers and performs the duties and functions specified by article 20.5 of title 8 under the department of labor and employment and the executive director thereof.
(6) The special funds board, created in section 8-44-206, is a type 2 entity, as defined in section 24-1-105.
(7) The workers' compensation cost containment board, created in the division of workers' compensation in section 8-14.5-104, is a type 2 entity, as defined in section 24-1-105.
Source: L. 68: p. 84, § 21. L. 69: p. 567, § 1. C.R.S. 1963: § 3-28-21. L. 71: p. 104, § 11. L. 73: p. 935, § 25. L. 75: (4)(d) repealed, p. 443, § 6, effective April 15; (4)(e) added, p. 214, § 41, effective July 16. L. 76: (3)(b) amended, p. 352, § 21, effective October 1. L. 77: (3)(b) amended, p. 281, § 30, effective July 1. L. 80: (4)(e) repealed, p. 451, § 6, effective April 13. L. 83: (3)(a) and (3)(b) amended, p. 404, § 3, effective May 25. L. 86: (3)(c) repealed, p. 540, § 54, effective May 3; (1) amended, p. 885, § 8, effective May 23; (1.5) added and (2) R&RE, p. 463, §1, effective July 1. L. 87: (4)(a) repealed, p. 378, § 4, effective May 20. L. 89: (3)(a) amended, p. 379, § 3, effective July 1. L. 90: (3)(a)(II)(A) amended, p. 567, § 44, effective July 1. L. 91: (3) amended, p. 1338, § 55, effective July 1. L. 94: (1) amended, p. 564, § 7, effective April 6. L. 95: (5) added, p. 419, § 7, effective July 1. L. 2001: (3)(e) added and IP(4), (4)(b), and (4)(c) amended, p. 1113, §§ 1, 2, effective June 5. L. 2008: (3)(f) added, p. 1290, § 3, effective July 1. L. 2012: IP(3) and (3)(b) amended and (3)(g) added, (HB 12-1120), ch. 27, p. 77, § 1, effective June 1. L. 2015: IP(3) amended and (3)(h) added, (SB 15-239), ch. 160, p. 487, § 5, effective July 1, 2016. L. 2016: (3)(i) added, (SB 16-093), ch. 54, p. 132, § 2, effective March 23; (3)(a)(I) amended, (HB 16-1323), ch. 131, p. 380, § 16, effective August 10. L. 2018: (3)(j) added, (SB 18-167), ch. 256, p. 1577, § 10, effective August 8. L. 2021: (3)(l) added, (HB 21-1007), ch. 309, p. 1890, § 2, effective July 1; (3)(k) added, (HB 21-1150), ch. 350, p. 2277, § 2, effective September 7. L. 2022: (1.5), (3)(a)(I), (3)(b), (3)(d)(I), (3)(e), (3)(f), (3)(g), (3)(h), (3)(i), (3)(j), (3)(k), (3)(l), IP(4), (4)(b), and (5) amended and (6) and (7) added, (SB 22-162), ch. 469, p. 3380, § 82, effective August 10. L. 2023: (3)(m) added, (SB 23-051), ch. 37, p. 145, § 20, effective March 23. L. 2024: (3)(n) added, (HB 24-1360), ch. 324, p. 2166, § 5, effective July 1.
Editor's note: (1) Subsection (3)(d)(II)(B) provided for the repeal of subsection (3)(d)(II), effective July 1, 1992. (See L. 91, p. 1338.)
(2) Subsection (3)(c) was repealed, effective July 1, 1987, prior to subsection (3) being amended in 1991.
(3) The effective date for amendments to this section by House Bill 12-1120 (chapter 27, Session Laws of Colorado 2012) was changed from August 8, 2012, to June 1, 2012, by House Bill 12S-1002 (First Extraordinary Session, chapter 2, p. 2432, Session Laws of Colorado 2012.)
Cross references: (1) For the legislative declaration in SB 15-239, see section 1 of chapter 160, Session Laws of Colorado 2015. For the legislative declaration in HB 24-1360, see section 1 of chapter 324, Session Laws of Colorado 2024.
(2) For the short title (the "Debbie Haskins 'Administrative Organization Act of 1968' Modernization Act") in SB 22-162, see section 1 of chapter 469, Session Laws of Colorado 2022.
24-1-122. Department of regulatory agencies - creation.
(1) There is hereby created a department of regulatory agencies, the head of which shall be the executive director of the department of regulatory agencies, which office is hereby created. The executive director shall be appointed by the governor, with the consent of the senate, and shall serve at the pleasure of the governor. The reappointment of an executive director after initial election of a governor shall be subject to the provisions of section 24-20-109.
(1.1) Repealed.
(2) The department of regulatory agencies consists of the following divisions:
(a) The public utilities commission, created in article 2 of title 40. The public utilities commission is a type 1 entity, as defined in section 24-1-105, and exercises its powers and performs its duties and functions under the department of regulatory agencies as a division thereof. The director of the commission serves as the division director.
(a.5) The office of the utility consumer advocate and the utility consumers' board, created in article 6.5 of title 40. The office of the utility consumer advocate is a type 1 entity, as defined in section 24-1-105, and exercises its powers and performs its duties and functions under the department of regulatory agencies as a division of the department. The utility consumers' board is a type 2 entity, as defined in section 24-1-105. The utility consumers' board exercises its powers and performs its duties and functions under the department and is allocated to the office of the utility consumer advocate.
(b) (I) The division of insurance, created in section 10-1-103, the head of which is the commissioner of insurance. The division of insurance is a type 1 entity, as defined in section 24-1-105, and exercises its powers and performs its duties and functions under the department of regulatory agencies.
(II) The workers' compensation classification appeals board, created in section 8-55-101 (1). The workers' compensation classification appeals board is a type 1 entity, as defined in section 24-1-105, and exercises its powers and performs its duties and functions under the division of insurance.
(c) The division of financial services, the head of which is the state commissioner of financial services. The financial services board, created in section 11-44-101.6, is a type 1 entity, as defined in section 24-1-105. The financial services board exercises its powers and performs its duties and functions under the department of regulatory agencies and is allocated to the division of financial services. The office of state commissioner of financial services and the division of financial services, created in article 44 of title 11, are type 2 entities, as defined in section 24-1-105, and exercise their powers and perform their duties and functions under the department of regulatory agencies.
(d) The division of banking, the head of which is the state bank commissioner. The banking board, created in article 102 of title 11 is a type 1 entity, as defined in section 24-1-105. The banking board exercises its powers and performs its duties and functions under the department of regulatory agencies and is allocated to the division of banking.
(e) The division of securities, the head of which is the commissioner of securities. The securities board, created in section 11-51-702.5, is a type 1 entity, as defined in section 24-1-105. The securities board exercises its powers and performs its duties and functions under the department of regulatory agencies and is allocated to the division of securities. The division of securities, and the office of commissioner of securities, created in article 51 of title 11, are type 1 entities, as defined in section 24-1-105, and exercise their powers and perform their duties and functions under the department of regulatory agencies.
(f) Repealed.
(g) The division of professions and occupations, the head of which is the director of professions and occupations, which office is hereby created. The division of professions and occupations is a type 2 entity, as defined in section 24-1-105.
(h) The Colorado civil rights division, the head of which is the director of the Colorado civil rights division, and the Colorado civil rights commission. The Colorado civil rights commission, the Colorado civil rights division, and the office of director of the Colorado civil rights division, created in part 3 of article 34 of this title 24, are type 1 entities, as defined in section 24-1-105, and exercise their powers and perform their duties and functions under the department of regulatory agencies.
(i) and (j) Repealed.
(k) (I) The division of real estate, the head of which is the director of the division, and the real estate commission. The division of real estate and the director of the division, created in part 2 of article 10 of title 12, are type 2 entities, as defined in section 24-1-105, and exercise their powers and perform their duties and functions under the department of regulatory agencies. The real estate commission, created in part 2 of article 10 of title 12, is a type 1 entity, as defined in section 24-1-105, and exercises its powers and performs its duties and functions under the department of regulatory agencies.
(II) The division of real estate includes the board of real estate appraisers, created in part 6 of article 10 of title 12. The board of real estate appraisers is a type 1 entity, as defined in section 24-1-105, and exercises its powers and performs its duties and functions under the department of regulatory agencies. The division of real estate also includes the board of mortgage loan originators, created in section 12-10-703. The board of mortgage loan originators is a type 1 entity, as defined in section 24-1-105, and exercises its powers and performs its duties and functions under the department of regulatory agencies.
(l) The division of conservation, the head of which is the director of the division, and the conservation easement oversight commission. The division of conservation and the director of the division, created in article 15 of title 12, are type 2 entities, as defined in section 24-1-105, and exercise their powers and perform their duties and functions under the department of regulatory agencies. The conservation easement oversight commission, created in section 12-15-103, is a type 2 entity, as defined in section 24-1-105. The conservation easement oversight commission exercises its powers and performs its duties and functions under the department of regulatory agencies and is allocated to the division of conservation.
(3) The following boards and agencies in the department of regulatory agencies are allocated to the division of professions and occupations and are type 1 entities, as defined in section 24-1-105:
(a) Repealed.
(b) State board of accountancy, created by article 100 of title 12;
(c) (Deleted by amendment, L. 2006, p. 742, § 10, effective July 1, 2006.)
(d) to (g) Repealed.
(h) Colorado state board of chiropractic examiners, created by article 215 of title 12;
(i) and (j) Repealed.
(k) Colorado dental board, created in article 220 of title 12;
(l) Repealed.
(m) (I) Colorado medical board, created by article 240 of title 12;
(II) Colorado podiatry board, created by article 290 of title 12;
(n) and (o) Repealed.
(p) State board of optometry, created by article 275 of title 12;
(q) Passenger tramway safety board, created by article 150 of title 12;
(r) State board of pharmacy, created by part 1 of article 280 of title 12;
(s) and (t) Repealed.
(u) State board of licensure for architects, professional engineers, and professional land surveyors, created by section 12-120-103;
(v) Colorado state board of psychologist examiners, created by part 3 of article 245 of title 12;
(w) and (x) Repealed.
(y) State board of veterinary medicine, created by article 315 of title 12;
(z) Board of examiners of nursing home administrators, created by article 265 of title 12;
(aa) State plumbing board, created by article 155 of title 12;
(bb) to (ee) Repealed.
(ff) State electrical board, created by article 115 of title 12;
(gg) State board of nursing, created by article 255 of title 12;
(hh) Repealed.
(ii) State board of social work examiners, created by part 4 of article 245 of title 12;
(jj) State board of marriage and family therapist examiners, created by part 5 of article 245 of title 12;
(kk) State board of licensed professional counselor examiners, created by part 6 of article 245 of title 12;
(ll) State board of unlicensed psychotherapists, created by part 7 of article 245 of title 12;
(mm) State board of addiction counselor examiners, created by part 8 of article 245 of title 12;
(nn) The state physical therapy board, created in part 1 of article 285 of title 12.
(4) The following boards and agencies in the department of regulatory agencies are allocated to the division of professions and occupations and are type 2 entities, as defined in section 24-1-105:
(a) to (e) Repealed.
(f) The office of combative sports, created in section 12-110-105, and the Colorado combative sports commission, created in section 12-110-106.
(5) Repealed.
(6) (a) The Colorado prescription drug affordability review board created in section 10-16-1402 is a type 1 entity, as defined in section 24-1-105. The Colorado prescription drug affordability review board exercises its powers and performs its duties and functions under the department of regulatory agencies and is allocated to the division of insurance.
(b) The Colorado prescription drug affordability advisory council created in section 10-16-1409 is a type 2 entity, as defined in section 24-1-105. The Colorado prescription drug affordability advisory council exercises its powers and performs its duties and functions under the department of regulatory agencies and is allocated to the division of insurance.
Source: L. 68: p. 85, § 22. L. 69: p. 838, § 3. C.R.S. 1963: § 3-28-22. L. 70: p. 424, § 13. L. 71: p. 105, § 12. L. 72: p. 143, § 2. L. 73: pp. 935, 1038, 1065, §§ 26, 2, 2. L. 74: (3)(ff) added, p. 276, § 1, effective July 1. L. 75: IP(3) amended and (3)(dd) added, p. 443, §§ 4, 5, effective April 15; IP(3) amended, (3)(dd) repealed, and (4) added, pp. 542, 543, §§ 2, 3, effective July 1; (3)(ee) added, p. 553, § 2, effective July 1; (4) added, p. 487, § 2, effective July 1. L. 76: (3)(g) repealed, p. 400, § 11, effective April 3; (3)(ee) repealed and (4)(d) added, p. 305, §§ 40, 41, effective May 20; (3)(f) repealed, p. 416, § 13, effective July 1; (3)(l) repealed, p. 429, § 1, effective July 1, 1977. L. 77: (2)(j) added, p. 718, § 3, effective July 1; (3)(d) repealed, p. 626, § 1, effective July 1; (3)(e) R&RE and (3)(j) repealed, p. 623, §§ 2, 4, effective July 1; (3)(i) repealed, p. 633, § 8, effective July 1. L. 78: (2)(b) amended, p. 284, § 2, effective July 1; (2)(i) amended and (3)(x) repealed, pp. 265, 266, §§ 62, 63, effective May 23; (3)(bb) amended, p. 315, § 3, effective July 1; (3)(cc) repealed, p. 266, § 64, effective July 1; (3)(ff) added and (4)(a) repealed, pp. 325, 326, §§ 15, 17, effective July 1. L. 79: (2)(h) amended, p. 922, § 1, effective July 1; (2)(k) added, p. 567, § 1, effective July 1; (2)(k) added and (3)(w) repealed, §§ 7, 9, pp. 571, 572, effective July 1; (2)(j) repealed, p. 553, § 1, effective March 1, 1980. L. 80: (5) added, p. 592, § 2, effective May 1; (3)(m) amended, p. 795, § 51, effective June 5; (3)(o) and (3)(t) repealed, p. 495, § 5, effective July 1; (3)(gg) added, p. 495, § 3, effective July 1. L. 81: (1.1) added, p. 1192, § 2, effective July 1; (3)(hh) added and (4)(c) repealed, p. 825, §§ 25, 27, effective July 1. L. 82: (2)(i) repealed, p. 624, § 23, effective April 2. L. 83: (3)(n) repealed, p. 575, § 10, effective April 22; (3)(a) repealed, p. 513, § 4, effective May 16; (4)(e) added, p. 580, § 2, effective July 1; (3)(bb) repealed, p. 2049, § 11, effective October 14. L. 85: (2)(b) amended, p. 382, § 4, effective April 17; (2)(f) amended, p. 553, § 6, effective July 1. L. 86: (4)(d) repealed, p. 447, § 6, effective April 17. L. 88: (2)(d) amended, p. 417, § 7, effective April 11; (3)(v) amended, (3)(ii), (3)(jj), (3)(kk), and (3)(ll) added, and (4)(b) repealed, pp. 567, 569, §§ 2, 9, effective July 1; (4)(e) repealed, p. 582, § 3, effective July 1. L. 89: (2)(a) amended, p. 1524, § 1, effective April 12; (2)(c) and (3)(hh) amended, pp. 621, 728, §§ 16, 32, effective July 1. L. 90: (2)(k) amended, p. 846, § 3, effective July 1. L. 93: (2)(c) amended , p. 1455, § 19, effective June 6; (2)(f) repealed, p. 1784, § 54, effective June 6; (2)(a.5) added, p. 974, § 2, effective July 1; (2)(f) repealed, p. 1033, § 16, effective July 1; (2)(f) repealed, p. 1237, § 7, effective July 1. L. 94: (3)(hh) repealed, p. 705, § 8, effective April 19; (2)(e) amended, p. 1848, § 16, effective July 1. L. 96: (2)(b) amended, p. 1144, § 3, effective October 1. L. 97: (1.1) repealed, p. 523, § 2, effective July 1. L. 2000: (3)(e) repealed, p. 2025, § 31, effective July 1. L. 2003: (2)(a) amended, p. 1704, § 16, effective May 14; (2)(d) amended, p. 1210, § 20, effective July 1. L. 2004: (3)(u) amended, p. 1310, § 54, effective May 28. L. 2006: (3)(c) and (3)(u) amended, p. 742, § 10, effective July 1. L. 2010: (3)(m)(I) amended, (HB 10-1260), ch. 403, p. 1988, § 81, effective July 1; (2)(k) amended, (HB 10-1141), ch. 280, p. 1299, § 29, effective August 11. L. 2011: (3)(p) amended, (SB 11-094), ch. 129, p. 452, § 32, effective April 22; (3)(ll) amended and (3)(mm) added, (SB 11-187), ch. 285, p. 1328, § 72, effective July 1. L. 2012: (3)(r) amended, (HB 12-1311), ch. 281, p. 1627, § 68, effective July 1. L. 2014: (3)(k) amended, (HB 14-1227), ch. 363, p. 1738, § 46, effective July 1. L. 2016: IP(3) amended, (SB 16-189), ch. 210, p. 765, § 45, effective June 6. L. 2018: (2)(l) added, (HB 18-1291), ch. 273, p. 1693, § 8, effective May 29. L. 2019: (2)(k), (2)(l), (3)(b), (3)(h), (3)(k), (3)(m), (3)(p), (3)(q), (3)(r), (3)(u), (3)(v), (3)(y), (3)(z), (3)(aa), (3)(ff), (3)(gg), and (3)(ii) to (3)(mm) amended, (HB 19-1172), ch. 136, p. 1685, § 124, effective October 1. L. 2020: (3)(ll) amended, (HB 20-1206), ch. 304, p. 1551, § 66, effective July 14. L. 2021: (6) added, (SB 21-175), ch. 240, p. 1276, § 3, effective June 16; IP(2) and (2)(a.5) amended, (SB 21-103), ch. 477, p. 3413, § 10, effective September 1. L. 2022: (2)(a), (2)(a.5), (2)(b), (2)(c), (2)(d), (2)(e), (2)(g), (2)(h), (2)(k), (2)(l), IP(3), IP(4), and (6) amended and (3)(nn) and (4)(f) added, (SB 22-162), ch. 469, p. 3386, § 99, effective August 10.
Editor's note: (1) Section 4 of chapter 131, Session Laws of Colorado 1975, provides that the act enacting subsection (4) is effective July 1, 1975, but the governor did not approve the act until July 16, 1975.
(2) Section 5 of chapter 142, Session Laws of Colorado 1975, provides that the act amending the introductory portion to subsection (3), repealing subsection (3)(dd), and enacting subsection (4) is effective July 1, 1975, but the governor did not approve the act until July 25, 1975.
(3) Amendments to subsection (2)(k) by Senate Bill 79-242 and House Bill 79-1231 were harmonized.
(4) Subsection (5)(b) provided for the repeal of subsection (5), effective July 1, 1981. (See L. 80, p. 592.)
Cross references: (1) For the creation of the office of commissioner of insurance, see § 10-1-104.
(2) For the legislative declaration in SB 21-175, see section 1 of chapter 240, Session Laws of Colorado 2021.
(3) For the short title (the "Debbie Haskins 'Administrative Organization Act of 1968' Modernization Act") in SB 22-162, see section 1 of chapter 469, Session Laws of Colorado 2022.
24-1-123. Department of agriculture - creation.
(1) There is hereby created a department of agriculture, the head of which shall be the commissioner of agriculture.
(2) The state agricultural commission, created in article 1 of title 35, is a type 1 entity, as defined in section 24-1-105, and exercises its powers and performs its duties and functions under the department of agriculture.
(3) The state department of agriculture and the office of commissioner of agriculture, created in article 1 of title 35, are type 2 entities, as defined in section 24-1-105.
(4) The department of agriculture consists of the following divisions:
(a) The division of markets, the head of which is the director of the division of markets. The division of markets and the office of the director thereof, created in article 1 of title 35, are type 2 entities, as defined in section 24-1-105, and exercise their powers and perform their duties and functions under the department of agriculture.
(b) The division of plant industry, the head of which is the director of the division of plant industry. The division of plant industry and the office of the director thereof, created in article 1 of title 35, are type 2 entities, as defined in section 24-1-105, and exercise their powers and perform their duties and functions under the department of agriculture.
(c) (I) The division of animal health, the head of which is the director of the division of animal health. The division of animal health and the office of the director thereof, created in article 1 of title 35, are type 2 entities, as defined in section 24-1-105, and exercise their powers and perform their duties and functions under the department of agriculture.
(II) The state bureau of animal protection, created in article 42 of title 35. The state bureau of animal protection is a type 2 entity, as defined in section 24-1-105. The state bureau of animal protection exercises its powers and performs its duties and functions under the department of agriculture and is allocated to the division of animal welfare as a section of the department.
(d) The administrative services division, the head of which is the director of the administrative services division. The division of administrative services and the office of the director thereof, created in article 1 of title 35, are type 2 entities, as defined in section 24-1-105, and exercise their powers and perform their duties and functions under the department of agriculture.
(e) The division of inspection and consumer services, the head of which is the director of the division of inspection and consumer services. The division of inspection and consumer services and the office of the director thereof, created in article 1 of title 35, are type 2 entities, as defined in section 24-1-105, and exercise their powers and perform their duties and functions under the department of agriculture.
(f) Repealed.
(g) (I) The division of brand inspection, the head of which is the brand commissioner. The state board of stock inspection commissioners and the office of brand commissioner, created in article 41 of title 35, are type 1 entities, as defined in section 24-1-105, and exercise their powers and perform their duties and functions under the department of agriculture as a part of the division of brand inspection.
(II) and (III) Repealed.
(g.5) The division of animal welfare, the head of which is the director of the division of animal welfare. The division of animal welfare and the office of the director of the division of animal welfare, created in article 1 of title 35, are type 2 entities, as defined in section 24-1-105, and exercise their powers and perform their duties and functions under the department of agriculture.
(h) (I) The Colorado state fair authority, the head of which is the manager of the Colorado state fair and industrial exposition. The Colorado state fair authority and the office of the manager of the Colorado state fair and industrial exposition, created in part 4 of article 65 of title 35, are type 1 entities, as defined in section 24-1-105, and exercise their powers and perform their duties and functions as a division of the department of agriculture.
(II) The Colorado state fair authority includes the board of commissioners of the Colorado state fair authority, created in part 4 of article 65 of title 35. The board of commissioners of the Colorado state fair authority is a type 1 entity, as defined in section 24-1-105, and exercises its powers and performs its duties and functions as specified by law under the department of agriculture as a part of the Colorado state fair authority.
(i) The state conservation board, created in article 70 of title 35. The state conservation board is a type 1 entity, as defined in section 24-1-105, and exercises its powers and performs its duties and functions under the department of agriculture as a division thereof. The employees of the state conservation board appointed pursuant to section 35-70-103 are transferred to the department of agriculture.
(5) The Colorado wine industry development board, created in article 29.5 of title 35, is a type 1 entity, as defined in section 24-1-105, and exercises its powers and performs its duties and functions under the department of agriculture.
(6) The aquaculture board, created in article 24.5 of title 35, is a type 2 entity, as defined in section 24-1-105, and exercises its powers and performs its duties and functions as specified by law under the department of agriculture and the commissioner thereof.
(7) The Colorado agricultural value-added development board, created in section 35-75-203, is a type 1 entity, as defined in section 24-1-105, and exercises its powers and performs its duties and functions as specified by law under the department.
Source: L. 68: p. 87, § 23. L. 69: pp. 121, 122, §§ 1, 5. C.R.S. 1963: § 3-28-23. L. 71: p. 162, § 7. L. 75: (4)(g)(III) amended, p. 1362, § 2, effective November 1. L. 83: (4)(f) repealed, p. 1374, § 19, effective June 2. L. 90: (5) added, p. 1604, § 6, effective July 1. L. 91: (6) added, p. 200, § 6, effective June 7. L. 93: (4)(g)(II) and (4)(g)(III) repealed, pp. 1855, 1846, §§ 3, 2, effective July 1. L. 97: (4)(h) added, p. 819, § 14, effective June 30. L. 2000: (4)(i) added, p. 558, § 7, effective July 1. L. 2001: (7) added, p. 623, § 1, effective May 30. L. 2002: (4)(i) amended, p. 513, § 2, effective July 1. L. 2022: (2), (3), IP(4), (4)(a), (4)(b), (4)(c), (4)(d), (4)(e), (4)(g)(I), (4)(h), (4)(i), (5), (6), and (7) amended, (SB 22-162), ch. 469, p. 3399, § 144, effective August 10. L. 2024: (4)(c)(II) amended and (4)(g.5) added, (HB 24-1458), ch. 288, p. 1928, § 1, effective August 7.
Cross references: For the short title (the "Debbie Haskins 'Administrative Organization Act of 1968' Modernization Act") in SB 22-162, see section 1 of chapter 469, Session Laws of Colorado 2022.
ANNOTATION
The brand inspection division is considered to be an arm of the state for eleventh amendment immunity purposes, because it is part of the department of agriculture and is thus subject to control by state officials. Colby v. Herrick, 849 F.3d 1273 (10th Cir. 2017).
24-1-124. Department of natural resources - creation - divisions.
(1) There is hereby created a department of natural resources, the head of which shall be the executive director of the department of natural resources, who shall be the commissioner of mines. The executive director shall be appointed by the governor pursuant to law.
(2) The office of the executive director, created in article 33 of this title 24, is a type 2 entity, as defined in section 24-1-105, and exercises its powers and performs its duties and functions under the department of natural resources.
(2.1) The department of natural resources includes, as a part of the office of the executive director:
(a) The office of commissioner of mines, created in section 1 of article XVI of the state constitution. The office of commissioner of mines is a type 2 entity, as defined in section 24-1-105, and exercises its powers and performs its duties and functions under the department of natural resources.
(b) Repealed.
(c) The Colorado avalanche information center, created pursuant to section 24-33-116. The Colorado avalanche information center is a type 2 entity, as defined in section 24-1-105, and exercises its powers and performs its duties and functions under the department of natural resources.
(3) The department of natural resources consists of the following divisions:
(a) The division of water resources, the head of which is the state engineer, as described in subsection (4) of this section;
(b) The Colorado water conservation board and the office of director thereof, created in article 60 of title 37. The Colorado water conservation board and the office of the director are type 1 entities, as defined in section 24-1-105, and exercise their powers and perform their duties and functions under the department of natural resources as a division thereof.
(c) (Deleted by amendment, L. 2000, p. 556, § 3, effective July 1, 2000.)
(d) The state board of land commissioners, created in section 9 of article IX of the state constitution. The state board of land commissioners is a type 1 entity, as defined in section 24-1-105, and exercises its powers and performs its duties and functions under the department of natural resources as a division thereof, subject to the state constitution.
(e) The division of reclamation, mining, and safety, created in section 34-20-103, the head of which is the director of the division of reclamation, mining, and safety, under the supervision of the executive director of the department of natural resources. The division and director are type 2 entities, as defined in section 24-1-105, and exercise their powers and perform their duties and functions as prescribed by law under the department of natural resources and the executive director thereof. The division of reclamation, mining, and safety includes the following:
(I) The coal mine board of examiners, created in article 22 of title 34. The coal mine board of examiners is a type 2 entity, as defined in section 24-1-105, and exercises its powers and performs its duties and functions under the department of natural resources as a section of the division of reclamation, mining, and safety.
(II) The mined land reclamation board and the office of mined land reclamation, created in article 32 of title 34. The mined land reclamation board is a type 1 entity, as defined in section 24-1-105, and exercises its powers and performs its duties and functions under the department of natural resources and is allocated to the division of reclamation, mining, and safety. The office of mined land reclamation is a type 2 entity, as defined in section 24-1-105, and exercises its powers and performs its duties and functions under the department of natural resources and is allocated to the division of reclamation, mining, and safety as a section thereof.
(III) The office of active and inactive mines, created in article 21 of title 34. The office of active and inactive mines is a type 2 entity, as defined in section 24-1-105, and exercises its powers and performs its duties and functions as prescribed by law under the department of natural resources and is allocated to the division of reclamation, mining, and safety as a section thereof.
(IV) (Deleted by amendment, L. 2005, p. 1462, § 1, effective July 1, 2005.)
(V) Repealed.
(f) The energy and carbon management commission created in section 34-60-104.3 (1) and the office of the director of the commission, created in article 60 of title 34. The commission and the office of the director are type 1 entities, as defined in section 24-1-105, and exercise their powers and perform their duties and functions under the department of natural resources as a division of the department.
(g) Repealed.
(h) (I) and (II) (Deleted by amendment, L. 2011, (SB 11-208), ch. 293, p. 1382, § 3, effective July 1, 2011.)
(III) Repealed.
(i) (Deleted by amendment, L. 2011, (SB 11-208), ch. 293, p. 1382, § 3, effective July 1, 2011.)
(j) The division of forestry, created in section 24-33-201 (1), the head of which is the state forester, appointed pursuant to section 23-31-207. The division of forestry and the state forester are type 2 entities, as defined in section 24-1-105, and exercise their powers and perform their duties and functions as prescribed by law under the department of natural resources and the executive director thereof.
(k) (I) (A) The parks and wildlife commission, created in article 9 of title 33. The powers, duties, and functions of the parks and wildlife commission include the powers, duties, and functions of the wildlife commission and the board of parks and outdoor recreation. The parks and wildlife commission is a type 1 entity, as defined in section 24-1-105.
(B) The parks and wildlife commission includes, as an advisory council, the Colorado natural areas council created in article 33 of title 33.
(II) (A) The division of parks and wildlife, the head of which is the director of the division of parks and wildlife, created in section 33-9-104. The division of parks and wildlife and the office of the director of the division of parks and wildlife are type 1 entities, as defined in section 24-1-105.
(B) The division of parks and wildlife includes the fish health board created in article 5.5 of title 33. The fish health board is a type 2 entity, as defined in section 24-1-105, and exercises its powers and performs its duties and functions as specified by law under the department of natural resources and the executive director of the department of natural resources.
(4) The division of water resources includes the following:
(a) The office of the state engineer, created in article 80 of title 37. The office of the state engineer is a type 1 entity, as defined in section 24-1-105, and exercises its powers and performs its duties and functions under the department of natural resources and is allocated to the division of water resources as a section thereof.
(b) The division engineers, created in part 2 of article 92 of title 37. The division engineers are type 1 entities, as defined in section 24-1-105, and exercise their powers and perform their duties and functions under the department of natural resources and are allocated to the division of water resources as a section thereof.
(c) The ground water commission, created in article 90 of title 37. The ground water commission is a type 1 entity, as defined in section 24-1-105, and exercises its powers and performs its duties and functions under the department of natural resources and is allocated to the division of water resources as a section thereof.
(d) The state board of examiners of water well and ground heat exchanger contractors created in section 37-91-103. The state board of examiners of water well and ground heat exchanger contractors is a type 1 entity, as defined in section 24-1-105, and exercises its powers and performs its duties and functions under the department of natural resources and is allocated to the division of water resources as a section of the division of water resources.
(e) Repealed.
(5) Repealed.
Source: L. 68: p. 88, § 24. L. 69: pp. 867, 1223, §§ 2, 19. C.R.S. 1963: § 3-28-24. L. 72: pp. 321, 493, §§ 2, 3, 12. L. 74: (3)(f)(IV) repealed, p. 195, § 1, effective July 1. L. 77: (2.1) and (5) added, (3)(e)(I) and (3)(e)(III) amended, pp. 281, 1130, 1629, §§ 31, 32, 1, 2, effective July 1. L. 81: (3)(e)(III) amended, p. 1665, § 17, effective June 30. L. 83: (2.1) amended, p. 1307, § 2, effective May 10. L. 84: (3)(i) and (3)(f) amended, pp. 923, 934, §§ 13, 2, effective January 1. L. 87: (4)(d) amended, p. 1581, § 34, effective July 10. L. 88: (3)(i) amended and (5) repealed, p. 1179, § 3, effective March 23; (3)(e)(II) amended, p. 1180, § 4, effective May 3; (3)(e)(I) and (3)(e)(III) amended, p. 1435, § 14, effective June 11; (2.1)(a) amended, p. 1215, §7, effective July 1. L. 91: (4)(e) repealed, p. 884, § 4, effective June 5; (3)(h) amended, p. 200, § 7, effective June 7. L. 92: (2.1), (3)(e), and (3)(g) amended, p. 1917, § 2, effective July 1. L. 94: (3)(h)(III) added, p. 1710, § 7, effective July 1. L. 99: (3)(h)(III) amended, p. 533, § 3, effective May 3; (3)(h)(I) amended, p. 607, § 2, effective January 1, 2000. L. 2000: (3)(c) amended and (3)(j) added, p. 556, § 3, effective July 1. L. 2003: (2.1)(b) RC&RE and (3)(e)(V) repealed, p. 1961, §§ 2, 4, effective May 22. L. 2005: (3)(e)(IV) and (3)(g) amended, p. 1462, § 1, effective July 1. L. 2006: (3)(e) amended, p. 212, § 1, effective August 7. L. 2007: (3)(j) amended, p. 549, § 4, effective August 3. L. 2010: (3)(j) amended, (HB 10-1223), ch. 41, p. 164, § 2, effective August 11. L. 2011: IP(3), (3)(h)(I), (3)(h)(II), and (3)(i) amended and (3)(k) added, (SB 11-208), ch. 293, p. 1382, § 3, effective July 1. L. 2012: (3)(g) amended, (HB 12-1355), ch. 247, p. 1196, § 3, effective June 4; (3)(k)(I) amended, (HB 12-1317), ch. 248, p. 1203, § 6, effective June 4. L. 2013: (2.1)(c) added, (HB 13-1057), ch. 1, p. 2, § 5, effective January 31; (2.1)(b) repealed, (HB 13-1300), ch. 316, p. 1681, § 48, effective August 7. L. 2022: (2), IP(2.1), (2.1)(a), (2.1)(c), (3)(a), (3)(b), (3)(d), IP(3)(e), (3)(e)(I), (3)(e)(II), (3)(e)(III), (3)(f), (3)(j), (3)(k), IP(4), (4)(a), (4)(b), (4)(c), and (4)(d) amended, (SB 22-162), ch. 469, p. 3404, § 155, effective August 10. L. 2023: (3)(f) amended, (SB 23-285), ch. 235, p. 1253, § 22, effective July 1. L. 2025: (4)(d) amended, (HB 25-1165), ch. 257, p. 1320, § 29, effective August 6.
Editor's note: (1) Subsection (3)(h)(III)(B) provided for the repeal of subsection (3)(h)(III), effective July 1, 2009. (See L. 1999, p. 533.)
(2) Subsection (3)(g)(II) provided for the repeal of subsection (3)(g), effective January 31, 2013, if the revisor of statutes received notification described in § 23-41-209 (2). The revisor of statutes received said notification on January 25, 2013. (See L. 2012, p. 1196.)
Cross references: (1) For the legislative declaration in the 2011 act amending the introductory portion to subsection (3) and subsections (3)(h)(I), (3)(h)(II), and (3)(i) and adding subsection (3)(k), see section 1 of chapter 293, Session Laws of Colorado 2011.
(2) For the short title (the "Debbie Haskins 'Administrative Organization Act of 1968' Modernization Act") in SB 22-162, see section 1 of chapter 469, Session Laws of Colorado 2022.
(3) For the legislative declaration in HB 25-1165, see section 1 of chapter 257, Session Laws of Colorado 2025.
ANNOTATION
Mining reclamation board and the division of mined land reclamation are definite and distinct entities and the designation of the division as a party defendant in lieu of a designation of the board in a challenge to the board's issuance of a mining permit was a failure to join an indispensable party, since the board is an indispensable party to such an action. Cold Springs Ranch v. Dept. of Nat. Res., 765 P.2d 1035 (Colo. App. 1988).
24-1-125. Department of local affairs - creation.
(1) There is hereby created a department of local affairs, the head of which shall be the executive director of the department of local affairs, which office is hereby created. The executive director shall be appointed by the governor, with the consent of the senate, and shall serve at the pleasure of the governor. The reappointment of an executive director after initial election of a governor shall be subject to the provisions of section 24-20-109. The executive director shall have those powers, duties, and functions prescribed for heads of principal departments in the "Administrative Organization Act of 1968", article 1 of this title.
(2) The department of local affairs consists of the following divisions:
(a) (I) The division of local government, the head of which is the director of local government. The division of local government and the office of the director of local government, created in part 1 of article 32 of this title 24, are type 2 entities, as defined in section 24-1-105, and exercise their powers and perform their duties and functions under the department of local affairs.
(II) The division of local government includes the Colorado resiliency office, the head of which is the director of the Colorado resiliency office. The Colorado resiliency office is a type 2 entity, as defined in section 24-1-105, and exercises its powers and performs its duties and functions under the division of local government and the department of local affairs.
(b) The division of property taxation, the head of which is the property tax administrator, created in section 39-2-101. The division of property taxation and the property tax administrator are type 1 entities, as defined in section 24-1-105. Except for the powers, duties, and functions of the former Colorado tax commission that are vested with the board of assessment appeals pursuant to subsection (3) of this section, the powers, duties, and functions of the property tax administrator and the division of property taxation, as is otherwise provided in law, include the rule-making, administrative, and enforcement powers, duties, and functions of the former Colorado tax commission.
(c) (I) The division of commerce and development, the head of which is the director of commerce and development. The division of commerce and development and the office of the director thereof, created in part 3 of article 32 of this title 24, are type 2 entities, as defined in section 24-1-105, and exercise their powers and perform their duties and functions under the department of local affairs.
(II) Repealed.
(d) and (e) Repealed.
(f) The division of housing, created in the "Colorado Housing Act of 1970", part 7 of article 32 of this title 24. The division of housing is a type 1 entity, as defined in section 24-1-105, and exercises its powers and performs its duties and functions under the department of local affairs.
(g) The division of planning, the head of which is the director of the division of planning. The division of planning and the office of the director, created in part 2 of article 32 of this title 24, are type 2 entities, as defined in section 24-1-105, and exercise their powers and perform their duties and functions under the department of local affairs.
(h) Repealed.
(i) The office of rural development, the head of which is the coordinator of rural development. The office of rural development and the position of coordinator of rural development, created in part 8 of article 32 of this title 24, are type 2 entities, as defined in section 24-1-105, and exercise their powers and perform their duties and functions under the department of local affairs.
(j) Repealed.
(k) The office of the Colorado youth service corps, created in part 20 of article 32 of this title 24. The office of the Colorado youth service corps is a type 2 entity, as defined in section 24-1-105, and exercises its powers and performs its duties and functions under the department of local affairs.
(l) and (m) Repealed.
(3) The board of assessment appeals, created in article 2 of title 39, is vested with the quasi-judicial powers, duties, and functions of the former Colorado tax commission, and constitutes a part of the department of local affairs. The board of assessment appeals is a type 1 entity, as defined in section 24-1-105.
(4) The advisory committee to the property tax administrator, created in article 2 of title 39, constitutes a part of the department of local affairs . The advisory committee to the property tax administrator is a type 1 entity, as defined in section 24-1-105, and exercises its powers and performs its duties and functions under the department.
(5) to (9) Repealed.
(10) The office of smart growth, created in section 24-32-3203, in the department of local affairs is a type 2 entity, as defined in section 24-1-105, and exercises its powers and performs its duties and functions under the department.
(11) The office of homeless youth services is created in the department pursuant to section 24-32-723.
Source: L. 68: p. 90, § 25. C.R.S. 1963: § 3-28-25. L. 70: pp. 241, 387, §§ 2, 27. L. 71: pp. 105, 124, 1058, §§ 13, 2, 1. L. 73: p. 190, § 2. L. 76: (4) added, p. 756, § 8, effective July 1. L. 81: (2)(h) amended, p. 1128, § 2, effective July 1. L. 83: (2)(c) amended, p. 900 § 2, effective June 14; (2)(d), (2)(e), and (2)(h) repealed, p. 971, § 28, effective July 1, 1984. L. 85: (2)(c)(II)(A) amended and (2)(c)(II)(B) repealed, p. 791, §§ 2, 1, effective March 14; (2)(j) and (5) added, pp. 820, 929, §§ 2, 1, effective July 1. L. 86: (1) amended, p. 886, § 10, effective May 23. L. 87: (6) added, p. 1027, § 2, effective July 8. L. 89: (6)(b) amended, p. 339, § 2, effective June 7. L. 90: (2)(j) repealed, p. 1246, § 3, effective July 1. L. 91: (2)(k) added, p. 928, § 2, effective May 31. L. 92: (7) and (8) added, p. 1010, § 1, effective March 12; (6) RC&RE, p. 2176, § 32, effective June 2. L. 93: (6) amended, p. 469, § 1, effective April 21; (9) added, p. 1899, § 3, effective July 1; (5)(b) added by revision, pp. 1094, 1168, §§ 8, 151. L. 94: (1) amended, p. 564, § 8, effective April 6. L. 95: (9) repealed, p. 511, § 3, effective May 16. L. 2000: (2)(l) added, p. 1911, § 3, effective July 1. L. 2004: (2)(m) added and (7) amended, p. 1176, §§ 1, 2, effective August 4. L. 2008: (2)(l) repealed, p. 1290, § 4, effective July 1. L. 2012: (2)(m), (7), and (8) repealed, (HB 12-1283), ch. 240, p. 1137, § 55, effective July 1. L. 2018: (2)(a) amended, (HB 18-1394), ch. 234, p. 1472, § 18, effective August 8. L. 2022: IP(2), (2)(a), (2)(b), (2)(c)(I), (2)(f), (2)(g), (2)(i), (2)(k), (3), and (4) amended and (10) and (11) added, (SB 22-162), ch. 469, p. 3411, § 172, effective August 10.
Editor's note: (1) Subsection (5)(b) provided for the repeal of subsection (5), effective July 1, 1994. (See L. 93, pp. 1094, 1168.)
(2) (a) Subsection (6)(b) provided for the repeal of subsection (6), effective July 1, 1991. (See L. 89, p. 339.)
(b) Subsection (6)(b) provided for the repeal of subsection (6), effective July 6, 1997. (See L. 93, p. 469.)
Cross references: (1) For the transfer of the powers, duties, and functions of the Colorado bureau of investigation and the division of criminal justice from the department of local affairs to the department of public safety, see § 24-1-128.6.
(2) For the legislative declaration in the 2012 act repealing subsections (2)(m), (7), and (8), see section 1 of chapter 240, Session Laws of Colorado 2012.
(3) For the short title (the "Debbie Haskins 'Administrative Organization Act of 1968' Modernization Act") in SB 22-162, see section 1 of chapter 469, Session Laws of Colorado 2022.
ANNOTATION
For the unconstitutionality of designation of executive director as a "confidential employee", see Colorado State Civil Serv. Employees Ass'n v. Love, 167 Colo. 436, 448 P.2d 624 (1968).
24-1-126. State department of highways - creation. (Repealed)
Source: L. 68: p. 91, § 26. C.R.S. 1963: § 3-28-26. L. 71: p. 105, § 14. L. 74: (3)(d) added, p. 196, § 1, effective July 1. L. 83: (3)(b) repealed, p. 971, § 28, effective July 1, 1984. L. 86: (1) amended, p. 886, § 11, effective May 23. L. 91: Entire section repealed, p. 1135, § 224, effective July 1.
24-1-127. Department of military and veterans affairs - creation.
(1) There is hereby created a department of military and veterans affairs, the head of which shall be the adjutant general who shall be appointed by the governor pursuant to law.
(2) The office of the adjutant general, created in part 1 of article 3 of title 28, is a type 2 entity, as defined in section 24-1-105, and exercises its powers and performs its duties and functions under the department of military and veterans affairs.
(3) The department of military and veterans affairs consists of the following divisions:
(a) The Colorado National Guard, created in part 2 of article 3 of title 28. The Colorado National Guard is a type 2 entity, as defined in section 24-1-105, and exercises its powers and performs its duties and functions under the department of military and veterans affairs.
(b) The Colorado division of civil air patrol, created in article 1 of title 28. The Colorado division of civil air patrol is a type 1 entity, as defined in section 24-1-105, and exercises its powers and performs its duties and functions under the department of military and veterans affairs.
(c) Repealed.
(d) The Colorado state defense force, when organized by the governor pursuant to article 4 of title 28. If organized, the Colorado state defense force is a type 2 entity, as defined in section 24-1-105, and exercises its powers and performs its duties and functions under the department of military and veterans affairs.
(e) Repealed.
(f) The division of veterans affairs, created in part 7 of article 5 of title 28. The division of veterans affairs is a type 2 entity, as defined in section 24-1-105, and exercises its powers and performs its duties and functions under the department of military and veterans affairs.
(g) The Colorado board of veterans affairs, created in section 28-5-702. The Colorado board of veterans affairs is a type 2 entity, as defined in section 24-1-105, and exercises its powers and performs its duties and functions under the department of military and veterans affairs.
Source: L. 68: p. 91, § 27. C.R.S. 1963: § 3-28-27. L. 73: p. 419, § 2. L. 84: (3)(c) repealed, p. 686, § 25, effective January 1, 1985. L. 86: (3)(d) amended, p. 1016, § 6, effective July 1. L. 88: (3)(e) added, p. 1090, § 3, effective January 1. L. 91: (3)(e) repealed, p. 1055, § 5, effective July 1. L. 2002: (1), (2), IP(3), (3)(a), (3)(b), and (3)(d) amended and (3)(f) and (3)(g) added, p. 358, § 12, effective July 1. L. 2022: (2), IP(3), (3)(a), (3)(b), (3)(d), (3)(f), and (3)(g) amended, (SB 22-162), ch. 469, p. 3415, § 184, effective August 10.
Cross references: (1) For the legislative declaration contained in the 2002 act amending subsections (1) and (2), the introductory portion to subsection (3), and subsections (3)(a), (3)(b), and (3)(d) and enacting subsections (3)(f) and (3)(g), see section 1 of chapter 121, Session Laws of Colorado 2002.
(2) For the short title (the "Debbie Haskins 'Administrative Organization Act of 1968' Modernization Act") in SB 22-162, see section 1 of chapter 469, Session Laws of Colorado 2022.
24-1-128. Department of personnel - creation.
(1) Pursuant to the provisions of section 14 of article XII of the state constitution, there is hereby created a department of personnel, the head of which shall be the state personnel director, also referred to as the executive director of personnel, who shall be appointed by the governor, with the consent of the senate, and who shall serve at the pleasure of the governor.
(2) The state personnel board, created in section 14 of article XII of the state constitution, is a type 1 entity, as defined in section 24-1-105, and exercises its powers and performs its duties and functions under the department of personnel, subject to the provisions of the state constitution.
(3) The powers, duties, and functions of the department of personnel include the powers, duties, and functions of the civil service commission. The powers, duties, and functions of the civil service commission are allocated to the state personnel board and the state personnel director, pursuant to the provisions of the state constitution and laws enacted pursuant thereto, and the civil service commission is abolished.
(4) The powers, duties, and functions of the department of personnel include the powers, duties, and functions of the state employees' and officials' group insurance board of administration, created in part 2 of article 8 of title 10, prior to its repeal in 1994. The powers, duties, and functions of the state employees' and officials' group insurance board of administration are allocated to the state personnel director, pursuant to the provisions of the state constitution and laws enacted pursuant thereto, and the state employees' and officials' group insurance board of administration is abolished.
(5) Repealed.
(6) The powers, duties, and functions of the department of personnel include the powers, duties, and functions of the department of administration, and the department of administration is abolished.
(7) The powers, duties, and functions of the department of personnel include the following administrative support services:
(a) The powers, duties, and functions concerning purchasing, specified in part 2 of article 102 of this title 24.
(b) The powers, duties, and functions concerning state archives and public records, specified in part 1 of article 80 of this title 24.
(c) Repealed.
(d) The powers, duties, and functions concerning accounts and control and the office of the controller, specified in part 2 of article 30 of this title 24. The office of the controller is a type 2 entity, as defined in section 24-1-105, and exercises its powers and performs its duties and functions under the department of personnel.
(e) Repealed.
(f) The office of administrative courts, the head of which is the executive director of the department of personnel. The office of administrative courts, created in part 10 of article 30 of this title 24, is a type 2 entity, as defined in section 24-1-105, and exercises its powers and performs its duties and functions under the department of personnel.
(g) The powers, duties, and functions concerning central services, specified in part 11 of article 30 of this title 24.
(h) The powers, duties, and functions concerning the risk management system, specified in part 15 of article 30 of this title 24.
(i) (Deleted by amendment, L. 96, p. 1493, § 1, effective June 1, 1996.)
(j) Repealed.
(k) The powers, duties, and functions concerning state buildings, specified by part 13 of article 30 of this title 24 and formerly vested in the office of state planning and budgeting.
(l) The state claims board, created in part 15 of article 30 of this title 24. The state claims board is a type 1 entity, as defined in section 24-1-105, and exercises its powers and performs its duties and functions under the department of personnel.
(m) Repealed.
(8) The statewide equity office, created in section 24-50-146 (2)(a), and its powers, duties, and functions are transferred by a type 2 transfer to the department of personnel.
(9) The office of sustainability is created in section 24-30-2303. The office is a type 2 entity, as defined in section 24-1-105, and exercises its powers and performs its duties and functions under the department of personnel.
Source: L. 71: p. 302, § 1. C.R.S. 1963: § 3-28-34. L. 74: Entire section added, p. 401, § 2, effective July 1. L. 89: (4) and (5) added, pp. 487, 1646, §§ 16, 22, effective July 1. L. 95: (6) and (7) added, p. 624, § 3, effective July 1. L. 96: (7)(a) to (7)(e) and (7)(g) to (7)(i) amended, p. 1493, § 1, effective June 1. L. 99: (7)(m) repealed, p. 872, § 2, effective July 1. L. 2000: (1) amended, p. 1861, § 72, effective August 2. L. 2004: (7)(j) repealed, p. 304, § 2, effective April 7. L. 2005: (7)(f) amended, p. 851, § 1, effective June 1. L. 2008: (7)(c) and (7)(e) repealed, p. 1129, § 11, effective May 22. L. 2009: (5) repealed, (SB 09-066), ch. 73, p. 260, § 25, effective July 1. L. 2022: (8) added, (HB 22-1397), ch. 413, p. 2919, § 2, effective June 7; (2), (3), (4), (6), IP(7), (7)(a), (7)(b), (7)(d), (7)(f), (7)(g), (7)(h), (7)(k), and (7)(l) amended, (SB 22-162), ch. 469, p. 3418, § 191, effective August 10. L. 2024: (9) added, (SB 24-214), ch. 191, p. 1089, § 2, effective May 17.
Editor's note: The reference in subsection (4) of this section concerning the state employees' and officials' group insurance board of administration created in part 2 of article 8 of title 10 was repealed, effective May 19, 1994, but has been left in for historical purposes.
Cross references: (1) For the legislative declaration contained in the 1995 act enacting subsections (6) and (7), see section 112 of chapter 167, Session Laws of Colorado 1995.
(2) For the short title (the "Debbie Haskins 'Administrative Organization Act of 1968' Modernization Act") in SB 22-162, see section 1 of chapter 469, Session Laws of Colorado 2022.
24-1-128.1. Office of state planning and budgeting - creation. (Repealed)
Source: L. 74: Entire section added, p. 202, § 4, effective July 1. L. 78: (3) added, p. 266, § 65, effective May 23. L. 83: Entire section repealed, p. 971, § 28, effective July 1, 1984.
Cross references: For the establishment of the office of state planning and budgeting within the office of the governor, see article 37 of this title.
24-1-128.5. Department of corrections - creation.
(1) There is hereby created a department of corrections, the head of which shall be the executive director of the department of corrections, who shall be appointed by the governor, with the consent of the senate, and who shall serve at the pleasure of the governor. The reappointment of an executive director after initial election of a governor shall be subject to the provisions of section 24-20-109.
(1.5) The department of corrections shall supervise and control each correctional facility, as defined in section 17-1-102. The powers, duties, and functions of the department of corrections include the powers, duties, and functions of the former department of institutions relating to honor camps, work release programs, and other adult correctional programs. The powers, duties, and functions of the department of corrections also include the powers, duties, and functions of the former division of parole in the department of institutions, and the division of parole in the department of institutions is abolished. The executive director of the department of corrections has the powers and duties specified in title 17.
(2) The department of corrections consists of the following divisions:
(a) The division of adult parole, the head of which is the director of the division of adult parole. The division of adult parole is a type 2 entity, as defined in section 24-1-105, and exercises its powers and performs its duties and functions under the department of corrections.
(b) The division of correctional industries, the head of which is the director of the division of correctional industries. The division supervises and controls correctional industries programs in this state. The division is a type 2 entity, as defined in section 24-1-105, and exercises its powers and performs its duties and functions under the department of corrections.
(c) (Deleted by amendment, L. 2000, p. 859, § 73, effective May 24, 2000.)
(3) The state board of parole, created in part 2 of article 2 of title 17, is a type 1 entity, as defined in section 24-1-105.
(3.5) The division of correctional industries includes, as a section thereof, the Colorado state agency for surplus property, created in part 4 of article 82 of this title 24. The agency is a type 2 entity, as defined in section 24-1-105, and exercises its powers and performs its duties and functions under the department of corrections. The agency is allocated to the division of correctional industries as a section thereof.
(4) Any powers, duties, and functions relating to adult corrections which were previously vested in the department of institutions and are not specifically transferred to the department of corrections shall be assigned thereto by the governor.
Source: L. 77: Entire section added, p. 950, § 15, effective July 13. L. 79: (2)(a) amended, p. 702, § 75, effective June 21. L. 86: (3.5) added, pp. 755, 886, §§ 4, 12, effective July 1. L. 90: (2)(c) added, p. 977, § 5, effective July 1. L. 2000: (2)(a) and (2)(c) amended, p. 859, § 73, effective May 24. L. 2010: (1.5) added and (2)(a) amended, (SB 10-130), ch. 106, p. 355, § 1, effective April 15. L. 2022: (1.5), IP(2), (2)(a), (2)(b), (3), and (3.5) amended, (SB 22-162), ch. 469, p. 3421, § 201, effective August 10.
Cross references: For the short title (the "Debbie Haskins 'Administrative Organization Act of 1968' Modernization Act") in SB 22-162, see section 1 of chapter 469, Session Laws of Colorado 2022.
24-1-128.6. Department of public safety - creation.
(1) There is hereby created a department of public safety, the head of which shall be the executive director of the department of public safety. The executive director shall be appointed by the governor, with the consent of the senate, and shall serve at the pleasure of the governor. The reappointment of an executive director after initial election of a governor shall be subject to the provisions of section 24-20-109.
(2) The department of public safety consists of the following divisions:
(a) The Colorado state patrol, the head of which is the chief of the Colorado state patrol. The Colorado state patrol and the office of chief, created in part 2 of article 33.5 of this title 24, are type 2 entities, as defined in section 24-1-105, and exercise their powers and perform their duties and functions under the department of public safety. The responsibilities of the department of public safety and the Colorado state patrol include the powers, duties, and functions of the state department of highways relating to the Colorado state patrol. The responsibilities of the department of public safety and the Colorado state patrol include the powers, duties, and functions of the ports of entry section of the former motor carrier services division of the division of motor vehicles of the department of revenue, which motor carrier services division is abolished pursuant to section 24-1-117 (5), enacted by House Bill 12-1019, in 2012.
(b) Repealed.
(c) The Colorado bureau of investigation, the head of which is the director of the Colorado bureau of investigation. The Colorado bureau of investigation and the office of the director, created in part 4 of article 33.5 of this title 24, are type 2 entities, as defined in section 24-1-105, and exercise their powers and perform their duties and functions under the department of public safety. The powers, duties, and functions of the department of public safety and the Colorado bureau of investigation include the powers, duties, and functions relating to the Colorado bureau of investigation that were formerly vested in the department of local affairs.
(d) The division of criminal justice, the head of which is the director of the division of criminal justice. The division of criminal justice and the office of the director, created in part 5 of article 33.5 of this title 24, are type 2 entities, as defined in section 24-1-105, and exercise their powers and perform their duties and functions under the department of public safety. The powers, duties, and functions of the department of public safety and the division of criminal justice include the powers, duties, and functions relating to the division of criminal justice that were formerly vested in the department of local affairs.
(e) Repealed.
(f) (Deleted by amendment, L. 2002, p. 1204, § 1, effective June 3, 2002.)
(g) Repealed.
(h) (I) The division of homeland security and emergency management, the head of which is the director of the division of homeland security and emergency management. The division of homeland security and emergency management and the office of the director, created in part 16 of article 33.5 of this title 24, are type 2 entities, as defined in section 24-1-105. The division of homeland security and emergency management and the office of the director of the division exercise their powers and perform their duties and functions under the department of public safety and are allocated to the division of homeland security and emergency management.
(II) The division of homeland security and emergency management includes the following agencies, which are type 2 entities, as defined in section 24-1-105, and which exercise their powers and perform their duties and functions under the department of public safety:
(A) The office of emergency management, created in part 7 of article 33.5 of this title 24, the head of which is the director of the office of emergency management. Effective July 1, 2012, the powers, duties, and functions of the department of public safety and the office of emergency management under the division of homeland security and emergency management pursuant to this article 1 include the powers, duties, and functions of the former division of emergency management, created in part 21 of article 32 of this title 24, prior to its repeal in 2012.
(B) The office of prevention and security, created in section 24-33.5-1606; and
(C) Repealed.
(D) The office of public safety communication created in section 24-33.5-2502.
(i) The division of fire prevention and control, the head of which is the director of the division of fire prevention and control. The division of fire prevention and control and the office of the director, created in part 12 of article 33.5 of this title 24, are type 2 entities, as defined in section 24-1-105, and exercise their powers and perform their duties and functions under the department of public safety.
(3) Repealed.
(4) (a) The powers, duties, and functions of the department of public safety include the powers, duties, and functions of the Colorado emergency planning commission, created in section 24-33.5-1503, prior to the repeal of that section by House Bill 14-1004, as follows:
(I) The duty to promulgate any rules necessary for implementation of the federal "Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act of 1986", 42 U.S.C. sec. 11001 et seq., Title III of the federal "Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986", Pub.L. 99-499, the other powers and duties described under section 24-33.5-1503.5 (2), and the duty to administer the SARA Title III fund created in section 24-33.5-1506, are transferred to the department of public safety and allocated to the director of the division of homeland security and emergency management; and
(II) All other functions relating to implementation of the federal "Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act of 1986", 42 U.S.C. sec. 11001 et seq., Title III of the federal "Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986", Pub.L. 99-499, that were enjoyed by the Colorado emergency planning commission prior to its repeal by House Bill 14-1004, are transferred to the department of public safety and allocated to the emergency planning subcommittee of the homeland security and all-hazards senior advisory committee, which subcommittee is created under section 24-33.5-1614 (3.5).
(b) (Deleted by amendment, L. 2014.)
(5) The witness protection board, created in section 24-33.5-106, is a type 1 entity, as defined in section 24-1-105, and exercises its powers and performs its duties and functions under the department of public safety.
(6) Repealed.
(7) The cold case task force, created in section 24-33.5-109, is a type 2 entity, as defined in section 24-1-105, and exercises its powers and performs its duties and functions under the department of public safety.
(8) Repealed.
(9) The crime victim services advisory board, created pursuant to section 24-4.1-117.3, is a type 2 entity, as defined in section 24-1-105, and exercises its powers and performs its duties and functions under the division of criminal justice in the department of public safety.
(10) The office of school safety, created in section 24-33.5-2702, is a type 2 entity, as defined in section 24-1-105, and exercises its powers and performs its duties and functions under the office of the executive director in the department of public safety.
(11) The school safety resource center, created in section 24-33.5-1803, is a type 2 entity, as defined in section 24-1-105, and exercises its powers and performs its duties and functions under the office of school safety in the office of the executive director in the department of public safety.
Source: L. 83: Entire section added, p. 960, § 3, effective July 1, 1984. L. 86: (1) amended, p. 886, § 13, effective May 23. L. 87: (2)(g) added, p. 1569, § 2, effective July 1. L. 90: (3) added, p. 1220, § 3, effective May 31. L. 92: (2)(e) and (3) repealed, p. 1011, § 2, effective March 12. L. 93: (4) added, p. 1323, § 3, effective June 6. L. 95: (5) added, p. 1346, § 2, effective June 5. L. 99: (2)(g) repealed, p. 437, § 7, effective April 30. L. 2002: (2)(f) amended and (2)(h) added, p. 1204, § 1, effective June 3. L. 2006: (6) added, p. 1298, § 2, effective May 30. L. 2007: (8) added, p. 1105, § 2, effective May 23; (7) added, p. 1897, § 4, effective June 1. L. 2009: (9) added, (SB 09-047), ch. 129, p. 556, § 3, effective July 1. L. 2012: IP(2), (2)(h), and (4) amended, (2)(b) repealed, and (2)(i) added, (HB 12-1283), ch. 240, p. 1068, § 7, effective July 1; (2)(a) amended, (HB 12-1019), ch. 135, p. 464, § 2, effective July 1. L. 2014: (4) amended, (HB 14-1004), ch. 11, p. 101, § 1, effective February 27; (8) RC&RE, (HB 14-1363), ch. 302, p. 1267, § 21, effective May 31. L. 2018: (8)(b) amended, (HB 18-1287), ch. 318, p. 1909, § 2, effective May 30. L. 2022: (2)(a), (2)(c), (2)(d), (2)(h), (2)(i), IP(4)(a), (5), (6), (7), (8)(a), and (9) amended, (SB 22-162), ch. 469, p. 3424, § 206, effective August 10; (2)(h)(II)(B) and (2)(h)(II)(C) amended and (2)(h)(II)(D) added, (HB 22-1353), ch. 479, p. 3497, § 6, effective July 1, 2023. L. 2023: (10) and (11) added, (SB 23-241), ch. 120, p. 449, § 14, effective April 27. L. 2025: (6) repealed, (SB 25-179), ch. 322, p. 1695, § 5, effective August 6. L. 2026: (2)(h)(II)(B) amended and (2)(h)(II)(C) repealed, (HB 26-1252), ch. 382, p. 2379, § 11, effective August 12.
Editor's note: (1) Prior to its recreation in 2014, subsection (8)(b) provided for the repeal of subsection (8), effective July 1, 2013. (See L. 2007, p. 1105.)
(2) Amendments to subsection (2)(h)(II) by SB 22-162 and HB 22-1353 were harmonized.
(3) Subsection (8)(b) provided for the repeal of subsection (8), effective July 1, 2023. (See L. 2018, p. 1909.)
Cross references: (1) For the legislative declaration in the 2012 act amending the introductory portion to subsection (2) and subsections (2)(h) and (4), repealing subsection (2)(b), and adding subsection (2)(i), see section 1 of chapter 240, Session Laws of Colorado 2012.
(2) For the short title (the "Debbie Haskins 'Administrative Organization Act of 1968' Modernization Act") in SB 22-162, see section 1 of chapter 469, Session Laws of Colorado 2022.
(3) For the legislative declaration in HB 22-1353, see section 1 of chapter 479, Session Laws of Colorado 2022.
24-1-128.7. Department of transportation - creation.
(1) There is hereby created a department of transportation, the head of which shall be the executive director of the department of transportation.
(2) The transportation commission, created in part 1 of article 1 of title 43, is a type 1 entity, as defined in section 24-1-105, and exercises its powers and performs its duties and functions under the department of transportation.
(3) The department of transportation consists of the following divisions:
(a) The highway maintenance division, the head of which is the director of the highway maintenance division. The highway maintenance division and the office of the director, created in part 1 of article 1 of title 43, are type 2 entities, as defined in section 24-1-105, and exercise their powers and perform their duties and functions under the department of transportation.
(b) The aeronautics division, the head of which is the director of the aeronautics division. The aeronautics division and the office of the director, created in article 10 of title 43, are type 1 entities, as defined in section 24-1-105, and exercise their powers and perform their duties and functions under the department of transportation. The responsibilities of the department of transportation and the aeronautics division include the powers, duties, and functions of the division of aviation, formerly under the authority of the department of military and veterans affairs.
(c) The transportation development division, the head of which is the director of the transportation development division. The transportation development division and the office of the director, created in part 1 of article 1 of title 43, are type 2 entities, as defined in section 24-1-105, and exercise their powers and perform their duties and functions under the department of transportation.
(d) The engineering, design, and construction division, the head of which is the chief engineer. The engineering, design, and construction division and the office of the chief engineer, created in part 1 of article 1 of title 43, are type 2 entities, as defined in section 24-1-105, and exercise their powers and perform their duties and functions under the department of transportation.
(e) The transit and rail division created in part 1 of article 1 of title 43, the head of which is the director of the transit and rail division. The transit and rail division and the office of the director of the division are type 2 entities, as defined in section 24-1-105, and exercise their powers and perform their duties and functions under the department of transportation and the executive director of the department.
(4) The powers, duties, and functions of the department of transportation include the powers, duties, and functions of the state department of highways, created in section 24-1-126, prior to its repeal in 1991, and the state department of highways is abolished.
(5) The statewide bridge and tunnel enterprise created in section 43-4-805 (2) is a type 1 entity, as defined in section 24-1-105, and exercises its powers and performs its duties and functions under the department of transportation.
(6) (a) The high-performance transportation enterprise, created in section 43-4-806 (2)(a), is a type 1 entity, as defined in section 24-1-105, and exercises its powers and performs its duties and functions under the department of transportation.
(b) The powers, duties, and functions of the department of transportation and the high-performance transportation enterprise include the powers, duties, and functions of the statewide tolling enterprise, created in the transportation commission pursuant to section 43-4-803 (1), prior to the repeal and reenactment of said section by Senate Bill 09-108, enacted in 2009, and the statewide tolling enterprise is abolished.
(7) and (8) Repealed.
(9) The clean transit enterprise, created in section 43-4-1203, is a type 1 entity, as defined in section 24-1-105, and exercises its powers and performs its duties and functions under the department of transportation.
(10) The nonattainment area air pollution mitigation enterprise, created in section 43-4-1303, is a type 1 entity, as defined in section 24-1-105, and exercises its powers and performs its duties and functions under the department of transportation.
Source: L. 91: Entire section added, p. 1055, § 6, effective July 1. L. 92: (4) amended, p. 2176, § 33, effective June 2. L. 2002: (3)(b) amended, p. 358, § 13, effective July 1. L. 2009: (5) and (6) added, (SB 09-108), ch. 5, p. 48, § 2, effective March 2; (3)(e) added, (SB 09-094), ch. 280, p. 1249, § 1, effective May 20. L. 2014: (7) added, (HB 14-1161), ch. 185, p. 690, § 2, effective August 6. L. 2015: IP(3) and (3)(a) amended, (HB 15-1209), ch. 64, p. 173, § 1, effective March 30. L. 2017: (8) added, (SB 17-153), ch. 225, p. 865, § 1, effective July 1. L. 2021: (5) amended and (9) and (10) added, (SB 21-260), ch. 250, p. 1366, § 4, effective June 17; (8)(c) added by revision, (SB 21-238), ch. 401, pp. 2673, 2674, §§ 2, 6. L. 2022: (2), (3), (4), (5), (6), (9), and (10) amended, (SB 22-162), ch. 469, p. 3429, § 217, effective August 10.
Editor's note: (1) Subsection (7)(b) provided for the repeal of subsection (7), effective July 1, 2017. (See L. 2014, p. 690.)
(2) Subsection (8)(c) provided for the repeal of subsection (8), effective May 15, 2022. (See L. 2021, p. 2673.)
Cross references: (1) For the legislative declaration contained in the 2002 act amending subsection (3)(b), see section 1 of chapter 121, Session Laws of Colorado 2002. For the legislative declaration in SB 21-260, see section 1 of chapter 250, Session Laws of Colorado 2021.
(2) For the short title (the "Debbie Haskins 'Administrative Organization Act of 1968' Modernization Act") in SB 22-162, see section 1 of chapter 469, Session Laws of Colorado 2022.
24-1-129. Effect of transfer of powers, duties, and functions. (Repealed)
Source: L. 68: p. 92, § 28. C.R.S. 1963: § 3-28-28. L. 2022: Entire section repealed, (SB 22-162), ch. 469, p. 3351, § 4, effective August 10.
Cross references: For the short title (the "Debbie Haskins 'Administrative Organization Act of 1968' Modernization Act") in SB 22-162, see section 1 of chapter 469, Session Laws of Colorado 2022.
24-1-130. Actions, suits, or proceedings not to abate by reorganization - maintenance by or against successors.
(1) No suit, action, or other proceeding, judicial or administrative, lawfully commenced, or which could have been lawfully commenced, by or against any department, institution, or other agency or by or against any officer of the state in his official capacity or in relation to the discharge of his official duties shall abate by reason of the taking effect of any reorganization under the provisions of this article. The court may allow the suit, action, or other proceeding to be maintained by or against the successor of any department, institution, or other agency, or any officer affected.
(2) No criminal action commenced or which could have been commenced by the state shall abate by the taking effect of this article.
Source: L. 68: p. 92, § 29. C.R.S. 1963: § 3-28-29.
24-1-131. Rules, regulations, and orders adopted prior to article - continuation.
All rules, regulations, and orders of departments, institutions, boards, commissions, or other agencies lawfully adopted prior to July 1, 1968, shall continue to be effective until revised, amended, repealed, or nullified pursuant to law.
Source: L. 68: p. 92, § 30. C.R.S. 1963: § 3-28-30.
24-1-132. Transfer of officers and employees.
Effective July 1, 1968, such officers and employees who were engaged prior to said date in the performance of powers, duties, and functions of any department, institution, or other agency transferred to a principal department under the provisions of this article and who, in the opinion of the head of the principal department and the governor, are necessary to perform the powers, duties, and functions of the principal department or of any division, section, or unit thereof shall become officers and employees of such principal department and shall retain all rights to state personnel system and retirement benefits under the laws of the state, and their services shall be deemed to be continuous. All transfers and any abolishment of positions of personnel in the state personnel system shall be made and processed in accordance with state personnel system laws and rules and regulations.
Source: L. 68: p. 93, § 32. C.R.S. 1963: § 3-28-31.
24-1-133. Transfer of property and records.
In all cases where, under the provisions of this article, the powers, duties, and functions of any department, institution, or other agency are transferred to a principal department or divided between any two or more principal departments, such principal department shall succeed to all property and records which were used for or pertain to the performance of the powers, duties, and functions transferred. Any conflict as to the proper disposition of such property or records arising under this section and resulting from the transfer, allocation, abolishment, or division of any department, institution, or other agency or the powers, duties, and functions thereof shall be determined by the governor, whose decision shall be final.
Source: L. 68: p. 93, § 33. C.R.S. 1963: § 3-28-32.
24-1-134. Subsequent powers and functions - assignment.
Pursuant to the provisions of section 22 of article IV of the state constitution, all powers and functions of the executive department of state government created or specified by law after July 1, 1968, including the creation of any new division, section, unit, or other agency of said executive department, shall be assigned to a principal department, and such powers and functions shall be exercised under such principal department as if the same were transferred to such department by this article under a type 2 transfer, unless otherwise specified by such law.
Source: L. 68: p. 93, § 35. C.R.S. 1963: § 3-28-33.
24-1-135. Effect of congressional redistricting on boards and commissions - definition.
(1) As used in this section, "board" includes any board, commission, committee, task force, or other similar body created in the state constitution or state statute.
(2) Unless a section of the state constitution or a statute creating a board provides otherwise:
(a) Any member of a board who was appointed or elected to the office as a resident of a designated congressional district pursuant to any section of the state constitution or any statutory section creating the board and who no longer resides in the congressional district solely because of a change made to the boundaries of the district pursuant to sections 44 to 44.6 of article V of the state constitution is eligible to hold office for the remainder of the term to which the member was elected or appointed, notwithstanding the nonresidency of the member.
(b) When a board increases in size or changes in composition due to the addition of a congressional district following a federal decennial census, an appointing authority responsible for making appointments of members from the state's congressional districts shall appoint a member to represent the new district as soon as practicable in the year following the approval of the new congressional district's boundaries pursuant to sections 44 to 44.6 of article V of the state constitution. The newly appointed member serves a full term as set forth in the state constitution or statute for a member of the board; except that the appointing authority may appoint the member for a shorter term if necessary to preserve any required staggering of the terms of the members of the board.
(c) (I) When a board decreases in size or changes in composition due to the loss of a congressional district following a federal decennial census, an appointing authority responsible for making appointments of members from the state's congressional districts shall review the current appointments to the board and:
(A) If the board decreases in size, select one board member whose term shall be terminated on June 30 of the year following the change in the number of congressional districts; or
(B) If the board changes in composition, select one board member appointed to represent a congressional district to be replaced with an at-large or other member when the member's term expires.
(II) In making the selections required by subsection (2)(c)(I) of this section, the appointing authority shall consider how well the current appointments represent the state's new congressional districts and attempt to ensure adequate representation for the new districts among the remaining board members for the remainder of their terms. If necessary, the appointing authority shall clarify which districts the remaining members represent and may adjust the terms of the remaining members to preserve any required staggering of the terms of the members of the board.
Source: L. 72: p. 545, § 2. C.R.S. 1963: § 3-28-35. L. 76: Entire section amended, p. 400, § 10, effective April 13. L. 81: Entire section amended, p. 1338, § 3, effective July 1. L. 82: Entire section R&RE, p. 349, § 1, effective April 30. L. 84: Entire section amended, p. 923, § 14, effective January 1, 1985. L. 85: Entire section amended, p. 382, § 5, effective April 17. L. 91: Entire section amended, p. 890, § 16, effective June 5. L. 92: Entire section amended, p. 1060, § 1, effective June 1. L. 2005: Entire section amended, p. 670, § 10, effective June 1. L. 2007: (2) amended, p. 2032, § 46, effective June 1. L. 2018: Entire section amended, (HB 18-1375), ch. 274, p. 1704, § 33, effective May 29; (2) amended, (SB 18-034), ch. 14, p. 245, § 29, effective October 1. L. 2019: Entire section amended, (SB 19-241), ch. 390, p. 3468, § 25, effective October 1. L. 2022: Entire section R&RE, (SB 22-013), ch. 2, p.2, § 1, effective February 25.
Editor's note: Amendments to subsection (2) by SB 18-034 and HB 18-1375 were harmonized.
24-1-135.1. Effect of congressional redistricting related to 2000 federal decennial census - definition. (Repealed)
Source: L. 2002: Entire section added, p. 942, § 1, effective August 7. L. 2003: (1)(a) amended, p. 1997, § 44, effective May 22. L. 2005: (1)(a) amended, p. 671, § 11, effective June 1; (1)(a) amended, p. 207, § 1, effective August 8. L. 2013: (1)(a) amended, (HB 13-1139), ch.120, p. 408, § 6, effective August 7. L. 2017: (1)(a) amended, (HB 17-1024), ch. 7, p. 21, § 2, effective August 9. L. 2022: Entire section repealed, (SB 22-013), ch. 2, p. 94, § 133, effective February 25.
24-1-135.5. Boards and commissions - definitions.
(1) As used in this section, "board" includes any board, commission, committee, task force, or other similar body created in the state constitution or state statute.
(2) Unless a section of the state constitution or a statute creating a board provides otherwise:
(a) Any vacancy in an appointed office on a board arising for any reason other than the expiration of the member's term shall be filled by the appointing authority who made the initial appointment for the remainder of the unexpired term. An appointment to fill a vacancy is subject to the same qualifications and conditions as set forth in statute or in the state constitution for the vacant position. The staff of a state agency that provides staff support to the board, or, if no agency provides staff support to the board, the chair of the board, shall notify the appointing authority for the vacant position of the vacancy by email within thirty days of the vacancy occurring.
(b) Notwithstanding the term length set forth in statute or the state constitution, an appointed member continues to serve until the member's successor is duly appointed.
(c) When the director or executive director of an executive agency, a division of an executive agency, or an office within an executive agency is an ex officio member of a board, the director or executive director may designate another person within the executive agency to fulfill the director or executive director's duties on the board.
(d) When a constitutional or statutory provision that creates or concerns activities of a board includes a requirement that applies to a "minimum majority" of the membership of a board, "minimum majority" means the lowest number of members that is more than half of all board members.
(e) A member of a board may participate remotely in board meetings if allowed by the board's policies or bylaws, including for the purposes of establishing a quorum of the board. Remote participation by a member at a board meeting must be recorded in the meeting minutes.
(f) For the purposes of any term limit that applies to the members of a board, a partial term counts toward the term limit only if the partial term was more than half the length of a standard term for a member of that board.
Source: L. 2022: Entire section added, (SB 22-013), ch. 2, p. 3, § 2, effective February 25.
24-1-136. "Information Coordination Act" - policy - functions of the heads of principal departments.
(1) This section shall be known and may be cited as the "Information Coordination Act". The legislative policy with reference to the coordination of information is hereby declared to be that:
(a) The operational reports of the executive agencies should provide complete, concise, and useful information about executive operations to the governor and the general assembly;
(b) The publications of executive agencies should be clearly related to agency functions and cost no more than is necessary to accomplish the purpose for which the material is published;
(c) Executive agencies should recover the full cost of those publications not necessary to the agency's function but issued for the convenience of the users;
(d) Publication activities of executive agencies should be responsive to the direction of the governor; and
(e) Operational reports and publications of executive agencies should continue to be produced as long as they are useful, but the need for them should be reviewed periodically to ensure that public resources are not misdirected toward the fulfillment of outmoded directives.
(2) There is assigned to the heads of the principal departments the function of coordination and control of operational and administrative information within the executive branch.
(3) The heads of the principal departments shall jointly have the following responsibilities of coordination and control:
(a) Development and direction of a system for the collection, coordination, control, and distribution of state operational and administrative reports and information;
(b) (I) Preparation for the governor of annual reports by the principal departments, accounting to the general assembly for the operations of all agencies in the executive branch, which shall include the results of any actions in furtherance of measurable annual objectives in the areas of operational efficiency and effectiveness set forth in the budget request of each department pursuant to section 24-37-304 (1)(a); and
(II) Publication of such reports subject to the approval of the governor;
(c) Preparation of operational and administrative reports and bringing to the attention of the governor special problems of agencies as disclosed through the reporting system;
(d) Repealed.
(e) Delivery to the custody of the state librarian of four copies of all state publications pursuant to section 24-90-204; and
(f) Effecting economies in the publication of operational and administrative information consistent with the purpose of the publication and without interference to the discharge of the agency's statutory responsibilities.
(4) The governor or the general assembly may at any time require that the heads of the principal departments collect and from time to time publish certain regular or special reports, in whole or in part.
(5) The provisions of this section shall not apply to reports and publications of the legislative and judicial branches of state government nor to the publications of executive agencies in connection with research they perform under contract.
(6) Nothing in this section shall be construed to change or supersede the present authority and responsibility of the executive director of the department of personnel to act as official custodian and trustee of permanent public documents and to respond to all reasonable requests for reference, research, and information and to provide facsimiles thereof concerning the contents of original agency reports.
(7) The authority of the heads of the principal departments over the issuance of publications as prescribed in this section shall in no way be construed as being in contravention of those administrative procedure laws which elsewhere either grant powers to executive agencies to promulgate and issue agency rules and regulations or define legal notice and publication with reference to such rules and regulations.
(8) Nothing in this section shall be construed to empower anyone to restrict or inhibit the free flow of news or the release of public information, or to establish censorship or control over news or information of actions by public employees or public bodies, or to restrict public access to public records; nor shall any part of this section be construed as restricting, amending, superseding, or contravening any existing law, order, or requirement relating to any required or permitted official or public notice or legal advertisement.
(9) Whenever any report is required or allowed to be made to the general assembly, including any report required to be made to any committee of the general assembly or legislative staff, the reporting entity shall file one electronic copy of the report with the joint legislative library, and four hard copies with the state librarian for the state publications depository and distribution center. Such filing is sufficient to comply with the direction or authority to make such report. The electronic filing shall be by means of a portable document format and shall include a hyperlink to the website where the report is located, if the report is directly accessible via the internet. If the reporting entity cannot provide an electronic copy of the report to the joint legislative library, then the reporting entity shall deliver six hard copies to the joint legislative library. The joint legislative library is responsible for delivering an electronic or hard copy of the report to the legislators, legislative committees, or legislative staff, as applicable, who are to receive the report. A legislator may request from the joint legislative library delivery of a hard copy of any report.
(10) An agency or department not having an appropriation for producing publications to be sold to the public shall obtain the approval of the controller prior to making any disbursements for said publications. The request for approval shall include the proposed procedures for control of the proceeds of sales.
(11) (a) (I) Effective July 1, 1996, whenever any report is required to be made to the general assembly by an executive agency or the judicial branch on a periodic basis, the requirement for such report shall expire on the day after the third anniversary of the date on which the first such report is due unless the general assembly, acting by bill, continues the requirement.
(II) Repealed.
(b) Among the matters to be considered by the sunrise and sunset review committee, created by joint rule of the senate and house of representatives, during each interim shall be an inventory and review of all existing requirements for reports by executive agencies or the judicial branch to the general assembly that are due to expire on or before July 1 of the following year pursuant to paragraph (a) of this subsection (11); except that, if House Bill 96-1159 is enacted at the second regular session of the sixtieth general assembly and becomes law or if, for any other reason, the sunrise and sunset review committee ceases to exist, such inventory and review shall be conducted by the several committees of reference as directed by the president of the senate and the speaker of the house of representatives, or otherwise as follows:
(I) The agriculture, livestock, and natural resources committee in the house of representatives and the agriculture, natural resources, and energy committee in the senate, or any successor committees, shall consider reporting requirements contained in titles 33 to 37, C.R.S.;
(II) The appropriations committees, or any successor committees, in the house of representatives and the senate shall consider reporting requirements contained in articles 75 to 114 of this title;
(III) The business affairs and labor committee in the house of representatives and the business, labor, and technology committee in the senate, or any successor committees, shall consider reporting requirements contained in titles 4 to 12 and 40, C.R.S.;
(IV) The education committees, or any successor committees, in the house of representatives and the senate shall consider reporting requirements contained in titles 22 and 23, C.R.S.;
(V) The finance committees, or any successor committees, in the house of representatives and the senate shall consider reporting requirements contained in titles 38 and 39, C.R.S.;
(VI) The health and human services committees in the house of representatives and the senate, or any successor committees, shall consider reporting requirements contained in titles 25 to 27, C.R.S.;
(VII) The judiciary committees, or any successor committees, in the house of representatives and the senate shall consider reporting requirements contained in titles 13 to 21, C.R.S.;
(VIII) The local government committees, or any successor committees, in the house of representatives and the senate shall consider reporting requirements contained in titles 30 to 32, C.R.S.;
(IX) The state, veterans, and military affairs committees, or any successor committees, in the house of representatives and the senate shall consider reporting requirements contained in titles 1 to 3, C.R.S., titles 28 and 29, C.R.S., and this title with the exception of articles 75 to 114 and, in addition, any reporting requirement not otherwise assigned to a committee of reference under this paragraph (b); and
(X) The transportation and energy committee in the house of representatives and the transportation committee in the senate, or any successor committees, shall consider reporting requirements contained in titles 41 to 43, C.R.S.
Source: L. 83: Entire section added, p. 823, § 1, effective July 1. L. 96: (3)(d) and (6) amended, p. 1515, § 45, effective June 1; (1)(e) and (11) added, p. 1214, §§ 2, 3, effective August 7. L. 97: (3)(b) amended, p. 331, § 2, effective April 16; (11)(a)(II)(A) repealed, p. 1472, § 1, effective June 3. L. 98: (11)(a)(II)(B) repealed, p. 733, § 24, effective May 18. L. 2000: (11)(a)(II) amended, p. 1512, § 1, effective August 2; (11)(a)(II)(C) repealed, p. 1547, § 9, effective August 2. L. 2001: (11)(a)(II)(D) and (11)(a)(II)(E) repealed, p. 1169, § 1, effective August 8; (11)(a)(II)(D) and (11)(a)(II)(E) repealed, p. 1175, § 1, effective August 8. L. 2002: (11)(a)(II)(F) repealed, p. 874, § 16, effective August 7. L. 2007: (11)(b) amended, p. 2032, § 47, effective June 1. L. 2008: (9) amended, p. 1268, § 4, effective August 5. L. 2012: (9) amended, (SB 12-152), ch. 115, p. 395, § 1, effective August 8. L. 2017: (11)(a)(II) repealed, (SB 17-294), ch. 264, p. 1400, § 66, effective May 25. L. 2023: (3)(d) repealed, (HB 23-1056), ch. 369, p. 2220, § 3, effective August 7.
Editor's note: House Bill 96-1159, referenced in subsection (11)(b), was enacted and became law, effective May 23, 1996.
Cross references: (1) For the provisions concerning the inspection, copying, or photographing of public records, see part 2 of article 72 of this title.
(2) For the legislative declaration contained in the 1996 act enacting subsections (1)(e) and (11), see section 1 of chapter 237, Session Laws of Colorado 1996.
24-1-136.5. Long-range planning for capital construction, controlled maintenance, capital renewal - policy - heads of principal departments.
(1) The executive director of each department, after consultation with the directors of the subordinate agencies, divisions, or offices within the department, has the authority to prescribe uniform policies, procedures, and standards of space utilization in department facilities, except for office space, for the development and approval of capital construction, controlled maintenance, and capital renewal projects for the department. Nothing in this subsection (1) should be construed to alter the authority of the office of the state architect to prescribe uniform standards for office space pursuant to section 24-30-1303 (1)(h).
(2) The executive director shall review facilities master planning and facilities program planning for all capital construction, controlled maintenance, and capital renewal projects on department real property, regardless of the source of funds and shall submit for approval all such facilities master plans and facilities program plans to the office of the state architect for approval as specified in section 24-30-1311. No capital construction, controlled maintenance, or capital renewal shall commence except in accordance with an approved facilities master plan, facilities program plan, and physical plan.
(3) The executive director shall ensure conformity of facilities master planning with approved department operational master plans, facilities program plans with approved facilities master plans, and physical plans with approved facilities program plans.
(4) Plans for any capital construction, controlled maintenance, or capital renewal project for the department are subject to the approval of the executive director, regardless of the source of funds. The executive director may exempt any project which requires less than five hundred thousand dollars of state moneys from the requirements for master planning and program planning.
(5) The executive director shall annually request from the director of each subordinate agency, division, or office within the department a five-year projection of any capital construction, controlled maintenance, and capital renewal projects. The projection must include the estimated cost, the method of funding, a schedule for project completion, and the director's priority for each project. The executive director shall determine whether a proposed project is consistent with operational master planning and facilities master planning of the department and conforms to space utilization standards established pursuant to subsection (1) of this section and section 24-30-1303 (1)(h).
(6) (a) The executive director shall annually establish a department five-year capital construction, controlled maintenance, and capital renewal plan coordinated with department operational master plans and facilities master plans and forward the five-year plan to the office of the state architect for review as required in section 24-30-1311.
(b) The executive director shall transmit to the office of the state architect, consistent with the executive budget timetable, a recommended priority of funding of capital construction, controlled maintenance, and capital renewal projects for the department.
(c) Except as provided in subsection (4) of this section, it is the policy of the general assembly to appropriate funds only for projects approved by the office of the state architect.
(7) Any acquisition or utilization of real property by a department that is conditional upon or requires expenditures of state funds or federal funds is subject to the approval of the executive director and the office of the state architect, regardless of whether the acquisition is by lease, financed purchase of an asset, certificate of participation, purchase, gift, or otherwise.
(8) Prior to approving the facilities master plan and facilities program plan for any capital construction, controlled maintenance, or capital renewal project to be constructed, operated, and maintained solely from fees, gifts and bequests, grants, revolving funds, or a combination of such sources, the executive director shall request and consider recommendations from the office of the state architect.
(9) This section does not apply to the department of higher education, nor should it be construed to alter the duties of the Colorado commission on higher education set forth in section 23-1-106, C.R.S.
(10) As used in this section, unless the context otherwise requires:
(a) "Capital construction" has the same meaning as set forth in section 24-30-1301 (2).
(b) "Capital renewal" has the same meaning as set forth in section 24-30-1301 (3).
(c) "Controlled maintenance" has the same meaning as set forth in section 24-30-1301 (4), including the limitations specified in section 24-30-1303.9.
(d) "Facility" has the same meaning as set forth in section 24-30-1301 (8).
(e) "Real property" has the same meaning as set forth in section 24-30-1301 (15).
Source: L. 94: Entire section added, p. 561, § 2, effective April 6. L. 95: (1) amended, p. 639, § 28, effective July 1. L. 2007: (4) amended, p. 868, § 1, effective May 14. L. 2014: Entire section amended, (HB 14-1387), ch. 378, p. 1836, § 36, effective June 6. L. 2015: (1), (2), (6), (7), and (8) amended, (SB 15-270), ch. 296, p. 1217, § 16, effective June 5. L. 2021: (7) amended, (HB 21-1316), ch. 325, p. 2024, § 30, effective July 1.
Cross references: For the legislative declaration contained in the 1995 act amending subsection (1), see section 112 of chapter 167, Session Laws of Colorado 1995. For the legislative declaration in HB 14-1387, see section 1 of chapter 378, Session Laws of Colorado 2014.
24-1-137. Effect of decrease in length of terms of office for certain state boards, commissions, authorities, and agencies. (Repealed)
Source: L. 87: Entire section added, p. 901, § 1, effective June 15. L. 90: Entire section amended, p. 1152, § 3, effective March 13. L. 91: Entire section amended, p. 890, § 17, effective June 5. L. 2000: Entire section amended, p. 1296, § 18, effective May 26. L. 2001: Entire section amended, p. 479, § 10, effective July 1. L. 2003: Entire section amended, p. 793, § 18, effective July 1. L. 2005: Entire section amended, p. 671, § 12, effective June 1. L. 2006: Entire section amended, p. 1658, § 3, effective July 1. L. 2010: Entire section amended, (SB 10-158), ch. 231, p. 1014, § 3, effective July 1. L. 2011: Entire section amended, (HB 11-1060), ch. 31, p. 88, § 2, effective August 10. L. 2022: Entire section repealed, (SB 22-013), ch. 2, p. 94, § 133, effective February 25.
24-1-138. Mandatory donation of services prohibited.
(1) A regulatory agency or other department, division, agency, branch, instrumentality, or political subdivision of state government shall not require:
(a) A person practicing a regulated profession or occupation to donate the person's professional services without compensation to another person as a condition of admission to or continued licensure, or other authorization to practice the profession or occupation; or
(b) Payment of money in lieu of uncompensated service.
(2) This section shall not be construed to prohibit the crediting of required hours of continuing education in exchange for hours of donated services by a person in a regulated profession or occupation.
Source: L. 2019: Entire section added with relocations, (HB 19-1172), ch. 136, p. 1642, § 2, effective October 1.
Editor's note: This section is similar to former § 12-1.5-101 as it existed prior to 2019.
ARTICLE 1.5
State Administrative Organization Board
24-1.5-101. Legislative declaration.
24-1.5-101.5. Definitions.
24-1.5-102. State administrative organization board - creation - duties.
24-1.5-101. Legislative declaration.
The general assembly hereby finds and declares that the proliferation of type 1 agencies in state government has increased the number of state government programs through the adoption of administrative rules and regulations and that the level of accountability within each principal department of state government has decreased due to the independence of the type 1 agencies. The general assembly therefore adopts this article in order to evaluate existing type 1 agencies and to determine whether agencies created in the future should be so designated.
Source: L. 90: Entire article added, p. 1177, § 1, effective May 24.
24-1.5-101.5. Definitions.
As used in this article 1.5, unless the context otherwise requires:
(1) "Board" means the state administrative organization board created in section 24-1.5-102 (1).
Source: L. 2025: Entire section added, (SB 25-275), ch. 377, p. 2057, § 129, effective August 6.
24-1.5-102. State administrative organization board - creation - duties.
(1) There is hereby created the state administrative organization board, to be comprised of eleven members. Two members of the board shall be appointed by the speaker of the house of representatives, one of whom shall be a member of the general assembly. One member shall be appointed by the minority leader of the house of representatives and shall not be a member of the general assembly and shall not be a state government employee. The other member appointed by the speaker shall not be a member of the general assembly and shall not be a state government employee. Two members of the board shall be appointed by the president of the senate, one of whom shall be a member of the senate. One member shall be appointed by the minority leader of the senate and shall not be a member of the general assembly and shall not be a state government employee. The other member appointed by the president shall not be a member of the general assembly and shall not be a state government employee. Five members of the board shall be appointed by the governor, three of whom shall not be members of the general assembly or state government employees.
(2) The board shall develop a procedure to systematically and regularly review the functions and duties of all type 1 agencies in accordance with a schedule that the board shall devise. The board shall establish criteria for type 1 agencies to determine whether all existing type 1 agencies should continue as type 1 agencies and to evaluate the designation of proposed new type 1 agencies.
(3) The board shall select a chairman from among its members, and it shall meet as often as necessary to carry out the duties specified in this section.
Source: L. 90: Entire article added, p. 1177, § 1, effective May 24. L. 96: (2) and (3) amended, p. 1271, § 203, effective August 7. L. 2025: (1) amended, (SB 25-275), ch. 377, p. 2058, § 130, effective August 6.
Cross references: For the legislative declaration contained in the 1996 act amending subsections (2) and (3), see section 1 of chapter 237, Session Laws of Colorado 1996.
ARTICLE 1.7
Restructuring the Health and Human Services Delivery System
24-1.7-101. Legislative declaration.
24-1.7-102. Local health and human services advisory boards - creation - functions.
24-1.7-103. Consolidation of local boards - process - requirements.
24-1.7-101. Legislative declaration.
The general assembly hereby declares its support for local flexibility in the planning and delivery of health and human services and states its intent to foster continuing coordination, communication, and collaboration at the local level. The general assembly further states its support for local decisions to utilize people and resources at the local level in a more efficient, effective, and economical manner through consolidation of local advisory boards. The general assembly further declares its intent to streamline local planning and community input mechanisms.
Source: L. 97: Entire article R&RE, p. 1181, § 1, effective July 1.
Editor's note: This section is similar to former §§ 24-1.7-101 and 24-1.7-401 as they existed prior to 1997.
24-1.7-102. Local health and human services advisory boards - creation - functions.
(1) In order to accomplish the intent of prior legislation on human services delivery that there be an ongoing process or forum for continued coordination and collaboration at the local level concerning the delivery of human services, this article authorizes the creation of local health and human services advisory boards. A local health and human services advisory board may serve a single county, two or more counties jointly, one or more judicial districts, or other service areas. Members of an advisory board shall be appointed by the governing body or bodies of the counties included. Membership shall be locally determined and shall include appropriate geographic, ethnic, and cultural representation and representation from the public and from consumers of services. Membership shall also include persons who have program expertise for the types of programs the advisory board advises.
(2) In addition to, in combination with, or in lieu of creating a local health and human services advisory board, a county, judicial district, or other service area may elect to consolidate its advisory board with that of one or more other counties, judicial districts, or service areas as specified in section 24-1.7-103.
Source: L. 97: Entire article R&RE, p. 1181, § 1, effective July 1.
Editor's note: This section is similar to former §§ 24-1.7-201 and 24-1.7-402 to 24-1.7-404 as they existed prior to 1997.
24-1.7-103. Consolidation of local boards - process - requirements.
(1) The general assembly hereby finds that there are many advisory types of boards in the human services delivery system that have similar functions and purposes and have members with similar qualifications and expertise. The general assembly finds that greater efficiency and flexibility would be achieved by allowing counties, judicial districts, and other service areas to combine and consolidate some or all of these boards into one board that serves as a broad-based local planning group and carries out all of the functions and responsibilities of the previous boards through a consolidated board.
(2) Any combination of the following boards or groups may be consolidated into a single advisory board:
(a) Placement alternatives commissions, created pursuant to section 19-1-116 (2)(a), C.R.S.;
(b) Juvenile community review boards, as defined in section 19-2.5-102 and described in section 19-2.5-1402;
(c) Local juvenile services planning committees, created pursuant to section 19-2.5-302;
(d) Child protection teams, if such a team is created pursuant to section 19-3-308 (6)(a);
(e) Family preservation commissions, established pursuant to section 26-5.5-106, C.R.S.;
(f) A local health and human services advisory board, created pursuant to section 24-1.7-102.
(3) The consolidation of, and appointments to, local boards or groups that have different appointing authorities set in statute, are subject to the agreement of each appointing authority. Each of the separate functions and responsibilities of each board or group as specified in statute must continue to be met by the consolidated board.
Source: L. 97: Entire article R&RE, p. 1182, § 1, effective July 1. L. 2017: (2)(d) amended, (SB 17-016), ch. 107, p. 392, § 5, effective August 9. L. 2021: (2)(b) and (2)(c) amended, (SB 21-059), ch. 136, p. 742, § 105, effective October 1.
Editor's note: This section is similar to former § 24-1.7-103 as it existed prior to 1997.
ARTICLE 1.9
Collaborative Management of Multi-agency Services Provided to Children and Families
24-1.9-101. Legislative declaration.
24-1.9-102. Memorandum of understanding - local-level interagency oversight groups - individualized service and support teams - coordination of services for children and families - requirements - waiver.
24-1.9-102.3. Duties of individualized service and support teams.
24-1.9-102.5. Evaluation.
24-1.9-102.7. Technical assistance.
24-1.9-103. Reports - executive director review.
24-1.9-104. Cash fund - creation - grants, gifts, and donations.
24-1.9-105. Funding for future local collaborative management programs.
24-1.9-101. Legislative declaration.
(1) The general assembly hereby finds that children and families often benefit from treatment and services that involve multiple agencies, divisions, units, and sections of departments at the state and county level.
(2) The general assembly further finds that the development of a uniform system of collaborative management is necessary for agencies at the state and county levels to effectively and efficiently collaborate to share resources or to manage and integrate the treatment and services provided to children and families who would benefit from multi-agency services.
(3) (a) The development of a more uniform system of collaborative management that includes the input, expertise, and active participation of parent advocacy or family advocacy organizations may reduce duplication and eliminate fragmentation of services; increase the quality, appropriateness, and effectiveness of services provided; encourage cost sharing among service providers; and ultimately lead to better outcomes and cost-reduction for the services provided to children and families in the state of Colorado.
(b) In addition, the general fund moneys saved through utilizing a collaborative approach and consolidating various sources of agency funding will allow for reinvestment of these moneys by the agencies participating in the systems of collaborative management to provide appropriate support to children and families who would benefit from collaborative management of treatment and services.
(4) The general assembly therefore finds that because a collaborative approach may lead to the provision of more appropriate and effective delivery of services to children and families and may ultimately allow the agencies providing treatment and services to provide appropriate services to children and families within existing consolidated resources, it is in the best interests of the state of Colorado to establish systems of collaborative management of multi-agency services provided to children and families.
Source: L. 2004: Entire article added, p. 1547, § 1, effective May 28. L. 2015: (1), (2), and (3)(a) amended, (SB 15-241), ch. 140, p. 425, § 1, effective May 1.
24-1.9-102. Memorandum of understanding - local-level interagency oversight groups - individualized service and support teams - coordination of services for children and families - requirements - waiver.
(1) (a) Local representatives of each of the agencies specified in this subsection (1)(a) and county departments of human or social services may enter into memorandums of understanding that are designed to promote a collaborative system of local-level interagency oversight groups and individualized service and support teams to coordinate and manage the provision of services to children and families who would benefit from integrated multiagency services. The memorandums of understanding entered into pursuant to this subsection (1) must be between interested county departments of human or social services and local representatives of each of the following agencies or entities:
(I) The local judicial districts, including probation services;
(II) The health department, whether a county or district public health agency;
(III) The local school district or school districts;
(IV) Each comprehensive behavioral health safety net provider;
(V) Each behavioral health administrative services organization;
(VI) The division of youth services;
(VII) Repealed.
(VIII) A domestic violence program as defined in section 26-7.5-102, if representation from such a program is available; and
(IX) Each managed care entity, as defined in section 25.5-5-802.
(a.5) In addition to the parties specified in subsection (1)(a) of this section, the memorandums of understanding entered into pursuant to this subsection (1) may include family resource centers created pursuant to part 1 of article 3 of title 26.5.
(b) The general assembly strongly encourages the agencies specified in paragraphs (a) and (a.5) of this subsection (1) to enter into memorandums of understanding that are regional.
(c) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (1)(b) of this section, the agencies specified in subsections (1)(a) and (1)(a.5) of this section may enter into memorandums of understanding involving only one or more county departments of human or social services, not necessarily by region, as may be appropriate to ensure the effectiveness of local-level interagency oversight groups and individualized service and support teams in the county or counties.
(d) In developing the memorandums of understanding, the general assembly strongly encourages the parties to the memorandums of understanding to seek input, support, and collaboration from key stakeholders in the private and nonprofit sector, as well as parent advocacy or family advocacy organizations that represent family members or caregivers of children who would benefit from multi-agency services.
(e) Nothing precludes the agencies specified in subsections (1)(a) and (1)(a.5) of this section from including parties in addition to the agencies specified in subsections (1)(a) and (1)(a.5) of this section in the memorandums of understanding developed for purposes of this section, and which may include the local juvenile services planning committee as described in section 19-2.5-302.
(1.5) The department of human services shall ensure a uniform system of collaborative management that results in statewide consistency with respect to the requirements for program memorandums of understanding pursuant to this article.
(2) (a) Each memorandum of understanding entered into shall include, but is not limited to, the requirements specified in paragraphs (b) to (j) of this subsection (2). On or before October 1, 2004, utilizing moneys in the performance incentive cash fund created in section 26-5-105.5 (3.2)(a), C.R.S., the state department of human services, in conjunction with the judicial department, shall develop and make available to the parties specified in paragraph (a) of subsection (1) of this section, a model memorandum of understanding based on the requirements specified in paragraphs (b) to (j) of this subsection (2).
(b) Identification of services and funding sources. The memorandum of understanding must specify the legal responsibilities and funding sources of each party to the memorandum of understanding as those responsibilities and funding sources relate to children and families who would benefit from integrated multi-agency services, including the identification of the specific services that may be provided. Specific services that may be provided may include, but are not limited to: Prevention, intervention, and treatment services; family preservation services; family stabilization services; out-of-home placement services; services for children at imminent risk of out-of-home placement; probation services; services for children with behavioral or mental health disorders; public assistance services; medical assistance services; child welfare services; and any additional services the parties deem necessary to identify.
(c) Definition of the population to be served. The memorandum of understanding must include a functional definition of "children and families who would benefit from integrated multi-agency services". The collaborative management program target population consists of at-risk children and youth from birth to twenty-one years of age, or families of children or youth, who would benefit from a multi-system integrated service plan that may include prevention, intervention, and treatment services.
(d) Creation of an oversight group. The memorandum of understanding must create a local-level interagency oversight group and identify the oversight group's membership requirements, procedures for selection of officers, procedures for resolving disputes by a majority vote of those members authorized to vote, and procedures for establishing any necessary subcommittees of the interagency oversight group. Each interagency oversight group must include a local representative of each party to the memorandum of understanding specified in subsections (1)(a) and (1)(a.5) of this section, each of whom is a voting member of the interagency oversight group. In addition, the interagency oversight group may include, but is not limited to, the following advisory nonvoting members:
(I) Representatives of interested local private sector entities;
(II) Family members or caregivers of children who would benefit from integrated multi-agency services or current or previous consumers of integrated multi-agency services; and
(III) Representatives or practitioners from local, regional, or statewide restorative justice programs.
(e) Establishment of collaborative management processes. The memorandum of understanding shall require the interagency oversight group to establish collaborative management processes to be utilized by individualized service and support teams authorized pursuant to subsection (2)(f) of this section when providing services to children and families served by the parties to the memorandum of understanding. The collaborative management processes required to be established by the interagency oversight group shall address risk-sharing, resource-pooling, performance expectations, outcome-monitoring, and staff-training, and shall be designed to do the following:
(I) Reduce duplication and eliminate fragmentation of services provided to children or families who would benefit from integrated multi-agency services;
(II) Increase the quality, appropriateness, and effectiveness of services delivered to children or families who would benefit from integrated multi-agency services to achieve better outcomes for these children and families; and
(III) Encourage cost sharing among service providers.
(f) Authorization to create individualized service and support teams. The memorandum of understanding must include authorization for the interagency oversight group to establish individualized service and support teams to develop a service and support plan and to provide services to children and families.
(g) Authorization to contribute resources and funding. The memorandum of understanding shall specify that each party to the memorandum of understanding has the authority to contribute time, resources, and funding to solve problems identified by the local-level interagency oversight group in order to create a seamless, collaborative system of delivering multi-agency services to children and families, upon approval by the head or director of each agency or department specified in paragraphs (a) and (a.5) of subsection (1) of this section.
(h) Reinvestment of money saved to serve additional children and families. The memorandum of understanding must require the interagency oversight group to create a procedure, subject to approval by the head or director of each agency or department specified in subsections (1)(a) and (1)(a.5) of this section, to allow any money resulting from waivers granted by the federal government, any local funds, and any state general fund money appropriated to the program to be used to provide services to children and families who would benefit from integrated multi-agency services, as the population is defined by the memorandum of understanding pursuant to subsection (2)(c) of this section.
(i) Repealed.
(j) Confidentiality compliance. The memorandum of understanding shall include a provision specifying that state and federal law concerning confidentiality shall be followed and that records used or developed by the interagency oversight group or its members or the individualized service and support teams that relate to a particular person are to be kept confidential and may not be released to any other person or agency except as provided by law.
(3) Each department or division, section, unit, or agency within a department that is a party to the memorandum of understanding shall enter into the memorandum of understanding and all revisions to the memorandum. Revisions to the memorandum shall be developed as necessary to reflect department reorganizations or statutory changes affecting the departments that are parties to the memorandum.
(4) The departments and agencies that provide oversight to the parties to the memorandum of understanding specified in paragraphs (a) and (a.5) of subsection (1) of this section are authorized to issue waivers of any rules to which the departments and agencies are subject and that would prevent the departments from effective implementation of the memorandums of understanding; however, the departments and agencies are prohibited from waiving a rule in violation of federal law or that would compromise the safety of a child.
Source: L. 2004: Entire article added, p. 1548, § 1, effective May 28. L. 2008: IP(1)(a), (1)(a)(IV), (1)(a)(V), and (2)(h) amended and (1)(a)(VI) and (1)(a)(VII) added, p. 1529, § 1, effective May 28. L. 2009: (1)(a)(VI) and (1)(a)(VII) amended and (1)(a)(VIII) added, (HB 09-1007), ch. 32, p. 137, § 1, effective August 5. L. 2010: (1)(a)(VII) amended, (SB 10-175), ch. 188, p. 795, § 51, effective April 29; (1), (2)(b), (2)(d), (2)(g), (2)(h)(I), (2)(i), and (4) amended, (SB 10-007), ch. 148, p. 510, § 2, effective August 11; (1)(a)(II) amended, (HB 10-1422), ch. 419, p. 2081, § 59, effective August 11. L. 2015: (1.5) added and (2)(c), (2)(h)(I), and (2)(i) amended, (SB 15-241), ch. 140, p. 426, § 2, effective May 1. L. 2017: (2)(b) amended, (SB 17-242), ch. 263, p. 1320, § 176, effective May 25; IP(1)(a) and (1)(a)(VI) amended, (HB 17-1329), ch. 381, p. 1981, § 51, effective June 6. L. 2018: (1)(e) amended, (SB 18-154), ch. 161, p. 1125, § 3, effective April 25; (2)(h) amended, (SB 18-254), ch. 216, p. 1373, § 2, effective May 18; IP(1)(a) and (1)(c) amended, (SB 18-092), ch. 38, p. 439, § 94, effective August 8. L. 2021: (1)(e) amended, (SB 21-059), ch. 136, p. 742, § 106, effective October 1. L. 2022: (1)(a)(VIII) amended, (SB 22-183), ch. 194, p. 1304, § 10, effective May 19; (1)(a.5) amended, (HB 22-1295), ch. 123, p. 843, § 63, effective July 1; (1)(a)(IV) and (1)(a)(V) amended, (HB 22-1278), ch. 222, p. 1590, § 223, effective July 1, 2024. L. 2023: (2)(d) and (2)(f) amended and (2)(i) repealed, (HB 23-1249), ch. 287, p. 1722, § 3, effective August 7. L. 2025: (1)(a)(VII) repealed, (1)(a)(VIII) amended, and (1)(a)(IX) added, (HB 25-1035), ch. 32, p. 169, § 1, effective March 26.
Editor's note: Amendments to subsection (1)(a)(II) by House Bill 10-1422 and Senate Bill 10-007 were harmonized. Amendments to subsection (1)(a)(VII) by Senate Bill 10-007 and Senate Bill 10-175 were harmonized.
Cross references: (1) For the legislative declaration in the 2010 act amending subsections (1), (2)(b), (2)(d), (2)(g), (2)(h)(I), (2)(i), and (4), see section 1 of chapter 148, Session Laws of Colorado 2010.
(2) For the legislative declaration in SB 17-242, see section 1 of chapter 263, Session Laws of Colorado 2017. For the legislative declaration in SB 18-092, see section 1 of chapter 38, Session Laws of Colorado 2018. For the legislative declaration in HB 23-1249, see section 1 of chapter 287, Session Laws of Colorado 2023.
ANNOTATION
Law reviews. For article, "The Evolution of Colorado's School Attendance Laws: Moving Toward Prevention and Restoration", see 43 Colo. Law. 63 (July 2014).
24-1.9-102.3. Duties of individualized service and support teams.
(1) A local collaborative management program, as described in section 24-1.9-102, must create one or more individualized service and support teams. An individualized service and support team may refer a child to services and may establish a service and support plan for a child after meeting with the child, the child's family, and any other relevant party or community partners.
(2) The information form for children created in section 24-1.9-102.7, or any other form created by the local collaborative management program, may be used by multiple agencies to refer a child to a local collaborative management program in accordance with the local collaborative management program's memorandum of understanding. Such agencies include, but are not limited to:
(a) Law enforcement;
(b) A district attorney;
(c) A school;
(d) A family resource center;
(e) A child advocacy center, as defined in section 19-1-103; and
(f) A county department of human or social services.
(3) The following persons or agencies may have access to records created by an individualized service and support team, including service and support plans:
(a) The county department of human or social services when investigating a report of a known or suspected incident of child abuse or neglect or providing services for a child or family who is the subject of the report;
(b) An agency with legal responsibility or authorization to care for, treat, or supervise a child who is the subject of the record;
(c) A parent, legal guardian or custodian, or other person responsible for the health or welfare of a child named in a record, or the assigned designee of any such person acting by and through a validly executed power of attorney;
(d) The child named in the record and the child's guardian ad litem or counsel for youth;
(e) (I) A service provider who is and continues to be officially and professionally involved in the care of the child who is the subject of the record, but only with regard to information that the service provider has a need to know in order to fulfill the service provider's professional, official, and ongoing role, including:
(A) Hospital personnel engaged in the admission, care, or treatment of the child;
(B) Mental health professionals;
(C) Physicians or surgeons, including physicians in training;
(D) Registered nurses or licensed practical nurses;
(E) Dentists;
(F) Psychologists licensed pursuant to part 3 of article 245 of title 12;
(G) Unlicensed psychotherapists;
(H) Professional counselors licensed pursuant to part 6 of article 245 of title 12;
(I) Marriage and family therapists licensed pursuant to part 5 of article 245 of title 12;
(J) Public or private school officials or employees;
(K) Social workers licensed pursuant to part 4 of article 245 of title 12 or individuals employed by an agency that is licensed or certified pursuant to part 9 of article 6 of title 26 or part 3 of article 5 of title 26.5;
(L) Victim's advocates, as defined in section 13-90-107 (1)(k)(II);
(M) Clergy members, as defined in section 19-3-304 (2)(aa)(III); or
(N) Educators providing services through the federal special supplemental nutrition program for women, infants, and children, as provided for in 42 U.S.C. sec. 1786.
(II) Information disclosed to a service provider pursuant to this subsection (3)(e) is confidential and shall not be disclosed by the service provider to any other person, except as provided by law.
(4) Information disclosed pursuant to subsection (3) of this section must not include the contact information of a victim, or any identifying information of a victim, unless the victim consents to sharing information.
(5) Notwithstanding any other provision of law to the contrary, a child's records, statements, or history with the local collaborative management program are not, without the child's consent, admissible as evidence in any adjudicatory or criminal hearing in which the child is accused and are not subject to subpoena in any adjudicatory or criminal hearing in which the juvenile is accused. This subsection (5) does not supercede any obligations and duties of any mandatory reporter pursuant to section 19-3-304.
(6) The court with jurisdiction to hear the case at issue may have access to the current service and support plan created by an individualized service and support team.
(7) Nothing in this section prohibits the release of records created by the individualized service and support team pursuant to existing law of this state.
Source: L. 2023: Entire section added, (HB 23-1249), ch. 287, p. 1723, § 4, effective August 7. L. 2025: IP(3) amended and (6) and (7) added, (HB 25-1035), ch. 32, p. 170, § 2, effective March 26. L. 2026: (2)(e) amended, (HB 26-1142), ch. 44, p. 205, § 6, effective August 12.
Cross references: (1) For the legislative declaration in HB 23-1249, see section 1 of chapter 287, Session Laws of Colorado 2023.
(2) For the short title ("Colorado Child Advocacy Center Act") and the legislative declaration in HB 26-1142, see sections 1 and 2 of chapter 44, Session Laws of Colorado 2026.
24-1.9-102.5. Evaluation.
The department of human services shall ensure that an annual external evaluation of the statewide program and each county or regional program is conducted by an independent outside entity. The department may contract with the outside entity to conduct an external evaluation of those counties that opted not to participate in the collaborative management program. The department of human services shall utilize money in the collaborative management cash fund created in section 24-1.9-104, or any general fund money appropriated for this purpose, for annual external evaluations of the counties participating in memorandums of understanding pursuant to section 24-1.9-102, also known as the local collaborative management program, as well as external evaluations as determined by the department of human services of those counties that opted to not participate in the collaborative management program. The annual external evaluation must include any evaluation that may be required in connection with a waiver authorized pursuant to section 24-1.9-102 (4). Each county participating in the local collaborative management program shall participate fully in the annual external evaluation.
Source: L. 2008: Entire section added, p. 1530, § 2, effective May 28. L. 2010: Entire section amended, (SB 10-007), ch. 148, p. 512, § 3, effective August 11. L. 2015: Entire section amended, (SB 15-241), ch. 140, p. 427, § 3, effective May 1. L. 2023: Entire section amended, (HB 23-1249), ch. 287, p. 1725, § 5, effective August 7.
Cross references: For the legislative declaration in the 2010 act amending this section, see section 1 of chapter 148, Session Laws of Colorado 2010. For the legislative declaration in HB 23-1249, see section 1 of chapter 287, Session Laws of Colorado 2023.
24-1.9-102.7. Technical assistance.
(1) The department of human services shall develop and implement training for counties participating in the local collaborative management program. The department of human services shall utilize money in the collaborative management cash fund created in section 24-1.9-104, or any general fund money appropriated for this purpose, to develop and implement training for counties. The training must identify management strategies to collaborate effectively and efficiently to share resources or to manage and integrate the treatment and services provided to children and families receiving collaborative management services pursuant to this article 1.9, and strategies to address the needs of children who would benefit from integrated multi-agency services, including children who have had contact with law enforcement or are at risk of involvement with the juvenile justice system. In developing services to support victims, the department of human services shall consult with the department of public safety and the district attorneys. In developing the training and strategies to integrate treatment and services for children who have engaged in behavior in which the underlying factual basis involves unlawful sexual behavior, the department of human services shall consult with the sex offender management board created pursuant to section 16-11.7-103. In developing the training and oversight, the department of human services shall consider the report from the pre-adolescent services task force created in section 19-3-304.4.
(2) On or before December 1, 2023, the department of human services shall create a model information form for children for a party to use to refer a child to a local collaborative management program for assessment and services.
Source: L. 2008: Entire section added, p. 1530, § 2, effective May 28. L. 2015: Entire section amended, (SB 15-241), ch. 140, p. 427, § 4, effective May 1. L. 2023: Entire section amended, (HB 23-1249), ch. 287, p. 1726, § 6, effective August 7.
Cross references: For the legislative declaration in HB 23-1249, see section 1 of chapter 287, Session Laws of Colorado 2023.
24-1.9-103. Reports - executive director review.
(1) Commencing January 1, 2007, and on or before each January 1 thereafter, each interagency oversight group shall provide a report to the executive director of each department and agency that is a party to any memorandum of understanding entered into that includes:
(a) The number of children and families served through the individualized service and support teams and a description of the recommended services; the outcomes of the services provided, including the number, age, race, gender, and, if known, the disability status of the children served; a description of the outcomes for children served; and a description of any reduction in duplication or fragmentation of services provided and a description of any significant improvement in outcomes for children and families;
(b) A description of estimated costs of implementing the collaborative management approach and any estimated cost-shifting or cost-savings that may have occurred by collaboratively managing the multi-agency services provided through the individualized service and support teams;
(b.5) The number of children and families who were referred to a local collaborative management program and did not receive recommended services, including a description of the services that were recommended but not provided; a description of the barriers to providing such services; and the age, race, gender, and, if known, the disability status of the children;
(b.7) The number of children, by age, served by a local collaborative management program, who were referred by the juvenile justice system;
(b.8) The number of children, by age, who were served by a local collaborative management program, who were referred by a county department of human or social services, including referrals through a dependency and neglect case;
(b.9) The number of children, by age, who were served by a local collaborative management program and who identified themselves to the local collaborative management program as:
(I) A named victim in a criminal protection order pursuant to section 18-1-1001 or in a juvenile delinquency or criminal case;
(II) A recipient of victim compensation pursuant to article 4.1 of this title 24; or
(III) A protected party in a protection order pursuant to article 14 of title 13, section 19-2-707 as it existed prior to its repeal in 2021, or section 18-1-1001;
(c) An accounting of money that was reinvested in additional services provided to children or families who would benefit from integrated multi-agency services due to cost-savings that may have resulted;
(d) A description of any identified barriers to the ability of the state and county to provide effective services to persons who received multi-agency services; and
(e) Any other information relevant to improving the delivery of services to persons who would benefit from multi-agency services.
(2) (a) Utilizing the reports created pursuant to subsection (1) of this section, the persons specified in paragraph (b) of this subsection (2) shall meet at least annually with the governor, or his or her designee, to review the activities and progress of counties and agencies engaged in collaborative management of multi-agency services provided to children and families. The purpose of the meeting shall be to identify barriers encountered in collaborative management development or implementation or reinvestment of moneys and to discuss and effectuate solutions to these barriers to achieve greater efficiencies and better outcomes for the state, for local communities, and for persons who would benefit from multi-agency services.
(b) The following persons or their designees shall attend the annual meeting required pursuant to subsection (2)(a) of this section:
(I) The commissioner of education;
(II) A superintendent of a school district that has entered into a memorandum of understanding, as such superintendent is selected by the commissioner of education;
(III) A director of a county department of human or social services that has entered into a memorandum of understanding, as such director is selected by the executive director of the state department of human services;
(IV) The executive director of the department of health care policy and financing;
(V) The executive director of the department of human services;
(VI) A director of a local mental health center that has entered into a memorandum of understanding, as such director is selected by the executive director of the department of human services;
(VII) A representative from a statewide parent advocacy or family advocacy organization who participated in the development of a memorandum of understanding, as such representative is selected by a director of a county department of human or social services chosen by the state department of human services;
(VIII) The executive director of the department of public health and environment; and
(IX) The chief justice of the Colorado supreme court.
Source: L. 2004: Entire article added, p. 1552, § 1, effective May 28. L. 2015: (1)(c), (2)(b)(II), (2)(b)(III), and (2)(b)(VI) amended, (SB 15-241), ch. 140, p. 428, § 5, effective May 1. L. 2018: IP(2)(b), (2)(b)(III), and (2)(b)(VII) amended, (SB 18-092), ch. 38, p. 439, § 95, effective August 8. L. 2023: (1)(a), (1)(c), (2)(b)(II), (2)(b)(III), and (2)(b)(VI) amended and (1)(b.5), (1)(b.7), (1)(b.8), and (1)(b.9) added, (HB 23-1249), ch. 287, p. 1726, § 7, effective August 7.
Cross references: For the legislative declaration in SB 18-092, see section 1 of chapter 38, Session Laws of Colorado 2018. For the legislative declaration in HB 23-1249, see section 1 of chapter 287, Session Laws of Colorado 2023.
24-1.9-104. Cash fund - creation - grants, gifts, and donations.
(1) On July 1, 2005, there is created in the state treasury the collaborative management cash fund, which is referred to in this section as the "fund". The money in the fund is subject to annual appropriation by the general assembly to the department of human services for state fiscal year 2005-06 and each fiscal year thereafter. The fund consists of money received from docket fees in civil actions and transferred as specified in section 13-32-101.
(1.5) Repealed.
(2) The executive director of the department of human services is authorized to accept and expend on behalf of the state any grants, gifts, or donations from any private or public source for the purposes of this section. All private and public funds received through grants, gifts, or donations must be transmitted to the state treasurer, who shall credit the same to the fund in addition to money credited pursuant to subsection (1) of this section and any money that may be appropriated to the fund directly by the general assembly. All investment earnings derived from the deposit and investment of money in the fund remains in the fund and does not transfer or revert to the general fund of the state or any other fund at the end of any fiscal year.
(2.5) Notwithstanding any provision of this section to the contrary, on June 1, 2009, the state treasurer shall deduct three hundred thousand dollars from the fund and transfer such sum to the general fund.
(3) (a) On and after July 1, 2005, the executive director of the department of human services shall allocate the money in the fund, and any general fund money appropriated for this purpose, to parties to a memorandum of understanding who have agreed to collaborative management pursuant to section 24-1.9-102. The executive director of the department of human services shall:
(I) Beginning July 1, 2023, distribute additional funds appropriated for the 2023-24 state fiscal year to the fund to existing collaborative management programs pursuant to the funding formula in place on June 30, 2023; and
(II) Beginning July 1, 2024, provide an annual sum to each local collaborative management program to provide services to children who would benefit from integrated multi-agency services, including children who have had contact with law enforcement or who are at risk of involvement with the juvenile justice system. For the 2024-25 state fiscal year and each state fiscal year thereafter, the amount of the sum provided to each local collaborative management program must be determined through a funding formula that considers:
(A) The amount of money available in the fund;
(B) The need for a base of resources to direct a child and the child's family members to appropriate services; and
(C) The number of children in the population to be served, as defined by the memorandum of understanding pursuant to section 24-1.9-102, in each county or region.
(a.5) On and after July 1, 2008, the executive director of the department of human services is authorized to allocate money in the fund, and any general fund money appropriated for this purpose, to be used to cover the direct and indirect costs of the external evaluation of the collaborative management program described in section 24-1.9-102 and the technical assistance and training for counties as described in section 24-1.9-102.7.
(b) For purposes of allocating money pursuant to this subsection (3), the executive director of the department of human services shall submit an accounting of money in the fund, and any general fund money appropriated for this purpose, and a proposal for the allocation of money to the state board of human services for review and approval prior to the allocation of the money. The state board of human services shall approve the proposal not later than thirty days after receipt of the proposal from the executive director of the department of human services.
Source: L. 2004: Entire article added, p. 1554, § 1, effective May 28. L. 2008: (3)(a.5) added, p. 1531, § 3, effective May 28. L. 2009: (2.5) added, (SB 09-279), ch. 367, p. 1926, § 7, effective June 1. L. 2011: (1) amended, (HB 11-1303), ch. 264, p. 1164, § 54, effective August 10. L. 2015: (3) amended, (SB 15-241), ch. 140, p. 428, § 6, effective May 1; (1) amended, (SB 15-264), ch. 259, p. 958, § 60, effective August 5. L. 2023: Entire section amended, (HB 23-1249), ch. 287, p. 1728, § 8, effective August 7. L. 2025: (1.5) repealed, (SB 25-266), ch. 108, p. 460, § 1, effective July 1.
Cross references: For the legislative declaration in HB 23-1249, see section 1 of chapter 287, Session Laws of Colorado 2023.
24-1.9-105. Funding for future local collaborative management programs.
(1) For state fiscal year 2023-24, the general assembly shall appropriate two million dollars from the general fund to the department of human services to be used to assist interested counties that do not already operate a local collaborative management program with establishing a local collaborative management program or joining an existing local collaborative management program. The department of human services shall determine the amount that is distributed to a county for this purpose.
(2) All unexpended or unencumbered money that remains at the end of state fiscal year 2023-24 shall revert to the collaborative management cash fund created in section 24-1.9-104.
Source: L. 2023: Entire section added, (HB 23-1249), ch. 287, p. 1729, § 9, effective August 7.
Cross references: For the legislative declaration in HB 23-1249, see section 1 of chapter 287, Session Laws of Colorado 2023.
ARTICLE 2
Organization of Administrative Departments
24-2-101. Application.
24-2-102. Appointment of officers and employees.
24-2-103. Compensation of heads of departments and other officers and employees.
24-2-104. Bonds. (Repealed)
24-2-105. Rules and regulations.
24-2-106. Restriction of number of employees.
24-2-107. Transfer of employees.
24-2-108. Departments to share information and mailings.
24-2-101. Application.
The provisions of this article, parts 2 and 11 of article 30, and articles 31, 35, and 36 of this title shall not be construed to apply to the judiciary nor the legislature, except when expressly specified.
Source: L. 41: p. 35, § 2. CSA: C. 3, § 2. CRS 53: § 3-1-2. C.R.S. 1963: § 3-1-2. L. 68: p. 138, § 175. L. 2001: Entire section amended, p. 1273, § 29, effective June 5.
ANNOTATION
For the constitutionality of earlier administrative code, see Johnson v. People, 96 Colo. 175, 40 P.2d 615 (1935).
24-2-102. Appointment of officers and employees.
(1) Except as otherwise provided by law, such officers and employees as may be necessary in each principal department or institution of higher education shall be appointed by the head of each such department or institution in conformity with section 13 of article XII of the constitution of the state and the laws enacted in accordance therewith.
(2) The head of each principal department shall certify to the governor the number of officers and employees needed or required for the operation of his or her department for the ensuing twelve-month period in accordance with article 37 of this title.
(3) If, after appointments have been made to any principal department, the governor is of the opinion that the appointed personnel of any such department is in excess of its needs, the governor may require the separation of any of said appointees if ten days' prior notice of the proposed action is given by the governor to the head of any such department affected and opportunity given to such head within said ten-day period to be heard as to the necessity for the retention of all or any of said appointees proposed to be separated. The decision of the governor after such hearing shall be final and conclusive.
(4) Repealed.
(5) Elective officers shall not be subject to the provisions of this article 2, parts 2 and 11 of article 30, and articles 31, 35, 36, and 101 to 111 of this title 24.
Source: L. 41: p. 37, § 5. CSA: C. 3, §§ 5, 6. CRS 53: § 3-1-5. C.R.S. 1963: § 3-1-4. L. 68: p. 137, § 171. L. 72: p. 182, §§ 2, 3. L. 81: (4) amended, p. 1286, § 4, effective January 1, 1982. L. 91: (4) amended, p. 805, § 2, effective July 1. L. 95: (4) amended, p. 1103, § 35, effective May 31. L. 99: (1) amended, p. 164, § 23, effective August 4. L. 2004: (1) and (2) amended, p. 1693, § 29, effective July 1, 2005. L. 2025, 1st Ex. Sess.: (4) repealed and (5) added, (SB 25B-001), ch. 11, p. 69, § 2, effective August 28.
Editor's note: (1) Subsection (4) was relocated to § 24-75-201.5 (1) in 2025.
(2) Section 4 of chapter 11 (SB 25B-001), Session Laws of Colorado 2025, First Extraordinary Session, provides that the act changing this section applies to revenue estimates and interim revenue estimates presented, and executive orders issued, on or after August 28, 2025.
Cross references: For power of the head of a principal department to discontinue divisions, sections, or units other than those created by law, see § 24-1-107.
ANNOTATION
I. General Consideration.
II. Appointments.
III. Suspensions.
I. GENERAL CONSIDERATION.
Annotator's note. Cases decided under former law (prior to 1941) have been included in the annotations to this section.
II. APPOINTMENTS.
Persons necessary after department formed deemed necessary employees. The officers, assistants, and employees necessary in each principal department are those persons necessary after each department is formed, not those persons initially necessary to constitute the department. People v. Downen, 106 Colo. 557, 108 P.2d 224 (1940).
Motive or intent in making an appointment is irrelevant where the authority to make an appointment is conferred by statute. Davis v. Morley, 79 Colo. 168, 244 P. 599 (1926).
Chief of Colorado state patrol is appointed by head of department of highways and the appointment must be made from a list of three persons ranking highest, as determined by a competitive test of competence administered by the Colorado state personnel board. Schippers v. Colo. State Pers. Bd., 178 Colo. 154, 496 P.2d 307 (1972) (decided prior to the 1983 transfer of the Colorado state patrol to the department of public safety).
For the former requirement that appointments are to be approved by executive council, see People ex rel. Swayze v. Bixby, 102 Colo. 583, 81 P.2d 880 (1938).
III. SUSPENSIONS.
For constitutionality of provision authorizing suspensions for economy reasons, see Getty v. Gaffy, 96 Colo. 454, 44 P.2d 506 (1935).
Suspension of positions within the Division of Disaster Emergency Services to decrease general fund expenditures is warranted regardless of whether the funding source of the positions is the general fund or federal funds. Bardsley v. Dept. of Pub. Safety, 870 P.2d 641 (Colo. App. 1994).
Temporary discontinuance of a state department's functions and consequent lay off of employees as part of a budget reduction plan is lawful, but abolition of a statutorily created state agency and the transfer of its functions to another principal department without prior legislative authority is unlawful. Subsequent legislative authority for such transfer of functions does not make the issue of the validity of the Governor's actions moot. Bardsley v. Dept. of Pub. Safety, 870 P.2d 641 (Colo. App. 1994).
Governor's suspension decision not open to judicial inquiry. The finding of the governor that sufficient reason exists for suspending or discontinuing an office, etc., is not open to judicial inquiry. Getty v. Gaffy, 96 Colo. 454, 44 P.2d 506 (1935); People ex rel. Engley v. Martin, 19 Colo. 565, 36 P. 543 (1894); Lee v. Morley, 79 Colo. 481, 247 P. 178 (1926).
Order suspending officer may name incumbent. Where the governor, by executive order, under statutory authority, suspends the secretary of the state civil service commission (now the department of personnel), the fact that the incumbent is named personally in the order is unimportant. Getty v. Gaffy, 96 Colo. 454, 44 P.2d 506 (1935).
Secretary of former civil service commission was not entitled to compensation during suspension. Bedford v. Gaffy, 96 Colo. 452, 44 P.2d 508 (1935).
24-2-103. Compensation of heads of departments and other officers and employees.
(1) (a) Except as provided in paragraph (b) of this subsection (1), officers and employees of the state who are exempt from the state personnel system shall receive compensation as fixed by law. Any officer or employee who receives compensation as fixed by law shall not receive compensation or fees from more than one department or institution of higher education or in more than one capacity; except that the lieutenant governor may be compensated for any additional duties and functions relating to a department or institution of higher education as may be authorized by law.
(b) If the compensation of an officer or employee who is exempt from the state personnel system is not fixed by law, the officer's or employee's compensation shall be determined as follows:
(I) The governor shall determine the compensation for the head of each principal department, and the head of each principal department shall determine the compensation for officers and employees of the department.
(II) The governing board of each institution of higher education, including the Auraria higher education center established in article 70 of title 23, C.R.S., shall determine the compensation for the head of the institution, and the head of each institution shall determine the compensation for officers and employees of the institution.
(c) Officers and employees in the state personnel system shall receive compensation pursuant to section 13 of article XII of the state constitution and the compensation system established by the state personnel director pursuant to article 50 of this title. Officers and employees in the state personnel system shall not receive compensation or fees from more than one department or institution of higher education except as permitted by rules adopted by the state personnel director in accordance with article 4 of this title that are consistent with the overtime provisions of section 24-50-104.5.
(d) Nothing in this subsection (1) shall prevent departments and institutions of higher education, including the Auraria higher education center established in article 70 of title 23, C.R.S., from sharing personnel if the terms and conditions of the personnel sharing agreement are in writing and include a provision concerning the distribution of compensation.
(2) Upon declaration of a fiscal emergency made pursuant to section 24-50-109.5 (1) and the subsequent imposition of mandatory furloughs or other measures to reduce personnel expenditures, such measures shall apply not only to state personnel system employees but shall be likewise imposed upon all other officers and employees of the executive branch, if exempt from the state personnel system, except as otherwise provided by law or prohibited by contract.
Source: L. 41: p. 39, § 6. CSA: C. 3, § 7. CRS 53: § 3-1-6. L. 61: p. 128, § 1. C.R.S. 1963: § 3-1-5. L. 68: p. 138, § 172. L. 73: p. 166, § 1. L. 83: Entire section amended, p. 848, § 1, effective May 31. L. 2004: (1) R&RE, p. 1536, § 1, effective May 28. L. 2011: (1)(a) amended, (HB 11-1155), ch. 90, p. 265, § 2, effective April 6. L. 2012: (1)(b)(II) and (1)(d) amended, (HB 12-1081), ch. 210, p. 903, § 4, effective August 8.
ANNOTATION
Section 13 of art. XII, Colo. Const., operates as a limitation upon the power of the general assembly, governor, and department heads to fix the salaries of persons under the state personnel system; such power is limited to fixing salaries according to classes and grades and does not include discriminating between individuals in the same classification as determined by the state personnel board. Vivian v. Bloom, 115 Colo. 579, 177 P.2d 541 (1947).
Constitutional or statutory provision fixing salary operates as continuous appropriation. When the constitution or a statutory provision fixes the salary to be received by a public officer, it operates as a continuous appropriation therefor, and no further legislative sanction is necessary to authorize the proper officers to pay the same. People ex rel. Hegwer v. Goodykoontz, 22 Colo. 507, 45 P. 414 (1896).
Appropriation for institution deemed appropriation for employees' salaries. An appropriation for the "support and maintenance" of a state institution is an appropriation for the payment of salaries of the employees thereof. Davis v. Morley, 79 Colo. 168, 244 P. 599 (1926).
24-2-104. Bonds. (Repealed)
Source: L. 41: p. 39, § 7. CSA: C. 3, § 8. CRS 53: § 3-1-7. C.R.S. 1963: § 3-1-6. L. 68: p. 138, § 173. L. 2018: Entire section repealed, (HB 18-1140), ch. 41, p. 462, § 2, effective August 8.
Cross references: For the legislative declaration in HB 18-1140, see section 1 of chapter 41, Session Laws of Colorado 2018.
24-2-105. Rules and regulations.
The head of each principal department is empowered, subject to the written approval of the governor, to prescribe rules and regulations, not inconsistent with law, for the government of his department, the conduct of its employees, the distribution and performance of its business, and the custody, use, and preservation of the records, papers, books, documents, and property pertaining thereto.
Source: L. 41: p. 39, § 8. CSA: C. 3, § 8. CRS 53: § 3-1-8. C.R.S. 1963: § 3-1-7. L. 68: p. 138, § 174.
Cross references: For rule-making procedures, see article 4 of this title.
ANNOTATION
Department of revenue rule may be inconsistent with retail sales tax law if deemed to create a "conclusive presumption" based upon the failure of the vendee to have a sales tax license or a store license, because the law imposes a tax on retail sales only, not on wholesale sales. Pluss v. Dept. of Rev., 173 Colo. 86, 476 P.2d 253 (1970).
24-2-106. Restriction of number of employees.
It is the duty of the governor as the supreme executive power of the state to restrict the number of employees in the various offices, boards, divisions, and agencies of the executive department to the lowest number required for efficient operation thereof. In making any appointment or in approving any appointment made by any other official of the executive department, the governor shall certify in writing that he deems such appointment necessary and for the best interests of the public service. In the exercise of his responsibility, the governor may delegate in writing to some other official the power to approve or disapprove appointments made by other officials of the executive department, subject always to final review by the governor at his option.
Source: L. 41: p. 51, § 10. CSA: C. 3, § 10. CRS 53: § 3-2-2. L. 63: p. 121, § 2. C.R.S. 1963: § 3-2-2.
24-2-107. Transfer of employees.
For the purpose of providing necessary flexibility to meet working conditions and seasonal demands, the governor has power, when he is of the opinion and so certifies in writing that it is necessary or desirable so to do, to transfer any employee of any office, board, division, or agency of the state government to any other office, board, division, or agency of the state government for such time as in the opinion of the governor is necessary.
Source: L. 41: p. 51, § 11. CSA: C. 3, § 11. CRS 53: § 3-2-3. L. 63: p. 121, § 3. C.R.S. 1963: § 3-2-3.
24-2-108. Departments to share information and mailings.
For the convenience of the citizens of this state and to promote economy in state government, it is the intent of the general assembly that all principal departments, when feasible and not contrary to federal or state law, shall share as much information as possible and, when reasonably feasible to do so, shall coordinate forms, both federal and state, and shall eliminate multiple mailings to addressees.
Source: L. 77: Entire section added, p. 1133, § 1, effective May 24.
Cross references: For the "Information Coordination Act", see § 24-1-136.
ARTICLE 3
Agencies as Parties in Actions
24-3-101. Agency defined.
24-3-102. Party in original action.
24-3-103. Provisions procedural and remedial.
24-3-101. Agency defined.
As used in this article, the term "agency" means every agency in the executive branch of the state government which is required by the constitution or statutes of the state to exercise discretion or to perform judicial or quasi-judicial functions. As so qualified, the term "agency" includes, but is not limited to, boards, commissions, departments, divisions, offices, and officers.
Source: L. 57: p. 118, § 1. CRS 53: § 3-2-4. C.R.S. 1963: § 3-2-4.
24-3-102. Party in original action.
(1) Except as otherwise specifically provided and subject to applicable provisions of the constitution, statutes, and rules of civil procedure of the state of Colorado, every agency is authorized:
(a) To institute and appear as a party in original actions in the supreme court of the state of Colorado and the United States supreme court in all causes, matters, and proceedings involving the functions and duties of such agency where such courts have original jurisdiction;
(b) To prosecute appeals in all cases, causes, matters, and proceedings in which such agency is a party in the courts of this state and its subdivisions, federal courts, and courts in other jurisdictions.
Source: L. 57: p. 118, § 2. CRS 53: § 3-2-5. C.R.S. 1963: § 3-2-5.
24-3-103. Provisions procedural and remedial.
The provisions of this article shall be construed as procedural and remedial and shall not be construed as extending, conferring, or granting such agencies any substantive powers, duties, or functions, nor shall this article be construed as granting permission to sue the sovereign state of Colorado or any agency thereof.
Source: L. 57: p. 119, § 4. CRS 53: § 3-2-7. C.R.S. 1963: § 3-2-7.
ARTICLE 3.5
Meetings of Boards and Commissions
24-3.5-101. Legislative declaration relating to meetings of state boards and commissions.
24-3.5-101. Legislative declaration relating to meetings of state boards and commissions.
The general assembly declares that public participation in government produces better government; therefore, to promote as much public participation in government as possible, every state board and commission established by law is encouraged to hold at least one-third of its regularly scheduled meetings outside the Denver metropolitan area each year, taking their budgetary constraints into account.
Source: L. 75: Entire article added, p. 791, § 1, effective June 20.
Cross references: For the open meetings law, see part 4 of article 6 of this title.
ARTICLE 3.7
Statutory Requirements for Creation of Boards and Commissions
24-3.7-101. Statutory language required for creation of state boards and commissions.
24-3.7-102. Best practices for state boards and commissions.
24-3.7-101. Statutory language required for creation of state boards and commissions.
When the general assembly statutorily creates any board or commission in state government, such statutory provision shall specify a termination date for such board or commission, the appointing authority for each member, any requirement for senate confirmation of appointments, the number and type of members, any per diem or allowance for expenses, the state department in which the board or commission shall be located, any explicit powers possessed by such board or commission, including but not limited to advisory authority, rule-making authority, or authority regarding the control of revenues, and any staffing, funding, or reporting requirements.
Source: L. 91: Entire article added, p. 834, § 1, effective March 29.
24-3.7-102. Best practices for state boards and commissions.
(1) Notwithstanding any law to the contrary, commencing January 1, 2019, each statutorily created board or commission in state government, not including a special purpose authority as defined in section 24-77-102 (15), shall implement written policies or bylaws and obtain annual training on:
(a) Understanding and operating within the limits of statutory directives, legislative intent, and any specific directions or laws related to the board or commission's establishment and its powers and duties;
(b) Defining the board or commission's mission or role in the oversight of projects or entities approved to receive public funding, if applicable;
(c) Understanding the goals of the programs the board or commission oversees, and aligning the board or commission's processes with those goals;
(d) Identifying and managing conflicts of interest;
(e) Understanding the requirements of the "Colorado Open Records Act", part 2 of article 72 of this title 24, and the open meetings law, part 4 of article 6 of this title 24;
(f) Setting parameters regarding board or commission staff's duties relative to the board or commission's mission or role;
(g) Identifying and securing sufficient data in order for the board or commission to make informed decisions;
(h) Ensuring the appropriate involvement of members in the review of key communications and in any policy-making activities;
(i) Ensuring members act in accordance with their roles as public representatives;
(j) Coordinating with other boards or commissions, industry, educational institutions, and state agencies where responsibilities and interests overlap; and
(k) Annually reviewing management practices to ensure best practices are utilized.
(2) Each state agency responsible for a statutorily created board or commission shall ensure that the state board or commission obtains the annual training and implements the written policies specified in subsection (1) of this section.
Source: L. 2018: Entire section added, (HB 18-1198), ch. 145, p. 930, § 1, effective August 8.
ARTICLE 4
Rule-making and Licensing Procedures by State Agencies
PART 1
GENERAL
24-4-101. Short title.
24-4-101.5. Legislative declaration.
24-4-102. Definitions.
24-4-103. Rule-making - procedure - definitions - statutory citation correction.
24-4-103.3. Mandatory review of rules by agencies - report on results of review in departmental regulatory agendas - definitions.
24-4-103.5. Rule-making affecting small business - procedure. (Repealed)
24-4-104. Licenses - issuance, suspension or revocation, renewal.
24-4-104.5. Permits - rules in effect at time of submission of application for a permit control.
24-4-104.6. Analysis of noncompliance with department rules - definition - legislative declaration.
24-4-105. Hearings and determinations.
24-4-106. Judicial review.
24-4-107. Application of article.
24-4-108. Legislative consideration of rules. (Repealed)
24-4-109. State engagement of disproportionately impacted communities - definitions.
PART 2
MILITARY OCCUPATIONAL STREAMLINING
24-4-201. Definitions.
24-4-202. Legislative declaration - reports.
24-4-203. Evaluation and implementation.
24-4-204. Consultation - cooperation.
PART 1
GENERAL
24-4-101. Short title.
This article shall be known and may be cited as the "State Administrative Procedure Act".
Source: L. 69: p. 91, § 8. C.R.S. 1963: § 3-16-7.
ANNOTATION
Applied in City of Aurora v. Indus. Comm'n, 44 Colo. App. 132, 609 P.2d 129 (1980); CF&I Steel Corp. v. Colo. Air Pollution Control Comm'n, 44 Colo. App. 111, 640 P.2d 238 (1981).
24-4-101.5. Legislative declaration.
The general assembly finds that an agency should not regulate or restrict the freedom of any person to conduct his or her affairs, use his or her property, or deal with others on mutually agreeable terms unless it finds, after a full consideration of the effects of the agency action, that the action would benefit the public interest and encourage the benefits of a free enterprise system for the citizens of this state. The general assembly also finds that many government programs may be adopted without stating the direct and indirect costs to consumers and businesses and without consideration of such costs in relation to the benefits to be derived from the programs. The general assembly further recognizes that agency action taken without evaluation of its economic impact may have unintended effects, which may include barriers to competition, reduced economic efficiency, reduced consumer choice, increased producer and consumer costs, and restrictions on employment. The general assembly further finds that agency rules can negatively impact the state's business climate by impeding the ability of local businesses to compete with out-of-state businesses, by discouraging new or existing businesses from moving to this state, and by hindering economic competitiveness and job creation. Accordingly, it is the continuing responsibility of agencies to analyze the economic impact of agency actions and reevaluate the economic impact of continuing agency actions to determine whether the actions promote the public interest.
Source: L. 77: Entire section added, p. 1134, § 1, effective May 31. L. 2003: Entire section amended, p. 2369, § 1, effective August 6.
24-4-102. Definitions.
As used in this article 4, unless the context otherwise requires:
(1) "Action" includes the whole or any part of any agency rule, order, interlocutory order, license, sanction, relief, or the equivalent or denial thereof, or failure to act. Any agency rule, order, license, sanction, relief, or the equivalent or denial thereof which constitutes final agency action shall include a list of all parties to the agency proceeding and shall specify the date on which the action becomes effective.
(2) "Adjudication" means the procedure used by an agency for the formulation, amendment, or repeal of an order and includes licensing.
(3) "Agency" means any board, bureau, commission, department, institution, division, section, or officer of the state, except those in the legislative branch or judicial branch and except:
(a) State educational institutions administered pursuant to title 23, except part 1 of article 8, parts 2 and 3 of article 21, and parts 2 to 4 of article 31 of title 23;
(b) Repealed.
(c) The adjutant general of the National Guard, whose powers and duties are set forth in section 28-3-106, C.R.S.
(3.5) "Aggrieved", for the purpose of judicial review of rule-making, means having suffered actual loss or injury or being exposed to potential loss or injury to legitimate interests including, but not limited to, business, economic, aesthetic, governmental, recreational, or conservational interests.
(4) "Counsel" means an attorney admitted to practice before the supreme court of this state.
(5) "Decision" means the determinative action in adjudication and includes order, opinion, sanction, and relief.
(5.5) "Economic competitiveness" means the ability of the state of Colorado to attract new business and the ability of the businesses currently operating in Colorado to create new jobs and raise productivity.
(6) "Initial decision" means a decision made by a hearing officer or administrative law judge which will become the action of the agency unless reviewed by the agency.
(6.2) "Interested person" includes any person who may be aggrieved by agency action.
(6.5) "Legislative committees of reference" means the committees established by the rules of the house of representatives and rules of the senate of the general assembly having jurisdiction over subject matter regulated by state agencies.
(7) "License" includes the whole or any part of any agency permit, certificate, registration, charter, membership, or statutory exemption.
(8) "Licensing" includes the procedure used by an agency respecting the grant, renewal, denial, revocation, suspension, annulment, limitation, or modification of a license.
(9) "Opinion" means the statement of reasons, findings of fact, and conclusions of law in explanation or support of an order.
(10) "Order" means the whole or any part of the final disposition (whether affirmative, negative, injunctive, or declaratory in form) by any agency in any matter other than rule-making.
(11) "Party" includes any person or agency named or admitted as a party, or properly seeking and entitled as of right to be admitted as a party, in any court or agency proceeding subject to the provisions of this article.
(12) "Person" includes an individual, limited liability company, partnership, corporation, association, county, and public or private organization of any character other than an agency.
(13) "Proceeding" means any agency process for any rule or rule-making, order or adjudication, or license or licensing.
(14) "Relief" includes the whole or any part of any agency grant of money, assistance, license, authority, exemption, exception, privilege, or remedy; recognition of any claim, right, immunity, privilege, exemption, exception, or remedy; or any other action upon the application or petition of, and beneficial to, any person.
(14.5) "Representative group" means a diverse group convened by an agency prior to rule-making or invited to participate in the rule-making hearing to give input and to comment on the effect of the proposed rules. The group should represent different points of view and may include representatives of persons, businesses, advocacy groups, trade associations, labor organizations, environmental advocacy groups, consumer advocates, or the regulated industry or profession affected negatively or positively by proposed rules.
(15) "Rule" means the whole or any part of every agency statement of general applicability and future effect implementing, interpreting, or declaring law or policy or setting forth the procedure or practice requirements of any agency. "Rule" includes "regulation".
(16) "Rule-making" means agency process for the formulation, amendment, or repeal of a rule. "Rule-making" does not include a statutory citation correction authorized by section 24-4-103 (11)(l).
(17) "Sanction" includes the whole or any part of any agency prohibition, requirement, limitation, or other condition affecting the freedom of any person; withholding of relief; imposition of any form of penalty or fine; destruction, taking, seizure, barring access to, or withholding of property; assessment of damages; reimbursement; restitution; compensation; costs; charges or fees; requirement; revocation or suspension of a license or the prescription or requirement of terms, conditions, or standards of conduct thereunder; or other compulsory or restrictive action.
(18) "Small business" means a business with fewer than five hundred employees.
Source: L. 59: p. 158, § 1. CRS 53: § 3-16-1. C.R.S. 1963: §3-16-1. L. 67: p. 300, § 1. L. 69: p. 81, § 1. L. 76: (4) amended and (6.5) added, p. 582, § 14, effective May 24. L. 79: (3.5) added and (12) amended, pp. 842, 843, §§ 1, 1, effective May 26. L. 81: (1) amended, p. 1133, § 1, effective June 6. L. 83: (3) amended, p. 962, § 7, effective July 1, 1984. L. 87: (6) amended, p. 961, § 64, effective March 13. L. 90: (12) amended, p. 447, § 8, effective April 18. L. 93: (6.2) added, p. 1325, § 1, effective June 6. L. 2002: (3) amended, p. 586, § 6, effective May 24. L. 2003: (5.5) and (18) added, p. 2370, § 2, effective August 6. L. 2012: (14.5) added, (HB 12-1008), ch. 182, p. 691, § 1, effective May 17; (3)(b) repealed, (HB 12-1283), ch. 240, p. 1133, § 44, effective July 1. L. 2013: (3)(a) amended, (HB 13-1300), ch. 316, p. 1681, § 49, effective August 7. L. 2017: (16) amended, (HB 17-1006), ch. 31, p. 88, § 1, effective March 16. L. 2021: IP and (3)(a) amended, (HB 21-1264), ch. 308, p. 1876, § 16, effective June 23.
Cross references: (1) For the legislative declaration in the 2012 act repealing subsection (3)(b), see section 1 of chapter 240, Session Laws of Colorado 2012.
(2) For the legislative declaration in HB 21-1264, see section 2 of chapter 308, Session Laws of Colorado 2021.
ANNOTATION
Law reviews. For article, "One Year Review of Constitutional and Administrative Law", see 38 Dicta 154 (1961). For note, "Colorado's Ombudsman Office", see 45 Den. L.J. 93 (1968). For article, "A Review of Recent Activity in Colorado Water Law", see 47 Den. L.J. 181 (1970). For comment, "Standing of State Political Subdivisions to Challenge State Agency Rulings Under the Colorado Administrative Procedure Act", see 53 Den. L. J. 437 (1976).
The director of the department of revenue is an "agency" for purposes of this act. Farmers Cafe v. State Dept. of Rev., 752 P.2d 1064 (Colo. App. 1988).
Board of chiropractic examiners is an "agency" of the state and not subject to civil rights claims asserted under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Stjernholm v. Colo. Bd. of Chiropractic Exam'rs, 820 P.2d 1166 (Colo. App. 1991).
State board for community colleges and occupational education is an "agency" of the state and no action for damages may be maintained under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Nat'l Camera, Inc. v. Sanchez, 832 P.2d 960 (Colo. App. 1991).
Labor department's division of employment must also be deemed an "agency", as that term is defined in this section. City of Aurora v. Indus. Comm'n, 44 Colo. App. 132, 609 P.2d 129 (1980).
Air pollution (now air quality) control commission is an "agency" under this section and is subject to the provisions of the state administrative procedure act. CF&I Steel Corp. v. Colo. Air Pollution Control Comm'n, 199 Colo. 270, 610 P.2d 85 (1980).
University of Colorado not an "agency". Since the university of Colorado is neither a rule-making nor licensing agency, the administrative procedure act doesn't apply to it expressly or by implication. Sigma Chi Fraternity v. Regents of Univ. of Colo., 258 F. Supp. 515 (D. Colo. 1966).
Community college board not an "agency". Pursuant to subsection (3) of this section and § 24-4-106, decisions by the state board for community colleges and occupational education and by a college president are excluded from judicial review. Van Pelt v. State Bd. for Cmty. Colls. & Occupational Educ., 195 Colo. 316, 577 P.2d 765 (1978).
Private hospital not an "agency". A private hospital's peer review process is not subject to judicial review under this article because, for purposes of this article, "agency" only applies to state actors. Crow v. Penrose-St. Francis Healthcare, 2012 COA 43, 292 P.3d 1018.
"Aggrieved" parties defined. Those whose activities are exactly those to which a particular regulation apply, and who will be adversely affected by an application of the regulation, are "aggrieved" parties, with standing to seek judicial review of the regulation. CF&I Steel Corp. v. Colo. Air Pollution Control Comm'n, 199 Colo. 270, 610 P.2d 85 (1980).
"Aggrieved" parties under health insurer conversion statute included a policyholder of the corporation to be converted and a coalition of nonprofit organizations that could be adversely affected if the entity established to receive the consideration under this section were not sufficiently funded. Hawes v. Colo. Div. of Ins., 32 P.3d 571 (Colo. App. 2001).
Any decision made by a hearing officer or administrative law judge is an initial decision, which becomes final only if no exceptions or agency motion are submitted within the allotted time. Colo. Workers for Innovative v. Gherardini, 2023 COA 80, 540 P.3d 950.
A letter from the executive director informing a petitioner that the executive director finds no basis to proceed with an investigation, issue a cease-and-desist order, or take other action is an "order" and constitutes agency action and final agency action. W. Colo. Motors v. Gen. Motors, LLC, 2016 COA 103, 411 P.3d 1068.
The executive director is not required to hold a formal adjudicatory proceeding before issuing a final agency action. W. Colo. Motors v. Gen. Motors, LLC, 2016 COA 103, 411 P.3d 1068.
"Party" seeking review need not file alternative regulation. Status as a "party" in seeking judicial review of agency action does not require that one have filed an alternative to a proposed regulation. CF&I Steel Corp. v. Colo. Air Pollution Control Comm'n, 199 Colo. 270, 610 P.2d 85 (1980).
County not included in definition of "party". A county, as an arm of the state board of social services, has no rights or privileges so far as its statutory duties are concerned and hence does not come within the definition of "party". Bd. of County Comm'rs v. Bd. of Soc. Servs., 186 Colo. 435, 528 P.2d 244 (1974).
Board of county commissioners has standing to initiate action against Colorado department of social services because it is seeking judicial review on its own behalf, as distinct from its role as the county board of social services, for an alleged injury it has suffered. Under these circumstances, board is not subordinate to the department. Bd. of County Comm'rs v. Romer, 931 P.2d 504 (Colo. App. 1996).
The state board for community colleges and occupational education is by definition a state agency, not a "person" under a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action, and no action for damages may be maintained against it under that statute. Nat'l Camera, Inc. v. Sanchez, 832 P.2d 960 (Colo. App. 1991).
State department of personnel and its director were not "persons" and lacked standing to seek judicial review of state personnel board's action in questioning part of decision made by department and director. State of Colo. v. Colo. State Pers. Bd., 722 P.2d 1012 (Colo. 1986).
Division of labor's requirement that self-insured employers use payroll statement to calculate the tax owed amounted to a "rule" as defined in subsection (15). Jefferson Sch. Dist. R-1 v. Div. of Labor, 791 P.2d 1217 (Colo. App. 1990).
Agency actions often invoke both rule-making and adjudicatory authority, but generally, agency proceedings that primarily seek to or in effect determine policies or standards of general applicability are rule-making proceedings. Colo. Office of Consumer Counsel v. Mtn. States Tel. & Tel. Co., 816 P.2d 278 (Colo. 1991).
Determining whether a proceeding constitutes rule-making requires careful analysis of the actual conduct and effect of the proceedings and a determination of the purpose for which the proceedings were called. Colo. Office of Consumer Counsel v. Mtn. States Tel. & Tel. Co., 816 P.2d 278 (Colo. 1991).
The mere fact that a particular proceeding may have collateral prospective effects on other similarly situated parties does not convert an adjudication into rule-making. Trans Shuttle, Inc. v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 89 P.3d 398 (Colo. 2004).
Although the decision of the public utilities commission (PUC) appeared as a classification of a single utility's services, it in effect established the standards and policies applicable to telecommunications services of all public utilities. The proceeding which resulted in the ruling was therefore a rule-making proceeding, subject to the APA requirements for rule-making proceedings. Colo. Office of Consumer Counsel v. Mtn. States Tel. & Tel. Co., 816 P.2d 278 (Colo. 1991); Avicomm, Inc. v. Colo. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 955 P.2d 1023 (Colo. 1998).
It is within the discretion of the administrative law judge to decide, prior to issuing a decision which constitutes the final agency action in a particular matter, when that decision will become effective. Bethesda Found. v. Dept. of Soc. Servs., 877 P.2d 861 (Colo. 1994).
Secretary of state's notice informing games of chance suppliers and manufacturers of fee assessment and reporting requirement was equivalent to an order and therefore amounted to an agency "action" under subsection (1). Bingo Games Supply Co., Inc. v. Meyer, 895 P.2d 1125 (Colo. App. 1995).
Colorado water quality control division's failure to act on a request for a temporary water discharge permit within 180 days constituted final agency action, thereby requiring any district court complaint concerning said action to be filed within 30 days after the end of the 180-day period. Roosevelt Tunnel, LLC v. Norton, 89 P.3d 427 (Colo. App. 2003).
Referring doctors to the state medical board for possible Medical Practice Act violations that the board may then further investigate is not a final agency "action" as defined by this section. Doe v. Colo. Dept. of Pub. Health & Env't, 2019 CO 92, 450 P.3d 851.
Substance of actions by PUC and not label attached to actions by PUC determines whether PUC has acted in an adjudicatory or rule-making capacity. Home Builders Ass'n v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 720 P.2d 552 (Colo. 1986).
Function of supreme court is to review the judgment of trial court, and a question of whether a commission violated administrative rule-making statutory provisions in consideration of a well application is beyond the scope of review. Fundingsland v. Colo. Ground Water Comm'n, 171 Colo. 487, 468 P.2d 835 (1970).
Applied in Colo. State Bd. of Optometric Exam'rs v. Dixon, 165 Colo. 488, 440 P.2d 287 (1968); Colo. Auto & Truck Wreckers Ass'n v. Dept. of Rev., 618 P.2d 646 (Colo. 1980); Colo. Water Quality Control Comm'n v. Town of Frederick, 641 P.2d 958 (Colo. 1982); Fish v. Charnes, 652 P.2d 598 (Colo. 1982); Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n v. Cotter Corp., 665 P.2d 598 (Colo. 1983).
24-4-103. Rule-making - procedure - definitions - statutory citation correction.
(1) When any agency is required or permitted by law to make rules, in order to establish procedures and to accord interested persons an opportunity to participate therein, the provisions of this section shall be applicable. Except when notice or hearing is otherwise required by law, this section does not apply to interpretative rules or general statements of policy, which are not meant to be binding as rules, or rules of agency organization.
(1.5) If an agency reinterprets an existing rule in a manner that is substantially different than previous agency interpretations of the rule or if there has been a change in a statute that affects the interpretation or the legality of a rule, the office of legislative legal services shall review the rule in the same manner as rules that have been newly adopted or amended under paragraph (d) of subsection (8) of this section upon receiving a request for such a review of the rule by any member of the general assembly.
(2) When rule-making is contemplated, public announcement thereof may be made at such time and in such manner as the agency determines. The agency shall establish a representative group of participants with an interest in the subject of the rule-making to submit views or otherwise participate informally in conferences on the proposals under consideration or to participate in the public rule-making proceedings on the proposed rules. In establishing the representative group, the agency shall make diligent attempts to solicit input from representatives of each of the various stakeholder interests that may be affected positively or negatively by the proposed rules. If the agency convenes a representative group prior to issuing a notice of proposed rule-making as provided in paragraph (a) of subsection (3) of this section, the agency shall add those persons who participated in the representative group to the list of persons who receive notification of proposed rule-making as provided in paragraph (b) of subsection (3) of this section.
(2.5) (a) At the time of filing a notice of proposed rule-making with the secretary of state as the secretary may require, an agency shall submit a draft of the proposed rule or the proposed amendment to an existing rule and a statement, in plain language, concerning the subject matter or purpose of the proposed rule or amendment to the office of the executive director in the department of regulatory agencies. The executive director, or his or her designee, shall distribute the proposed rule or amendment, the agency's statement concerning the subject matter or purpose of the proposed rule or amendment, and any cost-benefit analysis prepared pursuant to this section to all persons who have submitted a request to receive notices from the department of regulatory agencies about proposed rule-making. Any person may, within five days after publication of the notice of proposed rule-making in the Colorado register, request that the department of regulatory agencies require the agency submitting the proposed rule or amendment to prepare a cost-benefit analysis. The executive director, or his or her designee, shall determine, after consultation with the agency proposing the rule or amendment, whether to require the agency to prepare a cost-benefit analysis. If the executive director, or his or her designee, determines that a cost-benefit analysis is required, the agency shall complete a cost-benefit analysis at least ten days before the hearing on the rule or amendment, shall make the analysis available to the public by posting the analysis on the agency's official website, and shall submit a copy to the executive director or his or her designee. The executive director, or his or her designee, shall post the analysis on the department of regulatory agencies' official website. By filing an additional notice published in the Colorado register, the agency may postpone the hearing on the rule or amendment to comply with the requirement to complete the cost-benefit analysis at least ten days before the hearing. Failure to complete a requested cost-benefit analysis pursuant to this subsection (2.5) shall preclude the adoption of such rule or amendment. Such cost-benefit analysis shall include the following:
(I) The reason for the rule or amendment;
(II) The anticipated economic benefits of the rule or amendment, which shall include economic growth, the creation of new jobs, and increased economic competitiveness;
(III) The anticipated costs of the rule or amendment, which shall include the direct costs to the government to administer the rule or amendment and the direct and indirect costs to business and other entities required to comply with the rule or amendment;
(IV) Any adverse effects on the economy, consumers, private markets, small businesses, job creation, and economic competitiveness; and
(V) At least two alternatives to the proposed rule or amendment that can be identified by the submitting agency or a member of the public, including the costs and benefits of pursuing each of the alternatives identified.
(b) The executive director, or his or her designee, shall study the cost-benefit analysis and may urge the agency to revise the rule or amendment to eliminate or reduce the negative economic impact. The executive director, or his or her designee, may inform the public about the negative impact of the proposed rule or the proposed amendment to an existing rule.
(c) Any proprietary information provided to the department of revenue by a business or trade association for the purpose of preparing a cost-benefit analysis shall be confidential.
(d) If the agency has made a good faith effort to comply with the requirements of paragraph (a) of this subsection (2.5), the rule or amendment shall not be invalidated on the ground that the contents of the cost-benefit analysis are insufficient or inaccurate.
(e) This subsection (2.5) shall not apply to orders, licenses, permits, adjudication, or rules affecting the direct reimbursement of vendors or providers with state funds.
(f) Repealed.
(g) Each state rule-making agency with a website containing rule-making information shall include the following information on its website:
(I) Information about the cost-benefit analysis process set forth in this subsection (2.5); and
(II) A link to the online regulatory notice enrollment form created by the executive director of the department of regulatory agencies or the executive director's designee and listed on the department's website.
(2.7) (a) As used in this subsection (2.7):
(I) "Director" means the director of the office of state planning and budgeting.
(II) "State mandate" has the same meaning as set forth in section 29-1-304.5 (3)(d), C.R.S.
(b) No agency shall promulgate a rule creating a state mandate on a local government unless the agency complies with the requirements of section 29-1-304.5, C.R.S.
(c) (I) Except as provided in paragraph (g) of this subsection (2.7), beginning January 1, 2014, for each proposed rule that includes a state mandate, an agency shall provide to the director a description of:
(A) The proposed rule;
(B) The nature and extent of any consultations that the agency had with elected officials or other representatives of the local governments that would be affected by the proposed state mandate;
(C) The nature of any concerns of the elected officials or other representatives of the local governments;
(D) Any written communications or comments submitted to the agency by an elected official or other representative of a local government; and
(E) The agency's reasoning supporting the need to promulgate the rule containing the state mandate.
(II) The director shall review the information provided pursuant to subparagraph (I) of this paragraph (c) and, if it complies with the requirements of this paragraph (c), the director shall send a written notice of compliance to the agency. An agency shall not conduct a public rule-making proceeding unless the agency has received the written notice of compliance from the director.
(d) Each agency shall develop a process to actively solicit the meaningful and timely input of elected officials and other representatives of local governments into the development of proposed rules with state mandates affecting local governments. Each agency shall implement its process no later than January 1, 2014, and post the process on the agency's website.
(e) The executive director of each department shall be responsible for ensuring implementation of and compliance with this subsection (2.7).
(f) The general assembly shall appropriate any moneys necessary for the implementation of this subsection (2.7) to the office of state planning and budgeting in the annual general appropriation act for the fiscal year 2013-14.
(g) Beginning January 1, 2014, for each proposed rule of the state board of education that imposes a new state mandate or an increase in the level of service for an existing state mandate beyond that required by statute, the department of education shall comply with the provisions of paragraph (c) of this subsection (2.7).
(3) (a) Notice of proposed rule-making shall be published as provided in subsection (11) of this section and shall state the time, place, and nature of public rule-making proceedings that shall not be held less than twenty days after such publication, the authority under which the rule is proposed, and either the terms or the substance of the proposed rule or a description of the subjects and issues involved.
(a.5) If the agency proposes a rule to increase fees or fines, at the time of giving notice of proposed rule-making or within ten days following the adoption of an emergency or temporary rule that increases fees or fines, the agency shall send a written or electronic notification to each member of the general assembly notifying the members of the general assembly of the proposed rule or the adoption of an emergency rule and specifying the amount of the increase in the fees or fines.
(b) Each rule-making agency shall maintain a list of all persons who request notification of proposed rule-making, including temporary or emergency rule-making. Any person on such list who requests a copy of the proposed rules shall submit to the agency a fee that shall be set by such agency based upon the agency's actual cost of copying and mailing the proposed rules to such person. All fees collected by the agency are hereby appropriated to the agency solely for the purpose of defraying such cost. On or before the date of the publication of notice of proposed rule-making in the Colorado register, the agency shall mail the notice of proposed rule-making to all persons on such list. If a person requests to be notified by electronic mail, notice is sufficient by such means if a copy of the proposed rules is attached or included in the electronic mail or if the electronic mail provides the location where the proposed rules may be viewed on the internet. No fees shall be charged for notification by electronic mail. A person may only request notification on his or her own behalf, and a request for notification by one person on behalf of another person need not be honored.
(4) (a) At the place and time stated in the notice, the agency shall hold a public hearing at which it shall afford interested persons an opportunity to submit written data, views, or arguments and to present the same orally unless the agency deems it unnecessary. The agency shall consider all such submissions. Any proposed rule or revised proposed rule by an agency which is to be considered at the public hearing, together with a proposed statement of basis, specific statutory authority, purpose, and the regulatory analysis required in subsection (4.5) of this section, shall be made available to any person at least five days prior to said hearing. The rules promulgated by the agency shall be based on the record, which shall consist of proposed rules, evidence, exhibits, and other matters presented or considered, matters officially noticed, rulings on exceptions, any findings of fact and conclusions of law proposed by any party, and any written comments or briefs filed.
(a.5) Subject to the provisions of section 24-72-204 (3)(a)(IV), any study or other documentation utilized by an agency as the basis of a proposed rule shall be a public document in accordance with the provisions of part 2 of article 72 of this title and shall be open for public inspection. Subject to the provisions of section 24-72-204 (3)(a)(IV), all information, including, but not limited to, the conclusions and underlying research data from any studies, reports, published papers, and documents, used by the agency in the development of a proposed rule shall be a public document in accordance with the provisions of part 2 of article 72 of this title and shall be open for public inspection.
(b) All proposed rules shall be reviewed by the agency. No rule shall be adopted unless:
(I) The record of the rule-making proceeding demonstrates the need for the regulation;
(II) The proper statutory authority exists for the regulation;
(III) To the extent practicable, the regulation is clearly and simply stated so that its meaning will be understood by any party required to comply with the regulation;
(IV) The regulation does not conflict with other provisions of law; and
(V) The duplication or overlapping of regulations is explained by the agency proposing the rule.
(c) Rules, as finally adopted, shall be consistent with the subject matter as set forth in the notice of proposed rule-making provided in subsection (11) of this section. After consideration of the relevant matter presented, the agency shall incorporate by reference on the rules adopted a written concise general statement of their basis, specific statutory authority, and purpose. The written statement of the basis, specific authority, regulatory analysis required by subsection (4.5) of this section, and purpose of a rule which involves scientific or technological issues shall include an evaluation of the scientific or technological rationale justifying the rule. Each agency shall maintain a copy of its currently effective rules and the current status of each published proposal for rules and minutes of all its action upon rules, as well as any attorney general's opinion rendered on any adopted or proposed rule. Such materials shall be available for inspection by any person during regular office hours.
(d) Within one hundred eighty days after the last public hearing on the proposed rule, the agency shall adopt a rule pursuant to the rule-making proceeding or terminate the proceeding by publication of a notice to that effect in the Colorado register.
(4.5) (a) Upon request of any person, at least fifteen days prior to the hearing, the agency shall issue a regulatory analysis of a proposed rule. The regulatory analysis shall contain:
(I) A description of the classes of persons who will be affected by the proposed rule, including classes that will bear the costs of the proposed rule and classes that will benefit from the proposed rule;
(II) To the extent practicable, a description of the probable quantitative and qualitative impact of the proposed rule, economic or otherwise, upon affected classes of persons;
(III) The probable costs to the agency and to any other agency of the implementation and enforcement of the proposed rule and any anticipated effect on state revenues;
(IV) A comparison of the probable costs and benefits of the proposed rule to the probable costs and benefits of inaction;
(V) A determination of whether there are less costly methods or less intrusive methods for achieving the purpose of the proposed rule; and
(VI) A description of any alternative methods for achieving the purpose of the proposed rule that were seriously considered by the agency and the reasons why they were rejected in favor of the proposed rule.
(b) Each regulatory analysis shall include quantification of the data to the extent practicable and shall take account of both short-term and long-term consequences.
(c) The regulatory analysis shall be available to the public at least five days prior to the rule-making hearing.
(d) If the agency has made a good faith effort to comply with the requirements of paragraphs (a) to (c) of this subsection (4.5), the rule shall not be invalidated on the ground that the contents of the regulatory analysis are insufficient or inaccurate.
(e) Nothing in paragraphs (a) to (c) of this subsection (4.5) shall limit an agency's discretionary authority to adopt or amend rules.
(f) The provisions of this subsection (4.5) shall not apply to rules and regulations promulgated by the department of revenue regarding the administration of any tax which is within the authority of said department.
(5) A rule shall become effective twenty days after publication of the rule as finally adopted, as provided in subsection (11) of this section, or on such later date as is stated in the rule. Once a rule becomes effective, the rule-making process shall be deemed to have become final agency action for judicial review purposes.
(6) (a) A temporary or emergency rule may be adopted without compliance with the procedures prescribed in subsection (4) of this section and with less than the twenty days' notice prescribed in subsection (3) of this section, or where circumstances imperatively require, without notice, only if the agency finds that immediate adoption of the rule is imperatively necessary to comply with a state or federal law or federal regulation or for the preservation of public health, safety, or welfare and compliance with the requirements of this section would be contrary to the public interest and makes such a finding on the record. Such findings and a statement of the reasons for the action shall be published with the rule. A temporary or emergency rule may be adopted without compliance with subsections (2.5) and (2.7) of this section, but shall not become permanent without compliance with such subsections (2.5) and (2.7). A temporary or emergency rule shall become effective on adoption or on such later date as is stated in the rule, shall be published promptly, and shall have effect for not more than one hundred twenty days after its adoption or for such shorter period as may be specifically provided by the statute governing such agency, unless made permanent by compliance with subsections (3) and (4) of this section.
(b) The period of effectiveness provided by this subsection (6) does not apply to temporary or emergency rules adopted by the public utilities commission under section 40-2-108 (2), C.R.S.
(7) Any interested person shall have the right to petition for the issuance, amendment, or repeal of a rule. Such petition shall be open to public inspection. Action on such petition shall be within the discretion of the agency; but when an agency undertakes rule-making on any matter, all related petitions for the issuance, amendment, or repeal of rules on such matter shall be considered and acted upon in the same proceeding.
(8) (a) No rule shall be issued except within the power delegated to the agency and as authorized by law. A rule shall not be deemed to be within the statutory authority and jurisdiction of any agency merely because such rule is not contrary to the specific provisions of a statute. Any rule or amendment to an existing rule issued by any agency, including state institutions of higher education administered pursuant to title 23, C.R.S., which conflicts with a statute shall be void.
(b) An agency shall not issue a rule or amend an existing rule unless the issuing agency first submits the rule to the attorney general for the attorney general's opinion as to its constitutionality and legality. If an agency issues a rule or an amendment to an existing rule without first submitting the rule or amendment to the attorney general, the rule or amendment is void.
(c) (I) (A) Notwithstanding any other provision of law to the contrary, including section 24-4-107, and except as provided in subsection (8)(c)(I)(B) of this section, on and after November 1, 1993, all rules adopted or amended during any one-year period that begins each November 1 and continues through the following October 31 expire at 11:59 p.m. on the May 15 that follows such one-year period unless the general assembly by bill acts to postpone the expiration of a specific rule.
(B) A rule adopted pursuant to section 25.5-4-402.4 (6)(b)(III) expires at 11:59 p.m. on the May 15 following the adoption of the rule unless the general assembly acts by bill to postpone the expiration of a specific rule.
(C) Postponing the expiration of a rule does not constitute legislative approval of the rule and is not admissible in any court as evidence of legislative intent. Postponing the expiration date of a specific rule does not prohibit any action by the general assembly pursuant to subsection (8)(d) of this section with respect to the rule.
(II) It is the intent of the general assembly that, in the event of a conflict between this paragraph (c) and any other provision of law relating to suspension or extension of rules by joint resolution (whether said provision was adopted prior to or subsequent to this paragraph (c)), this paragraph (c) shall control, notwithstanding the rule of law that a specific provision of law controls over a general provision of law.
(d) (I) An agency that has adopted or amended a rule shall submit the adopted or amended rule, including a temporary or emergency rule, to the office of legislative legal services in the form and manner prescribed by the committee on legal services. The office of legislative legal services shall first review the rule or amendment to the existing rule to determine whether the rule or amendment is within the agency's rule-making authority and for later review by the committee on legal services for its opinion as to whether the rule conforms with subsection (8)(a) of this section.
(II) The committee on legal services shall direct the office of legislative legal services to review the rules submitted by adopting agencies using graduated levels of review based on criteria established by the committee. The criteria developed by the committee on legal services must provide that the office of legislative legal services review every rule as to form and compliance with filing procedures and that, upon request of any member of the committee or any other member of the general assembly, the office of legislative legal services provide full legal review of any rule during the time period that the rule is subject to review by the committee.
(III) The official certificate of the director of the office of legislative legal services, or the director's designee, as to the fact that an agency submitted a rule to the office of legislative legal services or as to the date an agency submitted a rule, as shown by the records of the director's office, as well as to the fact that an agency failed to submit a rule to the office of legislative legal services, as shown by the nonexistence of such records, shall be received and held in all civil cases as competent evidence of the facts contained in the official certificate. The office of legislative legal services shall retain records regarding the review of rules pursuant to this section in accordance with policies established pursuant to section 2-3-303 (2). If an agency issues a rule or an amendment to an existing rule for review by the committee on legal services pursuant to this subsection (8) without submitting the rule or amendment to the office of legislative legal services within twenty days after the date of the attorney general's opinion on the rule or amendment pursuant to subsection (8)(b) of this section, the rule or amendment is void.
(IV) The office of legislative legal services shall present its findings to the committee on legal services at a public meeting held after timely notice to the public and affected agencies. The committee on legal services shall, on affirmative vote, submit such rules, comments, and proposed legislation at the next regular session of the general assembly. The committee on legal services is the committee of reference for any bill introduced pursuant to this subsection (8)(d)(IV). Any member of the general assembly may introduce a bill that rescinds or deletes portions of the rule. Rejection of such a bill does not constitute legislative approval of the rule. Only that portion of any rule specifically disapproved by bill is no longer effective, and that portion of the rule that remains after deletion of a portion of the rule retains its character as an administrative rule.
(V) Each agency shall revise its rules to conform with the action taken by the general assembly. An agency shall not repromulgate a rule that has been allowed to expire by action of the general assembly pursuant to subsection (8)(c) of this section because the rule, in the opinion of the general assembly, is not authorized by the state constitution or statute, unless the authority to promulgate the rule has been granted to the agency by a statutory amendment, by the state constitution, or by a judicial determination that statutory or constitutional authority exists. Any rule so repromulgated is void. Any rule that an agency revises pursuant to this subsection (8)(d)(V) shall be transmitted to the secretary of state for publication pursuant to subsection (11) of this section. Passage of a bill repealing a rule does not result in revival of a predecessor rule.
(VI) This subsection (8)(d) and subsection (4.5) of this section do not apply to rules of agency organization or general statements of policy that are not meant to be binding as rules.
(VII) For the purpose of performing the functions assigned it by this subsection (8)(d), the committee on legal services, with the approval of the speaker of the house of representatives and the president of the senate, may appoint subcommittees from the membership of the general assembly.
(e) The office of legislative legal services shall identify rules that were adopted during each applicable one-year period as a result of legislation enacted during any legislative session, regular or special, commencing on or after the previous eight calendar years. After the rules have been identified, the office of legislative legal services shall notify in writing any prime sponsors of the enacted legislation who are still serving in the general assembly and the current members of the applicable committees of reference in the senate and house of representatives for that enacted legislation that a rule has been adopted as a result of the legislation; except that the office of legislative legal services need not provide the notice regarding an adopted rule if the rule resulted from legislation that was enacted more than eight calendar years prior to the rule's adoption.
(8.1) (a) An agency shall maintain an official rule-making record for each proposed rule for which a notice of proposed rule-making has been published in the Colorado register. Such rule-making record shall be maintained by the agency until all administrative and judicial review procedures have been completed pursuant to the provisions of this article. The rule-making record shall be available for public inspection.
(b) The agency rule-making record must contain:
(I) Copies of all publications in the Colorado register with respect to the rule or the proceeding upon which the rule is based;
(II) Copies of any portions of the agency's public rule-making docket containing entries relating to the rule or the proceeding upon which the rule is based;
(III) All written petitions, requests, submissions, and comments received by the agency as of the date of the hearing on the rule and all other written materials, or a listing of such materials, considered by the agency in connection with the formulation, proposal, or adoption of the rule or the proceeding upon which the rule is based, which materials shall be available for public inspection during working hours;
(IV) Any official transcript of oral presentations made in the proceeding upon which the rule is based or, if not transcribed, any tape recording or stenographic record of those presentations and any memorandum prepared by a presiding official summarizing the contents of those presentations;
(V) A copy of any regulatory analysis or cost-benefit analysis prepared for the proceeding upon which the rule was based, if applicable, and any formal statement made to the agency promulgating the rule by the executive director of the department of regulatory agencies regarding such cost-benefit analysis;
(VI) A copy of the rule and explanatory statement filed in the office of the secretary of state;
(VII) All petitions for exceptions to, amendments of, or repeal or suspension of the rule;
(VIII) A copy of any objection to the rule presented to the committee on legal services by the office of legislative legal services pursuant to subsection (8)(d) of this section and the agency's response;
(IX) A copy of any filed executive order with respect to the rule; and
(X) A copy of any information provided to the director pursuant to paragraph (c) of subsection (2.7) of this section and the written notice of compliance from the director.
(c) Upon judicial review, the record required by this section constitutes the official rule-making record with respect to a rule. The agency rule-making record need not constitute the exclusive basis for agency action on that rule or for judicial review thereof; except that, this paragraph (c) shall not be interpreted to allow the introduction of evidence or information into such rule-making record from outside of the public rule-making hearing, or to allow such introduction of evidence or information without notice to all parties to such hearing and opportunity to respond.
(d) If an agency includes information required by subparagraph (X) of paragraph (b) of this subsection (8.1) in the rule-making record, the agency shall provide a copy of the portion of the record that includes such information with the executive committee of the legislative council in accordance with the provisions of section 24-1-136 (9).
(8.2) (a) A rule adopted on or after September 1, 1988, shall be invalid unless adopted in substantial compliance with the provisions of this section. However, inadvertent failure to mail a notice of proposed rule-making to any person as required by subsection (3) of this section shall not invalidate a rule.
(b) An action to contest the validity of a rule on the grounds of its noncompliance with any provision of this section shall be commenced within thirty days after the effective date of the rule.
(8.3) (a) On or after August 11, 2010, all new or amended rules or regulations promulgated pursuant to this section that refer to persons with disabilities shall comply with the provisions of section 2-2-802, C.R.S., as applicable to the new or amended rule.
(b) Violation of this subsection (8.3) shall not be grounds to invalidate any new or amended rule; however, such rules shall be amended to reflect the provisions of section 2-2-802, C.R.S., in any subsequent revision.
(c) Nothing in this subsection (8.3) shall constitute a requirement to change the name of any department, agency, or program of the state.
(9) Each agency shall make available to the public and shall deliver to anyone requesting it a copy of any notice of proposed rule-making proceeding in which action has not been completed. Upon request, such copy shall be certified. The agency may make a reasonable charge for supplying any such copy.
(10) No rule shall be relied upon or cited against any person unless, if adopted after May 1, 1959, it has been published and, whether adopted before or after said date, it has been made available to the public in accordance with this section.
(11) (a) There is hereby established the code of Colorado regulations for the publication of rules of agencies of the executive branch and the Colorado register for the publication of notices of rule-making, proposed rules, attorney general's opinions relating to such rules, and adopted rules. The code and the register shall be the sole official publications for such rules, notices of rule-making, proposed rules, and attorney general's opinions. The code and the register shall contain, where applicable, references to court opinions and recommendations of the legal services committee of the general assembly that relate to or affect such rules and references to any action of the general assembly relating to the extension, expiration, deletion, or rescission of such rules and may contain other items that, in the opinion of the editor, are relevant to such rules. The register may also include other public notices, including annual departmental regulatory agendas submitted by principal departments to the secretary of state pursuant to section 2-7-203, C.R.S.; however, except as specifically permitted by law, the inclusion of such notices in the register shall be in addition to and not in substitution for existing public notice requirements.
(b) The secretary of state shall cause to be published in electronic form, and may cause to be published in printed form, at the least cost possible to the state, the code of Colorado regulations and the Colorado register no less often than once each calendar month. In the event of any discrepancy between the electronic and printed form of the code or the register, the electronic form shall prevail unless it is conclusively shown, by reference to the rule-making filings made with the secretary of state pursuant to this section, that the electronic form contains an error in publication.
(c) (Deleted by amendment, L. 2010, (SB 10-123), ch. 104, p. 350, § 1, effective April 15, 2010.)
(d) The agency adopting a rule shall file the adopted rule, together with the attorney general's opinion rendered in connection with the rule, with the secretary of state for publication in the Colorado register pursuant to subsection (12) of this section within twenty days after adoption of the rule. Upon written request of an agency, the secretary of state shall correct typographical and other nonsubstantive errors appearing in the rules as filed by the agency that occur after final adoption of the rules by the agency during the preparation of the rules for publication in order to conform the published rules with the adopted rules. The agency shall also file notices of rule-making proceedings pursuant to subsection (3) of this section with the secretary of state in sufficient time for publication in the register pursuant to subsection (5) of this section. An agency shall file rules revised to conform with action taken by the general assembly with the secretary of state for publication in the register and in the code of Colorado regulations. The office of legislative legal services shall notify the secretary of state whenever a rule published in the code is rescinded or a portion of the rule is deleted by the general assembly and whenever a rule or a portion of a rule is allowed to expire in accordance with subsection (8)(c)(I) of this section. The secretary of state shall direct the removal from the code of material that was deleted, rescinded, or allowed to expire.
(e) The secretary of state shall establish and maintain an accurate docket system for recording the time and date of the filing of each document, the agency filing the same, and the title or description of such document required to be filed for publication under the provisions of this section, which docket system shall be cross-indexed as to such time, date, agency, and title or description.
(f) (Deleted by amendment, L. 2010, (SB 10-123), ch. 104, p. 350, § 1, effective April 15, 2010.)
(g) Publication of notices and other required information related to proposed and adopted rules shall be by electronic publication.
(h) (Deleted by amendment, L. 2010, (SB 10-123), ch. 104, p. 350, § 1, effective April 15, 2010.)
(i) (I) (Deleted by amendment, L. 2010, (SB 10-123), ch. 104, p. 350, § 1, effective April 15, 2010.)
(II) The Colorado register shall contain only such notices, proposed rules, adopted rules, opinions, and other relevant information and materials as are filed pursuant to law with the secretary of state.
(III) (Deleted by amendment, L. 2010, (SB 10-123), ch. 104, p. 350, § 1, effective April 15, 2010.)
(j) Repealed.
(k) (Deleted by amendment, L. 2010, (SB 10-123), ch. 104, p. 350, § 1, effective April 15, 2010.)
(l) (I) An agency may request the secretary of state to correct a statutory citation contained in a rule, including a form incorporated into a rule, as published in the code of Colorado regulations if:
(A) The general assembly has relocated the statute in a manner that renders the rule's citation to the statute inaccurate; and
(B) The agency submits to the secretary a written determination by the attorney general that finds that the condition specified in subsection (11)(l)(I)(A) of this section applies, specifies what the correct citation is, and identifies each citation that should be corrected.
(II) Upon receipt of a request that complies with subsection (11)(l)(I) of this section, the secretary of state shall correct in the code of Colorado regulations each statutory citation listed in the determination specified in subsection (11)(l)(I)(B) of this section.
(III) A statutory citation correction authorized by this subsection (11)(l) is not rule-making and need not comply with any requirements of this section other than those specified in this subsection (11)(l).
(m) Repealed.
(12) All rules of any agency that have been submitted to the attorney general under the provisions of subsection (8) of this section and the opinion of the attorney general, when issued, shall be filed in the office of the secretary of state. The secretary of state shall require that all rules of any agency that have been submitted to the attorney general under the provisions of subsection (8) of this section and the opinion of the attorney general, when issued, be filed in an electronic format that complies with any requirements established pursuant to sections 24-37.5-106 and 24-71.3-118.
(12.5) (a) A rule may incorporate by reference all or any part of a code, standard, guideline, or rule that has been adopted by an agency of the United States, this state, or another state, or adopted or published by a nationally recognized organization or association, if:
(I) Repeating verbatim the text of the code, standard, guideline, or rule in the rule would be unduly cumbersome, expensive, or otherwise inexpedient;
(II) The reference fully identifies the incorporated code, standard, guideline, or rule by citation and date, identifies the address of the agency where the code, standard, guideline, or rule is available for public inspection, and states that the rule does not include any later amendments or editions of the code, standard, guideline, or rule;
(III) The code, standard, guideline, or rule is readily available to the public in written or electronic form;
(IV) The rule states where copies of the code, standard, guideline, or rule are available for a reasonable charge from the agency adopting the rule and where copies are available from the agency of the United States, this state, another state, or the organization or association originally issuing the code, standard, guideline, or rule; and
(V) The agency maintains a copy of the code, standard, guideline, or rule readily available for public inspection at the agency office during regular business hours.
(b) The agency shall provide certified copies of the material incorporated at cost upon request or shall provide the requester with information on how to obtain a certified copy of the material incorporated by reference from the agency of the United States, this state, another state, or the organization or association originally issuing the code, standard, guideline, or rule.
(c) If any agency incorporates or proposes to incorporate any material by reference in a rule and the version or edition of the material to be incorporated has not previously been provided to the state publications depository and distribution center, and if the rule or proposed rule does not identify where the incorporated material is available to the public on the internet at no cost, then the agency shall provide one copy of the material in either paper or electronic format to the state publications depository and distribution center. The state librarian shall retain the copy of the material and shall make the copy available to the public.
(13) Any agency conducting a hearing shall have authority on its own motion or upon the motion of any interested person for good cause shown to: Administer oaths and affirmations; sign and issue subpoenas; regulate the course of the hearing, set the time and place for continued hearings, and fix the time for the filing of appropriate documents; take depositions or have depositions taken; issue appropriate orders which shall control the subsequent course of the proceedings; and take any other action authorized by agency rule consistent with this article. In the event more than one person engages in the conduct of a hearing, such persons shall designate one of their number to perform the functions of this subsection (13) and subsection (14) of this section as can best be performed by one person only, and thereafter such person only shall perform those functions which are assigned to him by the several persons conducting such hearing.
(14) Subpoenas shall be issued without discrimination between public and private parties by any agency or any member, the secretary or chief administrative officer thereof, or, with respect to any hearing for which a hearing officer or an administrative law judge has been appointed, the hearing officer or administrative law judge. A subpoena shall be served in the same manner as a subpoena issued by a district court. Upon failure of any witness to comply with such subpoena, the agency may petition any district court, setting forth that due notice has been given of the time and place of attendance of the witness and the service of the subpoena, in which event, the district court, after hearing evidence in support of or contrary to the petition, may enter an order as in other civil actions compelling the witness to attend and testify or produce books, records, or other evidence, under penalty of punishment for contempt in case of contumacious failure to comply with the order of the court. A witness shall be entitled to the fees and mileage provided for a witness in sections 13-33-102 and 13-33-103, C.R.S.
Source: L. 59: p. 159, § 2. CRS 53: § 3-16-2. C.R.S. 1963: §3-16-2. L. 67: p. 300, § 2. L. 69: p. 82, §§ 2, 3. L. 76: (1) and (8)(a) amended and (8)(d) added, p. 582, § 15, effective May 24. L. 77: (8)(d) amended, p. 1134, § 2, effective May 31; (13) and (14) added, p. 1144, § 1, effective June 3; (4) amended, p. 1136, § 1, effective June 19; (4) amended and (11) R&RE, p. 1138, §§ 1, 2, effective June 19; (8)(d) amended, p. 1141, § 1, effective (see editor's note). L. 78: (12) amended, p. 390, § 1, March 30. L. 79: (5) amended, p. 842, § 2, effective May 22; (8)(d) and (11)(d) amended, p. 849, § 1, effective May 25; (8)(c) R&RE and (8)(d) amended, p. 845, §§ 1, 2, effective June 29. L. 81: (9) and (11) amended, (11)(k) added, and (11)(j) repealed, pp. 1129, 1130, §§ 1, 2; (12.5) added, p. 1131, § 1, effective July 1; (12) and (13) amended, p. 1133, § 2, effective July 1. L. 82: (11)(a) and (11)(d) amended, p. 360, § 1, effective March 11. L. 84: (4) amended, p. 649, § 1, effective July 1. L. 87: (11)(k) amended, p. 915, § 1, effective July 1; (8)(c)(I) and (8)(d) amended, p. 919, § 2, effective July 3; (14) amended, p. 961, § 65, effective March 13. L. 88: (8)(d) amended, p. 311, § 19, effective May 23; (3), (6), and (8)(d) amended, (4) R&RE, and (4.5), (8.1), and (8.2) added, pp. 884, 886, 887, §§ 1, 2, 3, effective May 17. L. 89: (4.5)(f) added and (8.1)(b)(V) amended, pp. 1502, 1503, §§ 10, 11, effective July 1, 1990. L. 91: (1) amended, p. 807, § 3, effective June 5. L. 93: (3)(b), (6), (8.1)(c), (8.2)(b), and (11)(d) amended, p. 1325, § 2, effective June 6; (8)(d) amended, p. 2109, § 12, effective June 9; (8)(c)(I) amended, p. 496, § 1, effective July 1. L. 94: (1.5) added and (3)(a) and (12.5) amended, p. 2587, § 1, effective July 1. L. 95: (6) amended, p. 232, § 2, effective April 17. L. 98: (4)(a.5) added, p. 721, § 1, effective May 18. L. 2000: (1) amended, p. 1861, § 73, effective August 2. L. 2001: (8)(d) amended, p. 318, § 2, effective April 12; (4)(a.5) amended, p. 1076, § 5, effective August 8; (12) amended, p. 38, § 2, effective August 8. L. 2002: (3)(b), (9), (11)(b), (11)(d), (11)(f), (11)(g), (11)(h), (11)(i), (11)(k), and (12) amended, p. 436, § 2, effective May 14. L. 2003: (11)(b) and (11)(d)(I) amended, p. 2048, § 1, effective May 22; (2.5) added and (6), (8.1)(b)(V), and (11)(b) amended, p. 2370, § 3, effective August 6. L. 2005: (12) amended, p. 768, § 36, effective June 1. L. 2006: IP(2.5)(a) and (2.5)(f)(I) amended, p. 202, § 1, effective March 31; (12) amended, p. 1735, § 20, effective June 6. L. 2007: (12) amended, p. 910, § 2, effective May 17. L. 2009: (8)(c)(I) amended, (HB 09-1293), ch. 152, p. 651, § 9, effective July 1. L. 2010: (3)(a), (8.1)(a), and (12.5) amended, (HB 10-1235), ch. 76, p. 258, § 1, effective April 5; (6) amended, (HB 10-1346), ch. 137, p. 460, § 1, effective April 15; (11) and (12) amended, (SB 10-123), ch. 104, p. 350, § 1, effective April 15; (8.3) added, (HB 10-1137), ch. 93, p. 320, § 2, effective August 11. L. 2012: (2), (3), and (11)(a) amended, (HB 12-1008), ch. 182, pp. 691, 694, §§ 2, 5, effective May 17; (2.7), (8.1)(b)(X), and (8.1)(d) added and (6)(a), (8.1)(b)(VIII), and (8.1)(b)(IX) amended, ch. 199, p. 797, § 1, effective August 8. L. 2013: IP(2.5)(a) amended and (8)(e) added, (SB 13-030), ch. 110, p. 379, § 1, effective April 8; IP(2.5)(a) and (2.5)(f) amended, (SB 13-158), ch. 283, p. 1490, § 1, effective July 1; IP(2.7)(c)(I) amended and (2.7)(g) added, (HB 13-1219), ch. 104, p. 366, § 20, effective August 7. L. 2015: (8)(e) amended, (SB 15-047), ch. 71, p. 190, § 1, effective August 5. L. 2016: (8)(b) amended, (HB 16-1094), ch. 94, p. 267, § 12, effective August 10. L. 2017: (11)(l) added, (HB 17-1006), ch. 31, p. 88, § 2, effective March 16; (11)(m) added, (SB 17-242), ch. 263, p. 1321, § 177, effective May 25; (8)(c)(I) amended, (SB 17-267), ch. 267, p. 1440, § 7, effective July 1. L. 2018: (2.5)(f) repealed and (2.5)(g) added, (HB 18-1237), ch. 165, p. 1137, § 2, effective August 8. L. 2021: (8)(e) amended, (HB 21-1137), ch. 37, p. 142, § 1, effective September 7. L. 2022: (8)(b), (8)(c)(I), (8)(d), IP(8.1)(b), (8.1)(b)(VIII), and (11)(d) amended, (SB 22-091), ch. 28, p. 165, § 1, effective August 10.
Editor's note: (1) House Bill 77-1646, which amended subsection (8)(d), was delivered to the governor on June 20, 1977. The general assembly adjourned sine die on June 22, 1977. The governor disapproved House Bill 77-1646 on July 15, 1977, but the bill was not filed with the secretary of state until July 27, 1977, and the governor's letter stating objections to the bill was not filed with the secretary of state until August 2, 1977. Because House Bill 77-1646 and the governor's objections to it were not filed with the secretary of state within thirty days after adjournment of the general assembly, House Bill 77-1646 became a law pursuant to the provisions of § 11 of article IV of the Colorado Constitution.
(2) Amendments to subsection (4) by House Bill 77-1419 and House Bill 77-1623 were harmonized.
(3) Amendments to subsection (8)(d) by House Bill 79-1393 and House Bill 79-1063 were harmonized.
(4) Amendments to subsection (11)(b) by Senate Bill 03-121 and House Bill 03-1350 were harmonized.
(5) Amendments to the introductory portion to subsection (2.5)(a) by Senate Bill 13-030 and Senate Bill 13-158 were harmonized.
(6) Section 34 of chapter 267 (SB 17-267), Session Laws of Colorado 2017, provides that the section of the act amending this section does not take effect if the centers for medicare and medicaid services determine that the amendments do not comply with federal law. For more information, see SB 17-267. (L. 2017, p. 1447.) The executive director of the department of health care policy and financing did not notify the revisor of statutes by June 1, 2017, of such determination; therefore, amendments to this section took effect July 1, 2017.
(7) Subsection (11)(m)(II) provided for the repeal of subsection (11)(m), effective July 1, 2018. (See L. 2017, p. 1321.)
Cross references: (1) For the general authority of department heads to adopt rules and regulations, see § 24-2-105.
(2) For the legislative declaration in SB 17-242, see section 1 of chapter 263, Session Laws of Colorado 2017. For the legislative declaration in SB 17-267, see section 1 of chapter 267, Session Laws of Colorado 2017.
ANNOTATION
Law reviews. For article, "Discovery and Judicial Review in State Administrative Practice", see 10 Colo. Law. 2490 (1981). For article, "Administrative Law", which discusses a Tenth Circuit decision dealing with rule-making, see 61 Den. L.J. 110 (1984). For article, "Administrative Law", which discusses Tenth Circuit decisions dealing with rulemaking, see 62 Den. U. L. Rev. 15 (1985). For article, "General Principles of the Colorado Administrative Procedure Act", see 16 Colo. Law. 1983 (1987). For article, "Hearsay Evidence and the Residuum Rule in Colorado", see 17 Colo. Law. 651 (1988). For article, "Administrative Law", which discusses a Tenth Circuit decision dealing with an agency's interpretation of its rules, see 65 Den. U. L. Rev. 366 (1988). For article, "Legislative and Judicial Oversight of Rulemaking", see 18 Colo. Law. 246 (1989). For article, "Understanding Administrative Fact-Finding", see 20 Colo. Law. 1607 (1991). For article, "Legislative Sunset of Administrative Rules", see 21 Colo. Law. 2191 (1992). For article, "Guidelines for Negotiated Rulemaking", see 25 Colo. Law. 21 (Jan. 1996). For article, "Researching Colorado Regulations", see 52 Colo. Law. 14 (Nov. 2023).
Section constitutional. Subsection (10) does not violate § 21 of art. VI, Colo. Const. People v. Bobian, 626 P.2d 1132 (Colo. 1981).
The basic purpose of subsection (10) is public policy rather than simply a legislative attempt to regulate the day-to-day procedural operation of the courts. People v. Bobian, 626 P.2d 1132 (Colo. 1981).
Section is not applicable to board of regents of university of Colorado. Sigma Chi Fraternity v. Regents of Univ. of Colo., 258 F. Supp. 515 (D. Colo. 1966).
Section is not applicable to suspension of medical license. Section 24-4-104 (4), dealing with the procedure for the issuance, suspension, revocation, or renewal of licenses, is the authority for the state board of medical examiners to summarily suspend a license to practice medicine pending a full hearing; this section and § 12-36-101 et seq., dealing with medical practice, do not apply. Bd. of Med. Exam'rs v. District Court, 191 Colo. 158, 551 P.2d 194 (1976).
Apparent purpose of the 1977 amendment was to formalize, to a limited degree, the agency rule-making process by requiring a brief explanation of the reasoning process underlying an administrative regulation, and by requiring that the regulation be based upon and tied to the administrative record. Citizens for Free Enter. v. Dept. of Rev., 649 P.2d 1054 (Colo. 1982).
Rationale for requirement of statement of basis and purpose. The statement of basis and purpose assures that the administratively perceived necessity for the rule will be explicated, and serves to provide a reference point against which the validity of the rule can be measured. It removes the review process from the realm of speculation and provides a context within which meaningful judicial review can occur. Citizens for Free Enter. v. Dept. of Rev., 649 P.2d 1054 (Colo. 1982).
Where agency, in rule-making, fails to maintain an appropriate record of the public hearing because of a malfunctioning tape recorder, improperly compiles the rule-making record by introducing documents from outside of the rule-making procedures, and fails to maintain the rule-making record by failing to include and maintain all written submissions and comments received by the agency prior to the hearing, the agency has failed to substantially comply with the requirements of the State Administrative Procedure Act (APA). Studor v. Examining Bd. of Plumbers, 929 P.2d 46 (Colo. App. 1996).
The reason for the prehearing statement of basis and purpose under subsection (2.5)(a) is to provide public notice of what the agency is considering. The reason for requiring that rules incorporate by reference a written concise general statement of their basis, specific statutory authority, and purpose under subsection (4)(c) is to assist in appellate review. Brighton Pharmacy, Inc. v. Colo. State Pharmacy Bd., 160 P.3d 412 (Colo. App. 2007).
Agency substantially complied with the requirement of APA of providing a statement of basis and purpose. Here, regulation at issue was not based on findings of fact obtained from evidence presented at the hearing or otherwise. Instead, it was based almost entirely on policy considerations. In addition, the purpose of the regulation is self-explanatory. Brighton Pharmacy, Inc. v. Colo. State Pharmacy Bd., 160 P.3d 412 (Colo. App. 2007).
State pharmacy board (Board) substantially complied with APA requirements of maintaining an adequate and appropriate record of the rulemaking hearing proceeding. Maintaining an adequate record provides a rationale and support for agency decisions, allows for public inspection of the agency's actions, and establishes a record that an appellate court may use to evaluate the basis of the agency's conclusions. Here, the Board substantially complied with APA hearing procedure requirements where (1) although the tape recording of the hearing contains inaudible and unreconstructed portions, the substance of and core testimony at the hearing appears to be intact and sufficient for public inspection and appellate review, (2) written comments were included in the record that address many of the items discussed at the hearing, (3) comments and questions made by Board members during the testimony are sufficient to convey the Board 's thought processes and reasoning, and (4) the record sufficiently indicates that a majority of Board members voted in favor of the rule. Brighton Pharmacy, Inc. v. Colo. State Pharmacy Bd., 160 P.3d 412 (Colo. App. 2007).
State pharmacy board (Board) did not exceed its statutory authority in promulgating rule prohibiting pharmacists from dispensing prescription drugs resulting from internet-based questionnaires, internet-based consultation, or telephonic consultation without a valid preexisting patient-practitioner relationship. Court rejects appellants' claims that a determination of whether a valid preexisting patient-practitioner relationship (1) necessarily involves knowledge of the Medical Practice Act and the rules promulgated by the state board of medical examiners (BME), (2) is beyond the expertise of individual pharmacists and the Board, and (3) improperly injects the Board into areas that are properly regulated by the BME. Brighton Pharmacy, Inc. v. Colo. State Pharmacy Bd., 160 P.3d 412 (Colo. App. 2007).
Fiscal impact determination not based on record before agency. Subsection (8)(d) does not require that the fiscal impact determination be based upon or supported by the record before the administrative agency. Rather, the administrative agency should conduct such investigations and research as are reasonably necessary to arrive at an estimate of fiscal impact or to determine that such impact cannot reasonably or reliably be quantified. Citizens for Free Enter. v. Dept. of Rev., 649 P.2d 1054 (Colo. 1982) (decided prior to 1988 amendment deleting fiscal impact statement requirement).
Fiscal impact statement requirement relates to the substance of new or amended regulations and not to their form. If the amendment is one of substance which has fiscal implications, then the fiscal impact statement is required. Conversely, if the change is not substantive and does not affect the fiscal impact of the regulation as it is written, then no fiscal impact statement is required. Dept. of Natural Res. v. Clark Gen. Store, Inc., 658 P.2d 1385 (Colo. App. 1983) (decided prior to 1988 amendment deleting fiscal impact statement requirement).
Simple renumbering of preexisting regulation does not constitute an amendment such as would require a fiscal impact statement under subsection (8)(d). Dept. of Natural Res. v. Clark Gen. Store, Inc., 658 P.2d 1385 (Colo. App. 1983) (decided prior to 1988 amendment deleting fiscal impact statement requirement).
Review of fiscal impact statements is limited. The role of the court in reviewing the sufficiency of fiscal impact statements is limited. Citizens for Free Enter. v. Dept. of Rev., 649 P.2d 1054 (Colo. 1982) (decided prior to 1988 amendment deleting fiscal impact statement requirement).
Only where the statement of fiscal impact is clearly inadequate may the court intervene. Citizens for Free Enter. v. Dept. of Rev., 649 P.2d 1054 (Colo. 1982) (decided prior to 1988 amendment deleting fiscal impact statement requirement).
Lack of bona fide emergency. Rule not invalid for lack of emergency where challenge was merely procedural and where notice and an opportunity to be heard were given. Colo. Health Care Ass'n v. Dept. of Soc. Servs., 598 F. Supp. 1400 (D. Colo. 1984).
Issue of validity of emergency regulations not considered when the new regulations, if invalidly promulgated, would have left identical prior regulations in effect. Nat. Advert. Co. v. Dept. of Hwys., 718 P.2d 1038 (Colo. 1986).
Rule-making quasi-legislative in character. Rule-making conducted in accordance with this section is quasi-legislative, not quasi-judicial, in character. Collopy v. Wildlife Comm'n, 625 P.2d 994 (Colo. 1981).
An administrative regulation promulgated pursuant to this section is a quasi-legislative action subject to review by a declaratory judgment. Clasby v. Klapper, 636 P.2d 682 (Colo. 1981).
Legislative delegation of rule-making and regulatory authority to an administrative agency must provide both sufficient standards for rational and consistent rule-making and adequate procedural safeguards for effective judicial review of administrative action. Orsinger Outdoor Advert., Inc. v. Dept. of Hwys., 752 P.2d 55 (Colo. 1988); Partridge v. State, 895 P.2d 1183 (Colo. App. 1995).
The general assembly need not adopt a specific formula to guide agency rule-making if the agency can find general guidance, through the legislative intent, in the purposes and overall scheme of an act. Ettelman v. State Bd. of Accountancy, 849 P.2d 795 (Colo. App. 1992).
While the construction of a statute by an administrative agency charged with its enforcement should be given deference by the courts, the courts have a duty to invalidate administrative regulations which conflict with the design of a statute because they are in excess of the administrative authority granted. Ettelman v. State Bd. of Accountancy, 849 P.2d 795 (Colo. App. 1992).
Board's rules were not abolished by legislation abolishing existing board and immediately creating a newly constituted one, nor was board required to re-enact, ratify, or promulgate new rules, since annual legislation by the general assembly specifically postponing the expiration of the board's rules effectively postponed the rules of the "old" board and continued their application under the "new" board. 1st Am. Sav. Bank v. Boulder County, 888 P.2d 360 (Colo. App. 1994).
Secretary of state was not required to promulgate rules under the APA in order to implement the reporting requirement for games of chance suppliers and manufacturers under § 12-9-107.5. Bingo Games Supply Co., Inc. v. Meyer, 895 P.2d 1125 (Colo. App. 1995) (decided prior to 2017 amendments relocating article 9 of title 12 to part 6 of article 21 of title 24).
Counties not "persons" or "parties". There is nothing in the context of this section that includes counties as "persons" or "parties" entitled as of right to be admitted to agency hearings. Bd. of County Comm'rs v. State Bd. of Soc. Servs., 186 Colo. 435, 528 P.2d 244 (1974).
Department proposing a regulation has no affirmative duty to offer supporting evidence. Colo. Auto & Truck Wreckers Ass'n v. Dept. of Rev., 618 P.2d 646 (Colo. 1980).
Study or findings are not required to support rules based primarily on policy considerations if reasoning process leading to rules is defensible. Colo. Health Care Ass'n v. Dept. of Soc. Servs., 598 F. Supp. 1400 (D. Colo. 1984).
Racing commission was not precluded from making financial irresponsibility grounds for discipline, even though such grounds were not enumerated in § 12-60-507, since the rule was in the interests of the public and reasonable and was fully consistent with the commission's authority to promulgate rules. Partridge v. State, 895 P.2d 1183 (Colo. App. 1995).
Submissions by interested persons not controlling. Although subsection (4) provides that the agency "shall consider all submissions", it does not provide that such submissions shall be controlling, even when unrebutted. Colo. Auto & Truck Wreckers Ass'n v. Dept. of Rev., 618 P.2d 646 (Colo. 1980).
Definition of "rule". The numerical point system formulated by a peer review organization was not a rule but a general statement of policy which did not establish a binding norm nor finally determine issues or rights. Therefore no publication of the point system was required. Meyer v. State Dept. of Soc. Servs., 758 P.2d 192 (Colo. App. 1988).
Division of labor's requirement that self-insured employers use payroll statement to calculate the tax owed amounted to a "rule" as defined in subsection (15) of § 24-4-102. Jefferson Sch. Dist. R-1 v. Div. of Labor, 791 P.2d 1217 (Colo. App. 1990).
Promulgated and effective rule deemed "final" and subject to review. Once a commission's rule or regulation has been promulgated and is in effect, the agency action is "final" as to that particular regulation and subject to review under this article. CF&I Steel Corp. v. Colo. Air Pollution Control Comm'n, 199 Colo. 270, 610 P.2d 85 (1980).
Properly filed and indexed rules introduced in evidence. In effect, the general assembly stated in this section that, in order to have a rule introduced in evidence, the filing authority shall index and number the set of rules involved, shall keep amendments and repealed rules in a separate permanent file, and shall cross-index with up-to-date rules any amended or repealed rules. People v. Williams, 197 Colo. 559, 596 P.2d 745 (1979).
When rule may be introduced into evidence. An administrative rule which does not satisfy the public notice requirements of this section may not be introduced as evidence in criminal proceedings. People v. More, 668 P.2d 968 (Colo. App. 1983).
A party to judicial proceedings has the right to require an adverse party seeking to introduce an administrative rule into evidence to establish compliance with the applicable provisions of this section. People v. More, 668 P.2d 968 (Colo. App. 1983).
Statute governing admission of administrative rules and regulations into evidence against an accused in a criminal trial requires only a showing of proper publication and public availability of the rules. No showing need be made that there has been compliance with the provisions of the statute governing other aspects of issuance or promulgation of the rules. People v. Gallegos, 692 P.2d 1074 (Colo. 1984) (limiting People v. More cited in the previous paragraphs).
Standard of review specified in subsection (6) correctly applied where termination was reversed without an explicit finding that agency action was arbitrary, capricious, or contrary to rule or law. Kinchen v. Dept. of Insts., 867 P.2d 8 (Colo. App. 1993).
Conviction based on regulation not available to public is reversed. Where, in order to show that defendant received aid to the blind benefits to which he was not entitled, the department of social services had to both cite and rely on a regulation which had not been made available to the public in violation of this section, the defendant's conviction for welfare fraud had to be reversed. People v. Bobian, 626 P.2d 1132 (Colo. 1981).
Administrative law judge (ALJ) violated subsection (10) where the numerical point system formulated by the department of social services was utilized by the ALJ as the sole criterion upon which to determine petitioners' continuing eligibility for benefits but had never been made the subject of a formally adopted rule or regulation nor had claimant been given proper notice of its preeminent significance in determining benefit eligibility. Weaver v. Dept. of Soc. Servs., 791 P.2d 1230 (Colo. App. 1990).
The use of unpublished criteria in a scoring system used to evaluate the plaintiff's eligibility for home- and community-based services was not in violation of the APA because the scoring system serves only to facilitate the evaluation process for certain applicants and is not the final factual determination of eligibility. Morgan v. Colo. Dept. of Health Care Policy & Fin., 56 P.3d 1136 (Colo. App. 2002).
Agency rule-making conducted in accordance with this section is quasi-legislative, not quasi-judicial, in character. Colo. Ground Water Comm'n v. Eagle Peak Farms, 919 P.2d 212 (Colo. 1996).
Rules that are interpretive in nature fall within the express exception to the notice and hearing requirements of this section. Regular Rt. Com. Carrier Conf. v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 761 P.2d 737 (Colo. 1988).
Agency's rule, which provides minimum guidelines as to how the discovery process will be conducted with respect to that agency, is an interpretive rule and falls within the express exception to the notice and hearing requirements of this section. Colo. Motor Vehicle v. Northglenn, 972 P.2d 707 (Colo. App. 1998).
Whether a rule is legislative or interpretive depends on its effect. It is legislative if it establishes a norm that commands a particular result in all applicable proceedings; it is interpretive if it establishes guidelines that do not bind the agency to a particular result. Hammond v. Pub. Employees' Ret. Ass'n, 219 P.3d 426 (Colo. App. 2009).
A policy is an interpretative rule and not subject to the rulemaking requirements of the APA if it serves the advisory function of explaining the meaning of a word or phrase in statute and describes the type of factors that an agency will consider in future administrative proceedings without binding the agency to a particular result. Doe v. Colo. Dept. of Pub. Health & Env't, 2019 CO 92, 450 P.3d 851.
Emergency rule-making was within authority of department of social services and in accordance with the APA and the Medicaid Act. Health Care of Colo. v. Dept. of Soc. Servs., 842 F.2d 1158 (10th Cir. 1988).
Fiscal impact statement is not required to contain a description of the types of persons the rule will injure. The paragraph of the rule only requires a description of those types of persons or groups who will bear the costs of the rule and, for purposes of this paragraph, costs means fiscal costs. Urbish v. Lamm, 761 P.2d 756 (Colo. 1988) (decided under law in effect prior to 1988 amendment deleting fiscal impact statement requirement).
Rules published in the code of Colorado regulations are a fit subject for judicial notice. Westfall v. Town of Hugo, 851 P.2d 299 (Colo. App. 1993).
Where an agency's interpretation of law established agency policy and procedure, compliance with the APA was required and, where the APA requirements were not met, the rule was not enforceable. Jefferson Sch. Dist. R-1 v. Division of Labor, 791 P.2d 1217 (Colo. App. 1990).
It was permissible for the trial court to consider the commission's deliberations in the rule-making proceeding, in conjunction with the rest of the record, in conducting the court's review. The transcripts of the commission's deliberations are analogous to legislative history concerning a statute. Bd. of County Comm'rs v. Water Quality Control Comm'n, 809 P.2d 1107 (Colo. App. 1991).
A regulation may not modify or contravene an existing statute, and any regulation that is inconsistent with or contrary to statute is void. Ettelman v. State Bd. of Accountancy, 849 P.2d 795 (Colo. App. 1992); Colo. Consumer Health Initiative v. Colo. Bd. of Health, 240 P.3d 525 (Colo. App. 2010); Hanlen v. Gessler, 2014 CO 24, 333 P.3d 41.
A regulation that states that permits issued pursuant to it shall be binding with respect to "any conflicting local governmental permit or land use approval process" is overly broad and void where it conflicts with law providing that oil and gas rules preempt county regulations only when the operational effect of the county regulations conflicts with the application of the state oil and gas statute or state regulations. Bd. of County Comm'rs v. Colo. Oil & Gas Conservation Comm'n, 81 P.3d 1119 (Colo. App. 2003).
District court did not abuse its discretion by entering preliminary injunction against secretary of state enjoining implementation of administrative rule. Proposed rule would force labor and other covered organizations to get written permission before using an individual's dues or contributions to fund political campaigns. Plaintiffs demonstrated reasonable probability of success on the merits in challenging secretary's authority to enact proposed rule. Secretary's "definition" of term "member" in proposed rule is much more than an effort to define term. It can be read effectively to add, modify, and conflict with constitutional provision by imposing new condition not found in text of article XXVIII. Secretary's stated purpose in enacting proposed rule not furthered by "definition" contained in proposed rule. Proposed rule does not further secretary's stated goal of achieving transparency of contributions. Finally, timing and scope of secretary's definition raise constitutional issues with respect to plaintiff's associational rights. Sanger v. Dennis, 148 P.3d 404 (Colo. App. 2006).
Although the secretary of state's attempt to conform § 2(7)(a) of article XXVIII of the state constitution to first amendment standards is understandable, it exceeds his authority to "administer and enforce" the law. Section 2(7)(a) defines "electioneering communication" to include all communication that "[u]nambiguously refers to any candidate". But the secretary of state's proposed rule, 8 Colo. Code Regs. 1505-6, § 1.7, defines it only as communication that is the functional equivalent of express advocacy. Thus the plain language of the rule restricts the type of communication that would fall in the category of "electioneering communication" because it adds a "functional equivalence" test. Accordingly, the rule is invalid because the constitutional provisions are clear and unambiguous that all communication unambiguously referring to a candidate is electioneering communication, leaving no gap for the secretary to fill. Colo. Ethics Watch v. Gessler, 2013 COA 172M, 363 P.3d 727.
Applied in Union P. R. R. v. Heckers, 181 Colo. 374, 509 P.2d 1255 (1973); Chroma Corp. v. County of Adams, 36 Colo. App. 345, 543 P.2d 83 (1975); United Buying Serv., Inc. v. State Dept. of Rev., 37 Colo. App. 465, 548 P.2d 1286 (1976); Van Pelt v. State Bd. for Cmty. Colls. & Occupational Educ., 195 Colo. 316, 577 P.2d 765 (1978); Colorado-Ute Elec. Ass'n v. Air Pollution Control Comm'n, 41 Colo. App. 393, 591 P.2d 1323 (1978); A & A Auto Wrecking, Inc. v. Dept. of Rev., 43 Colo. App. 85, 602 P.2d 10 (1979); Schneider v. Indus. Comm'n, 624 P.2d 371 (Colo. App. 1981); Colo. Water Quality Control Comm'n v. Town of Frederick, 641 P.2d 958 (Colo. 1982); Geriatrics, Inc. v. Colo. State Dept. of Health, 650 P.2d 1288 (Colo. App. 1982), aff'd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 699 P.2d 952 (Colo. 1985); Fontanari v. Colo. Mined Land Reclamation, 2023 COA 15, 529 P.3d 615.
24-4-103.3. Mandatory review of rules by agencies - report on results of review in departmental regulatory agendas - definitions.
(1) Each principal department shall establish a schedule for the periodic review of all of the department's rules to occur at least every five years. Each principal department shall conduct a review of all of its rules to assess the continuing need for and the appropriateness and cost-effectiveness of its rules to determine if they should be continued in their current form, modified, or repealed. The applicable rule-making agency or official in the principal department shall consider the following:
(a) Whether the rule is necessary;
(b) Whether the rule overlaps or duplicates other rules of the agency or with other federal, state, or local government rules;
(c) Whether the rule is written in plain language and is easy to understand;
(d) Whether the rule has achieved the desired intent and whether more or less regulation is necessary;
(e) Whether the rule can be amended to give more flexibility, reduce regulatory burdens, or reduce unnecessary paperwork or steps while meeting its intended goals and benefits;
(f) Whether the rule is implemented in an efficient and effective manner, including the requirements for the issuance of permits and licenses;
(g) Whether a cost-benefit analysis was performed by the applicable rule-making agency or official in the principal department pursuant to section 24-4-103 (2.5) or an equivalent analysis pursuant to section 25-7-110.5;
(h) Whether the rule is adequate for the protection of the safety, health, and welfare of the state or its residents.
(i) Whether there are other rules adopted by the rule-making agency or official that have the same or similar purpose, intent, or goal; how those are coordinated; and whether redundancies can be eliminated;
(j) Whether the rule is outdated or obsolete;
(k) Whether funding levels to support the program or function subject to the rule are appropriate. As used in this subsection (1)(k), "appropriate" means sufficient to administer and enforce the program or rule in compliance with state and federal law, within existing appropriations and authorized fee structures.
(l) Whether there are opportunities to improve the effectiveness of the rule in meeting its purpose, intent, or goal. As used in this subsection (1)(l), "opportunities" means reasonable and legally permissible adjustments within the agency's existing statutory authority that would improve implementation or administration of the rule.
(2) Each rule-making agency or official shall provide public notice on the agency's official website of its review of the rules, give the public an appropriate opportunity to provide input, and notify other state agencies that may have jurisdiction over the subject matter of the rules to allow for collaboration and input. Based on this review, the rule-making agency or official shall determine whether the existing rules should be continued in their current form, amended, or repealed. If the rule-making agency or official decides that a rule should be amended or repealed, the rule-making agency or official shall comply with the notice and hearing requirements of section 24-4-103.
(3) Repealed.
(4) (a) Each principal department shall include a report on the results of its mandatory review of rules as part of its departmental regulatory agenda that it submits to the staff of the legislative council for distribution to the applicable committee of reference of the general assembly as outlined in section 2-7-203. The committee of reference shall review the departmental report during the committee's "SMART Act" hearing.
(b) In accordance with the process set forth in section 24-34-104 (6)(a) and (6)(c), the committee of reference may make a recommendation whether a program or function subject to the rules should be subject to a sunset review pursuant to section 24-34-104 (5) or may make a recommendation to the legislative audit committee for an audit by the office of the state auditor pursuant to section 2-3-108.
Source: L. 2014: Entire section added, (SB 14-063), ch. 69, p. 296, § 1, effective March 27. L. 2026: IP(1), (1)(e), (1)(g), and (4) amended, (1)(i), (1)(j), (1)(k), and (1)(l) added, and (3) repealed, (SB 26-137), ch. 132, p. 586, § 1, effective August 12.
24-4-103.5. Rule-making affecting small business - procedure. (Repealed)
Source: L. 82: p. 362, § 1. L. 87: (1) amended, p. 1010, § 1, effective April 16. L. 97: Entire section repealed, p. 525, § 6, effective July 1.
24-4-104. Licenses - issuance, suspension or revocation, renewal.
(1) In any case in which application is made for a license required by law, the agency, with due regard for the rights and privileges of all interested persons, shall set and conduct the proceedings in accordance with this article unless otherwise required by law.
(2) Every agency decision respecting the grant, renewal, denial, revocation, suspension, annulment, limitation, or modification of a license shall be based solely upon the stated criteria, terms, and purposes of the statute, or regulations promulgated thereunder, and case law interpreting such statutes and regulations pursuant to which the license is issued or required. Terms, conditions, or requirements limiting any license shall be valid only if reasonably necessary to effectuate the purposes, scope, or stated terms of the statute pursuant to which the license is issued or required.
(3) (a) No revocation, suspension, annulment, limitation, or modification of a license by any agency shall be lawful unless, before institution of agency proceedings therefor, the agency has given the licensee notice in writing of objective facts or conduct established upon a full investigation that may warrant such action and afforded the licensee opportunity to submit written data, views, and arguments with respect to the facts or conduct and, except in cases of deliberate and willful violation or of substantial danger to public health and safety, given the licensee a reasonable opportunity to comply with all lawful requirements. For purposes of this subsection (3), "full investigation" means a reasonable ascertainment of the underlying facts on which the agency action is based.
(b) The full investigation requirement specified in subsection (3)(a) of this section shall not apply to licenses issued under articles 1.1, 9, 10.1, and 11.5 of title 40 or article 2 of title 42.
(4) (a) Where the agency has objective and reasonable grounds to believe and finds, upon a full investigation, that the licensee has been guilty of deliberate and willful violation or that the public health, safety, or welfare imperatively requires emergency action and incorporates the findings in its order, it may summarily suspend the license pending proceedings for suspension or revocation which shall be promptly instituted and determined. For purposes of this subsection (4), "full investigation" means a reasonable ascertainment of the underlying facts on which the agency action is based.
(b) The full investigation requirement specified in subsection (4)(a) of this section shall not apply to licenses issued under articles 1.1, 9, 10.1, and 11.5 of title 40 or article 2 of title 42.
(5) A proceeding for the revocation, suspension, annulment, limitation, or modification of a previously issued license shall be commenced by the agency upon its own motion or by the filing with the agency of a written complaint, signed and sworn to by the complainant, stating the name of the licensee complained against and the grounds for the requested action.
(6) Except as provided in subsection (4) of this section, an agency shall not revoke, suspend, annul, limit, or modify a previously issued license until after holding a hearing as provided in section 24-4-105.
(7) In any case in which the licensee has made timely and sufficient application for the renewal of a license or for a new license for the conduct of a previously licensed activity of a continuing nature, the existing license shall not expire until such application has been finally acted upon by the agency, and, if the application is denied, it shall be treated in all respects as a denial. The licensee, within sixty days after the giving of notice of such action, may request a hearing before the agency as provided in section 24-4-105, and the action of the agency after any hearing shall be subject to judicial review as provided in section 24-4-106.
(8) An application for a license shall be acted upon promptly, and, immediately after the taking of action on such application by an agency, a written notice of the action taken by the agency and, if the application is denied, the grounds therefor shall be given to the applicant. The giving of such notice shall be by personal service upon the applicant or by mailing the same to the address of the applicant as shown on the application or as subsequently furnished in writing by the applicant to the agency.
(9) If an application for a new license is denied without a hearing, the applicant, within sixty days after the giving of notice of such action, may request a hearing before the agency as provided in section 24-4-105, and the action of the agency after any hearing shall be subject to judicial review as provided in section 24-4-106.
(10) Written notice of the revocation, suspension, annulment, limitation, or modification of a license and the grounds therefor shall be served forthwith on the licensee personally or by mailing by first-class mail to the last address furnished the agency by the licensee.
(11) A limitation, unless consented to by the applicant, on a license applied for shall be treated as a denial. A modification, unless consented to by the licensee, of a license already issued shall be treated as a revocation.
(12) In an appropriate case a revoked or suspended license may be reissued.
(13) (a) Any applicant who, under oath, supplies false information to an agency in an application for a license commits perjury in the second degree, as defined in section 18-8-503, C.R.S. Any such application shall bear notice, in accordance with section 18-8-501 (2)(a)(I), C.R.S., that false statements made therein are punishable.
(b) On and after January 1, 1985, an agency shall not require that information contained in an application for a license be affirmed to before a notary.
Source: L. 59: p. 161, § 3. CRS 53: § 3-16-3. C.R.S. 1963: § 3-16-3. L. 69: p. 84, § 4. L. 81: (2) amended, p. 1141, §1, effective April 16. L. 83: (13) added, p. 521, § 4, effective March 15. L. 93: (3) and (7) amended, p. 1327, § 3, effective June 6. L. 2006: (3) and (4) amended, p. 838, § 1, effective August 7. L. 2007: (3)(b) and (4)(b) amended, p. 2033, § 48, effective June 1. L. 2018: (3)(b) and (4)(b) amended, (HB 18-1375), ch. 274, p. 1705, § 34, effective May 29; (6) amended, (HB 18-1224), ch. 288, p. 1780, § 1, effective May 29.
ANNOTATION
Law reviews. For article, "A Critical Evaluation of the Federal Role in Nursing Home Quality Enforcement", see 51 U. Colo. L. Rev. 607 (1980). For article, "Law and Strategy in Licensing Disciplinary Proceedings", see 18 Colo. Law. 647 (1988). For article, "Alternative Dispute Resolution Meets the Administrative Process", see 24 Colo. Law. 1549 (1995). For article, "Right to Cure: The ‘One Bite Rule’ Is Alive and Well", see 27 Colo. Law. 27 (Apr. 1998).
This section provides an independent right to a hearing in only two areas: Rule-making and licensure. Bazemore v. Colo. State Lottery Div., 64 P.3d 876 (Colo. App. 2002).
Colorado statutory scheme makes adequate provisions for prompt hearing and determination of emergency summary license suspensions to meet due process requirements. Any vagueness in the term "promptly" is adequately cured by licensee's statutory right to request and obtain an "immediate" hearing following an emergency suspension. Motor Vehicle Div. v. Castro, 914 P.2d 517 (Colo. App. 1996).
Section applicable to suspension of medical license. Subsection (4) is the authority for the state board of medical examiners to summarily suspend a license to practice medicine pending a full hearing; § 12-36-101 et seq., dealing with medical practice, and § 24-4-103, dealing with rule-making procedure, do not apply. Bd. of Med. Exam'rs v. District Court, 191 Colo. 158, 551 P.2d 194 (1976).
And to suspension of fireworks licenses by the secretary of state. Sanchez v. State, 730 P.2d 328 (Colo. 1986).
Section not applicable to board of accountancy. The notice and hearing requirements of subsection (3) are of no significance where there is a specific statutory provision concerning the notice and hearing requirements in proceedings before the board of accountancy. People ex rel. Bd. of Accountancy v. McFarland, 37 Colo. App. 93, 543 P.2d 112 (1975).
Nor to liquor license suspension proceedings. The provisions of § 12-47-110, not the State Administrative Procedure Act (APA), do not apply to liquor license suspension proceedings. Continental Liquor Co. v. Kalbin, 43 Colo. App. 438, 608 P.2d 353 (1977); Chroma Corp. v. Campbell, 44 Colo. App. 387, 619 P.2d 74 (1980).
Nor to the director of the department of revenue's discretionary decision. Because § 39-26-111 makes the authority of the director of the department of revenue to withdraw permission to make returns and pay taxes on the cash basis discretionary, that specific provision controls over the general provisions of this section and § 24-4-105 regarding notice and a hearing upon revocation of a license. Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Dept. of Rev., 628 P.2d 85 (Colo. 1981).
Suspension or revocation hearing is a disciplinary proceeding. An administrative hearing to revoke or suspend a professional license is a disciplinary, not a criminal, proceeding. Commerce City Drug v. Bd. of Pharmacy, 32 Colo. App. 216, 511 P.2d 935 (1973).
License conditions and revocation authorized by law and constitution. The gaming commission was within its statutory authority in conditioning a key employee license on payment of back child support and taxes and revoking such license for failure to comply with such conditions. The gaming commission did not abuse its discretion or violate due process in so revoking the license where the licensee was given a reasonable opportunity to comply with such conditions, failed to provide requested income tax returns, and made false statements of material fact to the investigator regarding the filing of tax returns and where the gaming commission provided the licensee with substantial evidentiary leeway, allowed the licensee to cross-examine and impeach the investigator, and gave the licensee the opportunity to argue the proper standard for license revocation. Feeney v. Colo. Ltd. Gaming Control Comm'n, 890 P.2d 173 (Colo. App. 1994).
When there is a conflict between provisions of the APA and a specific statutory provision relating to a specific agency, the specific statutory provision is deemed controlling in professional disciplinary proceedings before the board of medical examiners. State Bd. of Med. Exam'rs v. Reiner, 786 P.2d 499 (Colo. App. 1989).
Board of chiropractic examiners only has authority to suspend a license summarily in situations involving an emergency, despite the APA's provision allowing summary suspension for either a deliberate or willful violation or an emergency situation, since the more specific statutory provision relating to a particular agency controls. Stjernholm v. Bd. of Chiropractic Exam'rs, 865 P.2d 853 (Colo. App. 1993).
Agency that is given authority to suspend and revoke licenses pursuant to this section is given qualified authority to revoke licenses and not absolute authority. Sanchez v. State, 730 P.2d 328 (Colo. 1986).
Because the statutes specific to the state engineer are silent with regard to the procedures applicable to a petition to revoke a groundwater permit, the state engineer must follow the procedures established in this section. V Bar Ranch LLC v. Cotten, 233 P.3d 1200 (Colo. 2010).
Agency has no authority to revoke a license unless the licensee is first given a reasonable opportunity to correct such conduct that would justify the revocation of the license, except when it has been determined to have been deliberate and wilful. Sanchez v. State, 730 P.2d 328 (Colo. 1986); Colo. Motor Vehicle Dealer Bd. v. Butterfield, 9 P.3d 1148 (Colo. App. 2000).
A finding that the charges alleged in the notice, which involved fraudulent conduct, had been proven necessarily implied that the respondent acted willfully and deliberately, and thus there was no requirement for a pre-hearing opportunity for compliance. Colo. Motor Vehicle Dealer Bd. v. Butterfield, 9 P.3d 1148 (Colo. App. 2000).
Exhaustion of administrative remedies is not required prior to judicial review when the agency fails to trigger appropriate procedures by issuing the notice required by subsection (3). Golden's Concrete Co. v. State, 937 P.2d 789 (Colo. App. 1996), rev'd on other grounds, 962 P.2d 919 (Colo. 1998).
Exhaustion doctrine explained. The principal policies underlying the exhaustion doctrine are to prevent premature interference with agency processes; to afford the parties and the courts the benefit of the agency's experience and expertise; and to compile a record that is adequate for judicial review. Golden's Concrete Co. v. State, 937 P.2d 789 (Colo. App. 1996), rev'd on other grounds, 962 P.2d 919 (Colo. 1998).
Exceptions to exhaustion doctrine include situations where only pure questions of law are presented, hence the agency's expertise is of no particular value, and where further administrative proceedings would be futile. Golden's Concrete Co. v. State, 937 P.2d 789 (Colo. App. 1996), rev'd on other grounds, 962 P.2d 919 (Colo. 1998).
Summary revocation of fireworks licenses was improper without the secretary of state making an initial finding of deliberate and wilful conduct because the licensee suffers an immediate loss of livelihood without due process protections of prior notice and formal hearing. Sanchez v. State, 730 P.2d 328 (Colo. 1986).
"Timely" notice, plus opportunity to submit arguments, is constitutionally required. When the specific time for a hearing is not expressly provided elsewhere, notice of the hearing must be "timely", and the licensee shall have the opportunity to submit written data, views, and arguments in order to afford due process. Bd. of Med. Exam'rs v. Palmer, 157 Colo. 40, 400 P.2d 914 (1965).
Although "double" notice not required. In a proceeding to revoke an optometrist's license, neither due process considerations nor this section requires "double" notice, i.e., notice that license revocation proceedings have been initiated, as well as a separate notice of the hearing itself. Dixon v. Bd. of Optometric Exam'rs, 39 Colo. App. 200, 565 P.2d 960 (1977); Colo. Motor Vehicle Dealer Bd. v. Butterfield, 9 P.3d 1148 (Colo. App. 2000); Colo. Motor Vehicle Dealer Bd. v. Brinker, 39 P.3d 1269 (Colo. App. 2001).
Department of agriculture did not violate notice requirements merely because it failed to provide written notice of plaintiff's right to submit written data, views, and arguments before the filing of the notice of charges. Speer v. Kourlis, 935 P.2d 43 (Colo. App. 1996); Colo. Motor Vehicle Dealer Bd. v. Butterfield, 9 P.3d 1148 (Colo. App. 2000).
The record did not support that plaintiff's conduct with regard to licensing violations was not willful and deliberate, and therefore plaintiff was entitled to an opportunity to comply with the law before licensing sanctions were imposed. Speer v. Kourlis, 935 P.2d 43 (Colo. App. 1996).
It is less than certain that the APA requires the state board for community colleges and occupational education to conduct a predeprivation hearing since it is not clear that a revocation results when an existing certificate merely expires because the renewal application is not sufficient in form or substance as prescribed by § 12-59-108. Nat'l Camera, Inc. v. Sanchez, 832 P.2d 960 (Colo. App. 1991) (decided prior to 2017 amendments relocating article 59 of title 12 to article 64 of title 23).
No conflict between this section and § 12-36-118 of the "Colorado Medical Practice Act" (MPA) since the MPA does not reference summary suspensions. Bd. of Med. Exam'rs v. Court of Appeals, 920 P.2d 807 (Colo. 1996).
Applied in In re Estate of Smith v. O'Halloran, 557 F. Supp. 289 (D. Colo. 1983); In re Maul v. State Bd. of Dental Exam'rs, 668 P.2d 933 (Colo. 1983).
24-4-104.5. Permits - rules in effect at time of submission of application for a permit control.
(1) For purposes of this section, unless the context otherwise requires, "permit" means a grant of authority by an agency that authorizes the holder of the permit to do some act not forbidden by law but not allowed to be performed without such authority. "Permit" does not include a professional license issued by a licensing board or an agency to conduct a profession or occupation. "Permit" does not include a registration or certification issued by a board or state agency to an individual to pursue a profession, practice, or occupation. "Permit" does not include a water well permit issued by the state engineer pursuant to title 37, C.R.S.
(2) (a) The rules and any written statements of agency interpretation of the statutes of an agency that are in effect on the date that a person applies for issuance or renewal of a permit govern the application process and any permit eligibility requirement. If the rules or any written statements of agency interpretation of the statutes governing the agency's permit process or the requirements to qualify for a permit have been amended, the agency shall process the application under the rules and any written statements of agency interpretation of the statutes in effect on the date of the application, unless the agency determines in writing that:
(I) (A) The new rules materially affect the health and safety of the public; and
(B) Use of the rules in effect on the date of application is likely to result in an unsafe situation if the applicant does not comply with the new rules; or
(II) New rules or new requirements are necessary to ensure that the agency and the permit will be in compliance with the requirements of federal law and federal regulations; or
(III) New rules or new requirements are necessary to ensure that the agency and the permit will not be in conflict with state statutes; or
(IV) New rules or new requirements are necessary to ensure that the agency and the permit will be in compliance with the requirements of a court order.
(b) If the agency determines that one of the exceptions to the requirements of paragraph (a) of this subsection (2) will occur if the applicant does not comply with the new rules or new requirements, the agency shall:
(I) Treat the application as pending;
(II) Provide a written notice to the applicant stating the reasons the application is incomplete; and
(III) Give the applicant a reasonable opportunity to comply with the new rules or new requirements.
(3) If an agency adopts or amends rules that govern or impact the application process or any permit eligibility requirements after a person has applied for a permit or renewal of a permit and while the application is pending with the agency, the person shall have the option to have the application processed under the rules in existence at the time of the filing of the application or under the new rules.
Source: L. 2012: Entire section added, (HB 12-1002), ch. 249, p. 1241, § 2, effective August 8.
Cross references: In 2012, this section was added by the "Creating Level Expectations for Application Review Act" or the "CLEAR Act". For the short title, see section 1 of chapter 249, Session Laws of Colorado 2012.
24-4-104.6. Analysis of noncompliance with department rules - definition - legislative declaration.
(1) (a) The general assembly hereby finds and declares that this section codifies existing practice, that each agency already knows about and tracks the rule issues described in subsection (2)(a) of this section, and that much of this work is currently completed in the normal course of an agency's business.
(b) The general assembly further finds and declares that it is not the general assembly's intent for an agency to increase its existing rule compliance monitoring.
(2) (a) Each agency shall conduct, within existing resources, an analysis of noncompliance with its rules to identify rules with the greatest frequency of noncompliance, rules that generate the greatest amount of fines, how many first-time offenders were given the opportunity to cure a minor violation, and those factors that contribute to noncompliance with rules by regulated businesses. The analysis will guide each department on how to improve its education and outreach to regulated businesses on compliance with the department's rules. The agency shall consider and review:
(I) Whether the rule is unclear and should be rewritten;
(II) Whether more education or training of the regulated businesses would be likely to achieve better compliance with the rule; and
(III) The enforcement level and any appropriate fines for noncompliance with the department's rules.
(b) Any principal department that conducts an analysis of noncompliance with rules adopted by agencies within its department pursuant to subsection (2)(a) of this section shall forward that analysis to the department of regulatory agencies, which shall compile and summarize those analyses into one combined analysis of noncompliance with rules. The department of regulatory agencies shall include the compiled analysis in its departmental presentation to its oversight legislative committee of reference made pursuant to section 2-7-203 of the "State Measurement for Accountable, Responsive, and Transparent (SMART) Government Act".
Source: L. 2018: Entire section added, (HB 18-1250), ch. 195, p. 1286, § 1, effective August 8.
24-4-105. Hearings and determinations.
(1) In order to assure that all parties to any agency adjudicatory proceeding are accorded due process of law, the provisions of this section shall be applicable.
(2) (a) In any proceeding in which an opportunity for agency adjudicatory hearing is required under the state constitution or by this or any other statute, the parties are entitled to a hearing and decision in conformity with this section. Any person entitled to notice of a hearing shall be given timely notice of the time, place, and nature thereof, the legal authority and jurisdiction under which it is to be held, and the matters of fact and law asserted. Unless otherwise provided by law, the notice shall be served personally; by electronic means, upon the documented request or consent of the person to be notified; or by mailing by first-class mail to the last address furnished to the agency by the person to be notified at least thirty days prior to the hearing. In fixing the time and place for a hearing, due regard shall be had for the convenience and necessity of the parties and their representatives.
(b) Any person given notice pursuant to subsection (2)(a) of this section shall file a written answer thirty days after the service, electronic delivery, or mailing of the notice. If the person fails to answer, any agency, administrative law judge, or hearing officer, upon motion, may enter a default. For good cause shown, the entry of default may be set aside within ten days after the date of entry.
(c) A person who may be affected or aggrieved by agency action shall be admitted as a party to the proceeding upon his filing with the agency a written request therefor, setting forth a brief and plain statement of the facts which entitle him to be admitted and the matters which he claims should be decided. Nothing in this subsection (2) shall prevent an agency from admitting any person or agency as a party to any agency proceeding for limited purposes.
(3) At a hearing only one of the following may preside: The agency, an administrative law judge from the office of administrative courts, or, if otherwise authorized by law, a hearing officer who if authorized by law may be a member of the body which comprises the agency. Upon the filing in good faith by a party of a timely and sufficient affidavit of personal bias of an administrative law judge or a hearing officer or a member of the agency or the agency, the administrative law judge, hearing officer, or agency shall forthwith rule upon the allegations in such affidavit as part of the record in the case. An administrative law judge or a hearing officer may at any time withdraw if he or she deems himself or herself disqualified or for any other good reason in which case another administrative law judge or hearing officer may be assigned to continue the case, and he or she shall do so in such manner that no substantial prejudice to any party results therefrom. An agency or a member of an agency may withdraw for any like reason and in like manner, unless his or her withdrawal makes it impossible for the agency to render a decision.
(4) (a) Any agency conducting a hearing, any administrative law judge, and any hearing officer shall have authority to: Administer oaths and affirmations; sign and issue subpoenas; rule upon offers of proof and receive evidence; dispose of motions relating to the discovery and production of relevant documents and things for inspection, copying, or photographing; regulate the course of the hearing, set the time and place for continued hearings, and fix the time for the filing of briefs and other documents; direct the parties to appear and confer to consider the simplification of the issues, admissions of fact or of documents to avoid unnecessary proof, and limitation of the number of expert witnesses; issue appropriate orders that shall control the subsequent course of the proceedings; dispose of motions to dismiss for lack of agency jurisdiction over the subject matter or parties or for any other ground; dispose of motions to amend or to dismiss without prejudice applications and other pleadings; dispose of motions to intervene, procedural requests, or similar matters; reprimand or exclude from the hearing any person for any improper or indecorous conduct in his or her presence; award attorney fees for abuses of discovery procedures or as otherwise provided under the Colorado rules of civil procedure; and take any other action authorized by agency rule consistent with this article 4 or in accordance, to the extent practicable, with the procedure in the district courts. All parties to the proceeding shall also have the right to cross-examine witnesses who testify at the proceeding. In the event more than one person engages in the conduct of a hearing, such persons shall designate one of their number to perform such of the above functions as can best be performed by one person only, and thereafter such person only shall perform those functions that are assigned to him or her by the several persons conducting such hearing.
(b) (I) (A) The general assembly hereby finds that the mediation process generally saves the state and the licensee time and money. Mediation takes much less time than moving a case through agency proceedings and judicial review. These cases typically take months or years to resolve, but mediation typically achieves a resolution in a matter of hours. Taking less time means expending less money on hourly fees and costs. This benefits both the agency and the licensee, and because the result is attained by the parties working together, compliance with the mediated agreement is usually high. This further reduces costs because agencies do not have to pay an attorney or investigators to force compliance.
(B) The general assembly hereby declares that, in order to save time and money, the policy of Colorado is to use mediation whenever appropriate to settle disputes between agencies and licensees.
(II) Upon petition of the agency or licensee after the licensee has received the notice of hearing under subsection (2)(a) of this section, the hearing officer or administrative law judge shall order mediation between the agency and the licensee unless the license was summarily suspended in accordance with section 24-4-104 (4). When mediation is ordered, the agency shall:
(A) Assign a person with authority to make prehearing decisions concerning disposition of the matter to be present during meetings related to settlement communications or mediation communications and to be included in any material settlement communications with the licensee or the licensee's representative over the matter; and
(B) Upon the licensee's request, allow a private or public mediator chosen by the licensee to be present during meetings related to mediation and to be included in any material settlement communications with the licensee or the licensee's representative over the matter. If the mediator is privately retained, the licensee must pay the mediator's reasonable fees, and the agency need not pay the privately retained mediator's fees.
(III) To the extent feasible, for the purpose of carrying out this subsection (4):
(A) Administrative law judges shall make themselves available as public mediators without cost to the licensee;
(B) The members of any governing body that regulates the licensee shall make a member or other person available for mediation as a person with authority to make prehearing decisions concerning disposition of the matter.
(IV) If an agency fails to comply with an order of mediation, a licensee adversely affected by the failure may petition the administrative law judge or hearing officer to suspend the proceedings and require compliance with the order, to be completed in good faith as soon as practicable, under the administrative law judge's or the hearing officer's supervision.
(V) If mediation fails, the agency shall notify the administrative law judge or the hearing officer, and the administrative law judge or the hearing officer shall lift the suspension and proceed with the hearing.
(VI) When determining the place to hold the mediation, the agency shall give due consideration to the location of the licensee's occupation or residence, the availability of an administrative law judge to mediate, and the availability of a member of the governing body that regulates the licensee to be a person with authority to make prehearing decisions concerning disposition of the matter.
(VII) This subsection (4)(b) applies only to agency proceedings that concern an individual who is licensed to practice an occupation or profession; except that this subsection (4)(b) does not apply to a commercial driver's license issued under part 4 of article 2 of title 42.
(VIII) This subsection (4)(b) does not apply if a license has been summarily suspended because the agency finds, in accordance with section 24-4-104 (4), that the licensee is guilty of a deliberate and willful violation or that the public health, safety, or welfare imperatively requires emergency action and incorporates the findings in the agency's order. Nothing in this subsection (4)(b) prohibits an agency and licensee from voluntarily agreeing to a mediation following a summary suspension.
(IX) Repealed.
(5) Subpoenas shall be issued without discrimination between public and private parties by any agency or any member, the secretary, or chief administrative officer thereof or, with respect to any hearing for which an administrative law judge or a hearing officer has been appointed, the administrative law judge or the hearing officer. A subpoena shall be served in the same manner as a subpoena issued by a district court. Upon failure of any witness to comply with such subpoena, the agency may petition any district court, setting forth that due notice has been given of the time and place of attendance of the witness and the service of the subpoena; in which event, the district court, after hearing evidence in support of or contrary to the petition, may enter an order as in other civil actions compelling the witness to attend and testify or produce books, records, or other evidence, under penalty of punishment for contempt in case of contumacious failure to comply with the order of the court and may award attorney fees under the Colorado rules of civil procedure. A witness shall be entitled to the fees and mileage provided for a witness in a court of record.
(6) No person engaged in conducting a hearing or participating in a decision or an initial decision shall be responsible to or subject to the supervision or direction of any officer, employee, or agent engaged in the performance of investigatory or prosecuting functions for the agency.
(7) Except as otherwise provided by statute, the proponent of an order shall have the burden of proof, and every party to the proceeding shall have the right to present his case or defense by oral and documentary evidence, to submit rebuttal evidence, and to conduct such cross-examination as may be required for a full and true disclosure of the facts. Subject to these rights and requirements, where a hearing will be expedited and the interests of the parties will not be substantially prejudiced thereby, a person conducting a hearing may receive all or part of the evidence in written form. The rules of evidence and requirements of proof shall conform, to the extent practicable, with those in civil nonjury cases in the district courts. However, when necessary to do so in order to ascertain facts affecting the substantial rights of the parties to the proceeding, the person so conducting the hearing may receive and consider evidence not admissible under such rules if such evidence possesses probative value commonly accepted by reasonable and prudent men in the conduct of their affairs. Objections to evidentiary offers may be made and shall be noted in the record. The person conducting a hearing shall give effect to the rules of privilege recognized by law. He may exclude incompetent and unduly repetitious evidence. Documentary evidence may be received in the form of a copy or excerpt if the original is not readily available; but, upon request, the party shall be given an opportunity to compare the copy with the original. An agency may utilize its experience, technical competence, and specialized knowledge in the evaluation of the evidence presented to it.
(8) An agency may take notice of general, technical, or scientific facts within its knowledge, but only if the fact so noticed is specified in the record or is brought to the attention of the parties before final decision and every party is afforded an opportunity to controvert the fact so noticed.
(9) (a) Any party, or the agent, servant, or employee of any party, permitted or compelled to testify or to submit data or evidence shall be entitled to the benefit of legal counsel of his or her own choosing and at his or her own expense, but a person may appear on their own behalf. An attorney who is a witness may not act as counsel for the party calling the attorney as a witness. Any party, upon payment of a reasonable charge therefor, shall be entitled to procure a copy of the transcript of the record or any part thereof. Any person permitted or compelled to testify or to submit data or evidence shall be entitled to the benefit of legal counsel of such person's own choosing and, upon payment of a reasonable charge therefor, to procure a copy of the transcript of such person's testimony if it is recorded.
(b) (I) Except as provided in subparagraph (III) of this paragraph (b), no attorney shall submit a document concerning an adjudicatory proceeding after January 1, 1994, unless such document is submitted on recycled paper. The provisions of this section shall apply to all papers appended to each such document.
(II) (A) Any state agency that adopts policies, procedures, rules, or regulations for the purpose of implementing the provisions of this section shall ensure that the conduct of state business is not impeded and that no person is denied access to the services or programs of a state agency as a result of such implementation.
(B) No document shall be refused by a state agency solely because it was not submitted on recycled paper.
(III) Nothing in this section shall be construed to apply to:
(A) Photographs;
(B) An original document that was prepared or printed prior to January 1, 1994;
(C) A document that was not created at the direction or under the control of the submitting attorney;
(D) Facsimile copies concerning an adjudicatory proceeding otherwise permitted to be filed in lieu of the original document; however, if the original is also required to be filed, such original shall be submitted in compliance with this section;
(E) Existing stocks of nonrecycled paper and preprinted forms acquired or printed prior to January 1, 1994.
(IV) The provisions of this section shall not be applicable if recycled paper is not readily available.
(V) For purposes of this paragraph (b), unless the context otherwise requires:
(A) "Attorney" means an attorney-at-law admitted to practice law before any court of record in this state.
(B) "Document" means any pleading or any other paper submitted as an appendix to such pleading by an attorney, which document is required or permitted to be filed with a state agency concerning any action to be commenced or which is pending before such agency.
(C) "Recycled paper" means paper with not less than fifty percent of its total weight consisting of secondary and postconsumer waste and with not less than ten percent of such total weight consisting of postconsumer waste.
(10) Every agency shall proceed with reasonable dispatch to conclude any matter presented to it with due regard for the convenience of the parties or their representatives, giving precedence to rehearing proceedings after remand by court order. Prompt notice shall be given of the refusal to accept for filing or the denial in whole or in part of any written application or other request made in connection with any agency proceeding or action, with a statement of the grounds therefor. Upon application made to any court of competent jurisdiction by a party to any agency proceeding or by a person adversely affected by agency action and a showing to the court that there has been undue delay in connection with such proceeding or action, the court may direct the agency to decide the matter promptly.
(11) Every agency shall provide by rule for the entertaining, in its sound discretion, and prompt disposition of petitions for declaratory orders to terminate controversies or to remove uncertainties as to the applicability to the petitioners of any statutory provision or of any rule or order of the agency. The order disposing of the petition shall constitute agency action subject to judicial review.
(12) Nothing in this article shall affect statutory powers of an agency to issue an emergency order where the agency finds and states of record the reasons for so finding that immediate issuance of the order is imperatively necessary for the preservation of public health, safety, or welfare and observance of the requirements of this section would be contrary to the public interest. Any person against whom an emergency order is issued, who would otherwise be entitled to a hearing pursuant to this section, shall be entitled upon request to an immediate hearing in accordance with this article, in which proceeding the agency shall be deemed the proponent of the order.
(13) The administrative law judge or the hearing officer shall cause the proceedings to be recorded by a reporter or by an electronic recording device. When required, the administrative law judge or the hearing officer shall cause the proceedings, or any portion thereof, to be transcribed, the cost thereof to be paid by the agency when it orders the transcription or by any party seeking to reverse or modify an initial decision of the administrative law judge or the hearing officer. If the agency acquires a copy of the transcription of the proceedings, its copy of the transcription shall be made available to any party at reasonable times for inspection and study.
(14) (a) For the purpose of a decision by an agency that conducts a hearing or an initial decision by an administrative law judge or a hearing officer, the record must include: All pleadings, applications, evidence, exhibits, and other papers presented or considered, matters officially noticed, rulings upon exceptions, any findings of fact and conclusions of law proposed by any party, and any written brief filed. The agency, administrative law judge, or hearing officer may permit oral argument. The agency, the administrative law judge, or the hearing officer shall not receive or consider ex parte material or representation of any kind offered without notice. The agency, an administrative law judge, or hearing officer, with the consent of all parties, may eliminate or summarize any part of the record where this may be done without affecting the decision. In any case in which the agency has conducted the hearing, the agency shall prepare, file, and serve upon each party its decision. In any case in which an administrative law judge or a hearing officer has conducted the hearing, the administrative law judge or the hearing officer shall prepare and file an initial decision that the agency shall serve upon each party, except where all parties with the consent of the agency have expressly waived their right to have an initial decision rendered by such administrative law judge or hearing officer. Each decision and initial decision must include a statement of findings and conclusions upon all the material issues of fact, law, or discretion presented by the record and the appropriate order, sanction, relief, or denial. An appeal to the agency must be made as follows:
(I) With regard to initial decisions regarding agency action by the department of health care policy and financing, the department of early childhood, the state department of human services, or county department of human or social services, or any contractor acting for any such department, under section 26-1-106 (1)(a), 26.5-1-107, or 25.5-1-107 (1)(a), by filing exceptions within fifteen days after service of the initial decision upon the parties, unless extended by the department of health care policy and financing, the department of early childhood, or the state department of human services, as applicable, or unless a review has been initiated in accordance with this subsection (14)(a)(I) upon motion of the applicable department within fifteen days after service of the initial decision. In the event a party fails to file an exception within fifteen days, the applicable department may allow, upon a showing of good cause by the party, for an extension of up to an additional fifteen days to reconsider the final agency action.
(II) With regard to initial decisions regarding agency action of any other agency, by filing exceptions within thirty days after service of the initial decision upon the parties, unless extended by the agency or unless review has been initiated upon motion of the agency within thirty days after service of the initial decision.
(b) (I) In the absence of an exception filed pursuant to subparagraph (I) of paragraph (a) of this subsection (14), the executive director of the department of health care policy and financing shall review the initial decision regarding agency action by such department in accordance with a procedure adopted by the medical services board pursuant to section 25.5-1-107 (1), C.R.S.
(II) In the absence of an exception filed pursuant to subparagraph (I) of paragraph (a) of this subsection (14), the executive director of the state department of human services shall review the initial decision regarding agency action by such department in accordance with a procedure adopted by the state board of human services pursuant to section 26-1-106 (1), C.R.S.
(III) In the absence of an exception filed pursuant to subparagraph (II) of paragraph (a) of this subsection (14), the initial decision of any other agency shall become the decision of the agency, and, in such case, the evidence taken by the administrative law judge or the hearing officer need not be transcribed.
(c) Failure to file the exceptions prescribed in this subsection (14) shall result in a waiver of the right to judicial review of the final order of such agency, unless that portion of such order subject to exception is different from the content of the initial decision.
(15) (a) Any party who seeks to reverse or modify the initial decision of the administrative law judge or the hearing officer shall file with the agency, within twenty days following such decision, a designation of the relevant parts of the record described in subsection (14) of this section and of the parts of the transcript of the proceedings which shall be prepared and advance the cost therefor. A copy of this designation shall be served on all parties. Within ten days thereafter, any other party or the agency may also file a designation of additional parts of the transcript of the proceedings which is to be included and advance the cost therefor. The transcript or the parts thereof which may be designated by the parties or the agency shall be prepared by the reporter or, in the case of an electronic recording device, the agency and shall thereafter be filed with the agency. No transcription is required if the agency's review is limited to a pure question of law. The agency may permit oral argument. The grounds of the decision shall be within the scope of the issues presented on the record. The record shall include all matters constituting the record upon which the decision of the administrative law judge or the hearing officer was based, the rulings upon the proposed findings and conclusions, the initial decision of the administrative law judge or the hearing officer, and any other exceptions and briefs filed.
(b) The findings of evidentiary fact, as distinguished from ultimate conclusions of fact, made by the administrative law judge or the hearing officer shall not be set aside by the agency on review of the initial decision unless such findings of evidentiary fact are contrary to the weight of the evidence. The agency may remand the case to the administrative law judge or the hearing officer for such further proceedings as it may direct, or it may affirm, set aside, or modify the order or any sanction or relief entered therein, in conformity with the facts and the law.
(16) (a) Each decision and initial decision shall be served on each party by personal service; by electronic means, upon the documented request or consent of the party to be served; or by mailing by first-class mail to the last address furnished to the agency by the party and, except as provided in subsection (16)(b) of this section, shall be effective as to the party on the date mailed, provided electronically, or the later date as is stated in the decision.
(b) Upon application by a party, and prior to the expiration of the time allowed for commencing an action for judicial review, the agency may change the effective date of a decision or initial decision.
Source: L. 59: p. 162, § 4. CRS 53: § 3-16-4. L. 61: p. 138, § 1. C.R.S. 1963: § 3-16-4. L. 69: p. 85, § 5. L. 76: (13) and (14) amended and (15) R&RE, pp. 583, 584, §§ 16, 17, effective May 24. L. 77: (14) amended, pp. 1137, 1145, §§ 2, 2, effective June 19. L. 81: (4) amended, p. 1134, § 3, effective June 6. L. 87: (3), (4), (5), (13), (14), and (15) amended, p. 961, § 66, effective March 13. L. 93: (14) amended, p. 426, § 3, effective April 19; (2), (4), (5), (14), (15)(a), and (16) amended, p. 1327, § 4, effective June 6; (9) amended, p. 624, § 3, effective July 1; (9)(b)(V)(B) amended, p. 1798, § 107, effective July 1. L. 94: (14)(a)(I) and (14)(b) amended, p. 2692, § 228, effective July 1. L. 95: (14)(a)(I) and (14)(b) amended, p. 902, § 1, effective May 25. L. 2005: (3) amended, p. 857, § 21, effective June 1. L. 2018: (4) amended, (HB 18-1224), ch. 288, p. 1780, § 2, effective May 29; IP(14)(a) and (14)(a)(I) amended, (SB 18-092), ch. 38, p. 440, § 96, effective August 8. L. 2019: (4)(b)(IX) amended, (SB 19-241), ch. 390, p. 3469, § 26, effective August 2. L. 2022: (14)(a)(I) amended, (HB 22-1295), ch. 123, p. 843, § 64, effective July 1. L. 2026: (2)(a), (2)(b), and (16)(a) amended, (HB 26-1343), ch. 390, p. 2449, § 1, effective August 12.
Editor's note: (1) Amendments to subsection (14) by Senate Bill 93-133 and House Bill 93-1001 were harmonized.
(2) Subsection IP(4)(b)(IX) provided for the repeal of subsection (4)(b)(IX), effective July 1, 2022. (See L. 2019, p. 3469.)
Cross references: (1) For mileage allowances and fees of witnesses, see §§ 13-33-102 and 13-33-103.
(2) For the legislative declaration in SB 18-092, see section 1 of chapter 38, Session Laws of Colorado 2018.
ANNOTATION
I. General Consideration.
II. Notice.
III. Administrative Law Judges.
IV. Evidence.
V. Agency and Judicial Review.
I. GENERAL CONSIDERATION.
Law reviews. For article, "Discovery and Judicial Review in State Administrative Practice", see 10 Colo. Law. 2490 (1981). For article, "Administrative Law", which discusses a Tenth Circuit decision dealing with Miranda rights in administrative proceedings, see 61 Den. L. J. 131 (1984). For article, "General Principles of the Colorado Administrative Procedure Act", see 16 Colo. Law. 1983 (1987). For article, "Hearsay Evidence and the Residuum Rule in Colorado", see 17 Colo. Law. 651 (1988). For article, "Administrative Law", which discusses a Tenth Circuit decision dealing with fifth amendment rights and administrative proceedings, see 65 Den. U. L. Rev. 379 (1988). For article, "Challenges to Agency Rules in Adjudicatory-Type Hearings", see 17 Colo. Law. 1991 (1988). For article, "Law and Strategy in Licensing Disciplinary Proceedings", see 18 Colo. Law. 647 (1988). For article, "Practicing Law Before Part-Time Citizen Boards and Commissions", see 18 Colo. Law. 1133 (1989). For article, "Alternative Dispute Resolution Meets the Administrative Process", see 24 Colo. Law. 1549 (1995). For article, "Appealing an Administrative Order: The Exceptions Process", see 30 Colo. Law. 91 (Sept. 2001). For article, "Horizontal Gaze Nystagmus Test Evidence in Colorado-The Framework under Campbell v. People", see 49 Colo. Law. 23 (June 2020).
Annotator's note. Cases included in the annotations to this section which refer to a hearing officer were decided prior to the enactment of 1987 House Bill No. 1049 which changed the title of hearing officers to administrative law judges.
Purpose of section. These statutory provisions are designed to assure that administrative adjudicatory proceedings are conducted in accordance with due process and will be expedited in the interest of the parties so that no party will be substantially prejudiced thereby. Weiss v. Dept. of Pub. Safety, 847 P.2d 197 (Colo. App. 1992).
Authority of state personnel board hearing officer with respect to hearing procedures is established by this section in accordance with Art. XII, §§ 13 and 14, of the state constitution. Weiss v. Dept. of Pub. Safety, 847 P.2d 197 (Colo. App. 1992).
Under the State Administrative Procedure Act (APA), an administrative agency has authority and, in certain situations, the duty to issue subpoenas. Nye v. State, Dept. of Rev., 902 P.2d 959 (Colo. App. 1995).
Whether to apply the fifth amendment adverse inference in a civil proceeding and what weight to give that adverse inference in an agency's determination is an ultimate conclusion of fact. Romero v. Colo. Dept. of Human Servs., 2018 COA 2, 417 P.3d 914.
In its final decision, the department is required to make a determination of whether to apply the adverse inference, and state what weight it held, if any, in its determination. Romero v. Colo. Dept. of Human Servs., 2018 COA 2, 417 P.3d 914.
Section not applicable to the director of the department of revenue's discretionary decision. Because § 39-26-111 makes the authority of the director of the department of revenue to withdraw permission to make returns and pay taxes on the cash basis discretionary, that specific provision controls over the general provisions of § 24-4-104 and this section. Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Dept. of Rev., 628 P.2d 85 (Colo. 1981).
Nor to water commissioners supplying customers outside city. Denver's action in supplying customers outside the city does not subject the board of water commissioners to the notice and hearing requirements of this section. Cottrell v. City & County of Denver, 636 P.2d 703 (Colo. 1981).
Nor to delays prior to hearing. This section deals with the progress of proceedings before an agency after commencement thereof, and not with delays prior to hearing. Berry v. Dept. of Rev., 656 P.2d 721 (Colo. App. 1982).
Nor do subsection (14) requirements apply to the initiative title setting review board when it holds a meeting for designating and fixing a title, ballot title and submission clause, and summary. Specific process and procedure is set out in the initiative and referendum statutes. Matter of Title, Ballot Title et al., 831 P.2d 1301 (Colo. 1992).
Subsection (14) requirements do not apply to the board of equalization in light of the specific hearing and appellate provisions set out in the property tax statutes. Carrara Place v. Bd. of Equaliz., 761 P.2d 197 (Colo. 1988).
The APA does not bar a dual role as a fact witness at one step of the proceedings and a member of a reviewing body at another step in the proceedings. Leonard v. Bd. of Dirs., 673 P.2d 1019 (Colo. App. 1983).
The APA contains no statutory provision indicating that the director of the motor vehicle division of the department of revenue is one who is "engaged in the performance of investigatory or prosecuting functions" of the department. Cordova v. Mansheim, 725 P.2d 1158 (Colo. App. 1986).
Subsection (6), which requires separation of prosecutorial and judging functions, is only applicable when the statutory scheme requires both a prosecutor and a hearing examiner. When the statutory scheme provides for a nonadversarial, show cause proceeding, which does not require the participation of a prosecutor, subsection (6) does not apply. Woodrow v. Wildlife Comm'n, 206 P.3d 835 (Colo. App. 2009).
Subsection (6) is not violated simply because a hearing officer is a member of the relevant agency. Woodrow v. Wildlife Comm'n, 206 P.3d 835 (Colo. App. 2009).
Disqualification of hospital board members. The withdrawal of hospital board members for reason of alleged bias would make it impossible to decide the question of a physician's medical staff privileges where the board is the only body empowered under the bylaws to make such a decision. Disqualification will not be permitted to destroy the only tribunal with power in the premises. Leonard v. Bd. of Dirs., 673 P.2d 1019 (Colo. App. 1983).
Suspension or revocation hearing is a disciplinary proceeding. An administrative hearing to revoke or suspend a professional license is a disciplinary, not a criminal, proceeding. Commerce City Drug v. Bd. of Pharmacy, 32 Colo. App. 216, 511 P.2d 935 (1973).
License revocation proceeding is civil in nature, not criminal. Thus, the right to counsel is not constitutional, but rather is governed by statute. Bedell v. Dept. of Rev., 655 P.2d 849 (Colo. App. 1982).
Although the public utilities commission (PUC) has broad power to issue declaratory orders and to initiate various types of proceedings, where a declaratory order is in essence a rule, the commission is bound by the procedural requirements pertaining to rule-making proceedings. Colo. Office of Consumer Counsel v. Mtn. States Tel. & Tel. Co., 816 P.2d 278 (Colo. 1991).
A hearing on a contested permit application under the Colorado Oil and Gas Conservation Act is an agency adjudicatory proceeding subject to this section. Grand Valley Citizens v. Colo. Oil & Gas, 298 P.3d 961 (Colo. App. 2010), rev'd on other grounds, 2012 CO 52, 279 P.3d 646.
Due process rights in a liquor licensing hearing are diluted by strong state interest in liquor control and safeguards provided by judicial review. Therefore, where plaintiff had notice of issue and knowledge of contents of documents, failure to give him documents did not violate his due process rights. Fueston v. City of Colo. Springs, 713 P.2d 1323 (Colo. App. 1985).
Secretary of state need not hold public hearing regarding revocation of liquor license, but may rely on investigation reports and the hearing record of the local licensing authority, which by law must conduct a hearing. Potter v. Anderson, 155 Colo. 25, 392 P.2d 650 (1964).
A quasi-judicial hearing must be conducted strictly in accordance with requirements of section. Carroll v. Barnes, 169 Colo. 277, 455 P.2d 644 (1969).
It is within the discretion of the administrative law judge (ALJ) to decide, prior to issuing a decision which constitutes the final agency action in a particular matter, when that decision will become effective. Bethesda Found. v. Dept. of Soc. Servs., 877 P.2d 860 (Colo. 1994).
Administrative remedies available must be exhausted prior to seeking judicial relief. Leete v. Bd. of Med. Exam'rs, 807 P.2d 1249 (Colo. App. 1991).
There is no requirement that proceedings to review a hearing officer's initial decision concerning disciplinary actions be recorded. Ranum v. Colo. Real Estate Comm'n, 713 P.2d 418 (Colo. App. 1985).
1993 amendment to subsection (4) explicitly authorizing ALJs to award attorney fees was procedural and had no substantive effect on existing authority to award such fees. Colo. Dept. of Soc. Servs. v. Bethesda Care Ctr., Inc., 867 P.2d 4 (Colo. App. 1993).
Colorado department of social services is a party for purposes of an administrative proceeding conducted pursuant to this section and as such may be held liable for attorney fees for asserting a frivolous defense. Colo. Dept. of Soc. Servs. v. Bethesda Care Ctr., Inc., 867 P.2d 4 (Colo. App. 1993).
Where an agency's interpretation of a regulation clearly contradicts that agency's consistent practice, the agency's practices and not its interpretation should prevail. Geriatrics, Inc. v. Dept. of Soc. Servs., 712 P.2d 1035 (Colo. App. 1985).
Applied in Walton v. Banking Bd., 36 Colo. App. 311, 541 P.2d 1254 (1975); Kuiper v. Atchison, T. & S. F., Ry., 195 Colo. 557, 581 P.2d 293 (1978); Johns v. Miller, 42 Colo. App. 97, 594 P.2d 590 (1979); People v. District Court, 200 Colo. 65, 612 P.2d 87 (1980); Macleod v. Miller, 44 Colo. App. 313, 612 P.2d 1158 (1980); Ricci v. Davis, 627 P.2d 1111 (Colo. 1981); Stone Envtl. Eng'r Servs., Inc. v. Dept. of Health, 631 P.2d 1185 (Colo. App. 1981); Cavanaugh v. State, Dept. of Soc. Servs., 644 P.2d 1 (Colo. 1982); Spelts v. Klausing, 649 P.2d 303 (Colo. 1982); Lee v. State Bd. of Dental Exam'rs, 654 P.2d 839 (Colo. 1982); World Wide Constr. Servs., Inc. v. Chapman, 665 P.2d 132 (Colo. App. 1982); First Nat'l Bank v. Banking Bd., 663 P.2d 261 (Colo. App. 1983); In re Maul v. Bd. of Dental Exam'rs, 668 P.2d 933 (Colo. 1983); Rosenberg v. Bd. of Educ. of Sch. District #1, 710 P.2d 1095 (Colo. 1985); Platinum Props. v. Assess. App. Bd., 738 P.2d 34 (Colo. App. 1987); Beardsley v. Colo. State Univ., 746 P.2d 1350 (Colo. App. 1987); Lopez-Samoyoa v. Bd. of Med. Exam'rs, 868 P.2d 1110 (Colo. App. 1993); Partridge v. State, 895 P.2d 1183 (Colo. App. 1995).
II. NOTICE.
Liquor code notice requirements applicable in county proceeding. Since the general assembly has not adopted legislation requiring that license suspension proceedings by a county be conducted pursuant to the APA, and since a county does not have statewide jurisdiction, the notice requirements for a proceeding for the suspension of a liquor license are governed by the Colorado liquor code. Chroma Corp. v. County of Adams, 36 Colo. App. 345, 543 P.2d 83 (1975).
Test as to whether party is afforded procedural due process is "fundamental fairness" in light of total circumstances. The due process clause does not guarantee any particular mode of procedure, but it does require adequate notice of opposing claims, reasonable opportunity to prepare and meet them in an orderly hearing adapted to the nature of the case, and, finally, a fair and impartial decision. Sigma Chi Fraternity v. Regents of Univ. of Colo., 258 F. Supp. 515 (D. Colo. 1966).
The essence of procedural due process is fundamental fairness. Mtn. States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Dept. of Labor & Emp., 184 Colo. 334, 520 P.2d 586 (1974).
"Timely" notice, plus opportunity to submit arguments, is constitutionally required. When the specific time for a hearing is not expressly provided elsewhere, notice of hearing must be "timely", so that the licensee shall have the opportunity to submit data, views, and arguments in order to afford due process. Bd. of Med. Exam'rs v. Palmer, 157 Colo. 40, 400 P.2d 914 (1965).
Opportunity to be heard, not an actual hearing, is all that due process requires. Where the respondent receives timely notice and elects not to appear, there is no violation. Colo. State Bd. of Nursing v. Geary, 954 P.2d 614 (Colo. App. 1997).
Fundamental fairness embodies adequate advance notice and an opportunity to be heard prior to state action resulting in the deprivation of a significant property interest. Mtn. States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Dept. of Labor & Emp., 184 Colo. 334, 520 P.2d 586 (1974).
It likewise entitles a litigant to timely notice of decisions which have adjudicated his property interests, in relation to available appellate remedies. Mtn. States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Dept. of Labor & Emp., 184 Colo. 334, 520 P.2d 586 (1974).
Where the parties, whether an employee or an employer, are represented in an administrative proceeding under consideration by attorneys of record, notice of decisions affecting the substantial rights of the parties must be given to their attorneys. Mtn. States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Dept. of Labor & Emp., 184 Colo. 334, 520 P.2d 586 (1974).
The requirement of this section that notice of the hearing be made by first-class mail is not satisfied when such notice is sent by certified mail, since the notice will not be delivered by certified mail if the addressee is not present at the time of the attempted delivery. Dodge v. Meyer, 793 P.2d 639 (Colo. App. 1990).
Party requesting early hearing cannot complain that statutory time period not observed. Where a party has adequate notice of a hearing and its purpose, and where promptness of a hearing is in accordance with that party's request that it be held at "as early a date as possible", the party may not complain that the commission conducting the hearing did not wait the 20 days prescribed in this section. Harbour v. Racing Comm'n, 32 Colo. App. 1, 505 P.2d 22 (1973).
Notice of state pharmacy board's changes in hearing officer's decision not required. Changes made by the state board of pharmacy in a hearing officer's penalty for a pharmacist's violation of § 12-22-124 (now § 12-22-126) rendered without notice to the appellant or without any further hearings following a hearing officer's initial decision and order are quasi-judicial in nature and, thus, neither statutory nor due process principles require that the board issue any notice prior to announcing its final decision. Mitchell v. Klapper, 626 P.2d 1163 (Colo. App. 1980).
Applied in Gessler v. Grossman, 2015 COA 62, 488 P.3d 53, aff'd on other grounds sub nom. Gessler v. Smith, 2018 CO 48, 419 P.3d 964.
III. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGES.
There is no requirement that a hearing officer be learned in the law. Campbell v. Dept. of Rev., 176 Colo. 202, 491 P.2d 1385 (1971).
Officer may be appointed through oral examination. The fact that a hearing officer is appointed on the basis of an oral examination does not invalidate his appointment, because the mode of examination is discretionary with the civil service commission. Campbell v. Dept. of Rev., 176 Colo. 202, 491 P.2d 1385 (1971).
No requirement that officer take oath before entering duties. Since a hearing officer possesses no independent power of his own, his position is that of employee, not that of civil officer; thus, there is no requirement that a hearing officer take an oath of office before entering upon his duties. Campbell v. Dept. of Rev., 176 Colo. 202, 491 P.2d 1385 (1971).
Colorado rules of civil procedure offer guidance in deciding issues regarding conduct of hearings under this section. Weiss v. Dept. of Pub. Safety, 847 P.2d 197 (Colo. App. 1992).
Agency decision making must demonstrate the use of (1) sufficient standards ensuring rational and consistent results in the application of the statute and implementing regulations and (2) adequate procedural safeguards, determinations, and a record enabling judicial review. Zamarripa v. Q & T Food Stores, Inc., 929 P.2d 1332 (Colo. 1997).
Failure to make timely objection to the appointment of a hearing officer is a waiver, and the objection cannot be raised at a later date. Geriatrics, Inc. v. Dept. of Health, 650 P.2d 1288 (Colo. App. 1982), aff'd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 699 P.2d 952 (Colo. 1985).
Affidavit of personal bias required for disqualification of presiding officers. Under subsection (3), a motion seeking to disqualify a hearing officer, a member of the agency, or the agency itself from presiding over an administrative hearing must be accompanied by a timely and sufficient affidavit of personal bias. Peoples Natural Gas Div. v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 626 P.2d 159 (Colo. 1981).
Drastic sanctions such as dismissal with prejudice or striking of pleadings should be reserved for only the most flagrant cases in which a party acts deliberately, with rebellious disregard for authority, or with gross negligence and in which such actions result in prejudice to the other party. Weiss v. Dept. of Pub. Safety, 847 P.2d 197 (Colo. App. 1992).
Substitution of hearing officer following hospitalization constitutional. Where the initial hearing officer is hospitalized at the time further proceedings are scheduled, the substitution of a second hearing officer to hear the remainder of the case satisfies both statutory requirements and due process. Harris v. Charnes, 616 P.2d 996 (Colo. App. 1980).
Hearing where examiner takes active role and where party represented by attorney is constitutional. A hearing conducted under § 42-4-1202 does not violate the requirement of separation of the judicial and executive functions, although the hearing examiner conducts the hearing without a prosecutor and takes an active role in the questioning of the witnesses, where the motorist accused of driving while intoxicated is represented by an attorney. Stream v. Heckers, 184 Colo. 149, 519 P.2d 336 (1974).
Hearing officer abused discretion by rescinding disciplinary action for noncompliance with deadline schedule, where noncompliance was apparently innocent and opposing party was not prejudiced. Weiss v. Dept. of Pub. Safety, 847 P.2d 197 (Colo. App. 1992).
The power conferred in the ALJ to modify a decision upon a motion for reconsideration encompasses the power to modify the decision's effective date. Bethesda Found. v. Dept. of Soc. Servs., 877 P.2d 861 (Colo. 1994).
Any error by ALJ in requiring accountant to testify at proceeding to revoke license of physician without counsel was harmless where the essence of accountant's testimony was that he had been able to communicate with physician despite his incarceration in another state, which duplicated administrative clerk's testimony. Colo. Bd. of Med. Exam'rs v. Boyle, 924 P.2d 1113 (Colo. App. 1996).
The decision to disqualify an ALJ for personal bias is within the discretion of the ALJ and will not be disturbed absent an abuse of that discretion. Rice v. Dept. of Corr., 950 P.2d 676 (Colo. App. 1997).
IV. EVIDENCE.
Burden is upon the proponent of order of suspension or revocation to prove sufficient grounds therefor, not upon the licensee. People ex rel. Heckers v. District Court, 170 Colo. 533, 463 P.2d 310 (1970); Colo. Real Estate Comm'n v. Bartlett, 272 P.3d 1099 (Colo. App. 2011).
"Proponent of an order" bearing the burden of proof under subsection (7), in the context of an employee's appeal of an allocation decision before the director of personnel, is not the appointing authority which made the decision appealed from, but is instead the employee who seeks an order of the director voiding the decision. Renteria v. State Dept. of Pers., 811 P.2d 797 (Colo. 1991).
The burden of proof is on the certified state employee to prove that she was terminated involuntarily and, once the employee prevails upon that issue, then it will be the appointing authority's burden to prove that the termination imposed was justified by the factual circumstances. Harris v. State Bd. of Agric., 968 P.2d 148 (Colo. App. 1998).
Hearing officer properly placed burden of proof on department of institutions as proponent of order upholding dismissal in proceeding involving state employee's appeal of termination. Kinchen v. Dept. of Insts., 867 P.2d 8 (Colo. App. 1993).
When an agency seeks revocation of an existing license, the agency is the proponent of the order and bears the burden of proof. Q & T Food Stores, Inc. v. Zamarripa, 910 P.2d 44 (Colo. App. 1995), aff'd, 929 P.2d 1332 (Colo. 1997).
Administrative hearing not bound by strict rules of evidence. A driver's license revocation hearing is an administrative hearing and is not governed by the strict rules of evidence and procedure which obtain in a criminal action. Campbell v. Dept. of Rev., 176 Colo. 202, 491 P.2d 1385 (1971).
The state board of accountancy is not bound by the technical rules on the admission of documentary evidence. Hentges v. Bartsch, 35 Colo. App. 384, 533 P.2d 66 (1975).
A hearing officer has some flexibility in his adherence to the civil rules of evidence in order to promote the fact finding process. Fish v. Charnes, 652 P.2d 598 (Colo. 1982).
The standard to be applied is whether the evidence possesses probative value commonly accepted by reasonable and prudent persons in the conduct of their affairs. Partridge v. State, 895 P.2d 1183 (Colo. App. 1995).
Hearsay testimony may be allowed and reversal is proper only if otherwise inadmissible hearsay is sole evidence relied upon by trier of fact. Mondragon v. Poudre Sch. Dist. R-1, 696 P.2d 831 (Colo. App. 1984).
Hearsay evidence alone may be used to establish an element at a revocation hearing if such evidence is sufficiently reliable and trustworthy, and the evidence possesses probative value commonly accepted by reasonable and prudent persons in the conduct of their affairs. Dept. of Rev. v. Kirke, 743 P.2d 16 (Colo. 1987); Div. of Rev. v. Lounsbury, 743 P.2d 23 (Colo. 1987); Charnes v. Lobato, 743 P.2d 27 (Colo. 1987); Heller v. Velasquez, 743 P.2d 34 (Colo. 1987); Charnes v. Oldna, 743 P.2d 36 (Colo. 1987); Schaffer v. State Dept. of Soc. Servs., 759 P.2d 837 (Colo. App. 1988).
The PUC is allowed to consider a broader range of information in making an adjudicatory decision than that allowed by subsection (14). Colo. Energy Advocacy v. Pub. Serv. Co., 704 P.2d 298 (Colo. 1985).
Factors which provide guidance in determining whether evidence is reliable, trustworthy, and probative for the purposes of an administrative hearing are: (1) Whether the statement was written and signed; (2) Whether the statement was sworn to by the declarant; (3) Whether the declarant was a disinterested witness or had a potential bias; (4) Whether the hearsay statement is denied or contradicted by other evidence; (5) Whether the declarant is credible; (6) Whether there is corroboration for the hearsay statement; (7) Whether the case turns on the credibility of witnesses; (8) Whether the party relying on the hearsay offers an adequate explanation for the failure to call the declarant to testify; and, (9) Whether the party against whom the hearsay is used had access to the statements prior to the hearing or the opportunity to subpoena the declarant. Indus. Claim Appeals Office v. Flower Stop, 782 P.2d 13 (Colo. 1989); Partridge v. State, 895 P.2d 1183 (Colo. App. 1995).
Due process requires that hearsay evidence admitted at an administrative hearing be of a kind commonly relied upon so as to be worthy of belief under similar circumstances and must possess probative value commonly accepted by reasonable and prudent persons in the conduct of their affairs. 117th Assoc. v. Jefferson County, 811 P.2d 461 (Colo. App. 1991).
Agencies are not always restricted to litigants' record. Although courts are generally limited to the consideration of the record made by litigants in the trial court, administrative agencies are not always so restricted. City & County of Denver v. Dore, 176 Colo. 367, 490 P.2d 694 (1971).
Therefore, records of the division of motor vehicles are not inadmissible hearsay. Campbell v. Dept. of Rev., 176 Colo. 202, 491 P.2d 1385 (1971); Zaba v. Motor Vehicle Div., 183 Colo. 335, 516 P.2d 634 (1973).
Driver's history record is prima facie evidence of its contents. Hoehl v. Motor Vehicle Div., 624 P.2d 907 (Colo. App. 1980).
Admitting photocopy of blood test into evidence in driver's license revocation was proper. Ellis v. Charnes, 722 P.2d 436 (Colo. App. 1986).
Hearing officer's insistence that witness testify in person, rather than via telephone, was within officer's discretion where credibility was a significant issue. Shaball v. State Compensation Ins. Auth., 799 P.2d 399 (Colo. App. 1990).
ALJ did not abuse her discretion in determining that good cause existed to take telephone testimony because of the limited testimony to be given by the witnesses, the absence of reference in their testimony to exhibits or to demonstrative evidence, and the inconvenience and expense to procure their live testimony. State Bd. of Med. Exam'rs v. Thompson, 944 P.2d 547 (Colo. App. 1996).
Rebuttal of driving record's accuracy presents a question of fact. Where evidence is presented which rebuts the accuracy of any item in a person's driving record, there is a fact question to be resolved by the hearing officer. Hoehl v. Motor Vehicle Div., 624 P.2d 907 (Colo. App. 1980).
Identical copies of cancelled checks from separate disinterested sources is competent evidence. Where two sets of copies of cancelled checks are put into evidence from separate disinterested sources, and the two sets are identical, the evidence is competent under the standards set out in the APA. Hentges v. Bartsch, 35 Colo. App. 384, 533 P.2d 66 (1975).
Court cannot release grand jury documents for use in civil action. The trial court does not have the jurisdiction to order an ex parte release of documents which are being used by a grand jury in a criminal investigation, for use in a civil liquor code violations action. Granbery v. District Court, 187 Colo. 316, 531 P.2d 390 (1975).
Exchanges between tribunal parties cannot be screened from review. Ex parte exchanges between an advocate and the adjudicatory tribunal may not be screened arbitrarily from appellate scrutiny. Peoples Natural Gas Div. v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 626 P.2d 159 (Colo. 1981).
Findings of evidentiary fact of hearing officer supported ultimate finding of board of medical examiners that physician's actions were a manipulation of a patient for his own personal interest and constituted misconduct. Puls v. People ex rel. Woodard, 722 P.2d 424 (Colo. App. 1986).
Limitation on rebuttal evidence authorized and not a violation of due process. Hearing officer's limitation on oral rebuttal testimony did not violate licensee's due process rights to rebut expert witnesses' statements where licensee was given opportunity to present rebuttal evidence through presubmitted written statements and where such procedure was authorized by statute. Bassett v. State Bd. of Dental Exam'rs, 727 P.2d 864 (Colo. App. 1986).
In determining eligibility for Medicaid home-based services under § 25.5-6-306, an ALJ is not limited to evidence that the case manager heard on the day of assessment. The ALJ may properly consider any testimony introduced at the hearing concerning the individual's condition as of the date of the level of care assessment. Reiff v. Colo. Dept. of Health Care Policy & Fin., 148 P.3d 355 (Colo. App. 2006).
Applied in Jimerson v. Prendergast, 697 P.2d 804 (Colo. App. 1985).
V. AGENCY AND JUDICIAL REVIEW.
Colorado statutory scheme makes adequate provisions for prompt hearing and determination of emergency summary license suspensions to meet due process requirements. Any vagueness in the term "promptly" is adequately cured by licensee's statutory right to request and obtain an "immediate" hearing following an emergency suspension. Motor Vehicle Div. v. Castro, 914 P.2d 517 (Colo. App. 1996).
Party status required for judicial review. One must comply with the requirements for obtaining party status in adjudicatory hearings as a prerequisite to seeking judicial review under the APA. Colo. Water Quality Control Comm'n v. Town of Frederick, 641 P.2d 958 (Colo. 1982).
There is no requirement, under the applicable statutes and rules, that the limited gaming control commission hold an evidentiary hearing on petitions for declaratory orders. Purcell v. Colo. Div. of Gaming, 924 P.2d 1203 (Colo. App. 1996).
Order disposing of a petition for a declaratory order under subsection (11) is subject to judicial review only when the order constitutes final agency action within the meaning of § 24-4-106 (2) or the exception to final agency action in § 24-4-106 (8) applies. Chittenden v. Bd. of Soc. Work Exam'rs, 2012 COA 150M, 292 P.3d 1138.
Exhaustion of administrative remedies was not required by this section with respect to plaintiff's claims that lottery division and lottery commission knew that the last grand prize for a particular scratch game had been claimed, continued to sell tickets for the scratch game, did not inform potential ticket purchasers that the grand prize was no longer available, and continued to represent the availability of the grand prize. The applicable lottery statute does not provide a right to a hearing under this section. Bazemore v. Colo. State Lottery Div., 64 P.3d 876 (Colo. App. 2002).
District court's order can only apply to parties. Unless an agency has adjudicated the rights of a person who is also a party, a district court reviewing the agency action has no authority, sua sponte, to enter its own findings and conclusions of law with regard to that person. N.J. Zinc Co. v. Mined Land Reclamation, 738 P.2d 51 (Colo. App. 1987).
"Final" agency action required for judicial review. The decision of an agency (other than a remand for further proceedings) described in subsection (15)(b) is the "final" agency action subject to judicial review under § 24-4-106 (2). State Pers. Bd. v. District Court, 637 P.2d 333 (Colo. 1981).
A decision and order of a hearing officer or ALJ is an initial decision only, and becomes final only if no exceptions or agency motions have been submitted within the 30-day appeal period. W. Colo. Congress v. Dept. of Health, 844 P.2d 1264 (Colo. App. 1992); Colo. Workers for Innovative v. Gherardini, 2023 COA 80, 540 P.3d 950.
If the division of labor standards and statistics assigns a hearing officer to decide appeals of the state personnel director's coverage decisions under the Colorado Partnership for Quality Jobs and Services Act, the hearing officer's decision is an initial decision subject to further agency review by the exceptions procedure set forth in subsection (14)(a)(II). Colo. Workers for Innovative v. Gherardini, 2023 COA 80, 540 P.3d 950.
Determination by a division of the department of public health and environment regarding whether documents contained confidential information did not constitute an adjudicatory agency action of the kind addressed in this section. Therefore, the trial court was deciding the dispute between the parties in the first instance and properly resolved the dispute in accordance with the standards applicable to injunctive relief. CF&I Steel, L.P. v. Air Pollution Control Div., 77 P.3d 933 (Colo. App. 2003).
This section contemplates that review of the ALJ's initial order be initiated by the filing of exceptions or upon the motion of the agency within the requisite time. Because exceptions were not timely filed by the agency and because review was not initiated upon motion of the agency within 30 days of service of the ALJ's initial decision, that decision became the agency's final order as a matter of law. Winterhawk Outfitters, Inc. v. Office of Outfitters Registration, 43 P.3d 745 (Colo. App. 2002).
An agency cannot vest final authority in a hearing officer when the regulation relied upon to make the delegation of final decision-making authority is contrary to statute. W. Colo. Congress v. Dept. of Health, 844 P.2d 1264 (Colo. App. 1992).
The department of health improperly denied plaintiff its right to agency review of a hearing officer's order. It was accordingly held that the order never became the decision of the department. W. Colo. Congress v. Dept. of Health, 844 P.2d 1264 (Colo. App. 1992); Colo. Workers for Innovative & New Solutions v. Gherardini, 2023 COA 80, 540 P.3d 950.
An appeal from a decision of the hearing officer must be made within 30 days of the date the initial decision is mailed to the parties, and not within 30 days of the receipt of such decision by the parties. Vendetti v. Univ. of So. Colo., 793 P.2d 657 (Colo. App. 1990).
Dissatisfied party to appeal to agency within 30 days. A party dissatisfied with the rulings of a hearing officer may appeal to the Colorado civil rights commission by filing exceptions within 30 days after service of the initial decision. N. Wash. St. Water & San. Dist. v. Emerson, 626 P.2d 1152 (Colo. App. 1980); State Bd. of Med. Exam'rs v. Thompson, 944 P.2d 547 (Colo. App. 1996).
Agency-specific procedural requirements in § 11-51-606 (1.5) for a ten-calendar-day deadline for issuance of a final order by the securities commissioner apply over the general thirty-day period in subsection (14)(a)(II) of this section for a respondent to file an exception to an initial decision. Ricchio v. Colo. Sec. Comm'r, 2022 COA 35, 512 P.3d 1058.
Placing exceptions in the mail is not the same as filing. For the purposes of this section, filing requires actual, physical presentation of documents to the appropriate official. State Bd. of Registration v. Brinker, 948 P.2d 96 (Colo. App. 1997).
Failure to file exceptions as prescribed in subsection (14) results in a waiver of the right to appeal. State Bd. of Registration v. Brinker, 948 P.2d 96 (Colo. App. 1997).
Exceptions to disciplinary finding were timely filed within 30 days after service of agency decision. State Bd. of Nursing v. Crickenberger, 757 P.2d 1167 (Colo. App. 1988).
The language of subsection (14) is directory and is not intended to limit the jurisdiction of an agency to review an initial decision outside of the 30-day period so long as the agency's motion to review was timely made. Cornell v. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 813 P.2d 771 (Colo. App. 1990).
Failure of exceptions to mention a ruling on a motion for a continuance constituted a waiver of any contention of error in the ruling pursuant to subsection (14)(c). State Bd. of Med. Exam'rs v. Thompson, 944 P.2d 547 (Colo. App. 1996).
The term "exception" in subsection (14)(a)(II) is designed to serve the same purpose as common law exceptions acting as a statement of specific formal objections designed to place the agency on notice of the basis for the requested review of the initial decision. Requiring a specific statement furthers the purpose of agency review of initial decisions, providing the agency with an opportunity to correct errors before judicial review is sought in the same way common law exceptions provided the trial court with an opportunity to correct errors and thereby make appellate review unnecessary. Lanphier v. Dept. of Pub. Health & Env't, 179 P.3d 148 (Colo. App. 2007).
Notice of review need not be given. Subsection (15) does not require that notice of the time and place of the agency review be given. Dixon v. Bd. of Optometric Exam'rs, 39 Colo. App. 200, 565 P.2d 960 (1977).
Subsection (15)(a) requires that a party's challenge to the factual findings of the ALJ must be supported by transcripts made available for the agency's review. Colo. State Bd. of Med. Exam'rs v. Hoffner, 832 P.2d 1062 (Colo. App. 1992).
Party may not decline to request a transcript and then assert, as a matter of law, that the board decided his case without review of a transcript. Tepley v. Pub. Emp. Retirement Ass'n, 955 P.2d 573 (Colo. App. 1997).
When agency seeks to reverse evidentiary facts found by an ALJ, subsection (15)(a) requires a transcript of the hearing. A tape recording of a hearing does not constitute a transcript within the meaning of subsection (15)(a). Rigmaiden v. Colo. Dept. of Health Care Policy & Fin., 155 P.3d 498 (Colo. App. 2006).
Aggrieved party may order hearing transcript from agency at own expense. A party seeking to reverse a hearing officer's decision may, at his or her own expense, order a hearing transcript from the agency involved. Loesch v. Dept. of Rev., 194 Colo. 169, 570 P.2d 530 (1977).
A court order for transcript is unnecessary. A party desiring a hearing transcript may order it directly from the agency, and a court order would not be necessary absent agency refusal. Loesch v. Dept. of Rev., 194 Colo. 169, 570 P.2d 530 (1977).
No error resulted from lack of a transcript of the proceedings, because the ALJ's finding were not challenged, and the review was limited to conclusions of law and findings of fact based on undisputed evidentiary facts. Hall v. State Bd. of Med. Exam'rs, 876 P.2d 77 (Colo. App. 1994).
Discovery in post-hearing, preappeal administrative proceeding available where party shows impermissible tribunal considerations. In a post-hearing, preappeal administrative proceeding, discovery should be available as a matter of right only if the party alleging procedural irregularities first shows, by affidavit or other substantial factual evidence, that there is good cause to believe that ex parte communications, personal bias, or other impermissible considerations played a part in the tribunal's decision. Peoples Natural Gas Div. v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 626 P.2d 159 (Colo. 1981).
Subsection (15) expressly makes discretionary with the agency the presentation of oral argument. Dixon v. Bd. of Optometric Exam'rs, 39 Colo. App. 200, 565 P.2d 960 (1977).
There is no constitutional requirement that the agency personally hear the licensee or other witnesses. Dixon v. Bd. of Optometric Exam'rs, 39 Colo. App. 200, 565 P.2d 960 (1977).
Board may review decision and adopt findings different than those of hearing officer where attorney general filed exceptions to decision, complaint charges were not unproven or unfounded, board expressly concluded that findings were contrary to weight of evidence, and decision was neither arbitrary nor capricious. Bd. of Med. Exam'rs v. Robertson, 751 P.2d 648 (Colo. App. 1987); Davis v. Bd. of Psychologist Exam'rs, 791 P.2d 1198 (Colo. App. 1989).
Presumption of correct findings. Classification and valuation of property by a county assessor is presumed correct, and in an appeal to the state board of assessment appeals, the burden of proof is on the taxpayer to rebut that presumption by showing, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the classification and valuation is incorrect. The determination whether that burden of proof has been met is a question of fact for the board and may not be displaced by a reviewing court. Gyurman v. Weld County Bd. of Equaliz., 851 P.2d 307 (Colo. App. 1993).
Hearing officer's decision held not contrary to weight of evidence and binding upon agency. Brennan v. Dept. of Local Affairs, 786 P.2d 426 (Colo. App. 1989).
Unless contrary to the weight of the evidence, a hearing officer's determinations of evidentiary fact cannot be set aside by a reviewing court. Colo. State Bd. of Nursing v. Geary, 954 P.2d 614 (Colo. App. 1997).
An agency's determination of ultimate fact may be set aside on review if it is unsupported by any reasonable basis. If there is sufficient evidentiary support in the record for that decision, a reviewing court must defer to the decision of an agency as to matters within the agency's discretion. Nat'l Inst. of Nutritional Educ. v. Meyer, 855 P.2d 31 (Colo. App. 1993).
Board exceeded its jurisdiction in finding that nurse was "presently" addicted to or dependent on drug where substantial evidence in the record supported findings that nurse had not used habit forming drugs for a substantial period of time and was not an habitual user of controlled substances at the time of the hearing. Colo. State Bd. of Nursing v. Lang, 842 P.2d 1383 (Colo. App. 1992).
Although an ALJ's finding of evidentiary fact may not be altered by the board if supported by the evidence, the board is not precluded from drawing a different ultimate conclusion therefrom. Puls v. People ex rel. Woodard, 722 P.2d 424 (Colo. App. 1986); Colo. State Bd. of Med. Exam'rs v. Hoffner, 832 P.2d 1062 (Colo. App. 1992).
In determining eligibility for Medicaid home-based services under § 25.5-6-306, an ALJ is not limited to evidence that the case manager heard on the day of assessment. The ALJ may properly consider any testimony introduced at the hearing concerning the individual's condition as of the date of the level of care assessment. Reiff v. Colo. Dept. of Health Care Policy & Fin., 148 P.3d 355 (Colo. App. 2006).
Findings of evidentiary fact involve the raw, historical data underlying the controversy. If there is conflicting testimony, the credibility of witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony is within the province of the hearing officer. Barrett v. Univ. of Colo., 851 P.2d 258 (Colo. App. 1993).
Findings of ultimate fact, such as whether particular conduct constitutes "willful misconduct", may be disturbed on appellate review only if it is unsupported by any competent evidence or is based on an incorrect legal conclusion applied to the underlying facts. Barrett v. Univ. of Colo., 851 P.2d 258 (Colo. App. 1993).
An agency's determination of ultimate facts may be set aside if it is not supported by substantial evidence in the record. Department's decision reversing ALJ determination had no reasonable basis in fact or law and district court erred in upholding that decision. Moczygemba v. Colo. Dept. of Health Care Policy & Fin., 51 P.3d 1083 (Colo. App. 2002).
The distinction between evidentiary facts and ultimate conclusions of fact is not always clear. State Bd. of Med. Exam'rs v. McCroskey, 880 P.2d 1188 (Colo. 1994).
Evidentiary facts are detailed factual or historical findings upon which a legal determination rests, such as when a physician made certain entries into a patient's medical records. State Bd. of Med. Exam'rs v. McCroskey, 880 P.2d 1188 (Colo. 1994).
Ultimate conclusions of fact involve a conclusion of law, or at least a mixed question of law and fact, and settle the rights and liabilities of the parties. Unlike evidentiary facts, ultimate conclusions of fact usually are phrased in the language of the controlling statute or legal standard. State Bd. of Med. Exam'rs v. McCroskey, 880 P.2d 1188 (Colo. 1994).
The standard for setting aside a hearing officer's findings of fact, stated in subsection (15), establishes the assumption that the hearing officer's findings are accurate. If the evidence would equally support alternative findings, the hearing officer's determination may not be set aside. The party challenging the hearing officer's findings has the burden of proving the weight of the evidence. Samaritan Inst. v. Prince-Walker, 883 P.2d 3 (Colo. 1994).
Reversal of a driver's license revocation is warranted where the agency failed to comply with written request to issue a subpoena and this failure caused prejudice to the driver's substantial right to engage in cross-examination of witnesses. Nye v. State, Dept. of Rev., 902 P.2d 959 (Colo. App. 1995).
Remedy for driver who has had his driver's license revoked or suspended may be available pursuant to subsection (10) where the Colorado department of revenue does not hold an administrative hearing prior to the expiration of 60 days as the department is under statutory obligation to hold an administrative hearing within 60 days under either § 42-2-125 or § 42-2-126. Kriz v. Colo. Dept. of Rev., 916 P.2d 659 (Colo. App. 1996).
The fact that questions of statutory interpretation have been raised by claims does not exempt the matter from administrative review. Even if pure questions of law are concerned, agency review of the challenged action is desirable in order to provide the court with the benefit of the agency's considered interpretation of its enabling statute. Kendal v. Cason, 791 P.2d 1227 (Colo. App. 1990).
Prevailing party not required to file an appeal to defend the results reached by the hearing officer on any grounds. An appeal need not be filed unless an enlargement of rights under the original decision is sought. Ehrle v. Dept. of Admin., 844 P.2d 1267 (Colo. App. 1992).
There is no provision in subsection (14) for an administrative cross-appeal. Ehrle v. Dept. of Admin., 844 P.2d 1267 (Colo. App. 1992).
Where notice to the respondent did not apprise him of the type of conduct being alleged, the charge must be dismissed. Herein, the dental examiners' charge against respondent dentist was based upon respondent's alleged failure to wear gloves during a procedure but the evidence supported a finding that one of the respondent's assistants had failed to wear gloves during a procedure. State Bd. of Dental Exam'rs v. Micheli, 928 P.2d 839 (Colo. App. 1996).
Subsection (15)(b) is a broad grant of authority that permits the agency to enter additional orders as required to bring its prior orders into conformity with the mandate from the appellate court. Rodgers v. Colo. Dept. of Human Servs., 39 P.3d 1232 (Colo. App. 2001).
The district court did not err in considering complainant's claims under the judicial review principles of the APA and in remanding the case for further administrative proceedings. When considered in conjunction with this section, the purpose of § 1-1.5-105 (3)(b), the so-called "adjudication clause" of the state version of the federal Help America Vote Act (HAVA), is to spare the secretary and persons filing administrative complaints under the state HAVA from having to observe the numerous, and somewhat complex, procedural requirements contained in this section, and to curtail the administrative rights and obligations the parties would ordinarily have in adjudicatory proceedings. The court also rejected the secretary of state's assertion that, if a statute precludes the application of the administrative procedures under § 1-1.5-105 it necessarily precludes judicial review under the APA. Accordingly, the district court had plenary authority under § 24-4-106 (7) to review and remand this case for further proceedings if it concluded that the agency acted contrary to law. Marks v. Gessler, 2013 COA 115, 350 P.3d 883.
The exclusive administrative remedy clause under § 1-1.5-105 (3)(c) does not limit an aggrieved party's judicial remedies. The clause does not refer to a complainant's available judicial remedies; it refers only to the procedures that constitute the administrative remedy for a violation of title III of the federal HAVA. The plain meaning of "administrative remedy" does not include a judicial remedy. This interpretation is further supported by the appeals clause in § 1-1.5-105 (4), which allows a person aggrieved by a final determination of the secretary to appeal the decision to the district court, and thus, potentially obtain a judicial remedy. Marks v. Gessler, 2013 COA 115, 350 P.3d 883.
Although the APA rules and procedures do not apply to the secretary's resolution of a state HAVA administrative complaint at the agency level, the APA does apply to judicial review in the district court of the secretary's determination. Section 1-1.5-105 (3)(b) and (3)(c) exclude only the administrative procedure provisions set forth under this section. They do not limit the availability of judicial remedies. At the agency level, a person filing a state HAVA administrative complaint is only entitled to administrative procedures and rights included in the state HAVA statute itself and is not entitled to or burdened by the additional administrative procedures, rights, and obligations provided under the APA. Marks v. Gessler, 2013 COA 115, 350 P.3d 883.
24-4-106. Judicial review.
(1) In order to assure a plain, simple, and prompt judicial remedy to persons or parties adversely affected or aggrieved by agency actions, the provisions of this section shall be applicable.
(2) Final agency action under this or any other law shall be subject to judicial review as provided in this section, whether or not an application for reconsideration has been filed, unless the filing of an application for reconsideration is required by the statutory provisions governing the specific agency. In the event specific provisions for rehearing as a basis for judicial review as applied to any particular agency are in effect on or after July 1, 1969, then such provisions shall govern the rehearing and appeal procedure, the provisions of this article to the contrary notwithstanding.
(3) An action may be commenced in any court of competent jurisdiction by or on behalf of an agency for judicial enforcement of any final order of such agency. In any such action, any person adversely affected or aggrieved by such agency action may obtain judicial review of such agency action.
(4) Except as provided in subsection (11) of this section, any person adversely affected or aggrieved by any agency action may commence an action for judicial review in the district court within thirty-five days after such agency action becomes effective; but, if such agency action occurs in relation to any hearing pursuant to section 24-4-105, then the person must also have been a party to such agency hearing. A proceeding for such review may be brought against the agency by its official title, individuals who comprise the agency, or any person representing the agency or acting on its behalf in the matter sought to be reviewed. The complaint shall state the facts upon which the plaintiff bases the claim that he or she has been adversely affected or aggrieved, the reasons entitling him or her to relief, and the relief which he or she seeks. Every party to an agency action in a proceeding under section 24-4-105 not appearing as plaintiff in such action for judicial review shall be made a defendant; except that, in review of agency actions taken pursuant to section 24-4-103, persons participating in the rule-making proceeding need not be made defendants. Each agency conducting a rule-making proceeding shall maintain a docket listing the name, address, and telephone number of every person who has participated in a rule-making proceeding by written statement, or by oral comment at a hearing. Any person who commences suit for judicial review of the rule shall notify each person on the agency's docket of the fact that a suit has been commenced. The notice shall be sent by first-class certified mail within fourteen days after filing of the action and shall be accompanied by a copy of the complaint for judicial review bearing the action number of the case. Thereafter, service of process, responsive pleadings, and other matters of procedure shall be controlled by the Colorado rules of civil procedure. An action shall not be dismissed for failure to join an indispensable party until an opportunity has been afforded to an affected party to bring the indispensable party into the action. The residence of a state agency for the purposes of this subsection (4) shall be deemed to be the city and county of Denver. In any action in which the plaintiff seeks judicial review of an agency decision made after a hearing as provided in section 24-4-105, the parties after issue is joined shall file briefs within the time periods specified in the Colorado appellate rules.
(4.5) Subject to the limitation set forth in section 39-8-108 (2), C.R.S., the board of county commissioners of any county of this state may commence an action in the Denver district court within the time limit set forth in subsection (4) of this section for judicial review of any agency action which is directed to any official, board, or employee of such county or which involves any duty or function of any official, board, or employee of such county with the consent of said official, board, or employee, and to the extent that said official, board, or employee could maintain an action under subsection (4) of this section. In addition, in any action brought against any official, board, or employee of a county of this state for judicial enforcement of any final order of any agency, the defendant official, board, or employee may obtain judicial review of such agency action. In any such action for judicial review, the county official, board, or employee shall not be permitted to seek temporary or preliminary injunctive relief pending a final decision on the merits of its claim.
(4.7) The county clerk and recorder of any county may commence an action under this section in the Denver district court for judicial review of any final action issued by the secretary of state arising under the "Uniform Election Code of 1992", articles 1 to 13 of title 1, C.R.S. In any such action, the county clerk and recorder may seek temporary or preliminary injunctive relief pending a final decision on the merits of the claim as permitted under this section.
(5) Upon a finding that irreparable injury would otherwise result, the agency, upon application therefor, shall postpone the effective date of the agency action pending judicial review, or the reviewing court, upon application therefor and regardless of whether such an application previously has been made to or denied by any agency, and upon such terms and upon such security, if any, as the court shall find necessary and order, shall issue all necessary and appropriate process to postpone the effective date of the agency action or to preserve the rights of the parties pending conclusion of the review proceedings.
(6) In every case of agency action, the record, unless otherwise stipulated by the parties, shall include the original or certified copies of all pleadings, applications, evidence, exhibits, and other papers presented to or considered by the agency, rulings upon exceptions, and the decision, findings, and action of the agency. Any person initiating judicial review shall designate the relevant parts of such record and advance the cost therefor. As to alleged errors, omissions, and irregularities in the agency record, evidence may be taken independently by the court.
(7) (a) If the court finds no error, it shall affirm the agency action.
(b) The court shall hold unlawful and set aside the agency action and shall restrain the enforcement of the order or rule under review, compel any agency action to be taken that has been unlawfully withheld or unduly delayed, remand the case for further proceedings, and afford other relief as may be appropriate if the court finds that the agency action is:
(I) Arbitrary or capricious;
(II) A denial of statutory right;
(III) Contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege, or immunity;
(IV) In excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, purposes, or limitations;
(V) Not in accord with the procedures or procedural limitations of this article 4 or as otherwise required by law;
(VI) An abuse or clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion;
(VII) Based upon findings of fact that are clearly erroneous on the whole record;
(VIII) Unsupported by substantial evidence when the record is considered as a whole; or
(IX) Otherwise contrary to law, including failing to comply with section 24-4-104 (3)(a) or 24-4-105 (4)(b).
(c) In making the findings specified in this subsection (7), the court shall review the whole record or portions of the record cited by any party.
(d) In all cases under review, the court shall determine all questions of law and interpret the statutory and constitutional provisions involved and shall apply the interpretation to the facts duly found or established.
(8) Upon a showing of irreparable injury, any court of competent jurisdiction may enjoin at any time the conduct of any agency proceeding in which the proceeding itself or the action proposed to be taken therein is clearly beyond the constitutional or statutory jurisdiction or authority of the agency. If the court finds that any proceeding contesting the jurisdiction or authority of the agency is frivolous or brought for the purpose of delay, it shall assess against the plaintiff in such proceeding costs and a reasonable sum for attorney fees (or an equivalent sum in lieu thereof) incurred by other parties, including the state.
(9) The decision of the district court shall be subject to appellate review as may be permitted by law or the Colorado appellate rules, but a notice of intent to seek appellate review must be filed with the district court within forty-nine days after its decision becomes final. If no notice of intent to seek appellate review is filed with the trial court within forty-nine days after its decision becomes final, the trial court shall immediately return to the agency its record. Upon disposition of a case in an appellate court which requires further proceedings in the trial court, the agency's record shall be returned to the trial court. On final disposition of the case in the appellate court when no further proceedings are necessary or permitted in the trial court, the agency's record shall be returned by the appellate court to the agency with notice of such disposition to the trial court or to the trial court, in which event the agency's record shall be returned by the trial court to the agency.
(10) In any judicial review of agency action, the district court or the appellate court shall advance on the docket any case which in the discretion of the court requires acceleration.
(11) (a) Whenever judicial review of any agency action is directed to the court of appeals, the provisions of this subsection (11) shall be applicable except for review of orders of the industrial claim appeals office.
(b) Such proceeding shall be commenced by the filing of a notice of appeal with the court of appeals within forty-nine days after the date of the service of the final order entered in the action by the agency, together with a certificate of service showing service of a copy of said notice of appeal on the agency and on all other persons who have appeared as parties to the action before the agency. The date of service of an order is the date on which a copy of the order is delivered in person or, if service is by mail, the date of mailing.
(c) The record on appeal shall conform to the provisions of subsection (6) of this section. The designation and preparation of the record and its transmission to the court of appeals shall be in accordance with the Colorado appellate rules. A request for an extension of time to transmit the record shall be made to the court of appeals and may be granted only by that court.
(d) The docketing of the appeal and all procedures thereafter shall be as set forth in the Colorado appellate rules. The agency shall not be required to pay a docket fee. All persons who have appeared as parties to the action before the agency who are not designated as appellants shall, together with the agency, be designated as appellees.
(e) The standard for review as set forth in subsection (7) of this section shall apply to appeals brought under this subsection (11).
Source: L. 59: p. 164, § 5. CRS 53: § 3-16-5. C.R.S. 1963: §3-16-5. L. 69: pp. 89, 268, §§ 6, 2. L. 76: (4) amended, p. 584, § 18, effective May 24. L. 79: (4.5) added, p. 843, § 2, effective May 26. L. 81: (4) amended and (11) added, pp. 890, 1134, 1142, §§ 4, 4, 1, effective July 1. L. 86: (11)(a) amended, p. 498, § 117, effective July 1. L. 87: (9) amended, p. 921, § 1, effective June 20. L. 93: (6) amended, p. 1330, § 5, effective June 6. L. 2012: (4) amended, (SB 12-175), ch. 208, p. 880, § 144, effective July 1. L. 2013: (9) and (11)(b) amended, (HB 13-1126), ch. 58, p. 192, § 5, effective July 1. L. 2014: (4.7) added, (HB 14-1354), ch. 159, p. 553, § 2, effective May 9. L. 2018: (7) amended, (HB 18-1224), ch. 288, p. 1783, § 3, effective May 29.
ANNOTATION
I. General Consideration.
II. Applicability.
III. Commencement of Action.
IV. Finality and Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies.
V. Parties.
VI. Relief Granted.
VII. Record on Review.
VIII. Standard of Review.
I. GENERAL CONSIDERATION.
Law reviews. For comment, "Standing of State Political Subdivisions to Challenge State Agency Rulings Under the Colorado Administrative Procedure Act", see 53 Den. L.J. 437 (1976). For article, "Discovery and Judicial Review in State Administrative Practice", see 10 Colo. Law. 2490 (1981). For article, "Property Tax Assessments in Colorado", see 12 Colo. Law. 563 (1983). For article, "Administrative Law", which discusses Tenth Circuit decisions dealing with judicial review, see 61 Den. L. J. 121 (1984). For article, "Administrative Law", which discusses Tenth Circuit decisions dealing with judicial review, see 62 Den. U. L. Rev. 18 (1985). For article, "Appealing Property Tax Assessments", see 15 Colo. Law. 798 (1986). For article, "Administrative Law", which discusses Tenth Circuit decisions dealing with judicial review, see 64 Den. U.L. Rev. 125 (1987). For article, "Prosecuting an Appeal from a Decision of the Colorado Public Utilities Commission", see 16 Colo. Law. 2163 (1987). For article, "Winning an Appeal From A Decision of the Colorado Public Utilities Commission", see 17 Colo. Law. 1529 (1988). For article, "Challenges to Agency Rules in Adjudicatory-Type Hearings", see 17 Colo. Law. 1991 (1988). For article, "Legislative and Judicial Oversight of Rulemaking", see 18 Colo. Law. 246 (1989). For article, "Can Colorado Administrative Agencies Settle Judicial Review Actions", see 19 Colo. Law. 835 (1990). For article, "Appellate Advocacy in Administrative Law Cases", see 22 Colo. Law. 27 (1993). For article, "Doctrine of Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies as an Offensive Tool", see 38 Colo. Law. 53 (Oct. 2009). For article, "Staying Enforcement of a Judgment Pending Appeal", see 48 Colo. Law. 30 (May 2019).
Subsection (4) is not violative of § 21 of art. VI, Colo. Const., since this section does not impinge on the supreme court's rule-making power. Warren Vill., Inc. v. Bd. of Assmt. Appeals, 619 P.2d 60 (Colo. 1980).
Nature of judicial review. Judicial review pursuant to subsection (6) is an original proceeding and not an appeal. Tassian v. People, 696 P.2d 825 (Colo. App. 1984), rev'd on other grounds, 731 P.2d 672 (Colo. 1987).
Subsection (7) gives a court plenary authority to review and remand a case for further proceedings if it concludes that the agency has acted contrary to law. City & County of Denver v. Bd. of Assessment Appeals, 947 P.2d 1373 (Colo. 1997).
Although agency should have adopted a rule pursuant to the State Administrative Procedure Act (APA) prior to engaging in unauthorized conduct, that did not remove the jurisdictional requirement that a party seek judicial review of the final agency action within 30 days of an agency's final action. Jefferson Sch. Dist. R-1 v. Div. of Labor, 791 P.2d 1217 (Colo. App. 1990).
When an administrative remedy has not been sought in a timely manner, C.R.C.P. 57 does not provide jurisdiction for judicial review. Jefferson Sch. Dist. R-1 v. Div. of Labor, 791 P.2d 1217 (Colo. App. 1990).
This section governing judicial review of final agency action does not expand power of courts to initiate and compel administrative action beyond that available under C.R.C.P. 106. Jones v. Bd. of Chiropractic Exam'rs, 874 P.2d 493 (Colo. App. 1994).
Section only addresses procedures of review available once it is established that the dispute is properly brought under some other statutory section. This section alone does not create a legally protected right so as to confer standing to seek judicial review. Dolores Huerta Prep. High v. Colo. State Bd. of Educ., 215 P.3d 1229 (Colo. App. 2009).
District court has subject matter jurisdiction over appeal of jeopardy assessment made pursuant to § 39-21-111 where no notice of deficiency has been issued. A proceeding under this section was proper because there was no conflict with any other statute and there was final agency action where the tax was determined, a demand for payment was issued, and there were no administrative remedies under § 39-21-101 et seq. to exhaust. Flores v. Dept. of Rev., 802 P.2d 1175 (Colo. App. 1990).
Section applies to review of board of assessment appeals' (BAA) denial of abatement petition. Capital Assoc. Intern. v. Arapahoe Comm'rs, 802 P.2d 1180 (Colo. App. 1990).
Mined land reclamation board orders are final and subject to judicial review, notwithstanding the filing of a motion for reconsideration and denial of such motion by the board. The filing of such a motion is not authorized by law, and does not extend the time within which to seek judicial review of the order. Cheney v. State of Colo. Mined Land Reclamation Bd., 826 P.2d 367 (Colo. App. 1991).
Legal conclusions by peace officer do not constitute substantial evidence under subsection (7). The peace officer must allege facts in an affidavit sufficient to support the agency action. Jansma v. Colo. Dept. of Rev., 2023 COA 59, 536 P.3d 859.
Board acted arbitrarily and capriciously within the meaning of subsection (7) in refusing to hold an evidentiary hearing upon employee's disagreements with involuntary transfers where the reasons given by the board do not justify its order of denial, where the hearing officer found, based upon information submitted to her, that employee's allegations were facially supported, and where a proper determination of employee's contentions would require factual determinations that could only be made after an evidentiary hearing. Ivy v. State Pers. Bd., 860 P.2d 602 (Colo. App. 1993).
BAA has no authority to dismiss an administrative appeal based on a taxpayer's failure to comply with non-statutory procedural requirements. Fleisher-Smyth v. Bd. of Assessment App., 865 P.2d 922 (Colo. App. 1993).
Any right that may have existed to obtain review of a prison disciplinary action under the APA was eliminated by the enactment of § 17-1-111. Crawford v. State Dept. of Corr., 895 P.2d 1156 (Colo. App. 1995).
Court of appeals lacked jurisdiction in the absence of a specific rule or statute allowing immediate review in that court. A section of the state constitution allowing decisions on campaign finance complaints to be reviewed by the court of appeals was found unconstitutional in federal court. Without that section, there was no statute or rule providing for immediate review in the court of appeals. Therefore, subsection (11) required appeal to the district court. Day v. Chase for Colo., 2020 COA 84, 479 P.3d 1.
The eleventh amendment bars claims for relief against a state official sued in their official capacity for declaratory and injunctive relief under this act and under art. II, § 10, of the state constitution. InfoCision Mgmt. Corp. v. Griswold, 570 F. Supp. 3d 1051 (D. Colo. 2021).
Applied in Evans v. Simpson, 190 Colo. 426, 547 P.2d 931 (1976); Dixon v. Bd. of Optometric Exam'rs, 39 Colo. App. 200, 565 P.2d 960 (1977); Harris v. Owen, 39 Colo. App. 494, 570 P.2d 26 (1977); Van Pelt v. State Bd. for Cmty. Colls. & Occupational Educ., 195 Colo. 316, 577 P.2d 765 (1978); Stortz v. Dept. of Rev., 195 Colo. 325, 578 P.2d 229 (1978); Arnold v. Charnes, 41 Colo. App. 338, 589 P.2d 1373 (1978); Marin v. Dept. of Rev., 41 Colo. App. 557, 591 P.2d 1336 (1978); Cloverleaf Kennel Club, Inc. v. Racing Comm'n, 42 Colo. App. 13, 592 P.2d 1341 (1978); Enriquez v. Merit Sys. Council, 197 Colo. 14, 589 P.2d 492 (1979); Nesbit v. Indus. Comm'n, 43 Colo. App. 398, 607 P.2d 1024 (1979); Gilbert v. Sch. Dist. No. 50, 485 F. Supp. 505 (D. Colo. 1980); Red Seal Potato Chip Co. v. Civil Rights Comm'n, 44 Colo. App. 381, 618 P.2d 697 (1980); Hoehl v. Motor Vehicle Div., 624 P.2d 907 (Colo. App. 1980); Davis v. Dept. of Rev., 623 P.2d 874 (Colo. 1981); Bernstein v. Livingston, 633 P.2d 519 (Colo. App. 1981); Franco v. District Court, 641 P.2d 922 (Colo. 1982); State ex rel. Dept. of Health v. I.D.I., Inc., 642 P.2d 14 (Colo. App. 1981); Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n v. Cotter Corp., 646 P.2d 393 (Colo. App. 1981); Citizens for Free Enter. v. Dept. of Rev., 649 P.2d 1054 (Colo. 1982); Crocker v. Dept. of Rev., 652 P.2d 1067 (Colo. 1982); Lee v. Bd. of Dental Exam'rs, 654 P.2d 839 (Colo. 1982); BA Leasing Corp. v. Bd. of Assmt. Appeals, 653 P.2d 80 (Colo. App. 1982); Thompson v. Bd of Educ., 668 P.2d 954 (Colo. App. 1983); Laredo Hous. Apts., Ltd. v. Bd. of Assmt. Appeals, 675 P.2d 23 (Colo. App. 1983); Mondragon v. Poudre Sch. Dist. R-1, 696 P.2d 831 (Colo. App. 1984); City & County of Denver v. Indus. Comm'n, 707 P.2d 1008 (Colo. App. 1985); City Bd. of Equal. v. Bd. of Assmt. Appeals, 743 P.2d 444 (Colo. App. 1987); Eckley v. Colo. Real Estate Comm'n, 752 P.2d 68 (Colo. 1988); Farmers Cafe v. State Dept. of Rev., 752 P.2d 1064 (Colo. App. 1988); Golden Gate Dev. v. Gilpin Cty. Bd., 856 P.2d 72 (Colo. App. 1993); Kelley v. Grand County Bd. of Equaliz., 934 P.2d 929 (Colo. App. 1997); Wildwood Child & Adult Care Program, Inc. v. Colo. Dept. of Pub. Health & Env't, 985 P.2d 654 (Colo. App. 1999); Schlapp ex rel. Schlapp v. Dept. of Health, 2012 COA 105, 284 P.3d 177; Craig v. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Inc., 2015 COA 115, 370 P.3d 272, rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm'n, 584 U.S. 617 (2018); McLellan v. Colo. Dept. of Human Servs., 2022 COA 7, 507 P.3d 1025.
II. APPLICABILITY.
Section applicable to revocation of driver's license. Appellate review by the district court of a department of revenue order revoking a driver's license is governed by this article. Donelson v. Dept. of Rev., 38 Colo. App. 354, 561 P.2d 345 (1976).
The APA and, specifically, this section, constitute the exclusive means through which a person may seek judicial review of the revocation under § 42-4-1202 (3)(f) (now § 42-2-126) of a driver's license. People v. District Court, 200 Colo. 65, 612 P.2d 87 (1980).
A request for extraordinary relief in the form of mandamus under C.R.C.P. 106 was improper to challenge arbitrary action by the department of revenue in revoking a person's driver's license, even though petition was filed on the basis that the department refused to conduct a revocation hearing. The APA provides the proper mechanism for seeking relief based on arbitrary action by an executive agency. Dept. of Rev. v. District Court, 802 P.2d 473 (Colo. 1990).
And to commission of insurance when functioning in adjudicatory capacity. If the commissioner of insurance holds a hearing pursuant to subsections (3) and (4) upon the application of an "aggrieved" person, insurer, or rating organization to determine whether he shall affirm, reverse, or modify his previous action, he is then functioning in an adjudicatory or quasi-judicial capacity and the procedures employed by him must conform to standards prescribed in the administrative code. Carroll v. Barnes, 169 Colo. 277, 455 P.2d 644 (1969).
And to certain actions of state engineer. The modified doctrine of prior appropriation provided for in the Colorado ground water management act applies to nontributary ground water, and rights to such water in designated ground water basins must be obtained through the procedures established in that act. Rights to nontributary ground water not located in a designated basin may be obtained only through application for a well permit from the state engineer under § 37-90-137. Review of the state engineer's action on well permit applications may be obtained under this section, as prescribed by § 37-90-115, for appeals taken before the 1983 revision of § 30-90-115 became applicable. Dept. of Natural Res. v. Sw. Colo. Water Conservation Dist., 671 P.2d 1294 (Colo. 1983).
Subsection (7) standards do not apply to the initiative title setting review board when it holds a meeting for designating and fixing a title, ballot title and submission clause, and summary. Specific process and procedure is set out in the initiative and referendum statutes. Matter of Title, Ballot Title et al., 831 P.2d 1301 (Colo. 1992).
Section is not inapplicable to the adjudication of state water engineers' regulations. Kuiper v. Well Owners Conservation Ass'n, 176 Colo. 119, 490 P.2d 268 (1971).
Nor to insurance commissioner functioning in quasi-legislative capacity. When the commissioner of insurance conducts a hearing, either on his own initiative or at the request of a filing insurer or rating organization, prior to the approval or disapproval by him of a rate filing, he is functioning in a quasi-legislative capacity and the validity of the procedure which he follows is not to be determined by standards provided in the administrative code. Carroll v. Barnes, 169 Colo. 277, 455 P.2d 644 (1969).
Nor to workmen's compensation cases. The appeal procedures under the workmen's compensation act are complete and definitive and constitute an organic act which is self-operational without the need of supplementation from the APA. Zappas v. Indus. Comm'n, 36 Colo. App. 319, 543 P.2d 101 (1975).
Nor to order revoking permission to remit sales taxes on cash basis. Section 39-21-105 specifically, and article 21 of title 39 generally, prescribe the procedure for the determination and review of deficiencies in tax payments. So, while this section governs the defendant's appeal of the department's final deficiency determination, it does not govern the defendant's challenge to the order revoking its permission to remit sales taxes on a cash basis. Dept. of Rev. v. District Court, 193 Colo. 553, 568 P.2d 1157 (1977).
Nor to local licensing authority actions. Because the Denver department of excise and licenses is not a state agency with statewide territorial jurisdiction, the decisions of its director are not within the ambit of review procedures under this section. Two G's, Inc. v. Kalbin, 666 P.2d 129 (Colo. 1983).
Nor to private hospital's peer review process. A private hospital's peer review process is not subject to judicial review under this article. Crow v. Penrose-St. Francis Healthcare, 2012 COA 43, 292 P.3d 1018.
The actions of the approved treatment provider review board within the department of corrections denying a treatment provider as an approved treatment provider for the department is exempt from review under this section. Wisdom Works Counseling v. Dept. of Corr., 2015 COA 118, 360 P.3d 262.
Referring doctors to the Colorado medical board for possible Medical Practice Act violations that the board may then further investigate is not a "proceeding" for the court to enjoin under this section. Doe 1 v. Dept. of Pub. Health & Env't, 2018 COA 106, 454 P.3d 327, aff'd, 2019 CO 92, 450 P.3d 851.
Colorado rules of civil procedure provide an available remedy for a prisoner who is still held within the period of his sentence. Peterson v. Ricketts, 495 F. Supp. 312 (D. Colo. 1980).
This section is not applicable to the adjustment of the timing and manner of inmate's restitution payments. Jones v. Colo. Dept. of Corr., 53 P.3d 1187 (Colo. App. 2002).
III. COMMENCEMENT OF ACTION.
In absence of statutory provision, standing is conferred by implied right of action. Where statutory provisions do not specify what counts as an actionable injury, the law of implied private rights of action furnishes a model for whether the substantive law creates rights the invasion of which confers standing under the APA. Cloverleaf Kennel Club, Inc. v. Racing Comm'n, 620 P.2d 1051 (Colo. 1980).
Nominal availability of judicial review does not preclude action seeking declaratory relief. The nominal availability of judicial review under subsection (4) of this section or C.R.C.P. 106(a)(4) does not preclude a C.R.C.P. 57 action seeking declaratory relief if, in the context of a particular controversy, the remedy afforded by this section or by certiorari review would be inadequate. Collopy v. Wildlife Comm'n, 625 P.2d 994 (Colo. 1981).
Permissible to join actions. It is permissible to join a § 24-4-106 action and a C.R.C.P. 57 action for purposes of review. Utah Int'l, Inc. v. Bd. of Land Comm'rs, 41 Colo. App. 72, 579 P.2d 96 (1978).
Failure to pursue other remedies may bar declaratory judgment. The plaintiff's failure to pursue remedies provided in this section and in C.R.C.P. 106(a) in a timely manner bars a declaratory judgment action, following an agency's adverse interpretation of a statute. Greyhound Racing Ass'n v. Racing Comm'n, 41 Colo. App. 319, 589 P.2d 70 (1978).
Declaratory action is not invariably barred by expiration of this section's filing period. While agency rules and regulations are indeed reviewable under subsection (4), expiration of that subsection's filing period does not invariably bar as untimely a C.R.C.P. 57, action attacking the constitutionality of an administrative regulation promulgated by § 24-4-103 rule-making. Collopy v. Wildlife Comm'n, 625 P.2d 994 (Colo. 1981).
A person to whom an agency regulation is allegedly being unconstitutionally applied need not defy that regulation to obtain a judicial determination of its validity, but may instead commence a suit under C.R.C.P. 57 and an action for declaratory relief brought under these circumstances will not be barred because the time period prescribed by subsection (4) has elapsed since the agency regulation under attack became effective. Collopy v. Wildlife Comm'n, 625 P.2d 994 (Colo. 1981).
Amendment of pleadings governed by rules of civil procedure. The propriety of amendments to pleadings in actions for judicial review under this section is governed by the rules of civil procedure. People v. District Court, 200 Colo. 65, 612 P.2d 87 (1980).
Amendment allowed where mistaken reference to basis of court's jurisdiction. Where the sole amendment required to bring a cause of action within the APA is a deletion of a mistaken reference to C.R.C.P. 106(a)(4), as the basis for the court's jurisdiction, and the substitution of a reference to this section, and where in all other respects, the petition states a cause of action under this section, an amendment to the petition should be allowed pursuant to C.R.C.P. 15(a). People v. District Court, 200 Colo. 87, 612 P.2d 87 (1980).
A complaint for judicial review must be filed within 30 days after final agency action even if the claim is a contract claim. Buzick v. Pub. Emp. Ret. Ass'n, 849 P.2d 869 (Colo. App. 1992) (decided under former law).
Subsection (4) does not authorize service of process by mail in an action for judicial review of an agency decision. Trial court erred in concluding that subsection (4) authorizes initial service of process of complaints for judicial review of agency action by first-class mail. Instead, the plaintiff seeking such judicial review must comply with the Colorado rules of civil procedure regarding service of process of a complaint. Bennett v. Colo. Dept. of Rev., 2024 COA 97, 559 P.3d 690.
Plaintiff seeking judicial review of final decision in driver's license revocation proceeding did not properly commence action by hand-delivering a copy of the complaint to plaintiff's county department of motor vehicles office and mailing a copy of the complaint to the department of revenue and the attorney general. Proper commencement required personal service of the complaint to the department and the attorney general by an adult, non-party in accordance with C.R.C.P. 4. Bennett v. Colo. Dept. of Rev., 2024 COA 97, 559 P.3d 690.
The thirty-five-day deadline in subsection (4) applies to judicial review cases but not to judicial enforcement cases. The deadline applies to an adversely affected or aggrieved person's suit seeking judicial review of an agency's action but not to an agency's suit seeking judicial enforcement of one of its final orders. Arapahoe Dept. of Human Svcs. v. Velarde, 2022 CO 18, 507 P.3d 518.
A complaint in the district court seeking to challenge an administrative ruling concerning attorney fees entered subsequent to a decision on the merits must be filed within 30 days after the ruling. Allen Homesite Group v. Colo. Water Quality Control Comm'n, 19 P.3d 32 (Colo. App. 2000) (decided under former law).
Provision in subsection (4) for mailing of "notice to each person on the agency's docket of the fact that a suit has been commenced" pertains only to a suit for judicial review of a rule-making proceeding under § 24-4-103. And such notice is not intended to supplant service of process or other procedural requirements. Instead, subsection (4) provides that "service of process, responsive pleadings, and other matters of procedure shall be controlled by the Colorado rules of civil procedure." Bennett v. Colo. Dept. of Rev., 2024 COA 97, 559 P.3d 690.
Appeal filed within 30 days of service of order from Colorado oil and gas commission timely even if § 34-60-108 (6) provides that such orders are entered as of the date entered into the books of the commission. Richmond Petroleum v. Oil & Gas Conservation Comm'n, 907 P.2d 732 (Colo. App. 1995) (decided under former law).
Colorado water quality control division's failure to act on a request for a temporary water discharge permit within 180 days constituted final agency action, thereby requiring any district court complaint concerning said action to be filed within 30 days after the end of the 180-day period. Roosevelt Tunnel, LLC v. Norton, 89 P.3d 427 (Colo. App. 2003) (decided under former law).
Motion to amend filed after expiration of 30-day period is allowed. Although a motion to amend is filed approximately one month after the 30-day period prescribed by subsection (4) has expired, leave to amend should be granted under C.R.C.P. 15(a) and where the amended pleading relates back to the date on which the original petition was filed, the pleading, as amended, states a timely claim for judicial review. Cloverleaf Kennel Club, Inc. v. Racing Comm'n, 620 P.2d 1051 (Colo. 1980) (decided under former law).
Filing of motion to reconsider pursuant to subsection (2) does not extend effective date of agency's final decision. Bethesda Found. v. Colo. Dept. of Soc. Servs., 867 P.2d 1 (Colo. App. 1993), rev'd on other grounds, 877 P.2d 860 (Colo. 1994).
The plain language of subsection (3) requires a party aggrieved by an agency action to commence an action for review, and failure of the party to commence such action in the appropriate district court precludes review of the agency action by the appellate court. Davila v. Merit Sys. Council, 15 P.3d 781 (Colo. App. 2000).
Burden is on the appellants to make timely filing of their opening brief pursuant to subsection (4) and C.A.R. 31. It is within the court's discretion to dismiss an appeal if the appellant has not complied with the statutory time limitations for filing briefs. Warren Vill., Inc. v. Bd. of Assmt. Appeals, 619 P.2d 60 (Colo. 1980).
Judicial review of agency action pursuant to subsection (4) is subject to the time limitations specified in C.A.R. 31(a). Dismissal for failure to comply with statutory time limitations for filing briefs is left within the trial court's discretion. DuPuis v. Charnes, 668 P.2d 1 (Colo. 1983).
Time for review where no specific decision challenged. Where there is no specific decision being challenged, and consequently no specific date from which to reckon the time for filing for judicial review, the standard must be that the action is to be brought within a reasonable time. Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n v. Cotter Corp., 665 P.2d 598 (Colo. 1983).
Action for review of tenured teacher's dismissal was barred as untimely where it was not filed within the 45 days during which the teacher was required to seek review pursuant to the Teacher Tenure Act and this section and where the teacher received actual notice of the termination. Talbot v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 700 P.2d 919 (Colo. App. 1984).
Although the recognized interpretation of issuance of an order is the date of mailing, the mailing occurs on the date that a letter, property addressed, and bearing proper postage, is deposited in the mails. Where governor's decision was mailed without proper postage, his order is deemed effective when actual notice is received. N. Colo. Consortium v. Rural Job Training, 728 P.2d 744 (Colo. App. 1986).
Time limit in subsection (4) applies to actions under both subsection (2) and subsection (3). Where defendant in enforcement action asserted a counterclaim challenging validity of agency action being enforced, and more than 30 days had elapsed since agency action became effective, court was without jurisdiction to entertain the counterclaim. Gibbs v. Colo. Mined Land Reclamation Bd., 883 P.2d 592 (Colo. App. 1994); Allen Homesite Group v. Colo. Water Quality Control Comm'n, 19 P.3d 32 (Colo. App. 2000) (decided under former law).
Subsection (4) does not set date by which appellees must object or be deemed to have waived the brief-filing requirements of this section. Warren Vill., Inc. v. Bd. of Assmt. Appeals, 619 P.2d 60 (Colo. 1980).
Trial court properly dismissed plaintiff's judicial review claim as time-barred under subsection (4). Under subsection (4), any person adversely affected or aggrieved by any agency action may file an action for judicial review in the district court within 30 days after such agency action becomes effective. Moreover, under subsection (2), "unless the filing of an application for reconsideration is required by the statutory provisions governing the specific agency", judicial review must be sought within the 30-day filing requirement, regardless of whether or not a motion for reconsideration has been filed. There is no authority requiring a reconsideration motion before seeking judicial review of department's decisions concerning medicaid. Accordingly, plaintiff's motion for reconsideration did not extend the deadline for commencing a judicial review action. Bates v. Henneberry, 211 P.3d 68 (Colo. App. 2009) (decided under former law).
IV. FINALITY AND EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES.
The parties involved in administrative proceedings are required to exhaust their administrative remedies before seeking judicial review in order to avoid encroaching on the executive function. The exception to this rule, however, is stated in subsection (8). A district court may intervene if the agency proceeding or action clearly exceeds the constitutional or statutory jurisdiction or authority of the agency and the party seeking to enjoin the proceedings shows that the agency action will cause irreparable injury. Envirotest Sys. v. Colo. Dept. of Rev., 109 P.3d 142 (Colo. 2005).
The general rule is that the failure to exhaust administrative remedies prior to seeking judicial relief is a jurisdictional defect. This is especially true in cases involving tax matters, and thus, if there are complete, adequate, and speedy administrative remedies available for alleged tax irregularities, a taxpayer must exhaust them. Kendal v. Cason, 791 P.2d 1227 (Colo. App. 1990).
Right to review arises only after final adverse decision. A statutory provision defining the period within which judicial review can be sought does not become material until after the right to review arises, that is, until after there is a final decision adverse to the claimant. McCartney v. W. Adams County Fire Prot. Dist., 40 Colo. App. 330, 574 P.2d 516 (1978).
Absent final agency action, a district court does not have the authority to interfere with administrative agency proceedings by granting a stay of a public employee's dismissal. State Pers. Bd. v. District Court, 637 P.2d 333 (Colo. 1981).
Until an agency makes a determination, any action of the judiciary is premature. Dept. of Rev. v. District Court, 172 Colo. 144, 470 P.2d 864 (1970).
Judiciary cannot interfere even where claim of unconstitutionality. Even a claim that a statute under which the department is proceeding is unconstitutional will not clothe the judiciary with the power to interfere with or control the department in advance of its taking final action. The question of constitutionality is a matter to be raised on appeal after the executive has performed his functions. Dept. of Rev. v. District Court, 172 Colo. 144, 470 P.2d 864 (1970); Chonoski v. Dept. of Rev., 699 P.2d 416 (Colo. App. 1985).
The claim of unconstitutionality will not clothe the judiciary with the power to interfere with an administrative agency in advance of its taking final action. Moore v. District Court, 184 Colo. 63, 518 P.2d 948 (1974).
A claim that a statute is unconstitutional does not give the judiciary the power under subsection (8) to interfere with an administrative agency in advance of its taking final action. State Pers. Bd. v. District Court, 637 P.2d 333 (Colo. 1981).
Section only addresses procedures of review available once it is established that the dispute is properly brought under some other statutory section. This section alone does not create a legally protected right so as to confer standing to seek judicial review. Dolores Huerta Prep. High v. Colo. State Bd. of Educ., 215 P.3d 1229 (Colo. App. 2009).
Agency statement on law or policy, or procedure or practice, deemed final action. Whole or part of every agency statement of general applicability and future effect implementing, interpreting, or declaring law or policy, or setting forth procedure or practice requirements of any agency is final agency action subject to judicial review and authority to postpone the effective date of agency action pending review. Colo. Bd. of Optometric Exam'rs v. Dixon, 165 Colo. 488, 440 P.2d 287 (1968).
Agency's decision reviewing hearing officer's decision is final action. The decision of an agency (other than a remand for further proceedings) described in § 24-4-105 (15)(b), is final agency action subject to judicial review under subsection (2). State Pers. Bd. v. District Court, 637 P.2d 333 (Colo. 1981).
But individual votes of members of the state personnel board on motions put before the board do not constitute agency actions. Rather, it is the outcome or effect of those votes that is subject to review. Maggard v. Dept. of Human Servs., 226 P.3d 1209 (Colo. App. 2009), rev'd on other grounds, 248 P.3d 708 (Colo. 2011).
State personnel board order awarding attorney fees, but not establishing the fee amount is a reviewable final agency action. Colo. State Pers. Bd. v. Dept. of Corr., 988 P.2d 1147 (Colo. 1999).
Right to review tax exemption arises only upon board of assessment appeals decision. Where a taxpayer initially applies for a tax exemption prior to the effective date of a statutory provision, but the final administrative decision adverse to the claimant is a board of assessment appeals decision after the statute's effective date, the right to district court review does not arise until that latter date. Warren Vill., Inc. v. Bd. of Assmt. Appeals, 619 P.2d 60 (Colo. 1980).
For purposes of timely filing a claim seeking judicial review of the Colorado economic development commission's award of a project pursuant to the Colorado Regional Tourism Act, final agency action, as required by the APA, did not occur until the Colorado economic development commission adopted a resolution memorializing the terms of the regional tourism authority award. 1405 Hotel, LLC v. Colo. Econ. Dev. Comm'n, 2015 COA 127, 370 P.3d 309.
In cases arising under the tenure act, the "final order" for judicial review is certainly the "order" of the board of education required by § 22-63-117 (10). Snyder v. Jefferson City Sch. Dist. No. 1, 707 P.2d 1049 (Colo. App. 1985); Lockhart v. Arapahoe County Sch. District No. 6, 735 P.2d 913 (Colo. App. 1986).
Finality of license revocation by division of motor vehicles. An order of revocation issued at the conclusion of a hearing is final. Inasmuch as motor vehicle statutes are specific as to when an order is effective, when it is final, and when a petition for judicial review is to be filed, they are controlling notwithstanding other conflicting provisions of the APA. Houston v. Dept. of Rev., 699 P.2d 15 (Colo. App. 1985).
Order of board of health reversing and remanding the determination of the hearing officer is not a reviewable final agency action. Colo. Health Facilities Review Council v. District Court, 689 P.2d 617 (Colo. 1984).
Filing of exceptions to the preliminary recommendations of the administrative law judge does not effect the 45-day deadline for filing a notice of appeal from the date of the final agency action. Hussein v. Regents of the Univ. of Colo., 124 P.3d 871 (Colo. App. 2005).
A party seeking judicial review of a commission's final order must file a complaint within thirty-five days of the effective date of the order, even if the party first filed a motion to reconsider and the commission declined to reconsider its order. The plain language of the Colorado Air Pollution Prevention and Control Act and the APA requires a finding that a complaint was untimely when a party filed its complaint sixty-nine days after the effective date of a final order. Sterling Ethanol v. Colo. Air Quality, 2017 COA 26, 413 P.3d 215.
Administrative remedies must be exhausted. Before there can be recourse to courts in administrative matters, there must be an exhaustion of administrative remedies. Moschetti v. Liquor Licensing Auth., 176 Colo. 281, 490 P.2d 299 (1971).
Normally, judicial review of administrative action is available only after an exhaustion of administrative remedies and final agency action. Bd. of Cosmetology v. District Court, 187 Colo. 175, 530 P.2d 1278 (1974); Chonoski v. Dept. of Rev., 699 P.2d 416 (Colo. App. 1985).
Exhaustion of the administrative remedy of an appeal to the Colorado civil rights commission from an adverse ruling of a hearing officer is a prerequisite to the maintenance of a court action challenging the hearing officer's ruling. N. Wash. St. Water & San. Dist. v. Emerson, 626 P.2d 1152 (Colo. App. 1980).
The need for application of the rule requiring exhaustion of remedies becomes more persuasive when the matter in controversy raises the precise questions which are within the expertise of the administrative agency, and are of the very nature the agency was designed to resolve. Downey v. Dept. of Rev., 653 P.2d 72 (Colo. App. 1982).
District court properly dismissed action for lack of jurisdiction since plaintiffs failed to exhaust the administrative remedies available to them which could have afforded them complete relief in the matter. Kendal v. Cason, 791 P.2d 1227 (Colo. App. 1990).
District court does not have jurisdiction under C.R.C.P. 106(a)(4) to review an interlocutory order of a state administrative agency, absent a showing of irreparable harm from such order. T & S Leasing v. District Court, 728 P.2d 729 (Colo. 1986).
District court lacked authority to issue injunctive relief regarding a hearing officer ruling made during an ongoing administrative hearing. Envirotest Sys. v. Colo. Dept. of Rev., 109 P.3d 142 (Colo. 2005).
There is an exception to this rule that judicial review is available only after an exhaustion of administrative remedies provided by subsection (8). Bd. of Cosmetology v. District Court, 187 Colo. 175, 530 P.2d 1278 (1974).
Individual may initiate pre-enforcement challenge to regulation's validity. Nothing in the APA denies standing to an individual to initiate a pre-enforcement challenge to the validity of a regulation, if he is subject to its demands. CF&I Steel Corp. v. Colo. Air Pollution Control Comm'n, 199 Colo. 270, 610 P.2d 85 (1980).
Trial court erred in dismissing 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim against the members of the state board for community colleges and occupational education since the availability of judicial review pursuant to this section did not preclude such action. Nat'l Camera, Inc. v. Sanchez, 832 P.2d 960 (Colo. App. 1991).
Applied in Envirotest Sys. v. Colo. Dept. of Rev., 109 P.3d 142 (Colo. 2005).
V. PARTIES.
Counties not included in definition of "party". A county, as an arm of the state board of social services, has no rights or privileges so far as its statutory duties are concerned and, hence, does not come within the definition of "party". Bd. of County Comm'rs v. Bd. of Soc. Servs., 186 Colo. 435, 528 P.2d 244 (1974).
Nor board of county commissioners. The board of county commissioners is an "agency" within the meaning of the administrative code and as such is not the person who may seek review of final agency action. Also, boards of county commissioners have no authority to sue as representatives of taxpayers of their counties. Bd. of County Comm'rs v. Love, 172 Colo. 121, 470 P.2d 861 (1970) (decided prior to 1979 amendment).
A county and, as such, its board of county commissioners are without standing to challenge an action of the state board of social services, even though they may have been extended the courtesy of presenting evidence at the rule-making hearing. Bd. of County Comm'rs v. Bd. of Soc. Servs., 186 Colo. 435, 528 P.2d 244 (1974) (decided prior to 1979 amendment).
Where the state board of social services is a party to judicial review proceedings, as a result of which a settlement agreement was reached, reinstating an employee suspended by a county department of social services, the county board and the county department, as subordinates of the state agency, are bound by the state department's actions settling the judicial review proceedings. Accordingly, the county board and the county department are without standing to seek judicial review of the merit system council's order implementing the settlement agreement, and, pursuant to subsection (4.5), the board of county commissioners is likewise without standing to seek judicial review. Bd. of County Comm'rs v. Merit Sys. Council, 662 P.2d 1093 (Colo. App. 1982).
Nor does a county department of social services have standing to seek judicial review of an action by the state board of social services by the merit system council. Nadeau v. Merit Sys. Council for County Depts. of Soc. Servs., 36 Colo. App. 362, 545 P.2d 1061 (1975) (decided prior to 1979 amendment).
A county department of social services is not an adversely affected or aggrieved "party" empowered to bring an action for judicial review of an agency action within the meaning of this section. Martin v. District Court, 191 Colo. 107, 550 P.2d 864 (1976) (decided prior to 1979 amendment) (political subdivision doctrine and its articulation in this case abandoned in Bd. of Educ. v. Adams County Sch. Dist., 2023 CO 52, 537 P.3d 1).
A county board of commissioners has standing to review an administrative rule that provided that a permit issued pursuant to the rule shall be binding with respect to any conflicting local governmental permit or land use approval process. Bd. of County Comm'rs v. Colo. Oil & Gas Conservation Comm'n, 81 P.3d 1119 (Colo. App. 2003).
Subsection (4) does not grant a county the right to seek judicial review of state department decisions. Romer v. Bd. of County Comm'rs of the County of Pueblo, 956 P.2d 566 (Colo. 1998).
The statute does not confer a substantive legal right on a county to sue for monetary damages. Provisions that include counties within the definition of "person" were not intended to confer substantive rights on counties to sue the state. Romer v. Bd. of County Comm'rs of the County of Pueblo, 956 P.2d 566 (Colo. 1998).
"Party" status required as prerequisite to judicial review. One must comply with the requirements for obtaining "party" status in adjudicatory hearings as a prerequisite to seeking judicial review under the APA. Colo. Water Quality Control Comm'n v. Town of Frederick, 641 P.2d 958 (Colo. 1982).
Right to judicial review is limited to "aggrieved" parties. The right to judicial review of final administrative actions under the APA is limited to those parties to the proceeding before the administrative agency whose rights, privileges, or duties, as distinct from those of the state, are adversely affected by the decision. Bd. of County Comm'rs v. Bd. of Soc. Servs., 186 Colo. 435, 528 P.2d 244 (1974); Colo.-Ute Elec. Ass'n v. Air Pollution Control Comm'n, 41 Colo. App. 393, 591 P.2d 1323 (1978), rev'd on other grounds, 199 Colo. 270, 610 P.2d 85 (1980).
This section, in conjunction with § 34-60-111, allows challenges to the issuance of an oil and gas drilling permit by persons other than the permit applicant, owners of surface rights, and a local government. Although citizens' and community groups are not entitled to be heard in connection with a permit application, they may be "persons or parties adversely affected or aggrieved by agency actions" within the meaning of this section, following issuance of the permit. Weld Air & Water v. Colo. Oil & Gas, 2019 COA 86, 457 P.3d 727.
"Aggrieved" party defined. Those whose activities are exactly those to which a particular regulation apply, and who will be adversely affected by an application of the regulation, are "aggrieved" parties with standing to seek judicial review of the regulation. CF&I Steel Corp. v. Colo. Air Pollution Control Comm'n, 199 Colo. 270, 610 P.2d 85 (1980).
If an administrative rule or order either commands or prohibits action on the part of specific individuals or entities, then those subject to the mandate or prohibition of the rule have sufficient interest and standing to seek judicial review of the administrative action adopting the rule or order under this section. Colo.-Ute Elec. Ass'n v. Air Pollution Control Comm'n, 41 Colo. App. 393, 591 P.2d 1323 (1978), rev'd on other grounds, 199 Colo. 270, 610 P.2d 85 (1980).
Party to an adjudicatory determination by an administrative agency may initiate an appeal. Douglas County Bd. of Comm'rs v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 829 P.2d 1303 (Colo. 1992).
"Party" need not file alternative to proposed regulation. Status as a "party" in seeking judicial review of agency action does not require that one have filed an alternative to the proposed regulation. CF&I Steel Corp. v. Colo. Air Pollution Control Comm'n, 199 Colo. 270, 610 P.2d 85 (1980).
Where there is no allegation of "aggrieved" parties, motion for relief denied. Where a motion for relief does not allege the grounds which, if established, would "aggrieve" parties, the commissioner of insurance does not abuse his discretion in denying the motion. Carroll v. Barnes, 169 Colo. 277, 455 P.2d 644 (1969).
Parties held to be aggrieved persons adversely affected by action of board of public welfare (now department of social services). Fields v. Dept. of Pub. Welfare, 165 Colo. 118, 437 P.2d 538 (1968).
State property tax administrator is an "agency" and therefore is not entitled to appeal an agency action under this section. Maurer v. Young Life, 751 P.2d 653 (Colo. App. 1987), aff'd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 779 P.2d 1317 (Colo. 1989).
Standing to seek tax refund depends on financial burden suffered. One who does not bear the financial burden of a tax suffers no loss or injury and has no standing to seek a refund under this section. Wash. Plaza Assocs. v. Bd. of Assmt. Appeals, 44 Colo. App. 559, 620 P.2d 52 (1980).
Purpose of indispensable party requirement. The purpose of the requirement that every party in the agency action not appearing as a plaintiff shall be made a defendant is to ensure the complete and just adjudication of the rights of those having an interest in the subject matter of the litigation. Cissell v. Bd. of Assmt. Appeals, 38 Colo. App. 560, 564 P.2d 124 (1977).
Joinder of indispensable parties required. An appeal must be perfected — as well as commenced — within the time period established. Part of the perfection of an appeal requires the joinder of indispensable parties. W. Brandt Found., Inc. v. Carper, 44 Colo. App. 137, 608 P.2d 355 (1978), rev'd on other grounds, 199 Colo. 334, 608 P.2d 339 (1980).
Joinder of board of assessment appeals required in action for review of a board of assessment appeals' decision. Capital Assoc. Intern. v. Arapahoe Comm'rs, 802 P.2d 1180 (Colo. App. 1990); Colo. Interstate Gas Co. v. Huddleston, 28 P.3d 958 (Colo. App. 2000).
C.R.C.P. 19 is inapplicable to proceedings under this article. Because the general assembly specifically has addressed the question of joinder in this section, C.R.C.P. 19 is not applicable in proceedings brought under the APA. Whether a person or organization meets the statutory requirement as a mandatory party in an action for judicial review depends on whether it should have been included in the administrative proceeding. Town of Frederick v. Colo. Water Quality Control Comm'n, 628 P.2d 129 (Colo. App. 1980), rev'd on other grounds, 641 P.2d 958 (1982).
Language of subsection (4) is mandatory in effect. Cissell v. Bd. of Assmt. Appeals, 38 Colo. App. 560, 564 P.2d 124 (1977); West-Brandt Found., Inc. v. Carper, 199 Colo. 334, 608 P.2d 339 (1980).
Mining reclamation board and the division of mined land reclamation are definite and distinct entities and the designation of the division as a party defendant in lieu of a designation of the board in a challenge to the board's issuance of a mining permit was a failure to join an indispensable party, since the board is an indispensable party to such an action. Cold Springs Ranch v. Dept. of Nat. Res., 765 P.2d 1035 (Colo. App. 1988).
Failure to join indispensable party requires dismissal. The failure to join an indispensable party in an action for review of an administrative proceeding is a defect of constitutional proportion requiring dismissal of the action. Cissell v. Bd. of Assmt. Appeals, 38 Colo. App. 560, 564 P.2d 124 (1977).
University is an indispensable party in employment dispute. The university of Colorado is an indispensable party required by this section to be joined in a suit seeking judicial review of a termination of employment at the university. Ricci v. State Pers. Bd., 44 Colo. App. 9, 605 P.2d 492 (1980).
Erroneous designation of agency, where not technical error, precludes determination of merits. Where a proceeding is not brought against the agency whose action is challenged by its official title, the issue is whether the error in designation is a mere technical error which should not preclude a determination of the issues on the merits. Spahn v. Dept. of Pers., 44 Colo. App. 446, 615 P.2d 66 (1980).
The designation of the state department of personnel instead of the state personnel board as the defendant in a suit by a party who had her employment terminated in a hearing before the state personnel board is not a mere technical error and, therefore, the district court should dismiss the complaint for failure to join an indispensable party. Spahn v. Dept. of Pers., 44 Colo. App. 446, 615 P.2d 66 (1980).
Class action relief can be sought for the first time on appeal where review is pursuant to this section. Rodgers v. Atencio, 43 Colo. App. 268, 608 P.2d 813 (1979).
VI. RELIEF GRANTED.
Section allows for declaratory and injunctive relief from an unconstitutional agency action as part of the APA review. Jeffrey v. Colo. Dept. of Soc. Servs., 198 Colo. 265, 599 P.2d 874 (1979).
Colorado department of social services is a party for purposes of an administrative proceeding conducted pursuant to this section and as such may be held liable for attorney's fees for asserting a frivolous defense. Colo. Dept. of Soc. Servs. v. Bethesda Care Ctr., Inc., 867 P.2d 4 (Colo. App. 1993).
But assessment of costs against state not allowed. Upon judicial review of administrative action, while subsection (7) permits the court "to afford such other relief as may be appropriate", this provision cannot be construed to authorize the assessment of costs against the state so as to take precedence over C.R.C.P. 54(d). Shumate v. State Pers. Bd., 34 Colo. App. 393, 528 P.2d 404 (1974).
There is no specific statutory provision allowing for the award of costs where an individual pursues his right to judicial review of an administrative hearing officer's actions under § 42-2-127 and this section; such an award is erroneous, because C.R.C.P. 54(d) limits the imposition of costs against the state to "the extent permitted by law". Lucero v. Charnes, 44 Colo. App. 73, 607 P.2d 405 (1980).
Jurisdiction of court to postpone action's effective date limited. The jurisdiction of a district court to postpone the effective date of an agency action is limited to proceedings taken in conjunction with an action for judicial review filed after final agency action. State Pers. Bd. v. District Court, 637 P.2d 333 (Colo. 1981).
There is no constitutional prohibition against requiring irreparable injury showing. Nothing in the constitution of Colorado, or that of the United States, prohibits the general assembly from requiring a showing of irreparable injury as a condition to be met before the postponement of the effective date of agency action shall be brought about. Theobald v. District Court, 148 Colo. 466, 366 P.2d 563 (1961).
Showing of irreparable injury constitutes only prerequisite to entry of stay. Under subsection (5), the only prerequisite to an entry of a stay of agency action is a finding that irreparable injury would otherwise result. Dept. of Rev. v. District Court, 193 Colo. 553, 568 P.2d 1157 (1977).
Where there is no showing of irreparable injury justifying the postponement of the effective date of an order of the director of revenue suspending a driver's license, and no notice to the director of an application for an order commanding him to restore the license pending determination of review proceedings, the district court is without authority to summarily order restoration of the license. Theobald v. District Court, 148 Colo. 466, 366 P.2d 563 (1961).
Section 39-21-105 does not expressly prohibit the entry of a stay as authorized by subsection (5). Dept. of Rev. v. District Court, 193 Colo. 553, 568 P.2d 1157 (1977).
Court may provide appropriate temporary relief for driver with suspended license. When a driver whose license has been suspended establishes that irreparable injury would otherwise result if the suspension were effective pending judicial review, a court may provide appropriate relief under subsection (5). Tomasi v. Thompson, 635 P.2d 538 (Colo. 1981).
Court cannot modify administrative relief awarded. To "postpone" the effective date of an agency action means only to hold back to a later time or to defer; it cannot be expanded to include a modification of the administrative relief awarded by substituting a period of restricted driving for a period of full suspension of driving privileges. Tomasi v. Thompson, 635 P.2d 538 (Colo. 1981).
Supreme court not to act as licensing board. It is not within the scope of judicial review for the supreme court to act as a professional licensing board. In re Maul v. State Bd. of Dental Exam'rs, 668 P.2d 933 (Colo. 1983).
Insurance companies allowed to increase rates approved by commissioner. Where a suit challenging an insurance premium rate increase has not been determined, companies can increase rates approved by the commissioner, since the commissioner can order refunds if the increase is held invalid, and since insurance companies would otherwise suffer irreparable injury if the increase were upheld. Nat'l Auto. Underwriters Ass'n v. District Court, 160 Colo. 467, 418 P.2d 52 (1966).
No further agency action once judicial review commenced. Once an action for judicial review had been commenced in the district court, the department of revenue has no jurisdiction to enter any further orders in the case until final disposition of the judicial proceedings and a remand of the case to the department, and may not stay an order of license revocation. Marr v. Dept. of Rev., 43 Colo. App. 36, 598 P.2d 155 (1979).
The district court did not err in considering complainant's claims under the judicial review principles of the APA and in remanding the case for further administrative proceedings. When considered in conjunction with § 24-4-105, the purpose of § 1-1.5-105 (3)(b), the so-called "adjudication clause"of the state version of the federal Help America Vote Act (HAVA), is to spare the secretary and persons filing administrative complaints under the state HAVA from having to observe the numerous, and somewhat complex, procedural requirements contained in § 24-4-105, and to curtail the administrative rights and obligations the parties would ordinarily have in adjudicatory proceedings. The court also rejected the secretary of state's assertion that, if a statute precludes the application of the administrative procedures under § 1-1.5-105, it necessarily precludes judicial review under the state APA. Accordingly, the district court had plenary authority under subsection (7) to review and remand this case for further proceedings if it concluded that the agency acted contrary to law. Marks v. Gessler, 2013 COA 115, 350 P.3d 883.
The exclusive administrative remedy clause under § 1-1.5-105 (3)(c) does not limit an aggrieved party's judicial remedies. The clause does not refer to a complainant's available judicial remedies; it refers only to the procedures that constitute the administrative remedy for a violation of title III of the federal HAVA. The plain meaning of "administrative remedy" does not include a judicial remedy. This interpretation is further supported by the appeals clause in § 1-1.5-105 (4), which allows a person aggrieved by a final determination of the secretary to appeal the decision to the district court, and thus, potentially obtain a judicial remedy. Marks v. Gessler, 2013 COA 115, 350 P.3d 883.
Although the APA rules and procedures do not apply to the secretary's resolution of a state HAVA administrative complaint at the agency level, the APA does apply to judicial review in the district court of the secretary's determination. Section 1-1.5-105 (3)(b) and (3)(c) exclude only the administrative procedure provisions set forth under § 24-4-105. They do not limit the availability of judicial remedies. At the agency level, a person filing a state HAVA administrative complaint is only entitled to administrative procedures and rights included in the state HAVA statute itself and is not entitled to or burdened by the additional administrative procedures, rights, and obligations provided under the APA. Marks v. Gessler, 2013 COA 115, 350 P.3d 883.
Complainant satisfied jurisdictional prerequisites for standing as well as the standing requirements to obtain judicial review of an agency action under the APA and the state HAVA. Complainant had legal standing to maintain her first claim for relief in which she sought judicial review under § 1-1.5-105 (4) and this section of the dismissal of her state HAVA complaint. Because complainant alleged that defendants deprived her of her legally protected interests in using the administrative complaint procedure to remedy violations of the federal HAVA and a hearing on the record in connection with her state HAVA administrative complaint, she has alleged a sufficient injury in fact. Injury in fact is also supported by complainant's allegations in her administrative complaint that she believed violations of title III of the federal HAVA occurred during the 2010 general election. Marks v. Gessler, 2013 COA 115, 350 P.3d 883.
Complainant also suffered an injury to a legally protected interest. Section 1-1.5-105 (2)(b) provides complainant with a right to file a state HAVA complaint and § 1-1.5-105 (2)(g) states that a complainant is entitled to a hearing on the record. In addition, complainant has a right under subsection (2) to seek judicial review of the agency action. Defendants' dismissal of her complaint for lack of standing violated her right to file a state HAVA complaint, and, therefore, she was adversely affected by the decision. Likewise, § 1-1.5-105 (4) also provides complainant with a right to seek judicial review of the decision. Marks v. Gessler, 2013 COA 115, 350 P.3d 883.
VII. RECORD ON REVIEW.
No time limitations relating to filing record. Subsection (6) does not contain any time limitations on filing a designation of record, objecting to or supplementing the record designated, or filing the record. Harris v. District Court, 655 P.2d 398 (Colo. 1982).
Party seeking review must order transcript to make it part of record. The party seeking review is required to order and pay for a transcript of an administrative hearing in order to make it part of the record for purposes of judicial review under this section. Harris v. District Court, 655 P.2d 398 (Colo. 1982).
However, when the party seeking review proceeds in forma pauperis, an alternative method of providing a record of the administrative proceedings may be allowed. Schaffes v. District Court, 719 P.2d 1088 (Colo. 1986); Earl v. District Court, 719 P.2d 321 (Colo. 1986).
Review by district court is limited to the record compiled by the agency. Stream v. Heckers, 184 Colo. 149, 519 P.2d 336 (1974).
In certiorari proceedings reviewing an administrative action, the trial court is confined to a review of the record of hearings before the agency. Bd. of County Comm'rs v. Simmons, 177 Colo. 347, 494 P.2d 85 (1972).
Remand is mandated where agency order is without findings. Where the civil service commission (now the department of personnel) modifies a dismissal order of the police chief without findings, the district court should remand to the commission (now department) to supply findings, because otherwise there can be no meaningful review on the merits. Lawless v. Bach, 176 Colo. 165, 489 P.2d 316 (1971).
Record may not include post-hearing matters. Complaints about other matters filed after the agency hearing upon which the board based its findings of fact and conclusions of law could not pertain to errors, omissions, and irregularities in the agency record, and may not be included in the record on appeal. Harris v. District Court, 655 P.2d 398 (Colo. 1982).
Hearing transcript made part of record considered. If a hearing transcript is ordered, paid for, and made part of the record on appeal, the reviewing court is required to consider it. Loesch v. Dept. of Rev., 194 Colo. 169, 570 P.2d 530 (1977).
Appellate court reviews record where lower court reviews only transcript and exhibits. Where a review of a dismissal action in a lower court is only of the transcript and exhibits presented at the agency hearing, the appellate court is in as good a position as the district court to review the record, and it need not remand the case to the lower court for a determination of whether the dismissal was supported by the requisite substantial evidence. Lassner v. Civil Service Comm'n, 177 Colo. 257, 493 P.2d 1087 (1972).
VIII. STANDARD OF REVIEW.
Standard of review in the consideration of agency rule-making is reasonableness. Amax, Inc. v. Water Quality Control Comm'n, 790 P.2d 879 (Colo. App. 1989); Brown v. Colo. Ltd. Gaming Control Comm'n, 1 P.3d 175 (Colo. App. 1999).
Under the applicable standard of review, the board of assessment appeals' exemption determination must be sustained if it has a reasonable basis in law and is supported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole. Bd. of Assessment Appeals v. AM/FM Int'l, 940 P.2d 338 (Colo. 1997); Pilgrim Rest Baptist Church, Inc. v. Prop. Tax Adm'r, 971 P.2d 270 (Colo. App. 1998); EchoStar Satellite, L.L.C. v. Arapahoe County Bd. of Equaliz., 171 P.3d 633 (Colo. App. 2007).
Valuation determinations of the board of assessment appeals will not be disturbed on review if the board's factual findings as to the appropriate valuation of the subject property are supported by competent and substantial evidence in the record as a whole. Home Depot USA, Inc. v. Pueblo County Bd. of Comm'rs, 50 P.3d 916 (Colo. App. 2002).
Rules adopted pursuant to a statutory rulemaking proceeding are presumed valid. Brown v. Colo. Ltd. Gaming Control Comm'n, 1 P.3d 175 (Colo. App. 1999).
Judicial review of state agency action under this section is the counterpart to judicial review of local government action under C.R.C.P. 106. Review of agency action, whether in the district court or the court of appeals, is essentially appellate in nature based on the board's administrative record. Bd. of Chiropractic Exam'rs v. Stjernholm, 935 P.2d 959 (Colo. 1997).
The board is collaterally estopped from relitigating, in a § 1983 action, the issue of a summary license suspension decided between the same parties in an earlier proceeding in the absence of new circumstances and a finding by the board that an emergency exists. Bd. of Chiropractic Exam'rs v. Stjernholm, 935 P.2d 959 (Colo. 1997).
Burden on challenging party to establish invalidity of rules adopted pursuant to a statutory rule-making proceeding by demonstrating that the rule-making body acted in an unconstitutional manner, exceeded its statutory authority, or otherwise acted in a manner contrary to statutory requirements. Amax, Inc. v. Water Quality Control Comm'n, 790 P.2d 879 (Colo. App. 1989); Wine & Spirits Wholesalers v. Colo. Dept. of Rev., 919 P.2d 894 (Colo. App. 1996); Brown v. Colo. Ltd. Gaming Control Comm'n, 1 P.3d 175 (Colo. App. 1999).
Agency rules are presumed valid and a plaintiff challenging a rule must establish the invalidity of the rule by demonstrating that the rule-making body exceeded its statutory authority. An agency's construction of its own governing statute is entitled to great weight. Mile High Greyhound Park v. Racing Comm'n, 12 P.3d 351 (Colo. App. 2000).
A reviewing court may reverse an administrative agency's determination if the court finds that the agency acted in an arbitrary and capricious manner, made a determination that is unsupported by the evidence in the record, erroneously interpreted the law, or exceeded its constitutional or statutory authority. Ohlson v. Weil, 953 P.2d 939 (Colo. App. 1997).
The ultimate determination as to the appropriate classification of property for property tax purposes involves mixed issues of law and fact. Under the applicable standard of review, the board of assessment appeal's property classification determination must be sustained by the appellate court if it has a reasonable basis in law and is supported by substantial evidence in the record considered as a whole. E.R. Southtech, Ltd. v. Arapahoe County Bd. of Equaliz., 972 P.2d 1057 (Colo. App. 1998); Farny v. Bd. of Equaliz., 985 P.2d 106 (Colo. App. 1999); Home Depot USA, Inc. v. Pueblo County Bd. of Comm'rs, 50 P.3d 916 (Colo. App. 2002).
Board of assessment appeals can consider reasonable inferences and circumstances tending to weaken or discredit uncontroverted evidence of a single party. Weingarten v. Bd. of Assessment Appeals, 876 P.2d 118 (Colo. App. 1994).
Board of assessment appeals' property tax classification determination must be sustained if it has a reasonable basis in law and is supported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole. Johnston v. Park County Bd. of Equaliz., 979 P.2d 578 (Colo. App. 1999); Home Depot USA, Inc. v. Pueblo County Bd. of Comm'rs, 50 P.3d 916 (Colo. App. 2002).
Board of assessment appeals' factual determination as to the appropriate valuation of a parcel may not be disturbed on review where it is supported by competent and substantial evidence in the record as a whole. Steamboat Ski & Resort Corp. v. Routt County Bd. of Equaliz., 23 P.3d 1258 (Colo. App. 2001).
In determining whether an administrative agency's decision is arbitrary or capricious, the court must determine whether a reasonable person, considering all of the evidence in the record, would fairly and honestly be compelled to reach a different conclusion. If not, no abuse of discretion has occurred and the agency decision must be upheld. Ramseyer v. Colo. Dept. of Soc. Servs., 895 P.2d 1188 (Colo. App. 1995); WCC v. Umetco Minerals, 919 P.2d 887 (Colo. App. 1996).
District court has no jurisdiction to interfere with officers of the executive branch of government whose duties are imposed by statute, because such action constitutes direct and unjustified judicial interference with a function properly delegated to the executive department. Colo. Dept. of Rev. v. District Court, 172 Colo. 144, 470 P.2d 864 (1970).
District courts do not have jurisdiction to interfere with the executive branch of the government in the performance of its statutory duties. Moore v. District Court, 184 Colo. 63, 518 P.2d 948 (1974).
A court cannot substitute its judgment for that of an agency as to what is a reasonable penalty and the power to modify is not given to a reviewing court under subsection (7). Petersen v. Racing Comm'n, 677 P.2d 412 (Colo. App. 1983).
The district court cannot usurp the power of the state banking board to determine whether to grant a bank charter. Banking Bd. v. District Court, 177 Colo. 77, 492 P.2d 837 (1972).
District court cannot substitute its judgment for that of administrative tribunal when there is substantial evidence in record to support tribunal's decision. Inst. for Research v. Bd. of Assessment Appeals, 748 P.2d 1346 (Colo. App. 1987).
Weighing evidence and resolving conflicts is the task of the administrative agency, not the reviewing court. Bd. of Assessment Appeals v. Arlberg Club, 762 P.2d 146 (Colo. 1988).
Agency decision may be set aside only upon the grounds that it is arbitrary and capricious or it is unsupported by any competent evidence. Bd. of Assessment Appeals v. Arlberg Club, 762 P.2d 146 (Colo. 1988); Denver v. Bd. of Assessment Appeals, 802 P.2d 1109 (Colo. App. 1990).
A reviewing court may not reverse the decision of an agency unless the court finds it to be arbitrary and capricious or contrary to rule or law. Kramer v. Colo. Dept. of Rev., 964 P.2d 629 (Colo. App. 1998).
An agency interpretation that is not only in conformity with the relevant statutory provisions but is reasonably supported by the agency's reasoning and the record is entitled to deference. Dept. of Rev. v. Woodmen of the World, 919 P.2d 806 (Colo. 1996); Kramer v. Colo. Dept. of Rev., 964 P.2d 629 (Colo. App. 1998).
Because the fire and police pension association is not an agency of state government, the standard of review of a decision of the association is not whether there is "substantial evidence" under subsection (7), but rather, whether there is "no competent evidence" under C.R.C.P. 106(a)(4), to support the decision. Pueblo v. Fire & Police Pension Ass'n, 827 P.2d 597 (Colo. App. 1992); Wine & Spirits Wholesalers v. Colo. Dept. of Rev., 919 P.2d 894 (Colo. App. 1996).
Where evidence is conflicting, the hearing officer's finding is binding on appeal, and a reviewing court may not substitute its judgment for that of the fact finder. Marek v. Dept. of Rev., 709 P.2d 978 (Colo. App. 1985); Glasmann v. Dept. of Rev., 719 P.2d 1096 (Colo. App. 1986).
Record as a whole substantially supported the racing commission's order, and, therefore, the agency's decision must be upheld. Partridge v. State, 895 P.2d 1183 (Colo. App. 1995).
Court properly exercised its judicial review function where record of rule-making proceeding supports the adoption of the rule. City of Aurora v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 785 P.2d 1280 (Colo. 1990).
Administrative decision set aside where unsupported by competent evidence. In order for a court to set aside a decision of an administrative body on the ground that it is arbitrary and capricious, the court must find that the decision is unsupported by any competent evidence. Bd. of County Comm'rs v. Simmons, 177 Colo. 347, 494 P.2d 85 (1972); Dolan v. Rust, 195 Colo. 173, 576 P.2d 560 (1978); Noe v. Dolan, 197 Colo. 32, 589 P.2d 483 (1979); Bd. of County Comm'rs v. Bd. of Assmt. Appeals, 628 P.2d 156 (Colo. App. 1981); Mertsching v. Webb, 757 P.2d 1102 (Colo. App. 1988).
A trial court may not set aside the decision of an administrative body as arbitrary and capricious unless the decision is unsupported by competent evidence. Guildner Way, Inc. v. Bd. of Adjustment, 35 Colo. App. 70, 529 P.2d 332 (1974).
Hearing officer wrongly denied licensee access to documents considered by the agency. The state administrative procedure act requires that the record include copies of all exhibits and other papers. Gilbert v. Julian, 230 P.3d 1218 (Colo. App. 2009).
Abuse of discretion by board of assessment appeals exists where board failed to consider evidence of value of similar properties in other counties in Colorado and other states for purposes of property tax assessment. Platinum Props. Corp. v. Bd. of Assess. App., 738 P.2d 34 (Colo. App. 1987); Sonnenberg & Sons v. Bd. of Assess. App., 768 P.2d 748 (Colo. App. 1988).
Because specialty board certification exceeds the requirements for licensure of a physician, the board of medical examiners acted outside of its statutory authority in imposing such a requirement as a condition of license reinstatement. Lopez-Samoyoa v. Bd. of Med. Exam., 868 P.2d 1110 (Colo. App. 1993).
Courts cannot interfere with zoning decisions unless record shows clear abuse of discretion. Bd. of County Comm'rs v. Simmons, 177 Colo. 347, 494 P.2d 85 (1972).
Abuse of discretion not shown where factual question debatable. Where the question of whether the character of a neighborhood has changed sufficiently to justify a change in zoning is fairly debatable and the zoning decision of the board of county commissioners is supported by competent evidence, the record does not show a clear abuse of discretion. Bd. of County Comm'rs v. Simmons, 177 Colo. 347, 494 P.2d 85 (1972).
Agency action to be supported by substantial evidence when record considered as whole. This section requires agency action to be supportable by substantial evidence when the record is considered as a whole; if there is only some evidence in some particulars, it is insufficient to justify an affirmance of discharge of a civil service employee. Lassner v. Civil Service Comm'n, 177 Colo. 257, 493 P.2d 1087 (1972).
The hearing panel's findings of basic facts must be rejected if they are unsupported by substantial evidence when the record is considered as a whole or if they are not supported by competent evidence in the record. Ricci v. Davis, 627 P.2d 1111 (Colo. 1981).
Facts were sufficient to support, by a preponderance of the evidence, a finding of child abuse; therefore, record on the whole supports the findings of fact and the district court judgment and final agency order shall not be disturbed on review. M.G. v. Colo. Dept. of Human Servs., 12 P.3d 815 (Colo. App. 2000).
The imposition of sanctions is a discretionary function that cannot be overturned unless it is an abuse of that discretion. As long as the record as a whole provides sufficient evidence that the penalty is not manifestly excessive in relation to the misconduct and the public need, the penalty will be upheld. The "reasonable basis" standard does not apply to the review of an agency's imposition of sanctions. Colo. Real Estate Comm'n v. Hanegan, 947 P.2d 933 (Colo. 1997); Ainsworth v. Colo. Ltd. Gaming Control Comm'n, 45 P.3d 768 (Colo. App. 2001).
Effect of substantial evidence supporting agency action. Where appellate review of the record shows "substantial evidence" to support the decision of an administrative hearing officer, the existence of such evidence renders an appellant's claim of an unduly restrictive standard of review by the district court devoid of merit. DeScala v. Motor Vehicle Div., 667 P.2d 1360 (Colo. 1983).
Doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel applicable. While the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel were developed in the context of judicial proceedings, it is now well accepted that in a proper case they may be applied to administrative proceedings as well. Umberfield v. Sch. Dist. No. 11, 185 Colo. 165, 522 P.2d 730 (1974).
Where a teacher has a full adversary hearing before a teacher tenure panel, which has the power to determine all his claims of religious discrimination, the doctrine of res judicata operates as a bar to the relitigation of issues before the civil rights commission which the teacher raises or could raise in the hearing before that panel and on judicial review. Umberfield v. Sch. Dist. No. 11, 185 Colo. 165, 522 P.2d 730 (1974).
Where an agency's interpretation of a regulation clearly contradicts that agency's consistent practice, the agency's practices and not its interpretation should prevail. Geriatrics, Inc. v. Dept. of Soc. Servs., 712 P.2d 1035 (Colo. App. 1985).
Determination held to be supported by substantial evidence. Geriatrics, Inc. v. Dept. of Health, 650 P.2d 1288 (Colo. App. 1982), aff'd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 699 P.2d 952 (Colo. 1985); Pub. Emp. Ret. Ass'n v. Stermole, 874 P.2d 444 (Colo. App. 1993).
School board found to have abused its discretion in dismissing teacher. Hudson v. Bd. of Educ., 655 P.2d 853 (Colo. App. 1982).
Whether PUC "regularly pursued its authority" pursuant to subsection (7) depends on several factors including whether: The decision is based on evidence introduced at evidence gathering stage of process; the PUC order is supported by findings of fact; the PUC supplied legislative standards guiding its decision-making function; and the PUC acted within authority conferred on it. Home Builders Ass'n v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 720 P.2d 552 (Colo. 1986); Colo. Office of Consumer Counsel v. Mtn. States Tel. & Tel. Co., 816 P.2d 278 (Colo. 1991).
State pharmacy board (Board) did not exceed its statutory authority pursuant to subsection (7) in promulgating rule prohibiting pharmacists from dispensing prescription drugs resulting from internet-based questionnaires, internet-based consultation, or telephonic consultation without a valid preexisting patient-practitioner relationship. Court rejects appellants' claims that a determination of whether a valid preexisting patient-practitioner relationship (1) necessarily involves knowledge of the Medical Practice Act and the rules promulgated by the Colorado state board of medical examiners (BME), (2) is beyond the expertise of individual pharmacists and the Board, and (3) improperly injects the Board into areas that are properly regulated by the BME. Brighton Pharmacy, Inc. v. Colo. State Pharmacy Bd., 160 P.3d 412 (Colo. App. 2007).
Department of health care policy and financing's rules denying spouse of institutionalized man a community spouse monthly income allowance are contrary to federal law and, therefore, may not be applied. Koehler v. Colo. Dept. of Health Care Policy & Fin., 252 P.3d 1174 (Colo. App. 2010).
An agency's failure to comply with its own regulations constitutes arbitrary and capricious conduct; however, any impropriety in the administrative process will not require reversal unless a plaintiff can demonstrate prejudice. Rags Over Ark. River v. Parks & Wildlife Bd., 2015 COA 11M, 360 P.3d 186.
District court erred to the extent that it reweighed evidence and made credibility determinations based on information outside an administrative record. The administrative record did not contain any evidence regarding prior condemnation cases involving a municipal water delivery project at issue. Moreover, the state's water quality control commission (commission) and not the district court is tasked with determining the weight and credibility of the evidence. Thus, it was for the commission to determine the weight and impact of any proposed future mitigation efforts agreed to by participants in the project. Chostner v. Colo. Water Quality Control Comm'n, 2013 COA 111, 327 P.3d 290.
There is substantial evidence in the record to support the commission's conclusion that a conditional certification of a municipal water delivery project under § 401 of the federal Clean Water Act by the water quality control division (division) meets the federal standard of providing reasonable assurance that the project will be conducted in a manner that will not violate applicable water quality standards. Chostner v. Colo. Water Quality Control Comm'n, 2013 COA 111, 327 P.3d 290.
District court erred in determining that the methodology selected and applied by the division in conditionally certifying a municipal water delivery project under § 401 of the federal Clean Water Act, and affirmed by the commission, was arbitrary and capricious. Because commission is the agency tasked with administrative review of § 401 certifications, and given the technical nature of the review, appellate court defers to commission's interpretation of its regulations. Commission's interpretative conclusions are neither unreasonable nor plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the 401 certification or antidegradation regulations. Although the district court disagreed with conclusions drawn from evidence presented and appeared not to credit testimony of division employee responsible for certification review, it is not the prerogative of the reviewing court to weigh the evidence. Under subsection (7), it is for the commission to resolve any conflicts in the testimony and to weigh the evidence presented. It is also not the role of the reviewing court to choose among alternative methodologies. That is the function of the commission. Rather, the role of the reviewing court is limited to determining whether the commission's decision is consistent with its regulations and supported by the record. Chostner v. Colo. Water Quality Control Comm'n, 2013 COA 111, 327 P.3d 290.
Administrative record supports findings of commission. There is substantial evidence in the administrative record to support commission's conclusion that the division complied with the public notice requirements specified in the commission's regulations and conducted antidegredation reviews. Consequently, the district court erred in finding that the division failed to conduct antidegradation reviews of the reviewable stream segments. The administrative record demonstrates that the division appropriately interpreted and applied the regulations and guidance governing the methodologies for antidegredation analysis. Commission correctly concluded that the division was not required to develop total maximum daily loads (TDMLs) for certain impaired stream segments before issuing its 401 certification. Accordingly, district court erred in concluding that a TDML was required and that division was required to assess potential impacts of future population growth as part of its section 401 review process. Thus, the commission's finding on these issues were neither arbitrary and capricious nor contrary to law. Chostner v. Colo. Water Quality Control Comm'n, 2013 COA 111, 327 P.3d 290.
24-4-107. Application of article.
This article applies to every agency of the state having statewide territorial jurisdiction except those in the legislative or judicial branches, courts-martial, military commissions, and arbitration and mediation functions. It applies to every other agency to which it is made to apply by specific statutory reference; but, where there is a conflict between this article and a specific statutory provision relating to a specific agency, such specific statutory provision shall control as to such agency.
Source: L. 59: p. 166, §6. CRS 53: § 3-16-6. C.R.S. 1963: § 3-16-6. L. 69: p. 91, § 7.
ANNOTATION
The State Administrative Procedure Act (APA) applies to the review of rules adopted by the ground water commission. Colo. Ground Water Comm'n v. Eagle Peak Farms, 919 P.2d 212 (Colo. 1996); Parrish v. Water Quality Control Div., 934 P.2d 913 (Colo. App. 1997).
Notice requirements for county liquor license suspension proceedings governed by state provisions. Since the general assembly has not adopted legislation requiring that license suspension proceedings by a county be conducted pursuant to the APA and since a county does not have statewide jurisdiction, the notice requirements for a county proceeding for the suspension of a liquor license are governed by the state liquor code. Chroma Corp. v. County of Adams, 36 Colo. App. 345, 543 P.2d 83 (1975).
When there is a conflict between provisions of the APA and a specific statutory provision relating to a specific agency, the specific statutory provision is deemed controlling in professional disciplinary proceedings before the board of medical examiners. State Bd. of Med. Exam'rs v. Reiner, 786 P.2d 499 (Colo. App. 1989).
The APA does not conflict with, but rather supplements, the appeal procedures set forth in the Colorado Partnership for Quality Jobs and Services Act (Partnership Act). The APA fills the procedural gap left by the Partnership Act when the division of labor standards and statistics assigns a hearing officer to decide an appeal of the state personnel director's coverage decision under §§ 24-50-1106 (4) and 24-50-1115 (1). Colo. Workers for Innovative v. Gherardini, 2023 COA 80, 540 P.3d 950.
No conflict is found between §§ 39-21-105 and 24-4-106 (5) where none plainly appears. Dept. of Rev. v. District Court, 193 Colo. 553, 568 P.2d 1157 (1977).
Air pollution (now air quality) control commission is an "agency" under this section and is subject to the provisions of the APA. CF&I Steel Corp. v. Colo. Air Pollution Control Comm'n, 199 Colo. 270, 610 P.2d 85 (1980).
Fire and police pension association board is not an "agency" for purposes of the APA. Ross v. Fire & Police Pension Ass'n, 713 P.2d 1304 (Colo. 1986).
County cannot challenge rule promulgated by state board of social services. This article is inapplicable in determining whether a county, through its board of commissioners, while not engaged in rule-making, has standing to challenge a rule promulgated by the state board of social services fixing the salaries of county welfare department employees. Bd. of County Comm'rs v. Bd. of Soc. Servs., 186 Colo. 435, 528 P.2d 244 (1974) (decided prior to 1979 amendment of § 24-4-106).
Provisions on marketing orders supersede administrative provisions. The specific procedural requirements for the issuance and administration of marketing orders, as set forth in agricultural marketing act, supersede the general procedure of the administrative code as dictated by stated legislative intent. Shoenberg Farms, Inc. v. People ex rel. Swisher, 166 Colo. 199, 444 P.2d 277 (1968).
Provisions concerning property tax administration in §§ 39-2-117 and 39-2-125 supersede administrative provisions. Colo. Rocky Mtn. Sch., Inc., v. Shriver, 689 P.2d 651 (Colo. App. 1984).
Where provisions of public utilities law and the APA conflict, the former governs. Home Builders Ass'n v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 720 P.2d 552 (Colo. 1986).
The provisions of §§ 1-40-101 and 1-40-102, rather than the provisions of the APA, govern the initiative title setting board's action in fixing the title, ballot title and submission clause, and summary of a proposed initiative measure. In re Proposed Initiative Entitled W.A.T.E.R., 831 P.2d 1301 (Colo. App. 1992).
The 30-day deadline set forth in § 25-8-404, rather than the 35-day deadline under the APA, governs the window of time for seeking judicial review of a water quality control order. Peabody Sage Creek Min. v. Pub. Health, 2020 COA 127, 484 P.3d 730.
The initiative title setting review board is not acting in an adjudicative or rule-making capacity when it holds a meeting for designating and fixing a title, ballot title and submission clause, and summary. In this context, it is a special statutory body governed by initiative and referendum statutes rather than the APA. Matter of Title, Ballot Title et al., 831 P.2d 1301 (Colo. 1992).
Administrative provisions inapplicable to board of accountancy proceedings. The notice and hearing requirements of § 24-4-104 (3) are of no significance where there is a specific statutory provision concerning the notice and hearing requirements in proceedings before the board of accountancy. People ex rel. Bd. of Accountancy v. McFarland, 37 Colo. App. 93, 543 P.2d 112 (1975).
Former § 12-2-125 (2) (now repealed) required that the person charged be served at least 30 days before the hearing with a written notice stating the nature of the charges against the accused and the time and place of the hearing before the board on such charges. This provision was in conflict with the more detailed notice requirements of the APA. Therefore, the notice requirements of the former provision controlled. Hentges v. Bartsch, 35 Colo. App. 384, 533 P.2d 66 (1975).
And to city's supplying out-of-city customers with water. Denver's action in supplying customers outside the city does not subject the board of water commissioners to the notice and hearing requirements of § 24-4-105. Cottrell v. City & County of Denver, 636 P.2d 703 (Colo. 1981).
The APA does not apply to a board of county commissioners when the board does not have statewide territorial jurisdiction and no statute explicitly states that APA requirements apply to the board. Moss v. Bd. of County Comm'rs for Boulder County, 2015 COA 35, 411 P.3d 918.
Review of quasi-judicial action would ordinarily be brought pursuant to C.R.C.P. 106(a)(4) and not the APA. Moss v. Bd. of County Comm'rs for Boulder County, 2015 COA 35, 411 P.3d 918.
The department of state clearly meets APA's definition of a state agency. Marks v. Gessler, 2013 COA 115, 350 P.3d 883.
Applied in Lontine v. VanCleave, 483 F.2d 966 (10th Cir. 1973); Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Dept. of Rev., 628 P.2d 85 (Colo. 1981); Colo. Water Quality Control Comm'n v. Town of Frederick, 641 P.2d 958 (Colo. 1982); Citizens for Free Enter. v. Dept. of Rev., 649 P.2d 1054 (Colo. 1982).
24-4-108. Legislative consideration of rules. (Repealed)
Source: L. 79: Entire section added, p. 846, § 3, effective July 1. L. 80: (2)(c) repealed, p. 289, § 3, effective April 13; (2)(b) repealed, p. 292, § 3, effective April 16; (6)(g) added and (2)(a) repealed, p. 287, §§ 2, 3, effective April 16. L. 81: (3)(a) repealed and (6.1) added, p. 1148, §§ 3, 2, effective April 24; (3)(d) repealed and (6.1) added, p. 1149, §§ 3, 2, effective May 28; (3)(b) repealed, p. 272, § 2, effective June 5; (7) amended and (3)(c), (6)(f), (6)(g), (6)(h), and (6.1) repealed, pp. 1145, 1146, §§ 1, 7, effective July 1; (8) amended, p. 1178, § 7, effective July 1. L. 82: (4)(a) repealed, p. 199, § 2, effective March 11; (4)(b) repealed, p. 201, § 2, effective April 27; (4)(c) repealed, p. 203, § 2, effective March 13. L. 83: (5)(b) repealed, p. 304, § 2, effective May 20; (5)(a) repealed, p. 306, § 2, effective May 25; (5)(c) repealed, p. 309, § 2, effective May 26; (5)(d) repealed, p. 308, § 2, effective June 1. L. 84: (6)(b) repealed, p. 260, § 2, effective March 29; (6)(e) repealed, p. 259, § 2, effective April 5; (6)(d) repealed, p. 258, § 2, effective April 9. L. 2016: (8) amended, (HB 16-1192), ch. 83, p. 234, § 16, effective April 14. L. 2022: Entire section repealed, (SB 22-091), ch. 28, p. 168, § 2, effective August 10.
24-4-109. State engagement of disproportionately impacted communities - definitions.
(1) Goal. The goal of outreach to and engagement of disproportionately impacted communities is to build trust and transparency, provide meaningful opportunities to influence public policy, and modify proposed state action in response to received public input to decrease environmental burdens or increase environmental benefits for each disproportionately impacted community.
(2) Definitions.
(a) (I) (A) All statewide agencies shall use the definition of disproportionately impacted community set forth in subsection (2)(b)(II) of this section.
(B) In applying the definition of disproportionately impacted community, a statewide agency may prioritize or target certain criteria of the definition of disproportionately impacted community or certain subsets of communities that meet the definition of disproportionately impacted community if the statewide agency makes a determination by rule or other public decision-making process that the prioritization or targeting is warranted and reasonably tailored to the category of statewide agency action involved. A statewide agency with rulemaking authority shall make the determination by rule.
(C) A determination of the public utilities commission that it will prioritize or target certain criteria of the definition of disproportionately impacted community or subsets of communities that meet the definition of disproportionately impacted community does not constitute any prejudice or disadvantage or any unreasonable difference as set forth in section 40-3-106 (1)(a).
(II) (Deleted by amendment, L. 2023.)
(b) As used in this section and sections 25-1-134 and 25-7-105 (1)(e), unless the context otherwise requires:
(I) "Agency" means the air quality control commission created in section 25-7-104 and, as used in this section and section 25-1-134, the water quality control commission created in section 25-8-201 (1)(a). The portions of this subsection (2)(b)(I) that apply to the water quality control commission are effective on July 1, 2023, except for the portions requiring the water quality control commission to effectuate the requirements of subsections (3)(b)(I), (3)(b)(II), (3)(b)(IV), and (3)(b)(V) of this section, which apply to any rule-making proceedings of the commission concerning the classifications and numeric standards for the South Platte river basin, Laramie river basin, Republican river basin, and Smoky Hill river basin that occur after June 8, 2022.
(II) "Disproportionately impacted community" means a community that is described in subsection (2)(b)(II)(G) or (2)(b)(II)(H) of this section or that is in a census block group, as determined in accordance with the five-year United States bureau of the census American community survey released no later than three years prior and meets one or more of the following criteria:
(A) The proportion of the population living in households that are below two hundred percent of the federal poverty level is greater than forty percent;
(B) The proportion of households that spend more than thirty percent of household income on housing is greater than fifty percent;
(C) The proportion of the population that identifies as people of color is greater than forty percent;
(D) The proportion of the population that is linguistically isolated is greater than twenty percent;
(E) A statewide agency determines, after a community presents evidence of being and requests to be classified as a disproportionately impacted community, that the population is disproportionately impacted based on evidence, presented in a relevant statewide agency decision-making process, that a census block group is disproportionately impacted because it has a history of environmental racism perpetuated through redlining or through anti-indigenous, anti-immigrant, anti-Latino, or anti-Black laws, policies, or practices and that present-day demographic factors and data demonstrate that the community currently faces environmental health disparities;
(F) The community is identified by a statewide agency as being one where multiple factors, including socioeconomic stressors, vulnerable populations, disproportionate environmental burdens, vulnerability to environmental degradation or climate change, and lack of public participation may act cumulatively to affect health and the environment and may contribute to persistent disparities;
(G) The community is a mobile home park, as defined in section 38-12-201.5 (6), regardless of whether the mobile home park is a census block group; or
(H) The community is located on the Southern Ute or Ute Mountain Ute Indian reservation, regardless of whether the community is a census block group;
(III) "Proposed state action" means:
(A) Rule-making proceedings held pursuant to section 24-4-103;
(B) Licensing proceedings, including the issuance and renewal of permits, held pursuant to section 24-4-104; and
(C) Adjudicatory hearings held pursuant to section 24-4-105.
(IV) "Statewide agency" means any board, bureau, commission, department, institution, division, section, or officer of the state. "Statewide agency" does not include:
(A) The legislative branch;
(B) The judicial branch;
(C) State educational institutions administered pursuant to title 23, except part 1 of article 8, parts 2 and 3 of article 21, and parts 2 to 4 of article 31 of title 23; or
(D) The adjutant general of the National Guard, whose powers and duties are set forth in section 28-3-106.
(3) Engagement.
(a) To promote the goal of state engagement of disproportionately impacted communities, an agency shall strive to create new ways to gather input from communities across the state, using multiple languages and multiple formats and transparently sharing information about adverse environmental effects from its proposed state action.
(b) When conducting outreach to and engagement of disproportionately impacted communities regarding a proposed state action, the agency shall:
(I) Schedule variable times of day and days of the week for opportunities for public input on the proposed state action, including at least one weekend time, one evening time, and one morning time for public input;
(II) Provide notice at least thirty days before any public input opportunity or before the start of any public comment period;
(III) Utilize several different methods of outreach and ways to publicize the proposed state action, including disseminating information through schools, clinics, social media, social and activity clubs, local governments, tribal governments, libraries, religious organizations, civic associations, community-based environmental justice organizations, or other local services;
(IV) Provide several methods for the public to give input, such as in-person meetings, virtual and online meetings, online comment portals or email, and call-in meetings;
(V) Consider using a variety of locations for public input on the proposed state action, including meeting locations in urban centers, in neighborhoods whose populations are predominantly Black, Indigenous, or people of color and have an average income below the state's average, and in rural locations in various regions of the state; and
(VI) Create outreach materials concerning the proposed state action in layperson's terms, translated into the top two languages spoken in a community, that inform people of opportunities to provide input on the proposed state action, their rights, the possible outcomes, and the upcoming public input process.
(4) The division of parks and wildlife created in section 33-9-104 shall, in conducting public outreach regarding the keep Colorado wild pass pursuant to section 33-12-108 (7):
(a) Include outreach to and engagement of disproportionately impacted communities with a goal to build trust and transparency, provide meaningful opportunities to influence public policy, and modify proposed state action in response to public input received to decrease environmental burdens or increase environmental benefits for each disproportionately impacted community; and
(b) Engage disproportionately impacted communities in accordance with the procedures set forth in subsection (3) of this section.
(5) (a) (I) The division of administration in the Colorado department of public health and environment shall administer the Colorado EnviroScreen tool so that a census block group that scores above the eightieth percentile in the Colorado EnviroScreen tool is presumed to be a disproportionately impacted community under subsection (2)(b)(II)(F) of this section. A statewide agency determining whether a community is a disproportionately impacted community under subsection (2)(b)(II)(F) of this section shall apply the most recent version of the Colorado EnviroScreen tool available at the time the statewide agency makes the determination.
(II) As used in this subsection (5)(a), "Colorado EnviroScreen tool" means the environmental justice mapping tool developed and administered by the department of public health and environment and Colorado state university, or any successor tool.
(b) A census block group that is within a census tract that qualifies as disadvantaged as determined under the climate and economic justice screening tool developed by the council on environmental quality in the office of the president of the Unites States is presumed to be a disproportionately impacted community under subsection (2)(b)(II)(F) of this section. A statewide agency determining whether a community is a disproportionately impacted community under subsection (2)(b)(II)(F) of this section shall apply the most recent version of the climate and economic justice screening tool available when it is determining whether a community is a disproportionately impacted community.
(6) The provisions of subsection (2)(b)(II) of this section are severable, and if any provision of subsection (2)(b)(II) of this section is found by a court of competent jurisdiction to be unconstitutional, the remaining provisions are valid, unless:
(a) It appears to the court that the valid provisions are so essentially and inseparably connected with, and so dependent on, the unconstitutional provision that it cannot be presumed that the legislature would have enacted the valid provisions without the unconstitutional one; or
(b) The court determines that the valid provisions, standing alone, are incomplete and are incapable of being executed in accordance with the legislative intent.
Source: L. 2021: Entire section added, (HB 21-1266), ch. 411, p. 2725, § 3, effective July 2; (4) added, (SB 21-249), ch. 273, p. 1587, § 2, effective September 7. L. 2022: (2)(b)(I) amended, (HB 22-1322), ch. 460, p. 3270, § 1, effective June 8. L. 2023: (2)(a) and (2)(b)(II) amended and (2)(b)(IV), (5), and (6) added, (HB 23-1233), ch. 245, p. 1328, § 14, effective May 23. L. 2024: IP(2)(b) and (2)(b)(I) amended, (HB 24-1338), ch. 259, p. 1720, § 5, effective May 28. L. 2026: IP(2)(b)(II) amended, (SB 26-101), ch. 140, p. 674, § 3, effective August 12.
Editor's note: Section 4(2) of chapter 140 (SB 26-101), Session Laws of Colorado 2026, provides that the act changing this section applies to conduct occurring on or after August 12, 2026.
Cross references: (1) For the short title ("Environmental Justice Act") and the legislative declaration in HB 21-1266, see sections 1 and 2 of chapter 411, Session Laws of Colorado 2021.
(2) For the legislative declaration in HB 23-1233, see section 1 of chapter 245, Session Laws of Colorado 2023. For the legislative declaration in SB 26-101, see section 1 of chapter 140, Session Laws of Colorado 2026.
PART 2
MILITARY OCCUPATIONAL STREAMLINING
Cross references: For the legislative declaration in HB 16-1197, see section 1 of chapter 190, Session Laws of Colorado 2016.
24-4-201. Definitions.
As used in this part 2, unless the context otherwise requires:
(1) "Authority to practice" or "authorized to practice" means the holding of a currently valid license to practice in an occupation or a currently valid certification or registration necessary to practice in an occupation if the person is licensed, certified, or registered.
(2) "Military occupational specialty" means the category or categories of special duties a member of the United States armed forces is trained to perform.
(3) "Occupation" means an occupation or profession that is licensed, certified, or registered under state statute.
(4) "State agency" means any department, division, board, or other agency of the state of Colorado that certifies, licenses, or registers an occupation.
Source: L. 2016: Entire part added, (HB 16-1197), ch. 190, p. 675, § 2, effective August 10.
24-4-202. Legislative declaration - reports.
(1) The general assembly intends that:
(a) Each state agency that authorizes more than ten occupations to practice or oversees other agencies that authorize more than ten occupations to practice should have implemented this part 2 for:
(I) At least twenty-five percent of the occupations by December 30, 2018;
(II) At least fifty percent of the occupations by December 30, 2020; and
(III) All of the occupations by December 30, 2022;
(b) Each state agency that authorizes ten or fewer occupations to practice or oversees other agencies that authorize ten or fewer occupations to practice should have implemented this part 2 for:
(I) At least fifty percent of the occupations by December 30, 2018; and
(II) All of the occupations by December 30, 2020.
(2) Repealed.
Source: L. 2016: Entire part added, (HB 16-1197), ch. 190, p. 675, § 2, effective August 10.
Editor's note: Subsection (2)(b) provided for the repeal of subsection (2), effective July 1, 2023. (See L. 2016, p. 675.)
24-4-203. Evaluation and implementation.
(1) Each agency shall:
(a) Document the following results and publish a summary of pathways available to a veteran to obtain authorization to practice an occupation:
(I) Evaluate the extent to which military training meets all or part of the state requirements to be authorized to practice an occupation;
(II) Identify reciprocity mechanisms with other states; and
(III) Determine if an occupational exam is available to authorize a veteran to practice an occupation;
(b) Consult with community colleges and other post-secondary educational institutions with regard to:
(I) Courses or programs to cover the gap between military occupational specialty training and the training required to be authorized to practice an occupation; and
(II) Refresher courses for the reinstatement of lapsed civilian credentials; and
(c) Consider adopting a national credentialing exam.
Source: L. 2016: Entire part added, (HB 16-1197), ch. 190, p. 676, § 2, effective August 10.
24-4-204. Consultation - cooperation.
(1) Each state agency may consult with any federal or state military official or agency, state agency, or post-secondary educational institution to determine how best to implement this part 2.
(2) Nothing in this part 2 gives a state agency authority to determine curriculum, programs, or courses offered at any post-secondary education institution.
Source: L. 2016: Entire part added, (HB 16-1197), ch. 190, p. 676, § 2, effective August 10.
ARTICLE 4.1
Crime Victim Compensation and Victim and Witness Rights
PART 1
CRIME VICTIM COMPENSATION ACT
24-4.1-100.1. Short title.
24-4.1-101. Legislative declaration.
24-4.1-102. Definitions.
24-4.1-103. Crime victim compensation board - creation.
24-4.1-104. District attorney to assist board.
24-4.1-105. Application for compensation.
24-4.1-106. Hearings.
24-4.1-107. Regulations.
24-4.1-107.5. Confidentiality of materials - definitions.
24-4.1-108. Approving compensation.
24-4.1-109. Losses compensable.
24-4.1-110. Recovery from collateral source.
24-4.1-111. Compensation to relatives.
24-4.1-112. Emergency approvals.
24-4.1-113. Fees.
24-4.1-114. Assignment, attachment, or garnishment of approved compensation.
24-4.1-114.5. Limitations on characterization of payment as income.
24-4.1-115. Survival of rights.
24-4.1-116. Subrogation.
24-4.1-116.5. Collection actions against crime victims - suspension.
24-4.1-117. Fund created - control of fund.
24-4.1-117.3. Crime victim services advisory board - creation - duties.
24-4.1-117.5. Standards for administration of funds - sanctions. (Repealed)
24-4.1-117.7. State crime victims compensation program - creation - appropriation.
24-4.1-118. Court executive custodian of fund - disbursements.
24-4.1-119. Costs and surcharges levied on criminal actions and traffic offenses - definition.
24-4.1-120. Effective dates of provisions of this article.
24-4.1-121. Repeal. (Repealed)
24-4.1-122. Reports.
24-4.1-123. When redistribution of moneys required. (Repealed)
24-4.1-124. State crime victim compensation fund - creation - allocation of moneys. (Repealed)
PART 2
COMPENSATION FROM BENEFITS OF CRIME
24-4.1-200.3. Definitions.
24-4.1-201. Distribution of profits from crime - escrow account - civil suit by victim.
24-4.1-202. Notification of board.
24-4.1-203. More than one claim.
24-4.1-204. Actions null and void.
24-4.1-205. Interest on moneys in the account.
24-4.1-206. Annual reports of funds.
24-4.1-207. Applicability.
PART 3
GUIDELINES FOR ASSURING THE RIGHTS OF VICTIMS OF AND WITNESSES TO CRIMES
24-4.1-300.1. Short title.
24-4.1-301. Legislative declaration.
24-4.1-302. Definitions.
24-4.1-302.5. Rights afforded to victims - definitions.
24-4.1-303. Procedures for ensuring rights of victims of crimes.
24-4.1-304. Child victim or witness - rights and services.
24-4.1-305. Disclosure by agent of defense-initiated victim outreach required - definition.
PART 4
CERTIFICATION OF CERTAIN FEDERAL IMMIGRATION FORMS
24-4.1-401. Definitions.
24-4.1-402. Immigration certification forms - completion deadlines.
24-4.1-403. Certification forms - signature requirement - limitation on factors for consideration.
24-4.1-404. Prohibition on disclosure of victim's immigration status.
24-4.1-405. Duty to inform victims.
24-4.1-406. Reports.
PART 5
BRAIN INJURY SUPPORT FOR VICTIMS OF VIOLENT CRIMES IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE
SYSTEM
24-4.1-501. Definitions.
24-4.1-502. Victims of a violent crime brain injury task force - established - duties - membership - report - repeal. (Repealed)
PART 1
CRIME VICTIM COMPENSATION ACT
24-4.1-100.1. Short title.
This part 1 shall be known and may be cited as the "Colorado Crime Victim Compensation Act".
Source: L. 82: Entire section added, p. 364, § 1, effective March 22. L. 84: Entire section amended, p. 657, § 5, effective May 14.
24-4.1-101. Legislative declaration.
The general assembly hereby finds that an effective criminal justice system requires the protection and assistance of victims of crime and members of the immediate families of such victims in order to preserve the individual dignity of victims and to encourage greater public cooperation in the apprehension and prosecution of criminal defendants. The general assembly hereby intends to provide protection and assistance to victims and members of the immediate families of such victims by declaring and implementing the rights of such persons and by lessening the financial burden placed upon victims due to the commission of crimes. This article shall be liberally construed to accomplish such purposes.
Source: L. 81: Entire article added, p. 1135, § 5, effective July 1. L. 92: Entire section amended, p. 415, § 1, effective January 14, 1993.
Cross references: For constitutional provisions relating to the rights of crime victims, see § 16a of article II, Colo. Const.; for statutory provisions relating to the rights of victims of and witnesses to crimes, see part 3 of this article.
24-4.1-102. Definitions.
As used in this part 1, unless the context otherwise requires:
(1) "Applicant" means any victim of a compensable crime who applies to the fund for compensation under this part 1. In the case of such a victim's death, the term includes any person who was the victim's dependent at the time of the death of that victim.
(1.3) "Assault by strangulation" means assault as described in section 18-3-202 (1)(g) or 18-3-203 (1)(i).
(2) "Board" means the crime victim compensation board in each judicial district.
(3) "Child" means an unmarried person who is under eighteen years of age. The term includes a posthumous child, a stepchild, or an adopted child.
(4) (a) "Compensable crime" means:
(I) An intentional, knowing, reckless, or criminally negligent act of a person or any act in violation of section 42-4-1301 (1) or (2) that results in residential property damage to or injury or death of another person or results in loss of or damage to eyeglasses, dentures, hearing aids, or other prosthetic or medically necessary devices and which, if committed by a person of full legal capacity, is punishable as a crime in this state; or
(II) An act in violation of section 42-4-1402 that results in the death or bodily injury of another person or section 42-4-1601, where the crash results in the death or bodily injury of another person.
(b) "Compensable crime" includes, but is not limited to, any state offense that is a crime pursuant to section 24-4.1-302 (1) and any federal offense that is comparable to those specified in subsection (4)(a) of this section and is committed in this state.
(5) (a) "Dependent" means relatives of a deceased victim who, wholly or partially, were dependent upon the victim's income at the time of death or would have been so dependent but for the victim's incapacity due to the injury from which the death resulted.
(b) "Dependent" also means a child or intimate partner of the accused or other person in an intimate relationship, as defined in section 18-6-800.3, with the accused, if the accused provided household support to the dependent.
(6) "Economic loss" means economic detriment consisting only of allowable expense, net income, replacement services loss, and, if injury causes death, dependent's economic loss. The term does not include noneconomic detriment.
(7) "Fund" means the crime victim compensation fund as established in each judicial district.
(7.5) "Household support" means the monetary support that a dependent would have received from the accused for the purpose of maintaining a home or residence and dependent care.
(8) "Injury" means impairment of a person's physical or mental condition and includes pregnancy.
(8.5) (a) "Property damage" means damage to windows, doors, locks, or other security devices of a residential dwelling and includes damage to a leased residential dwelling.
(b) "Property damage" also includes expenses related to the rekeying of a motor vehicle or other locks necessary to ensure a victim's safety and may include expenses incurred for a motor vehicle that is determined by law enforcement to be where a compensable crime was committed.
(9) "Relative" means a victim's intimate partner, parent, grandparent, stepfather, stepmother, child, grandchild, brother, sister, half brother, half sister, or spouse's parents. The term includes said relationships that are created as a result of adoption. In addition, "relative" includes any person who has a family-type relationship with a victim.
(9.5) "Replacement services loss" means expenses reasonably incurred in obtaining necessary services that an injured or deceased victim would otherwise have performed for the benefit of the victim's self or family, but not for income, if the victim had not been injured or died.
(10) (a) "Victim" means any of the following persons who suffer property damage, economic loss, injury, or death as a result of a compensable crime perpetrated or attempted in whole or in part in this state:
(I) Any person against whom a compensable crime is perpetrated or attempted. Such a person is a "primary victim".
(II) and (III) (Deleted by amendment, L. 2024.)
(b) "Victim" also means a person who suffers injury or death, the proximate cause of which is a compensable crime perpetrated or attempted in the person's presence against a primary victim. Such a person is a "secondary victim" and also includes:
(I) Any person who attempts to assist or assists a primary victim; or
(II) Any person who is a relative of a primary victim.
(c) "Victim" also means a person who is a resident of this state and who is a victim of a crime that occurred outside of this state, where the crime would be a compensable crime had it occurred in this state and where the state or country in which the crime occurred does not have a reasonably accessible crime victim compensation program for which the person would be eligible.
(d) "Victim" also means a person who is a resident of this state who is injured or killed by an act of international terrorism, as defined in 18 U.S.C. sec. 2331, committed outside of the United States.
Source: L. 81: Entire article added, p. 1135, § 5, effective July 1. L. 83: (4) and (10) amended and (8.5) added, pp. 669, 854, 1648, §§ 16, 1, 19, effective July 1. L. 84: IP(1) and (1) amended, p. 657, § 6, effective May 14. L. 85: (1) and (6) amended, p. 792, § 1, effective April 11. L. 90: (10) amended, p. 1179, § 1, effective July 1. L. 94: (4) amended, p. 2555, § 50, effective January 1, 1995. L. 95: (8) to (10) amended, p. 1400, § 1, effective July 1. L. 97: (4) and (10)(c) amended and (10)(d) added, p. 1560, § 3, effective July 1. L. 98: (10)(d) amended, p. 517, § 1, effective April 30. L. 99: (10)(d) amended, p. 58, § 10, effective March 15. L. 2015: (4)(a)(II), (5), and (8.5) amended and (7.5) added, (HB 15-1035), ch. 60, p. 143, § 1, effective March 30. L. 2021: (1.3) added, (HB 21-1165), ch. 129, p. 520, § 2, effective May 10. L. 2024: (1), (4)(a)(I), (4)(b), (5)(b), (7.5), (8.5)(b), (9), (10)(a), (10)(b), and (10)(c) amended and (9.5) added, (SB 24-120), ch. 177, p. 958, § 1, effective May 15. L. 2026: (4)(a)(II) amended, (HB 26-1237), ch. 117, p. 466, § 12, effective August 12.
Cross references: For the legislative declaration in HB 21-1165, see section 1 of chapter 129, Session Laws of Colorado 2021.
ANNOTATION
With regard to a victim compensation board's payment of a victim compensation claim, the definition of "victim" in this section prevails over the definition of "victim" in the general restitution statute, § 18-1.3-602 (10), because the definition in this section deals only with restitution payments made to a victim compensation board and is, therefore, the more specific statute. People v. Stone, 2020 COA 24, 471 P.3d 1159.
24-4.1-103. Crime victim compensation board - creation.
(1) There is hereby created in each judicial district a crime victim compensation board. Each board is composed of three members to be appointed by the district attorney. The district attorney shall designate one of the members as chairperson. To the extent possible, members shall fairly reflect the population of the judicial district.
(2) The term of office of each member of the board shall be three years; except that, of those members first appointed, one shall be appointed for a three-year term, one for a two-year term, and one for a one-year term. All vacancies, except through the expiration of term, shall be filled for the unexpired term only. Each member may be reappointed once and serve two consecutive terms. A person may be reappointed to the board thereafter if it has been at least one year since such person served on the board.
(3) Members of the board shall receive no compensation but are entitled to be reimbursed for travel expenses at the rate authorized for state employees.
(4) (a) Effective November 1, 2024, a crime victim compensation board for the twenty-third judicial district is created. The district attorney for the eighteenth judicial district shall appoint the initial board of three members, each of whom must be residents of Douglas, Elbert, or Lincoln counties. The district attorney for the eighteenth judicial district shall designate one of the members as the initial chair. After January 7, 2025, the district attorney for the twenty-third judicial district shall appoint board members for that judicial district, including any vacancies. To the extent possible, members must fairly reflect the population of the twenty-third judicial district.
(b) For the initial board, the term of office of each member of the twenty-third judicial district board is fourteen months. Thereafter, the term is three years; except that, of those members first appointed by the twenty-third judicial district attorney, the district attorney shall appoint one for a three-year term, one for a two-year term, and one for a one-year term. All other terms and vacancies must be consistent with subsection (2) of this section.
(c) The crime victim compensation board for the twenty-third judicial district shall begin awarding compensation to victims of crimes on or after January 7, 2025.
Source: L. 81: Entire article added, p. 1136, § 5, effective July 1. L. 90: (2) amended, p. 1179, § 2, effective July 1. L. 2024: (4) added, (HB 24-1013), ch. 43, p. 153, § 1, effective April 4; (1) amended, (SB 24-120), ch. 177, p. 960, § 2, effective May 15.
24-4.1-104. District attorney to assist board.
(1) The district attorney and the district attorney's legal and administrative staff shall assist the board in the performance of its duties pursuant to this part 1.
(2) Repealed.
Source: L. 81: Entire article added, p. 1137, § 5, effective July 1. L. 84: Entire section amended, p. 657, § 7, effective May 14. L. 2024: Entire section amended, (HB 24-1013), ch. 43, p. 154, § 2, effective April 4; entire section amended, (SB 24-120), ch. 177, p. 960, § 3, effective May 15.
Editor's note: (1) Amendments to this section by HB 24-1013 and SB 24-120 were harmonized.
(2) Subsection (2)(b) provided for the repeal of subsection (2), effective July 1, 2025. (See L. 2024, pp. 154, 960.)
24-4.1-105. Application for compensation.
(1) A person who may be eligible for compensation under this part 1 may apply to the board in the judicial district in which the crime was committed. In a case in which the person entitled to apply is a minor, the application may be made on the minor's behalf by the minor's parent or guardian. In a case in which the person entitled to apply is mentally incompetent, the application may be made on the person's behalf by the person's parent, conservator, or guardian or by any other individual authorized to administer the person's estate.
(2) (a) In order to be eligible for compensation under this part 1, the applicant shall submit reports, if reasonably available, from any physician who has treated or examined the victim at the time of or subsequent to the victim's injury or death. The report shall be in relation to the injury for which compensation is claimed. If, in the opinion of the board, reports on the previous medical history of the victim, a report on the examination of the injured victim, or the report on the cause of death of the victim by a medical expert would be of material aid to its determination, the board may order the reports.
(b) In order to be eligible for compensation for property damage under this part 1, the applicant shall submit a report or case number, if reasonably available, from a law enforcement agency which shall set forth the nature of the property damage which is the result of a compensable crime.
(3) If the applicant makes any false statement as to a material fact, the applicant is ineligible for approval pursuant to this part 1.
Source: L. 81: Entire article added, p. 1137, § 5, effective July 1. L. 83: (2) amended, p. 669, § 17, effective July 1. L. 84: Entire section amended, p. 657, § 8, effective May 14. L. 2024: (1) and (3) amended, (SB 24-120), ch. 177, p. 960, § 4, effective May 15.
ANNOTATION
A crime victim compensation board (CVCB) is not prohibited from compensating a crime victim for wages the victim expects to lose in the future. A CVCB may reimburse a crime victim for lost wages without specifying whether that amount includes only wages lost in the past, or wages that will be lost in the future. People v. Bohn, 2015 COA 178, 381 P.3d 335.
24-4.1-106. Hearings.
(1) The board, in its discretion, may conduct a hearing upon any application submitted to it. All hearings conducted by the board and appeals therefrom shall be held pursuant to sections 24-4-105 and 24-4-106.
(2) The burden of proof is upon the applicant to show that the claim is reasonable and is compensable under the terms of this part 1. The standard of proof is by a preponderance of the evidence.
(3) If a person has been convicted of an offense with respect to an act on which a claim is based, proof of that conviction shall be taken as conclusive evidence that the offense has been committed, unless an appeal or a proceeding with regard to it is pending. The fact that the identity of the assailant is unknown or that the assailant has not been prosecuted or convicted shall not raise a presumption that the claim is invalid.
(4) Orders and decisions of the board are final.
(5) Review of an order or decision of the board may be made in accordance with the Colorado rules of civil procedure.
Source: L. 81: Entire article added, p. 1137, § 5, effective July 1. L. 84: Entire section amended, p. 658, § 9, effective May 14.
ANNOTATION
A crime victim compensation board (CVCB) is not prohibited from compensating a crime victim for wages the victim expects to lose in the future. A CVCB may reimburse a crime victim for lost wages without specifying whether that amount includes only wages lost in the past, or wages that will be lost in the future. People v. Bohn, 2015 COA 178, 381 P.3d 335.
24-4.1-107. Regulations.
In the performance of its functions, the board, pursuant to article 4 of this title, is authorized to make, rescind, and amend regulations prescribing the procedures to be followed in the filing of applications and in proceedings under this part 1.
Source: L. 81: Entire article added, p. 1137, § 5, effective July 1. L. 84: Entire section amended, p. 658, § 10, effective May 14.
24-4.1-107.5. Confidentiality of materials - definitions.
(1) For purposes of this section, unless the context otherwise requires:
(a) "In camera review" means the judge views the material in private, without either party present.
(b) "Materials" means any records, claims, writings, documents, or information.
(2) Any materials received, made, or kept by a board or a district attorney to process a claim on behalf of a crime victim under this article are confidential. The district attorney shall have standing in any action to oppose the disclosure of any such materials. A board shall not provide through discovery in any civil or criminal action any exhibits, medical records, psychological records, counseling records, work records, criminal investigation records, criminal court case records, witness statements, telephone records, and other records of any type or nature whatsoever gathered for the purpose of evaluating whether to compensate a victim except:
(a) In the event of the review by the court of an order or decision of the board pursuant to section 24-4.1-106, and then only to the extent narrowly and necessary to obtain court review; or
(b) Upon a strict showing to the court in a separate civil or a criminal action that particular information or documents are known to exist only in board records. The court may inspect in camera such records to determine whether the specific requested information exists. If the court determines that the specific information sought exists in the board's records, the documents may then be released only by court order if the court finds as part of its order that the documents will not pose any threat to the safety or welfare of the victim or any other person whose identity may appear in the board's records, or violate any other privilege or confidentiality right.
(3) In a proceeding for determining the amount of restitution, if the defendant's request is not speculative and is based on an evidentiary hypothesis that warrants an in camera review to rebut the presumption established in section 18-1.3-603, C.R.S., the court may release additional information contained in the records of the board only after an in camera review and additionally finding that the information:
(a) Is necessary for the defendant to dispute the amount claimed for restitution; and
(b) Will not pose any threat to the safety or welfare of the victim, or any other person whose identity may appear in the board's records, or violate any other privilege or confidentiality right.
Source: L. 2000: Entire section added, p. 242, § 7, effective March 29. L. 2015: Entire section amended, (HB 15-1035), ch. 60, p. 144, § 2, effective March 30.
ANNOTATION
Because an in camera review of confidential or privileged records is only required when disclosure is "necessary" to resolve a pending issue, court did not err in denying defendant's request for in camera review of victim's mental health record. Defendant must show that his or her request is not speculative and that an evidentiary hypothesis would disprove all or part of the prosecution's restitution request on the basis that the requested amounts were not proximately caused by defendant's conduct. People v. Rivera, 250 P.3d 1272 (Colo. App. 2010).
24-4.1-108. Approving compensation.
(1) A person is entitled to approval of compensation under this part 1 if:
(a) The person is a victim or a dependent of a victim or a successor in interest under the "Colorado Probate Code" of a victim of a compensable crime which was perpetrated on or after July 1, 1982, and which resulted in a loss;
(b) The appropriate law enforcement officials were notified of the perpetration of the crime allegedly causing the death of or injury to the victim. The requirement to notify the appropriate law enforcement officials required by this subsection (1)(b) is satisfied if, as the result of the compensable crime that the application is being submitted for, the victim or applicant provides documentation that a forensic examination was conducted by a licensed or registered nurse or medical provider.
(c) The applicant has cooperated reasonably with law enforcement officials in the apprehension and prosecution of the assailant, or the board has found good cause exists for the failure to cooperate, or, if the applicant is a victim of assault by strangulation, the applicant cooperates with law enforcement by undergoing a medical forensic examination;
(d) Repealed.
(e) The death of or injury to the victim was not substantially attributable to the victim's wrongful act or substantial provocation of the victim's assailant; and
(f) The application for approval of compensation under this part 1 is filed with the board.
(1.5) A person is entitled to approval of compensation for property damage under this part 1 if:
(a) The person is a victim of a compensable crime which was perpetrated on or after July 1, 1983, and which resulted in property damage;
(b) The appropriate law enforcement officials were notified of the perpetration of the crime causing property damage within seventy-two hours after its perpetration, unless the board finds good cause exists for the failure of notification;
(c) The applicant has cooperated reasonably with law enforcement officials in the apprehension and prosecution of the assailant or the board has found that good cause exists for the failure to cooperate; and
(d) The application for approval of compensation for property damage under this part 1 is filed with the board within six months of the date of property damage or within such further extension of time as the board, for good cause shown, allows.
(2) The board may waive any of the requirements set forth in this section, or the limitations set forth in section 24-4.1-109 (1), or order a denial or reduction of an award if, in the interest of justice, it is so required.
(3) Upon a finding by the board that compensation should be approved, the board shall submit a payment request to the court executive, who shall remit payment in accordance with the payment request.
(4) Consistent with approved standards established pursuant to section 24-4.1-117.3 (3) for the administration of crime victim compensation funds, the board may develop policies to ensure that victims are compensated and to ensure that available money in the fund is not exceeded.
Source: L. 81: Entire article added, p. 1138, § 5, effective July 1. L. 83: (2)(a) and (1)(f) amended and (1.5) added, pp. 668, 669, 854, §§ 14, 18, 2, effective July 1. L. 84: IP(1), (1)(f), IP(1.5), and (1.5)(d) amended, pp. 658, 1120, §§ 11, 20, effective May 14. L. 85: (2) amended, p. 792, § 2, effective April 11. L. 89: (1)(d) repealed, p. 1016, § 3, effective April 23. L. 95: (4) added, p. 1401, § 2, effective July 1. L. 2009: (4) amended, (SB 09-047), ch. 129, p. 556, § 4, effective July 1. L. 2012: (1)(f) amended, (HB 12-1053), ch. 244, p. 1158, § 4, effective August 8. L. 2021: (1)(c) amended, (HB 21-1165), ch. 129, p. 520, § 3, effective May 10. L. 2024: IP(1), (1)(b), (1)(c), (1)(e), (1)(f), IP(1.5), (1.5)(c), (1.5)(d), (3), and (4) amended, (SB 24-120), ch. 177, p. 960, § 5, effective May 15.
Cross references: (1) For the "Colorado Probate Code", see articles 10 to 17 of title 15.
(2) For the legislative declaration in HB 21-1165, see section 1 of chapter 129, Session Laws of Colorado 2021.
24-4.1-109. Losses compensable.
(1) Losses compensable under this part 1 resulting from death of or injury to a victim include:
(a) Reasonable medical and hospital expenses and expenses incurred for dentures, eyeglasses, hearing aids, or other prosthetic or medically necessary devices;
(b) Loss of earnings;
(c) and (d) Repealed.
(d.5) Replacement services losses;
(e) Funeral and burial expenses;
(f) Loss of support to dependents;
(g) Mental health counseling;
(h) Household support; except that household support is only available to a dependent when:
(I) The offender is accused of committing the criminally injurious conduct that is the basis of the dependent's claim under this article;
(II) As a result of the criminal event, the offender vacated any home the offender shared with the dependent; and
(III) The dependent provides verification of dependency on the offender at the time of the criminal event.
(i) Reasonable travel expenses for a victim related to funeral, burial, medical care, mental health counseling, or traditional healing ceremonies, including as described in subsection (1)(m) of this section;
(j) Reasonable travel expenses for a victim related to attending critical events pursuant to section 24-4.1-302 (2), except when the primary or secondary victim is subpoenaed to testify;
(k) Dependent care services;
(l) Reasonable relocation expenses for a victim to relocate as necessary to ensure the victim's safety;
(m) Expenses for traditional Native American healing ceremonies and practices for persons who are indigenous as defined in section 24-33.5-2601, including, but not limited to:
(I) Traditional counseling and healing from an elder or spiritual healer;
(II) Traditional ceremonial practices;
(III) Ceremonial burials, including clothing for the deceased, meals, and other expenses related to traditional giveaway or gifting practices;
(IV) Child care during burial ceremonies; and
(V) Reimbursement for honoraria provided in connection with ceremonial services; and
(n) Reasonable travel expenses related to traditional Native American healing ceremonies and practices, as described in subsection (1)(m) of this section, for a victim who is indigenous, as defined in section 24-33.5-2601.
(1.5) (a) Losses compensable under this part 1 resulting from property damage include:
(I) (A) Repair or replacement of residential property damaged as a result of a compensable crime; or
(B) Payment of the deductible amount on a residential or motor vehicle insurance policy;
(II) Any modification to the victim's residence that is necessary to ensure victim safety;
(III) The rekeying of a motor vehicle or other lock that is necessary to ensure the victim's safety;
(IV) Towing or impound fees for a motor vehicle that law enforcement determines to be where a compensable crime was committed; and
(V) Repair or replacement of dentures, eyeglasses, hearing aids, or other prosthetic or medically necessary devices damaged or stolen as a result of a compensable crime.
(b) (Deleted by amendment, L. 98, p. 517, §2, effective April 30, 1998.)
(2) Compensable losses do not include:
(a) Pain and suffering or property damage expenses other than those specified in subsection (1.5)(a) of this section;
(b) Aggregate damages to the victim or to the dependents of a victim exceeding thirty thousand dollars; or
(c) Repealed.
(d) Motor vehicle expenses other than those specified in subsections (1.5)(a)(I)(B) and (1.5)(a)(III) of this section.
Source: L. 81: Entire article added, p. 1138, § 5, effective July 1. L. 83: (2)(a) and (2)(b) amended and (1.5) added, pp. 670, 854, §§ 19, 3, effective July 1. L. 84: Entire section amended, p. 659, § 12, effective May 14. L. 85: (1)(g) added, p. 792, § 3, effective June 6. L. 89: (1.5)(a)(II) amended, p. 1016, § 1, effective April 23. L. 93: (2) amended, p. 2051, § 1, effective June 9. L. 98: (1.5) and (2)(b) amended, p. 517, § 2, effective April 30. L. 2015: (1)(h) and (1.5)(a)(III) added, (1.5)(a)(I)(B), (1.5)(a)(II), (2)(a), and (2)(b) amended, and (2)(c) repealed, (HB 15-1035), ch. 60, p. 145, § 3, effective March 30. L. 2024: (1)(c) and (1)(d) repealed, (1)(d.5), (1)(i), (1)(j), (1)(k), (1)(l), and (2)(d) added, and (1)(e), (1.5)(a), (2)(a), and (2)(b) amended, (SB 24-120), ch.177, p. 961, § 6, effective May 15. L. 2026: (1)(i) and (1)(k) amended and (1)(m) and (1)(n) added, (SB 26-012), ch. 211, p. 1246, § 1, effective August 12.
ANNOTATION
A crime victim compensation board (CVCB) is not prohibited from compensating a crime victim for wages the victim expects to lose in the future. A CVCB may reimburse a crime victim for lost wages without specifying whether that amount includes only wages lost in the past, or wages that will be lost in the future. People v. Bohn, 2015 COA 178, 381 P.3d 335.
Because the general assembly did not include specific language prohibiting a CVCB from paying a claimant for wages that will be lost after the date of the CVCB's payments, the general assembly did not intend to prohibit the payment of future lost wages. People v. Bohn, 2015 COA 178, 381 P.3d 335.
24-4.1-110. Recovery from collateral source.
(1) The board may deduct from compensation it approves under this part 1 any payments received by the applicant from the offender or from a person on behalf of the offender, from the United States or any state, or any subdivision or agency thereof, from a private source, or from an emergency approval under this part 1 for injury or death compensable under this part 1, excluding death or pension benefits.
(2) If compensation is approved under this part 1 and the person receiving it also receives a collateral sum under subsection (1) of this section which has not been deducted from it, the person shall refund to the board the lesser of the sums or the amount of compensation paid to the person under this part 1 unless the aggregate of both sums does not exceed the person's losses. The fund is the payer of last resort.
(3) If a defendant is ordered to pay restitution under article 18.5 of title 16 to a person who has received compensation awarded under this part 1, an amount equal to the compensation approved must be transmitted from such restitution to the board for allocation to the fund.
Source: L. 81: Entire article added, p. 1139, § 5, effective July 1. L. 83: Entire section amended, p. 670, § 20, effective July 1. L. 84: (1)(b) amended, p. 659, § 13, effective May 14. L. 98: (3) amended, p. 823, § 33, effective August 5. L. 2000: (3) amended, p. 1051, § 20, effective September 1. L. 2006: (2) amended, p. 422, § 5, effective April 13. L. 2024: Entire section amended, (SB 24-120), ch. 177, p. 962, § 7, effective May 15.
24-4.1-111. Compensation to relatives.
(1) A relative of a victim, even though the relative was not a dependent of the victim, is eligible for compensation for reasonable medical, funeral, or burial expenses for the victim, if:
(a) Such expenses were paid by the relative; and
(b) The relative files a claim in the manner provided in this part 1.
Source: L. 81: Entire article added, p. 1139, § 5, effective July 1. L. 84: (1)(b) amended, p. 659, § 14, effective May 14. L. 2024: Entire section amended, (SB 24-120), ch. 177, p. 963, § 8, effective May 15.
24-4.1-112. Emergency approvals.
(1) The board may order an emergency approval to the applicant pending a final decision in the claim if it appears to the board, prior to taking action upon the claim, that undue hardship will result to the applicant if immediate payment is not made. Approvals pursuant to this section are intended to cover expenses incurred by crime victims in meeting their immediate short-term needs. The amount of an approval pursuant to this section must not exceed the amount set forth in the board's policies regarding emergency approvals and must be deducted from any final approval made as a result of the claim.
(2) If the amount of an emergency approval exceeds the sum the board would have approved pursuant to this part 1, such excess must be repaid by the recipient.
Source: L. 81: Entire article added, p. 1139, § 5, effective July 1. L. 84: (2) amended, p. 659, § 15, effective May 14. L. 98: (1) amended, p. 518, § 3, effective April 30. L. 2015: (1) amended, (HB 15-1035), ch. 60, p. 146, § 4, effective March 30. L. 2024: Entire section amended, (SB 24-120), ch. 177, p. 963, § 9, effective May 15.
24-4.1-113. Fees.
No fee may be charged to the applicant by the board in any proceeding under this article.
Source: L. 81: Entire article added, p. 1139, § 5, effective July 1.
24-4.1-114. Assignment, attachment, or garnishment of approved compensation.
No compensation payable under this article 4.1, prior to actual receipt thereof by the person or beneficiary entitled thereto or the person's or beneficiary's legal representative, is assignable or subject to execution, garnishment, attachment, or any other process, including process to satisfy an order or judgment for support or alimony.
Source: L. 81: Entire article added, p. 1139, § 5, effective July 1. L. 2024: Entire section amended, (SB 24-120), ch. 177, p. 963, § 10, effective May 15.
24-4.1-114.5. Limitations on characterization of payment as income.
No compensation payable to an applicant under this part 1 is included in the applicant's income for purposes of the Colorado income tax imposed in article 22 of title 39, nor is it considered as income, property, or support for the purposes of determining the eligibility of the applicant for public assistance or the amount of assistance payments pursuant to section 26-2-108.
Source: L. 83: Entire section added, p. 856, § 1, effective July 1. L. 84: Entire section amended, p. 659, § 16, effective May 14. L. 87: Entire section amended, p. 1452, § 28, effective June 22. L. 2024: Entire section amended, (SB 24-120), ch.177, p. 964, § 11, effective May 15.
ANNOTATION
Law reviews. For article, "Trust Protection of Personal Injury Recoveries from Public Creditors", see 19 Colo. Law. 2187 (1990).
24-4.1-115. Survival of rights.
The rights to compensation created by this part 1 are personal and shall not survive the death of the person or beneficiary entitled to them; except that, if death occurs after an application for compensation has been filed with the board, the proceeding shall not abate but may be continued by the legal representative of the decedent's estate.
Source: L. 81: Entire article added, p. 1139, § 5, effective July 1. L. 84: Entire section amended, p. 660, § 17, effective May 14.
24-4.1-116. Subrogation.
The acceptance of approved compensation made pursuant to this part 1 subrogates the state, to the extent of the approved amount, to any right or right of action accruing to the applicant.
Source: L. 81: Entire article added, p. 1139, § 5, effective July 1. L. 84: Entire section amended, p. 660, § 18, effective May 14. L. 2024: Entire section amended, (SB 24-120), ch.177, p. 964, § 12, effective May 15.
24-4.1-116.5. Collection actions against crime victims - suspension.
(1) A medical service provider or medical service provider billing agent shall suspend all debt collection actions against the claimant for a compensable loss under section 24-4.1-109 related to the substance of the claim pending a resolution of the claim by the board for a period of ninety days to allow an opportunity for the board to resolve the claim, if, within one hundred eighty days after date of services rendered as part of the criminal episode, the claimant files an application for a claim with the board pursuant to section 24-4.1-105 and:
(a) Provides written notice to the medical service provider or its billing agent that a claim has been submitted to the board, including a crime victim compensation claim number; and
(b) Authorizes the medical service provider or its billing agent to confirm with the board the claimant's claim status and date of resolution as it relates to the medical provider's specific debt.
(2) The provisions of this section apply only to the claimant and not to a collateral source on the claimant's behalf.
(3) The provisions of subsection (1) of this section:
(a) Do not require the deletion of the debt on the claimant's credit report if the debt had already been reported to one or more credit bureaus prior to notice of the victim compensation claim being received by the medical service provider or its billing agent.
(b) Do not apply to any debt where a lawsuit has been commenced against the claimant for the collection of the debt prior to notice of the victim compensation claim being received by the medical service provider or its billing agent.
Source: L. 2015: Entire section added, (HB 15-1035), ch. 60, p. 146, § 5, effective March 30.
24-4.1-117. Fund created - control of fund.
(1) The crime victim compensation fund is hereby established in the office of the court executive of each judicial district for the benefit of eligible applicants under this part 1.
(1.3) The crime victim compensation fund for the twenty-third judicial district is established in the office of the court administrator for Douglas, Elbert, and Lincoln counties. The fund consists of any money due the twenty-third judicial district pursuant to subsection (2) of this section on and after January 7, 2025. The judicial department shall coordinate with the crime victim compensation board for the eighteenth judicial district to credit money paid as costs or surcharges levied on criminal actions in Douglas, Elbert, and Lincoln counties on and after April 1, 2024, to the fund for use by the twenty-third judicial district, from the money collected pursuant to subsection (2) of this section on or after April 1, 2024, in Douglas, Elbert, and Lincoln counties.
(1.5) Repealed.
(2) The fund consists of all money paid as a cost or surcharge levied on criminal actions, as provided in section 24-4.1-119; any federal money available to state or local governments for victim compensation; all money received from any action or suit to recover damages from an assailant for a compensable crime which was the basis for approval of, and limited to, compensation received under this part 1; any restitution paid by an assailant to a victim for damages for a compensable crime which was the basis for approval of compensation received under this part 1 and for damages for which the victim has received approval of, and limited to, compensation received under this part 1; money transferred from the marijuana tax cash fund pursuant to section 39-28.8-501 (4.9)(b); and any other money that the general assembly may appropriate or transfer to the fund.
(3) All money deposited in the fund is deposited in an interest-bearing account, which must be no less secure than those used by the state treasurer, and which must yield the highest interest possible. All interest earned by money in the fund is credited to the fund.
(4) At the conclusion of each fiscal year, all money remaining in the fund remains in the fund.
(5) (a) For state fiscal years commencing prior to July 1, 2026, all money deposited in the fund must be used solely for the compensation of victims pursuant to this part 1; except that the district attorney and the court executive may use an aggregate of no more than twenty-two and one-half percent of the total amount of money in the crime victim compensation fund for administrative costs incurred pursuant to this part 1. The district attorney may use no more than twenty percent of the total amount of money in the fund for administrative costs. The court executive may use no more than two and one-half percent of the total amount of money in the fund for administrative costs.
(b) For state fiscal years commencing on or after July 1, 2026:
(I) All money deposited in the fund must be used solely for the compensation of victims pursuant to this part 1; and
(II) The general assembly shall appropriate money to the district attorney in each judicial district in an amount equal to twenty percent of the total amount of money in the fund in that judicial district for administrative costs and to the court executive in each judicial district in an amount equal to two and one-half percent of the total amount of money in the fund in that judicial district for administrative costs.
(6) Grants of federal money that is accepted pursuant to this part 1 for the purpose of assisting crime victims shall not be used to supplant state funds available to assist crime victims.
Source: L. 81: Entire article added, p. 1139, § 5, effective July 1. L. 84: (1), (2), and (5) amended, p. 660, § 19, effective May 14. L. 85: (6) added, p. 793, § 4, effective April 11. L. 89: (5) amended, p. 1016, § 2, effective April 23. L. 98: (5) amended, p. 518, § 4, effective April 30. L. 2007: (2) amended, p. 1112, § 2, effective July 1. L. 2021: (1.5) repealed and (2) amended, (HB 21-1315), ch. 461, pp. 3114, 3120, §§ 21, 33, effective July 6. L. 2024: (1.3) added, (HB 24-1013), ch. 43, p. 154, § 3, effective April 4; entire section amended, (SB 24-120), ch. 177, p. 964, § 13, effective May 15. L. 2026: (5) amended, (SB 26-042), ch. 212, p. 1251, § 3, effective May 29.
Editor's note: Amendments to this section by HB 24-1013 and SB 24-120 were harmonized.
Cross references: For the legislative declaration in HB 21-1315, see section 1 of chapter 461, Session Laws of Colorado 2021. For the legislative declaration in SB 26-042, see section 1 of chapter 212, Session Laws of Colorado 2026.
24-4.1-117.3. Crime victim services advisory board - creation - duties.
(1) There is created in the division of criminal justice in the department of public safety the crime victim services advisory board, referred to in this section as the "advisory board". The advisory board is a type 2 entity, as defined in section 24-1-105, and exercises its powers and performs its duties and functions under the division of criminal justice in the department of public safety and the executive director of the department of public safety, referred to in this section as the "executive director".
(2) (a) The advisory board consists of at least seventeen members appointed by the executive director, including but not limited to:
(I) A judge;
(II) An elected district attorney, the assistant district attorney, or a chief deputy district attorney;
(III) A member of a crime victim compensation board created in section 24-4.1-103;
(IV) A member of a local victims and witnesses assistance and law enforcement board created in section 24-4.2-101;
(V) An administrator of crime victim compensation from a district attorney's office;
(VI) An administrator of victims and witnesses assistance from a district attorney's office;
(VII) A representative of a statewide victims' organization;
(VIII) A court executive or judicial district representative;
(IX) A representative of a domestic violence program;
(X) A representative of a sexual assault program;
(XI) A sheriff or sheriff's representative;
(XII) A police chief or police representative;
(XIII) A deputy district attorney;
(XIV) A victim of a crime of violence; and
(XV) Three members of the community at large.
(b) The executive director may consider geographic diversity when making appointments to the advisory board.
(c) The term of office for each member of the advisory board is three years. A member shall not serve more than three consecutive three-year terms. A member of the advisory board on May 19, 2022, who has served more than three consecutive terms may serve the remainder of the member's current term, but shall not serve a consecutive subsequent term.
(d) Members of the advisory board shall serve at the pleasure of the executive director or until the member no longer serves in the position for which he or she was appointed to the advisory board, at which time a vacancy shall be deemed to exist on the advisory board. If a vacancy arises on the advisory board, the executive director shall appoint an appropriate person to serve for the remainder of the unexpired term.
(e) The executive director may reappoint a person to serve subsequent terms on the advisory board, but the executive director shall not appoint a person to serve more than three consecutive terms. The executive director shall annually appoint a chairperson of the advisory board who shall preside over the advisory board's meetings.
(f) Members of the advisory board shall serve without compensation but may be reimbursed for actual travel expenses incurred in the performance of their duties.
(3) The advisory board's powers and duties include, but are not limited to, the following:
(a) To develop and revise, when necessary, standards for the administration of the crime victim compensation fund established in section 24-4.1-117 in each judicial district and the victims and witnesses assistance and law enforcement fund established in section 24-4.2-103 in each judicial district, and to develop, revise when necessary, and impose sanctions for violating these standards;
(a.5) Repealed.
(b) To review, pursuant to section 24-4.1-303 (17), any reports of noncompliance with this article;
(c) To distribute profits from crime pursuant to section 24-4.1-201;
(d) To advise and make recommendations to the division of criminal justice in the department of public safety concerning the award of grants pursuant to sections 24-33.5-506 and 24-33.5-507; and
(e) To establish subcommittees of the advisory board from within the membership of the advisory board, which subcommittees shall include, but need not be limited to:
(I) A standards subcommittee that shall make recommendations to the advisory board concerning the development and revision, when necessary, of standards and sanctions for the violation of standards to assist the advisory board in implementing paragraph (a) of this subsection (3); and
(II) A victim rights subcommittee that shall review, pursuant to section 24-4.1-303 (17), any reports of noncompliance with this article to assist the advisory board in implementing paragraph (b) of this subsection (3);
(f) To review any reports of noncompliance with section 13-10-104.5.
(4) The advisory board shall not release to the public any records submitted to or generated by the advisory board or a subcommittee of the advisory board for the purposes of the advisory board's or the subcommittee's review, pursuant to paragraph (b) of subsection (3) of this section, of a report of noncompliance with this article until the report of noncompliance has been reviewed and resolved by the advisory board. The advisory board shall redact all victim-identifying information from any document released to the public.
Source: L. 2009: Entire section added, (SB 09-047), ch. 129, p. 553, § 1, effective July 1. L. 2022: (2)(c) and (2)(e) amended, (SB22-183), ch.194, p. 1304, § 9, effective May 19; (1) amended, (SB 22-162), ch. 469, p. 3426, § 208, effective August 10. L. 2023: IP(3) amended and (3)(f) added, (HB 23-1222), ch. 267, p. 1587, § 3, effective January 1, 2024. L. 2024: (3)(a.5) added, (HB 24-1013), ch. 43, p. 154, § 4, effective April 4; IP(2)(a) and (2)(a)(VIII) amended, (SB 24-120), ch. 177, p. 965, § 14, effective May 15.
Editor's note: Subsection (3)(a.5)(II) provided for the repeal of subsection (3)(a.5), effective July 1, 2025. (See L. 2024, p. 154.)
Cross references: For the short title (the "Debbie Haskins 'Administrative Organization Act of 1968' Modernization Act") in SB 22-162, see section 1 of chapter 469, Session Laws of Colorado 2022.
24-4.1-117.5. Standards for administration of funds - sanctions. (Repealed)
Source: L. 90: Entire section added, p. 1180, § 3, effective July 1. L. 93: Entire section amended, p. 2051, § 2, effective June 9. L. 95: (2)(b)(I) amended, p. 1401, § 3, effective July 1. L. 2009: Entire section repealed, (SB 09-047), ch. 129, p. 558, § 10, effective July 1.
24-4.1-117.7. State crime victims compensation program - creation - appropriation.
There is created in the division of criminal justice in the department of public safety the state victim compensation program. The general assembly shall appropriate money from the economic recovery and relief cash fund, created in section 24-75-228, as enacted by Senate Bill 21-291, enacted in 2021, to the division of criminal justice in the department of public safety to be used for the compensation of victims pursuant to this part 1 that also conforms with the allowable purposes set forth in the federal "American Rescue Plan Act of 2021", Pub.L. 117-2, as the act may be subsequently amended. The division of criminal justice in the department of public safety shall distribute the money appropriated pursuant to this section based on need.
Source: L. 2021: Entire section added, (SB 21-292), ch. 291, p. 1721, § 4, effective June 22.
Cross references: For the legislative declaration in SB 21-292, see section 1 of chapter 291, Session Laws of Colorado 2021.
24-4.1-118. Court executive custodian of fund - disbursements.
(1) The court executive of each judicial district is the custodian of the fund, and the court executive shall pay all disbursements from the fund upon written authorization of the board or the court.
(2) Repealed.
Source: L. 81: Entire article added, p. 1140, § 5, effective July 1. L. 2024: Entire section amended, (HB 24-1013), ch. 43, p. 154, § 5, effective April 4; entire section amended, (SB 24-120), ch. 177, p. 965, § 15, effective May 15.
Editor's note: (1) House Bill 24-1013 was harmonized in part with and superseded in part by Senate Bill 24-120.
(2) Subsection (2)(b) provided for the repeal of subsection (2), effective July 1, 2025. (See L. 2024, pp. 154, 965.)
24-4.1-119. Costs and surcharges levied on criminal actions and traffic offenses - definition.
(1) (a) Except as provided in subsection (1)(c) of this section, a cost of one hundred sixty-three dollars for felonies, seventy-eight dollars for misdemeanors, forty-six dollars for class 1 misdemeanor traffic offenses, and thirty-three dollars for class 2 misdemeanor traffic offenses is levied on each criminal action resulting in a conviction or in a deferred judgment and sentence, as provided for in section 18-1.3-102, which criminal action is charged pursuant to state statute. The defendant shall pay these costs to the clerk of the court. Each clerk shall transmit the costs received to the court executive of the judicial district in which the offense occurred for credit to the crime victim compensation fund established in that judicial district.
(b) The costs required by subsection (1)(a) of this section shall not be levied on criminal actions which are charged pursuant to the penalty assessment provisions of section 42-4-1701 or to any violations of articles 1 to 15 of title 33.
(c) A cost of thirty-three dollars is levied on each criminal action resulting in a conviction or in a deferred judgment and sentence, as provided for in section 18-1.3-102 of a violation of section 42-4-1301 (1) or (2). The defendant shall pay this cost to the clerk of the court, who shall transmit the costs received to the court executive of the judicial district in which the offense occurred for credit to the crime victim compensation fund established in that judicial district.
(d) and (e) Repealed.
(f) (I) A surcharge is levied against each penalty assessment imposed for a violation of a class A or class B traffic infraction or class 1 or class 2 misdemeanor traffic offense pursuant to section 42-4-1701. The amount of the surcharge is one half of the amount specified in the penalty and surcharge schedule in section 42-4-1701 (4) or, if no surcharge amount is specified, the surcharge is calculated as thirty-seven percent of the penalty imposed. All money collected by the department of revenue pursuant to this subsection (1)(f) must be transmitted to the court executive of the judicial district in which the infraction occurred for credit to the crime victim compensation fund established in that judicial district in accordance with the requirements set forth in section 42-1-217.
(II) All calculated surcharge amounts pursuant to this subsection (1)(f) resulting in dollars and cents must be rounded down to the nearest whole dollar.
(III) The surcharges levied pursuant to this subsection (1)(f) are separate and distinct from surcharges levied pursuant to section 24-4.2-104 for the victims and witnesses assistance and law enforcement fund.
(g) (I) A surcharge of eight dollars is levied against each penalty imposed for violation of a civil infraction pursuant to section 16-2.3-101. The clerk of the court shall transmit all money collected to the court executive of the judicial department in which the offense occurred for credit to the crime victim compensation fund established in that judicial district.
(II) The surcharges levied pursuant to this subsection (1)(g) are separate and distinct from surcharges levied pursuant to section 24-4.2-104 for the victims and witnesses assistance and law enforcement fund.
(h) A cost of thirty-three dollars is levied on each criminal action that results with placement in an alternative sentencing program pursuant to section 18-1.3-101. This cost is paid to the alternative sentencing program and then transmitted to the court executive of the judicial district where the offense occurred for credit to the crime victim compensation fund established in that judicial district.
(1.5) A cost or surcharge levied pursuant to this section may not be suspended or waived by the court unless the court determines that the defendant against whom the cost or surcharge is levied is indigent.
(1.7) (a) A cost or surcharge levied pursuant to subsection (1)(a) of this section shall not be assessed against a juvenile or against the juvenile's parent, guardian, or legal custodian. A court or the state shall not enforce or collect court-levied costs or surcharges assessed by the court on or after July 6, 2021, that are outstanding against the juvenile or the juvenile's parent, guardian, or legal custodian.
(b) As used in this subsection (1.7), "juvenile" means a person who is under eighteen years old when the crime is committed.
(2) For purposes of determining the order of priority for payments required of a defendant pursuant to section 18-1.3-204 (2.5) the payments to the victim compensation fund required under this part 1 are the first obligation of the defendant.
(3) The provisions of sections 18-1.3-701 and 18-1.3-702 are applicable as to the collection of costs levied pursuant to this part 1.
Source: L. 81: Entire article added, p. 1140, § 5, effective July 1. L. 82: (1) amended, p. 364, § 2, effective March 22; (1)(a) amended and (1)(c) added, p. 604, § 5, effective July 1. L. 83: (1)(a) amended and (1)(d) added, p. 668, § 15, effective July 1. L. 84: (1)(a), (2), and (3) amended, pp. 660, 923, 1120, §§ 20, 15, 21, effective July 1. L. 85: (1)(a) amended, p. 793, § 5, effective April 11. L. 86: (1)(a) amended and (1)(e) added, p. 871, § 1, effective July 1. L. 87: (1)(d) and (1)(a) amended and (1)(e) repealed, pp. 819, 1496, 1529, §§ 32, 6, 74, effective July 1. L. 93: (1) amended, p. 2053, § 3, effective June 9. L. 94: (1)(c) and (1)(d) amended, p. 1637, § 48, effective May 31; (1)(b) and (1)(c) amended, p. 2555, § 51, effective January 1, 1995. L. 96: (1)(d) amended, p. 1695, § 35, effective January 1, 1997. L. 2002: (1)(a), (1)(c), (2), and (3) amended, p. 1529, § 239, effective October 1. L. 2007: (1)(a) and (1)(c) amended and (1)(f) added, p. 1111, § 1, effective July 1. L. 2010: (1)(f)(II) amended and (1.5) added, (HB 10-1265), ch. 178, p. 641, § 1, effective April 29. L. 2021: (1)(a) amended and (1)(d) repealed, (HB 21-1315), ch. 461, p. 3108, § 6, effective July 6; (1)(d) amended, (SB 21-059), ch. 136, p. 742, § 107, effective October 1. L. 2022: (1)(g) added, (HB 22-1229), ch. 68, p. 345, § 28, effective March 1. L. 2024: (1)(a), (1)(b), (1)(c), (1)(f), (1)(g)(I), (2), and (3) amended and (1)(h) added, (SB 24-120), ch. 177, p. 965, § 16, effective May 15. L. 2026: (1.7) added, (HB 26-1232), ch. 98, p. 390, § 8, effective May 4.
Editor's note: (1) Amendments to subsection (1)(c) by Senate Bill 94-001 and Senate Bill 94-206 were harmonized.
(2) Subsection (1)(d) was amended in SB 21-059, effective October 1, 2021. However, those amendments were superseded by the repeal of subsection (1)(d) in HB 21-1315, effective July 6, 2021.
(3) Section 47 of chapter 68 (HB 22-1229), Session Laws of Colorado 2022, provides that the act adding subsection (1)(g) is effective March 1, 2022, but the governor did not approve the act until April 7, 2022.
Cross references: (1) For additional costs imposed on criminal actions and traffic offenses, see § 24-4.2-104; for additional costs levied on alcohol- and drug-related traffic offenses, see §§ 42-4-1301.4 (5) and 43-4-402.
(2) For the legislative declaration contained in the 2002 act amending subsections (1)(a), (1)(c), (2), and (3), see section 1 of chapter 318, Session Laws of Colorado 2002. For the legislative declaration in HB 21-1315, see section 1 of chapter 461, Session Laws of Colorado 2021. For the legislative declaration in HB 26-1232, see section 1 of chapter 98, Session Laws of Colorado 2026.
ANNOTATION
Payment of victim compensation costs does not violate principles of double jeopardy. Costs are not a form of punishment but are essentially civil and are not traditionally considered to be punishment, and the imposition of costs generally does not serve the goals of retribution and deterrence. People v. McQuarrie, 66 P.3d 181 (Colo. App. 2002), overruled on other grounds in Yeadon v. People, 2020 CO 38, 462 P.3d 1087, and Waddell v. People, 2020 CO 39, 462 P.3d 1100.
The costs and surcharges levied pursuant to this section apply to juvenile cases as well as those cases against adults. People in Interest of T.C.C., 2017 COA 138, 410 P.3d 805.
Only the court can waive costs or surcharges levied pursuant to this section. People in Interest of T.C.C., 2017 COA 138, 410 P.3d 805.
Indigence is the only circumstance in which costs or surcharges may be waived. People in Interest of T.C.C., 2017 COA 138, 410 P.3d 805.
Court erred in allowing probation department to determine whether to waive costs and surcharges based on defendant's behavior. The absence of language prohibiting a fee waiver for good behavior does not permit such a waiver. People in Interest of T.C.C., 2017 COA 138, 410 P.3d 805.
A district court has no authority to collect the fee imposed pursuant to subsection (1)(a) after the completion of a deferred sentence and dismissal of the underlying charges. Pineda-Liberato v. People, 2017 CO 95, 403 P.3d 160.
24-4.1-120. Effective dates of provisions of this article.
Sections 24-4.1-117 to 24-4.1-120 originally took effect July 1, 1981. Sections 24-4.1-101 to 24-4.1-116 originally took effect July 1, 1982.
Source: L. 81: Entire article added, p. 1140, § 5, effective July 1.
24-4.1-121. Repeal. (Repealed)
Source: L. 81: Entire article added, p. 1140, § 5, effective July 1. L. 85: Entire section repealed, p. 794, § 7, effective April 11.
24-4.1-122. Reports.
On or before October 1, 1985, and on or before each October 1 thereafter, the court executive of each judicial district shall report to the state court administrator the amount of money collected by the judicial district in the prior fiscal year and the amount of money distributed to crime victims in the prior fiscal year by the board.
Source: L. 85: Entire section added, p. 793, § 6, effective April 11. L. 2024: Entire section amended, (SB 24-120), ch. 177, p. 966, § 17, effective May 15.
24-4.1-123. When redistribution of moneys required. (Repealed)
Source: L. 85: Entire section added, p. 793, § 6, effective April 11. L. 2002: Entire section repealed, p. 48, § 1, effective March 21.
24-4.1-124. State crime victim compensation fund - creation - allocation of moneys. (Repealed)
Source: L. 85: Entire section added, p. 794, § 6, effective April 11. L. 98: (2) amended, p. 518, § 5, effective April 30. L. 2002: Entire section repealed, p. 48, § 2, effective March 21.
PART 2
COMPENSATION FROM BENEFITS OF CRIME
24-4.1-200.3. Definitions.
As used in this part 2, unless the context otherwise requires:
(1) "Board" means the crime victim services advisory board created in section 24-4.1-117.3 (1).
(2) "Profits from the crime" means:
(a) Any property obtained through or income generated from the commission of the crime of which the defendant was convicted;
(b) Any property obtained by or income generated from the sale, conversion, or exchange of proceeds of the crime of which the defendant was convicted, including any gain realized by such sale, conversion, or exchange; and
(c) Any property that the defendant obtained or income generated as a result of having committed the crime of which the defendant was convicted, including any assets obtained through the use of unique knowledge obtained during the commission of, or in preparation for the commission of, the crime, as well as any property obtained by or income generated from the sale, conversion, or exchange of such property and any gain realized by such sale, conversion, or exchange.
(3) "Victim" means any natural person against whom any crime has been perpetrated or attempted, unless the person is accountable for the crime or a crime arising from the same conduct, criminal episode, or plan or, if such person is deceased or incapacitated, the person's spouse, parent, child, sibling, grandparent, significant other, or other lawful representative. For purposes of this part 2, any person under the age of eighteen years is considered incapacitated unless that person is emancipated.
Source: L. 2025: Entire section added with relocations, (SB 25-275), ch. 377, p. 2058, § 131, effective August 6.
Editor's note: Subsections (2) and (3) are similar to former § 24-4.1-201 (1.5)(a) and (1.3), respectively, as they existed prior to 2025.
24-4.1-201. Distribution of profits from crime - escrow account - civil suit by victim.
(1) The general assembly hereby finds that the state has a compelling interest in preventing any person who is convicted of a crime from profiting from the crime and in recompensing victims of the crime. It is therefore the intent of the general assembly to provide a mechanism whereby any profits from a crime that are received by the person convicted of the crime are available as restitution to the victims of the crime.
(1.3) Repealed.
(1.5) (a) Repealed.
(b) (I) Any person who contracts with a person convicted of a crime in this state, or such person's representative or assignee, for payment of any profits from the crime of which such person is convicted shall pay to the board any money that would otherwise, by terms of the contract, be paid to the convicted person or such person's representatives or assignees. The board shall distribute the money as described in subsection (1.5)(b.5) of this section.
(II) Any person or any person's agent or other legal representative who contracts with a convicted person, or the convicted person's representative or assignee, in the manner described in subparagraph (I) of this paragraph (b), shall:
(A) Submit a copy of the contract or a summary of the terms of an oral agreement to the board;
(B) Pay over to the board any moneys or consideration not subject to an order of restitution and that by the terms of the contract would be otherwise owing to the convicted person or owing to a representative or assignee of the convicted person.
(b.5) If there is a court order of restitution in the criminal case resulting from the crime that remains unpaid, any money received under paragraph (b) of this subsection (1.5) must first be applied to that order of restitution. If there is no outstanding balance from an order of restitution or there remains additional money, and all victims are identified and can be located, the money received or the remaining portion must be apportioned pro rata to the identified victims. For purposes of this section, "victim" has the same meaning as in section 24-4.1-302 (5). If all victims are not known or cannot be located, the board shall deposit the remaining money in an escrow account for the benefit of the victims.
(c) Upon the establishment of an escrow account, any person who is a victim of the crime from which a convicted person receives profits under paragraph (b) of this subsection (1.5) may, within three years of establishment of the escrow account, enforce any judgment entered against the convicted person against the money on deposit in the escrow account. If no judgment has been entered, the victim may bring a civil action in a court of competent jurisdiction to recover a judgment against the convicted person or such person's representatives or designees. After all filed claims are established, the board shall distribute the money in the escrow account to satisfy the claims, or such fraction of each claim as can be fulfilled by the available money.
(d) (I) Upon establishing an escrow account pursuant to paragraph (b) of this subsection (1.5), the board shall notify any victims of the crime of which the person was convicted at such victims' last-known addresses of the establishment of the escrow account.
(II) Unless all victims have been identified and can be located, the board shall publish at least once annually from the date of the establishment of the escrow account, a notice of the escrow account's establishment in a newspaper having general circulation throughout the county in which the crime was committed. The expenses of notification shall be paid from the amount received in the escrow account. The board, in its discretion, may provide for such additional notice as it deems necessary.
(III) The notice required under subparagraphs (I) and (II) of this paragraph (d) shall specify the existence of the escrow account, the amount on deposit, and the victim's right to execute an order of restitution or bring a civil action to recover against the moneys in the escrow account within three years after the date the escrow account is established.
(e) (I) Any person who knowingly fails to comply with any requirement of subparagraph (II) of paragraph (b) of this subsection (1.5) shall be liable for a civil penalty of not less than ten thousand dollars nor more than three times the contract amount.
(II) If two or more persons are adjudged liable for the civil penalty imposed, such persons shall be jointly and severally liable.
(III) After notice and opportunity to be heard is provided, the court, by order of judgment, may assess the penalty described in this paragraph (e). All moneys received from the payment of these penalties shall be paid over to the board.
(IV) In any action or proceeding brought to enforce the contract provisions of this subsection (1.5), the court shall have jurisdiction to grant the attorney general, without bond or other undertaking, any injunctive relief necessary to prevent any payment under a contract that is prohibited under this subsection (1.5).
(1.7) For purposes of this section, "person" means any natural person, firm, corporation, partnership, association, or other legal entity.
(2) If funds remain in the escrow account after payment of a money judgment pursuant to subsection (1) of this section and if no civil actions are pending under this section after three years from the establishment of an escrow account, the board shall notify the department of corrections of the existence of such escrow account. The department of corrections shall certify to the board a statement of the costs of maintenance of the person in the state correctional institution or institutions at which the person was incarcerated. A statement of the cost of maintenance shall be submitted annually for payment to the department of corrections by the board until such time as the person is released from custody of the state. No such payment shall be made upon the dismissal of the charges against any individual whose proceeds are placed in the escrow account.
(3) Upon the dismissal of the charges against any individual whose proceeds are placed in the escrow account or upon a showing by the defendant that three years have elapsed from the establishment of an escrow account and that no civil actions are pending against him or her under this section, the board shall immediately pay any money in the escrow account to the defendant except for funds paid to the department of corrections and anticipated as necessary for future payment to the department of corrections as set forth in subsection (2) of this section.
(4) If an escrow account is established under this section, no otherwise applicable statute of limitations on the time within which civil action may be brought bars action by a victim of a crime committed by the person accused or convicted of the crime, as to a claim resulting from the crime, until three years have elapsed from the time the escrow account was established.
(4.5) The escrow account shall be established for a period of three years. If an action is filed by a victim to recover the victim's interest in the escrow account within such three-year period, the escrow account shall continue until the conclusion of such action.
(5) The board shall make payments from an escrow account to the accused upon an order of the court after a showing by the accused that:
(a) The money will be used for the exclusive purpose of retaining legal representation at any stage of the civil or criminal proceedings against him, including the appeals process; and
(b) He has insufficient assets, other than funds in the escrow account and assets which could be claimed as exempt from execution under state law, to provide for payment of the expenses of legal representation.
(6) The attorney general, at the request of the board, shall bring an action to cause profits from the crime to be paid over and held in an escrow account established by the board.
Source: L. 84: Entire part added, p. 652, § 2, effective May 14. L. 88: (1) amended, p. 890, § 1, effective July 1. L. 94: (1) amended and (1.5) added, p. 1050, § 7, effective July 1. L. 2000: (1.3), (1.5)(e), (1.7), (4.5), and (6) added and (1.5)(b), (1.5)(d), (2), and (3) amended, pp. 239, 238, §§ 2, 1, effective March 29. L. 2009: (1.5)(b)(I) and (1.5)(e)(III) amended, (SB 09-047), ch. 129, p. 556, § 5, effective July 1. L. 2015: (1.5)(b)(I), (1.5)(c), (1.5)(d)(II), (1.5)(d)(III), (2), (3), (4), and (4.5) amended and (1.5)(b.5) added, (HB 15-1070), ch. 43, p. 106, § 1, effective March 20. L. 2025: (1.3) and (1.5)(a) repealed and (1.5)(b)(I) amended, (SB 25-275), ch. 377, pp. 2109, 2059, §§ 336 and 132, effective August 6.
Editor's note: Subsections (1.3) and (1.5)(a) were relocated to § 24-4.1-200.3 (3) and (2), respectively, in 2025.
24-4.1-202. Notification of board.
It shall be the duty of the victim, the victim's attorney, or the victim's representative to notify the board within thirty days of the filing of any compensable claim under section 24-4.1-201.
Source: L. 84: Entire part added, p. 653, § 2, effective May 14.
24-4.1-203. More than one claim.
If more than one claim is filed against the moneys in escrow pursuant to section 24-4.1-201, the board shall disburse payments from the escrow account on a pro rata basis of all judgments obtained, according to the amount of money in the escrow account as compared to the amount of each claim. No compensation shall be disbursed until all pending claims have been settled or reduced to judgment.
Source: L. 84: Entire part added, p. 653, § 2, effective May 14.
24-4.1-204. Actions null and void.
Any action taken by a person who is accused or convicted of a crime or who enters a plea of guilty, whether by way of the execution of a power of attorney, the creation of corporate entities, or any other action, to defeat the purpose of this part 2 shall be null and void as against the public policy of this state.
Source: L. 84: Entire part added, p. 653, § 2, effective May 14.
24-4.1-205. Interest on moneys in the account.
Interest earned on the moneys deposited in the escrow account pursuant to section 24-4.1-201 shall accrue to the benefit of the payee of the account.
Source: L. 84: Entire part added, p. 654, § 2, effective May 14.
24-4.1-206. Annual reports of funds.
No later than February 15 of each year, the board shall make available a report to the general assembly for the previous calendar year of an accounting of all funds received and disbursed under this part 2. The board shall notify, in the most cost-effective manner available, each member of the general assembly of the availability of such report and offer to provide each member with a copy of the report.
Source: L. 84: Entire part added, p. 654, § 2, effective May 14. L. 99: Entire section amended, p. 686, § 2, effective August 4.
24-4.1-207. Applicability.
This part 2 shall apply to offenses committed on or after January 1, 1985.
Source: L. 84: Entire part added, p. 654, § 2, effective May 14.
PART 3
GUIDELINES FOR ASSURING THE RIGHTS OF VICTIMS OF AND WITNESSES TO CRIMES
Cross references: For constitutional provisions relating to the rights of crime victims, see section 16a of article II of the Colorado constitution.
Law reviews: For article, "Adult Parole in Colorado: An Overview", see 44 Colo. Law. 37 (May 2015).
24-4.1-300.1. Short title.
The short title of this part 3 is the "Victim Rights Act".
Source: L. 2022: Entire section added, (SB 22-049), ch. 152, p. 969, § 1, effective May 6.
24-4.1-301. Legislative declaration.
The general assembly hereby finds and declares that the full and voluntary cooperation of victims of and witnesses to crimes with state and local law enforcement agencies as to such crimes is imperative for the general effectiveness and well-being of the criminal justice system of this state. It is the intent of this part 3, therefore, to assure that all victims of and witnesses to crimes are honored and protected by law enforcement agencies, prosecutors, and judges in a manner no less vigorous than the protection afforded criminal defendants.
Source: L. 84: Entire part added, p. 654, § 3, effective May 14.
24-4.1-302. Definitions.
As used in this part 3, and for no other purpose, including the expansion of the rights of any defendant:
(1) "Crime" means any of the following offenses, acts, and violations as defined by the statutes of the state of Colorado, whether committed by an adult or a juvenile:
(a) Murder in the first degree, in violation of section 18-3-102, C.R.S.;
(b) Murder in the second degree, in violation of section 18-3-103, C.R.S.;
(c) Manslaughter, in violation of section 18-3-104, C.R.S.;
(d) Criminally negligent homicide, in violation of section 18-3-105, C.R.S.;
(e) Vehicular homicide, in violation of section 18-3-106, C.R.S.;
(f) Assault in the first degree, in violation of section 18-3-202, C.R.S.;
(g) Assault in the second degree, in violation of section 18-3-203, C.R.S.;
(h) Assault in the third degree, in violation of section 18-3-204, C.R.S.;
(i) Vehicular assault, in violation of section 18-3-205, C.R.S.;
(j) Menacing, in violation of section 18-3-206, C.R.S.;
(k) (Deleted by amendment, L. 95, p. 1256, § 22, effective July 1, 1995.)
(l) First degree kidnapping, in violation of section 18-3-301, C.R.S.;
(m) Second degree kidnapping, in violation of section 18-3-302, C.R.S.;
(n) (I) Sexual assault, in violation of section 18-3-402, C.R.S.; or
(II) Sexual assault in the first degree, in violation of section 18-3-402, C.R.S., as it existed prior to July 1, 2000;
(o) Sexual assault in the second degree, in violation of section 18-3-403, C.R.S., as it existed prior to July 1, 2000;
(p) (I) Unlawful sexual contact, in violation of section 18-3-404, C.R.S.; or
(II) Sexual assault in the third degree, in violation of section 18-3-404, C.R.S., as it existed prior to July 1, 2000;
(q) Sexual assault on a child, in violation of section 18-3-405, C.R.S.;
(r) Sexual assault on a child by one in a position of trust, in violation of section 18-3-405.3, C.R.S.;
(s) Sexual assault on a client by a psychotherapist, in violation of section 18-3-405.5, C.R.S.;
(s.3) Invasion of privacy for sexual gratification, in violation of section 18-3-405.6, C.R.S.;
(t) Robbery, in violation of section 18-4-301, C.R.S.;
(u) Aggravated robbery, in violation of section 18-4-302, C.R.S.;
(v) Aggravated robbery of controlled substances, in violation of section 18-4-303, as it existed prior to October 1, 2023;
(w) Repealed.
(x) Incest, in violation of section 18-6-301, C.R.S.;
(y) Aggravated incest, in violation of section 18-6-302, C.R.S.;
(z) Child abuse, in violation of section 18-6-401, C.R.S.;
(aa) Sexual exploitation of children, in violation of section 18-6-403, C.R.S.;
(bb) Crimes against at-risk adults or at-risk juveniles, in violation of section 18-6.5-103, C.R.S.;
(bb.3) Any crime identified by law enforcement prior to the filing of charges as domestic violence, as defined in section 18-6-800.3 (1), C.R.S.;
(bb.7) An act identified by a district attorney in a formal criminal charge as domestic violence, as defined in section 18-6-800.3 (1), C.R.S.;
(cc) Any crime, the underlying factual basis of which has been found by the court on the record to include an act of domestic violence, as defined in section 18-6-800.3 (1), C.R.S., pursuant to section 18-6-801 (1), C.R.S.;
(cc.1) (I) Stalking, in violation of section 18-3-602, C.R.S.;
(II) Stalking, in violation of section 18-9-111 (4), C.R.S., as it existed prior to August 11, 2010;
(cc.2) Harassment in violation of section 18-9-111 (1)(i);
(cc.3) A bias-motivated crime, in violation of section 18-9-121, C.R.S.;
(cc.4) Harassment that is bias-motivated, in violation of section 18-9-111 (2);
(cc.5) Careless driving, in violation of section 42-4-1402 (2)(c), that results in the serious bodily injury or death of another person;
(cc.6) Failure to stop at the scene of a crash, in violation of section 42-4-1601, where the crash results in the death or serious bodily injury of another person;
(cc.7) False reporting of an emergency in violation of section 18-8-111 that is a bias-motivated crime as described in section 18-9-121 (2);
(dd) Any criminal attempt, as described in section 18-2-101, C.R.S., any conspiracy, as described in section 18-2-201, C.R.S., any criminal solicitation, as described in section 18-2-301, C.R.S., and any accessory to a crime, as described in section 18-8-105, C.R.S., involving any of the crimes specified in this subsection (1);
(ee) Retaliation against a witness or victim, in violation of section 18-8-706, C.R.S.;
(ee.3) Intimidating a witness or a victim, in violation of section 18-8-704, C.R.S.;
(ee.7) Aggravated intimidation of a witness or a victim, in violation of section 18-8-705, C.R.S.;
(ff) Tampering with a witness or victim, in violation of section 18-8-707, C.R.S.;
(gg) Indecent exposure, in violation of section 18-7-302, C.R.S.;
(hh) Violation of a protection order issued under section 18-1-1001 against a person charged with committing sexual assault in violation of section 18-3-402, sexual assault on a child in violation of section 18-3-405, sexual assault on a child by one in a position of trust in violation of section 18-3-405.3, sexual assault on a client by a psychotherapist in violation of section 18-3-405.5, or stalking in violation of section 18-3-602;
(ii) Human trafficking in violation of section 18-3-503 or 18-3-504, C.R.S.;
(jj) First degree burglary, in violation of section 18-4-202, C.R.S.;
(jj.5) Second degree burglary of a dwelling, in violation of section 18-4-203 (2)(b)(I);
(kk) Retaliation against a judge or elected official, in violation of section 18-8-615; retaliation against a prosecutor, in violation of section 18-8-616; or retaliation against a juror, in violation of section 18-8-706.5;
(ll) Soliciting for commercial sexual activity with a child, in violation of section 18-7-402; procurement of a child for sexual exploitation, in violation of section 18-6-404; pimping of a child, in violation of section 18-7-405; inducement of commercial sexual activity with a child, in violation of section 18-7-405.5; engaging in commercial sexual activity with a child, in violation of section 18-7-406; soliciting for child prostitution, in violation of section 18-7-402, as it existed prior to July 1, 2026; inducement of child prostitution, in violation of section 18-7-405.5, as it existed prior to July 1, 2026; or patronizing a prostituted child, in violation of section 18-7-406, as it existed prior to July 1, 2026;
(mm) Disclosing a private intimate image or intimate digital depiction for harassment in violation of section 18-7-107 or disclosing a private intimate image or intimate digital depiction for pecuniary gain in violation of section 18-7-108;
(nn) First degree arson, in violation of section 18-4-102;
(oo) Criminal invasion of privacy, in violation of section 18-7-801.
(1.2) "Cold case" means a felony crime reported to law enforcement that has remained unsolved for over one year after the crime was initially reported to law enforcement and for which the applicable statute of limitations has not expired.
(1.3) "Correctional facility" means any private or public entity providing correctional services to offenders pursuant to a court order including, but not limited to a county jail, a community corrections provider, the division of youth services, and the department of corrections.
(1.5) "Correctional official" means any employee of a correctional facility.
(2) "Critical stages" means the following stages of the criminal justice process:
(a) The filing of charges against a person accused of a crime;
(a.3) Any hearing for the disclosure of the name and identifying information of a child victim or child witness pursuant to section 24-72-304 (4.5)(a.5);
(a.5) The decision not to file charges against a person accused of a crime;
(a.7) The decision to enter into a diversion agreement pursuant to section 18-1.3-101, or to make a referral to the bridges wraparound care program pursuant to section 16-8.6-108;
(b) The preliminary hearing;
(c) (I) Any court action involving a bond reduction or modification at which the following occurs:
(A) A bond is set lower than the scheduled or customary amount for the specific charge, including any adjustments made by the court to the amount of bond to correspond to the specific charge to which the defendant pled guilty or for which the defendant was convicted, if the adjusted bond is lower than the scheduled or customary amount for the specific charge;
(B) A change in the type of bond;
(C) A modification to a condition of the bond;
(D) A defendant is permitted to appear without posting a bond;
(E) In a case involving a capital offense, the court grants the defendant's motion for admission to bail pursuant to section 16-4-101 (3), C.R.S.; or
(F) For jurisdictions that do not have a bond schedule or customary amount for bond, a bond is modified to a lower amount than that set at the initial bond hearing.
(II) Notwithstanding the provisions of subparagraph (I) of this paragraph (c), the following shall not constitute a bond reduction or modification:
(A) The initial setting of a bond, whether set by the court at the first appearance or by another entity authorized to do so by the court prior to the first appearance;
(B) The setting of a new bond upon the filing of charges by the district attorney, so long as the bond is set at or above the scheduled or customary amount for the specific charge filed; and
(C) For nonbailable offenses pursuant to section 16-4-101, C.R.S., the subsequent setting of a bond by the court.
(d) The arraignment of a person accused of a crime;
(e) Any hearing on motions concerning evidentiary matters or pre-plea or post-plea relief;
(e.5) Any subpoena or application for records concerning the victim's medical history, mental health, or education; victim's compensation records; or records that are privileged pursuant to section 13-90-107;
(f) Any disposition of the complaint or charges against the person accused;
(g) The trial;
(h) Any sentencing or resentencing hearing;
(i) Any appellate review or appellate decision;
(j) Any modification of the sentence pursuant to rule 35 (a) or 35 (b) of the Colorado rules of criminal procedure or any other provision of state or federal law;
(j.5) Any court-ordered modification of the terms and conditions of probation as described in section 18-1.3-204 or 19-2.5-1108 and as outlined in section 24-4.1-303 (13.5)(a);
(k) Any probation revocation hearing;
(k.3) The filing of any complaint, summons, or warrant filed by the probation department;
(k.5) The change of venue or transfer of probation supervision from one jurisdiction to another;
(k.7) The request for any release from probation supervision prior to the expiration of the defendant's sentence;
(l) An attack on a judgment or conviction for which a court hearing is set;
(m) Any parole application hearing and full parole board review hearing;
(n) The parole, release, or discharge from imprisonment of a person convicted of a crime;
(o) Any parole revocation hearing;
(p) The transfer to or placement of a person convicted of a crime in a nonsecured facility;
(q) The transfer, release, or escape of a person charged with or convicted of a crime from any state hospital;
(q.1) A trial for civil commitment or enhanced protective placement pursuant to section 16-8.5-118;
(q.2) A hearing to terminate a civil commitment pursuant to section 27-65-202 or an enhanced protective placement pursuant to section 25.5-10-508;
(q.3) The transfer, release, or escape of a person or the placement of a person into a community-based setting outside of inpatient care at the discretion of CDHS, as defined in section 16-8.5-101, when the person is under a civil commitment pursuant to section 27-65-201 or an enhanced protective placement under court supervision pursuant to section 25.5-10-507 when the criminal case initiating the civil commitment or enhanced protective placement involved a victim;
(r) Any petition or motion to terminate sex offender registration filed pursuant to section 16-22-113;
(r.3) (I) Except as provided in subsection (2)(r.3)(II) of this section, any hearing concerning a petition for expungement as described in section 19-1-306.
(II) The entry of an order of expungement is not a critical stage if:
(A) The case resulted in a not guilty verdict at trial;
(B) The case was dismissed in its entirety;
(C) The juvenile completed a sentence for a petty offense, any drug petty offense, any level 1 or level 2 drug misdemeanor, or a class 2 or class 3 misdemeanor offense not involving unlawful sexual behavior as defined in section 16-22-109 (9), domestic violence as described in section 18-6-800.3, or a crime that is a crime listed under section 24-4.1-302 (1); or
(D) The juvenile completed a sentence for a municipal offense not involving domestic violence as described in section 18-6-800.3.
(s) The execution of an offender in a capital case;
(t) A hearing held pursuant to section 18-1-414 (2)(b), C.R.S.;
(u) The decision, whether by court order, stipulation of the parties, or otherwise, to conduct postconviction DNA testing pursuant to section 18-1-413, the results of any such postconviction DNA testing, and court proceedings initiated based on the result of the postconviction DNA testing. An inmate's written or oral request for such testing is not a "critical stage".
(u.5) A hearing held pursuant to section 18-1-416 (1.5);
(v) A hearing held pursuant to section 24-72-706, 24-72-709, or 24-72-710;
(w) A hearing held pursuant to section 24-31-902 (2)(c);
(x) A hearing held pursuant to section 18-1.3-103.7 or 19-2.5-1118.5;
(y) A petition for modification of sentence filed pursuant to section 18-1.3-406 (1)(b) and any associated hearing;
(z) A petition for modification of sentence filed pursuant to section 18-1.3-801 (6) and any associated hearing;
(aa) Receipt by a district attorney of a notice that a crime laboratory employee engaged in a wrongful action, as described in section 16-12-307 (1);
(bb) An evidentiary hearing on post-conviction petition for relief held pursuant to section 16-12-312; and
(cc) A restitution assessment hearing held pursuant to section 18-1.3-603.
(3) "Lawful representative" means an individual who is designated by the victim or appointed by the court to act in the best interests of the victim; except that if the victim is a child or an at-risk adult, as defined in section 18-6.5-102, "lawful representative" does not include the defendant or alleged offender in the underlying case.
(3.5) "Modification of sentence" means an action taken by the court to modify the length, terms, or conditions of an offender's sentence pursuant to rule 35 (a) or (b) of the Colorado rules of criminal procedure; a resentencing following a probation revocation hearing; or a request for early termination of probation. As used in this subsection (3.5), "action taken by the court" includes an order by the court modifying an offender's sentence upon review of the written motion without a hearing but does not include an order denying a motion to modify a sentence without a hearing.
(4) "Significant other" means any person who is in a family-type living arrangement with a victim and who would constitute a spouse of the victim if the victim and such person were married.
(5) "Victim" means any natural person against whom any crime has been perpetrated or attempted, unless the person is accountable for the crime or a crime arising from the same conduct or plan as crime is defined under the laws of this state or of the United States, or, if such person is deceased or incapacitated, the person's spouse, parent, legal guardian, child, sibling, grandparent, grandchild, significant other, or other lawful representative. For purposes of notification under this part 3, any person under the age of eighteen years is considered incapacitated, unless that person is legally emancipated. It is the intent of the general assembly that this definition of the term "victim" shall apply only to this part 3 and shall not be applied to any other provision of the laws of the state of Colorado that refer to the term "victim".
(6) "Victim's immediate family" means the spouse, any child by birth or adoption, any stepchild, the parent, the stepparent, a sibling, a legal guardian, significant other, or a lawful representative of the victim.
(7) "Witness" means any natural person:
(a) Having knowledge of the existence or nonexistence of facts relating to any crime;
(b) Whose declaration under oath is received or has been received as evidence for any purpose;
(c) Who has reported any crime to any peace officer, correctional officer, or judicial officer;
(d) Who has been served with a subpoena issued under the authority of any court in this state, of any other state, or of the United States; or
(e) Who would be believed by any reasonable person to be an individual described in paragraph (a), (b), (c), or (d) of this subsection (7).
Source: L. 84: Entire part added, p. 654, § 3, effective May 14. L. 87: (2) amended, p. 1581, § 35, effective July 10. L. 92: Entire section amended, p. 415, § 2, effective January 14, 1993. L. 93: (1)(k) and (1)(w) amended, p. 1653, § 53, effective July 1. L. 95: (1)(w) repealed, p. 1110, § 64, effective May 31; IP(1), (1)(bb), (1)(cc), (2)(c), (2)(e), (2)(l), and (5) amended and (1)(dd) added, p. 1402, § 4, effective July 1; (1)(k) and (1)(bb) amended, p. 1256, § 22, effective July 1. L. 97: (1)(cc) and (1)(dd) amended and (1)(cc.1), (1)(cc.3), (1)(cc.5), (1)(cc.6), (2)(k.3), (2)(k.5), and (2)(k.7) added, pp. 1560, 1561, §§ 4, 5, effective July 1. L. 99: (1)(cc.1) amended, p. 794, § 2, effective July 1. L. 2000: (1)(cc.6) amended and (1)(ee), (1)(ff), (1.3), and (1.5) added, pp. 241, 240, §§ 4, 3, effective March 29; (1)(n), (1)(o), and (1)(p) amended, p. 707, § 34, effective July 1. L. 2005: (1)(cc.3) amended, p. 1501, § 6, effective July 1. L. 2006: IP(1), (1)(ee), (2)(k.5), (2)(k.7), and (2)(p) amended and (1)(bb.3), (1)(bb.7), (1)(ee.3), (1)(ee.7), (1)(gg), (1)(hh), (1.2), (2)(a.5), (2)(e.5), (2)(r), and (2)(s) added, pp. 643, 644, §§ 1, 2, 3, effective July 1. L. 2007: (2)(l) amended, p. 839, § 1, effective May 14. L. 2008: (2)(c) amended, p. 325, § 1, effective April 7; (2)(r) and (2)(s) amended and (2)(t) added, p. 1513, § 3, effective May 28. L. 2010: (1)(cc.1) amended, (HB 10-1233), ch. 88, p. 296, § 7, effective August 11. L. 2011: (1)(s.3) added, (HB 11-1303), ch. 264, p. 1164, § 55, effective July 1, 2012. L. 2012: (1)(gg), (2)(s), (2)(t), and (5) amended and (1)(ii), (1)(jj), (1)(kk), (2)(u), and (3.5) added, (HB 12-1053), ch. 244, p. 1151, § 1, effective August 8. L. 2013: (2)(a.7) added, (HB 13-1156), ch. 336, p. 1958, § 7, effective August 7; (2)(r.3) added, (HB 13-1082), ch. 238, p. 1157, § 2, effective August 7. L. 2014: (1)(ii) amended, (HB 14-1273), ch. 282, pp. 1157, 1158, §§ 23, 26, effective July 1; (1)(ii), (1)(jj), (2)(j), and (5) amended and (1)(ll) and (2)(j.5) added, (HB 14-1148), ch. 95, p. 347, § 1, effective August 6. L. 2015: (1)(kk) amended, (HB 15-1229), ch. 239, p. 885, § 3, effective May 29. L. 2016: (2)(h) amended, (SB 16-181), ch. 353, p. 1452, § 6, effective June 10. L. 2017: (1.3) amended, (HB 17-1329), ch. 381, p. 1981, § 52, effective June 6; (1)(cc.6), (1)(hh), (2)(j.5), (2)(m), and (3.5) amended and (1)(mm) added, (SB 17-051), ch. 155, p. 527, § 1, effective August 9; (2)(r.3) amended, (HB 17-1204), ch. 206, p. 784, § 6, effective November 1. L. 2019: (2)(t) amended and (2)(v) added, (HB 19-1275), ch. 295, p. 2747, § 4, effective August 2. L. 2020: (2)(w) added, (SB 20-217), ch. 110, p. 457, § 11, effective June 19. L. 2021: (1)(cc.4) added, (SB 21-280), ch. 372 p. 2465, § 3, effective June 28; (1)(kk) amended, (SB 21-064), ch. 190, p. 1008, § 2, effective July 1; (2)(r) amended, (HB 21-1064), ch. 320, p. 1969, § 10, effective September 1; (2)(v) amended, (HB 21-1214), ch. 455, p. 3036, § 8, effective September 7; (2)(j.5) amended, (SB 21-059), ch. 136, p. 742, § 108, effective October 1; (1)(jj.5) added, (SB 21-271), ch. 462, p. 3223, § 403, effective March 1, 2022. L. 2022: (1)(nn) and (1)(oo) added and (2)(e.5) and (2)(k.3) amended, (SB 22-049), ch. 152, p. 969, § 2, effective May 6. L. 2023: (1)(cc.7) added, (SB 23-249), ch. 418, p. 2470, § 4, effective June 7; (2)(y) and (2)(z) added, (HB 23-1292), ch. 297, p. 1781, § 3, effective July 1; (2)(a.3) added, (SB 23-075), ch. 242, p. 1300, § 2, effective August 7; (2)(x) added, (HB 23-1187), ch. 246, p. 1347, § 9, effective August 7; (1)(v) amended, (HB 23-1293), ch. 298, p. 1796, § 61, effective October 1; (2)(u) amended and (2)(u.5) added, (HB 23-1034), ch. 15, p. 47, § 7, effective October 1. L. 2024: (2)(a.7) amended, (HB 24-1355), ch. 471, p. 3315, § 15, effective August 7. L. 2025: (1)(cc.5) amended, (SB 25-281), ch. 346, p. 1871, § 2, effective June 2; (1)(cc.2) added, (HB 25-1290), ch. 353, p. 1909, § 3, effective August 6; (1)(jj.5) amended, (SB 25-300), ch. 428, p. 2448, § 27, effective August 6; (1)(mm) amended, (SB 25-288), ch. 339, p. 1837, § 7, effective August 6. L. 2026: (2)(q.1), (2)(q.2), and (2)(q.3) added, (SB 26-149), ch. 142, p. 789, § 30, effective May 21; (1)(ll) amended, (SB 26-015), ch. 335, p. 2043, § 25, effective July 1; (1)(cc.6) amended, (HB 26-1237), ch. 117, p. 466, § 13, effective August 12; (2)(e.5) amended, (HB 26-1052), ch. 346, p. 2103, § 1, effective August 12; (2)(aa), (2)(bb), and (2)(cc) added and (3) amended, (HB 26-1052), ch. 346, p. 2103, § 1, effective August 12.
Editor's note: Amendments to subsection (1)(bb) by House Bill 95-1070 and House Bill 95-1346 were harmonized.
Cross references: For the legislative declaration contained in the 2008 act amending subsections (2)(r) and (2)(s) and enacting subsection (2)(t), see section 1 of chapter 322, Session Laws of Colorado 2008. For the legislative declaration in SB 20-217, see section 1 of chapter 110, Session Laws of Colorado 2020. For the legislative declaration in SB 26-015, see section 1 of chapter 335, Session Laws of Colorado 2026.
24-4.1-302.5. Rights afforded to victims - definitions.
(1) In order to preserve and protect a victim's rights to justice and due process, each victim of a crime has the following rights:
(a) The right to be treated with fairness, respect, and dignity, and to be free from intimidation, harassment, or abuse, throughout the criminal justice process;
(a.5) The right to request, in order to protect the safety or privacy of a victim, to have the victim referred to by an abbreviation, pseudonym, initials, or another preferred name during hearings;
(b) The right to be informed of and be present by appearing in person, by phone, virtually by audio or video, or similar technology for all critical stages of the criminal justice process as specified in section 24-4.1-302 (2); except that the victim has the right to be informed of, without being present for, the critical stages described in section 24-4.1-302 (2)(a), (2)(a.5), (2)(a.7), (2)(e.5), (2)(k.3), (2)(n), (2)(p), (2)(q), (2)(q.3), (2)(r), (2)(u), and (2)(aa);
(b.4) The right to be informed, pursuant to section 16-12-307, of wrongful action by a crime laboratory employee in a case involving a crime listed in section 24-4.1-302 (1).
(b.5) Repealed.
(b.6) For a victim of an offense resulting in a juvenile felony adjudication, the right to be informed of the filing of any petition or motion to legally possess, use, or carry a firearm or other weapon pursuant to section 18-12-108 (3)(b);
(b.7) For a victim of a sex offense, the right to be informed of the filing of any petition or motion filed to terminate sex offender registration pursuant to section 16-22-103 (5) or 16-22-113 (2) and (2.5);
(b.8) For a victim who has had forensic medical evidence collected pursuant to section 12-240-139 (1)(b) that has not resulted in a conviction or plea of guilty, the right to be notified by the law enforcement agency with jurisdiction for the case of the status and location of the victim's forensic medical evidence including:
(I) The right to be notified that the forensic medical evidence has been submitted to an accredited crime lab for testing as required by the rules promulgated pursuant to section 24-33.5-113;
(II) The right to be notified when the law enforcement agency has received the results of the medical forensic evidence DNA analysis from the accredited crime laboratory;
(II.5) Notwithstanding subsection (1)(b.8)(II) of this section, the right to be notified every ninety days by the law enforcement agency when the law enforcement agency has not yet received the results of the medical forensic evidence DNA analysis from the accredited crime laboratory. A law enforcement agency complies with this subsection (1)(b.8)(II.5) by notifying all victims required to be notified at the same time during the first week of each of March, June, September, and December.
(III) The right to be informed of whether a DNA sample was obtained from the analysis and whether or not there are matches to DNA profiles in state or federal databases;
(IV) The right to be informed at least sixty days prior to the destruction of forensic medical evidence collected in connection with the alleged sex offense;
(V) The right to file, prior to the expiration of the sixty-day period, an objection with the law enforcement agency, the Colorado bureau of investigation, or the accredited crime laboratory that is proposing to destroy the forensic medical evidence;
(VI) The right to be informed of any change in status of the case, including if the case has been closed or reopened; and
(VII) The right to receive a physical document identifying the rights under law after the exam has been completed;
(b.9) The right to receive a free copy of the initial incident report from the investigating law enforcement agency; except that the release of a document associated with the investigation is at the discretion of the law enforcement agency based on the status of the case or security and safety concerns in a correctional facility, local jail, or private contract prison as defined in section 17-1-102. The initial incident report must contain, at a minimum, the victim's name, the offender's name, the date of the crime, the charges, and a summary of the incident so the victim has sufficient detail to help the victim with, including but not limited to, insurance claims, employer intercession, protection orders, and landlord-tenant notification. The law enforcement agency may redact the names of other victims involved in the incident who are not related to the victim requesting the report and any personal identifying information, including but not limited to social security numbers, driver's license numbers, telephone numbers, email addresses, and physical addresses related to parties or witnesses in the case. The investigating law enforcement agency shall notify the district attorney of the information the victim received in the incident report and when it was provided to the victim. The district attorney shall provide this information to any defendant involved in the case through the discovery process.
(c) (I) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (1)(c)(II) of this section:
(A) The right to be informed when a person who is accused or convicted of a crime against the victim is released or discharged from county jail; and
(B) The right to be informed when a person who is accused or convicted of a crime against the victim is released or discharged from custody other than county jail, is paroled, escapes from a secure or nonsecure correctional facility or program, absconds from probation or parole, or commits an unauthorized absence as described in section 18-8-208.2 (1).
(II) With respect to the release, discharge, or permanent transfer of a person from a county jail or correctional facility, the provisions of subparagraph (I) of this paragraph (c) shall apply when the person released, discharged, or permanently transferred is no longer within the care and control of the supervising law enforcement or correctional agency. The provisions of subparagraph (I) of this paragraph (c) shall not apply to the temporary transfer of the care and control of a person from a county jail or a correctional facility by the supervising law enforcement or correctional agency to another equally or more secure county jail or correctional facility, so long as the person will return to the care and control of the transferring supervisory agency.
(d) The right to be heard at a court proceeding:
(I) Involving the defendant's bond as specified in section 24-4.1-302 (2)(c). If there is a request to decrease or modify the bond or bond conditions, the court shall set a hearing pursuant to section 16-4-109 (1), and the district attorney shall notify the victim of the hearing.
(I.5) Involving a hearing for the disclosure of the name and identifying information of a child victim or child witness pursuant to section 24-72-304 (4.5)(a.5);
(II) At which the court accepts a plea of nolo contendere;
(III) At which the court accepts a negotiated plea agreement;
(IV) At which a person accused or convicted of a crime against the victim is sentenced or resentenced;
(V) At which the sentence of a person accused or convicted of a crime against the victim is modified;
(VI) At which the defendant requests a modification of the no contact provision of the mandatory criminal protection order pursuant to section 18-1-1001 or 19-2.5-607;
(VII) Involving an application to the court for the issuance of a subpoena for records concerning the victim's medical history, mental health, or education; victim compensation records; or any other records that are privileged pursuant to section 13-90-107;
(VIII) Involving a petition for expungement as described in section 19-1-306;
(IX) Involving a hearing as described in section 24-31-902 (2)(c);
(X) Involving a hearing held pursuant to section 24-72-706, 24-72-709, or 24-72-710;
(XI) Involving a hearing held pursuant to section 18-1.3-103.7 or 19-2.5-1118.5; or
(XII) Involving a hearing held pursuant to section 18-1.3-603.
(d.5) (I) If a victim or a victim's designee is unavailable to be present for the critical stages described in subsection (1)(d) of this section and the victim or the victim's designee wishes to address the court, the right to request that the court, within the court's resources, arrange and provide the means for the victim and the victim's designee to provide input to the court beyond a written victim impact statement, which may include, but need not be limited to, appearing by phone, virtually by video or audio, or similar technology.
(II) For purposes of this paragraph (d.5), "unavailable" means that the victim or the victim's designee is physically unable to attend the court hearing, may sustain a financial hardship to attend the court hearing, is concerned for his or her safety if he or she attends the court hearing, may suffer significant emotional impact by attending the hearing, or is unavailable for other good cause.
(III) The victim or the victim's designee shall notify the district attorney within a reasonable time that the victim or the victim's designee is unavailable to attend the court hearing. The district attorney's office shall then inform the court that the victim or the victim's designee, due to the victim's or the victim's designee's unavailability, is requesting the court to arrange for and provide the means to address the court, which must include but need not be limited to appearing by phone, virtually by video or audio, or similar technology. The district attorney shall inform the victim or the victim's designee of the available options to appear remotely.
(IV) This subsection (1)(d.5) applies to a victim who is incarcerated or otherwise being held in a local county jail, the department of corrections, or the division of youth services in the department of human services, but is limited to participation by telephone or appearing virtually by video or audio, or similar technology.
(e) The right to consult with the prosecution after any crime against the victim has been charged, prior to any prefile or post filing diversion offer, prior to any disposition of the case, or prior to any trial of the case, and the right to be informed of the final disposition of the case. The right to consult with the prosecution must include an explanation to the victim of the possibility that the defendant may not serve the defendant's entire sentence in the department of corrections because the defendant may receive good time credits or earned time while incarcerated;
(e.2) The right to be informed if a district attorney grants early termination to an offender participating in a diversion program and the date of termination from the diversion program;
(f) The right to be informed by local law enforcement agencies, prior to the filing of charges with the court, or by the district attorney, after the filing of charges with the court, of the status of any case concerning a crime against the victim, and any scheduling changes or cancellations, if such changes or cancellations are known in advance;
(g) The right to be present at the sentencing hearing, including any hearing conducted pursuant to section 18-1.3-1201 or 18-1.4-102, C.R.S., for cases involving class 1 felonies, of any person convicted of a crime against such victim, and to inform the district attorney and the court, in writing, by a victim impact statement, and by an oral statement, of the harm that the victim has sustained as a result of the crime, with the determination of whether the victim makes written input or oral input, or both, to be made at the sole discretion of the victim;
(h) The right to have the court determine the amount, if any, of restitution to be paid to a victim pursuant to part 6 of article 1.3 of title 18, C.R.S., by any person convicted of a crime against such victim for the actual pecuniary damages that resulted from the commission of the crime;
(i) The right to be informed of the victim's right to pursue a civil judgment against any person convicted of a crime against the victim for any damages incurred by the victim as a result of the commission of the crime regardless of whether the court has ordered such person to make restitution to the victim;
(i.5) (Deleted by amendment, L. 2006, p. 645, § 4, effective July 1, 2006.)
(j) The right to be informed of any proceeding at which any postconviction release from confinement in a secure state correctional facility is being considered for any person convicted of a crime against the victim and the right to be present by appearing in person, by phone, or virtually by video or audio, or similar technology, and heard at any such proceeding or to provide written information. For purposes of this subsection (1), "proceeding" means reconsideration of sentence, a parole hearing, a full parole board review, revocation hearing, rescission hearing, commutation of sentence, or consideration for placement in the specialized program developed by the department of corrections pursuant to section 17-34-102.
(j.2) The right to be informed of any request for progression from the state mental health hospital on behalf of a person in its custody as a result of a criminal case involving the victim, and the right to be present by appearing in person, by phone, or virtually by video or audio, or similar technology, and heard at any hearing during which a court considers such a request. For purposes of this subsection (1)(j.2), "request for progression" includes any request for off-grounds or unsupervised privileges, community placement, conditional release, unconditional discharge, or a special furlough.
(j.3) The right to be notified of a referral of an offender to community corrections;
(j.5) (I) The right to provide a written victim impact statement that must be included with any referral made by the department of corrections or a district court to place an offender in a community corrections facility or program. A community corrections board may allow a victim to provide an oral statement by appearing in person, by phone, or virtually by video or audio, or similar technology, to the community corrections board when an offender is being considered for a direct sentence to community corrections and may place reasonable limits on the victim's oral statement.
(II) For purposes of this subsection (1)(j.5), the victim shall have the right to provide a separate oral statement by appearing in person, by phone, or virtually by video or audio, or similar technology, to the community corrections board considering a transitional referral, but the board shall have discretion to place reasonable parameters on the victim's oral statement. If a community corrections board denies the offender's referral to community corrections, the victim's right under this subsection (1)(j.5)(II) to provide an oral statement must not take effect.
(III) For purposes of this subsection (1)(j.5), if a victim or a victim's designee is unavailable to be present for a proceeding to consider an offender for a direct sentence or transitional referral to community corrections as described in subsection (1)(j.5)(I) of this section, and the victim or the victim's designee wishes to address the community corrections board, the victim or the victim's designee shall notify the community corrections board within a reasonable time that the victim is unavailable to attend the proceeding but would like to make a statement. Within its resources, the community corrections board shall arrange for and provide the means for the victim to address the board, which means may include, but need not be limited to, appearing in person, by phone, or virtually by audio or video, or similar technology.
(IV) For purposes of this subsection (1)(j.5), "unavailable" means the victim or the victim's designee is physically unable to attend the proceeding, may sustain a financial hardship to attend the proceeding, is concerned for his or her safety if he or she attends the proceeding, may suffer significant emotional impact by attending the proceeding, or is unavailable for other good cause.
(V) This subsection (1)(j.5) applies to a victim who is incarcerated or otherwise being held in a local county jail, the department of corrections, or the division of youth corrections in the department of human services but is limited to participation by appearing in person, by phone, or virtually by audio or video, or similar technology.
(j.6) The right to be informed of any request for changes to material terms of a civil commitment pursuant to section 27-65-201 or enhanced protective placement pursuant to section 25.5-10-507 on behalf of a person in a civil commitment or protective placement in a criminal case involving the victim, and the right to be present by appearing in person, by phone, or virtually by video or audio, or similar technology, and heard at any hearing during which a court considers the request. As used in this subsection (1)(j.6), "request for changes to material terms" includes any request to be released from an inpatient setting to an outpatient setting or to be moved into a community-based setting outside of inpatient care at the discretion of CDHS, as defined in section 16-8.5-101.
(j.7) The right, at the discretion of the district attorney, to view all or a portion of the presentence report of the probation department;
(j.8) The right to obtain any incident recording as described in section 24-31-902;
(k) The right to promptly receive any property that belongs to a victim and that is being held by a prosecutorial or law enforcement agency unless there are evidentiary reasons for the retention of such property;
(l) The right to be informed of the availability of financial assistance and community services for victims, the immediate families of victims, and witnesses, which assistance and community services shall include, but shall not be limited to, crisis intervention services, victim compensation funds, victim assistance resources, legal resources, mental health services, social services, medical resources, rehabilitative services, and financial assistance services, and the right to be informed about the application process for such services;
(l.5) The right to be informed about the possibility of restorative justice practices, as defined in section 18-1-901 (3)(o.5), C.R.S., which includes victim-offender conferences;
(m) The right to be informed about what steps can be taken by a victim or a witness, including information regarding protection services, in case there is any intimidation or harassment by a person accused or convicted of a crime against the victim, or any other person acting on behalf of the accused or convicted person;
(n) The right to be provided with appropriate employer intercession services to encourage the victim's employer to cooperate with the criminal justice system in order to minimize the loss of employment, pay, or other benefits resulting from a victim's court appearances or other required meetings with criminal justice officials;
(o) The right to be assured that in any criminal proceeding the court, the prosecutor, and other law enforcement officials will take appropriate action to achieve a swift and fair resolution of the proceedings;
(p) The right to be provided, whenever practicable, with a secure waiting area during court proceedings that does not require a victim or a witness to be seen or to be in close proximity to the person accused or convicted of a crime against the victim or such person's family or friends;
(q) The right to be informed when a person convicted of a crime against the victim is placed in or transferred to a less secure public or private correctional facility or program;
(q.5) The right to be informed of the results of a probation or parole revocation hearing;
(r) The right to be informed when a person who is or was charged with or convicted of a crime against the victim escapes or is permanently or conditionally transferred or released from any public hospital, private hospital, or state hospital;
(s) The right to be informed of any rights which the victim has pursuant to the constitution of the United States or the state of Colorado;
(t) The right to be informed of the process for enforcing compliance with this article pursuant to section 24-4.1-303 (17);
(u) The right to be informed of the results of any testing for a sexually transmitted infection that is ordered and performed pursuant to section 18-3-415, 25-4-408 (6), or 25-4-412, C.R.S.;
(v) The right to prevent any party at any court proceeding from compelling testimony regarding the current address, telephone number, place of employment, or other locating information of the victim unless the victim consents or the court orders disclosure upon a finding that a reasonable and articulable need for the information exists. Any proceeding conducted by the court concerning whether to order disclosure shall be in camera.
(w) The right to have the district attorney, a law enforcement agency, a probation department, a state or private correctional facility, the department of human services, or the Colorado mental health institute at Pueblo make all reasonable efforts to exclude or redact a victim's social security number or a witness' social security number from a criminal justice document or record created or compiled as a result of a criminal investigation when the document or record is released to anyone other than the victim, the defense attorney of record, the defense attorney's agent, or a criminal justice agency that has duties under this article;
(x) The right to be notified of how to request protection of their address pursuant to the Colorado rules of criminal procedure;
(y) The right to receive a copy of the victim impact statement form from the district attorney's office;
(z) The right to be notified of a hearing concerning any motion filed for or petition for sealing of records described in section 24-72-706 or 24-72-709 or 24-72-710 filed by a defendant in the criminal case whose crime falls under section 24-4.1-302 (1);
(aa) The right to be informed of the governor's decision to commute or pardon a person convicted of a crime against the victim before such information is publicly disclosed.
(1.6) The right to be informed of the existence of a criminal protection order pursuant to section 18-1-1001 or 19-2.5-607 and, upon request of the victim, information about provisions that may be added or modified, and the process for requesting such an addition or modification.
(2) Subsection (1) of this section shall not be construed to imply that any victim who is incarcerated by the department of corrections or any local law enforcement agency has a right to be released to attend any hearing or that the department of corrections or the local law enforcement agency has any duty to transport such incarcerated victim to any hearing.
(3) Municipalities and municipal courts shall be encouraged to adopt policies which afford the rights granted to crime victims pursuant to this section to crime victims at the municipal court level, to the extent the adoption of such policies is practicable in the particular municipality.
(4) (a) If a victim contacts a criminal justice agency regarding a crime that occurred before 1993, and the offender who committed the crime is currently serving a sentence for the crime, the victim may request notification of any future critical stages of the criminal proceedings. This provision does not require a criminal justice agency to proactively locate victims of crimes that occurred before 1993.
(b) If an arrest is made for a crime committed before 1993 that was previously unsolved, the appropriate criminal justice agency shall notify the crime victim of all future critical stages.
Source: L. 92: Entire section added, p. 418, § 3, effective January 14, 1993. L. 94: (1)(i.5) added, p. 2042, § 25, effective July 1. L. 95: (1)(b), (1)(c), (1)(e), (1)(h), (1)(i.5), (1)(j), and (1)(p) to (1)(r) amended and (1)(j.5) added, p. 1403, § 5, effective July 1. L. 97: (1)(g) amended, p. 47, § 1, effective March 21; (1)(r) and (1)(s) amended and (1)(t) added, p. 1561, § 6, effective July 1. L. 2000: (1)(d), (1)(q), and (1)(r) amended and (1)(j.7) and (1)(u) added, p. 241, § 5, effective March 29; (1)(h) amended, p. 1051, § 21, effective September 1. L. 2002: (1)(g) amended, p. 1530, § 240, effective October 1. L. 2002, 3rd Ex. Sess.: (1)(g) amended, p. 34, § 31, effective July 12 and (1)(g) amended, p. 34, § 32, effective October 1. L. 2006: (1)(b), (1)(c), (1)(g), (1)(h), (1)(i.5), (1)(j.5), (1)(k), (1)(t), and (1)(u) amended and (1)(b.5), (1)(j.3), and (1)(v) added, p. 645, § 4, effective July 1. L. 2007: (1)(b.5) amended and (1)(b.7) added, pp. 839, 840, §§ 2, 3, effective May 14. L. 2008: (1)(d) amended, p. 326, § 2, effective April 7. L. 2009: (1)(j.5) amended, (HB 09-1181), ch. 76, p. 276, § 1, effective August 5. L. 2011: (1)(l.5) added, (HB 11-1032), ch. 296, p. 1408, § 19, effective August 10. L. 2012: (1)(b), (1)(c)(II), (1)(d)(V), (1)(d)(VI), (1)(j.5)(I), (1)(m), and (1)(u) amended and (1)(d)(VII), (1)(d.5), (1)(w), (1)(x), (1)(y), (1.6), and (4) added, (HB 12-1053), ch. 244, p. 1152, § 2, effective August 8. L. 2013: (1)(b) amended, (HB 13-1156), ch. 336, p. 1958, § 8, effective August 7; (1)(d)(VI) and (1)(d)(VII) amended and (1)(d)(VIII) added, (HB 13-1082), ch. 238, p. 1157, § 3, effective August 7; (1)(l.5) amended, (HB 13-1254), ch. 341, p. 1990, § 11, effective August 7. L. 2014: (1)(b.9) and (1)(z) added and (1)(d.5)(IV) and (4) amended, (HB 14-1148), ch. 95, p. 348, § 2, effective August 6. L. 2015: (1)(z) amended, (SB 15-264), ch. 259, p. 958, § 61, effective August 5. L. 2016: (1)(d)(IV) amended, (SB 16-181), ch. 353, p. 1452, § 7, effective June 10; IP(1) and (1)(u) amended, (SB 16-146), ch. 230, p. 919, § 16, effective July 1; (1)(j) amended, (SB 16-180), ch. 352, p. 1445, § 5, effective August 10. L. 2017: (1)(d.5)(IV) amended, (HB 17-1329), ch. 381, p. 1981, § 53, effective June 6; (1)(j) amended and (1)(j.2), (1)(j.5)(III), (1)(j.5)(IV), (1)(j.5)(V), (1)(q.5), and (1)(aa) added, (SB 17-051), ch. 155, p. 528, § 2, effective August 9; (1)(d)(VIII) amended, (HB 17-1204), ch. 206, p. 785, § 7, effective November 1. L. 2018: (1)(b.7) amended, (SB 18-026), ch. 143, p. 926, § 4, effective August 8. L. 2019: (1)(b.5) repealed and (1)(c)(I), (1)(j), (1)(q), and (1)(r) amended, (HB 19-1064), ch. 296, p. 2750, § 4, effective May 28; (1)(z) amended, (HB 19-1275), ch. 295, p. 2748, § 5, effective August 2. L. 2020: (1)(c)(I)(B) amended, (HB 20-1019), ch. 9, p. 28, § 12, effective March 6; (1)(d)(VII) and (1)(d)(VIII) amended and (1)(d)(IX) and (1)(j.8) added, (SB 20-217), ch. 110, p. 458, § 12, effective June 19. L. 2021: (1)(b.8) added, (HB 21-1143), ch. 191, p. 1012, § 4, effective May 27; (1)(b.7) amended, (HB 21-1064), ch. 320, p. 1970, § 11, effective September 1; (1)(d)(VIII), (1)(d)(IX), and (1)(z) amended and (1)(d)(X) added, (HB 21-1214), ch. 455, p. 3036, § 9, effective September 7; (1)(d)(VI) and (1.6) amended, (SB 21-059), ch. 136, p. 743, § 109, effective October 1. L. 2022: (1)(b.6) added, (HB 22-1257), ch. 69, p. 362, § 12, effective April 7; (1)(b), (1)(b.9), (1)(d)(I), (1)(d)(VII), (1)(d.5)(I), (1)(d.5)(III), (1)(d.5)(IV), (1)(e), (1)(j), (1)(j.2), (1)(j.5)(I), (1)(j.5)(II), (1)(j.5)(III), (1)(j.5)(V), and (1)(z) amended and (1)(e.2) added, (SB 22-049), ch. 152, p. 970, § 3, effective May 6. L. 2023: (1)(d)(I.5) added, (SB 23-075), ch. 242, p. 1300, § 3, effective August 7; (1)(d)(IX) and (1)(d)(X) amended and (1)(d)(XI) added, (HB 23-1187), ch. 246, p. 1347, § 10, effective August 7. L. 2025: (1)(b.10) added, (HB 25-1275), ch. 352, p. 1906, § 2, effective June 2; IP(1)(b.8) amended and (1)(b.8)(II.5) added, (SB 25-304), ch. 414, p. 2352, § 2, effective June 3. L. 2026: (1)(b) amended and (1)(j.6) added, (SB 26-149), ch. 142, p. 789, § 31, effective May 21; (1)(j.8) amended, (SB 26-190), ch. 337, p. 2051, § 5, effective June 3; (1)(a.5) and (1)(d)(XII) added and (1)(b), IP(1)(d), (1)(d)(VII), (1)(d)(X), and (1)(d)(XI) amended, (HB 26-1052), ch. 346, p. 2104, § 2, effective August 12.
Editor's note: (1) Section 5 of chapter 352 (HB 25-1275), Session Laws of Colorado 2025, provides that the act changing this section applies to claims for relief filed on or after June 2, 2025, that are based on knowing misconduct or a significant event, as defined in the act, that occurred before, on, or after June 2, 2025.
(2) Subsection (1)(b.4) was numbered as (1)(b.10) in HB 25-1275 but was renumbered on revision for ease of location.
(3) Amendments to subsection (1)(b) by HB 26-1052 and SB 26-149 were harmonized.
Cross references: For the legislative declaration contained in the 2002 act amending subsection (1)(g), see section 1 of chapter 318, Session Laws of Colorado 2002. For the legislative declaration contained in the 2002 Third Extraordinary Session act amending subsection (1)(g), see section 16 of chapter 1, Session Laws of Colorado 2002, Third Extraordinary Session. For the legislative declaration in SB 16-180, see section 1 of chapter 352, Session Laws of Colorado 2016. For the legislative declaration in SB 20-217, see section 1 of chapter 110, Session Laws of Colorado 2020. For the legislative declaration in SB 21-1143, see section 1 of chapter 191, Session Laws of Colorado 2021. For the legislative declaration in SB 26-190, see section 1 of chapter 337, Session Laws of Colorado 2026.
ANNOTATION
A victim's right to be present at all critical stages of the criminal justice process under § 16a of article II of the state constitution and subsection (1)(d) takes precedence over a party's right to sequester witnesses under CRE 615. The father of a murder victim who testified in the defendant's trial was wrongly excluded from subsequent portions of the trial. People v. Coney, 98 P.3d 930 (Colo. App. 2004); People v. Lopez, 2016 COA 179, 401 P.3d 103.
If the defense wants to call a victim to testify at a preliminary hearing, it must properly serve the victim with a subpoena. People v. Platteel, 2023 CO 18, 528 P.3d 176.
A victim's right to be informed of and present and heard at all critical stages of the criminal justice process under § 16a of article II includes a bond hearing in a capital case held after a court grants a motion for a new trial, even if the district attorney does not contend the proof is evident or presumption great. People v. Blagg, 2015 CO 2, 340 P.3d 1137.
A victim's "right to be heard" under § 16a of article II is limited by subsection (1)(d) to "any court proceeding which involves a bond reduction or modification, the acceptance of a negotiated plea agreement, or the sentencing of any person accused or convicted of a crime" against the victim. Gansz v. People, 888 P.2d 256 (Colo. 1995).
Section 16a of article II authorizes the general assembly to define "all terminology". The enactment of subsection (1)(d) reflects a legislative determination as to when a victim's input would be relevant, and, therefore, when a right to be heard would be appropriate. Gansz v. People, 888 P.2d 256 (Colo. 1995).
Section 16a of article II does not grant an alleged crime victim standing or the right to contest a district attorney's decision to dismiss criminal charges or the right to appellate review of the order dismissing the charges, nor does that section and the enabling legislation under this section grant an alleged crime victim the right to be heard on a district attorney's motion to dismiss a criminal charge. Gansz v. People, 888 P.2d 256 (Colo. 1995).
Mother convicted of contributing to the delinquency of her minor son was required to pay restitution since he was the victim of the crime. People v. Miller, 830 P.2d 1092 (Colo. App. 1991).
The doctrine of abatement ab initio does not apply to civil judgments created by restitution orders. Where defendant died after conviction and entry of the order of restitution, but before determination of the direct appeal, the common law doctrine of abatement ab initio applied to defendant's conviction. Because of the importance of protecting the rights of victims, however, the restitution order, which created a civil judgment under §18-1.3-603 (4)(a), was not subject to abatement but could be appealed by defendant's estate. People v. Daly, 313 P.3d 571 (Colo. App. 2011), overruled in People v. Johnson, 2021 CO 79, 499 P.3d 1045.
When a defendant dies while his criminal conviction is pending on direct appeal, the doctrine of abatement ab initio extinguishes a restitution order entered as part of his sentence. People v. Johnson, 2020 COA 124, 487 P.3d 1262, aff'd, 2021 CO 79, 499 P.3d 1045 (overruling People v. Daly, 313 P.3d 571 (Colo. App. 2011)).
The general assembly did not act improperly in limiting the proceedings in which a victim has the right to be heard. Since § 16a of article II grants the general assembly the power to define "critical stages" and "right to be heard", the constitution does not guarantee a victim the right to be heard at all stages of the trial. People v. Herron, 874 P.2d 435 (Colo. App. 1993).
In implementing § 16a of article II, the general assembly did not give victims the right to appeal a district attorney's decision to dismiss the charges. People v. Herron, 874 P.2d 435 (Colo. App. 1993).
24-4.1-303. Procedures for ensuring rights of victims of crimes.
(1) Law enforcement agencies, prosecutorial agencies, judicial agencies, and correctional agencies shall ensure that victims of crimes are afforded the rights described in section 24-4.1-302.5.
(1.5) If a crime victim is deceased or incapacitated, one or more members of the victim's immediate family may represent the interests of the victim as the victim's designee. A victim's designee has the right to be informed, present, or heard at any proceeding pursuant to section 24-4.1-302.5 (1)(d), (1)(j), and (1)(j.5) and subsections (13.5)(a)(III), (13.5)(a)(IV), and (14)(d) of this section. If the victim is a child or an at-risk adult, as defined in section 18-6.5-102, the victim's designee must not be the defendant or the alleged offender in the underlying case.
(2) All correctional officials shall keep confidential the address, telephone number, place of employment, or other personal information of such victim or members of such victim's immediate family.
(3) The district attorney's office, if practicable, shall inform the victim of any pending motion that may substantially delay the prosecution. The district attorney shall inform the court of the victim's position on the motion, if any. If the victim has objected, the court shall state in writing or on the record prior to granting any delay that the objection was considered.
(3.5) The district attorney's office, if practicable, shall inform the victim of any pending motion or decision by the district attorney to sequester the victim from a critical stage in the case. The district attorney shall inform the court of the victim's position on the motion or the district attorney's decision, if any. If the victim has objected, then the court, before granting the sequestration order, shall state in writing or on the record that the victim's objection was considered and state the basis for the court's decision. If a victim is sequestered, the district attorney must undertake best efforts to prioritize the timing of the victim's testimony and minimize the amount of time the victim is sequestered from the critical stages in the case.
(4) After a crime has been charged, or as part of a prefiling or post filing diversion offer, unless inconsistent with the requirements of investigative activities, the district attorney shall consult, if practicable, with the victim concerning the reduction of charges, negotiated pleas, diversion, dismissal, seeking of death penalty, or other disposition. The district attorney shall explain to the victim the possibility that the defendant may not serve the defendant's entire sentence in the department of corrections because the defendant may receive good time credits or earned time while incarcerated. Failure to comply with this subsection (4) does not invalidate any decision, agreement, or disposition. This subsection (4) must not be construed as a restriction on or delegation of the district attorney's authority under the constitution and laws of this state.
(5) All reasonable attempts shall be made to protect any victim or the victim's immediate family from harm, harassment, intimidation, or retaliation arising from cooperating in the reporting, investigation, and prosecution of a crime. Law enforcement officials and the district attorney shall provide reasonable efforts to minimize contact between the victim and the victim's immediate family and the defendant and the relatives of the defendant before, during, and immediately after a judicial proceeding. Whenever possible, a waiting area shall be provided that is separate in both proximity and sight from that of the defendant, the defendant's relatives, and any defense witnesses.
(6) (a) A victim or an individual designated by the victim may be present at all critical stages of a criminal proceeding regarding any crime against such victim unless the court or the district attorney determines that exclusion of the victim is necessary to protect the defendant's right to a fair trial or the confidentiality of juvenile proceedings. If the victim is present, the court, at the victim's request, may permit the presence of an individual to provide support to the victim.
(b) A victim may be present at the phase of the trial at which the defendant is determined to be guilty or not guilty and may be heard at such phase of the trial if called to testify by the district attorney, defense, or court if any such statement would be relevant.
(c) The court shall make all reasonable efforts to accommodate the victim upon the return of a verdict by the jury. If the court is informed by the district attorney that the victim is en route to the courtroom for the reading of the verdict, the court shall state on the record that it has considered the information provided by the district attorney prior to the return of the verdict by the jury.
(7) When a victim's property is no longer needed for evidentiary reasons, the district attorney or any law enforcement agency shall, upon request of the victim, return such property to the victim within five working days unless the property is contraband or subject to forfeiture proceedings.
(8) An employer may not discharge or discipline any victim or a member of a victim's immediate family for honoring a subpoena to testify in a criminal proceeding or for participating in the preparation of a criminal proceeding.
(9) The district attorney and any law enforcement agency shall inform each victim as to the availability of the following services:
(a) Follow-up support for the victim and the victim's immediate family in order to ensure that the necessary assistance is received by such persons;
(b) Services for child victims and elderly victims, and services for victims who are persons with disabilities, which are directed to the special needs of such victims;
(c) Referral to special counseling facilities and community service agencies by providing the names and telephone numbers of such facilities or agencies, whether public or private, which provide such services as crisis intervention services, victim compensation funds, victim assistance resources, legal resources, mental health services, social services, medical resources, rehabilitative services, financial assistance, and other support services;
(d) Transportation and household assistance to promote the participation of any victim or the victim's immediate family in the criminal proceedings;
(e) Assistance in dealing with creditors and credit reporting agencies to deal with any financial setbacks caused by the commission of a crime;
(f) Interpretation services and information printed in languages other than the English language;
(g) Child care services to enable a victim or the victim's immediate family to give testimony or otherwise participate in the prosecution of a criminal proceeding; and
(h) The existence of a criminal protection order pursuant to section 18-1-1001 or 19-2.5-607 and, upon request of the victim, information about provisions that may be added or modified and the process for requesting such an addition or modification.
(10) (a) After the initial contact between a victim and a law enforcement agency responsible for investigating a crime, the agency shall promptly give the victim the following information in writing:
(I) A statement of the victim's rights as enumerated in this article;
(II) Information concerning the availability of victim assistance, medical, and emergency services;
(III) Information concerning the availability of compensatory benefits pursuant to this article and the name, address, and telephone number of any person to contact to obtain such benefits;
(IV) The availability of protection for the victim from the person accused of committing a crime against the victim, including protective court orders; and
(V) The right of a victim to request a copy of the law enforcement report and other documents related to the case, including the right to receive a free copy of the initial incident report. The release of any documents associated with the investigation is at the discretion of the law enforcement agency based on the status of the case.
(b) As soon as available, the law enforcement agency shall give to each victim, as appropriate, the following information:
(I) The business address and business telephone number of the office of the district attorney;
(II) The file number of the case and the name, business address, and business telephone number of any law enforcement officer assigned to investigate the case;
(III) Unless such information would be inconsistent with the requirements of the investigation, information as to whether a suspect has been taken into custody and, if known, whether the suspect has been released, any conditions imposed upon such release, and further notification that may be required pursuant to section 24-4.1-302.5 (1)(c);
(IV) Upon request of the victim, the law enforcement agency shall provide the victim in a cold case information concerning any change in the status of the case. In addition, the law enforcement agency shall provide an update at least annually to the victim concerning the status of a cold case involving one or more crimes for which the criminal statute of limitations is longer than three years.
(V) Any final decision not to file misdemeanor charges against a person accused of committing any crime specified in section 24-4.1-302 (1) against the victim unless law enforcement and the district attorney's office in a judicial district have developed a policy specifying the manner in which to inform victims of decisions not to file charges in a case.
(11) The district attorney shall inform a victim of the following:
(a) The filing of charges against a person accused of committing any of the crimes specified in section 24-4.1-302 (1) against the victim, including an explanation of the charges when necessary; or a final decision not to file felony charges against a person for whom law enforcement has requested, pursuant to section 16-21-103 (2)(a), C.R.S., the filing of charges for any of the crimes specified in section 24-4.1-302 (1) committed against the victim unless law enforcement and the district attorney's office in a judicial district have developed a policy specifying the manner in which to inform victims of decisions not to file charges in a case;
(a.5) The charges to be filed, prior to filing of the charges, if the most serious charge to be filed is lower than the most serious charge for which the individual was arrested and the filing of the lower charge may result in the court issuing a new, lower bond;
(b) Any of the critical stages specified in section 24-4.1-302 (2)(a) to (2)(j), (2)(l), and (2)(u.5) of a criminal proceeding relating to a person accused of a crime against the victim; except that the district attorney shall not be obligated to inform the victim of any appellate review undertaken by the attorney general's office;
(b.3) Any hearing for the disclosure of the name and identifying information of a child victim or child witness pursuant to section 24-72-304 (4.5)(a.5);
(b.5) Any critical stage described in section 24-4.1-302 (2)(r.3) relating to a hearing concerning a petition for the expungement of juvenile records, which records concern an offense committed by the juvenile against the victim;
(b.7) Any motion filed, unless the motion is denied because the motion is either insufficient or the defendant is not entitled to relief, or any hearing concerning a motion or petition for sealing of records as described in section 24-72-706, 24-72-709, or 24-72-710 that was filed by a defendant in the criminal case and whose crime falls under section 24-4.1-302 (1). The notification should be made using the last-known contact information that is available for the victim.
(b.8) Any critical stage described in section 24-4.1-302 (2)(q.1), (2)(q.2), and (2)(q.3);
(b.9) Any information received pursuant to subsection (14.8) of this section;
(c) The assignment of any case regarding a crime against the victim, including the file number of such case and, if available, the name, business address, and business telephone number of any deputy district attorney assigned to the case, and the court room to which the case is assigned;
(d) The date, time, and place of any of the critical stages specified in section 24-4.1-302 (2)(a) to (2)(j) and (2)(l) of the proceeding;
(e) The availability of benefits pursuant to this article and the name, address, and telephone number of any person to contact to obtain such benefits;
(f) The availability of transportation to and from any court proceeding for any victim, except as provided in section 24-4.1-302.5 (2);
(g) The availability of restorative justice practices, as defined in section 18-1-901 (3)(o.5), C.R.S., which includes victim-offender conferences;
(h) The right to complete a written victim impact statement. The victim has the option to complete the statement on a form provided by the district attorney's office. The district attorney shall inform the victim that the defendant has a right to view the victim impact statement.
(i) The availability of the district attorney to seek a court order to protect a victim's residential address;
(j) That the district attorney received notice pursuant to section 16-12-307 (1) that a crime laboratory employee engaged in wrongful action and a criminal case identified in the notice involves a crime against the victim;
(k) An evidentiary hearing on post-conviction petition for relief held pursuant to section 16-12-312; and
(l) The victim's right to request the use of the victim's preferred name during hearings pursuant to section 24-4.1-302.5 (1)(a.5).
(12) Unless a victim requests otherwise, the district attorney shall inform each victim of the following:
(a) The function of a presentence report, including the name and telephone number of the probation office preparing any such report regarding a person convicted of a crime against the victim, and the right of a victim, or a member of the victim's immediate family, to make a victim impact statement pursuant to this article;
(b) The defendant's right to view the presentence report and the victim impact statement;
(c) The date, time, and location of any sentencing or resentencing hearing;
(d) The right of the victim, or a member of the victim's immediate family, to attend and to express an opinion at the sentencing hearing as to the appropriateness of any sentence proposed to the court for consideration;
(e) Any sentence imposed;
(f) (I) The date, time, and location of any hearing for modification of a sentence pursuant to rule 35 (a) or rule 35 (b) of the Colorado rules of criminal procedure or any provision of state or federal law; except that a district attorney is not required to inform each victim of a resentencing following a probation revocation hearing or a request for early termination of probation. For both probation revocation hearings and requests for early termination, it is the responsibility of the probation department to notify the victim if the victim has requested post-sentencing notification.
(II) If a hearing is not scheduled and the court has reviewed a written motion for modification of sentence and is considering granting any part of the motion without a hearing, the court shall inform the district attorney, and the district attorney shall notify and receive input from the victim to give to the court before the court rules on the motion.
(III) If the court has reviewed and denied the written motion without a hearing, the district attorney is not required to notify the victim regarding the filing of or ruling on the motion.
(IV) This paragraph (f) does not modify the probation department's responsibility to notify a victim that has opted to receive notifications described in subsection (13.5) of this section.
(f.5) Any motion to modify the terms and conditions of an unsupervised deferred sentence for which the district attorney's office is the monitoring agency. The procedures for notifying victims outlined in subparagraphs (I) and (II) of paragraph (f) of this subsection (12) apply to the district attorney and the court with regard to this motion.
(g) The right to receive information from correctional officials concerning the imprisonment and release of a person convicted of a crime against the victim pursuant to subsection (14) of this section;
(g.5) The right to receive information from the state mental health hospital concerning the custody and release of an offender who was ordered by a court into the hospital's custody pursuant to subsection (14.2) of this section;
(h) The right to receive information from the probation department concerning information outlined in subsection (13.5) of this section regarding a person convicted of a crime against the victim;
(i) The decision, whether by court order, stipulation of the parties, or otherwise, to conduct postconviction DNA testing to establish the actual innocence of the person convicted of a crime against the victim. If court proceedings are initiated based on the results of the postconviction DNA testing, the victim shall be notified of the court proceedings by the district attorney's office that filed and prosecuted the charges resulting in the entry of the judgment of conviction challenged by the defendant. If the attorney general's office is the agency that decides to conduct postconviction DNA testing, the attorney general's office is responsible for notifying the victim.
(j) The right to be informed of a request for progression from the state mental health hospital on behalf of a person in its custody as a result of a criminal case involving the victim.
(13) If a person convicted of a crime against the victim seeks appellate review or attacks the conviction or sentence, the district attorney or the office of the attorney general, whichever is appropriate, shall inform the victim of the status of the case and of the decision of the court.
(13.5) (a) Following a sentence to probation and upon the written request of a victim, the probation department shall notify the victim of the following information regarding any person who was charged with or convicted of a crime against the victim:
(I) The location and telephone number of the probation department responsible for the supervision of the person;
(II) The date of the person's termination from probation supervision;
(III) Any request for release of the person in advance of the person's imposed sentence or period of probation, including notification of the victim's right to be present and heard at the hearing and notification of the results of such a hearing pursuant to section 24-4.1-302.5 (1)(d). If a hearing is not scheduled and the court has reviewed a written motion for early termination of probation and is considering granting the motion without a hearing, the court shall inform the probation department and the district attorney's office, and the probation department shall notify and receive input from the victim to give to the court before the court rules on the motion. If the court has reviewed and denied such a request without a hearing, the probation department is not required to notify the victim regarding the filing of or ruling on the request.
(IV) Any probation revocation or modification hearing at which the person's sentence may be reconsidered or modified and any changes in the scheduling of the hearings, including notification of the victim's right to be present and heard at the hearing and notification of the results of such a hearing pursuant to section 24-4.1-302.5 (1)(d). If a hearing is not scheduled and the court has reviewed a written motion for modification of sentence and is considering granting any part of the motion without a hearing, the court shall inform the probation department and the district attorney's office, and the probation department shall notify and receive input from the victim to give to the court before the court rules on the motion. If the court has reviewed and denied the written motion without a hearing, the probation department is not required to notify the victim regarding the filing of or ruling on the motion.
(V) Any motion filed by the probation department requesting permission from the court to modify the terms and conditions of probation as described in section 18-1.3-204 or 19-2.5-1108 if the motion has not been denied by the court without a hearing;
(V.5) Any change of venue, transfer of probation supervision from one jurisdiction to another, or interstate compact transfer of probation supervision;
(VI) Any complaint, summons, or warrant filed by the probation department;
(VII) The death of the person while under the jurisdiction of the probation department;
(VIII) Concerning domestic violence cases, any conduct by the probationer that results in an increase in the supervision level by the probation department; and
(IX) Any court-ordered modification of the terms and conditions of probation as described in section 18-1.3-204 or 19-2.5-1108.
(b) Repealed.
(14) Upon receipt of a written victim impact statement as provided in section 24-4.1-302.5 (1)(j.5), the department of corrections shall include the statement with any referral made by the department of corrections or a district court to place an offender in a public or private community corrections facility or program. The department of corrections or the public or private local corrections authorities shall notify the victim of the following information regarding any person who was charged with or convicted of a crime against the victim:
(a) The institution in which such person is incarcerated or otherwise being held;
(b) The projected date of such person's release from confinement;
(c) Any release of such person on furlough or work release or to a community correctional facility or other program, or statutory discharge in advance of such release;
(d) Any scheduled parole hearings or full parole board reviews regarding the person and any changes in the scheduling of such hearings, including notification of the victim's right to be present and heard at such hearings;
(e) Any escape or unauthorized absence as described in section 18-8-208.2 (1) by such person, or transfer or release from any state hospital, a detention facility, a correctional facility, a community correctional facility, or other program, and any subsequent recapture of such person;
(f) Repealed.
(g) The transfer to or placement in a nonsecured facility of a person convicted of a crime, any release or discharge from confinement of the person, and any conditions attached to the release;
(h) The death of the person while in custody or while under the jurisdiction of the state of Colorado concerning the crime;
(i) The transition of the person from a residential facility to a nonresidential setting;
(j) Any decision by the parole board and any decision by the governor to commute the sentence of the person or pardon the person; and
(k) The date, time, and location of a scheduled execution.
(14.1) The Colorado mental health institute at Pueblo, or the Colorado mental health institute at Fort Logan, as may be applicable, shall notify the victim of the following information regarding any person who was charged with or convicted of a crime against the victim:
(a) The institution in which the person resides;
(b) Any release of the person on furlough or other program, in advance of such release;
(c) Any other transfer or release from the state hospital;
(d) Any escape by the person and any subsequent recapture of the person; and
(e) The death of the person while in custody or while under the jurisdiction of the state.
(14.2) Upon receipt of a written statement as provided in section 24-4.1-302.5 (1)(j.5), the department of human services, division of youth services, shall include the statement with any referral made by the department of human services or a district court to place an offender in a public or private community corrections facility or program. The department of human services and any state hospital shall notify the victim of the following information regarding any person who was charged with or adjudicated of a crime against the victim:
(a) The institution in which such person is incarcerated or otherwise being held;
(b) The projected date of such person's release from confinement;
(c) Any release of such person on furlough or work release or to a community correctional facility or other program, in advance of such release;
(d) Repealed.
(e) Any escape or unauthorized absence as described in section 18-8-208.2 (1) by the person, or transfer or release from any state hospital, a detention facility, a correctional facility, a community correctional facility, parole supervision, or other program, and any subsequent recapture of the person;
(f) Any decision by the governor to commute the sentence of the person or pardon the person;
(g) The transfer to or placement in a nonsecured facility of a person adjudicated of a crime, any release or discharge from the sentence of the person, and any conditions attached to the release;
(h) The death of the person while in custody or while under the jurisdiction of the state;
(i) Any request by the department of human services to the juvenile court to modify the sentence to commitment and any decision by the juvenile court to modify the sentence to commitment; and
(j) Any placement change that occurs during the person's parole that may affect the victim's safety, as determined by the division of youth services.
(14.3) The juvenile parole board shall notify the victim of the following information regarding any person who was charged with or adjudicated of an offense against the victim:
(a) Any scheduled juvenile parole hearings pursuant to sections 19-2.5-1203 and 19-2.5-1206 regarding the person, any change in the scheduling of such a hearing in advance of the hearing, the victim's right to be present and heard at such hearings, the results of any such hearing, any parole decision to release the person, and the terms and conditions of any such release; and
(b) and (c) (Deleted by amendment, L. 2022.)
(d) Any discharge from juvenile parole.
(14.4) The court or its designee, pursuant to section 18-3-415, C.R.S., shall disclose the results of any testing for a sexually transmitted infection that is ordered and performed pursuant to section 18-3-415, 25-4-408 (6), or 25-4-412, C.R.S., to any victim of a sexual offense in the case in which the testing was ordered. Disclosure of diagnostic test results must comply with the requirements of section 25-4-410 (2), C.R.S.
(14.5) (a) At any proceeding specified in section 24-4.1-302.5 (1)(d), the court shall inquire whether the victim is present and wishes to address the court. The court shall advise the victim of his or her right to address the court regarding issues relevant to the case.
(a.5) A party issuing a subpoena pursuant to rule 17 of the Colorado rules of criminal procedure for the production of the privileged records of a victim pursuant to section 13-90-107 or a subpoena requesting the compensation records of a victim pursuant to section 24-4.1-107.5 shall file with the court and serve on any opposing party:
(I) A copy of the subpoena;
(II) A certificate stating that the party has a good-faith belief that there is a lawful basis for issuing the subpoena;
(III) A copy of the written notice served on recipients that advises that a party may not release records until the court orders the release of the records at a hearing and that a party may only provide the records to the court if the court orders the party to release the records; and
(IV) A motion stating the party's lawful basis for the subpoena and, if subject to a claim of privilege pursuant to section 13-90-107, a good-faith claim that the victim has expressly or impliedly waived any privilege to allow the court to properly receive the records.
(b) (I) At a proceeding specified in section 24-4.1-302.5 (1)(d)(VII), after considering all relevant evidence, the court shall quash any subpoena and shall not receive any records protected by privilege pursuant to section 13-90-107 unless the court finds, based upon evidence, that a victim expressly or impliedly waived the statutory privilege. In considering whether to receive and release any records relating to the victim, the court shall determine whether:
(A) There is a reasonable likelihood that the subpoenaed records exist;
(B) The subpoenaed records are evidentiary and relevant;
(C) The subpoenaed records cannot be reasonably procured in advance of the trial despite due diligence;
(D) The party cannot properly prepare for trial without production and inspection of the subpoenaed records, and failure to inspect the subpoenaed records in advance may unreasonably delay the trial; and
(E) The application to review the subpoenaed records is made in good faith.
(II) If the court conducts a hearing on the application for the issuance of subpoenaed records, the court shall proceed only after input from the victim, unless the victim is unavailable and the court finds that the district attorney notified the victim or made all reasonable efforts to notify the victim.
(III) If after the hearing, the court orders the production of records, the court shall enter orders to set a timeline of no less than seven days for the party to arrange production of the records to the court; except that the court may order production in less than seven days to avoid the delay of a jury trial.
(c) The court shall inform the probation department and the district attorney's office before any hearing regarding any request by the probationer for early termination of probation or any change in the terms and conditions of probation.
(d) The court shall provide the victim or the victim's designee with translation or interpretation services as needed during all critical stages of the hearing. The victim or the victim's designee shall notify the district attorney within a reasonable time that the victim or the victim's designee needs an interpreter for the critical stages of the hearing. The district attorney's office shall inform the court that the victim or victim's designee requests that the court arrange for translation or interpretation services.
(e) The court shall require the defendant to be present by appearing in person, by phone, or virtually by audio or video, or similar technology, during the sentencing hearing to hear the victim's impact statement, unless the court excludes the defendant.
(14.6) Any facility or provider that has the care and physical custody of a respondent in an inpatient setting pursuant to a civil commitment or an enhanced protective placement pursuant to section 16-8.5-118 or supervision of a civil commitment pursuant to section 27-65-201 or enhanced protective placement pursuant to section 25.5-10-507 that resulted from a criminal case involving a victim shall notify the applicable county attorney of the following:
(a) The institution in which the person resides;
(b) Any release of the person on furlough or other program, in advance of the release;
(c) Any other transfer or release from an inpatient setting;
(d) Any escape by the person and any subsequent recapture of the person; and
(e) The death of the person while in custody or while under the jurisdiction of the state.
(14.7) (a) The court or its designee shall ensure that victim information be provided to any entity responsible for victim notification after the defendant is sentenced.
(b) The court shall notify the victim of petitions or motions filed to cease sex offender registration pursuant to sections 16-22-103 (5) and 16-22-113 (2) and (2.5).
(14.8) The county attorney shall inform the district attorney that sought civil commitment or enhanced protective placement pursuant to section 16-8.5-118 of the following:
(a) Any critical stage described in section 24-4.1-302 (2)(q.1), (2)(q.2), and (2)(q.3);
(b) Any request for changes to material terms of a civil commitment described in section 24-4.1-302.5 (1)(j.6); and
(c) Any information received pursuant to subsection (14.6) of this section from a facility or a provider who has the care and physical custody of a respondent in an inpatient setting pursuant to a civil commitment supervised pursuant to section 27-65-201 or an enhanced protective placement supervised pursuant to section 25.5-10-507.
(14.9) (a) If, in a case of an alleged sex offense that has not resulted in a conviction or plea of guilty or when a law enforcement report or a medical report is filed pursuant to section 12-240-139 (1)(b)(I), the law enforcement agency, the Colorado bureau of investigation, or the accredited crime laboratory with custody of forensic medical evidence wants to destroy the evidence, it shall notify the victim at least sixty days prior to the destruction of the forensic medical evidence.
(b) When a victim objects to the destruction of forensic medical evidence after receiving notice pursuant to subsection (14.9)(a) of this section, the law enforcement agency, the Colorado bureau of investigation, or the accredited crime laboratory shall retain the forensic medical evidence for an additional ten years.
(15) (a) Unless specifically stated otherwise, the requirements of this section to provide information to the victim may be satisfied by either written, electronic, or oral communication with the victim or the victim's designee. The person responsible for providing the information shall do so in a timely manner and advise the victim or the victim's designee of any significant changes in the information. The victim or the victim's designee shall keep appropriate criminal justice authorities informed of the name, address, electronic mail address, if available, and telephone number of the person to whom the information should be provided, and any changes of the name, address, electronic mail address, and telephone number.
(a.5) A victim who turns eighteen years of age has the right to request notification from a criminal justice agency and to become the primary point of contact. The designee for the victim shall also continue to receive notifications if the designee has requested notification; except that the notifying agency has the discretion to notify only the victim if the victim so requests or if the agency deems that extenuating and documentable circumstances justify discontinuing notification to the victim's designee. The right of a victim's designee to address the court remains in effect even if the victim requests notification from a criminal justice agency.
(b) An agency that is required to notify a victim under this part 3 shall make reasonable attempts to contact the victim or the victim's designee by mail, electronic communication, if the victim or the victim's designee has provided an electronic mail address, and by telephone. If the victim or the victim's designee does not provide the agency with a forwarding address, electronic mail address, and telephone number and the agency is unable to locate the victim or the victim's designee after reasonable attempts have been made to contact the victim or the victim's designee, the agency shall be deemed to have met its obligation under this part 3 and shall not be required to notify the victim or victim's designee until the victim or victim's designee provides the agency with the current address, electronic mail address, if available, and telephone of the victim and the name of the victim's current designee, if applicable.
(c) An agency that is required to notify a victim under this part 3 may use an automated victim notification system.
(d) Using recommendations from victim advocates, the person responsible for providing information pursuant to this section shall ensure the information required is in plain and easy-to-understand language. To the extent practicable, any written or electronic notice must ensure that information about the release, discharge, transfer, parole, escape, abscondence, or unauthorized absence of a person accused or convicted of a crime against the victim is presented prominently and in a manner intended to increase the likelihood of the victim's attention to the notice.
(16) A defendant or person accused or convicted of a crime against the victim shall have no standing to object to any failure to comply with this article.
(17) Any affected person, except as provided in subsection (16) of this section, may enforce compliance with this article by notifying the crime victim services advisory board created in section 24-4.1-117.3 (1) of any noncompliance with this article. The crime victim services advisory board shall review any report of noncompliance, and, if the board determines that the report of noncompliance has a basis in fact and cannot be resolved, the board shall refer the report of noncompliance to the governor, who shall request that the attorney general file suit to enforce compliance with this article. A person, corporation, or other legal entity shall not be entitled to claim or to receive any damages or other financial redress for any failure to comply with this article.
(18) The district attorney, a law enforcement agency, a probation department, a state or private correctional facility, the department of human services, or the Colorado mental health institute at Pueblo shall make all reasonable efforts to exclude or redact a victim's social security number or a witness' social security number from any criminal justice document or record created or compiled as a result of a criminal investigation when the document or record is released to anyone other than the victim, a criminal justice agency that has duties under this article, or the attorney for the defendant.
Source: L. 84: Entire part added, p. 655, § 3, effective May 14. L. 87: (1)(i.5) added, p. 922, § 1, effective July 1. L. 92: Entire section amended, p. 421, § 4, effective January 14, 1993. L. 94: IP(14) amended, p. 2693, § 229, effective July 1. L. 95: (3) to (5), (10)(a)(I), (11)(a), (11)(b), IP(14), (14)(c), (14)(e), (14)(g), and (14)(h) amended and (14.5) added, p. 1404, § 6, effective July 1. L. 97: (13.5) added, p. 1562, § 7, effective July 1. L. 2000: (2), (6), and IP(14) amended and (14.3) and (14.7) added, p. 241, § 6, effective March 29. L. 2001: (13.5) amended, p. 32, § 2, effective August 8. L. 2002: (13.5)(b) repealed, p. 123, § 1, effective August 7. L. 2006: (9)(f), (10)(b)(II), (11)(a), (11)(b), (11)(d), (13.5)(a)(III), (13.5)(a)(V), (13.5)(a)(VI), (13.5)(a)(VII), IP(14), (14.7), and (15) amended and (10)(b)(IV), (10)(b)(V), (13.5)(a)(VIII), and (14.2) added, pp. 646, 647, 648, §§ 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, effective July 1. L. 2007: IP(14.2) amended, p. 840, § 4, effective May 14. L. 2008: (11)(a.5) added, p. 327, § 3, effective April 7; (14.2)(g), (14.2)(h), and (14.3) amended and (14.2)(i) and (14.4) added, p. 1108, §§ 14, 15, effective July 1. L. 2009: (1), (9)(a), and (17) amended, (SB 09-047), ch. 129, p. 557, § 6, effective July 1. L. 2011: (11)(e) and (11)(f) amended and (11)(g) added, (HB 11-1032), ch. 296, p. 1408, § 20, effective August 10. L. 2012: (9)(f), (9)(g), IP(10)(a), (10)(a)(V), (11)(f), (11)(g), (12)(e), (12)(f), (13.5)(a)(V), IP(14), (14)(g), (14)(h), (14.5), and (15) amended and (9)(h), (11)(h), (11)(i), (12)(f.5), (12)(h), (12)(i), (13.5)(a)(V.5), (14)(i), and (18) added, (HB 12-1053), ch. 244, p. 1154, § 3, effective August 8. L. 2013: (11)(b.5) added, (HB 13-1082), ch. 238, p. 1158, § 4, effective August 7; (11)(g) amended, (HB 13-1254), ch. 341, p. 1990, § 12, effective August 7. L. 2014: (11)(b.7) and (13.5)(a)(IX) added, (HB 14-1148), ch. 95, p. 349, § 3, effective August 6. L. 2015: (11)(b.7) amended, (SB 15-264), ch. 259, p. 958, § 62, effective August 5. L. 2016: (12)(c) amended, (SB 16-181), ch. 353, p. 1452, § 8, effective June 10; (14.4) amended, (SB 16-146), ch. 230, p. 920, § 17, effective July 1. L. 2017: (14.3)(c) amended, (HB 17-1329), ch. 381, p. 1981, § 54, effective June 6; (3.5), (12)(g.5), (12)(j), (14)(j), (14)(k), (14.1), (14.2)(j), and (14.5)(c) added, (9)(g), (10)(b)(III), (12)(f)(I), (12)(g), (12)(h), (13.5)(a)(III), (13.5)(a)(IV), (13.5)(a)(V), (13.5)(a)(VIII), (13.5)(a)(IX), (14)(c), (14)(d), (14)(h), IP(14.2), (14.2)(e), (14.2)(f), (14.2)(g), (14.2)(h), (14.2)(i), IP(14.3), and (14.3)(a) amended, and (14)(f) and (14.2)(d) repealed, (SB 17-051), ch. 155, p. 529, § 3, effective August 9. L. 2018: (14.7)(b) amended, (SB 18-026), ch. 143, p. 926, § 5, effective August 8. L. 2019: (10)(b)(III), (10)(b)(IV), (12)(g), (12)(g.5), IP(14), IP(14.1), and IP(14.2) amended, (HB 19-1064), ch. 296, p. 2751, § 5, effective May 28; (11)(b.7) amended, (HB 19-1275), ch. 295, p. 2748, § 6, effective August 2. L. 2020: (14)(e) and (14.2)(e) amended, (HB 20-1019), ch. 9, p. 29, § 13, effective March 6. L. 2021: (14.9) added, (HB 21-1143), ch. 191, p. 1012, § 5, effective May 27; (14.7)(b) amended, (HB 21-1064), ch. 320, p. 1970, § 12, effective September 1; (11)(b.7) amended, (HB 21-1214), ch. 455, p. 3037, § 10, effective September 7; (9)(h), (13.5)(a)(V), (13.5)(a)(IX), and (14.3)(a) amended, (SB 21-059), ch. 136, p. 743, § 110, effective October 1. L. 2022: (1.5), (14.5)(a.5), (14.5)(d), and (14.5)(e) added and (2), (3.5), (4), (10)(b)(IV), (11)(b.7), (13.5)(a)(VI), (14.3), and (14.5)(b) amended, (SB 22-049), ch. 152, p. 973, § 4, effective May 6. L. 2023: (11)(b.3) added, (SB 23-075), ch. 242, p. 1300, § 4, effective August 7; (15)(d) added, (SB 23-193), ch. 307, p. 1878, § 4, effective August 7; (11)(b) amended, (HB 23-1034), ch. 15, p. 47, § 8, effective October 1. L. 2026: (11)(b.8), (11)(b.9), (14.6), and (14.8) added, (SB 26-149), ch. 142, p. 790, § 32, effective May 21; (1.5) amended and (11)(j), (11)(k), and (11)(l) added, (HB 26-1052), ch. 346, p. 2104, § 3, effective August 12.
Cross references: (1) For content of victim impact statements, see § 16-11-102 (1.5); for the right of victims to attend sentencing hearings and parole hearings, see §§ 16-11-601 and 17-2-214; for the issuance of protection orders against defendants, see § 18-1-1001; for restitution to victims of crime, see article 28 of title 17.
(2) For the legislative declaration in HB 21-1143, see section 1 of chapter 191, Session Laws of Colorado 2021.
ANNOTATION
Law reviews. For article, "1994 Legislature Strengthens Domestic Violence Protective Orders", see 23 Colo. Law. 2327 (1994).
Subsection (4) makes it clear that the general assembly did not grant victims the right to appeal a district attorney's decision to dismiss the charges. People v. Herron, 874 P.2d 435 (Colo. App. 1993).
24-4.1-304. Child victim or witness - rights and services.
(1) In addition to all rights afforded to a victim or witness under section 24-4.1-302.5, law enforcement agencies, prosecutors, and judges are encouraged to designate one or more persons to provide the following services on behalf of a child who is involved in criminal proceedings as a victim or a witness:
(a) To explain, in language understood by the child, all legal proceedings in which the child will be involved;
(b) To act, as a friend of the court, to advise the judge, whenever appropriate, of the child's ability to understand and cooperate in any court proceeding;
(c) To assist the child and the child's family in coping with the emotional impact of the crime and any subsequent criminal proceeding in which the child is involved;
(d) To advise the district attorney concerning the ability of a child witness to cooperate with the prosecution and concerning the potential effects of the proceeding on the child.
Source: L. 84: Entire part added, p. 656, § 3, effective May 14. L. 85: IP(1) amended, p. 1361, § 18, effective June 28. L. 92: IP(1) amended, p. 427, § 5, effective January 14, 1993.
24-4.1-305. Disclosure by agent of defense-initiated victim outreach required - definition.
(1) When any person attempting defense-initiated victim outreach contacts any victim of any crime, the person shall immediately provide full and unambiguous disclosure of:
(a) The person's legal name; and
(b) The fact that the person is acting as an agent for the person accused of the crime or for the defense team of such person.
(2) (a) As used in this section, unless the context requires otherwise, "defense-initiated victim outreach" means any effort by the defense team, including but not limited to a victim liaison, victim outreach specialist, social worker, investigator, or other individual, to directly or indirectly contact a victim or a victim's family member on behalf of the defendant or defense counsel.
(b) The definition in paragraph (a) of this subsection (2) does not require the identified members of a defense team to comply with any guidelines or standards promulgated by any professional defense-initiated victim outreach organization.
Source: L. 2015: Entire section added, (HB 15-1218), ch. 155, p. 463, § 1, effective August 5.
PART 4
CERTIFICATION OF CERTAIN FEDERAL IMMIGRATION FORMS
24-4.1-401. Definitions.
As used in this part 4, unless the context otherwise requires:
(1) "Certification form" or "certification" means the federal form I-918, supplement B, "U Nonimmigrant Status Certification", or any successor form, required under 8 U.S.C. sec. 1184 (p)(1) and 8 CFR 214.14 (c)(2)(i) and as defined under 8 CFR 214.14 (a)(12), which confirms that the petitioner is a victim of qualifying criminal activity and has been helpful, is being helpful, or is likely to be helpful in the investigation or prosecution of the qualifying criminal activity of which the petitioner is a victim.
(2) "Certifying agency" or "agency" has the same meaning as defined in 8 CFR 214.14 (a)(2) and includes but is not limited to:
(a) A state or local law enforcement agency;
(b) The office of a district, county, or city attorney;
(c) A court;
(d) The office of the attorney general;
(e) Any other agency that is responsible for the detection, investigation, or prosecution of a qualifying crime or criminal activity; or
(f) Entities that have criminal detection or investigative jurisdiction in their respective areas of expertise, including but not limited to a county department of human or social services and the department of labor and employment.
(3) "Certifying official" has the same meaning as defined in 8 CFR 214.14 (a)(3) and includes but is not limited to:
(a) The head of the certifying agency;
(b) A person in a supervisory role who has been specifically designated by the head of a certifying agency to issue certifications on behalf of that agency; or
(c) A judge or magistrate.
(4) "Qualifying criminal activity" has the same meaning as defined in 8 CFR 214.14 (a)(9), including any activity that constitutes a crime as defined pursuant to Colorado law, regardless of the statutory language or title used pursuant to Colorado law, for which the nature and elements of the offenses are substantially similar to the general categories of offenses enumerated in 8 U.S.C. sec. 1101 (a)(15)(U), or any other similar criminal activities, and the attempt, conspiracy, or solicitation to commit any of those offenses.
(5) "Victim of qualifying criminal activity" or "victim" has the same meaning as defined in 8 CFR 214.14 (a)(14) and includes an individual who has suffered direct and proximate harm as a result of the commission of qualifying criminal activity, including direct victims; indirect victims, as defined under 8 CFR 214.14 (a)(14)(i), regardless of the direct victim's immigration or citizenship status; and bystander victims, as recognized under the federal register at 72 FR 53016.
Source: L. 2021: Entire part added, (HB 21-1060), ch. 126, p. 510, § 1, effective September 1.
24-4.1-402. Immigration certification forms - completion deadlines.
(1) For the time period of September 1, 2021, through June 30, 2022, and except as provided in subsection (2) of this section, a certifying agency shall process and either sign or decline to sign a certification form within one hundred twenty days after receipt of a request.
(2) For the time period of September 1, 2021, through June 30, 2022, a certifying agency shall process and either sign or decline to sign a certification form within sixty days after receipt of a request if:
(a) The requester provides documentation that he or she is in federal immigration removal proceedings; or
(b) The requester provides documentation that one or more children, parents, or siblings of the requester would become ineligible for U nonimmigrant status by virtue of age within sixty business days after the date that the certifying official receives the certification form request.
(3) On and after July 1, 2022, and except as provided in subsection (4) of this section, a certifying agency shall process and either sign or decline to sign a certification form within ninety days after receipt of a request.
(4) On and after July 1, 2022, a certifying agency shall process and either sign or decline to sign a certification form within thirty days after receipt of a request if:
(a) The requester provides documentation that he or she is in federal immigration removal proceedings; or
(b) The requester provides documentation that one or more children, parents, or siblings of the requester would become ineligible for U nonimmigrant status by virtue of age within sixty business days after the date that the certifying official receives the certification form request.
Source: L. 2021: Entire part added, (HB 21-1060), ch. 126, p. 511, § 1, effective September 1.
24-4.1-403. Certification forms - signature requirement - limitation on factors for consideration.
(1) Upon request, a certifying official from a certifying agency shall execute and sign the certification form when it is determined that the victim:
(a) Was a victim of qualifying criminal activity; and
(b) Has been helpful, is being helpful, or is likely to be helpful to the detection, investigation, or prosecution of that qualifying criminal activity.
(2) (a) For purposes of determining helpfulness pursuant to subsection (1)(b) of this section, a victim is helpful, has been helpful, or is likely to be helpful to the detection, investigation, or prosecution of that qualifying criminal activity if there is no documentation that the victim refused or failed to provide assistance reasonably requested by law enforcement.
(b) A certifying agency's inability to communicate with a victim due to the victim's language must not be considered a refusal or failure to provide assistance.
(3) The certifying agency shall not consider any other factors in deciding whether to sign the certification form, except whether the individual was a victim of qualifying criminal activity and the victim's helpfulness, as specified in subsection (1) of this section.
(4) If a certifying official or agency signs the certification form, the official or agency shall return the signed certification form to the requester, along with, free of charge, relevant pages of offense reports related to the qualifying criminal activity subject to release by law, unless already provided by another agency. The timing of release of such reports for open investigations or prosecutions is subject to the certifying agency's discretion.
(5) The certifying agency is neither a sponsor nor a decision-maker in the granting of a U visa. A certifying official's completion of a certification form is not sufficient evidence that an applicant for a U visa has met all eligibility requirements and does not guarantee that the victim will receive a U visa. It is the exclusive responsibility of federal immigration officials to determine whether a person is eligible for a U visa. Completion of a certification form by a certifying official merely verifies factual information relevant for federal immigration officials to determine eligibility for a U visa. By completing a certification form, the certifying official attests that the information is true and correct to the best of the certifying official's knowledge.
(6) More than one victim may be identified and provided with certification, depending upon the circumstances.
(7) If a certifying official or agency declines to sign the certification form, the official or agency shall, in writing, notify the requester of the reason or reasons for the denial within the times set forth in section 24-4.1-402. The denial notification must contain a detailed explanation of the reason or reasons for the denial, consisting of one of the following:
(a) Lack of jurisdiction over the certification form request due to the certifying agency not having been involved in the detection, investigation, or prosecution of the qualifying criminal activity;
(b) The requester was not a victim of qualifying criminal activity; or
(c) Lack of helpfulness, including documented instances of failure or refusal to comply with reasonable requests for assistance.
(8) Upon receiving notice that a request for a certification form pursuant to this section is denied, a requester may provide supplemental information to the certifying agency and request that the certification form denial be reviewed by the certifying agency.
(9) A requester may seek a subsequent certification from the same certifying agency or may seek certification from multiple certifying agencies.
Source: L. 2021: Entire part added, (HB 21-1060), ch. 126, p. 512, § 1, effective September 1.
24-4.1-404. Prohibition on disclosure of victim's immigration status.
A certifying agency is prohibited from disclosing the personal identifying information or immigration status of a victim or person requesting the certification except to comply with federal or state law or process.
Source: L. 2021: Entire part added, (HB 21-1060), ch. 126, p. 513, § 1, effective September 1.
24-4.1-405. Duty to inform victims.
Certifying agencies shall provide information regarding the U visa and the agency's procedures for certification to victims.
Source: L. 2021: Entire part added, (HB 21-1060), ch. 126, p. 514, § 1, effective September 1.
24-4.1-406. Reports.
(1) On or before September 1, 2022, and on or before each March 1 thereafter, a certifying agency that receives a request for a certification shall report to the division of criminal justice in the department of public safety on an annual basis and in aggregate form, subject to the restrictions set forth in section 24-4.1-404, the following:
(a) The number of requests for certification received;
(b) The number of certifications that were signed;
(c) The total number that were denied;
(d) The number of certifications that were denied for each reason specified pursuant to section 24-4.1-403 (7); and
(e) The number of decisions that fell outside the prescribed completion deadlines.
(2) The division shall make the reports available to the public upon request.
Source: L. 2021: Entire part added, (HB 21-1060), ch. 126, p. 514, § 1, effective September 1.
PART 5
BRAIN INJURY SUPPORT FOR VICTIMS OF VIOLENT CRIMES IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM
Cross references: For the legislative declaration in SB 22-057, see section 1 of chapter 275, Session Laws of Colorado 2022.
24-4.1-501. Definitions.
As used in this part 5, unless the context otherwise requires:
(1) "Brain injury" has the same meaning as set forth in section 26-1-301.
(2) "Entity" means a state organization or other organization that would contract with the state to run a pilot program, as described in section 24-4.1-502.
(3) "Office" means the office for victims programs in the division of criminal justice in the department of public safety.
(4) "Pilot program" means the victims of a violent crime brain injury pilot program described in section 24-4.1-502.
(5) "Task force" means the victims of a violent crime brain injury task force created in section 24-4.1-502.
(6) "Victim of a violent crime" or "victim" means a person who was the victim of a crime in which physical force was used against that person. It is the intent of the general assembly that this definition of the term "victim of a violent crime" or "victim" only applies to this part 5 and does not apply to any other provision of the laws of the state of Colorado that refer to the term "victim of a violent crime" or "victim".
Source: L. 2022: Entire part added, (SB 22-057), ch. 275, p. 1976, § 2, effective May 31.
24-4.1-502. Victims of a violent crime brain injury task force - established - duties - membership - report - repeal. (Repealed)
Source: L. 2022: Entire part added, (SB 22-057), ch. 275, p. 1977, § 2, effective May 31. L. 2025: (3) amended, (SB 25-300), ch. 428, p. 2448, § 28, effective August 6.
Editor's note: Subsection (6) provided for the repeal of this section, effective June 30, 2026. (See L. 2022, p. 1977.)
ARTICLE 4.2
Assistance to Victims of and Witnesses to Crimes and Aid to Law Enforcement Act
24-4.2-100.3. Definitions.
24-4.2-101. Victims and witnesses assistance and law enforcement board - creation.
24-4.2-102. District attorney to assist board.
24-4.2-103. Victims and witnesses assistance and law enforcement fund - control of fund.
24-4.2-104. Surcharges levied on criminal actions and traffic offenses - definition.
24-4.2-105. Allocation of money from fund - application for grants - disbursements.
24-4.2-106. Court administrator custodian of fund - disbursements.
24-4.2-107. Regulations.
24-4.2-108. Report of grants and expenditures.
24-4.2-109. County, city, city and county, or municipality not preempted.
24-4.2-110. Applicability.
24-4.2-111. Repeal of article. (Repealed)
24-4.2-100.3. Definitions.
As used in this article 4.2, unless the context otherwise requires:
(1) "Board" means the victims and witnesses assistance and law enforcement board created in each judicial district, as described in section 24-4.2-101 (1).
(2) "Fund" means the victims and witnesses assistance and law enforcement fund established in section 24-4.2-103 (1).
Source: L. 2025: Entire section added, (SB 25-275), ch. 377, p. 2059, § 133, effective August 6.
24-4.2-101. Victims and witnesses assistance and law enforcement board - creation.
(1) There is hereby created in each judicial district a victims and witnesses assistance and law enforcement board. Each board shall be composed of five members appointed by the chief judge of the judicial district. In making such appointments, the chief judge shall consider whether an appointee represents or belongs to an organization, public or private, which might reasonably be anticipated to be a recipient of moneys pursuant to this article 4.2. In multicounty judicial districts, to the extent possible, members shall fairly reflect the population of the judicial district. The board shall designate one of its members as chairman.
(1.5) Effective November 1, 2024, a victims and witnesses assistance and law enforcement board for the twenty-third judicial district is created. The twenty-third judicial district administrative judge shall appoint the initial board for the twenty-third judicial district pursuant to subsections (1) to (3) of this section. Effective January 7, 2025, the chief judge of the twenty-third judicial district has all appointment authorities and duties pursuant to this section.
(2) The term of office of each member of the board shall be three years; except that, of those members first appointed, one shall be appointed for a one-year term, two for two-year terms, and two for three-year terms. All vacancies, except through the expiration of term, shall be filled for the unexpired term only. Each member may be reappointed once and serve two consecutive terms. A person may be reappointed to the board thereafter if it has been at least one year since such person served on the board.
(3) Members of the board shall receive no compensation.
Source: L. 84: Entire article added, p. 661, § 22, effective July 1. L. 90: (2) amended, p. 1181, § 4, effective July 1. L. 2024: (1.5) added, (HB 24-1013), ch. 43, p. 155, § 6, effective April 4. L. 2025: (1) amended, (SB 25-275), ch. 377, p. 2059, § 134, effective August 6.
24-4.2-102. District attorney to assist board.
The district attorney and his legal and administrative staff shall assist the board in the performance of its duties pursuant to this article.
Source: L. 84: Entire article added, p. 662, § 22, effective July 1.
24-4.2-103. Victims and witnesses assistance and law enforcement fund - control of fund.
(1) The victims and witnesses assistance and law enforcement fund is hereby established in the office of the court administrator of each judicial district. The fund shall consist of all moneys paid as a surcharge as provided in section 24-4.2-104.
(1.3) The victims and witnesses assistance and law enforcement fund for the twenty-third judicial district is established in the office of the court administrator for Douglas, Elbert, and Lincoln counties. The judicial department shall coordinate with the board of the eighteenth judicial district to credit money related to Douglas, Elbert, and Lincoln counties on and after April 1, 2024, to the fund for use by the twenty-third judicial district from surcharges collected on or after April 1, 2024, in Douglas, Elbert, and Lincoln counties. Money for use by the twenty-third judicial district victims and witnesses assistance and law enforcement board must be forwarded to the court administrator and deposited into the fund. The fund consists of all money collected as a surcharge on and after April 1, 2024, as provided in section 24-4.2-104; money paid pursuant to section 17-27-104 (4)(b)(IV); money transferred from the marijuana tax fund pursuant to section 39-28.8-501 (4.9)(c); and any other money the general assembly may appropriate or transfer to the fund. The state court administrator for the twenty-third judicial district shall comply with the provisions of this section.
(1.5) In addition to the money paid into the fund pursuant to subsection (1) of this section, the fund consists of money paid pursuant to section 17-27-104 (4)(b)(IV), money transferred from the marijuana tax cash fund pursuant to section 39-28.8-501 (4.9)(c), and any other money that the general assembly may appropriate or transfer to the fund.
(1.7) (a) In addition to the money paid into the fund pursuant to subsections (1) and (1.5) of this section, the fund consists of money appropriated by the general assembly from the economic recovery and relief cash fund, created in section 24-75-228, as enacted by Senate Bill 21-291, enacted in 2021, to the office of the court administrator for distribution to the district attorney's office of each judicial district to be used for victims and witness assistance and law enforcement programs and purposes described in sections 24-4.2-103 and 24-4.2-105.
(b) Money appropriated pursuant to this subsection (1.7) from the economic recovery and relief cash fund, created in section 24-75-228, as enacted by Senate Bill 21-291, enacted in 2021, must only fund programs and purposes that also conform with the allowable purposes set forth in the federal "American Rescue Plan Act of 2021", Pub.L. 117-2, as the act may be subsequently amended. The office of the state court administrator shall, in consultation with the division of criminal justice and the victims and witness assistance and law enforcement program administrators in each judicial district, distribute the money appropriated pursuant to this subsection (1.7) based on need.
(c) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (4) of this section, the district attorney's office of each judicial district may use up to ten percent of any money appropriated pursuant to this subsection (1.7) for development and administrative costs incurred by the district attorney's office pursuant to this section in the provision of programs and services allowed pursuant to the federal "American Rescue Plan Act of 2021", Pub.L. 117-2, as the act may be subsequently amended.
(d) The requirements set forth in section 24-4.2-105 (1) do not apply to this subsection (1.7).
(1.8) (a) Within three days after May 19, 2022, the state treasurer shall transfer three million dollars to the fund from the economic recovery and relief cash fund created in section 24-75-228 for distribution to district attorneys' offices for victims and witnesses programs and purposes described in sections 24-4.2-103 and 24-4.2-105. The office of the state court administrator shall, in consultation with the division of criminal justice and the victims and witness assistance and law enforcement program administrators in each judicial district, distribute the money transferred pursuant to this subsection (1.8) based on need.
(b) The judicial department and each recipient of money from the fund shall comply with the compliance, reporting, record-keeping, and program evaluation requirements established by the office of state planning and budgeting and the state controller in accordance with section 24-75-226 (5).
(c) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (4) of this section, a district attorney's office may use up to ten percent of any money distributed pursuant to this subsection (1.8) for development and administrative costs incurred by the district attorney's office pursuant to this section.
(d) The requirements set forth in section 24-4.2-105 (1) do not apply to this subsection (1.8).
(2) All money deposited in the fund shall be deposited in an interest-bearing account, which would be a legal investment for the state treasurer. All interest and income derived from the deposit and investment of money in the fund shall be credited to the fund, except as otherwise provided in section 24-75-226 (4)(c)(II).
(3) At the conclusion of each fiscal year, all moneys remaining in the fund shall remain in the fund for allocation as originally designated under section 24-4.2-105.
(4) All moneys deposited in the fund shall be used solely for the purposes designated in section 24-4.2-105; except that the district attorney may use up to an aggregate of ten percent of the total amount of moneys in the fund for administrative costs incurred pursuant to this article and for preparation of victim impact statements required pursuant to section 16-11-102 (1), C.R.S. The board shall determine the manner of reimbursement for preparation of victim impact statements and the method of establishing actual costs for such preparation.
(5) The priority use for moneys in the fund created in this section shall be for the implementation of the rights afforded to crime victims pursuant to section 24-4.1-302.5 and the provision of the services and programs delineated in sections 24-4.1-303, 24-4.1-304, and 24-4.2-105 (4) related to all crimes as defined by section 24-4.1-302 (1).
(6) Repealed.
Source: L. 84: Entire article added, p. 662, § 22, effective July 1. L. 85: (1) amended, p. 795, § 1, effective July 1. L. 92: (5) added, p. 427, § 6, effective January 14, 1993. L. 95: (5) amended, p. 1406, § 7, effective July 1. L. 96: (1.5) added, p. 133, § 2, effective July 1. L. 2003: (6) added, p. 1542, § 1, effective May 1. L. 2015: (6) repealed, (SB 15-264), ch. 259, p. 958, § 63, effective August 5. L. 2021: (1.7) added, (SB 21-292), ch. 291, p. 1722, § 5, effective June 22; (1.5) amended, (HB 21-1315), ch. 461, p. 3120, § 34, effective July 6. L. 2022: (2) amended, (HB 22-1342), ch. 137, p. 920, § 5, effective April 25; (1.8) added, (SB 22-183), ch. 194, p. 1305, § 13, effective May 19. L. 2024: (1.3) added, (HB 24-1013), ch. 43, p. 155, § 7, effective April 4. L. 2025: (1) amended, (SB 25-275), ch. 377, p. 2059, § 135, effective August 6.
Cross references: For the legislative declaration in HB 21-1315, see section 1 of chapter 461, Session Laws of Colorado 2021. For the legislative declaration in SB 21-292, see section 1 of chapter 291, Session Laws of Colorado 2021.
24-4.2-104. Surcharges levied on criminal actions and traffic offenses - definition.
(1) (a) (I) A surcharge equal to thirty-seven percent of the fine imposed for each felony, misdemeanor, or class 1 or class 2 misdemeanor traffic offense, or a surcharge of one hundred sixty-three dollars for felonies, seventy-eight dollars for misdemeanors, forty-six dollars for class 1 misdemeanor traffic offenses, and thirty-three dollars for class 2 misdemeanor traffic offenses, whichever amount is greater, except as otherwise provided in subsection (1)(b) of this section, is levied on each criminal action resulting in a conviction or in a deferred judgment and sentence, as provided in section 18-1.3-102, which criminal action is charged pursuant to state statute. The defendant shall pay these surcharges to the clerk of the court. Each clerk shall transmit the money to the court administrator of the judicial district in which the offense occurred for credit to the victims and witnesses assistance and law enforcement fund established in that judicial district.
(II) (A) In addition to any other surcharge provided for in this section, a surcharge of one thousand three hundred dollars shall be levied on each criminal action resulting in a conviction or in a deferred judgment and sentence, as provided in section 18-1.3-102, C.R.S., which criminal action is charged pursuant to the statutes listed in sub-subparagraph (B) of this subparagraph (II). These surcharges shall be paid to the clerk of the court by the defendant. Any moneys collected by the clerk pursuant to this subparagraph (II) shall be transmitted to the court administrator of the judicial district in which the offense occurred for credit to the victims and witnesses assistance and law enforcement fund established in that judicial district.
(B) The surcharge in sub-subparagraph (A) of this subparagraph (II) shall apply to charges brought pursuant to the following sections: 18-3-305, 18-3-402, 18-3-403, as it existed prior to July 1, 2000, 18-3-404, 18-3-405, 18-3-405.3, 18-3-405.5, 18-3-503, 18-3-504, 18-6-301, 18-6-302, 18-6-403, 18-6-404, 18-7-302, 18-7-402, 18-7-405, 18-7-405.5, and 18-7-406, C.R.S., or any attempt to commit any of these crimes.
(C) (Deleted by amendment, L. 93, p. 2054, § 5, effective June 9, 1993.)
(b) (I) A surcharge shall be levied against a penalty assessment imposed for a violation of a class A or class B traffic infraction or class 1 or class 2 misdemeanor traffic offense pursuant to section 42-4-1701, C.R.S. The amount of such surcharge shall be one half of the amount specified in the penalty and surcharge schedule in section 42-4-1701 (4), C.R.S., or, if no amount is specified, thirty-seven percent of the penalty imposed. All moneys collected by the department of revenue pursuant to this subparagraph (I) shall be transmitted to the court administrator of the judicial district in which the infraction occurred for credit to the victims and witnesses assistance and law enforcement fund established in that judicial district as provided in section 42-1-217, C.R.S. Surcharges paid to the clerk of the court pursuant to this subparagraph (I) shall be transmitted to the court administrator of the judicial district in which the offense was committed for credit to the victims and witnesses assistance and law enforcement fund established in that judicial district.
(II) A surcharge shall be levied against all penalty assessments issued pursuant to section 33-6-104, C.R.S., in an amount equal to thirty-seven percent of the penalty imposed. Any moneys collected by the division of parks and wildlife pursuant to this subparagraph (II) shall be transmitted to the court administrator of the judicial district in which the offense was committed for credit to the victims and witnesses assistance and law enforcement fund established in that judicial district.
(III) A surcharge of eight dollars is levied against each penalty imposed for violation of a civil infraction pursuant to section 16-2.3-101. The clerk of the court shall transmit all money collected to the court administrator of the judicial department in which the offense occurred for credit to the victims and witnesses assistance and law enforcement fund established in that judicial district.
(c) All calculated surcharge amounts resulting in dollars and cents shall be rounded down to the nearest whole dollar. The surcharge levied by this section may not be suspended or waived by the court unless the court determines that the defendant is indigent.
(d) The surcharges levied pursuant to this subsection (1) are separate and distinct from costs levied pursuant to section 24-4.1-119 for the crime victim compensation fund.
(1.5) Repealed.
(2) The provisions of sections 18-1.3-701 and 18-1.3-702, C.R.S., shall be applicable to the collection of costs levied pursuant to this section.
(3) (a) A cost or surcharge levied pursuant to subsection (1)(a)(I) of this section shall not be assessed against a juvenile or against the juvenile's parent, guardian, or legal custodian. A court or the state shall not enforce or collect court-levied costs or surcharges assessed by the court on or after July 6, 2021, that are outstanding against the juvenile or the juvenile's parent, guardian, or legal custodian.
(b) As used in this subsection (3), "juvenile" means a person who is under eighteen years old when the crime is committed.
Source: L. 84: Entire article added, p. 662, § 22, effective July 1. L. 85: (1)(a) amended and (1)(b) R&RE, pp. 795, 796, §§ 2, 3, effective July 1. L. 86: (1)(b)(I) amended, p. 1193, § 3, effective July 1. L. 87: (1) amended, p. 1497, § 7, effective July 1. L. 90: (1)(a) and (1)(c) amended, p. 1181, § 5, effective July 1. L. 91: (1)(a) and (1)(b)(I) amended, p. 241, § 1, effective July 1. L. 93: (1)(a)(I) and (1)(a)(II) amended, pp. 2053, 2054, §§ 4, 5, effective June 9. L. 94: (1)(b)(I) amended, p. 2555, § 52, effective January 1, 1995. L. 96: (1)(a)(I) amended, p. 1695, § 36, effective January 1, 1997. L. 97: (1)(a)(II)(B) amended, p. 1547, § 21, effective July 1. L. 2000: (1)(a)(II)(B) amended, p. 707, § 35, effective July 1. L. 2002: (1)(a)(I), (1)(a)(II)(A), and (2) amended, p. 1530, § 241, effective October 1. L. 2003: (1)(a)(I), (1)(a)(II)(A), and (1)(b)(I) amended, p. 1542, § 2, effective May 1. L. 2007: (1)(a)(I), (1)(a)(II)(A), and (1)(b)(I) amended and (1.5) added, p. 1112, § 3, effective July 1. L. 2010: (1)(a)(II)(B) amended, (SB 10-140), ch. 156, p. 540, § 12, effective April 21. L. 2014: (1)(a)(II)(B) amended, (HB 14-1273), ch. 282, p. 1157, § 24, effective July 1. L. 2021: (1)(a)(I) amended, (HB 21-1315), ch. 461, p. 3109, § 7, effective July 6; (1)(a)(I) amended, (SB 21-059), ch. 136, p. 744, § 111, effective October 1. L. 2022: (1)(b)(III) added, (HB 22-1229), ch. 68, p. 346, § 29, effective March 1. L. 2026: (3) added, (HB 26-1232), ch. 98, p. 390, § 9, effective May 4.
Editor's note: (1) Subsection (1.5)(b) provided for the repeal of subsection (1.5), effective July 1, 2008. (See L. 2007, p. 1112.)
(2) Amendments to subsection (1)(a)(I) by HB 21-1315 and SB 21-059 were harmonized.
(3) Section 47 of chapter 68 (HB 22-1229), Session Laws of Colorado 2022, provides that the act adding subsection (1)(b)(III) is effective March 1, 2022, but the governor did not approve the act until April 7, 2022.
Cross references: (1) For additional costs imposed on criminal actions and traffic offenses, see § 24-4.1-119; for additional costs levied on alcohol- and drug-related traffic offenses, see §§ 42-4-1301.4 (5) and 43-4-402.
(2) For the legislative declaration contained in the 2002 act amending subsections (1)(a)(I), (1)(a)(II)(A), and (2), see section 1 of chapter 318, Session Laws of Colorado 2002. For the legislative declaration in HB 21-1315, see section 1 of chapter 461, Session Laws of Colorado 2021. For the legislative declaration in HB 26-1232, see section 1 of chapter 98, Session Laws of Colorado 2026.
ANNOTATION
Assessment of surcharges pursuant to subsection (1)(a)(II) does not violate the prohibition against ex post facto laws since the statute's effective date predates the date of the offenses with which the defendant was charged. People v. Bowring, 902 P.2d 911 (Colo. App. 1995).
Imposition of two surcharges for conviction does not violate the prohibition against double jeopardy. The surcharge created by subsection (1)(a)(II)(A) and the surcharge created by § 18-21-103 (1)(c) may both be applied to the conviction for second degree sexual assault. People v. Thien Van Vo, 932 P.2d 849 (Colo. App. 1996).
Costs are not a form of punishment but are essentially civil and are not traditionally considered to be punishment, and the imposition of costs generally does not serve the goals of retribution and deterrence. People v. Howell, 64 P.3d 894 (Colo. App. 2002); People v. McQuarrie, 66 P.3d 181 (Colo. App. 2002), overruled on other grounds in Yeadon v. People, 2020 CO 38, 462 P.3d 1087, and Waddell v. People, 2020 CO 39, 462 P.3d 1100.
The surcharges levied pursuant to this section apply to juvenile cases as well as those cases against adults. People in Interest of T.C.C., 2017 COA 138, 410 P.3d 805.
Only the court can waive surcharges levied pursuant to this section. People in Interest of T.C.C., 2017 COA 138, 410 P.3d 805.
Indigence is the only circumstance in which surcharges may be waived. People in Interest of T.C.C., 2017 COA 138, 410 P.3d 805.
Court erred in allowing probation department to determine whether to waive costs and surcharges based on defendant's behavior. The absence of language prohibiting a fee waiver for good behavior does not permit such a waiver. People in Interest of T.C.C., 2017 COA 138, 410 P.3d 805.
A district court has no authority to collect the fee imposed pursuant to subsection (1)(a)(I) after the completion of a deferred sentence and dismissal of the underlying charges. Pineda-Liberato v. People, 2017 CO 95, 403 P.3d 160.
24-4.2-105. Allocation of money from fund - application for grants - disbursements.
(1) Thirteen percent of the aggregate amount of the moneys in the fund, after payment of the expenses specified in section 24-4.2-103 (4), shall be deposited with the state treasurer to the credit of the fund created pursuant to section 24-33.5-506.
(2) Not less than eighty-five percent of the net aggregate of the fund remaining after the deduction of the amounts specified in subsection (1) of this section shall be allocated for the purchase of victims and witnesses services pursuant to subsection (4) of this section, and the remaining moneys may be allocated to the police departments, sheriffs' departments, and district attorneys for the purposes specified in subsection (3) of this section.
(2.5) (a) The board shall not accept, evaluate, or approve any application requesting grants of money from the fund submitted by, or on behalf of, any state agency, including local offices of such agencies; except that:
(I) The court administrator of each judicial district may apply for grants of moneys for the purpose of collecting all moneys assessed by the courts, including moneys owed pursuant to this article, and collecting and disbursing restitution owed to victims of crime; and
(II) The local probation department may apply for grants of moneys for the purpose of implementing the rights of victims established pursuant to article 4.1 of this title.
(b) The state judicial department shall study alternative methods for funding the collection of restitution owed to victims of crime.
(3) The board shall accept and evaluate applications from the law enforcement agencies listed in subsection (2) of this section requesting grants of moneys for the following purposes, including, but not limited to, purchase of equipment, training programs, and additional personnel. Such moneys shall not be used for defraying the costs of routine and ongoing operating expenses.
(4) The board is authorized to enter into contracts for the purchase and coordination of victims and witnesses assistance services with persons or agencies which the board deems appropriate. Victims and witnesses assistance services may be used for the following:
(a) Provision of services for early crisis intervention;
(b) Provision of telephone lines for victims and witnesses assistance;
(c) Referral of victims to appropriate social service and victim compensation programs and assistance in filling out forms for compensation;
(c.5) Assistance programs for victims and their families;
(d) Education of victims and witnesses about the operation of the criminal justice system;
(e) Assistance in prompt return of the victims' property;
(f) Notification to the victim of the progress of the investigation, the defendant's arrest, subsequent bail determinations, and the status of the case;
(g) Intercession with the employers or creditors of victims or witnesses;
(h) Assistance to the elderly and to persons with disabilities in arranging transportation to and from court;
(i) Provision of translator services;
(j) Coordination of efforts to assure that victims have a secure place to wait before testifying;
(k) Provision of counseling or assistance during court appearances when appropriate;
(l) Protection from threats of harm and other forms of intimidation; and
(m) Special advocate services.
(4.3) (a) Moneys allocated for the purposes specified in subsections (3) and (4) of this section shall only be used for the purchases of equipment, training programs, additional personnel, and victims and witnesses services that are directly related to the implementation of the rights afforded to crime victims pursuant to section 24-4.1-302.5 and the provision of services delineated pursuant to sections 24-4.1-303 and 24-4.1-304.
(b) Equipment that may be purchased with such moneys includes technical equipment directly related to the immediate individual physical safety of crime victims.
(c) Grants of moneys may be approved for registration fees and expenses for lodging, travel, and meals for those in-state training programs specifically directed toward delivery of services to crime victims and for the actual cost of providing the necessary staff training directly related to the implementation of the rights afforded to crime victims pursuant to section 24-4.1-302.5 and the provision of services delineated pursuant to sections 24-4.1-303 and 24-4.1-304. Nothing in this subsection (4.3) shall preclude volunteer board members from receiving reimbursement for actual and necessary expenses incurred at in-state training programs held pursuant to this paragraph (c). Expenses for lodging, travel, and meals which may be reimbursed pursuant to this paragraph (c) shall not exceed the state government expense reimbursement guidelines.
(4.7) A requesting agency or person shall acknowledge in writing that such agency or person has read and understands the rights afforded to crime victims pursuant to section 24-4.1-302.5 and the services delineated pursuant to sections 24-4.1-303 and 24-4.1-304. Such written acknowledgment shall be attached to such requesting agency's or person's application for moneys pursuant to this section. The board shall not accept for evaluation any application for a grant of moneys pursuant to this section until the requesting agency or person provides the board with such written acknowledgment.
(5) The board shall specify levels and types of services to be provided pursuant to this section and shall review expenditures in accord with these standards.
(6) Upon a finding by the board that a disbursement shall be made from the fund, the board shall submit a written request for payment to the court administrator who shall remit payment in accordance with the request.
(6.5) Repealed.
(7) For purposes of this section:
(a) "Victim" and "witness" mean "victim" and "witness" as defined in section 24-4.1-302.
(b) "Special advocate services" means the services offered to aid victims who are children, including, but not limited to, court-appointed special advocate (CASA) programs, sexual assault treatment and prevention programs, community-based youth and family servicing programs, gang alternative programs, school-based intervention and prevention programs, big brother and big sister programs offering aid to children who are victims, restitution programs, partners programs offering aid to children who are victims, and child abuse treatment programs.
(c) "Court-Appointed Special Advocate" or "CASA" means a trained volunteer appointed by the court pursuant to the provisions of part 2 of article 1 of title 19, C.R.S., in a district to aid the court by providing independent and objective information as directed by the court, regarding children involved in actions brought pursuant to this title.
Source: L. 84: Entire article added, p. 662, § 22, effective July 1. L. 88: (4)(c.5) added, p. 892, § 1, effective July 1. L. 90: (1) amended, p. 1181, § 6, effective July 1. L. 91: (4)(k), (4)(l), and (7) amended and (4)(m) added, p. 242, § 2, effective July 1. L. 93: (4)(h) amended, p. 1653, § 54, effective July 1. L. 94: (2) and (3) amended and (2.5), (4.3), and (4.7) added, p. 1243, § 1, effective May 22. L. 95: (4.7) amended, p. 1103, § 36, effective May 31. L. 96: (7)(c) amended, p. 1094, § 5, effective May 23; (2.5)(b) amended, p. 1265, § 178, effective August 7. L. 97: (2.5)(a) amended, p. 1562, § 8, effective July 1. L. 2003: (7)(b) amended, p. 755, § 7, effective March 25. L. 2024: (6.5) added, (HB 24-1013), ch. 43, p. 155, § 8, effective April 4.
Editor's note: Subsection (6.5)(b) provided for the repeal of subsection (6.5), effective July 1, 2025. (See L. 2024, p. 155.)
Cross references: For the legislative declaration contained in the 1996 act amending subsection (2.5)(b), see section 1 of chapter 237, Session Laws of Colorado 1996.
24-4.2-106. Court administrator custodian of fund - disbursements.
The court administrator of each judicial district shall be the custodian of the fund, and all disbursements from the fund shall be paid by him upon written authorization of the board.
Source: L. 84: Entire article added, p. 664, § 22, effective July 1.
24-4.2-107. Regulations.
In the performance of its functions, the board, pursuant to article 4 of this title, may promulgate rules and regulations prescribing the procedures to be followed in the making, filing, and evaluation of grant applications, criteria for evaluation, fiscal procedures including proper investment of moneys in the fund, and any other regulations necessary for the administration of this article.
Source: L. 84: Entire article added, p. 664, § 22, effective July 1.
24-4.2-108. Report of grants and expenditures.
(1) Each victims and witnesses assistance and law enforcement board and each crime victim compensation board shall submit a report to the executive director of the department of public safety by such date each year as shall be specified by the executive director of the department of public safety, detailing the amount of funds granted to agencies or individuals pursuant to this article and article 4.1 of this title, the number and types of agencies applying for grants, and the projects and services for which such grants were made.
(2) The division of criminal justice in the department of public safety shall report annually to the crime victim services advisory board created in section 24-4.1-117.3 (1) on all grants made and contracts entered into pursuant to this article. The crime victim services advisory board may review the grants and contracts to determine the existence of any conflicts of interest involving members of boards, recipients, or contracting parties.
(3) (Deleted by amendment, L. 99, p. 686, § 3, effective August 4, 1999.)
Source: L. 84: Entire article added, p. 664, § 22, effective July 1. L. 90: (1) amended, p. 1182, § 7, effective July 1. L. 94: (3) added, p. 1244, § 2, effective May 22. L. 97: (2) amended, p. 1559, § 2, effective July 1. L. 99: (2) and (3) amended, p. 686, § 3, effective August 4. L. 2009: (2) amended, (SB 09-047), ch. 129, p. 557, § 7, effective July 1.
24-4.2-109. County, city, city and county, or municipality not preempted.
Nothing in this article shall preclude a home rule county, city, city and county, or municipality from enacting provisions to provide funds for law enforcement agencies and victims and witnesses assistance programs through charges assessed on fines imposed for violation of local ordinances.
Source: L. 84: Entire article added, p. 664, § 22, effective July 1.
24-4.2-110. Applicability.
The surcharge specified in section 24-4.2-104 shall apply to offenses committed on or after January 1, 1985.
Source: L. 84: Entire article added, p. 664, § 22, effective July 1.
24-4.2-111. Repeal of article. (Repealed)
Source: L. 84: Entire article added, p. 664, § 22, effective July 1. L. 88: Entire section repealed, p. 320, § 3, effective July 1.
ARTICLE 5
Public Employment - Eligibility
24-5-101. Effect of criminal conviction on employment rights - fee - determination.
24-5-102. Employee information - student loan repayment and forgiveness programs - legislative declaration - definitions.
24-5-101. Effect of criminal conviction on employment rights - fee - determination.
(1) (a) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (1)(b) of this section, the fact that a person has been convicted of a felony or other offense shall not, in and of itself, prevent the person from applying for and obtaining public employment or from applying for and receiving a license, certification, permit, or registration required by the laws of this state to follow any business, occupation, or profession.
(b) This subsection (1) does not apply to:
(I) The offices and convictions described in section 4 of article XII of the state constitution;
(II) The certification and revocation of certification of peace officers as provided in section 24-31-305;
(III) The employment of personnel in positions involving direct contact with vulnerable persons as specified in section 27-90-111, C.R.S.;
(IV) The licensure or authorization of educators prohibited pursuant to section 22-60.5-107 (2), (2.5), or (2.6), C.R.S.;
(V) The employment of persons in public or private correctional facilities pursuant to sections 17-1-109.5 and 17-1-202 (1)(a)(I) and (1.5), and the employment of persons in public or private juvenile facilities pursuant to sections 19-2.5-1505 and 19-2.5-1519 (4);
(VI) The employment of persons by the public employees' retirement association created pursuant to section 24-51-201 who, upon the commencement of that employment, will have access to association investment information, association assets, or financial, demographic, or other information relating to association members or beneficiaries; and
(VII) (A) The employment of persons by the department of public safety, the department of corrections, and the department of revenue.
(B) The exception in subsection (1)(b)(VII)(A) of this section does not apply to positions within the wildland fire management section in the department of public safety.
(2) (a) (I) When a state or local agency is required to make a finding regarding an applicant for a license, certification, permit, or registration as a condition of issuing the license, certification, permit, or registration, or is required to evaluate the impact of an applicant's criminal record, and the applicant has, at some time, been convicted of a felony or other offense, the state or local agency shall give consideration to pertinent circumstances connected with the conviction in determining whether the applicant is qualified. The intent of this section is to expand employment opportunities for persons who, notwithstanding that fact of conviction of an offense, have been rehabilitated and are ready to accept the responsibilities of a law-abiding and productive member of society.
(II) A state agency making a finding pursuant to subsection (2)(a)(I) of this section may only consider convictions pursuant to section 12-20-206.
(b) In evaluating an applicant, a local agency shall comply with subsection (4) of this section, and a state or local agency shall not use the determination of the following information as a basis for denial or taking adverse action against any applicant otherwise qualified:
(I) The applicant has been arrested for or charged with but not convicted of a criminal offense and the criminal case is not actively pending; except that, an agency may consider the conduct underlying the arrest;
(II) The applicant has been convicted of a criminal offense but pardoned;
(III) The applicant has been convicted of a criminal offense but records of the conviction have been sealed or expunged;
(IV) A court has issued an order of collateral relief specific to the credential sought by the applicant; or
(V) The applicant has been adjudicated for committing a delinquent act in a juvenile proceeding.
(3) (a) Unless statute prohibits the employment of a person with a specific criminal conviction for a particular position, an agency shall not advertise the position with a statement that a person with a criminal record may not apply for the position or place on the application a statement that a person with a criminal record may not apply for the position.
(b) (I) With the exception of the department of corrections and the department of public safety, a local agency shall not perform a background check until the agency determines that an applicant is a finalist or makes a conditional offer of employment to the applicant.
(II) The exception in subsection (3)(b)(I) of this section does not apply to positions within the wildland fire management section in the department of public safety.
(c) If, after determining that an applicant is a finalist or after making a conditional offer of employment to an applicant, a local agency determines that the applicant has a criminal history, the local agency shall comply with subsection (4) of this section and shall not use the determination of the following information as a basis for not making an offer of employment or for withdrawing the conditional offer of employment:
(I) The applicant has been arrested for or charged with but not convicted of a criminal offense and the criminal case is not actively pending;
(II) The applicant has been convicted of a criminal offense but pardoned;
(III) The applicant has been convicted of a criminal offense but records of the conviction have been sealed or expunged; or
(IV) A court has issued an order of collateral relief specific to the employment sought by the applicant.
(d) and (e) Repealed.
(4) Except as provided in subsection (6) of this section, when considering an applicant for a license, certification, permit, or registration pursuant to subsection (2) of this section or, if, after determining that an applicant is a finalist or making a conditional offer of employment to an applicant, a local agency determines that the applicant has a conviction other than as described in subsection (2)(b) or (3)(c) of this section, the local agency shall consider the following factors when determining whether the conviction disqualifies the applicant:
(a) The nature of the conviction;
(b) Whether there is a direct relationship between the conviction and the position's duties and responsibilities and the bearing, if any, the conviction may have on the applicant's fitness or ability to perform one or more such duties and responsibilities, including whether the conviction was for unlawful sexual behavior as listed in section 16-22-102 (9); whether the duties of employment would place a coworker or the public in a vulnerable position; and whether the applicant will be directly responsible for the care of individuals susceptible to abuse or mistreatment because of the individual's circumstances, including the individual's age, disability, frailty, mental health disorder, developmental disability, or ill health;
(c) Any information produced by the applicant or produced on his or her behalf regarding his or her rehabilitation and good conduct; and
(d) The time that has elapsed since the conviction.
(5) Notwithstanding any other provision of law to the contrary, the provisions of this section apply to the office of the governor.
(6) (a) If, at any stage in the hiring process, the department of corrections or the department of public safety determines that the applicant has been convicted of a crime, the department must consider the factors listed in subsections (4)(a) to (4)(d) of this section when determining whether the conviction disqualifies the applicant for the position.
(b) Notwithstanding subsection (6)(a) of this section, if, after determining that an applicant for a position within the wildland fire management section in the department of public safety is a finalist or when making a conditional offer of employment to the applicant, the department of public safety determines the applicant has been convicted of a crime, the department must consider the factors listed in subsections (4)(a) to (4)(d) of this section when determining whether the conviction disqualifies the applicant for the position.
(7) Before a local agency makes a final determination that a criminal conviction disqualifies an applicant from receiving a license, certification, permit, or registration, the agency shall provide the applicant with written notice that describes:
(a) The specific conviction that is the basis for the disqualification;
(b) The reasons the conviction was determined to be disqualifying, including findings for each of the factors in subsection (4) of this section that the agency deemed relevant to the determination; and
(c) The right to submit additional evidence relevant to each of the factors listed in subsection (4) of this section, consistent with section 24-4-104.
(8) A state or local agency that makes a final determination that a criminal conviction will prevent an applicant from receiving a license, certification, permit, or registration shall issue the determination in writing and shall include notice of the right to appeal the determination and notice of the earliest date the applicant may reapply for the credential in accordance with section 24-4-106.
Source: L. 73: p. 513, § 1. C.R.S. 1963: § 39-25-101. L. 90: Entire section amended, p. 1207, § 1, effective March 16. L. 92: Entire section amended, p. 1098, § 7, effective March 6. L. 95: Entire section amended, p. 1103, § 37, effective May 31. L. 99: Entire section amended, p. 923, § 2, effective July 1. L. 2003: Entire section amended, p. 2521, § 11, effective June 5. L. 2004: (1)(b)(III) and (1)(b)(IV) amended and (1)(b)(V) added, p. 232, § 5, effective April 1. L. 2006: (1)(b)(VI) added, p. 161, § 1, effective March 31. L. 2010: (1)(b)(III) amended, (SB 10-175), ch. 188, p. 795, § 52, effective April 29. L. 2011: (1)(b)(IV) amended, (HB 11-1121), ch. 242, p. 1061, § 9, effective August 10. L. 2012: (1)(b)(V) and (1)(b)(VI) amended and (1)(b)(VII), (3), (4), and (5) added, (HB 12-1263), ch. 233, p. 1021, § 1, effective August 8. L. 2014: (1)(b)(VII), (3)(b), and IP(4) amended and (6) added, (HB 14-1172), ch. 61, p. 279, § 1, effective August 6. L. 2018: (1)(b)(VII), (2), (3)(c), IP(4), and (4)(b) amended and (3)(d) and (3)(e) repealed, (HB 18-1418), ch. 352, p. 2086, § 1, effective May 30. L. 2021: (1)(a), IP(1)(b), (1)(b)(VII), (3)(b), and (6) amended, (SB 21-012), ch. 29, p. 121, § 1, effective April 15; IP(1)(b) and (1)(b)(V) amended, (SB 21-059), ch. 136, p. 744, § 112, effective October 1. L. 2022: (2)(b)(III) and (2)(b)(IV) amended and (2)(b)(V) added, (HB 22-1383), ch. 365, p. 2605, § 4, effective August 10; (7) and (8) added, (HB 22-1098), ch. 220, p. 1438, § 2, effective August 10. L. 2024: (1)(a), (2)(a), IP(2)(b), (3)(b)(I), IP(3)(c), IP(4), and IP(7) amended, (HB 24-1004), ch. 371, p. 2497, § 3, effective August 7.
Cross references: (1) In 2011, subsection (1)(b)(IV) was amended by the "Safer Schools Act of 2011". For the short title, see section 1 of chapter 242, Session Laws of Colorado 2011.
(2) For the legislative declaration in HB 22-1383, see section 1 of chapter 365, Session Laws of Colorado 2022.
ANNOTATION
Law reviews. For article, "The EEOC's New Enforcement Guidance on the Use of Criminal Background Checks", see 41 Colo. Law. 45 (Dec. 2012).
Strong public policy of Colorado is to aid ex-offenders in their rehabilitation to society and to insure that they are not discriminated against solely because they, at one time, were convicted of crimes. Watson v. Cronin, 384 F. Supp. 652 (D. Colo. 1974).
Medical license not necessarily prohibited by prior conviction. A prior felony conviction, by itself, is not sufficient to warrant the denial or revocation of a medical license. Bd. of Med. Exam'rs v. Jorgensen, 198 Colo. 275, 599 P.2d 869 (1979).
This section, in combination with the statutes governing disciplinary action against a real estate broker, makes the degree of rehabilitation an essential factor to be considered. The real estate commission bears the burden of proving not only that the broker was convicted of a felony, but also that he or she has not been rehabilitated. Colo. Real Estate Comm'n v. Bartlett, 272 P.3d 1099 (Colo. App. 2011).
Evidence of circumstances which led to prior felony conviction may be considered by the board of medical examiners in deciding whether or not to revoke a medical license. Bd. of Med. Exam'rs v. Jorgensen, 198 Colo. 275, 599 P.2d 869 (1979).
Massage parlor license inquiry not restricted to prior felony convictions. In making an examination of an applicant for a massage parlor license, a board of county commissioners is not restricted to inquiring into prior felony convictions. JRM, Inc. v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 200 Colo. 384, 615 P.2d 31 (1980).
This section does not prohibit denial of massage parlor license for other conduct which would establish the absence of good moral character. JRM, Inc. v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 200 Colo. 384, 615 P.2d 31 (1980).
Such as sexual activity and nudity. The consideration by the board of county commissioners of evidence of sex acts and nudity in the operation of a massage parlor by the applicant for a massage parlor license is proper. JRM, Inc. v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 200 Colo. 384, 615 P.2d 31 (1980).
Only "moral turpitude" offenses serve as justification for denial of liquor license. Sections 12-47-118, 12-47-137, and 12-47-141, as governed and modified by this section, require that only those offenses involving "moral turpitude" can serve as justification for the denial of a liquor license. Hartman v. Wadlow, 37 Colo. App. 90, 545 P.2d 735 (1975), aff'd, 191 Colo. 196, 551 P.2d 201 (1976).
"Driving while impaired" is not a moral turpitude offense. While "driving a motor vehicle while ability is impaired" is a serious offense, nevertheless, it does not rise to the magnitude of being one involving moral turpitude. Hartman v. Wadlow, 37 Colo. App. 90, 545 P.2d 735 (1975), aff'd, 191 Colo. 196, 551 P.2d 201 (1976).
Convictions may serve as a basis for delaying, but not permanently denying, a motor vehicle salesperson license under § 12-6-118 (7)(a)(I), which section is limited to specific felony convictions and does not make a criminal conviction, without more, the basis for denying a license; therefore, there is no irreconcilable conflict between this section and § 12-6-118 (7)(a)(I). Smith v. Colo. Motor Vehicle Dealer Bd., 200 P.3d 1115 (Colo. App. 2008).
Board may consider circumstances surrounding applicant's criminal conduct in determining whether to reinstate license. The applicant's rehabilitation alone does not mandate licensure. Colo. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Priem, 2012 COA 5, 272 P.3d 1136.
Applied in Beathune v. Colo. Dealer Licensing Bd., 198 Colo. 483, 601 P.2d 1386 (1979); R & F Enters., Inc. v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 199 Colo. 137, 606 P.2d 64 (1980).
24-5-102. Employee information - student loan repayment and forgiveness programs - legislative declaration - definitions.
(1) (a) The general assembly finds and declares that:
(I) Many Coloradans have federal student loans made through the United States department of education's direct loan program or the federal family education loan program;
(II) Large amounts of student loan debt and insecurity in the job market have resulted in high student loan default rates;
(III) However, many borrowers qualify for loan repayment programs that allow for lower monthly payments;
(IV) In addition, there are federal programs that allow borrowers to have their loans forgiven after working for a certain period of time in the public sector, as a teacher, or for a nonprofit public service organization;
(V) The federal consumer financial protection bureau has a toolkit and resources to help employers assist their employees in accessing the federal programs;
(VI) As a public sector employer, Colorado can help qualified employees access federal loan repayment and loan forgiveness programs for which they may qualify by providing information to its employees about these federal programs; and
(VII) Further, school districts, the state charter school institute, local governmental entities, and nonprofit public service organizations can assist their employees by providing information about these federal programs.
(b) Therefore, the general assembly declares that employees will benefit from receiving information about federal student loan programs that provide assistance through loan repayment options or loan forgiveness.
(2) As used in this section, unless the context otherwise requires:
(a) "Public service loan forgiveness program" means the loan forgiveness program set forth in 34 CFR 685.219.
(b) "Teacher loan forgiveness program" means the loan forgiveness program set forth in 34 CFR 685.217.
(3) (a) On or before December 31, 2019, the department of personnel shall develop informational materials described in subsection (3)(e) of this section to increase awareness of the public service loan forgiveness program, the teacher loan forgiveness program, and federal student loan repayment options, including income-sensitive repayment programs. In lieu of developing the informational materials, the department of personnel may provide materials published by a federal agency that include the required information.
(b) On or before January 1, 2020, and on or before January 1 each year thereafter, the department of personnel shall facilitate the distribution of the informational materials to:
(I) All state employees;
(II) The department of education, for distribution to each school district and board of cooperative services and to the state charter school institute for the benefit of teachers employed by a school district, a district charter school, a board of cooperative services, or by an institute charter school;
(III) The department of higher education, for distribution to the governing board for each state institution of higher education for the benefit of employees of state institutions of higher education;
(IV) The secretary of state, for posting the informational materials on the secretary of state's website for distribution to nonprofit public service organizations, as defined in 34 CFR 685.219, for the benefit of the employees of nonprofit public service organizations; and
(V) The division of local government in the department of local affairs, for distribution to local governmental entities, as defined in section 24-32-104 (1)(m)(II).
(c) In addition to annual distribution, the department of personnel shall facilitate the distribution of the informational materials to newly hired state employees as part of its employee orientation process.
(d) The department of personnel may distribute the informational materials to state employees or human resources directors through an email or as part of a mailing or regular communication to state employees.
(e) The information provided pursuant to this section must include a summary of the public service loan forgiveness program, the teacher loan forgiveness program, and federal student loan repayment programs, including who may be eligible for the programs, steps that an eligible employee must take in order to participate in the programs, and a recommendation that employees contact their student loan servicer or private education lender or an ombudsman at the state, if one exists, for additional information.
(f) The department of personnel shall make the informational materials available on the department of personnel's website. The department of personnel shall verify the information's accuracy at least annually and update the informational materials as necessary. The department of personnel shall distribute updated informational materials to the entities included in subsection (3)(b) of this section.
Source: L. 2019: Entire section added, (SB 19-057), ch. 35, p. 111, § 1, effective August 2. L. 2021: (3)(e) amended, (SB 21-057), ch. 378, p. 2534, § 18, effective June 29.
Editor's note: Section 19 of chapter 378 (SB 21-057), Session Laws of Colorado 2021, provides that the act changing this section applies to conduct occurring on or after June 29, 2021, including collection of debts arising out of loans issued before June 29, 2021.
ARTICLE 6
Colorado Sunshine Law
PART 1
GENERAL PROVISIONS
24-6-101. Short title.
24-6-102. Effective date.
PART 2
PUBLIC OFFICIAL DISCLOSURE LAW
24-6-201. Declaration of policy.
24-6-202. Disclosure - contents - filing - false or incomplete filing - penalty.
24-6-203. Reporting by incumbents and elected candidates - gifts, honoraria, and other benefits - prohibition on monetary gifts - penalty - definitions.
PART 3
REGULATION OF LOBBYISTS
24-6-301. Definitions - legislative declaration.
24-6-302. Disclosure statements - required - definition.
24-6-303. Registration as professional lobbyist - filing of disclosure statements - certificate of registration - legislative declaration.
24-6-303.5. Lobbying by state officials and employees.
24-6-304. Records - preservation - public inspection - electronic access.
24-6-304.5. Examination of books and records.
24-6-305. Powers of the secretary of state - granting and revoking of certificates - barring from registration - imposition of penalties - notification of substantial violation.
24-6-306. Employment of legislators, legislative employees, or state employees - filing of statement.
24-6-307. Employment of unregistered persons.
24-6-308. Prohibited practices.
24-6-309. Offenses - penalties - injunctions.
PART 4
OPEN MEETINGS LAW
24-6-401. Declaration of policy.
24-6-402. Meetings - open to public - legislative declaration - definitions.
PART 5
ENCRYPTION OF RADIO COMMUNICATIONS BY GOVERNMENTAL ENTITIES
24-6-501. Definitions.
24-6-502. Public broadcast of governmental radio communications - encryption policy.
PART 1
GENERAL PROVISIONS
24-6-101. Short title.
This article shall be known and may be cited as the "Colorado Sunshine Act of 1972".
Source: Initiated 72. L. 73: p. 1660, § 1. C.R.S. 1963: § 3-37-101.
24-6-102. Effective date.
This article became effective January 1, 1973.
Source: Initiated 72. L. 73: p. 1660, § 1. C.R.S. 1963: § 3-37-102.
PART 2
PUBLIC OFFICIAL DISCLOSURE LAW
Cross references: For the "Fair Campaign Practices Act", see article 45 of title 1.
24-6-201. Declaration of policy.
In order to continue the public confidence in the integrity of government officials and to promote trust of the people in the objectivity of their public servants, this open disclosure law is adopted.
Source: Initiated 72. L. 73: p. 1660, § 1. C.R.S. 1963: § 3-37-201.
24-6-202. Disclosure - contents - filing - false or incomplete filing - penalty.
(1) Not later than January 10 of each calendar year, each of the following individuals shall file an annual disclosure statement with the secretary of state of Colorado in such form as the secretary of state prescribes, stating the information specified in subsection (2) of this section:
(a) Each member of the general assembly;
(b) The governor, lieutenant governor, secretary of state, attorney general, and state treasurer;
(c) Each justice or judge of a court of record;
(d) Each district attorney;
(e) Each member of the state board of education;
(f) Each member of the board of regents of the university of Colorado;
(g) Each member of the public utilities commission.
(h) Repealed.
(1.3) If an individual begins serving in one of the positions specified in subsection (1) of this section after January 10 and has not filed a disclosure statement within the previous thirty days, the individual shall file a disclosure statement no later than ten days after assuming the position.
(1.5) The provisions of subsection (1) of this section apply to any individual who is serving in any position specified in subsection (1) of this section on or after January 1, 2024. If an individual who is specified in subsection (1) of this section is serving in office in the 2024 calendar year but has not filed an annual disclosure statement in the 2024 calendar year, the individual shall file a disclosure statement no later than July 1, 2024, or in accordance with the requirements specified in subsection (1.3) of this section, whichever is sooner.
(1.7) Repealed.
(2) Disclosure must include the following for the previous calendar year, unless otherwise specified:
(a) The names, and amounts, disclosed as a range as provided in the form prescribed by the secretary of state, of any source or sources of any income, including capital gains, whether or not taxable, of the person making disclosure, the person's spouse, and any minor children residing with the person making the disclosure;
(b) The name of each business, insurance policy, or trust in which he, his spouse, or minor children residing with him has a financial interest in excess of five thousand dollars;
(c) Any interest in real property, including an option to buy, in the state in which the person making disclosure, their spouse, or minor children residing with them have any interest, direct or indirect, the market value of which is in excess of five thousand dollars, and the city and county in which the property is located;
(d) The identity, by name, of all offices, directorships, and fiduciary relationships held by the person making disclosure, the person's spouse, and any minor children residing with the person making the disclosure, including whether the position is compensated or uncompensated;
(e) The identity, by name, of any person, firm, or organization for whom compensated lobbying is done by any person associated with the person making disclosure if the benefits of such compensation are or may be shared by the person making disclosure, directly or indirectly;
(f) The name of each creditor to whom the person making disclosure, the person's spouse, or the person's minor children owe money in excess of one thousand dollars, including the interest rate and the highest amount owed, disclosed as a range as provided in the form prescribed by the secretary of state, for the calendar year covered in the statement;
(g) A list of businesses with which the person making disclosure or his spouse are associated that do business with or are regulated by the state and the nature of such business or regulation;
(h) The sources of compensation exceeding five thousand dollars received by the person making the disclosure or the person's business affiliation for services provided directly by the person making the disclosure during the current year and during the prior calendar year, if the source is a person or entity that is regulated by the state or pays for a lobbyist that conducts lobbying at the general assembly or at a state regulatory body. This includes the names of clients and customers of any affiliated corporation, firm, partnership, or other business enterprise and a description of the duties performed or services rendered for each source of compensation if the person making the disclosure directly provided the services generating a fee or payment of more than five thousand dollars. The person making the disclosure may exclude any information considered confidential as a result of a privileged relationship recognized by law. If the person making the disclosure withholds information as a result of a privileged relationship, the person shall still disclose the existence of the source of compensation and an explanation for why information was withheld.
(i) Any additional information that the person making the disclosure deems necessary.
(3) Any disclosure statement shall be amended no more than thirty days after any termination, acquisition, or substantial change of interests as to which disclosure is required.
(4) Repealed.
(5) Each disclosure statement is public information and shall be made available on the secretary of state's website. The secretary of state shall redact the address and other personal information of an individual specified in subsection (1) of this section before posting the disclosure statement on the secretary's website. The secretary of state may also modify the disclosure statement form to eliminate the inclusion of certain personal information.
(6) Repealed.
(7) Any person who willfully files a false or incomplete disclosure statement, or who willfully fails to make any filing required by this section is guilty of a misdemeanor and, upon conviction thereof, shall be punished by a fine of not less than one thousand dollars nor more than five thousand dollars.
(8) In addition to any other process provided in law or rule, including article XXIX of the state constitution, any person who believes an official listed in subsection (1)(a) of this section is not substantially complying with the requirements of this section may file a complaint with the following:
(a) The secretary of the senate and the president of the senate for members of the senate; and
(b) The chief clerk of the house of representatives and the speaker of the house of representatives for members of the house of representatives.
(9) Upon receiving a complaint, the person or persons receiving the complaint shall follow any existing procedures for investigating ethics complaints or violations.
(10) If an official specified in subsection (1)(a) of this section does not timely file the required annual disclosure statement, the secretary of state shall forward notification to the appropriate individual specified in subsection (8) of this section.
Source: Initiated 72. L. 73: p. 1660, § 1. C.R.S. 1963: § 3-37-202. L. 79: IP(1), (4), and (6) amended and (1)(b), (1)(d), (1)(e), (1)(f), (1)(g), and (1)(h) added, pp. 851, 852, §§ 1, 2, effective July 1. L. 85: (1)(a) amended and (1)(h) repealed, pp. 382, 381, §§ 6, 1, effective April 17. L. 2010: IP(1) amended and (1.7) added, (SB 10-041), ch. 151, p. 524, § 5, effective July 1. L. 2022: (4) amended, (HB 22-1156), ch. 108, p. 496, § 3, effective August 10. L. 2023: IP(2), (2)(a), (2)(d), (2)(f), and (2)(h) amended and (2)(i) added, (SB 23-276), ch. 399, p. 2397, § 53, effective January 1, 2024. L. 2024: IP(1), (1.5), (2)(a), (2)(f), (3), (5), and (7) amended, (1.3), (8), (9), and (10) added, and (1.7), (4), and (6) repealed, (SB 24-210), ch. 468, p. 3262, § 51, effective June 6. L. 2026: (2)(c) and (5) amended, (HB 26-1422), ch. 331, p. 1933, § 10, effective June 2.
ANNOTATION
This section does not violate equal protection guarantees with regard to claimants in administrative proceedings. Although subsection (1)(c) by its terms mentions only "[a] justice or judge of a court of record", administrative law judges must follow substantially similar rules of disclosure under § 24-30-1003 (4)(a) and rule 3.15 of the Colorado Code of Judicial Conduct. Kilpatrick v. Indus. Claim Appeals Office, 2015 COA 30, 356 P.3d 1008.
24-6-203. Reporting by incumbents and elected candidates - gifts, honoraria, and other benefits - prohibition on monetary gifts - penalty - definitions.
(1) (a) As used in this section, the terms "appropriate officer" and "candidate" shall have the meanings ascribed to them in section 1-45-103, C.R.S., of the "Fair Campaign Practices Act".
(b) (I) As used in this section, the term "public office" means any office voted for in this state at any election. "Public office" includes, without limitation, the governor, lieutenant governor, secretary of state, attorney general, and state treasurer; a member of the general assembly or the state board of education; a regent of the university of Colorado; a judge on the Colorado court of appeals or the Colorado supreme court; a district attorney; or an officer of a county, municipality, city and county, school district, or any elective office within a special district for which the annual compensation exceeds two thousand four hundred dollars.
(II) "Public office" does not include:
(A) The office of president or vice president of the United States;
(B) The office of senator or representative in the congress of the United States;
(C) Any office in a political party chosen pursuant to sections 1-3-103, 1-4-403, and 1-4-701, C.R.S.; or
(D) Any political party office in an assembly or convention, including delegates thereto.
(E) Repealed.
(III) Repealed.
(c) As used in this section, "covered state office" means the governor, lieutenant governor, secretary of state, attorney general, state treasurer, a member of the state board of education, a regent of the university of Colorado, a member of the general assembly, or a district attorney.
(2) Every incumbent in or candidate elected to public office who receives from any other person any item described in subsection (3) of this section in connection with the incumbent's or elected candidate's public service shall file with the appropriate officer, on or before January 15, April 15, July 15, and October 15 of each year, a report covering the period since the last report. The requirement of this subsection (2) pertaining to the report due January 15 shall extend to an incumbent leaving public office between October 15 and January 15, who shall file with the appropriate officer by January 15 a report that covers any items received during the period since the last report. Such report shall be on forms prescribed by the secretary of state and shall contain, at a minimum, the name of the person from whom the item was received and the amount or value and the date of receipt. The secretary of state shall furnish such forms to municipal clerks, to county clerk and recorders, and to incumbents and elected candidates for state offices and district offices of districts greater than a county free of charge for use by incumbents and elected candidates required to file such forms. If any incumbent in or candidate elected to public office does not receive any such item, he or she shall not be required to file such report.
(3) The reports required by subsection (2) of this section shall include the following:
(a) In the case of a candidate elected to public office who is not an incumbent and has not yet been sworn into such office and subject to the requirements of subsection (3.5) of this section, any money, including but not limited to a loan, pledge, or advance of money or a guarantee of a loan of money, or any forbearance or forgiveness of indebtedness from any person, with a value greater than fifty-three dollars;
(b) In the case of a candidate elected to public office who is not an incumbent and has not yet been sworn into such office and subject to the requirements of subsection (3.5) of this section, any gift of any item of real or personal property, other than money, with a value greater than fifty-three dollars;
(c) In the case of a candidate elected to public office who is not an incumbent and has not yet been sworn into such office, any loan of any item of real or personal property, other than money, if the value of the loan is greater than fifty-three dollars. For such purpose, the "value of the loan" means the cost saved or avoided by the elected candidate by not borrowing, leasing, or purchasing comparable property from a source available to the general public.
(d) Any payment for a speech, appearance, or publication;
(e) In the case of a candidate elected to public office who is not an incumbent and has not yet been sworn into such office, tickets to sporting, recreational, educational, or cultural events with a value greater than fifty-three dollars for any single event;
(f) Payment of or reimbursement for actual and necessary expenditures for travel and lodging for attendance at a convention, fact-finding mission or trip, or other meeting that the incumbent or elected candidate who has been sworn into public office is permitted to accept or receive in accordance with the provisions of section 3 of article XXIX of the state constitution, unless the payment of or reimbursement for such expenditures is made from public funds of a state or local government in the case of an incumbent or elected candidate subject to the provisions of said article or from the funds of any association of public officials or public entities whose membership includes the incumbent's or elected candidate's office or the governmental entity in which such office is held;
(g) Subject to the provisions of section 3 of article XXIX of the state constitution, any gift of a meal to a fund-raising event of a political party;
(h) Payment of or reimbursement for actual and necessary expenses for travel and lodging for attendance at a convention, fact-finding mission or trip, or other meeting that is from an organization declared to be a joint governmental agency by section 2-3-311, C.R.S.
(3.5) (a) Each incumbent in or candidate elected to covered state office is prohibited from knowingly receiving or accepting from any other person, in connection with the public service of the incumbent or elected candidate:
(I) A gift of any money, including but not limited to a loan, pledge, or advance of money, a guarantee of a loan of money, or any monetary payment given, directly or indirectly, for the purpose of defraying any expenses related to the official duties undertaken by the incumbent or elected candidate; or
(II) An in-kind gift.
(b) Nothing in paragraph (a) of this subsection (3.5) shall be construed to prohibit an incumbent or elected candidate from receiving a salary or other compensation paid to the incumbent or elected candidate in connection with the performance of his or her official duties, including, without limitation, payment for a speech, appearance, or publication or payment of or reimbursement for actual and necessary expenditures for travel and lodging to the extent the incumbent or elected candidate who has been sworn into covered state office is permitted to accept or receive such items in accordance with the provisions of section 3 of article XXIX of the state constitution.
(c) For purposes of this subsection (3.5), an "in-kind gift" means any gift of equipment, goods, supplies, property, services, or anything else, the value of which exceeds fifty dollars in the aggregate in any one calendar year, given, directly or indirectly, to an incumbent in or candidate elected to covered state office for the purpose of defraying any expenses related to the official duties undertaken by the incumbent or elected candidate.
(3.7) Notwithstanding any other provision of this section, no incumbent in or candidate elected to covered state office shall accept a gift of any money from any person who is a professional or volunteer lobbyist or from a corporation or labor organization.
(4) The reports required by subsection (2) of this section need not include the following:
(a) A contribution or contribution in kind that has already been reported pursuant to section 1-45-108, C.R.S.;
(b) Any unsolicited item of trivial value as described in section 3 (3)(b) of article XXIX of the state constitution;
(c) An unsolicited token or award of appreciation as described in section 3 (3)(c) of article XXIX of the state constitution;
(d) Payment of or reimbursement for actual and necessary expenditures for travel and lodging for attendance at a convention, fact-finding mission or trip, or other meeting that the incumbent or elected candidate is permitted to accept or receive in accordance with the provisions of section 3 of article XXIX of the state constitution, if the payment of or reimbursement for such expenditures is made from public funds of a state or local government in the case of an incumbent or elected candidate subject to the provisions of said article or from the funds of any association of public officials or public entities whose membership includes the incumbent's or elected candidate's office or the governmental entity in which such office is held;
(e) Payment of salary from employment, including other government employment, in addition to that earned from being a member of the general assembly or by reason of service in other public office;
(f) Except as otherwise described in this subsection (4), any other gift or thing of value an incumbent or elected candidate who has been sworn into public office is permitted to solicit, accept, or receive in accordance with the provisions of section 3 of article XXIX of the state constitution.
(5) Any person who provides an incumbent or elected candidate with any item required to be reported by the incumbent or elected candidate pursuant to this section shall, at the time the item is provided, furnish the recipient with a written statement of the dollar value of the item.
(6) Nothing contained in this section shall relieve any person from the disclosure requirements of part 3 of article 6 of this title, relating to the regulation of lobbyists.
(7) Any person who willfully files a false or incomplete report pursuant to this section, who willfully fails to file a report required by this section, who willfully fails to provide the statement of value required by subsection (5) of this section, or who violates any provision of subsection (3.5) of this section is guilty of a misdemeanor and, upon conviction thereof, shall be punished by a fine of not less than fifty dollars nor more than one thousand dollars.
(8) The amount of the gift limit specified in subsection (3) of this section, set at fifty-three dollars as of August 8, 2012, shall be identical to the amount of the gift limit under section 3 of article XXIX of the state constitution, and shall be adjusted for inflation contemporaneously with any adjustment of the constitutional gift limit pursuant to section 3 (6) of article XXIX.
Source: L. 94: Entire section added, p. 1824, § 3, effective January 1, 1995. L. 98: (3)(g) added and (4)(b) amended, p. 952, §§ 5, 6, effective April 27; (1) amended, p. 823, § 34, effective August 5. L. 2006: (1)(c), (3.5), and (3.7) added and (2), IP(3), (3)(a), (3)(b), IP(4), and (7) amended, p. 2063, §§ 1, 2, effective July 1. L. 2010: (3)(f) and (4)(d) amended and (3)(h) added, (SB 10-099), ch. 184, p. 661, § 3, effective August 11. L. 2012: (1)(b)(I), (1)(c), (2), (3), IP(3.5)(a), (3.5)(b), (3.5)(c), (3.7), and (4) amended, (1)(b)(II)(E) and (1)(b)(III) repealed, and (8) added, (HB 12-1070), ch. 167, p. 580, § 1, effective August 8. L. 2017: (1)(b)(I) amended, (HB 17-1297), ch. 364, p. 1906, § 3, effective August 9.
Cross references: For the legislative declaration in the 2010 act amending subsections (3)(f) and (4)(d) and adding subsection (3)(h), see section 1 of chapter 184, Session Laws of Colorado 2010.
ANNOTATION
The "special occasion" exemption set forth in § 3(3)(g) of article XXIX of the Colorado constitution preempts the provisions of subsection (3.5)(a) of this section. IEC Advisory Opinion 13-01.
No violation of the gift ban under subsection (3.5). Matter of Ransom, Indep. Ethics Comm'n 16-20.
PART 3
REGULATION OF LOBBYISTS
24-6-301. Definitions - legislative declaration.
As used in this part 3, unless the context otherwise requires:
(1) "Client" means the person who employs or retains the professional services of one or more lobbyists to undertake lobbying on behalf of that person. For the purposes of this part 3, a professional lobbyist is not a client of another lobbyist for whom he or she undertakes lobbying on a subcontract basis nor is the professional lobbyist a client of either a lobbying firm or any other person that employs or retains one or more professional lobbyists to undertake lobbying on behalf of one or more clients. Where the client is an organization or entity, nothing in this subsection (1) requires the organization or entity to provide the names of any of its shareholders, investors, business partners, coalition partners, members, donors, or supporters, as applicable.
(1.3) "Communication" includes but is not limited to a transmittal of information, data, ideas, opinions, or anything of a similar nature, either oral, written, or by any other means, to a covered official.
(1.5) "Contribution" means a gift, subscription, loan, advance, or deposit of money or anything of value and includes a contract, promise, or agreement, whether or not legally enforceable, to make a contribution. "Contribution" also includes the compensation and reimbursement for expenses of a person required to file a disclosure statement under section 24-6-302.
(1.7) "Covered official" means:
(a) For the type of lobbying defined in subparagraphs (I), (II.5), and (III) of paragraph (a) of subsection (3.5) of this section, the governor, the lieutenant governor, a member of the general assembly, or the director of research of the legislative council of the general assembly or any member of legislative council staff;
(b) For the type of lobbying defined in subparagraph (IV) of paragraph (a) of subsection (3.5) of this section, a member of a rule-making board or commission or a rule-making official of a state agency which has jurisdiction over the subject matter of a rule, standard, or rate.
(1.9) (a) "Disclosure statement" means a written statement that contains:
(I) The name and address of each client or other professional lobbyist who has made a contribution totaling one hundred dollars or more for lobbying and the amount paid since the previous disclosure report;
(II) The total sum of the contributions made to or for the disclosing person for lobbying since the last disclosure statement which are not stated under subparagraph (I) of this paragraph (a);
(III) The total sum of all contributions made to or for the disclosing person for lobbying since the last disclosure statement and during the fiscal year;
(IV) The name of the covered official to or for whom such expenditures of more than fifty-three dollars have been made by or on behalf of the disclosing person for gift or entertainment purposes in connection with lobbying or for whom an expenditure was made by or on behalf of the disclosing person for a gift of a meal at a fund-raising event of a political party described in section 1-45-105.5 (1)(c)(IV), C.R.S., during either the first six months or the second six months of a state fiscal year and the amount, date, and principal purpose of the gift or entertainment, if the covered official or a member of his or her family actually received such gift or entertainment, but expenditures of one dollar or less shall be reported under subparagraph (V) of this paragraph (a). All amounts that a professional lobbyist spends on a covered official for which the lobbyist is reimbursed, or the source of which is a contribution, shall be deemed to be for gift or entertainment purposes.
(V) The total sum of all such expenditures made by or on behalf of the disclosing person to covered officials for gift or entertainment purposes in connection with lobbying since the last disclosure statement that are not stated under subparagraph (IV) of this paragraph (a);
(VI) (Deleted by amendment, L. 96, p. 1081, § 1, effective August 7, 1996.)
(VII) The total sum of all expenditures made by or on behalf of the disclosing person in connection with lobbying, other than gift and entertainment expenditures, since the last disclosure statement which are not stated under subparagraph (VI) of this paragraph (a);
(VIII) The total sum of all expenditures made by or on behalf of the disclosing person in connection with lobbying since the last disclosure statement and during the fiscal year;
(IX) A statement, which shall only be given by a professional lobbyist, which contains the names of, and the amounts of any expenditures or contributions made to, any papers, periodicals, magazines, radio or television stations, or other media of mass communication to whom expenditures or contributions were made in which the professional lobbyist or his employer or agent has caused to be published any advertisements, articles, or editorials relating to lobbying; except that this information is not required for regular or routine publications sent primarily to the members of the professional lobbyist's organization, which publications contain information relating to his lobbying;
(X) The nature of the legislation, standards, rules, or rates for which the disclosing person is lobbying and, where known, the specific legislation, standards, rules, or rates. In the case of specific legislation, the professional lobbyist shall include the bill number of the legislation, and whether such lobbyist's client is supporting, opposing, amending, or monitoring the legislation at the time of the disclosure statement. The professional lobbyist shall specify that his or her representation is accurate as of the date of disclosure only and that the representation is not binding and is subject to change after the date and before the time the next disclosure statement is due. If a professional lobbyist fails to show any bill numbers or nature of the legislation, as applicable, such lobbyist shall affirm that he or she was not retained in connection with any legislation. Nothing in this subparagraph (X) requires any additional disclosure on the part of a lobbyist before the next applicable reporting deadline pursuant to section 24-6-302 (3). For purposes of this subparagraph (X), "legislation" means the process of making or enacting law in written form in the form of codes, statutes, or rules. Nothing in this subparagraph (X) requires a lobbyist to amend a previously filed disclosure statement upon learning the bill number of a previously disclosed piece of legislation.
(XI) If the client or professional lobbyist is an individual, the name and address of the individual and a description of the business activity in which the individual is engaged. If the client or professional lobbyist is a business entity, a description of the business entity in which the client or lobbyist is engaged and the name or names of the entity's chief executive officer, partners, or other designated contact person, as applicable. If the client or lobbyist is an industry, trade, organization or group of persons, or professional association, a description of the industry, trade, organization or group of persons, or profession that the lobbyist represents.
(XII) A statement detailing any direct business association of the disclosing person in any pending legislation, measure, or question. For purposes of this subparagraph (XII), a "direct business association" means that, in connection with a pending bill, measure, or question, the passage or failure of the bill, measure, or question will result in the disclosing person deriving a direct financial or pecuniary benefit that is greater than any such benefit derived by or shared by other persons in the disclosing person's profession, occupation, or industry. A disclosing person shall not be deemed to have a direct personal relationship in a pending bill, measure, or question where such interest arises from a bill, measure, or question that affects the entire membership of a class to which the disclosing person belongs.
(b) The secretary of state shall prescribe a form for disclosure statements, which shall contain:
(I) A statement, which the disclosing person may adopt, if true, that no change has occurred since the prior month's disclosure statement, in which case the information required by paragraph (a) of this subsection (1.9) may be omitted;
(II) A statement, which the disclosing person may adopt, if true, that no unreported contributions for lobbying are receivable and that no unreported expenditures for lobbying will be made during the remainder of the fiscal year;
(III) A statement which the disclosing person shall sign indicating that the information provided is correct and complete; but notarization of such statement shall not be required. The disclosing person, in signing such statement, shall be subject to section 18-8-503, C.R.S., concerning false statements made to a public servant.
(c) Whenever a person required to file a disclosure statement under this part 3 solicits, collects, or receives contributions which are used for lobbying as well as for other purposes, or makes an expenditure which is attributable to lobbying as well as to other purposes, such contributions and expenditures shall be allocated between lobbying and other purposes, and the disclosure statement shall contain that portion allocated to lobbying.
(2) "Expenditure" means a payment, distribution, loan, advance, deposit, or gift of money or anything of value and includes a contract, promise, or agreement, whether or not legally enforceable, to make an expenditure.
(2.3) "Fiscal year" means the period commencing July 1 of a calendar year and concluding June 30 of the following calendar year.
(2.5) "Gross income for lobbying" means the total amount received from a client, including compensation for services, fees, and similar payments, before any deductions are made, by a professional lobbyist for lobbying or by a lobbying firm.
(3) Repealed.
(3.5) (a) "Lobbying" means communicating directly, or soliciting others to communicate, with a covered official for the purpose of aiding in or influencing:
(I) The drafting, introduction, sponsorship, consideration, debate, amendment, passage, defeat, approval, or veto by any covered official on:
(A) Any bill, resolution, amendment, nomination, appointment, or report, whether or not in writing, pending or proposed for consideration by either house of the general assembly or committee thereof, whether or not the general assembly is in session;
(B) Any other matter pending or proposed in writing by any covered official for consideration by either house of the general assembly or a committee thereof, whether or not the general assembly is in session;
(II) Repealed.
(II.5) The preparation of a fiscal summary or an initial fiscal impact statement required by section 1-40-105.5;
(III) The convening of a special session of the general assembly or the specification of business to be transacted at such special session;
(IV) The drafting, consideration, amendment, adoption, or defeat of any rule, standard, or rate of any state agency having rule-making authority.
(b) Subject to the exclusions and provisions of this paragraph (b), for the purpose of determining when contributions and expenditures become reportable in disclosure statements, "lobbying" includes activities undertaken by the person engaging in lobbying and persons acting at his request to prepare for lobbying which in fact ultimately occurs, provided:
(I) No such reports shall be required for activities occurring prior to the preceding fiscal year;
(II) Expenditures shall not be reported when such expenditures are incurred by a person in the ordinary course of the business or affairs of such person and are not made for lobbying. Such nonreportable expenditures will include, but not be limited to, the keeping of books of account and the routine collection of statistics and other data.
(c) "Lobbying" does not include communications made by a person in response to a statute, rule, regulation, or order requiring such a communication.
(d) (I) "Lobbying" does not include communications by a person who appears before a committee of the general assembly or a rule-making board or commission solely as a result of an affirmative vote by the committee, board, or commission issuing a mandatory order or subpoena commanding that the person appear and testify, or making such a person a respondent in such a proceeding whether or not the person is reimbursed by the committee, board, or commission for expenses incurred in making such appearance.
(II) (Deleted by amendment, L. 2004, p. 431, § 1, effective August 4, 2004.)
(III) (A) Legislative declaration. The general assembly hereby declares its support of the "Colorado Sunshine Act of 1972" and the open process that it has brought to the legislative process in Colorado. The general assembly's intent in enacting this subparagraph (III) is to achieve a more uniform application of the lobbying laws to witness testimony and to clarify the ability of the public to provide testimony to the general assembly and to state agencies.
(B) "Lobbying" excludes persons who are not otherwise registered as lobbyists and who limit their activities to appearances to give testimony or provide information to committees of the general assembly or at public hearings of state agencies or who give testimony or provide information at the request of public officials or employees and who clearly identify themselves and the interest for whom they are testifying or providing information.
(e) "Lobbying" does not include communications made by an attorney-at-law when such communications are made on behalf of a client whose name has been identified and when such communications constitute the practice of law subject to control by the judicial branch of the state of Colorado.
(f) "Lobbying" does not include duties performed by employees of the legislative department.
(3.6) "Lobbying firm" means a person or entity employing one or more professional lobbyists to lobby on behalf of a client that is not the person or entity. "Lobbying firm" includes a self-employed professional lobbyist.
(3.7) "Lobbyist" means either a professional or a volunteer lobbyist.
(4) "Person" means an individual, limited liability company, partnership, committee, association, corporation, or any other organization or group of persons.
(5) "Political committee" means any committee, association, or organization which accepts contributions or makes expenditures for the purpose of influencing or attempting to influence the election of candidates or presidential and vice-presidential electors or any duly authorized committee or subcommittee of a national, state, or local political party.
(5.5) Repealed.
(6) "Professional lobbyist" means a person, business entity, including a sole proprietorship, or an employee of a client, who is compensated by a client or another professional lobbyist for lobbying. "Professional lobbyist" does not include any volunteer lobbyist, any state official or employee acting in his official capacity, except as provided in section 24-6-303.5, any elected public official acting in his official capacity, or any individual who appears as counsel or advisor in an adjudicatory proceeding.
(7) "Volunteer lobbyist" means any individual who engages in lobbying and whose only receipt of money or other thing of value consists of nothing more than reimbursement for actual and reasonable expenses incurred for personal needs, such as meals, travel, lodging, and parking, while engaged in lobbying or for actual expenses incurred in informing the organization making the reimbursement or the members thereof of his lobbying.
Source: Initiated 72. L. 73: p. 1662, § 1. C.R.S. 1963: § 3-37-301. L. 77: (1) amended, (1.5), (1.7), (1.9), (3.5), (6), and (7) added, and (3) repealed, pp. 1147, 1154, §§ 1, 12, effective July 1. L. 79: (6) amended, p. 1638, § 37, effective December 29. L. 84: (3.5)(a)(II) repealed, p. 1121, § 22, June 7. L. 87: (6) amended, p. 923, § 1, effective July 3. L. 89: IP(1.9)(a) amended and (1.9)(b)(III) added, p. 1018, §§ 1, 2, effective March 15. L. 90: (4) amended, p. 447, § 9, effective April 18. L. 96: (1.9)(a)(VI) amended and (2.5) added, p. 1081, § 1, effective August 7. L. 98: (1.9)(a)(IV) amended, p. 952, § 7, effective April 27. L. 2000: IP(1.9)(a) and (1.9)(a)(IV) amended, p. 128, § 11, effective March 15. L. 2004: (3.5)(d) amended, p. 431, § 1, effective August 4. L. 2006: (1.9)(a)(X) amended and (1.9)(a)(XI), (1.9)(a)(XII), and (5.5) added, p. 2051, §§ 2, 1, effective July 1. L. 2010: (1.9)(a)(I), (1.9)(a)(III), (1.9)(a)(IV), (1.9)(a)(VIII), (1.9)(b)(II), and (3.5)(b)(I) amended and (2.3) and (3.7) added, (SB 10-087), ch. 407, p. 2010, § 1, effective June 10. L. 2012: (1.9)(a)(IV) and (1.9)(a)(V) amended, (HB 12-1070), ch. 167, p. 584, § 2, effective August 8. L. 2013: (1.7)(a) amended, (HB 13-1300), ch. 316, p. 1681, § 50, effective August 7. L. 2014: (1), (1.9)(a)(I), (1.9)(a)(X), (1.9)(a)(XI), (2.5), and (6) amended and (1.3) and (3.6) added, (SB 14-217), ch. 398, p. 2001, § 1, effective July 1, 2015; (5.5)(b) added by revision, pp. 2001, 2006, §§ 1, 7. L. 2015: (1.7)(a) amended and (3.5)(a)(II.5) added, (HB 15-1057), ch. 198, p. 679, § 7, effective March 26, 2016. L. 2019: (1) amended, (HB 19-1248), ch. 232, p. 2320, § 2, effective May 20. L. 2020: (3.5)(a)(II.5) amended, (HB 20-1416), ch. 232, p. 1126, § 6, effective November 1.
Editor's note: Subsection (5.5)(b) provided for the repeal of subsection (5.5), effective July 1, 2015. (See L. 2014, pp. 2001, 2006.)
Cross references: For the short title ("Lobbyist Transparency Act") in HB 19-1248, see section 1 of chapter 232, Session Laws of Colorado 2019.
ANNOTATION
Law reviews. For article, "Lawyers Who Lobby: Cautions and Considerations", see 45 Colo. Law. 41 (Apr. 2016).
24-6-302. Disclosure statements - required - definition.
(1) (Deleted by amendment, L. 96, p. 1081, § 2, effective August 7, 1996.)
(2) Any person who makes expenditures for gifts or entertainment purposes for the benefit of covered officials in the aggregate amount of two hundred dollars in a state fiscal year shall file disclosure statements with the secretary of state in accordance with this section. Such disclosure statements shall not include actual and reasonable expenses incurred for personal needs, such as meals, travel, lodging, and parking.
(2.5) (a) A professional lobbyist and any lobbying firm shall file a monthly disclosure statement with the secretary of state no later than the fifteenth day after the end of the first calendar month, and each subsequent month, in which the lobbyist received any income or made any expenditures for lobbying. In the case of a single-member lobbying firm, if a disclosure statement includes the name of the professional lobbyist and the name of a lobbying firm that solely employs the lobbyist, a single disclosure statement may be filed with the secretary of state on behalf of both the professional lobbyist and the lobbying firm.
(b) No disclosure statement shall be required of a person who is described in a disclosure statement of a professional lobbyist pursuant to paragraph (a) of this subsection (2.5).
(c) Nothing in this subsection (2.5) shall be construed to require a professional lobbyist or a firm organized for professional lobbying purposes that is engaged in lobbying for a trade association, public interest group, or governmental organization to include in the disclosure statement of such lobbyist or firm any dues, assessments, or fees collected by such association, group, or organization for lobbying purposes.
(3) (a) (Deleted by amendment, L. 2014.)
(b) In addition to the monthly disclosure statement, a professional lobbyist shall file with the secretary of state an annual disclosure statement for the entire fiscal year no later than July 15 that covers the immediately preceding fiscal year. The annual disclosure statement must contain the name of and total gross income for lobbying received from each client or other professional lobbyist for whom the lobbyist lobbied during the previous fiscal year. If a professional lobbyist receives business from another professional lobbyist on a subcontract basis, the lobbyist receiving such business shall describe in an annual disclosure statement the total gross income received from the professional lobbyist under the subcontract who is contemporaneously reporting the subcontracting business on his or her annual disclosure statement.
(4) If a professional lobbyist determines at any time during a fiscal year that he or she will not lobby or receive lobbying income for the remainder of the fiscal year, the lobbyist may file an annual disclosure statement at such time, and thereafter need not file subsequent monthly disclosure statements until he or she resumes lobbying.
(5) This section shall not apply to any political committee, volunteer lobbyist, citizen who lobbies on his or her own behalf, state official or employee acting in his or her official capacity, except as provided in section 24-6-303.5, or elected public official acting in his or her official capacity.
(6) (a) During the period that the general assembly is not in regular or special session, a professional lobbyist shall notify the secretary of state in writing within five business days after an oral or written agreement to engage in lobbying for any person or client not disclosed in the registration statement filed pursuant to section 24-6-303 (1). During the period that the general assembly is in regular or special session, a professional lobbyist shall notify the secretary of state after an agreement to engage in lobbying for any person or client not disclosed in the registration statement filed pursuant to section 24-6-303 (1), either by means of the electronic filing system created in section 24-6-303 (6.3) or by facsimile transmission in accordance with the following:
(I) In the case of a written agreement to engage the lobbyist, disclosure shall be made within twenty-four hours after the date of the agreement; and
(II) In the case of an oral agreement to engage the lobbyist, the disclosure shall be made within twenty-four hours after the date of a subsequent written agreement between the parties, the commencing of lobbying activities, or the date the lobbyist receives any payment on the agreement, whichever occurs first.
(b) A professional lobbyist who provides the notification under paragraph (a) of this subsection (6) shall file, concurrently with the next disclosure statement due after such notification, a signed written statement that contains:
(I) The name and address of the person described in such notification; and
(II) A summary of the terms related to lobbying under the agreement between such person and the professional lobbyist. A professional lobbyist shall also update his or her registration within twenty-four hours if he or she agrees to lobby for a client or other lobbyist on a subcontract basis who is not disclosed in the lobbyist's original registration statement.
(6.5) (a) In addition to any other disclosure required by this part 3, during the period that the general assembly is in regular or special session, a professional lobbyist shall notify the secretary of state by means of the electronic filing system created in section 24-6-303 (6.3) within seventy-two hours after:
(I) The lobbyist agrees to undertake lobbying in connection with new legislation, standards, rules, or rates for either a new or existing client of the lobbyist; or
(II) The lobbyist takes a new position on a new or existing bill for a new or existing client of the lobbyist.
(b) During the period that the general assembly is in regular or special session, where the lobbyist agrees to undertake lobbying in connection with new or existing legislation for either a new or existing client, the disclosure required by subsection (6.5)(a) of this section includes the bill number of the legislation at issue and whether the lobbyist's client is supporting, opposing, amending, or monitoring the legislation at the time the lobbyist agrees to undertake lobbying in connection with the legislation or takes a new position.
(7) In addition to the criminal penalty provided for in section 24-6-309 (1), the secretary of state, after proper notification by certified mail, shall impose an additional penalty of twenty dollars per day for each business day that a disclosure statement required to be filed by this section is not filed by the close of the business day on the day due up to and including the first ten business days on which the disclosure statement has not been filed after the day due. For failure to file a disclosure statement required to be filed by this section by the close of the eleventh business day on which the disclosure statement has not been filed after the day due, in addition to the criminal penalty provided for in section 24-6-309 (1), the secretary of state shall impose an additional penalty of fifty dollars for each day thereafter that a disclosure statement required to be filed by this section is not filed by the close of the business day. The secretary of state may excuse the payment of any penalty imposed by this subsection (7), or reduce the amount of any penalty imposed, for bona fide personal emergencies. Revenues collected from penalties assessed by the secretary of state shall be deposited in the department of state cash fund created in section 24-21-104 (3).
(8) Notwithstanding any other provision of this part 3, an attorney who is registered as a professional lobbyist is required to disclose information about the clients for whom he or she lobbies in accordance with this part 3 to the same extent as a professional lobbyist who is not an attorney. An attorney who is registered as a professional lobbyist may not decline to disclose his or her lobbying as such lobbying is required to be disclosed in accordance with this part 3 on the grounds that the lobbying is protected against disclosure as confidential matters between an attorney and a client.
(9) Notwithstanding any other provision of this part 3, in connection with any requirement to disclose the identity of a client in this section or section 24-6-303, "client" means, in accordance with section 24-6-301 (1), the name of the person who employs or retains the professional services of a lobbyist, a lobbying firm, or any other person or entity to undertake lobbying on its behalf. In connection with any requirement in this section or section 24-6-303 to disclose the identity of a client, a professional lobbyist who is a natural person and who is employed or retained by a lobbying firm or any other firm or entity may disclose the name of the lobbying firm or other person or entity by means of which, or under the name of which, a professional lobbyist does business, but to satisfy such disclosure requirement the lobbyist shall also disclose the name of the client who employs or retains the professional services of the lobbyist, or a lobbying firm or any other person or entity that employs or retains the lobbyist, to undertake lobbying on its behalf.
Source: Initiated 72. L. 73: p. 1662, § 1. C.R.S. 1963: § 3-37-302. L. 77: Entire section R&RE, p. 1150, § 2, effective June 19. L. 87: (5) amended, p. 923, § 2, effective July 3. L. 96: (1) and (3) amended and (2.5), (6), and (7) added, p. 1081, § 2, effective August 7. L. 2001: (2) amended, p. 1273, § 30, effective June 5; (3)(b), (6)(a), and (6)(b)(III) amended, p. 147, § 1, effective July 1. L. 2010: (2), (2.5), (3), (4), (5), IP(6)(a), IP(6)(b), (6)(b)(II), and (7) amended, (SB 10-087), ch. 407, p. 2011, § 2, effective June 10. L. 2012: (2) amended, (HB 12-1070), ch. 167, p. 584, § 3, effective August 8. L. 2014: (2.5)(a), (3), (4), and (6)(b) amended and (8) added, (SB 14-217), ch. 398, p. 2003, § 2, effective July 1, 2015. L. 2019: (6)(a) and (8) amended and (9) added, (HB 19-1248), ch. 232, p. 2320, § 3, effective May 20; (6.5) added, (HB 19-1248), ch. 232, p. 2320, § 3, effective January 1, 2020.
Cross references: For the short title ("Lobbyist Transparency Act") in HB 19-1248, see section 1 of chapter 232, Session Laws of Colorado 2019.
24-6-303. Registration as professional lobbyist - filing of disclosure statements - certificate of registration - legislative declaration.
(1) Before lobbying, a professional lobbyist shall file an electronic registration statement with the secretary of state that contains:
(a) His or her full legal name, business address, and business telephone number;
(b) The name, address, and telephone number of his or her employer, if applicable;
(c) The name, address, and telephone number of the client for whom he or she will be lobbying; and
(d) The name, address, and telephone number of any other professional lobbyist for whom he or she is lobbying on a subcontract basis.
(1.3) (a) At the time a professional lobbyist files a registration statement in accordance with subsection (1) of this section prior to engaging in lobbying, and each time such lobbyist files an updated registration statement in accordance with subsection (1.5) of this section, such individual shall pay a registration fee in an amount that shall be set by the secretary of state by rule promulgated in accordance with article 4 of this title and shall be set at a level that offsets the costs to the secretary of state of providing electronic access to information pursuant to section 24-6-304 (2), and in processing and maintaining the disclosure information required by this part 3. The secretary of state shall charge a reduced fee to a professional lobbyist that files his or her registration statement pursuant to paragraph (b) of subsection (6.3) of this section. The secretary of state may waive the fee of a professional lobbyist for a not-for-profit organization who derives his or her compensation solely from the organization. A volunteer lobbyist shall be exempt from the requirement to pay the registration fee mandated by this paragraph (a).
(b) All fees collected pursuant to the provisions of this subsection (1.3) shall be credited to the department of state cash fund created in section 24-21-104 (3)(b).
(1.5) A professional lobbyist shall file an updated registration statement on or before July 15 of each year unless at that time he or she is no longer a professional lobbyist. Registration under this subsection (1.5) shall be effective until July 1 of the next year.
(2) A professional lobbyist shall file disclosure statements as required by section 24-6-302.
(3) Consistent with the requirements of subsection (6.3) of this section, a hard copy of all registration statements and disclosure statements of professional lobbyists and lobbying firms must be compiled by the secretary of state within thirty days after the end of the calendar month for which such information is filed and shall be organized alphabetically according to the names of the lobbyists and firms.
(4) No individual shall act as a professional lobbyist unless he has received a certificate of registration as provided in section 24-6-305 (1).
(5) An individual shall not be considered a lobbyist solely because of his or her appearance as a witness in rule, standard, or rate-making proceedings.
(6) This section shall not apply to any political committee, volunteer lobbyist, citizen who lobbies on his or her own behalf, state official or employee acting in his or her official capacity, except as provided in section 24-6-303.5, or elected public official acting in his or her official capacity.
(6.3) (a) No later than January 1, 2002, the secretary of state shall establish, operate, and maintain a system that enables electronic filing of the reports required by this part 3 by utilizing the internet. Rules concerning the manner in which reports required by this part 3 may be filed electronically, including but not limited to the information to be contained in such reports, the procedure for amending such reports, and public access to the electronic filing system, shall be promulgated by the secretary of state in accordance with article 4 of this title.
(b) In addition to any other method of filing, any person subject to the filing requirements of this part 3 or his or her duly authorized agent may use the electronic filing system described in paragraph (a) of this subsection (6.3) in order to meet such filing requirements.
(7) Repealed.
Source: Initiated 72. L. 73: p. 1663, § 1. C.R.S. 1963: § 3-37-303. L. 77: Entire section R&RE p. 1151, § 3, effective June 19. L. 79: (1)(a) amended, pp. 853, 1638, §§ 1, 2, 38, effective December 29. L. 87: Entire section R&RE, p. 923, § 3, effective July 3. L. 96: (1)(d) amended, p. 1083, § 3, effective August 7. L. 2001: IP(1), (1)(d), (1.5), and (3) amended and (1.3) added, p. 148, § 2, effective July 1 and (6.3) added, p. 148, § 2, effective January 1, 2002. L. 2010: (1), (1.3)(a), (2), (3), (5), and (6) amended, (SB 10-087), ch. 407, p. 2013, § 3, effective June 10. L. 2014: (1) and (3) amended, (SB 14-217), ch. 398, p. 2004, § 3, effective July 1, 2015. L. 2019: (7) added, (HB 19-1248), ch. 232, p. 2322, § 4, effective May 20.
Editor's note: Subsection (7)(c) provided for the repeal of subsection (7), effective March 1, 2020. (See L. 2019, p. 2322.)
Cross references: For the short title ("Lobbyist Transparency Act") in HB 19-1248, see section 1 of chapter 232, Session Laws of Colorado 2019.
ANNOTATION
Law reviews. For article, "Lawyers Who Lobby: Cautions and Considerations", see 45 Colo. Law. 41 (Apr. 2016).
24-6-303.5. Lobbying by state officials and employees.
(1) (a) Each principal department of state government, as defined in section 24-1-110, shall designate one person who shall be responsible for any lobbying of the type defined in section 24-6-301 (3.5)(a)(I) or (3.5)(a)(III) by a state official or employee on behalf of said principal department. All designated persons from the principal departments, as well as any person lobbying, as defined in section 24-6-301 (3.5)(a)(I) or (3.5)(a)(III), on behalf of an institution or governing board of higher education, shall register with the secretary of state by filing a written statement on or before January 15 of each year. Such registration statement shall be on a form prescribed by the secretary of state and shall include the following:
(I) The designated person's full legal name, principal department address, and business telephone number;
(II) The name of any state official or employee who is lobbying on behalf of the principal department, the name of such person's division or unit within the principal department, his classification or job title, and the address and telephone number of his division or unit.
(b) Copies of the original documents filed with the secretary of state shall be filed with the governor's office, the secretary of the senate, and the chief clerk of the house of representatives.
(c) Any amendments to the original registration statement shall be filed with the secretary of state within seven days of the pertinent change.
(2) (a) In addition to the registration statement filed pursuant to subsection (1) of this section, the designated person, and any person lobbying on behalf of an institution or governing board of higher education, shall file, monthly, a disclosure statement with the secretary of state in accordance with this subsection (2). The secretary of state shall prescribe the form for such disclosure statement, which shall include:
(I) The legislation on which lobbying is being performed;
(II) Any expenditure of public funds used for lobbying and the amount thereof;
(III) An estimate of the time spent on lobbying or preparation thereof by any state official or employee named in the registration statement or any other employee of the principal department.
(b) Disclosure statements shall be filed within fifteen days after the end of the first calendar month and shall be filed within fifteen days after the end of each subsequent month during the fiscal year.
(3) For purposes of this section, "state official or employee" means an individual who is compensated by a state of Colorado warrant and receives state of Colorado employee benefits except a lobbyist hired on a contract basis if he is currently registered under sections 24-6-302 and 24-6-303 or a lobbyist who registers as a professional lobbyist pursuant to sections 24-6-302 and 24-6-303.
(4) This section shall not apply to the following persons:
(a) Members of the public utilities commission, the industrial claim appeals office, the state board of land commissioners, the office of the property tax administrator, the state parole board, and the state personnel board;
(b) Members of any board or commission serving without compensation except for per diem allowances provided by law and reimbursement of expenses;
(c) Members of the governor's cabinet and personal staff employees in the offices of the governor and the lieutenant governor whose functions are confined to such offices and who report directly to the governor or lieutenant governor;
(d) Appointees to fill vacancies in elective offices;
(e) One deputy of each elective officer other than the governor and lieutenant governor specified in section 1 of article IV of the state constitution;
(f) Members, officers, and employees of the legislative branch;
(g) Members, officers, and employees of the judicial branch; specifically, municipal, state, and federal judges and the state court administrator and his designee; and
(h) Any state official or employee communicating with a covered official in response to an inquiry of that covered official or when testifying before any committee of the general assembly upon request of a committee member.
(5) Any person who engages in lobbying for a principal department but who is not a state official or employee shall comply with the requirements of sections 24-6-302 and 24-6-303.
Source: L. 77: Entire section added, p. 1152, § 4, effective June 19. L. 79: (4)(a) amended, p. 1638, § 39, effective July 19. L. 87: Entire section R&RE, p. 924, § 4, effective July 3. L. 2010: IP(1)(a) and (2)(b) amended, (SB 10-087), ch. 407, p. 2014, § 4, effective June 10.
24-6-304. Records - preservation - public inspection - electronic access.
(1) Each person required to file statements or reports under this part 3 shall maintain for a period of five years such records relating to such statements or reports as the secretary of state determines by regulation are necessary for the effective implementation of this part 3.
(2) (a) Any statement required by this part 3 to be filed with the secretary of state shall be preserved by the secretary of state for a period of five years after the date of filing, shall constitute part of the public records of that office, and shall be open and readily accessible for public inspection. The secretary of state shall implement a computer information system that will allow computer users to cross-reference and review, using the name of a professional lobbyist or any other person, any disclosure statement or other written statement filed pursuant to section 24-6-302 and registration statement filed pursuant to section 24-6-303 on which the name of such lobbyist or other person appears.
(b) No later than January 1, 2002, the secretary of state shall establish, operate, and maintain a website on the internet, or modify an existing site, that will allow computer users electronic read-only access to the information required to be filed by this part 3 free of charge. All information required to be filed by this part 3 that is filed electronically shall be made available:
(I) On the website within twenty-four hours after filing; and
(II) In a form that allows a computer user to cross-reference and review, using the name of a professional lobbyist or any other person, any disclosure statement or other written statement filed pursuant to section 24-6-302 and registration statement filed pursuant to section 24-6-303 on which the name of such lobbyist or other person appears.
Source: Initiated 72. L. 73: p. 1663, § 1. C.R.S. 1963: § 3-37-304. L. 77: Entire section R&RE, p. 1152, § 5, effective June 19. L. 96: (2) amended, p. 1083, § 4, effective August 7. L. 2001: (2) amended, p. 149, § 3, effective January 1, 2002. L. 2010: (2)(a) and (2)(b)(II) amended, (SB 10-087), ch. 407, p. 2015, § 5, effective June 10.
24-6-304.5. Examination of books and records.
(1) The secretary of state has the power to request to examine or cause to be examined the books and records of any individual who has received or is seeking to renew a certificate of registration as a lobbyist as such books and records may relate to lobbying.
(2) Failure of a registrant or an applicant for renewal of the certificate of registration to comply with a request from the secretary of state to furnish the information in subsection (1) of this section shall be grounds for the secretary of state to proceed to use his powers to revoke or suspend a certificate of registration or bar an individual from registration as provided in section 24-6-305.
Source: L. 77: Entire section added, p. 1152, § 6, effective June 19. L. 79: (1) amended, p. 1638, § 40, effective July 19.
24-6-305. Powers of the secretary of state - granting and revoking of certificates - barring from registration - imposition of penalties - notification of substantial violation.
(1) It is the duty and responsibility of the secretary of state:
(a) To grant a certificate of registration as a lobbyist to any individual who registers under the provisions of this section and who supplies the information required in this part 3;
(b) To revoke the certificate of registration of any individual who has been convicted of violating any of the provisions of this part 3;
(c) and (d) Repealed.
(e) To revoke the certificate of registration of any individual whose lobbying privileges before the general assembly have been suspended following action on a written complaint against the person in accordance with the rules on lobbying practices promulgated by the general assembly.
(1.5) (a) In the case of revocation of a certificate of registration in accordance with the provisions of paragraph (b) or (e) of subsection (1) of this section, the secretary of state shall additionally indicate the revocation on the website and shall send written notice of the revocation by United States mail to each client or other lobbyist for whom the individual lobbies as shown on the individual's registration statement filed pursuant to section 24-6-303 (1).
(b) In the case of censure that has been adopted by the general assembly, the secretary of state shall send a copy of the resolution by United States mail to each client or other lobbyist for whom the individual lobbies as shown on the individual's registration statement filed pursuant to section 24-6-303 (1).
(2) In addition to any other powers conferred by this section, the secretary of state may:
(a) Revoke, or suspend for a maximum period of one year, or bar from registration for a maximum period of one year or the remainder of the legislative biennium, whichever is longer, the certificate of registration required by section 24-6-303 for failure to file the reports required by section 24-6-303, provide the information required by section 24-6-304.5, or pay fully any penalty imposed pursuant to section 24-6-302 (7); but no certificate may be revoked or suspended within thirty days after the failure to file such a report if, prior to the last day for filing such reports, the secretary of state has been informed in writing of extenuating circumstances justifying such failure. Any revocation or suspension of a certificate of registration or bar from registration shall be in accordance with the provisions of article 4 of this title.
(b) Adopt rules and regulations in accordance with the provisions of article 4 of this title to define, interpret, implement, and enforce the provisions of this part 3 and to prevent the evasion of the requirements of this part 3;
(c) On his or her own motion or on the verified complaint of any person, investigate the activities of any person who is or who has allegedly been engaged in lobbying and who may be in violation of the requirements of this part 3;
(d) Apply to the district court of the city and county of Denver for the issuance of an order requiring any individual who is believed by the secretary of state to be engaging in lobbying as a professional lobbyist as defined in section 24-6-301 without having received a certificate of registration as required by the provisions of section 24-6-303 to produce documentary evidence which is relevant or material or to give testimony which is relevant or material to the matter in question.
(3) If the secretary of state has reasonable grounds to believe that any person is in violation of section 24-6-302 or 24-6-303, the secretary of state may, after notice has been given and a hearing held in accordance with the provisions of article 4 of this title, issue a cease-and-desist order. Such order shall set forth the provisions of this part 3 found to be violated and the facts found to be the violation. Any person subject to a cease-and-desist order shall be entitled, upon request, to judicial review in accordance with the provisions of article 4 of this title.
(4) The secretary of state shall timely inform the president of the state senate and the speaker of the state house of representatives whenever the secretary of state has reasonable grounds to believe that a violation of section 24-6-302 or 24-6-303 has occurred that the secretary of state deems substantial.
Source: Initiated 72. L. 73: p. 1664, § 1. C.R.S. 1963: § 3-37-305. L. 77: (1)(c) and (1)(d) repealed, (2) amended, and (3) added, pp. 1153, 1154, §§ 7, 12, effective June 19. L. 79: (1)(a), (1)(b), and (2)(d) amended, p. 1638, § 41, effective July 19. L. 96: (2)(a) amended, p. 1084, § 5, effective August 7. L. 2001: (3) amended and (4) added, p. 150, § 4, effective July 1. L. 2010: (1)(e) and (1.5) added and (2) amended, (SB 10-087), ch. 407, p. 2015, §§ 6, 7, effective June 10. L. 2014: (1.5) amended, (SB 14-217), ch. 398, p. 2005, § 4, effective July 1, 2015.
24-6-306. Employment of legislators, legislative employees, or state employees - filing of statement.
If any person who engages in lobbying employs or causes his employer to employ any member of the general assembly, any member of a rule-making board or commission, any rule-making official of a state agency, any employee of the general assembly, or any full-time state employee who remains in the partial employ of the state or any agency thereof, the new employer shall file a statement under oath with the secretary of state within fifteen days after such employment. The statement shall specify the nature of the employment, the name of the individual to be paid thereunder, and the amount of pay or consideration to be paid thereunder.
Source: Initiated 72. L. 73: p. 1665, § 1. C.R.S. 1963: § 3-37-306. L. 77: Entire section amended, p. 1154, § 8, effective June 19. L. 79: Entire section amended, p. 1638, § 42, effective July 19.
24-6-307. Employment of unregistered persons.
It is unlawful for any person to employ for pay or any consideration, or pay or agree to pay any consideration to, an individual to engage in lobbying who is not registered except upon condition that such individual register forthwith.
Source: Initiated 72. L. 73: p. 1665, § 1. C.R.S. 1963: § 3-37-307. L. 77: Entire section amended, p. 1154, § 9, effective June 19. L. 79: Entire section amended, p. 1639, § 43, effective July 19.
24-6-308. Prohibited practices.
(1) No person engaged in lobbying shall:
(a) Make any agreement under which any consideration is to be given, transferred, or paid to any person contingent upon the passage or defeat of any legislation; the making or defeat of any rule, standard, or rate by any state agency; or the approval or veto of any legislation by the governor of this state;
(b) Knowingly attempt to deceive, or make a false statement to, a covered official regarding any material fact relating to a matter that is within the scope of duties of the covered official;
(c) Conceal from a covered official the identity of the person or entity for whom the lobbyist is lobbying;
(d) Knowingly use a fictitious name, or a real name without the consent of the person whose name is used, to communicate with a covered official;
(e) Knowingly represent an interest adverse to the lobbyist's client without first obtaining the consent of the client after full disclosure by the lobbyist of the adverse interest;
(f) Make any form of payment to a covered official as compensation for any interest in real or personal property or the provision of services in excess of the amount of compensation that would be paid by a person who is not a lobbyist for such interest or services in the ordinary course of business;
(g) Make a loan to a covered official or engage in any other transaction with a covered official with the intention of making the covered official personally obligated to the lobbyist;
(h) Attempt to influence the vote of a covered official in connection with any pending matter by threat of a political reprisal, including without limitation the promise of financial support of, or opposition to, the covered official's candidacy at any future election;
(i) Seek to influence a covered official by communicating with the covered official's employer;
(j) Cause to be introduced, or influence the introduction of, any bill, resolution, amendment, standard, rule, or rate for the purpose of afterwards being employed to secure its passage or defeat;
(k) Receive compensation for lobbying while serving as a state officer or employee of the state central committee of a political party;
(l) Make a campaign contribution in excess of the applicable limitations established by law or rule or make, solicit, or promise to solicit a campaign contribution during the period when lobbyists are prohibited from making such contributions under section 1-45-105.5, C.R.S.;
(m) Employ, subcontract, or pay compensation to a person for lobbying who has not registered as a lobbyist; or
(n) Engage in any other practice that discredits the practice of lobbying or the general assembly.
(2) Any person who believes that a lobbyist has committed any act or omission in violation of this section may file a complaint with the secretary of state or any member of the executive committee of the general assembly in accordance with the procedures for filing a complaint against a lobbyist under the joint rules of the senate and the house of representatives. Upon receipt of a complaint, the secretary of state may act upon alleged violations of this section to enforce governing laws or rules or may refer the matter to the executive committee of the general assembly.
Source: Initiated 72. L. 73: p. 1665, § 1. C.R.S. 1963: § 3-37-308. L. 77: Entire section amended, p. 1154, § 10, effective June 19. L. 2010: Entire section amended, (SB 10-087), ch. 407, p. 2016, § 8, effective June 10. L. 2014: (1)(e) amended, (SB 14-217), ch. 398, p. 2005, § 5, effective July 1, 2015.
24-6-309. Offenses - penalties - injunctions.
(1) Any person who violates any of the provisions of this part 3, except for the commission of any of the practices listed in section 24-6-308 (1)(b) to (1)(e) and (1)(h) to (1)(n), willfully files any document provided for in this part 3 that contains any materially false statement or material omission, or willfully fails to comply with any material requirement of this part 3 commits a petty offense.
(2) Whenever it appears that any person has engaged or is about to engage in any act or practice constituting a violation of any provision of this part 3 or any rule or order under this part 3, the secretary of state may bring an action in district court to enjoin the acts or practices and to enforce compliance with this part 3 or any rule or order under this part 3.
Source: Initiated 72. L. 73: p. 1665, § 1. C.R.S. 1963: § 3-37-309. L. 77: (2) R&RE, p. 1154, § 11, effective July 1, 1979. L. 78: (2) R&RE, p. 266, § 66, effective May 23. L. 2014: (1) amended, (SB 14-119), ch. 106, p. 392, § 1, effective April 7. L. 2021: (1) amended, (SB 21-271), ch. 462, p. 3224, § 404, effective March 1, 2022.
Editor's note: The effective date for amendments made to this section by chapter 216, L. 77, was changed from July 1, 1978, to April 1, 1979, by chapter 1, First Extraordinary Session, L. 78, and was subsequently changed to July 1, 1979, by chapter 157, § 23, L. 79. See People v. McKenna, 199 Colo. 452, 611 P.2d 574 (1980).
PART 4
OPEN MEETINGS LAW
24-6-401. Declaration of policy.
It is declared to be a matter of statewide concern and the policy of this state that the formation of public policy is public business and may not be conducted in secret.
Source: Initiated 72. L. 73: p. 1666, § 1. C.R.S. 1963: § 3-37-401. L. 91: Entire section amended, p. 815, § 1, effective June 1.
ANNOTATION
Law reviews. For article, "Home Rule Municipalities and Colorado's Open Records and Meetings Laws", see 18 Colo. Law. 1125 (1989).
Open meetings law is a general law. Associated Students of Univ. of Colo. v. Regents of Univ. of Colo., 189 Colo. 482, 543 P.2d 59 (1975).
Such legislation does not generally repeal conflicting special statutory or constitutional provisions unless the intent to do so is clear and unmistakable. Associated Students of Univ. of Colo. v. Regents of Univ. of Colo., 189 Colo. 482, 543 P.2d 59 (1975).
Such as that concerning attorney-client communications. The open meetings law cannot and does not repeal by implication the statutory provision concerning the attorney-client evidentiary privilege, § 13-90-107 (1)(b). Thus, executive sessions of a university board of regents involving "attorney-client communications" are permitted. Associated Students of Univ. of Colo. v. Regents of Univ. of Colo., 189 Colo. 482, 543 P.2d 59 (1975).
The intent of the open meetings law is to afford public access to a broad range of meetings at which public business is considered. Benson v. McCormick, 195 Colo. 381, 578 P.2d 651 (1978); Van Alstyne v. Hous. Auth. of City of Pueblo, 985 P.2d 97 (Colo. App. 1999); Bd. of County Comm'rs v. Costilla County Conservancy Dist., 88 P.3d 1188 (Colo. 2004).
The public meetings laws are interpreted broadly to further the legislative intent that citizens be given a greater opportunity to become fully informed on issues of public importance so that meaningful participation in the decision-making process may be achieved. Cole v. State, 673 P.2d 345 (Colo. 1983).
24-6-402. Meetings - open to public - legislative declaration - definitions.
(1) For the purposes of this section:
(a) (I) "Local public body" means any board, committee, commission, authority, or other advisory, policy-making, rule-making, or formally constituted body of any political subdivision of the state and any public or private entity to which a political subdivision, or an official thereof, has delegated a governmental decision-making function but does not include persons on the administrative staff of the local public body.
(II) Notwithstanding subsection (1)(a)(I) of this section, in order to assure school board transparency "local public body" shall include members of a board of education, school administration personnel, or a combination thereof who are involved in a meeting with a representative of employees at which a collective bargaining agreement is discussed.
(III) Notwithstanding subsection (1)(a)(I) of this section, "local public body" includes the governing board of an institute charter school that is authorized pursuant to part 5 of article 30.5 of title 22.
(IV) Notwithstanding subsection (1)(a)(I) of this section, "local public body" includes the board of trustees, created in section 24-51-202, of the public employees' retirement association, created in section 24-51-201.
(b) "Meeting" means any kind of gathering, convened to discuss public business, in person, by telephone, electronically, or by other means of communication.
(c) "Political subdivision of the state" includes, but is not limited to, any county, city, city and county, town, home rule city, home rule county, home rule city and county, school district, special district, local improvement district, special improvement district, or service district.
(d) (I) "State public body" means any board, committee, commission, or other advisory, policy-making, rule-making, decision-making, or formally constituted body of any state agency, state authority, governing board of a state institution of higher education including the regents of the university of Colorado, a nonprofit corporation incorporated pursuant to section 23-5-121 (2), C.R.S., or the general assembly, and any public or private entity to which the state, or an official thereof, has delegated a governmental decision-making function but does not include persons on the administrative staff of the state public body.
(II) Notwithstanding the provisions of subparagraph (I) of this paragraph (d), "state public body" does not include the governing board of an institute charter school that is authorized pursuant to part 5 of article 30.5 of title 22, C.R.S.
(2) (a) All meetings of two or more members of any state public body at which any public business is discussed or at which any formal action may be taken are declared to be public meetings open to the public at all times.
(b) All meetings of a quorum or three or more members of any local public body, whichever is fewer, at which any public business is discussed or at which any formal action may be taken are declared to be public meetings open to the public at all times.
(c) (I) Any meetings at which the adoption of any proposed policy, position, resolution, rule, regulation, or formal action occurs or at which a majority or quorum of the body is in attendance, or is expected to be in attendance, shall be held only after full and timely notice to the public. In addition to any other means of full and timely notice, a local public body shall be deemed to have given full and timely notice if the notice of the meeting is posted in a designated public place within the boundaries of the local public body no less than twenty-four hours prior to the holding of the meeting. The public place or places for posting such notice shall be designated annually at the local public body's first regular meeting of each calendar year. The posting shall include specific agenda information where possible.
(II) The general assembly hereby finds and declares that:
(A) It is the intent of the general assembly that local governments transition from posting physical notices of public meetings in physical locations to posting notices on a website, social media account, or other official online presence of the local government to the greatest extent practicable;
(B) It is the intent of the general assembly to relieve a local government of the requirement to physically post meeting notices, with certain exceptions, if the local government complies with the requirements of online posted notices of meetings;
(C) A number of factors may affect the ability of some local governments to easily establish a website, post meeting notices online, and otherwise benefit from having an online presence, including the availability of broadband or reliable broadband, the lack of cellular telephone and data services, and fiscal or staffing constraints of the local government;
(D) Local governments are encouraged to avail themselves of existing free resources for creating a website and receiving content management assistance from the Colorado statewide internet portal authority and statewide associations representing local governmental entities; and
(E) It is the intent of the general assembly to closely monitor the transition to providing notices of public meetings online over the next two years and, if significant progress is not made, to bring legislation mandating in statute that all notices be posted online except in very narrow circumstances that are beyond the control of a local government.
(III) On and after July 1, 2019, a local public body shall be deemed to have given full and timely notice of a public meeting if the local public body posts the notice, with specific agenda information if available, no less than twenty-four hours prior to the holding of the meeting on a public website of the local public body. The notice must be accessible at no charge to the public. The local public body shall, to the extent feasible, make the notices searchable by type of meeting, date of meeting, time of meeting, agenda contents, and any other category deemed appropriate by the local public body and shall consider linking the notices to any appropriate social media accounts of the local public body. A local public body that provides notice on a website pursuant to this subsection (2)(c)(III) shall provide the address of the website to the department of local affairs for inclusion in the inventory maintained pursuant to section 24-32-116. A local public body that posts a notice of a public meeting on a public website pursuant to this subsection (2)(c)(III) may in its discretion also post a notice by any other means including in a designated public place pursuant to subsection (2)(c)(I) of this section; except that nothing in this section shall be construed to require such other posting. A local public body that posts notices of public meetings on a public website pursuant to this subsection (2)(c)(III) shall designate a public place within the boundaries of the local public body at which it may post a notice no less than twenty-four hours prior to a meeting if it is unable to post a notice online in exigent or emergency circumstances such as a power outage or an interruption in internet service that prevents the public from accessing the notice online.
(IV) For purposes of this section, "local public body" includes municipalities, counties, school districts, and special districts.
(d) (I) Minutes of any meeting of a state public body shall be taken and promptly recorded, and such records shall be open to public inspection. The minutes of a meeting during which an executive session authorized under subsection (3) of this section is held shall reflect the topic of the discussion at the executive session.
(II) Minutes of any meeting of a local public body at which the adoption of any proposed policy, position, resolution, rule, regulation, or formal action occurs or could occur shall be taken and promptly recorded, and such records shall be open to public inspection. The minutes of a meeting during which an executive session authorized under subsection (4) of this section is held shall reflect the topic of the discussion at the executive session.
(III) If elected officials exchange electronic mail to discuss pending legislation or other public business among themselves, the electronic mail is subject to the requirements of this section. Electronic mail communication between elected officials that does not relate to the merits or substance of pending legislation or other public business, including electronic mail communication regarding scheduling and availability or electronic mail communication that is sent by an elected official for the purpose of forwarding information, responding to an inquiry from an individual who is not a member of the state or local public body, or posing a question for later discussion by the public body, shall not be considered a "meeting" within the meaning of this section. For purposes of this subsection (2)(d)(III), "merits or substance" means any discussion, debate, or exchange of ideas, either generally or specifically, related to the essence of any public policy proposition, specific proposal, or any other matter being considered by the governing entity.
(IV) Neither a state nor a local public body may adopt any proposed policy, position, resolution, rule, or regulation or take formal action by secret ballot unless otherwise authorized in accordance with the provisions of this subparagraph (IV). Notwithstanding any other provision of this section, a vote to elect leadership of a state or local public body by that same public body may be taken by secret ballot, and a secret ballot may be used in connection with the election by a state or local public body of members of a search committee, which committee is otherwise subject to the requirements of this section, but the outcome of the vote shall be recorded contemporaneously in the minutes of the body in accordance with the requirements of this section. Nothing in this subparagraph (IV) shall be construed to affect the authority of a board of education to use a secret ballot in accordance with the requirements of section 22-32-108 (6), C.R.S. For purposes of this subparagraph (IV), "secret ballot" means a vote cast in such a way that the identity of the person voting or the position taken in such vote is withheld from the public.
(d.5) (I) (A) Discussions that occur in an executive session of a state public body shall be electronically recorded. If a state public body electronically recorded the minutes of its open meetings on or after August 8, 2001, the state public body shall continue to electronically record the minutes of its open meetings that occur on or after August 8, 2001; except that electronic recording shall not be required for two successive meetings of the state public body while the regularly used electronic equipment is inoperable. A state public body may satisfy the electronic recording requirements of this sub-subparagraph (A) by making any form of electronic recording of the discussions in an executive session of the state public body. Except as provided in sub-subparagraph (B) of this subparagraph (I), the electronic recording of an executive session shall reflect the specific citation to the provision in subsection (3) of this section that authorizes the state public body to meet in an executive session and the actual contents of the discussion during the session. The provisions of this sub-subparagraph (A) shall not apply to discussions of individual students by a state public body pursuant to paragraph (b) of subsection (3) of this section.
(B) If, in the opinion of the attorney who is representing a governing board of a state institution of higher education, including the regents of the university of Colorado, and is in attendance at an executive session that has been properly announced pursuant to paragraph (a) of subsection (3) of this section, all or a portion of the discussion during the executive session constitutes a privileged attorney-client communication, no record or electronic recording shall be required to be kept of the part of the discussion that constitutes a privileged attorney-client communication. The electronic recording of said executive session discussion shall reflect that no further record or electronic recording was kept of the discussion based on the opinion of the attorney representing the governing board of a state institution of higher education, including the regents of the university of Colorado, as stated for the record during the executive session, that the discussion constituted a privileged attorney-client communication, or the attorney representing the governing board of a state institution of higher education, including the regents of the university of Colorado, may provide a signed statement attesting that the portion of the executive session that was not recorded constituted a privileged attorney-client communication in the opinion of the attorney.
(C) If a court finds, upon application of a person seeking access to the record of the executive session of a state public body in accordance with section 24-72-204 (5.5) and after an in camera review of the record of the executive session, that the state public body engaged in substantial discussion of any matters not enumerated in subsection (3) of this section or that the body adopted a proposed policy, position, resolution, rule, regulation, or formal action in the executive session in contravention of paragraph (a) of subsection (3) of this section, the portion of the record of the executive session that reflects the substantial discussion of matters not enumerated in subsection (3) of this section or the adoption of a proposed policy, position, resolution, rule, regulation, or formal action shall be open to public inspection pursuant to section 24-72-204 (5.5).
(D) No portion of the record of an executive session of a state public body shall be open for public inspection or subject to discovery in any administrative or judicial proceeding, except upon the consent of the state public body or as provided in sub-subparagraph (C) of this subparagraph (I) and section 24-72-204 (5.5).
(E) The record of an executive session of a state public body recorded pursuant to sub-subparagraph (A) of this subparagraph (I) shall be retained for at least ninety days after the date of the executive session.
(II) (A) Discussions that occur in an executive session of a local public body shall be electronically recorded. If a local public body electronically recorded the minutes of its open meetings on or after August 8, 2001, the local public body shall continue to electronically record the minutes of its open meetings that occur on or after August 8, 2001; except that electronic recording shall not be required for two successive meetings of the local public body while the regularly used electronic equipment is inoperable. A local public body may satisfy the electronic recording requirements of this sub-subparagraph (A) by making any form of electronic recording of the discussions in an executive session of the local public body. Except as provided in sub-subparagraph (B) of this subparagraph (II), the electronic recording of an executive session shall reflect the specific citation to the provision in subsection (4) of this section that authorizes the local public body to meet in an executive session and the actual contents of the discussion during the session. The provisions of this sub-subparagraph (A) shall not apply to discussions of individual students by a local public body pursuant to paragraph (h) of subsection (4) of this section.
(B) If, in the opinion of the attorney who is representing the local public body and who is in attendance at an executive session that has been properly announced pursuant to subsection (4) of this section, all or a portion of the discussion during the executive session constitutes a privileged attorney-client communication, no record or electronic recording shall be required to be kept of the part of the discussion that constitutes a privileged attorney-client communication. The electronic recording of said executive session discussion shall reflect that no further record or electronic recording was kept of the discussion based on the opinion of the attorney representing the local public body, as stated for the record during the executive session, that the discussion constituted a privileged attorney-client communication, or the attorney representing the local public body may provide a signed statement attesting that the portion of the executive session that was not recorded constituted a privileged attorney-client communication in the opinion of the attorney.
(C) If a court finds, upon application of a person seeking access to the record of the executive session of a local public body in accordance with section 24-72-204 (5.5) and after an in camera review of the record of the executive session, that the local public body engaged in substantial discussion of any matters not enumerated in subsection (4) of this section or that the body adopted a proposed policy, position, resolution, rule, regulation, or formal action in the executive session in contravention of subsection (4) of this section, the portion of the record of the executive session that reflects the substantial discussion of matters not enumerated in subsection (4) of this section or the adoption of a proposed policy, position, resolution, rule, regulation, or formal action shall be open to public inspection pursuant to section 24-72-204 (5.5).
(D) No portion of the record of an executive session of a local public body shall be open for public inspection or subject to discovery in any administrative or judicial proceeding, except upon the consent of the local public body or as provided in sub-subparagraph (C) of this subparagraph (II) and section 24-72-204 (5.5).
(E) Except as otherwise required by section 22-32-108 (5)(e), C.R.S., the record of an executive session of a local public body recorded pursuant to sub-subparagraph (A) of this subparagraph (II) shall be retained for at least ninety days after the date of the executive session.
(e) This part 4 does not apply to any chance meeting or social gathering at which discussion of public business is not the central purpose.
(f) The provisions of paragraph (c) of this subsection (2) shall not be construed to apply to the day-to-day oversight of property or supervision of employees by county commissioners. Except as set forth in this paragraph (f), the provisions of this paragraph (f) shall not be interpreted to alter any requirements of paragraph (c) of this subsection (2).
(2.5) (a) For purposes of applying subsections (2)(c)(I) and (2)(d)(I) of this section to a meeting of a state public body of the general assembly, a quorum must be contemporaneous.
(b) Notwithstanding subsections (1)(b) and (2)(d)(III) of this section, any form of written communication, electronic or otherwise, exchanged by two or more members of the general assembly is not subject to this part 4, but any records of the communication are subject to disclosure to the extent required by the "Colorado Open Records Act", part 2 of article 72 of title 24.
(c) For purposes of the application of this part 4 to the general assembly, "public business":
(I) Means:
(A) Introduced legislation, including bills, resolutions, and memorials;
(B) Proposed legislation, which includes a bill, resolution, or memorial, if a draft of the proposed legislation prepared by the office of legislative legal services is being discussed by a quorum of a statutory committee or a committee of reference during a regular or special legislative session of the general assembly or by a quorum of any type of interim committee; or
(C) Other matters before a statutory committee, any type of interim committee, or a committee of reference; and
(II) Does not include matters that are by nature interpersonal, administrative, or logistical or that concern personnel, planning, process, training, or operations, if the merits or substance of matters set forth in subsection (2.5)(c)(I) of this section are not discussed. As used in this subsection (2.5)(c)(II), "merits or substance" has the same meaning as set forth in subsection (2)(d)(III) of this section.
(3) (a) The members of a state public body subject to this part 4, upon the announcement by the state public body to the public of the topic for discussion in the executive session, including specific citation to the provision of this subsection (3) authorizing the body to meet in an executive session and identification of the particular matter to be discussed in as much detail as possible without compromising the purpose for which the executive session is authorized, and the affirmative vote of two-thirds of the entire membership of the body after such announcement, may hold an executive session only at a regular or special meeting and for the sole purpose of considering any of the matters enumerated in subsection (3)(b) of this section or the following matters; except that no adoption of any proposed policy, position, resolution, rule, regulation, or formal action, except the review, approval, and amendment of the minutes of an executive session recorded pursuant to subsection (2)(d.5)(I) of this section, shall occur at any executive session that is not open to the public:
(I) The purchase of property for public purposes, or the sale of property at competitive bidding, if premature disclosure of information would give an unfair competitive or bargaining advantage to a person whose personal, private interest is adverse to the general public interest. No member of the state public body shall use this paragraph (a) as a subterfuge for providing covert information to prospective buyers or sellers. Governing boards of state institutions of higher education including the regents of the university of Colorado may also consider the acquisition of property as a gift in an executive session, only if such executive session is requested by the donor.
(II) Conferences with an attorney representing the state public body concerning disputes involving the public body that are the subject of pending or imminent court action, concerning specific claims or grievances, or for purposes of receiving legal advice on specific legal questions. Mere presence or participation of an attorney at an executive session of a state public body is not sufficient to satisfy the requirements of this subsection (3).
(III) Matters required to be kept confidential:
(A) By federal law or rules;
(B) By state statutes;
(C) In accordance with the requirements of any joint rule of the senate and house of representatives pertaining to lobbying practices, the workplace harassment policy, or the workplace expectations policy; or
(D) In accordance with the requirements of the workplace harassment policy;
(IV) Specialized details of security arrangements or investigations, including defenses against terrorism, both domestic and foreign, and including where disclosure of the matters discussed might reveal information that could be used for the purpose of committing, or avoiding prosecution for, a violation of the law;
(V) Determining positions relative to matters that may be subject to negotiations with employees or employee organizations; developing strategy for and receiving reports on the progress of such negotiations; and instructing negotiators;
(VI) With respect to the board of regents of the university of Colorado and the board of directors of the university of Colorado hospital authority created pursuant to article 21 of title 23, C.R.S., matters concerning the modification, initiation, or cessation of patient care programs at the university hospital operated by the university of Colorado hospital authority pursuant to part 5 of article 21 of title 23, C.R.S., (including the university of Colorado psychiatric hospital), and receiving reports with regard to any of the above, if premature disclosure of information would give an unfair competitive or bargaining advantage to any person or entity;
(VII) With respect to nonprofit corporations incorporated pursuant to section 23-5-121 (2), C.R.S., matters concerning trade secrets, privileged information, and confidential commercial, financial, geological, or geophysical data furnished by or obtained from any person;
(VIII) With respect to the governing board of a state institution of higher education and any committee thereof, consideration of nominations for the awarding of honorary degrees, medals, and other honorary awards by the institution and consideration of proposals for the naming of a building or a portion of a building for a person or persons.
(IX) With respect to the joint budget committee, a conference with the attorney general, or the attorney general's designee, held pursuant to section 2-3-211.
(b) (I) All meetings held by members of a state public body subject to this part 4 to consider the appointment or employment of a public official or employee or the dismissal, discipline, promotion, demotion, or compensation of, or the investigation of charges or complaints against, a public official or employee shall be open to the public unless said applicant, official, or employee requests an executive session. Governing boards of institutions of higher education including the regents of the university of Colorado may, upon their own affirmative vote, hold executive sessions to consider the matters listed in this paragraph (b). Executive sessions may be held to review administrative actions regarding investigation of charges or complaints and attendant investigative reports against students where public disclosure could adversely affect the person or persons involved, unless the students have specifically consented to or requested the disclosure of such matters. An executive session may be held only at a regular or special meeting of the state public body and only upon the announcement by the public body to the public of the topic for discussion in the executive session and the affirmative vote of two-thirds of the entire membership of the body after such announcement.
(II) The provisions of subparagraph (I) of this paragraph (b) shall not apply to discussions concerning any member of the state public body, any elected official, or the appointment of a person to fill the office of a member of the state public body or an elected official or to discussions of personnel policies that do not require the discussion of matters personal to particular employees.
(c) Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraphs (a) and (b) of this subsection (3), the state board of parole created in part 2 of article 2 of title 17, C.R.S., may proceed in executive session to consider matters connected with any parole proceedings under the jurisdiction of said board; except that no final parole decisions shall be made by said board while in executive session. Such executive session may be held only at a regular or special meeting of the state board of parole and only upon the affirmative vote of two-thirds of the membership of the board present at such meeting.
(d) Notwithstanding any provision of paragraph (a) or (b) of this subsection (3) to the contrary, upon the affirmative vote of two-thirds of the members of the governing board of an institution of higher education who are authorized to vote, the governing board may hold an executive session in accordance with the provisions of this subsection (3).
(3.5) A search committee of a state public body or local public body shall establish job search goals, including the writing of the job description, deadlines for applications, requirements for applicants, selection procedures, and the time frame for appointing or employing a chief executive officer of an agency, authority, institution, or other entity at an open meeting. The state or local public body shall name one or more candidates as finalists for the position of chief executive officer. The state or local public body shall make public the finalist or finalists under consideration for the position of chief executive officer no later than fourteen days prior to appointing or employing a finalist to fill the position. No offer of appointment or employment shall be made prior to this public notice. Records submitted by or on behalf of a finalist for such position shall be subject to section 24-72-204 (3)(a)(XI). Nothing in this subsection (3.5) shall be construed to prohibit a search committee from holding an executive session to consider appointment or employment matters not described in this subsection (3.5) and otherwise authorized by this section.
(4) The members of a local public body subject to this part 4, upon the announcement by the local public body to the public of the topic for discussion in the executive session, including specific citation to this subsection (4) authorizing the body to meet in an executive session and identification of the particular matter to be discussed in as much detail as possible without compromising the purpose for which the executive session is authorized, and the affirmative vote of two-thirds of the quorum present, after such announcement, may hold an executive session only at a regular or special meeting and for the sole purpose of considering any of the following matters; except that no adoption of any proposed policy, position, resolution, rule, regulation, or formal action, except the review, approval, and amendment of the minutes of an executive session recorded pursuant to subsection (2)(d.5)(II) of this section, shall occur at any executive session that is not open to the public:
(a) The purchase, acquisition, lease, transfer, or sale of any real, personal, or other property interest; except that no executive session shall be held for the purpose of concealing the fact that a member of the local public body has a personal interest in such purchase, acquisition, lease, transfer, or sale;
(b) Conferences with an attorney for the local public body for the purposes of receiving legal advice on specific legal questions. Mere presence or participation of an attorney at an executive session of the local public body is not sufficient to satisfy the requirements of this subsection (4).
(c) Matters required to be kept confidential by federal or state law or rules and regulations. The local public body shall announce the specific citation of the statutes or rules that are the basis for such confidentiality before holding the executive session.
(d) Specialized details of security arrangements or investigations, including defenses against terrorism, both domestic and foreign, and including where disclosure of the matters discussed might reveal information that could be used for the purpose of committing, or avoiding prosecution for, a violation of the law;
(e) (I) Determining positions relative to matters that may be subject to negotiations; developing strategy for negotiations; and instructing negotiators.
(II) Subsection (4)(e)(I) of this section shall not apply to a meeting of the members of a board of education of a school district:
(A) During which negotiations relating to collective bargaining, as defined in section 8-3-104 (3), are discussed; or
(B) During which negotiations for employment contracts, other than negotiations for an individual employee's contract, are discussed.
(III) Notwithstanding subsection (4)(e)(II) of this section, the members of a board of education of a school district may hold an executive session in accordance with the requirements of this subsection (4)(e) for the purpose of developing the strategy of the school district for negotiations relating to collective bargaining or employment contracts.
(f) (I) Personnel matters except if the employee who is the subject of the session has requested an open meeting, or if the personnel matter involves more than one employee, all of the employees have requested an open meeting. With respect to hearings held pursuant to the "Teacher Employment, Compensation, and Dismissal Act of 1990", article 63 of title 22, C.R.S., the provisions of section 22-63-302 (7)(a), C.R.S., shall govern in lieu of the provisions of this subsection (4).
(II) The provisions of subparagraph (I) of this paragraph (f) shall not apply to discussions concerning any member of the local public body, any elected official, or the appointment of a person to fill the office of a member of the local public body or an elected official or to discussions of personnel policies that do not require the discussion of matters personal to particular employees.
(g) Consideration of any documents protected by the mandatory nondisclosure provisions of the "Colorado Open Records Act", part 2 of article 72 of this title; except that all consideration of documents or records that are work product as defined in section 24-72-202 (6.5) or that are subject to the governmental or deliberative process privilege shall occur in a public meeting unless an executive session is otherwise allowed pursuant to this subsection (4);
(h) Discussion of individual students where public disclosure would adversely affect the person or persons involved.
(i) (I) If the local public body is the board of education of a school district, the governing body of a district charter school that is authorized pursuant to part 1 of article 30.5 of title 22, or the governing board of an institute charter school that is authorized pursuant to part 5 of article 30.5 of title 22, negotiations concerning the terms of an employment contract with one or more finalists for the position of chief executive officer if:
(A) The board or governing body has named more than one candidate as a finalist for the position of chief executive officer pursuant to subsection (3.5) of this section; and
(B) The board or governing body holds a forum open to the public to conduct interviews with each of the finalists.
(II) The board or governing body may, in addition to interviewing finalists in a public forum, interview finalists in executive session.
(III) The board or governing body may instruct personnel and representatives to begin contract negotiations with one or more candidates in executive session, including the necessary process to prioritize, for the purposes of negotiation, one or more finalists after public forums have been completed.
(IV) Prioritizing among the finalists and beginning negotiations with one or more of the finalists shall not constitute formal action or adoption by the board or governing body. Such formal action occurs only when the board or governing body comes into public session and casts votes on their preferred next chief executive officer. No formal adoption is deemed to have taken place until a public vote has occurred.
(V) As used in this subsection (4)(i), "chief executive officer" means a superintendent of a school district or a chief executive officer of a charter school.
(5) (Deleted by amendment, L. 96, p. 691, §1, effective July 1, 1996.)
(6) The limitations imposed by subsections (3), (4), and (5) of this section do not apply to matters which are covered by section 14 of article V of the state constitution.
(7) The secretary or clerk of each state public body or local public body shall maintain a list of persons who, within the previous two years, have requested notification of all meetings or of meetings when certain specified policies will be discussed and shall provide reasonable advance notification of such meetings, provided, however, that unintentional failure to provide such advance notice will not nullify actions taken at an otherwise properly published meeting. The provisions of this subsection (7) shall not apply to the day-to-day oversight of property or supervision of employees by county commissioners, as provided in paragraph (f) of subsection (2) of this section.
(8) No resolution, rule, regulation, ordinance, or formal action of a state or local public body shall be valid unless taken or made at a meeting that meets the requirements of subsection (2) of this section.
(9) (a) Any person denied or threatened with denial of any of the rights that are conferred on the public by this part 4 has suffered an injury in fact and, therefore, has standing to challenge the violation of this part 4.
(b) The courts of record of this state shall have jurisdiction to issue injunctions to enforce the purposes of this section upon application by any citizen of this state. In any action in which the court finds a violation of this section, the court shall award the citizen prevailing in such action costs and reasonable attorney fees. In the event the court does not find a violation of this section, it shall award costs and reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing party if the court finds that the action was frivolous, vexatious, or groundless.
(10) Any provision of this section declared to be unconstitutional or otherwise invalid shall not impair the remaining provisions of this section, and, to this end, the provisions of this section are declared to be severable.
Source: Initiated 72. L. 73: p. 1666, § 1. C.R.S. 1963: § 3-37-402. L. 77: (1) and (2) amended and (3) added, pp. 1155, 1157, §§ 1, 1, effective June 19. L. 85: (2.6) added, p. 644, § 6, effective June 19. L. 87: (1), (2.3)(a), (2.3)(b), and (2.5) amended and (2.3)(f) added, p. 926, § 1, effective March 27. L. 89: (2.3)(f) amended, p. 1004, § 4, effective October 1. L. 91: Entire section amended, p. 815, § 2, effective June 1; (3)(a)(VI) amended, p. 586, § 6, effective October 1. L. 92: (2)(f) added, p. 972, § 1, effective April 23. L. 96: (2)(d)(III) added, p. 1480, § 2, effective June 1; (1)(b), (1)(d), (2)(d), IP(3)(a), (3)(a)(II), (3)(a)(V), (3)(b), IP(4), (4)(c), (5), and (7) amended and (3.5) added, p. 691, § 1, effective July 1. L. 97: (3.5) amended, p. 320, § 1, effective April 14. L. 99: (4)(g) amended, p. 205, § 1, effective March 31. L. 2000: (1)(d) amended and (3)(a)(VII) added, pp. 414, 415, §§ 4, 5, effective April 13. L. 2001: (3)(a)(III) amended, p. 150, § 5, effective March 27; (2)(d.5) added and IP(3)(a), (3)(b), IP(4), and (4)(f) amended, pp. 1069, 1072, §§ 1, 2, effective August 8. L. 2002: (3)(a)(IV) and (4)(d) amended, p. 238, § 7, effective April 12; (2)(d.5)(I)(A) and (2)(d.5)(II)(A) amended, p. 643, § 3, effective May 24; (3)(a)(VIII) added, p. 85, § 1, effective August 7. L. 2006: (2)(d.5)(I)(A), (2)(d.5)(I)(B), (2)(d.5)(II)(A), and (2)(d.5)(II)(B) amended, p. 9, § 1, effective August 7. L. 2009: (2)(d.5)(I)(B) and (3)(a)(II) amended, (HB 09-1124), ch. 94, p. 359, § 1, effective August 5; (4)(g) amended, (SB 09-292), ch. 369, p. 1967, § 74, effective August 5. L. 2010: (3)(d) added, (SB 10-003), ch. 391, p. 1859, § 40, effective June 9. L. 2012: (2)(d)(IV) added, (HB 12-1169), ch. 64, p. 227, § 1, effective March 24. L. 2014: (2)(d.5)(II)(E) amended, (SB 14-182), ch. 393, p. 1986, § 2, effective June 6; (9) amended, (HB 14-1390), ch. 380, p. 1859, § 1, effective June 6. Initiated 2014: (1)(a) and (4)(e) amended, L. 2015, p. 2203, § 1, effective upon proclamation of the governor, December 17, 2014. L. 2016: (1)(a)(III) added and (1)(d) amended, (HB 16-1422), ch. 351, p. 1436, § 15, effective June 10. L. 2019: IP(3)(a) and (3)(a)(III) amended, (SB 19-244), ch. 243, p. 2377, § 2, effective May 20; (2)(c) amended, (HB 19-1087), ch. 134, p. 608, § 1, effective August 2; IP(4) and (4)(e) amended, (HB 19-1201), ch. 98, p. 359, § 1, effective September 1. L. 2021: (2)(c)(IV) amended, (SB 21-268), ch. 222, p. 1185, § 23, effective June 11; (3.5) amended, (HB 21-1051), ch. 183, p. 986, § 2, effective September 7; (2)(d)(III) amended, (HB 21-1025), ch. 24, p. 110, § 1, effective September 7. L. 2022: (4)(i) added, (HB 22-1110), ch. 66, p. 327, § 1, effective April 4. L. 2024: (2.5) added, (SB 24-157), ch. 23, p. 65, § 2, effective March 12; (3)(a)(III) amended, (SB 24-160), ch. 445, p. 3115, § 2, effective August 7. L. 2025: (1)(a)(II) and (1)(a)(III) amended and (1)(a)(IV) added, (SB 25-147), ch. 369, p. 1992, § 1, effective June 3. L. 2026: (3)(a)(IX) added, (HB 26-1426), ch. 334, p. 2024, § 94, effective August 12.
Editor's note: (1) Subsection (2.3)(f) was amended by House Bill No. 1143, enacted by the General Assembly at its first regular session in 1989, as a conforming amendment necessitated by the authorization for the operation of the university of Colorado university hospital by a nonprofit-nonstock corporation. The Colorado Supreme Court subsequently declared House Bill No. 1143 unconstitutional in its entirety. See Colorado Association of Public Employees v. Board of Regents, 804 P.2d 138 (Colo. 1990). Senate Bill 91-225, enacted by the General Assembly at its first regular session in 1991, authorized the operation of university hospital by a newly created university of Colorado hospital authority. Since the previous act was declared unconstitutional in its entirety, the General Assembly elected to make a similar conforming amendment in Senate Bill 91-225. However, subsection (2.3)(f) was amended in Senate Bill 91-33, enacted by the General Assembly at its first regular session in 1991. The provisions of said subsection (2.3)(f) were moved to subsection (3)(a), and, therefore, said subsection was the version amended. For further explanation of the circumstances surrounding the enactment of Senate Bill 91-225, see the legislative declaration contained in section 1 of chapter 99, Session Laws of Colorado 1991.
(2) The vote count on the measure at the general election held November 4, 2014, was as follows:
FOR: 1,364,747
AGAINST: 582,473
Cross references: For the legislative declaration contained in the 1996 act enacting subsection (2)(d)(III), see section 1 of chapter 271, Session Laws of Colorado 1996. For the legislative declaration contained in the 2002 act amending subsections (2)(d.5)(I)(A) and (2)(d.5)(II)(A), see section 1 of chapter 187, Session Laws of Colorado 2002. For the legislative declaration in the 2010 act adding subsection (3)(d), see section 1 of chapter 391, Session Laws of Colorado 2010. For the legislative declaration in HB 24-1051, see section 1 of chapter 183, Session Laws of Colorado 2021. For the legislative declaration in SB 24-157, see section 1 of chapter 23, Session Laws of Colorado 2024.
ANNOTATION
Law reviews. For article, "Home Rule Municipalities and Colorado's Open Records and Meetings Laws", see 18 Colo. Law. 1125 (1989). For article, "Practicing Law Before Part-Time Citizen Boards and Commissions", see 18 Colo. Law. 1133 (1989). For article, "E-mail, Open Meetings, and Public Records", see 25 Colo. Law. 99 (Oct. 1996).
Constitutionality of section. The open meetings law does not conflict with § 12 of art. V, Colo. Const., which provides in pertinent part: "Each house shall have power to determine the rules of its proceedings . . .". Cole v. State, 673 P.2d 345 (Colo. 1983).
The open meetings law strikes the proper balance between the public's right of access to information and a legislator's right to freedom of speech. Cole v. State, 673 P.2d 345 (Colo. 1983).
Although § 14 of art. V, Colo. Const., expressly authorizes the general assembly to conduct certain business in secret, both the senate and the house of representatives have determined that the business of legislative caucuses is not such as ought to be kept secret. Therefore, the open meetings law does not conflict with § 14 of art. V, Colo. Const. Cole v. State, 673 P.2d 345 (Colo. 1983).
Section only applies to state agencies, authorities, and the general assembly. Bagby v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 186 Colo. 428, 528 P.2d 1299 (1974).
This section, in contrast to the Florida statute from which it was modeled, only applies to any state agency or authority. James v. Bd. of Comm'rs, 200 Colo. 28, 611 P.2d 976 (1980).
An entire state agency is not a "state public body". If the general assembly had intended to include entire state agencies in the definition of "state public body", it would not have limited the definition to identifiable bodies of any state agency. Doe 1 v. Dept. of Pub. Health & Env't, 2018 COA 106, 454 P.3d 327, aff'd, 2019 CO 92, 450 P.3d 851; Colo. Med. Bd. v. McLaughlin, 2019 CO 93, 451 P.3d 841.
And therefore is not subject to subsection (2)(a)'s requirements. Doe v. Colo. Dept. of Pub. Health & Env't, 2019 CO 92, 450 P.3d 851.
A broad construction of this section is unwarranted because the general assembly was very specific in defining the entities whose meetings were to be open to the public. Free Speech Def. Comm. v. Thomas, 80 P.3d 935 (Colo. App. 2003).
Section fails to define scope of term "state agency or authority". James v. Bd. of Comm'rs, 200 Colo. 28, 611 P.2d 976 (1980).
A county retirement plan operates as an agency or instrumentality of the county when the plan has availed itself of public entity tax and health benefits, has used county purchasing accounts, facilities, and the county seal, is authorized to levy a retirement tax, and has a budget that is factored into the county budget. Such plan is thereby subject to the open meetings law and the open records law. Zubeck v. El Paso County Ret. Plan, 961 P.2d 597 (Colo. App. 1998).
"Formal action" includes review of hearing officer's decision resulting in order representing final agency action on a particular issue. The quasi-judicial nature of such review is immaterial. Lanes v. State Auditor's Office, 797 P.2d 764 (Colo. App. 1990).
Teacher hiring and firing decisions are formal decisions, and, therefore, a firing decision by a school board that is made during an executive session as described in § 22-32-108 is invalid. Barbour v. Hanover Sch. Dist. No. 28, 148 P.3d 268 (Colo. App. 2006), aff'd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 171 P.3d 223 (Colo. 2007).
City council violated subsection (4) by improperly convening and taking formal action in deciding to end city clerk and records custodian's censure proceedings during an executive session. Sentinel Colo. v. Rodriguez, 2023 COA 118, 544 P.3d 1278, rev'd on other grounds, 2025 CO 58, 577 P.3d 48.
Censure resolution constituted a formal action of the board and was part of its policymaking function. The open meetings law was triggered when the censure resolution was adopted at a public meeting called to address the potential removal of a trustee and was attended by a quorum of the trustees. Anzalone v. Bd. of Trustees, 2024 COA 18, 549 P.3d 255.
Legislative caucus meetings are "meetings" of policy-making bodies within the meaning of the Colorado open meetings law and are therefore subject to the open meetings law's requirement that "meetings" be "public meetings open to the public at all times". Cole v. State, 673 P.2d 345 (Colo. 1983).
A local public body is required to give public notice of any meeting attended or expected to be attended by a quorum of the public body when the meeting is part of the policy-making process. Bd. of County Comm'rs v. Costilla County Conservancy Dist., 88 P.3d 1188 (Colo. 2004).
A meeting is part of the policy-making process when the meeting is held for the purpose of discussing or undertaking a rule, regulation, ordinance, or formal action. If the record supports the conclusion that the meeting is rationally connected to the policy-making responsibilities of the public body holding or attending the meeting, then the meeting is subject to the open meetings law, and the public body holding or attending the meeting must provide notice. Bd. of County Comm'rs v. Costilla County Conservancy Dist., 88 P.3d 1188 (Colo. 2004).
Board of county commissioners was not required to give notice of a meeting arranged by others because nothing in the record establishes any connection between the meeting and the policy-making function of the board. Bd. of County Comm'rs v. Costilla County Conservancy Dist., 88 P.3d 1188 (Colo. 2004).
E-mails exchanged between a regulatory agency's chairperson, its commissioners, and a member of the governor's staff about draft language of, and the agency's position on, pending legislation did not constitute a meeting under the statute because the e-mails did not concern the agency's public business. "Public business" means a public body's policy-making functions, which consist of discussing or undertaking a rule, regulation, ordinance, or formal action of the public body itself. Providing input on pending legislation is not a policy-making function of a regulatory agency. Intermountain Rural v. Pub. Utils., 2012 COA 123, 298 P.3d 1027.
Mere legislative formation of agency or authority insufficient. The mere enactment of legislation which permits the formation of a commission, board, agency, or authority does not per se make that body a state agency or authority. James v. Bd. of Comm'rs, 200 Colo. 28, 611 P.2d 976 (1980).
Section does not apply to political subdivisions. Bagby v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 186 Colo. 428, 528 P.2d 1299 (1974); James v. Bd. of Comm'rs, 42 Colo. App. 27, 595 P.2d 262 (1978), aff'd, 200 Colo. 28, 611 P.2d 976 (1980).
Local licensing authority of city was an arm of a political subdivision of the state rather than a state agency and thus was not subject to open meetings law with regard to license suspension revocation proceeding. Lasterka Corp. v. Buckingham, 739 P.2d 925 (Colo. App. 1987).
Nor to urban renewal authority. Rather than being a state agency or authority, an urban renewal authority is an arm or agency of the municipality which creates it, and, therefore, this section has no applicability to such an authority. James v. Bd. of Comm'rs, 42 Colo. App. 27, 595 P.2d 262 (1978), aff'd, 200 Colo. 28, 611 P.2d 976 (1980).
Nor to redistricting negotiations held in courthouse under judge's supervision. Combined Commc'ns Corp. v. Finesilver, 672 F.2d 818 (10th Cir. 1982).
Nor to a district attorney's advisory board. A district attorney is not a political subdivision under this section and, therefore, his advisory board is not a local public body. A district attorney is also not a state agency or state authority pursuant to the definition of state public body under this section, therefore, his advisory board is not a state public body. Free Speech Def. Comm. v. Thomas, 80 P.3d 935 (Colo. App. 2003).
The Colorado medical board is a state public body, but it was not subject to this section for a meeting that was not convened for the purpose of policy making. Doe 1 v. Dept. of Pub. Health & Env't, 2018 COA 106, 454 P.3d 327, aff'd on other grounds, 2019 CO 92, 450 P.3d 851.
Prohibition against making final policy decisions or taking formal action in a closed meeting also prohibits "rubber-stamping" previously decided issues. Bagby v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 186 Colo. 428, 528 P.2d 1299 (1974); Van Alstyne v. Housing Auth. of City of Pueblo, 985 P.2d 97 (Colo. App. 1999); Walsenburg Sand & Gravel Co. v. City Council of Walsenburg, 160 P.3d 297 (Colo. App. 2007); Anzalone v. Bd. of Trustees, 2024 COA 18, 549 P.3d 255; O'Connell v. Woodland Park Sch. Dist., 2025 CO 55, 576 P.3d 197.
Because the purpose of the open meetings law is to require open decision-making, not to permanently condemn a decision made in violation of the statute, a public body may "cure" a previous violation of the law by holding a subsequent complying meeting that is not a mere rubber stamping of an earlier decision. COHVCO v. Bd. of Parks & Outdoor Rec., 2012 COA 146, 292 P.3d 1132; O'Connell v. Woodland Park Sch. Dist., 2025 CO 55, 576 P.3d 197.
COHVCO v. Bd. of Parks & Outdoor Rec., annotated above, only applies where a party seeks to invalidate an action taken in an improperly convened executive session. Sentinel Colo. v. Rodriguez, 2023 COA 118, 544 P.3d 1278, rev'd on other grounds, 2025 CO 58, 577 P.3d 48.
The ability to cure a previous violation is not dependent on whether the violation was intentional or unintentional. O'Connell v. Woodland Park Sch. Dist., 2025 CO 55, 576 P.3d 197.
School boards not covered since they are political subdivisions. Bagby v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 186 Colo. 428, 528 P.2d 1299 (1974).
Section establishes flexible standard of notice. In view of the numerous meetings to which the statutory requirement of full and timely notice is applicable, this section establishes a flexible standard aimed at providing fair notice to the public, so that whether the notice requirement has been satisfied in a given case will depend upon the particular type of meeting involved. Benson v. McCormick, 195 Colo. 381, 578 P.2d 651 (1978); Lewis v. Town of Nederland, 934 P.2d 848 (Colo. App. 1996); Town of Marble v. Darien, 181 P.3d 1148 (Colo. 2008).
Publication of notice of meeting of local public body in newspaper of general circulation in the county in which the meeting is to be held, six days prior to the meeting, satisfies notice requirements of section. Van Alstyne v. Housing Auth. of City of Pueblo, 985 P.2d 97 (Colo. App. 1999).
An emergency necessarily presents a situation in which public notice, and likewise, a public forum would be impracticable or impossible. Lewis v. Town of Nederland, 934 P.2d 848 (Colo. App. 1996).
Procedures contained in a municipal ordinance requiring ratification of action taken at an emergency meeting at either the next board meeting or a special meeting where public notice of the emergency has been given, represent reasonable satisfaction of the "public" conditions of the open meetings law under emergency circumstances. Lewis v. Town of Nederland, 934 P.2d 848 (Colo. App. 1996).
Some overt action must be taken by the board to give notice to the public that a meeting is to be held. At the very minimum, full and timely notice to the public requires that notice of the meeting be posted within a reasonable time prior to the meeting in an area which is open to public view. Hyde v. Banking Bd., 38 Colo. App. 41, 552 P.2d 32 (1976).
The mailing of notice to the persons on the "sunshine list" does not constitute full and timely notice to the public. Hyde v. Banking Bd., 38 Colo. App. 41, 552 P.2d 32 (1976).
Though a copy of the notice mailed to persons on the "sunshine list" is available for public inspection upon request, such a procedure does not constitute sufficient notice to the public under this section. Hyde v. Banking Bd., 38 Colo. App. 41, 552 P.2d 32 (1976).
Full notice requirement satisfied. An ordinary member of the community would understand that notice of an advisory committee update would include consideration of, and possible formal action on, the advisory committee's recommendations. Town of Marble v. Darien, 181 P.3d 1148 (Colo. 2008).
Section does not require a public body to adjourn and re-notify when the action already falls under a topic listed on the notice. The particular notice contained the agenda information available at the time of the notice and, thus, satisfied the requirement that "specific agenda information" be included "where possible". Town of Marble v. Darien, 181 P.3d 1148 (Colo. 2008).
Employee disciplinary matters directed toward an individual employee are precisely the type of day-to-day supervisions that subsection (2)(f) meant to exempt. A meeting of the board of county commissioners to discuss personnel matters — the available disciplinary options to address a county employee's misconduct — falls within the notice exception of subsection (2)(f): The supervision of county employees by county commissioners. Ark. Valley Publ'g v. Lake County Bd. of County Comm'rs, 2015 COA 100, 369 P.3d 725.
The phrase "day-to-day" in subsection (2)(f) is not ambiguous. It would lead to an absurd result to require all disciplinary or other supervisory matters for a specific employee that involve a quorum of board members to be discussed in public meetings. It is the nature of the action that may be taken — for example, employee supervision, including discipline or periodic performance evaluation of an employee — as opposed to the nature of the employee's conduct — for example, tardiness, incompetence, or criminal misbehavior — that determines whether the meeting falls within the day-to-day supervision exemption. Ark. Valley Publ'g v. Lake County Bd. of County Comm'rs, 2015 COA 100, 369 P.3d 725.
Generally, disciplinary decisions and application of an existing personnel policy to an individual employee are not matters that require, or are necessarily appropriate for, public input. Requiring advance notice of this type of personnel meeting or discussion does not further the purpose of the open meetings law. Ark. Valley Publ'g v. Lake County Bd. of County Comm'rs, 2015 COA 100, 369 P.3d 725.
For any personnel matter not falling within subsection (2)(f)'s limited scope, proper notice is still required before the local public body may convene an executive session. Ark. Valley Publ'g v. Lake County Bd. of County Comm'rs, 2015 COA 100, 369 P.3d 725.
Compliance with subsection (3) is not substitute for compliance with subsection (2). Hyde v. Banking Bd., 38 Colo. App. 41, 552 P.2d 32 (1976).
Action taken without full and timely notice is invalid. This section does not invalidate the formal action of a board for the failure to comply with notice to those persons on the "sunshine list", but it does invalidate an action taken where there is not full and timely notice to the public. Hyde v. Banking Bd., 38 Colo. App. 41, 552 P.2d 32 (1976).
City council's use of anonymous ballot procedure to fill city council vacancies and to appoint municipal judge is not prohibited by section. Section does not impose specific voting procedures on local public bodies let alone one that prohibits the use of anonymous ballots. Section is silent as to whether the votes taken need to be recorded in a way that identifies which elected official voted for which candidate. Rather, section only requires that the public have access to meetings of local public bodies and be able to observe the decision-making process. Henderson v. City of Ft. Morgan, 277 P.3d 853 (Colo. App. 2011) (decided prior to 2012 amendment).
A state or local public body can name a single finalist for an executive position under subsection (3.5). Under the plain language of this statute, there is no requirement that an institution name a minimum number of finalists if there are more than three qualified applicants. Prairie Mtn. Publ'g v. Regents Univ. of Colo., 2021 COA 26, 491 P.3d 472.
Subsection (4) invalidates any formal action regarding compensation taken other than at an open meeting, absent prior request by the person affected for an executive session. Lanes v. State Auditor's Office, 797 P.2d 764 (Colo. App. 1990).
District court erred in permitting the redaction of the minutes of a county retirement plan's meetings that were not conducted in an executive session because the plan did not follow the statutory requirements for calling an executive session and the meetings were not actually held in an executive session. Zubeck v. El Paso County Ret. Plan, 961 P.2d 597 (Colo. App. 1998).
If a local public body fails strictly to comply with the requirements set forth to convene an executive session, it may not avail itself of the protections afforded by the executive session exception. Therefore, if an executive session is not properly convened, it is an open meeting subject to the public disclosure requirements of the open meetings law. Gumina v. City of Sterling, 119 P.3d 527 (Colo. App. 2004).
City council's announcement about an executive session that involved communication with special counsel did not identify any detail about the topic to be discussed and therefore violated the public notice requirement. Sentinel Colo. v. Rodriguez, 2023 COA 118, 544 P.3d 1278, rev'd on other grounds, 2025 CO 58, 577 P.3d 48.
Local public body violated statute by convening executive sessions outside of a regular or special meeting, without announcing the topic or otherwise noticing the session beforehand. Retroactively noticing the executive session at the next public meeting did not cure the violation. Bjornsen v. Bd. of County Comm'rs of Boulder, 2019 COA 59, 487 P.3d 1015.
Where custodian redacted work product from emails between elected officials pursuant to the Colorado Open Records Act, the district court should have considered whether the redactions were proper under this section. Bjornsen v. Bd. of County Comm'rs of Boulder, 2019 COA 59, 487 P.3d 1015.
The remedy in subsection (8) invalidates formal action taken in two circumstances. First, the open meetings law voids any resolution, rule, regulation, ordinance, or formal action of a state or local public body taken at a meeting that does not comply with the requirements of subsection (2). But the open meetings law also voids any of these actions taken without a meeting of the state or local public body. Wisdom Works Counseling v. Dept. of Corr., 2015 COA 118, 360 P.3d 262.
While the open meetings law does not dictate when, where, or how often any public body must meet, by any fair reading it must be interpreted to hold a public body that takes formal action without meeting at risk of the action being voided under subsection (8) and paying the adverse party's attorney fees under subsection (9). Wisdom Works Counseling v. Dept. of Corr., 2015 COA 118, 360 P.3d 262.
Subsection (9) is not a general grant of standing to any citizen and does not abrogate the requirement that in order to have standing the plaintiff must suffer an injury in fact. Pueblo Sch. Dist. No. 60 v. Colo. High Sch. Activities Assn., 30 P.3d 752 (Colo. App. 2000).
Standing to bring suit under open meetings law. Colorado courts apply the two-prong Wimberly v. Ettenberg, 194 Colo. 163, 570 P.2d 535 (1977), test for standing. To satisfy that test, a plaintiff must establish that (1) he or she suffered an injury in fact and (2) the injury was to a legally protected interest. Weisfield v. City of Arvada, 2015 COA 43, 361 P.3d 1069.
As a citizen seeking to enforce open, public decision-making by the city council that represents him, plaintiff was precisely the type of plaintiff contemplated under the open meetings law's enforcement provisions. Weisfield v. City of Arvada, 2015 COA 43, 361 P.3d 1069.
For purposes of standing, subsection (9)(a) establishes a legally protected interest in favor of at least every natural person in Colorado to have public bodies conduct public business in compliance with the open meetings law and the general assembly chose to create this as a broad right with statewide reach. Roane v. Elizabeth Sch. Dist., 2024 COA 59, 555 P.3d 69.
A person has a protected interest under the open meetings law by being a member of the public, not because of the person's relationship with the public body or based on the nature of their individual interest in the underlying meeting where the alleged violation occurred. Roane v. Elizabeth Sch. Dist., 2024 COA 59, 555 P.3d 69.
A person suffers an injury in fact when the person is denied or threatened with denial of any of the rights that are conferred on the public by the open meetings law. Access to meetings where public policy is shaped is a legally protected right under the open meetings law, and an injury in fact occurs when that right is abridged. Roane v. Elizabeth Sch. Dist., 2024 COA 59, 555 P.3d 69.
To have an injury in fact, a person is not required to provide a reason for seeking access to an open meeting; prove their proximity or connection to the political subdivision that is holding the meeting; explain the existence of an individual interest in the topic discussed during the meeting; or justify the purposes for which the impermissibly withheld information could have been used. Roane v. Elizabeth Sch. Dist., 2024 COA 59, 555 P.3d 69.
Injury in fact found where allegations show that plaintiff was deprived of his legally protected right to have the city council that represents him take action in an open manner rather than by secret ballot. Weisfield v. City of Arvada, 2015 COA 43, 361 P.3d 1069.
The open meetings law creates a legally protected interest on behalf of Colorado citizens to have public business conducted openly in conformity with the statutory provisions. This section sets out specific requirements with which public bodies must comply, including providing notice and public access to meetings where public business is discussed, as well as a specific prohibition on taking formal action by the use of secret ballots. Finally, subsections (8) and (9) provide a legal remedy whereby private citizens may enforce its provisions. In sum, the open meetings law articulates an interest in having public business conducted openly and provides a mechanism for private citizens to protect that interest. Weisfield v. City of Arvada, 2015 COA 43, 361 P.3d 1069.
Disclosure of a public letter from special counsel recounting factual details underlying a stipulation agreement but which did not contain privileged communications between the special counsel and the city council did not waive the attorney-client privilege. Sentinel Colo. v. Rodriguez, 2025 CO 58, 577 P.3d 48.
Subsection (4) violated. Town council failed to comply with the requirement of subsection (4) that the particular matters to be discussed in executive sessions be identified in as much detail as possible without compromising the purpose for which an executive session is authorized when its public notices of the executive sessions referenced only general statutory categories of legal advice and personnel matters without providing any information about what legal advice or personnel matters would be discussed. To comply with subsection (4), the notices needed to include at least the general subject on which legal advice was sought and identify the employee who was the subject of the personnel matter to be discussed. Guy v. Whitsitt, 2020 COA 93, 469 P.3d 546.
Subsection (9) entitles plaintiffs to an award of attorney fees upon a finding that the governmental entity has violated any of the provisions of law. There is no requirement that the violation be knowing or intentional. Zubeck v. El Paso County Ret. Plan, 961 P.2d 597 (Colo. App. 1998).
Subsection (9) establishes mandatory consequences for a violation of the open meetings law, entitling plaintiffs to their costs and attorney fees incurred in bringing an action to force a public body to comply with the law. Van Alstyne v. Housing Auth. of City of Pueblo, 985 P.2d 97 (Colo. App. 1999); O'Connell v. Woodland Park Sch. Dist., 2025 CO 55, 576 P.3d 197.
The word "citizen" in subsection (9)(b) includes corporations, as "citizen" is used interchangably with "person" and each word logically encompasses any party with standing to pursue litigation under the open meetings law. Sentinel Colo. v. Rodriguez, 2025 CO 58, 577 P.3d 48.
A newspaper formed as a corporation may recover attorney fees under subsection (9)(b) if it is the prevailing party because corporations are included in the meaning of "citizen" for purposes of this subsection and consistent with the statutory scheme of the open meetings law as a whole. Sentinel Colo. v. Rodriguez, 2025 CO 58, 577 P.3d 48.
Where a public body cured an admitted violation before the filing of a complaint, the plaintiff was not a prevailing party and is not entitled to an award of fees and costs. COHVCO v. Bd. of Parks & Outdoor Rec., 2012 COA 146, 292 P.3d 1132.
Because the judicial branch, where the independent ethics commission (IEC) resides, is not a "state agency" within the meaning of subsection (2)(a) and a state agency as a whole cannot constitute a "state public body" within the meaning of subsection (1)(d)(I), the IEC falls outside the scope of the open meetings law. Lacking subject matter jurisdiction over appellant's claims under the open meetings law, the district court appropriately dismissed his complaint. Dunafon v. Krupa, 2020 COA 149, 477 P.3d 785.
PART 5
ENCRYPTION OF RADIO COMMUNICATIONS BY GOVERNMENTAL ENTITIES
24-6-501. Definitions.
As used in this part 5, unless the context otherwise requires:
(1) "Encryption" means the encoding of voice communication on an analog or digitally modulated radio carrier, which encoding renders the communication difficult or impossible to be monitored by commercially available radio receivers or scanners.
(2) "Law enforcement agency" means a municipal police department or a county sheriff's office.
(3) "Media" means a news media entity associated with a statewide organization representing FCC-licensed broadcasting entities or a statewide organization representing a majority of Colorado newspapers.
(4) "Radio communications" means any communication by way of transmission of a radio frequency carrier to base, mobile, or portable radio transceivers by either analog or digital modulation.
(5) "Scanner" means a radio receiver designed for the purpose of monitoring multiple radio carriers simultaneously.
Source: L. 2021: Entire part added, (HB 21-1250), ch. 458, p. 3069, § 19, effective July 6.
24-6-502. Public broadcast of governmental radio communications - encryption policy.
A law enforcement agency that encrypts all of its radio communications shall create a communications access policy, through collaboration with Colorado-based media outlets, that includes an agreement governing access for the media to primary dispatch channels or talk groups through commercially available radio receivers, scanners, or any other feasible technology. The policy may include, but is not limited to, verification of media credentials; reasonable restrictions on the use of the commercially available radio receivers, scanners, or other feasible technology; and financial or other costs related to the sale, lease, or loan of the commercially available radio receivers, scanners, or any other feasible technology.
Source: L. 2021: Entire part added, (HB 21-1250), ch. 458, p. 3069, § 19, effective July 6.
ARTICLE 7
State Security Officers
24-7-100.2. Legislative declaration.
24-7-101. State institutions authorized to employ security officers.
24-7-102. Supervision and control.
24-7-103. Powers conferred.
24-7-104. State property not exempt from local law enforcement.
24-7-105. Officers' qualifications.
24-7-106. Peace officers standards and training board evaluation and recommendation - legislative authorization of peace officer status required.
24-7-100.2. Legislative declaration.
(1) The general assembly hereby finds that the efforts of security officers employed by institutions of higher education to protect the persons and property of their environments are important elements of effective public safety management.
(2) The general assembly acknowledges the operational and environmental acumen of security officers of institutions of higher education regarding their facilities and the importance of including representatives of the institutions in emergency preparedness planning and training efforts conducted by local law enforcement agencies and emergency planning agencies intended to reduce the likelihood of, and develop effective responses to, emergency situations occurring at their facilities.
(3) The general assembly hereby encourages ongoing cooperation efforts among local law enforcement agencies, emergency planning agencies, and the security officers of institutions of higher education regarding emergency preparedness and response planning and training and development of communication capabilities supporting effective coordination among these groups during emergencies.
Source: L. 2008: Entire section added, p. 87, § 5, effective March 18.
24-7-101. State institutions authorized to employ security officers.
The institutions, agencies, and departments of state government, including any institution of higher education, are hereby authorized to employ security officers to protect the property of the institution, agency, or department employing the officer and to perform other police, security, and administrative functions as may be deemed necessary.
Source: L. 71: p. 120, § 1. C.R.S. 1963: § 3-32-1. L. 2008: Entire section amended, p. 87, § 6, effective March 18.
24-7-102. Supervision and control.
The security officers employed pursuant to this article shall be under the control and supervision of the governing authority or head of the employing state institution. The governing authorities or heads of the state institutions, agencies, and departments shall provide appropriate credentials for the officers. The employing institution, department, or agency may permit its security officers that have been designated as peace officers pursuant to section 16-2.5-101, C.R.S., to hold and receive such other law enforcement commissions or appointments as are appropriate to carry out their duties.
Source: L. 71: p. 120, § 1. C.R.S. 1963: § 3-32-2. L. 2008: Entire section amended, p. 87, § 7, effective March 18.
24-7-103. Powers conferred.
(1) Security officers employed and commissioned pursuant to this article that have been designated as peace officers pursuant to section 16-2.5-101, C.R.S., when operating on state owned or leased property, are hereby granted all the powers conferred by law upon peace officers to carry weapons and to make arrests.
(2) When not on state owned or leased property, security officers employed and commissioned pursuant to this article shall not have any authority not possessed by private citizens to arrest, investigate, or carry weapons. This subsection (2) shall not apply to peace officers as described in section 16-2.5-101, C.R.S.
Source: L. 71: p. 120, § 1. C.R.S. 1963: § 3-32-3. L. 2002: Entire section amended, p. 840, § 2, effective May 30. L. 2003: (2) amended, p. 1622, § 38, effective August 6. L. 2008: (1) amended, p. 87, § 8, effective March 18.
24-7-104. State property not exempt from local law enforcement.
Nothing in this article shall be construed to exempt state property from the authority of law enforcement agencies within whose jurisdiction the state property is located; except that representatives of the law enforcement agencies shall coordinate their official actions on state property with the appropriate security officers or police officers, except when emergency circumstances preclude such coordination.
Source: L. 71: p. 121, § 1. C.R.S. 1963: § 3-32-4. L. 2008: Entire section amended, p. 88, § 9, effective March 18.
24-7-105. Officers' qualifications.
Security officers shall be at least twenty-one years of age and shall possess such other qualifications as may be specified by the state personnel director, including continuing training as may be prescribed by the said director.
Source: L. 71: p. 121, § 1. C.R.S. 1963: § 3-32-5. L. 94: Entire section amended, p. 1731, § 10, effective May 31.
24-7-106. Peace officers standards and training board evaluation and recommendation - legislative authorization of peace officer status required.
Notwithstanding other provisions of this article, a person or group of persons employed as security officers or guards by any institution, agency, or department of state government, including any institution of higher education, shall not be designated as peace officers, after June 3, 2004, without completing the peace officer standards and training board processes described in sections 16-2.5-201 and 16-2.5-202, C.R.S., and obtaining the legislative authorization described in section 16-2.5-101, C.R.S.
Source: L. 2008: Entire section added, p. 88, § 10, effective March 18.
ARTICLE 7.5
Colorado Higher Education Police Officers
24-7.5-101. State institutions of higher education authorized to employ police officers.
24-7.5-102. Supervision and control.
24-7.5-103. Powers conferred.
24-7.5-104. State institution of higher education property not exempt from local law enforcement.
24-7.5-105. Officers' qualifications.
24-7.5-106. Peace officers standards and training board evaluation and recommendation - legislative authorization of peace officer status required.
24-7.5-101. State institutions of higher education authorized to employ police officers.
The state institutions of higher education are authorized to employ police officers to provide law enforcement and property protection for the institution employing the officers and to perform other police, emergency planning, community safety, and administrative functions as may be deemed necessary.
Source: L. 2008: Entire article added, p. 88, § 11, effective March 18.
24-7.5-102. Supervision and control.
State higher education police officers employed pursuant to this article shall be under the supervision and control of the governing board of the employing state institution of higher education or its designee. The governing board or head of the state institution of higher education shall provide institutional police commissions and other appropriate credentials for the police officers. The employing institution may permit its police officers to hold and receive other law enforcement commissions or appointments as are appropriate to carry out their duties.
Source: L. 2008: Entire article added, p. 88, § 11, effective March 18.
24-7.5-103. Powers conferred.
(1) State higher education police officers employed and commissioned pursuant to this article, when operating on property owned or leased by the state institution of higher education, are granted all the powers conferred by law upon peace officers to carry weapons and make arrests.
(2) When not on property owned or leased by the state institution of higher education, state higher education police officers shall not have any greater authority than that conferred upon peace officers by section 16-3-110, C.R.S.
Source: L. 2008: Entire article added, p. 88, § 11, effective March 18.
24-7.5-104. State institution of higher education property not exempt from local law enforcement.
Nothing in this article shall be construed to exempt the property of a state institution of higher education from the authority of law enforcement agencies within whose jurisdiction the property is located; except that representatives of the law enforcement agencies shall coordinate their official actions on the property with the appropriate higher education police officers, except when emergency circumstances preclude such coordination.
Source: L. 2008: Entire article added, p. 89, § 11, effective March 18.
24-7.5-105. Officers' qualifications.
State higher education police officers shall be at least twenty-one years of age and shall possess other qualifications as may be specified by the state personnel director, including continuing training as may be prescribed by the director. State higher education police officers shall be certified by the peace officers standards and training board.
Source: L. 2008: Entire article added, p. 89, § 11, effective March 18.
24-7.5-106. Peace officers standards and training board evaluation and recommendation - legislative authorization of peace officer status required.
Notwithstanding any other provision of this article, a person or group of persons employed by any institution of higher education shall not be designated as police officers after June 3, 2004, without completing the peace officers standards and training board processes described in sections 16-2.5-201 and 16-2.5-202, C.R.S., and obtaining the certification described in section 16-2.5-102, C.R.S.
Source: L. 2009: Entire section added, (SB 09-097), ch. 110, p. 457, § 5, effective August 5.
ARTICLE 8
Governor-elect - Transition to New Administration
24-8-101. Legislative declaration.
24-8-102. Office space, supplies, and equipment.
24-8-103. Access to information.
24-8-104. Staff personnel - state employees.
24-8-105. General assembly to make appropriation.
24-8-101. Legislative declaration.
The general assembly declares it to be in the public interest that the transition from the administration of one governor to that of another be efficient and carefully planned. It is the purpose of this article to provide the governor-elect with sufficient resources to effect such a transition, including temporary office space, staff services, access to budgetary and other necessary and desirable information, and cooperation of officials and employees of the executive branch of state government.
Source: L. 69: p. 95, § 1. C.R.S. 1963: § 3-29-1.
24-8-102. Office space, supplies, and equipment.
The department of personnel shall provide the governor-elect and the governor-elect's staff with suitable office space in the capitol building, together with sufficient furnishings, supplies, equipment, and telephone service for the period between the general election and the inauguration.
Source: L. 69: p. 95, § 2. C.R.S. 1963: § 3-29-2. L. 95: Entire section amended, p. 639, § 29, effective July 1.
Cross references: For the legislative declaration contained in the 1995 act amending this section, see section 112 of chapter 167, Session Laws of Colorado 1995.
24-8-103. Access to information.
(1) The governor and executive director of the department of personnel shall cooperate with the governor-elect and the governor-elect's staff to enable the governor-elect to adequately prepare his or her policy priorities, budget recommendations, legislative program, and messages to the general assembly. To implement the provisions of this section, the governor-elect and authorized staff shall have full access to:
(a) All reports, estimates, minutes of hearings, and other information in the executive department of state government pertaining to estimated revenues and the proposed executive budget for the next fiscal year or years;
(b) All information relating to the problems, policies, and plans of any department of the executive branch of state government;
(c) The official records of the governor's office.
Source: L. 69: p. 95, § 3. C.R.S. 1963: § 3-29-3. L. 95: IP(1) amended, p. 640, § 30, effective July 1.
Cross references: For the legislative declaration contained in the 1995 act amending the introductory portion to subsection (1), see section 112 of chapter 167, Session Laws of Colorado 1995.
24-8-104. Staff personnel - state employees.
The governor-elect shall be entitled to contract for the assistance and services of persons of his own choosing for the period between the general election and the inauguration, and they shall receive reasonable compensation for their services within the limits of appropriations made under section 24-8-105. Such persons shall not otherwise be classified as state employees, nor shall they be subject to the state personnel system laws during such period. In addition, upon request of the governor-elect, the executive director of any department shall assign an employee of his department to assist the governor-elect and his staff for such time as may be necessary between the general election and the inauguration.
Source: L. 69: p. 95, § 4. C.R.S. 1963: § 3-29-4.
24-8-105. General assembly to make appropriation.
At the regular session in each year in which there is a general election to elect a new governor, the general assembly shall appropriate to the department of personnel a sum of not less than ten thousand dollars to pay the necessary expenses of the governor-elect incurred between the general election and the inauguration, including, but not limited to, office supplies, postage, actual and necessary travel expenses, and compensation of administrative, secretarial, and clerical personnel. Any unexpended balance of such appropriation remaining after the payment of such expenses shall revert to the general fund.
Source: L. 69: p. 96, § 5. C.R.S. 1963: § 3-29-5. L. 95: Entire section amended, p. 640, § 31, effective July 1.
Cross references: For the legislative declaration contained in the 1995 act amending this section, see section 112 of chapter 167, Session Laws of Colorado 1995.
ARTICLE 9
Compensation of State Officers
24-9-101. Salaries of elected state officials - definition - repeal.
24-9-102. Salaries of appointed state officials.
24-9-103. Deputy state officers.
24-9-104. Mileage allowances.
24-9-105. Elected state officials - discretionary funds.
24-9-106. Independent state elected official pay commission - creation - report - definitions.
24-9-101. Salaries of elected state officials - definition - repeal.
(1) The following state officials shall receive annual salaries and allowances, payable monthly, as follows:
(a) Governor:
(I) Repealed.
(II) (A) The salary payable to the governor for each year of the term commencing on the second Tuesday in January 2019 is an amount equal to sixty-six percent of the total annual salary paid to the chief justice of the state supreme court on January 10, 2019.
(B) Before January 1, 2027, each subsequent salary paid under this subsection (1)(a) must be adjusted on a quadrennial basis so that, beginning with the first day of each four-year gubernatorial term, and applying to each year of that term, the governor's annual salary is an amount equal to sixty-six percent of the total annual salary earned by the chief justice of the supreme court on the first day of the governor's term.
(C) This subsection (1)(a)(II) is repealed, effective July 1, 2028.
(III) On or after January 1, 2027, the salary payable to the governor for each year of the four-year term being served is in the amount set by the commission.
(b) Lieutenant governor:
(I) Repealed.
(II) (A) The salary payable to the lieutenant governor for each year of the term commencing on the second Tuesday in January 2019 is an amount equal to fifty-eight percent of the total annual salary paid to the judges of the county court in Class B counties, as defined in section 13-6-201, C.R.S., on January 10, 2019.
(B) Before January 1, 2027, each subsequent salary paid under this subsection (1)(b) must be adjusted on a quadrennial basis so that, beginning with the first day of each four-year term, and applying to each year of that term, the lieutenant governor's annual salary is an amount equal to fifty-eight percent of the total annual salary earned by the judges of the county court in Class B counties on the first day of the lieutenant governor's term.
(C) This subsection (1)(b)(II) is repealed, effective July 1, 2028.
(III) Notwithstanding any provision of this subsection (1)(b) to the contrary, if the lieutenant governor is concurrently serving as the head of a principal department and the salary for the head of that principal department is greater than that to which the lieutenant governor is entitled under this subsection (1)(b), the lieutenant governor shall also be paid that portion of the salary for the head of the principal department that, when added to the amount of the salary paid under this subsection (1)(b), equals the amount paid to the head of that principal department.
(IV) Notwithstanding any provision of this subsection (1)(b) to the contrary, if the lieutenant governor is concurrently serving as the director of the office of saving people money on healthcare within the office of the governor and the salary for the director of the office of saving people money on healthcare is greater than the amount to which the lieutenant governor is entitled under this subsection (1)(b), the lieutenant governor shall also be paid that portion of the salary for the director of the office of saving people money on healthcare that, when added to the amount of the salary paid under this subsection (1)(b), equals the amount paid to the director of the office of saving people money on healthcare.
(V) On or after January 1, 2027, the salary payable to the lieutenant governor for each year of the four-year term being served is in the amount set by the commission.
(c) President of the senate, speaker of the house of representatives, minority leader of the senate, or minority leader of the house of representatives, while for any reason acting as governor:
(I) Before January 1, 2027, the sum of twenty dollars per day as expenses; and
(II) On or after January 1, 2027, the amount set by the commission as expenses.
(d) Attorney general:
(I) Repealed.
(II) (A) The salary payable to the attorney general for each year of the term commencing on the second Tuesday in January 2019 is an amount equal to sixty percent of the total annual salary paid to the chief judge of the court of appeals on January 10, 2019.
(B) Before January 1, 2027, each subsequent salary paid under this subsection (1)(d) must be adjusted on a quadrennial basis so that, beginning with the first day of each four-year term, and applying to each year of that term, the attorney general's annual salary is an amount equal to sixty percent of the total annual salary earned by the chief judge of the court of appeals on the first day of the attorney general's term.
(C) This subsection (1)(d)(II) is repealed, effective July 1, 2028.
(III) On or after January 1, 2027, the salary payable to the attorney general for each year of the four-year term being served is in the amount set by the commission.
(e) Secretary of state:
(I) Repealed.
(II) (A) The salary payable to the secretary of state for each year of the term commencing on the second Tuesday in January 2019 is an amount equal to fifty-eight percent of the total annual salary paid to the judges of the county court in Class B counties, as defined in section 13-6-201, C.R.S., on January 10, 2019.
(B) Before January 1, 2027, each subsequent salary paid under this subsection (1)(e) must be adjusted on a quadrennial basis so that, beginning with the first day of each four-year term, and applying to each year of that term, the secretary of state's annual salary is an amount equal to fifty-eight percent of the total annual salary earned by the judges of the county court in Class B counties on the first day of the secretary of state's term.
(C) This subsection (1)(e)(II) is repealed, effective January 1, 2028.
(III) On or after January 1, 2027, the salary payable to the secretary of state for each year of the four-year term being served is in the amount set by the commission.
(f) State treasurer:
(I) Repealed.
(II) (A) The salary payable to the state treasurer for each year of the term commencing on the second Tuesday in January 2019 is an amount equal to fifty-eight percent of the total annual salary paid to the judges of the county court in Class B counties, as defined in section 13-6-201, C.R.S., on January 10, 2019.
(B) Before January 1, 2027, each subsequent salary paid under this subsection (1)(f) must be adjusted on a quadrennial basis so that, beginning with the first day of each four-year term, and applying to each year of that term, the state treasurer's annual salary is an amount equal to fifty-eight percent of the total annual salary earned by the judges of the county court in Class B counties on the first day of the state treasurer's term.
(C) This subsection (1)(f)(II) is repealed, effective July 1, 2028.
(III) On or after January 1, 2027, the salary payable to the state treasurer for each year of the four-year term being served is in the amount set by the commission.
(2) Any official who assumes his or her position by reason of filling a vacancy shall be paid the same salary as that to which the vacating official was entitled.
(3) Repealed.
(4) Nothing in this section authorizes the salary of any elected state official to be modified during the elected state official's official term.
(5) The director of research of the legislative council appointed pursuant to section 2-3-304 (1), C.R.S., shall post the amount of the current annual salary payable to each elected official pursuant to this section on the website of the general assembly. In addition, the department of each elected official shall publish the amount of the current annual salary payable to the elected official on the website of department.
(6) As used in this section, unless the context otherwise requires, "commission" means the independent state elected official pay commission created in section 24-9-106 (2).
Source: L. 58: p. 236, §§ 1, 2. C.R.S. 53: § 56-1-4. L. 62: pp. 155, 161, §§ 2, 1. C.R.S. 1963: § 56-1-1. L. 65: p. 162, § 13. L. 67: pp. 594, 595, §§ 1, 4. L. 70: p. 189, § 1. L. 74: (1)(e), (1)(f), and (1)(g) amended and (2) R&RE, p. 272, §§ 1, 2, effective July 1. L. 76: (1)(c) amended, p. 305, § 42, effective May 20. L. 78: (1)(a), (1)(c), (1)(d), (1)(e), (1)(f), and (2) amended, p. 392, § 2, effective January 1. L. 80: (1)(a), (1)(c), (1)(d), (1)(e), (1)(f), and (2) amended, p. 577, § 5, effective July 1. L. 85: (1)(a), (1)(b), (1)(d), (1)(e), (1)(f), and (2) amended, p. 801, § 1, effective July 1. L. 97: (1)(a), (1)(b), (1)(d), (1)(e), (1)(f), and (2) amended, p. 1176, § 2, effective May 28. L. 98: (3) added, p. 824, § 35, effective August 5. L. 2011: (1)(b) amended, (HB 11-1155), ch. 90, p. 265, § 3, effective April 6. L. 2015: (1)(a), (1)(b), (1)(d), (1)(e), (1)(f), and (2) amended and (4) and (5) added, (SB 15-288), ch. 270, p. 1056, § 1, effective January 1, 2016. L. 2016: (1)(b)(I) amended, (HB 16-1462), ch. 192, p. 681, § 2, effective May 26. L. 2019: (1)(b)(IV) added, (HB 19-1127), ch. 310, p. 2808, § 2, effective May 28. L. 2024: (1)(a)(II)(B), (1)(b)(II)(B), (1)(b)(III), (1)(b)(IV), (1)(c), (1)(d)(II)(B), (1)(e)(II)(B), (1)(f)(II)(B), and (4) amended and (1)(a)(II)(C), (1)(a)(III), (1)(b)(II)(C), (1)(b)(V), (1)(d)(II)(C), (1)(d)(III), (1)(e)(II)(C), (1)(e)(III), (1)(f)(II)(C), (1)(f)(III), and (6) added, (HB 24-1059), ch. 377, p. 2557, § 5, effective August 7.
Editor's note: (1) Subsection (3)(b) provided for the repeal of subsection (3), effective January 12, 1999. (See L. 98, p. 824.)
(2) Subsections (1)(a)(I)(B), (1)(b)(I)(B), (1)(d)(I)(B), (1)(e)(I)(B), and (1)(f)(I)(B) provided for the repeal of subsections (1)(a)(I), (1)(b)(I), (1)(d)(I), (1)(e)(I), and (1)(f)(I), respectively, effective January 10, 2019. (See L. 2015, p. 1056.)
Cross references: (1) For limitations on increase of salaries for elected officials, see § 11 of article XII, Colo. Const.
(2) For the legislative declaration in HB 24-1059, see section 1 of chapter 377, Session Laws of Colorado 2024.
ANNOTATION
Law reviews. For note, "Colorado's Ombudsman Office", see 45 Den. L.J. 93 (1968).
Annotator's note. Cases decided under former law, prior to 1958, have been included in the annotations to this section.
State treasurer is entitled to the salary fixed at the time of election, not any increase approved by the general assembly after the election but before taking office. Carlile v. Henderson, 17 Colo. 532, 31 P. 117 (1892).
There can be no appropriation for mileage. Mileage or traveling expenses paid to the lieutenant governor would clearly come within the term "compensation", because, unless the state paid it, he would have to pay it himself. Therefore, if an appropriation is intended to cover mileage, it would be an increase in his compensation and unconstitutional. Leckenby v. Post Printing & Publ'g Co., 65 Colo. 443, 176 P. 490 (1918) (decided prior to 1975 enactment of § 24-9-104).
24-9-102. Salaries of appointed state officials.
(1) The following state officials shall receive annual salaries and allowances, payable monthly, as follows:
(a) Deputy secretary of state, an amount set by the secretary of state;
(b) Deputy state treasurer, an amount set by the state treasurer;
(c) Repealed.
(d) Effective July 1, 2005, public utilities commission, each commissioner, an amount as set by the executive director of the department of regulatory agencies based on the most recent available figures contained in the quadrennial total compensation survey conducted by the state personnel director pursuant to section 24-50-104 (4)(a) and subject to review by the state auditor and the general assembly pursuant to section 24-50-104 (4)(b) and (4)(c). The commissioners' salaries shall be set within the range identified in the survey for the category of senior executive service and shall be uniform; except that the chairman may receive a salary that is up to ten percent higher than those of the other two commissioners.
(e) Repealed.
(2) The positions listed in paragraphs (a) to (e) of subsection (1) of this section shall be full-time positions, and the salaries shall be for the full-time services of the persons involved.
(3) (Deleted by amendment, L. 2005, p. 500, § 1, effective May 12, 2005.)
Source: L. 1883: p. 191, § 1. G.S. § 2993. L. 1891: p. 197, § 4. L. 05: p. 156, § 1. L. 07: p. 400, § 1. R.S. 08: §§ 2557, 2558, 2561, 2563. C.L. §§ 7912, 7916, 7918. CSA: C. 66, §§ 52(1a), 52(1b). L. 45: p. 340, § 1. L. 51: p. 389, § 1. L. 53: p. 292, §§ 1, 2. CRS 53: § 56-1-1. L. 55: p. 379, §§ 1, 2. L. 56: p. 142, § 1. L. 58: p. 237, § 2. L. 59: pp. 434, 435, §§ 1, 2. L. 62: pp. 155, 157, 158, §§ 1, 1, 1. L. 63: p. 489, § 1. C.R.S. 1963: § 56-1-3. L. 65: pp. 162, 623, §§ 13, 1. L. 67: pp. 31, 594, 595, §§ 1, 2-4. L. 68: p. 138, § 175. L. 69: pp. 380, 381, §§ 1, 1. L. 71: p. 316, § 21. L. 73: pp. 621, 622, §§ 1, 2, 1. L. 76: (1)(c), (1)(d), (1)(e) and (3) amended, p. 592, § 4, effective July 1. L. 78: (1)(a), (1)(b), (1)(c), (1)(d), (1)(e), and (3) amended, p. 393, § 3, effective July 1. L. 80: (1)(a), (1)(b), (1)(c), (1)(d), (1)(e), and (3) amended, p. 578, § 6, effective July 1. L. 84: (1)(c), (1)(d), (1)(e), and (3) amended, p. 667, § 1, effective May 9; (1)(a), (1)(b), and (3) amended, p. 665, § 1, effective July 1. L. 86: (1)(e) repealed, p. 502, § 125, effective July 1. L. 87: (1)(a), (1)(b), and (3) amended, p. 928, § 1, effective July 1. L. 93: (1)(d) amended, p. 2056, § 1, effective July 1. L. 96: (1)(d) amended, p. 632, § 1, effective May 1. L. 97: (1)(c) repealed, p. 855, § 42, effective May 21. L. 2005: (1)(d) and (3) amended, p. 500, § 1, effective May 12. L. 2022: (1)(d) amended, (HB 22-1337), ch. 133, p. 901, §1, effective April 25.
ANNOTATION
Law reviews. For note, "Colorado's Ombudsman Office", see 45 Den. L.J. 93 (1968).
Statutes relating to the compensation of public officers are strictly construed. Bd. of Comm'rs v. Walker, 66 Colo. 312, 181 P. 195 (1919).
Statutory allowance provision prerequisite before compensation appropriated. A law must be enacted providing for its allowance before the compensation or expenses of state officials can be included in a general appropriation bill. People ex rel. Clement v. Spruance, 8 Colo. 307, 6 P. 831 (1885); Opinion of Judges, 13 Colo. 316, 22 P. 464 (1889); Collier & Cleveland Lithographing Co. v. Henderson, 18 Colo. 259, 32 P. 417 (1893); In re House Bill No. 168, 21 Colo. 46, 39 P. 1096 (1895); Parks v. Comm'rs of Soldiers' & Sailors' Home, 22 Colo. 86, 43 P. 542 (1896); In re Senate Bill No. 196, 23 Colo. 508, 48 P. 540 (1897); Leckenby v. Post Printing & Publ'g Co., 65 Colo. 443, 176 P. 490 (1918).
Distinction between "salary" and "fees" recognized by all authorities is this: "Salary" is fixed compensation for regular work, while "fees" are compensation for particular services rendered at irregular periods, payable at the time services are rendered. Bd. of Comm'rs v. Trowbridge, 42 Colo. 449, 95 P. 554 (1908).
24-9-103. Deputy state officers.
The secretary of state and the state treasurer are hereby authorized to appoint their own deputies.
Source: L. 1891: p. 194, §§ 1-3. R.S. 08: §§ 2559, 2560, 2562. C.L. §§ 7914, 7915, 7917. CSA: C. 66, §§ 53-55. L. 47: p. 460, § 3. CRS 53: § 56-1-3. C.R.S. 1963: § 56-1-4. L. 65: p. 158, § 11.
24-9-104. Mileage allowances.
(1) Repealed.
(2) (a) to (c) Repealed.
(d) On and after January 1, 2008, state officers and employees shall be allowed a mileage allowance for each mile actually and necessarily traveled while on official state business calculated at ninety percent of the prevailing internal revenue service mileage reimbursement rate to the nearest cent, and, when authorized to be utilized and necessary for official state business, ninety-five percent of the prevailing internal revenue service mileage reimbursement rate to the nearest cent for four-wheel-drive vehicles and forty cents per nautical mile for privately owned aircraft.
(e) For purposes of this section, "four-wheel-drive vehicles" means sport utility vehicles and pick-up trucks with a four-wheel-drive transmission system. "Four-wheel-drive vehicles" shall not include standard vehicles with all-wheel-drive capability.
(f) Repealed.
Source: L. 83: Entire section R&RE, p. 858, § 1, effective June 3. L. 88: (1) repealed, p. 1435, § 31, effective June 11. L. 98: (2) amended, p. 896, § 1, effective July 1, 1999. L. 2006: (2) amended, p. 1348, § 2, effective May 31.
Editor's note: (1) Subsection (2)(a)(II) provided for the repeal of subsection (2)(a), effective January 1, 2007. (See L. 2006, p. 1348.)
(2) Subsection (2)(b)(II) provided for the repeal of subsection (2)(b), effective January 1, 2008. (See L. 2006, p. 1348.)
(3) Subsections (2)(c)(II) and (2)(f)(IV) provided for the repeal of subsections (2)(c) and (2)(f), respectively, effective January 1, 2009. (See L. 2006, p. 1348.)
ANNOTATION
District attorney's automotive expenses governed by section. The district attorney's reimbursement for expenses incurred in the operation of automobiles is governed by this section. Johns v. Miller, 42 Colo. App. 97, 594 P.2d 590 (1979).
24-9-105. Elected state officials - discretionary funds.
(1) Beginning with the fiscal year commencing July 1, 1985, and for each fiscal year thereafter, subject to annual appropriation by the general assembly, there is hereby available the following amounts for elected state officials for expenditure in pursuance of official business as each elected official sees fit:
(a) Governor, twenty thousand dollars;
(b) Lieutenant governor, five thousand dollars;
(c) Attorney general, five thousand dollars;
(d) Secretary of state, five thousand dollars;
(e) State treasurer, five thousand dollars.
(2) The appropriations made by paragraphs (a), (b), (c), and (e) of subsection (1) of this section shall be out of any moneys in the general fund not otherwise appropriated, and the appropriation made by paragraph (d) of subsection (1) of this section shall be out of any moneys in the department of state cash fund not otherwise appropriated.
Source: L. 85: Entire section added, p. 801, § 2, effective July 1. L. 93: (1) amended, p. 1515, § 19, effective June 6.
Cross references: For the department of state cash fund, see § 24-21-104 (3)(b).
ANNOTATION
This section falls within the ambit of § 5 of art. XXIX of the state constitution. This section does not give the secretary of state unfettered discretion over the use of the secretary's discretionary funds. This section limits the use of discretionary funds to the "pursuance of official business". Gessler v. Grossman, 2015 COA 62, 488 P.3d 53, aff'd on other grounds sub nom. Gessler v. Smith, 2018 CO 48, 419 P.3d 964.
By using funds from the discretionary account for other than official business, the secretary of state breached the public trust for private gain in violation of this section. Gessler v. Grossman, 2015 COA 62, 488 P.3d 53, aff'd on other grounds sub nom. Gessler v. Smith, 2018 CO 48, 419 P.3d 964.
Secretary of state violated the ethical standard of conduct in this section by accepting reimbursement of the balance of a discretionary account without any documentation or detail of expenses incurred because the reimbursement was not in pursuance of official business. Colo. Ethics Watch v. Gessler, Indep. Ethics Comm'n 12-07.
24-9-106. Independent state elected official pay commission - creation - report - definitions.
(1) As used in this section, unless the context otherwise requires:
(a) "Commission" means the independent state elected official pay commission created in subsection (2) of this section.
(b) "State elected official" means a state officer or a member of the general assembly.
(c) "State officer" means the governor, the lieutenant governor, the attorney general, the secretary of state, or the state treasurer.
(2) The independent state elected official pay commission is created. The commission shall set compensation for state elected officials. The commission shall meet beginning in 2025 and shall meet every four years thereafter.
(3) (a) The commission consists of nine appointed members. Subject to the provisions set forth in subsection (3)(b) of this section, the members are appointed as follows:
(I) The governor shall appoint three members as follows:
(A) One member with expertise in personnel management and human resources;
(B) One member with expertise in agricultural leadership; and
(C) One member with local government experience;
(II) The president of the senate shall appoint two members, one member with expertise in large business and one member with expertise in organized labor;
(III) The speaker of the house shall appoint two members, one member with expertise in small business and one member who is part of a minority chamber of commerce or business leadership organization;
(IV) The minority leader of the senate shall appoint a member who has expertise with salary surveys and total compensation analysis; and
(V) The minority leader of the house of representatives shall appoint a member who has large nonprofit leadership experience.
(b) The appointment of members must be in accordance with the following requirements:
(I) A member must be a registered elector;
(II) A member must not be a current or former state official, a current or former member of the general assembly, the spouse of a current state official or member of the general assembly, or a candidate to be a state elected official;
(III) A member must not be a registered lobbyist or a person who has lobbied as a registered lobbyist in the eight years immediately preceding the appointment date for the member; and
(IV) At any time, no more than four members may be from the same political party and no more than two members may be from the same congressional district of the state.
(c) The president of the senate shall designate one of the members that the president of the senate appoints to serve as the chairperson of the commission and the speaker of the house shall designate one of the members that the speaker of the house appoints to serve as the vice-chairperson of the commission.
(d) (I) The initial commission members shall be appointed on or before July 31, 2025, and shall serve until the submission of the report required by subsection (5)(a) of this section.
(II) Subsequent commission members shall be appointed on or before July 31 of each year in which the commission meets and shall serve until the submission of that commission's report.
(III) Each commission expires upon submission of the commission's report.
(4) (a) The chairperson and vice-chairperson of the initial commission shall convene the first meeting of the commission no later than September 1, 2025, and the commission shall meet as many times as necessary thereafter before submitting the report required by subsection (5)(a) of this section.
(b) After the initial commission expires, the chairperson and vice-chairperson of subsequent commissions shall convene the first meeting of a commission no later than September 1 of each year in which the commission meets, and such commissions shall meet as many times as necessary thereafter before submitting the report required by subsection (5)(a) of this section.
(5) (a) On or before December 15, 2025, the initial commission, and on or before December 15 of each year thereafter in which the commission meets, subsequent commissions shall submit a report to the office of state planning and budgeting created in section 24-37-102, to the joint budget committee of the general assembly, to the president of the senate, to the speaker of the house of representatives, and to the director of research of the legislative council appointed pursuant to section 2-3-304 (1) that sets forth the commission's recommendations for annual salaries and allowances for each state official and for members of the general assembly.
(b) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (5)(c) of this section, the salaries and allowances recommended in the report due on or before December 15, 2025, take effect on January 1, 2027, and the salaries and allowances recommended in subsequent reports take effect on January 1 of the first year of each subsequent four-year gubernatorial term if the general assembly makes an appropriation to pay the recommended salaries and allowances during the legislative session immediately preceding such year.
(c) Before the effective date of the recommended salaries and allowances, the general assembly may modify or reject the recommendations.
(6) (a) Any report submitted by the commission, as required by subsection (5) of this section, must include recommendations regarding:
(I) The amount of the annual base compensation for members of the general assembly as allowed by section 2-2-307 (1)(b);
(II) The amount of additional compensation that members of the general assembly are allowed for necessary attendance at meetings or functions or to legislative matters pursuant to section 2-2-307 (3)(a);
(III) The amount of the annual salaries for state officials allowed pursuant to section 24-9-101; and
(IV) The sum per day allowed as expenses to the president of the senate, speaker of the house of representatives, minority leader of the senate, or minority leader of the house of representatives while for any reason acting as governor pursuant to section 24-9-101 (1)(c).
(b) In making the recommendations required by subsection (6)(a) of this section, the commission shall consider the amount of compensation paid in government service and in the private sector to persons with similar qualifications, the amount of compensation needed to attract and retain experienced and competent persons, and the ability of the state to pay the recommended compensation.
(7) On or after January 1, 2028, but before January 1, 2029, and before January 1 of each year thereafter, except for the year in which the recommendations of a commission take effect pursuant to this section, the director of research of the legislative council appointed pursuant to section 2-3-304 (1) shall adjust the amount of compensation set by the commission in accordance with the percentage change since the immediately preceding January 1, in the United States department of labor, bureau of labor statistics, consumer price index for Denver-Aurora-Lakewood for all items and all urban consumers, or its applicable predecessor or successor index. The director of research shall post the adjusted annual salary amounts on the website of the general assembly.
(8) The annual salary of a state elected official whose term begins on or after the date the salaries go into effect pursuant to subsection (5)(b) of this section or adjusted pursuant to subsection (7) of this section must be as set by the commission, except if modified or rejected by the general assembly and then as set by the general assembly, or as adjusted by the director of research.
(9) (a) The department of personnel created in section 24-50-102 (1) shall provide staff services as necessary to implement this section.
(b) Members of the commission serve without compensation but receive reimbursement for reasonable travel expenses to attend meetings of the commission.
Source: L. 2024: Entire section added, (HB 24-1059), ch. 377, p. 2553, § 3, effective August 7.
Cross references: For the legislative declaration in HB 24-1059, see section 1 of chapter 377, Session Laws of Colorado 2024.
ARTICLE 9.5
Recall of State Officers
24-9.5-101 to 24-9.5-109. (Repealed)
Source: L. 92: Entire article repealed, p. 924, § 198, effective January 1, 1993.
Editor's note: (1) This article was added in 1979. For amendments to this article prior to its repeal in 1993, consult the Colorado statutory research explanatory note and the table itemizing the replacement volumes and supplements to the original volume of C.R.S. 1973 beginning on page vii in the front of this volume.
(2) Provisions relating to recall of state officers are now located in article 12 of title 1.
ARTICLE 10
Governmental Immunity
24-10-101. Short title.
24-10-102. Declaration of policy.
24-10-103. Definitions.
24-10-104. Waiver of sovereign immunity.
24-10-105. Prior waiver of immunity - effect - indirect claims not separate.
24-10-106. Immunity and partial waiver.
24-10-106.1. Immunity and partial waiver - claims against the state - injuries from prescribed fire - on or after January 1, 2012.
24-10-106.3. Immunity and partial waiver - claims for serious bodily injury or death on public school property or at school-sponsored events resulting from incidents of school violence - short title - definitions.
24-10-106.5. Duty of care.
24-10-107. Determination of liability.
24-10-108. Sovereign immunity a bar.
24-10-109. Notice required - contents - to whom given - limitations.
24-10-110. Defense of public employees - payment of judgments or settlements against public employees.
24-10-111. Judgment against public entity or public employee - effect.
24-10-112. Compromise of claims - settlement of actions.
24-10-113. Payment of judgments.
24-10-113.5. Attorney general to notify general assembly.
24-10-114. Limitations on judgments - recommendation to general assembly - authorization of additional payment - lower north fork wildfire claims.
24-10-114.5. Limitation on attorney fees in class action litigation.
24-10-115. Authority for public entities other than the state to obtain insurance.
24-10-115.5. Authority for public entities to pool insurance coverage.
24-10-116. State required to obtain insurance.
24-10-117. Execution and attachment not to issue.
24-10-118. Actions against public employees - requirements and limitations.
24-10-119. Applicability of article to claims under federal law.
24-10-120. Severability.
24-10-101. Short title.
This article shall be known and may be cited as the "Colorado Governmental Immunity Act".
Source: L. 71: p. 1204, § 1. C.R.S. 1963: § 130-11-1.
ANNOTATION
Applied in Kratzenstein v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 674 P.2d 1009 (Colo. App. 1983).
24-10-102. Declaration of policy.
It is recognized by the general assembly that the doctrine of sovereign immunity, whereunder the state and its political subdivisions are often immune from suit for injury suffered by private persons, is, in some instances, an inequitable doctrine. The general assembly also recognizes that the supreme court has abrogated the doctrine of sovereign immunity effective July 1, 1972, and that thereafter the doctrine shall be recognized only to such extent as may be provided by statute. The general assembly also recognizes that the state and its political subdivisions provide essential public services and functions and that unlimited liability could disrupt or make prohibitively expensive the provision of such essential public services and functions. The general assembly further recognizes that the taxpayers would ultimately bear the fiscal burdens of unlimited liability and that limitations on the liability of public entities and public employees are necessary in order to protect the taxpayers against excessive fiscal burdens. It is also recognized that public employees, whether elected or appointed, should be provided with protection from unlimited liability so that such public employees are not discouraged from providing the services or functions required by the citizens or from exercising the powers authorized or required by law. It is further recognized that the state, its political subdivisions, and the public employees of such public entities, by virtue of the services and functions provided, the powers exercised, and the consequences of unlimited liability to the governmental process, should be liable for their actions and those of their agents only to such an extent and subject to such conditions as are provided by this article. The general assembly also recognizes the desirability of including within one article all the circumstances under which the state, any of its political subdivisions, or the public employees of such public entities may be liable in actions which lie in tort or could lie in tort regardless of whether that may be the type of action or the form of relief chosen by a claimant and that the distinction for liability purposes between governmental and proprietary functions should be abolished.
Source: L. 71: p. 1204, § 1. C.R.S. 1963: § 130-11-2. L. 79: Entire section amended, p. 862, § 1, effective July 1. L. 86: Entire section amended, p. 873, § 1, effective July 1.
ANNOTATION
The denial of compensation is the constitutional result of the doctrine of sovereign immunity. In re Air Crash Disaster at Stapleton, 720 F. Supp. 1465 (D. Colo. 1989).
The Colorado Governmental Immunity Act (CGIA) is constitutional and classifications restricting recovery by various tort victims bear a rational relationship to the legitimate state interests of fiscal certainty. The fact that the state compensation insurance authority and the state compensation insurance fund were covered by the CGIA while private insurers were not was not a denial of equal protection. Simon v. State Compensation Ins. Auth., 903 P.2d 1139 (Colo. App. 1994), rev'd on other grounds, 946 P.2d 1298 (Colo. 1997).
Just compensation clause of constitution creates exception to doctrine of governmental immunity. Srb v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 43 Colo. App. 14, 601 P.2d 1082 (1979).
As does making of legislative contract. The making of a contract pursuant to legislative authority is a waiver by the state of its immunity from suit and of any statutory requirement for the filing of claims. Ace Flying Serv., Inc. v. Colo. Dept. of Agric., 136 Colo. 19, 314 P.2d 278 (1957) (decided under former CRS 53, § 130-2-1).
The CGIA does not apply to claims based on federal civil rights violations. Martinez v. El Paso County, 673 F. Supp. 1030 (D. Colo. 1987).
The CGIA does not apply to claims for prospective relief to prevent future injury. Open Door Ministries v. Lipschuetz, 2016 CO 37M, 373 P.3d 575.
The act therefore did not bar cross-claims for promissory estoppel and a declaratory judgment that a city-issued rooming and boarding permit allowing use of property for transitional housing would remain valid when the entity that had purchased the property filed the cross-claims during a legal proceeding challenging the validity of the permit. Because the permit was still valid when the entity filed the cross-claims, the entity had not yet suffered an injury to which the act applied. Open Door Ministries v. Lipschuetz, 2016 CO 37M, 373 P.3d 575.
The CGIA operates prospectively. Nothing in the CGIA states that it is intended to operate retroactively. Smokebrush Found. v. City of Colo. Springs, 2015 COA 80, 418 P.3d 530, aff'd, 2018 CO 10, 410 P.3d 1236.
Although the CGIA does not operate retroactively, its waiver provisions can be applied to conduct occurring before its enactment. Smokebrush Found. v. City of Colo. Springs, 2018 CO 10, 410 P.3d 1236.
Applying the CGIA's immunity waivers would not be a retroactive application of those waivers if issues are ongoing and continued after the CGIA's enactment. Smokebrush Found. v. City of Colo. Springs, 2018 CO 10, 410 P.3d 1236.
The CGIA governs the circumstances under which a person may maintain a tort action against the state, its political subdivisions, and its employees. Mesa County Valley Sch. Dist. v. Kelsey, 8 P.3d 1200 (Colo. 2000).
No immunity for sister state's activities in this state. Where an injured party is a citizen of this state, injured in this state, and sues in the courts of this state, there is no immunity, by law or as a matter of comity, covering a sister state's activities in this state. Peterson v. State of Texas, 635 P.2d 241 (Colo. App. 1981).
Where a public entity, as plaintiff, asserts injuries caused by one of its employees, it would frustrate the purpose of the CGIA to permit the employee to shield themself with the sovereign immunity meant to protect a public entity and a public employee only when acting as an extension of that entity. Tallman Gulch Metro. v. Natureview Dev., 2017 COA 69, 399 P.3d 792. But see BNC Metro. Dist. 1 v. BNC Metro. Dist. 3, 2025 COA 52, 573 P.3d 129 (rejecting broad rule that CGIA never applies when a public entity sues its own employee and limiting Tallman decision to unique facts presented regarding defendant's conduct).
State statutory provisions control over conflicting city charter. If a city charter establishes a different notice of claim procedure, it conflicts with the state statutory provisions, and when a conflict exists in a matter of both statewide and local concern, the state statute controls. Lipira v. City of Thornton, 41 Colo. App. 401, 585 P.2d 932 (1978).
The CGIA derogates Colorado's common law. Consequently, statute's immunity provisions are to be strictly construed. As a logical corollary, provisions withholding immunity are also to be strictly construed in the interest of compensating victims of governmental negligence. Padilla ex rel. Padilla v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 25 P.3d 1176 (Colo. 2001); Podboy v. Fraternal Order of Police, 94 P.3d 1226 (Colo. App. 2004).
The protections afforded under the CGIA attach on the date the negligence is alleged to have occurred. Muniz v. Garner, 921 F. Supp. 700 (D. Colo. 1996).
Applied in City of Colo. Springs v. Gladin, 198 Colo. 333, 599 P.2d 907 (1979); South of Second Assocs. v. Georgetown, 199 Colo. 394, 609 P.2d 125 (1980); Forrest v. County Comm'rs, 629 P.2d 1105 (Colo. App. 1981); Young v. State, 642 P.2d 18 (Colo. App. 1981); Mucci v. Falcon Sch. Dist. No. 49, 655 P.2d 422 (Colo. App. 1982).
24-10-103. Definitions.
As used in this article 10, unless the context otherwise requires:
(1) "Controlled agricultural burn" means a technique used in farming to clear the land of any existing crop residue, kill weeds and weed seeds, or to reduce fuel buildup and decrease the likelihood of a future fire.
(1.3) "Dangerous condition" means either a physical condition of a facility or the use thereof that constitutes an unreasonable risk to the health or safety of the public, which is known to exist or which in the exercise of reasonable care should have been known to exist and which condition is proximately caused by the negligent act or omission of the public entity or public employee in constructing or maintaining such facility. For the purposes of this subsection (1.3), a dangerous condition should have been known to exist if it is established that the condition had existed for such a period and was of such a nature that, in the exercise of reasonable care, such condition and its dangerous character should have been discovered. A dangerous condition shall not exist solely because the design of any facility is inadequate. The mere existence of wind, water, snow, ice, or temperature shall not, by itself, constitute a dangerous condition.
(1.5) "Health-care practitioner" means a physician, dentist, clinical psychologist, or any other person acting at the direction or under the supervision or control of any such persons.
(2) "Injury" means death, injury to a person, damage to or loss of property, of whatsoever kind, which, if inflicted by a private person, would lie in tort or could lie in tort regardless of whether that may be the type of action or the form of relief chosen by a claimant.
(2.5) "Maintenance" means the act or omission of a public entity or public employee in keeping a facility in the same general state of repair or efficiency as initially constructed or in preserving a facility from decline or failure. "Maintenance" does not include any duty to upgrade, modernize, modify, or improve the design or construction of a facility.
(2.7) "Motor vehicle" means a motor vehicle as defined in section 42-1-102, C.R.S., and a light rail car or engine owned or leased by a public entity.
(3) (a) "Operation" means the act or omission of a public entity or public employee in the exercise and performance of the powers, duties, and functions vested in them by law with respect to the purposes of any public hospital, jail, or public water, gas, sanitation, power, or swimming facility. "Operation" does not include any duty to upgrade, modernize, modify, or improve the design or construction of a facility.
(b) The term "operation" shall not be construed to include:
(I) A failure to exercise or perform any powers, duties, or functions not vested by law in a public entity or employee with respect to the purposes of any public facility set forth in paragraph (a) of this subsection (3);
(II) A negligent or inadequate inspection or a failure to make an inspection of any property, except property owned or leased by the public entity, to determine whether such property constitutes a hazard to the health or safety of the public.
(3.5) "Prescribed fire" means the application of fire in accordance with a written prescription for vegetative fuels and excludes a controlled agricultural burn.
(4) (a) "Public employee" means an officer, employee, servant, or authorized volunteer of the public entity, whether or not compensated, elected, or appointed, but does not include an independent contractor or any person who is sentenced to participate in any type of useful public service. For the purposes of this subsection (4), "authorized volunteer" means a person who performs an act for the benefit of a public entity at the request of and subject to the control of such public entity and includes a qualified volunteer as defined in section 24-33.5-802 (9).
(b) "Public employee" includes any of the following:
(I) Any health-care practitioner employed by a public entity, except for any health-care practitioner who is employed on less than a full-time basis by a public entity and who additionally has an independent or other health-care practice. Any such person employed on less than a full-time basis by a county or a district public health agency and who additionally has an independent or other health-care practice shall maintain the status of a public employee only when such person engages in activities at or for the county or the district public health agency that are within the course and scope of such person's responsibilities as an employee of the county or the district public health agency. For purposes of this subparagraph (I), work performed as an employee of another public entity or of an entity of the United States government shall not be considered to be an independent or other health-care practice.
(II) Any health-care practitioner employed part-time by and holding a clinical faculty appointment at a public entity as to any injury caused by a health-care practitioner-in-training under such health-care practitioner's supervision. Any such person shall maintain the status of a public employee when such person engages in supervisory and educational activities over a health-care practitioner-in-training at a nonpublic entity if said activities are within the course and scope of such person's responsibilities as an employee of a public entity.
(III) Any health-care practitioner-in-training who is duly enrolled and matriculated in an educational program of a public entity and who is working at either a public entity or a nonpublic entity. Any such person shall maintain the status of a public employee when such person engages in professional or educational activities at a nonpublic entity if said activities are within the course and scope of such person's responsibilities as a student or employee of a public entity.
(IV) Any health-care practitioner who is a nurse licensed under part 1 of article 255 of title 12 employed by a public entity. Any such person shall maintain the status of a public employee only when such person engages in activities at or for the public entity that are within the course and scope of such person's responsibilities as an employee of the public entity.
(V) Any health-care practitioner who volunteers services at or on behalf of a public entity, or who volunteers services as a participant in the community maternity services program;
(VI) Any release hearing officer utilized by the department of corrections and the state board of parole pursuant to section 17-2-217 (1), C.R.S. A release hearing officer shall maintain the status of a public employee only when the release hearing officer engages in activities that are within the course and scope of his or her responsibilities as a release hearing officer.
(VII) Any administrative hearing officer utilized by the department of corrections and the state board of parole pursuant to section 17-2-201 (3)(h)(I). An administrative hearing officer shall maintain the status of a public employee only when the administrative hearing officer engages in activities that are within the course and scope of his or her responsibilities as an administrative hearing officer.
(c) Except for persons identified in subsections (4)(b)(II), (4)(b)(III), and (4)(b)(V) of this section, "public employee" shall not include any health-care practitioner or any health-care professional as defined in section 13-64-202 (4) who is employed by the university of Colorado hospital authority unless the practitioner or professional is providing services within the course and scope of the person's responsibilities as an employee or volunteer of the university of Colorado hospital authority in a facility that is either located on the Anschutz medical campus or that is operating under the hospital license issued to the university hospital pursuant to part 1 of article 3 of title 25, including off-campus locations. The "Health Care Availability Act", article 64 of title 13, is applicable to health-care practitioners and health-care professionals employed by the university of Colorado hospital authority that are not immune from liability under section 24-10-118 because of the definition of "public employee" specified in this subsection (4)(c).
(5) "Public entity" means the state, the judicial department of the state, any county, city and county, municipality, school district, special improvement district, and every other kind of district, agency, instrumentality, or political subdivision thereof organized pursuant to law and any separate entity created by intergovernmental contract or cooperation only between or among the state, county, city and county, municipality, school district, special improvement district, and every other kind of district, agency, instrumentality, or political subdivision thereof.
(5.5) "Public sanitation facility" means structures and related apparatus used in the collection, treatment, or disposition of sewage or industrial wastes of a liquid nature that is operated and maintained by a public entity. "Public sanitation facility" does not include: A public water facility; a natural watercourse even if dammed, channelized, or containing storm water runoff, discharge from a storm sewer, or discharge from a sewage treatment plant outfall; a drainage, borrow, or irrigation ditch even if the ditch contains storm water runoff or discharge from storm sewers; a curb and gutter system; or other drainage, flood control, and storm water facilities.
(5.7) "Public water facility" means structures and related apparatus used in the collection, treatment, or distribution of water for domestic and other legal uses that is operated and maintained by a public entity. "Public water facility" does not include: A public sanitation facility; a natural watercourse even if dammed, channelized, or used for transporting domestic water supplies; a drainage, borrow, or irrigation ditch even if dammed, channelized, or containing storm water runoff or discharge; or a curb and gutter system.
(6) "Sidewalk" means that portion of a public roadway between the curb lines or the lateral lines of the traveled portion and the adjacent property lines which is constructed, designed, maintained, and intended for the use of pedestrians.
(7) "State" means the government of the state; every executive department, board, commission, committee, bureau, and office; and every state institution of higher education, whether established by the state constitution or by law, and every governing board thereof. "State" does not include the judicial department, a county, municipality, city and county, school district, special district, or any other kind of district, instrumentality, political subdivision, or public corporation organized pursuant to law.
Source: L. 71: p. 1205, § 1. C.R.S. 1963: § 130-11-3. L. 82: (4) amended, p. 604, § 6, effective July 1. L. 86: (1), (2), and (4) amended, p. 874, § 2, effective July 1. L. 87: (4) amended and (1.5) added, p. 929, § 1, effective June 20. L. 88: (4)(b)(I) amended and (4)(b)(IV) and (4)(b)(V) added, p. 893, § 1, effective March 20. L. 92: (1) and (5) amended and (6) added, p. 1115, § 1, effective July 1. L. 93: (4) amended, p. 571, § 1, effective April 30. L. 2002: (4)(b)(VI) added, p. 490, § 1, effective May 24. L. 2003: (1) and (3)(a) amended and (2.5), (5.5), and (5.7) added, p. 1343, § 2, effective July 1. L. 2004: (4)(b)(V) amended, p. 1200, § 61, effective August 4. L. 2007: (2.7) added, p. 1025, § 1, effective July 1. L. 2008: (4)(b)(VII) added, p. 32, § 1, effective March 13; (4)(b)(I) amended, p. 2051, § 2, effective July 1; (4)(a) amended, p. 610, § 2, effective August 5. L. 2012: (1) amended and (1.3), (3.5), and (7) added, (HB 12-1361), ch. 242, p. 1144, § 1, effective June 4. L. 2013: (5) amended, (HB 13-1294), ch. 313, p. 1644, § 1, effective May 28; (4)(a) amended, (HB 13-1300), ch. 316, p. 1681, § 51, effective August 7. L. 2018: (4)(b)(VII) amended, (HB 18-1375), ch. 274, p. 1705, § 35, effective May 29. L. 2019: IP and (4)(b)(IV) amended, (HB 19-1172), ch. 136, p. 1687, § 125, effective October 1. L. 2020: (4)(b)(IV) amended, (HB 20-1183), ch. 157, p. 701, § 55, effective July 1; (4)(c) added, (HB 20-1330), ch. 230, p. 1118, § 1, effective September 14.
Cross references: (1) For the exclusion of children ordered to participate in a work or community service program from the definition of "public employee", see § 19-2.5-1106 (9).
(2) For the legislative declaration contained in the 2003 act amending subsections (1) and (3)(a) and enacting subsections (2.5), (5.5), and (5.7), see section 1 of chapter 182, Session Laws of Colorado 2003.
ANNOTATION
Law reviews. For article, "Public Liability for Privately Employed Security Personnel", see 16 Colo. Law. 2175 (1987).
To recover under the "dangerous condition" of the Colorado Governmental Immunity Act (CGIA), a plaintiff must show as a threshold jurisdictional matter that the condition upon which the plaintiff bases his tort claim existed because of the government's act or omission in maintaining or constructing the condition rather than the government's design of the condition. Swieckowski v. City of Ft. Collins, 934 P.2d 1380 (Colo. 1997).
Under the CGIA, the "dangerous condition" must be proximately caused by the negligent act or omission of the public entity in constructing or maintaining a public facility. Jaffe v. City & County of Denver, 15 P.3d 806 (Colo. App. 2000).
A public entity constructs a building within the definition of "dangerous condition" even though it hires an independent contractor to perform the work for it. Springer v. City & County of Denver, 13 P.3d 794 (Colo. 2000).
The common meaning of the word "maintain", its legislative history, and Colorado case law support the court of appeals finding that a failure to "maintain" means a failure to keep a facility in the same general state of being, repair, or efficiency as initially constructed. Swieckowski v. City of Ft. Collins, 934 P.2d 1380 (Colo. 1997).
The duties of the public entity, for immunity purposes, to maintain do not include any duty to upgrade, modernize, or improve the design or construction of a facility. Springer v. City & County of Denver, 990 P.2d 1092 (Colo. App. 1999), rev'd on other grounds, 13 P.3d 794 (Colo. 2000).
The word "maintaining" does not include the complete demolition of a public building. The plain meaning of "demolition" is the act or state of demolishing something. "Demolish", in contrast to "maintain", means to pull or tear down (as a building) or to break to pieces or apart usually with force or violence. Demolishing is fundamentally the opposite of maintaining. The wholesale permanent demolition of a building is not included in the plain meaning of "maintain", "maintaining", or "maintenance". Had the legislature so intended, it would have included such language in the definition of "dangerous condition". Smokebrush Found. v. City of Colo. Springs, 2015 COA 80, 418 P.3d 530, aff'd, 2018 CO 10, 410 P.3d 1236.
The duty to maintain does not include any duty to upgrade, modernize, modify, or improve the design or construction of a facility. Lyons v. City of Aurora, 987 P.2d 900 (Colo. App. 1999); Jaffe v. City & County of Denver, 15 P.3d 806 (Colo. App. 2000).
The term "constructing" does not encompass "demolishing". "Constructing" includes a building as originally constructed but also permanent or temporary alterations made during its ensuing lifetime in service to the public. Smokebrush Found. v. City of Colo. Springs, 2015 COA 80, 418 P.3d 530, aff'd, 2018 CO 10, 410 P.3d 1236.
The city's failure to make improvements for the safety of players on its public golf courses did not create a "dangerous condition" on the golf course for purposes of the CGIA. Jaffe v. City & County of Denver, 15 P.3d 806 (Colo. App. 2000).
An inadequate design made in connection with a maintenance repair can be a "dangerous condition". A dangerous condition does not exist solely because the design of any facility is inadequate. But if an inadequate design is made in connection with a maintenance repair, a waiver of sovereign immunity is established. Stickle v. County of Jefferson, 2022 COA 79, 519 P.3d 751, aff'd, 2024 CO 7, 542 P.3d 688.
A "dangerous condition" can include a public entity's failure to warn of a hazardous physical condition in a public building when (1) the dangerous condition is not attributable solely to the inadequate design of the building, and (2) the public entity's duty to warn of a hazard is encompassed within its duty of maintenance. Galef v. Univ. of Colo., 2022 COA 91, 520 P.3d 184.
City is immune from liability for a roadway's abrupt transition at the ditch because the roadway was in the same condition as when it was originally constructed. Because the roadway remained unchanged, the city did not repair the roadway, and is immune from any claims for negligence for allowing this condition to exist. Swieckowski v. City of Ft. Collins, 934 P.2d 1380 (Colo. 1997).
A condition is "dangerous" only if it relates to the physical or structural condition of the facility at issue. King v. U.S., 53 F. Supp. 2d 1056 (D. Colo. 1999).
This section expressly excludes from the definition of "dangerous condition" any danger solely attributable to inadequate design. Swieckowski v. City of Ft. Collins, 934 P.2d 1380 (Colo. 1997); Jaffe v. City & County of Denver, 15 P.3d 806 (Colo. App. 2000).
The condition must be associated with construction or maintenance, not solely design. Padilla ex rel. Padilla v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 25 P.3d 1176 (Colo. 2001).
Mopping a floor of a public university's dormitory is considered maintenance of a public building within subsection (2.5) because it is an act done "in preserving a [dormitory] from decline". Galef v. Univ. of Colo., 2022 COA 91, 520 P.3d 184.
The "dangerous condition" definition does not include the complete demolition of a public facility. Smokebrush Found. v. City of Colo. Springs, 2015 COA 80, 418 P.3d 530, aff'd, 2018 CO 10, 410 P.3d 1236.
To be actionable, the state of the building or use of the building and the resulting injury therefrom must: (1) Have occurred in connection with a negligent act or omission of the governmental entity, not a third party; (2) be associated with "constructing" or "maintaining" the facility; and (3) not be due solely to the facility's design. Padilla ex rel. Padilla v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 25 P.3d 1176 (Colo. 2001); Curtis v. Hyland Hills Park & Rec. Dist., 179 P.3d 81 (Colo. App. 2007).
Absence of someone to regulate the spacing of people in rafts on a water attraction did not constitute a dangerous condition because there was no physical defect in attraction's construction or maintenance. Curtis v. Hyland Hills Park & Rec. Dist., 179 P.3d 81 (Colo. App. 2007).
A "dangerous condition" exists in a public building only if the condition stems from a physical or structural defect in the building. Jenks v. Sullivan, 826 P.2d 825 (Colo. 1992); Seder v. City of Ft. Collins, 987 P.2d 904 (Colo. App. 1999).
Improper placement of stop sign is "dangerous condition". Improper placement of a stop sign is within the statutory definition of a "dangerous condition" for which a city may be held liable. Stephen v. City & County of Denver, 659 P.2d 666 (Colo. 1983).
Private blasting activity adjacent to highway is a "dangerous condition". Belfiore v. Colo. Dept. of Hwys., 847 P.2d 244 (Colo. App. 1993).
Jointer machine used in gunsmithing class was an integral part of the educational facility, a public school building, therefore, a dangerous condition of the jointer is a dangerous condition of the facility for purposes of the "public building" waiver of the CGIA. Longbottom v. State Bd. of Cmty. Colls., 872 P.2d 1253 (Colo. App. 1993).
Phrase "or the use thereof" in definition of "dangerous condition" means the use of a physical condition of a public facility. Thus, the dangerous condition exception to sovereign immunity arises from the physical or structural state of the public building itself or from the use of the physical or structural state of the building, but not from conditions arising as a result of activities conducted within such building. Jenks v. Sullivan, 826 P.2d 825 (Colo. 1992).
The CGIA defines "dangerous condition" as a condition that constitutes an "unreasonable risk to the health or safety of the public". To prove this element in a case involving a damaged road, the plaintiff must prove that the road condition created a chance of injury, damage, or loss that exceeded the bounds of reason. City & County of Denver v. Dennis, 2018 CO 37, 418 P.3d 489.
This standard of proof also applies to whether a sidewalk constitutes a dangerous condition. Maphis v. City of Boulder, 2022 CO 10, 504 P.3d 287.
A public university's failure to warn of an imperceptibly wet, slippery staircase is a negligent act or omission resulting in a dangerous condition proximately causing injury, which satisfies the last prong of the test in Walton v. State, 968 P.2d 636 (Colo. 1998), and waives sovereign immunity. Galef v. Univ. of Colo., 2022 COA 91, 520 P.3d 184.
The term "public" in the definition of "dangerous condition" does not exclude a person in a public building at a city's invitation. It is the immunity created by the CGIA, and not the exceptions thereto, that must be strictly construed. Kittinger v. City of Colo. Springs, 872 P.2d 1265 (Colo. App. 1993).
Failure to modify or improve traffic signals because of increased pedestrian traffic does not create a "dangerous condition". Karr v. City & County of Denver, 677 P.2d 1384 (Colo. App. 1984).
Inadequate road design and lack of adequate traffic warning signs do not constitute "dangerous conditions" for which governmental immunity has been waived. Lafitte v. State Hwy. Dept., 885 P.2d 338 (Colo. App. 1994); Swieckowski v. City of Ft. Collins, 923 P.2d 208 (Colo. App. 1995).
The development of a dangerous condition of a public highway, subsequent to the initial design and construction of the highway creates in the state a duty to return the road to the same general state of being, repair, or efficiency as initially constructed. The duty to maintain requires the state only to rectify degradation not obsolescence. When an injury is caused by a breach of this duty, the CGIA waives the state's immunity in an action to recover therefore. Medina v. State, 35 P.3d 443 (Colo. 2001).
The design of a public roadway will often contribute to injury, but it is only when the dangerous condition is solely attributable to design that the state is immune. Medina v. State, 35 P.3d 443 (Colo. 2001).
The state has a duty to install safety devices only where their installation is necessary to mitigate an increase in risk attributable to a dangerous condition of the road that develops subsequent to the road's initial design and construction. Otherwise, requiring the state to install safety devices to mitigate the risk attributable to a dangerous condition inherent in the design of the road and persisting at the time of the injury would be to mandate that the state reduce the risk of injury below that which existed when the road was initially designed and constructed. Medina v. State, 35 P.3d 443 (Colo. 2001).
Temporary traffic plan in place during upgrade of highway is a new design, so immunity is not waived for plaintiff's injuries resulting from defendants' failure to require or install concrete median barriers during the upgrade, even though the pre-upgrade highway had barriers. In re Estate of Grant, 181 P.3d 1202 (Colo. App. 2008).
Mere accessibility of trash dumpster to the public did not convert it into a public sanitation facility for which the city's immunity has been waived. Delk v. City of Grand Junction, 958 P.2d 532 (Colo. App. 1998).
Dangerous condition not found. Sierra v. City & County of Denver, 730 P.2d 902 (Colo. App. 1986).
"Injury" includes a decrease in the value of property, where such decrease results from government's announcement of intent to take action physically affecting property at some time in the future. City of Lafayette v. Barrack, 847 P.2d 136 (Colo. 1993).
"Injury" includes loss of consortium and gives rise to separate right of recovery. Lee v. Colo. Dept. of Health, 718 P.2d 221 (Colo. 1986).
When commissioner of insurance immune from liability. Attempting to rehabilitate interinsurance exchange and reissuing certificate of authority to do business during the rehabilitation period were discretionary acts, clearly judgmental in nature, and the commissioner was immune from liability. Alias Smith & Jones, Inc. v. Barnes, 695 P.2d 302 (Colo. App. 1984).
Industrial commission protected by sovereign immunity for failure to inspect machinery. The industrial commission is protected by the doctrine of sovereign immunity from any liability for injuries of a laborer which supposedly result from the commission's failure to inspect industrial machinery. Quintano v. Indus. Comm'n, 178 Colo. 131, 495 P.2d 1137 (1972) (decided prior to the 1986 amendment abolishing the industrial commission).
The exclusion of independent contractors from the definition of "public employee" means that an independent contractor cannot, under any circumstances, gain immunity by reason of the CGIA's provisions, not that a public entity has immunity when it constructs a public building through the services of an independent contractor. Springer v. City & County of Denver, 13 P.3d 794 (Colo. 2000).
Employee of private company that contracts with public entity to perform public services is not a "public employee" entitled to immunity under the CGIA; nor is his or her employer. Because employee worked for an independent contractor, employee was not a public employee. Henisse v. First Transit, Inc., 247 P.3d 577 (Colo. 2011).
Private attorney hired by the board of directors of a hospital district is not a "public employee" for purposes of the CGIA. Wilson v. Meyer, 126 P.3d 276 (Colo. App. 2005).
Office of the Colorado state public defender is a "public entity" and its employees are "public employees" for purposes of the CGIA. Wallin v. McCabe, 293 P.3d 81 (Colo. App. 2011).
Defendants cannot be considered employees of the city and county of Denver as a matter of law and are thus not entitled to the CGIA's immunity. The city and county of Denver does not have the right to control defendants' performance as officers of the fraternal order of police (FOP); the complaint did not allege that defendants undertook the challenged action pursuant to their responsibilities as employees of Denver; and the city and county does not have the right to hire, appoint, or dismiss members and officers of the FOP. Podboy v. Fraternal Order of Police, 94 P.3d 1226 (Colo. App. 2004).
Subparagraph (4)(b)(V) does not require that a health care practitioner prove that the practitioner is under the control of a public entity in order to qualify as a "public employee" under the CGIA. Plummer v. Little, 987 P.2d 871 (Colo. App. 1999).
Business entity cannot be a "public employee". The definition includes only natural persons. Safari 300 v. Hamilton Family Enters., 181 P.3d 278 (Colo. App. 2007).
Fraternal order of police (FOP) is not a separate entity created by an intergovernmental contract with the city and county of Denver and is therefore not a "public entity" for purposes of the CGIA. The Denver Municipal Code governs selection and recognition of the bargaining agent elected to represent the Denver sheriff department employees, and, pursuant to the code, the FOP was elected to represent the department employees. However, the code is not a contract between other governmental entities, it does not create the FOP, and it does not confer governmental status upon the FOP. Podboy v. Fraternal Order of Police, 94 P.3d 1226 (Colo. App. 2004).
City housing authority was a "public entity" within the plain and ordinary meaning of the CGIA. Allen v. City of Boulder Hous. Auth., 852 P.2d 1335 (Colo. App. 1993) (decided prior to 1992 amendment to subsection (5)).
The university of Colorado and its governing board are "public entities" under this section. Uberoi v. Univ. of Colo., 713 P.2d 894 (Colo. 1986).
State university a public entity within the meaning of the CGIA. State v. Zahourek, 935 P.2d 74 (Colo. App. 1996).
Three-part balancing test applied to determine that the university of Colorado is characterized as an arm of the state and thus not a person for purposes of sovereign immunity in a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim. The factors considered were that the university serves a state function, the university has a significant lack of autonomy or independence from the state, and that the ultimate potential for state liability exists. Hartman v. Regents of the Univ. of Colo., 22 P.3d 524 (Colo. App. 2000), aff'd on other grounds, 45 P.3d 721 (Colo. 2002).
Denver department of social services is a public entity under this section. Corbin by Corbin v. City & County of Denver, 735 P.2d 214 (Colo. App. 1987).
The judicial department is a public entity, and a third party supervising a father's visitation was an "authorized volunteer" and thus a public employee. Yonker by & through Helstrom v. Thompson, 939 P.2d 530 (Colo. App. 1997).
But the director and supervisors of the Adams county department of social services are not state employees under this section and are not entitled to indemnification from the state when they are sued as a result of their official duties. Norton v. Gilman, 949 P.2d 565 (Colo. 1997).
By placing the term "instrumentality" in the context of other entities that are public in nature, the general assembly has expressed an intent to restrict the definition of that term only to those entities that are governmental in nature. There is no indication that the general assembly intended to expand the scope of the CGIA to include any private person or corporation that entered into some type of agreement with a public entity. Robinson v. Colo. State Lottery Div., 155 P.3d 409 (Colo. App. 2006), aff'd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 179 P.3d 998 (Colo. 2008); Moran v. Standard Ins. Co., 187 P.3d 1162 (Colo. App. 2008).
A private person or corporation that is a licensed sales agent for the state is not an instrumentality. Robinson v. Colo. State Lottery Div., 155 P.3d 409 (Colo. App. 2006), aff'd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 179 P.3d 998 (Colo. 2008).
In analyzing whether an entity is a "public entity", a court should determine whether the entity is governmental in nature. Colo. Special Dists. v. Lyons, 2012 COA 18, 277 P.3d 874.
Trust created to hold union pension fund assets and its board of trustees not "public entities". Trust created by transit union representing regional transportation district (RTD) hourly workers to hold assets of the union's pension plan and pay pension benefits not a public entity. Nor is the board of trustees that administers the pension plan. Walker v. Bd. of Trustees, Reg'l Transp. Dist., 76 F. Supp. 2d 1105 (D. Colo. 1999).
Individual members of board of trustees that administers union's pension plan cannot be considered public employees of RTD in carrying out their duties as fiduciaries of the plan. Walker v. Bd. of Trustees, Reg'l Transp. Dist., 76 F. Supp. 2d 1105 (D. Colo. 1999).
RTD and the board of trustees that administers the union's pension plan have a symbiotic relationship that permits the fair attribution of the board's conduct to the state, however. Because the general assembly created RTD as a political subdivision of the state pursuant to § 39-9-119 (1)(a) and required it to engage in mandatory collective bargaining and because that collective bargaining process created the board of trustees, it is only fair that the state should be held responsible for the board's decisions. Walker v. Bd. of Trustees, Reg'l Transp. Dist., 76 F. Supp. 2d 1105 (D. Colo. 1999).
Self-insurance pool established pursuant to an intergovernmental agreement between special districts is a "public entity". As a separate entity created by intergovernmental cooperation between or among other public entities, the self-insurance pool is a "public entity" under subsection (5). Colo. Special Dists. v. Lyons, 2012 COA 18, 277 P.3d 874.
Third-party nonprofit corporation formed by public entities for the sole purpose of providing services to public entities (namely, self-insurance pools) is also a "public entity" pursuant to subsection (5). Such corporation is a "public entity" under either of two analyses. First, because it is a "public" corporation that is "governmental" in nature and serves as an intermediary to a public entity, it is an "instrumentality" of the public entity and thus a "public entity" under the CGIA. Alternatively, the corporation is a public entity because, like the self-insurance pools to which it provides services, it is a separate entity created by intergovernmental cooperation between or among other public entities. Colo. Special Dists. v. Lyons, 2012 COA 18, 277 P.3d 874.
Private limited liability limited partnership created by municipal housing authority to finance low-income housing properties is an instrumentality of a public entity within the meaning of the CGIA and, therefore, a public entity itself entitled to governmental immunity. Martinez v. CSG Redevelopment Partners LLLP, 2019 COA 91, 469 P.3d 491.
Partnership is an instrumentality of a public entity because the authority manages the partnership and exercises exclusive control over all of its day-to-day operations and because of its public purpose in providing low-income housing. The use of some private funding doesn't negate this public purpose. Martinez v. CSG Redevelopment Partners LLLP, 2019 COA 91, 469 P.3d 491.
A sheriff's office is a "public entity" under subsection (5). Dodge v. Padilla, 2023 COA 67, 537 P.3d 409.
The word "agency" in subsection (5) means a "division or subdivision of government". And "division of government" is defined as (1) a group (2) that does a particular job (3) within a large organization. Dodge v. Padilla, 2023 COA 67, 537 P.3d 409.
A sheriff's office is a "division of government", and therefore an agency under subsection (5), because it comprises the sheriff, undersheriff, deputies, and administrative or support staff that perform the particular job of law enforcement and public safety functions within a county, which is a large organization. Dodge v. Padilla, 2023 COA 67, 537 P.3d 409.
Plain language of the 2003 amendments does not indicate that the general assembly intended legislation addressing the definitions of "public sanitation facility", "public water facility", "maintenance", "operation", and "dangerous condition" to have retroactive effect. Powell v. City of Colo. Springs, 131 P.3d 1129 (Colo. App. 2005), aff'd, 156 P.3d 461 (Colo. 2007); Speight Family P'ship, LLLP v. City of Colo. Springs, 131 P.3d 1136 (Colo. App. 2005), aff'd, 155 P.3d 1099 (Colo. 2007).
1986 amendments to the definition of "dangerous condition" negate the proposition that the general assembly intended to distinguish between designs that are "inadequate" initially and designs which become "inadequate" over a period of time. Willer v. City of Thornton, 817 P.2d 514 (Colo. 1991).
As an exception to CGIA, to establish "dangerous condition", plaintiff was required to show that ice constituted an unreasonable risk to the health or safety of the public, the town knew or should have known of the presence of the ice, and the presence of the ice was caused by the negligent act or omission of the town. Smith v. Town of Snowmass Vill., 919 P.2d 868 (Colo. App. 1996).
Trial court properly found that plaintiff adequately established ice constituted a "dangerous condition" for the purpose of a C.R.C.P. 12(b)(1) motion. Martinez v. Weld County Sch. Dist. RE-1, 60 P.3d 736 (Colo. App. 2002).
The fact that the city had not received prior notice of the precise harm that occurred does not compel the conclusion that it did not have either constructive or actual knowledge of the alleged dangerous condition. Luenberger v. City of Golden, 990 P.2d 1145 (Colo. App. 1999).
Town did not have notice of dangerous condition, preserving the town's immunity under the act where the public works director and finance director, officials authorized to receive complaints, did not know or receive complaints of ice on an unlit landing, when there was no evidence of the length of time the ice had been present or how the ice appeared. Smith v. Town of Snowmass Vill., 919 P.2d 868 (Colo. App. 1996).
While plaintiff may have sufficiently alleged an act of negligence, leaving a disabled and distraught child out of sight and reach in an unstable stroller, plaintiff did not demonstrate a sufficient connection between use of the state of the building and a construction or maintenance facility or omission for which defendant school district is responsible. Plaintiff's theory of the case amounts only to a claim that school district should have upgraded the design of the closet if it wished to use it as a "time out" room for students exhibiting disruptive behavior. As such, plaintiff's complaint lacked sufficient jurisdictional facts to support an immunity waiver under the provision of the CGIA waiving immunity for a dangerous condition of a public facility. Padilla ex rel. Padilla v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 25 P.3d 1176 (Colo. 2001).
Term "operation" must not be construed to include the failure to exercise or perform any powers, duties, or functions not vested by law in a public entity. An urban drainage and flood control district is not vested by law with a responsibility to own or acquire particular property or implement suggested improvements. Nothing in the Urban Drainage and Flood Control Act requires such affirmative action, and the district had no preexisting common law duty to act. Larry H. Miller Corp.-Denver v. Urban Drainage & Flood Control Dist., 64 P.3d 941 (Colo. App. 2003).
Phrase "public water facility" includes a water meter pit. Montoya v. City of Westminster Dept. of Pub. Works, 181 P.3d 1197 (Colo. App. 2008).
General assembly intended the term "public roadway", which is a highway designed for vehicular travel, to include the portion intended for pedestrian use. Colucci v. Town of Vail, 232 P.3d 218 (Colo. App. 2009).
As defined in the CGIA, the term "sidewalk" includes a pedestrian overpass. In construing the term, trial court erred in referring to the definition of "roadway" as it appears in the motor vehicle laws, which definition explicitly excludes sidewalks. Colucci v. Town of Vail, 232 P.3d 218 (Colo. App. 2009).
A roadway that allows the transportation of the general public via public buses qualifies as a "public roadway" for the purpose of defining the term "sidewalk" in the CGIA, even if private vehicles are not permitted on the roadway. Trujillo v. Reg'l Transp. Dist., 2018 COA 182, 434 P.3d 782.
Applied in City of Colo. Springs v. Gladin, 198 Colo. 333, 599 P.2d 907 (1979); Adams County Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. District Court, 199 Colo. 284, 611 P.2d 963 (1980); Jones v. Ne. Durango Water Dist., 622 P.2d 92 (Colo. App. 1980); Mucci v. Falcon Sch. Dist. No. 49, 655 P.2d 422 (Colo. App. 1982); Beacom v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 657 P.2d 440 (Colo. 1983); Moldovan v. State, 829 P.2d 481 (Colo. App. 1991), aff'd, 842 P.2d 230 (Colo. 1992); Martinez v. Weld County Sch. Dist. RE-1, 60 P.3d 736 (Colo. App. 2002); Larry H. Miller Corp.-Denver v. Urban Drainage & Flood Control Dist., 64 P.3d 941 (Colo. App. 2003); Falcon Broadband v. Banning Lewis Ranch, 2018 COA 92, 474 P.3d 1231.
24-10-104. Waiver of sovereign immunity.
Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary, the governing body of a public entity, by resolution, may waive the immunity granted in section 24-10-106 for the types of injuries described in the resolution. Any such waiver may be withdrawn by the governing body by resolution. A resolution adopted pursuant to this section shall apply only to injuries occurring subsequent to the adoption of such resolution.
Source: L. 71: p. 1205, § 1. C.R.S. 1963: § 130-11-4. L. 86: Entire section R&RE, p. 875, § 3, effective July 1.
Cross references: For authorization to procure insurance against liability, see §§ 24-10-115 and 24-14-102.
ANNOTATION
No waiver of eleventh amendment immunity. A state's waiver of its immunity against suit in its own courts does not constitute a waiver of its eleventh amendment immunity against suit in federal court. Verner v. Colo., 533 F. Supp. 1109 (D. Colo. 1982), aff'd, 716 F.2d 1352 (10th Cir. 1983); Griess v. Colo., 624 F. Supp. 450 (D. Colo. 1985), aff'd, 841 F.2d 1042 (10th Cir. 1988).
The type of resolution contemplated by this section is a formal legislative action approved by a majority of the governing body. Pierson v. Black Canyon Aggregates, Inc., 32 P.3d 567 (Colo. App. 2000), rev'd on other grounds, 48 P.3d 1215 (Colo. 2002).
Quasi-judicial immunity not waived. Quasi-judicial immunity of parole board and state were not waived by state's purchase of insurance under statute concerning waiver or nonwaiver of sovereign immunity. State v. Mason, 724 P.2d 1289 (Colo. 1986) (decided under law in effect prior to 1986 repeal and reenactment).
Since the grant of immunity to public entities must be strictly construed, the waiver of that immunity may not be so construed. Kittinger v. City of Colo. Springs, 872 P.2d 1265 (Colo. App. 1993).
Exceptions to waivers of immunity are to be construed narrowly but the waiver provisions themselves are to be construed deferentially in favor of injured persons. Quintana v. City of Westminster, 56 P.3d 1193 (Colo. App. 2002).
Public entity is to be treated like a private entity and may not assert the "honest and reasonable mistake" defense in a negligence action since the board had obtained insurance to cover its liability and therefore had waived the defense of sovereign immunity. Moreland v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 725 P.2d 1 (Colo. App. 1985), rev'd on other grounds, 764 P.2d 812 (Colo. 1988) (decided under law in effect prior to 1986 repeal and reenactment).
Express waiver of immunity bars defense. In claim against police officers and city, city waived immunity by confessing liability if arrestee prevailed on assault and battery claim against the police, regardless of finding of negligence against city, and by stating as affirmative defense that arrestee's recovery was limited by Governmental Immunity Act, even though city incorrectly believed that its self-insurance affected its immunity. Valdez v. City & County of Denver, 764 P.2d 393 (Colo. App. 1988) (decided under law in effect prior to 1986 repeal and reenactment).
State held to have waived sovereign immunity by having insurance policy while Denver department of social services held not to have waived sovereign immunity through self-insurance. Corbin by Corbin v. City & County of Denver, 735 P.2d 214 (Colo. App. 1987) (decided prior to 1986 repeal and reenactment).
When a public entity claims before trial that timely notice was not given to it under the Governmental Immunity Act, the issue must be determined by the court before trial. Capra v. Tucker, 857 P.2d 1346 (Colo. App. 1993).
Claim that lawfully seized vehicle was unlawfully retained, could lie in tort and therefore failure to give required notice pursuant to the Governmental Immunity Act required that the action be dismissed. Denver v. Desert Truck Sales, Inc. 837 P.2d 759 (Colo. 1992).
Waiver of sovereign immunity by virtue of liability insurance coverage does not extend to requirement of notice under § 24-10-109. The notice provision is a condition precedent to the commencement of a negligence action against the city, and no provision in the governmental immunity act alters the requirement of notice where the entity carries liability insurance. Morrison v. City of Aurora, 745 P.2d 1042 (Colo. App. 1987) (decided under law in effect prior to 1986 repeal and reenactment).
Purpose of 1986 amendment to this section was to eliminate the provision that the procurement of liability insurance by a public entity effected a waiver of immunity. Pierson v. Black Canyon Aggregates, Inc., 32 P.3d 567 (Colo. App. 2000), rev'd on other grounds, 48 P.3d 1215 (Colo. 2002).
24-10-105. Prior waiver of immunity - effect - indirect claims not separate.
(1) It is the intent of this article to cover all actions which lie in tort or could lie in tort regardless of whether that may be the type of action or the form of relief chosen by the claimant. No public entity shall be liable for such actions except as provided in this article, and no public employee shall be liable for injuries arising out of an act or omission occurring during the performance of his or her duties and within the scope of his or her employment, unless such act or omission was willful and wanton, except as provided in this article. Nothing in this section shall be construed to allow any action which lies in tort or could lie in tort regardless of whether that may be the type of action or the form of relief chosen by a claimant to be brought against a public employee except in compliance with the requirements of this article.
(2) (a) A reference in this article to an injury, claim, or action that "lies in tort or could lie in tort" shall be construed in all cases to include, in addition to a direct claim or action, a claim or action asserted by way of assignment or subrogation to recover from a public entity or public employee the amount paid on a damages claim or the amount that may become payable on a damages claim because of the occurrence of an injury, as defined in section 24-10-103 (2).
(b) In any case in which an assignee or subrogee asserts an injury governed by this article:
(I) The injury shall not be deemed to be separate from the injury suffered by the assignor or subrogor; and
(II) Pursuant to section 24-10-114 (1.5), the assignment or subrogation concerning the injury shall not be deemed to be a separate occurrence with regard to limitations on judgments.
Source: L. 71: p. 1206, § 1. C.R.S. 1963: § 130-11-5. L. 85, 1st Ex. Sess.: Entire section amended, p. 9, § 4, effective September 27. L. 86: Entire section amended, p. 875, § 4, effective July 1. L. 2006: Entire section amended, p. 455, § 2, effective April 18.
Cross references: For the legislative declaration contained in the 2006 act amending this section, see section 1 of chapter 132, Session Laws of Colorado 2006.
ANNOTATION
Article is intended to define the bounds of public entity liability. Forrest v. County Comm'rs, 629 P.2d 1105 (Colo. App. 1981).
Article protects individual public employees from personal liability for a tort allegedly committed by that employee when acting within the scope of his or her employment. City of Lakewood v. Brace, 919 P.2d 231 (Colo. 1996); Richardson ex rel. Richardson v. Starks, 36 P.3d 168 (Colo. App. 2001).
Plaintiff's claim could lie in tort. City's act of providing specifications and design for the pipe to be used gave rise to a common law tort duty to design the pipe with reasonable care and skill. Accordingly, plaintiff's claim could sound in tort, and its nature was not changed by the existence of the contractual relationship between the parties. Morrison v. City of Aurora, 745 P.2d 1042 (Colo. App. 1987).
The exception for willful and wanton conduct does not apply to the acts of a public entity. Stump v. Gates, 777 F. Supp. 808 (D. Colo. 1991).
The Colorado Governmental Immunity Act (CGIA) does not provide for the waiver of the sovereign immunity of public entities from suit based either on their own willful and wanton acts or omissions, or their employees' willful and wanton acts or omissions. Gray v. Univ. of Colo. Hosp., 2012 COA 113, 284 P.3d 191 (conclusion that a public entity is immune from suit based on its own willful and wanton conduct disavowed in Cisneros v. Elder, 2022 CO 13M, 506 P.3d 828).
A waiver of the sovereign immunity of public entities from suit is not triggered by an allegation of willful and wanton conduct because article 10 of this title does not expressly contain any language creating such a waiver. Gray v. Univ. of Colo. Hosp., 2012 COA 113, 284 P.3d 191 (conclusion that a public entity is immune from suit based on its own willful and wanton conduct disavowed in Cisneros v. Elder, 2022 CO 13M, 506 P.3d 828).
This section operates as a waiver of a public employee's immunity for willful and wanton acts but does not operate as a waiver of a public entity's immunity for such acts. King v. U.S., 53 F. Supp. 2d 1056 (D. Colo. 1999). But see Cisneros v. Elder, 2022 CO 13M, 506 P.3d 828 (rejecting conclusion that a public entity is immune from suit based on its own willful and wanton conduct).
The existence of a special relationship, by itself, does not operate as a waiver of immunity under the CGIA. Rather, such a relationship creates a duty that may subject defendants to liability only if it is first determined that defendant's sovereign immunity is waived for the activity in question. Richardson ex rel. Richardson v. Starks, 36 P.3d 168 (Colo. App. 2001).
Court applied definition of "willful and wanton" found in § 13-21-102 (1)(b). King v. U.S., 53 F. Supp. 2d 1056 (D. Colo. 1999).
To satisfy the willful and wanton exception to the CGIA, a plaintiff must establish not only the elements of a claim for defamation, but also that the defendant's conduct was done heedlessly and recklessly, without regard to the consequences, or rights and safety of others, particularly plaintiff. Drake v. City & County of Denver, 953 F. Supp. 1150 (D. Colo. 1997).
The CGIA does not shield public entities from an award for attorney's fees for the filing of a frivolous claim by such entities. Colo. City Metro. Dist. v. Graber & Son's, Inc., 897 P.2d 874 (Colo. App. 1995).
Where a public entity, as plaintiff, asserts injuries caused by one of its employees, it would frustrate the purpose of the CGIA to permit the employee to shield him- or herself with the sovereign immunity meant to protect a public entity and a public employee only when acting as an extension of that entity. Tallman Gulch Metro. v. Natureview Dev., 2017 COA 69, 399 P.3d 792. But see BNC Metro. Dist. 1 v. BNC Metro. Dist. 3, 2025 COA 52, 573 P.3d 129 (rejecting broad rule that CGIA never applies when a public entity sues its own employee; limiting Tallman decision to unique facts presented regarding defendant's conduct; and holding that allowing individual director defendants being sued by plaintiff metropolitan districts the initial protection of the CGIA's notice requirement does not undermine the purposes of the CGIA).
Article not applicable to contractual statutory breaches. This article is not meant to apply to situations where the action concerns the breach of a contractual statutory duty. Julesburg Sch. Dist. No. RE-1 v. Ebke, 193 Colo. 40, 562 P.2d 419 (1977).
Claims asking for orders for water services cannot lie in tort. They constitute, in effect, a mandamus action. Jones v. Ne. Durango Water Dist., 622 P.2d 92 (Colo. App. 1980).
Defendants did not make alleged defamatory statements within the scope of employment as law enforcement officers employed by the Denver sheriff department and are therefore not immune from liability under the CGIA. Defendants made alleged statements during fraternal order of police (FOP) directors meetings concerning FOP business in their capacity as officers of the FOP, not as employees of the Denver sheriff Department. Podboy v. Fraternal Order of Police, 94 P.3d 1226 (Colo. App. 2004).
Applied in Gray v. City of Manitou Springs, 43 Colo. App. 60, 598 P.2d 527 (1979); State Comp. Ins. Fund v. City of Colo. Springs, 43 Colo. App. 112, 602 P.2d 881 (1979).
24-10-106. Immunity and partial waiver.
(1) A public entity is immune from liability in all claims for injury that lie in tort or could lie in tort regardless of whether that may be the type of action or the form of relief chosen by the claimant except as provided otherwise in this section. Sovereign immunity is waived by a public entity in an action for injuries resulting from:
(a) The operation of a motor vehicle, owned or leased by such public entity, by a public employee while in the course of employment, except emergency vehicles operating within the provisions of section 42-4-108 (2) and (3), C.R.S.;
(b) The operation of any public hospital, correctional facility, as defined in section 17-1-102, C.R.S., or jail by such public entity;
(c) A dangerous condition of any public building;
(d) (I) A dangerous condition of a public highway, road, or street which physically interferes with the movement of traffic on the paved portion, if paved, or on the portion customarily used for travel by motor vehicles, if unpaved, of any public highway, road, street, or sidewalk within the corporate limits of any municipality, or of any highway which is a part of the federal interstate highway system or the federal primary highway system, or of any highway which is a part of the federal secondary highway system, or of any highway which is a part of the state highway system on that portion of such highway, road, street, or sidewalk which was designed and intended for public travel or parking thereon. As used in this section, the phrase "physically interferes with the movement of traffic" shall not include traffic signs, signals, or markings, or the lack thereof. Nothing in this subparagraph (I) shall preclude a particular dangerous accumulation of snow, ice, sand, or gravel from being found to constitute a dangerous condition in the surface of a public roadway when the entity fails to use existing means available to it for removal or mitigation of such accumulation and when the public entity had actual notice through the proper public official responsible for the roadway and had a reasonable time to act.
(II) A dangerous condition caused by the failure to realign a stop sign or yield sign which was turned, without authorization of the public entity, in a manner which reassigned the right-of-way upon intersecting public highways, roads, or streets, or the failure to repair a traffic control signal on which conflicting directions are displayed;
(III) A dangerous condition caused by an accumulation of snow and ice which physically interferes with public access on walks leading to a public building open for public business when a public entity fails to use existing means available to it for removal or mitigation of such accumulation and when the public entity had actual notice of such condition and a reasonable time to act.
(e) A dangerous condition of any public hospital, jail, public facility located in any park or recreation area maintained by a public entity, or public water, gas, sanitation, electrical, power, or swimming facility. Nothing in this paragraph (e) or in paragraph (d) of this subsection (1) shall be construed to prevent a public entity from asserting sovereign immunity for an injury caused by the natural condition of any unimproved property, whether or not such property is located in a park or recreation area or on a highway, road, or street right-of-way.
(f) The operation and maintenance of any public water facility, gas facility, sanitation facility, electrical facility, power facility, or swimming facility by such public entity;
(g) The operation and maintenance of a qualified state capital asset that is the subject of a leveraged leasing agreement pursuant to the provisions of part 10 of article 82 of this title;
(h) Failure to perform an education employment required background check as described in section 13-80-103.9, C.R.S.;
(i) An action brought pursuant to section 13-21-128;
(j) An action brought pursuant to part 12 of article 20 of title 13, whether the conduct alleged occurred before, on, or after January 1, 2022; or
(k) An action brought pursuant to section 24-34-806 (4).
(1.5) (a) The waiver of sovereign immunity created in paragraphs (b) and (e) of subsection (1) of this section does not apply to claimants who have been convicted of a crime and incarcerated in a correctional facility or jail pursuant to such conviction, and such correctional facility or jail shall be immune from liability as set forth in subsection (1) of this section.
(b) The waiver of sovereign immunity created in paragraphs (b) and (e) of subsection (1) of this section does apply to claimants who are incarcerated but not yet convicted of the crime for which such claimants are being incarcerated if such claimants can show injury due to negligence.
(c) The waiver of sovereign immunity created in paragraph (e) of subsection (1) of this section does not apply to any backcountry landing facility located in whole or in part within any park or recreation area maintained by a public entity. For purposes of this paragraph (c), "backcountry landing facility" means any area of land or water that is unpaved, unlighted, and in a primitive condition and is used or intended for the landing and takeoff of aircraft, and includes any land or water appurtenant to such area.
(2) Nothing in this section or in section 24-10-104 shall be construed to constitute a waiver of sovereign immunity where the injury arises from the act, or failure to act, of a public employee where the act is the type of act for which the public employee would be or heretofore has been personally immune from liability.
(3) In addition to the immunity provided in subsection (1) of this section, a public entity shall also have the same immunity as a public employee for any act or failure to act for which a public employee would be or heretofore has been personally immune from liability.
(4) No rule of law imposing absolute or strict liability shall be applied in any action against a public entity or a public employee for an injury resulting from a dangerous condition of, or the operation and maintenance of, a public water facility or public sanitation facility. No liability shall be imposed in any such action unless negligence is proven.
(5) The immunity from liability granted in subsection (1) of this section shall not apply to the university of Colorado hospital authority except for any hospital, clinic, surgery center, department, or other facility owned or operated by the authority that is located on the Anschutz medical campus or that is a facility operating under the hospital license issued to the university hospital pursuant to part 1 of article 3 of title 25, including off-campus locations. The "Health Care Availability Act", article 64 of title 13, is applicable to health-care institutions as defined in section 13-64-202 (3) that are not immune from liability under this section because of this section.
(6) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, nothing in subsections (4) or (5) of this section shall be construed to grant any additional immunity from liability beyond that which is otherwise provided in this article 10.
Source: L. 71: p. 1206, § 1. C.R.S. 1963: § 130-11-6. L. 79: (1)(b) amended, p. 702, § 76, effective June 21. L. 86: IP(1), (1)(b), (1)(d), (1)(e), (1)(f), and (2) amended and (3) added, p. 875, § 5, effective July 1. L. 87: (4) added, p. 931, § 1, effective May 13. L. 92: (1)(d) amended, p. 1116, § 2, effective July 1. L. 94: (1.5) added, p. 2087, § 1, effective July 1; (1)(a) amended, p. 2556, § 53, effective January 1, 1995. L. 2002: (1.5)(c) added, p. 63, § 1, effective March 22. L. 2004: (1)(g) added, p. 1056, § 1, effective May 21. L. 2008: (1)(h) added, p. 2226, § 4, effective June 5. L. 2015: (1)(i) added, (HB 15-1290), ch. 212, p. 776, § 3, effective May 20, 2016. L. 2020: (5) and (6) added, (HB 20-1330), ch. 230, p. 1119, § 2, effective September 14. L. 2021: (1)(i) amended and (1)(j) added, (SB 21-088), ch. 442, p. 2927, § 3, effective January 1, 2022. L. 2024: IP(1), (1)(i), and (1)(j) amended and (1)(k) added, (HB 24-1342), ch. 477, p. 3344, § 2, effective January 1, 2025.
Cross references: For the legislative declaration in SB 21-088, see section 1 of chapter 442, Session Laws of Colorado 2021.
ANNOTATION
I. General Consideration.
III. Subsection (1.5).
IV. Subsection (2).
V. Subsection (3).
VI. Subsection (4).
I. GENERAL CONSIDERATION.
Law reviews. For note, "Prisoners' Rights: Personal Security", see 42 U. Colo. L. Rev. 305 (1970). For article, "1988 Update on Colorado Tort Reform Legislation — Part II", see 17 Colo. Law. 1949 (1988). For article, "The Public Building Exception to Governmental Immunity", see 24 Colo. Law. 1059 (1995). For article, "Health Care Litigation in Colorado: A Survey of Recent Decisions", see 30 Colo. Law. 91 (Aug. 2001).
Constitutionality upheld. Subsection (1)(d) does not violate the equal protection or due process clause of the state or federal constitution nor the prohibition against special legislation contained in § 25 of article V of the state constitution. Bloomer v. Boulder County Bd. of Comm'rs, 799 P.2d 942 (Colo. 1990).
Subsection (1.5) is rationally related to the legitimate state interests of fiscal solvency and provision of essential services while minimizing taxpayer burdens. Davis v. Paolino, 21 P.3d 870 (Colo. App. 2001).
Subsection (1.5)(a) is rationally related to legitimate state interests; therefore, it does not violate the equal protection clause or the due process clause. Sealock v. Colo., 218 F.3d 1205 (10th Cir. 2000).
Immunity strictly construed. The Colorado Governmental Immunity Act (CGIA) is in derogation of the common law, and the legislative grants of immunity must be strictly construed. Stephen v. City & County of Denver, 659 P.2d 666 (Colo. 1983); Bloomer v. Boulder County Bd. of Comm'rs, 799 P.2d 942 (Colo. 1990), overruled in Bertrand v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 873 P.2d 223 (Colo. 1994); City of Aspen v. Meserole, 803 P.2d 950 (Colo. 1990); Jenks v. Sullivan, 826 P.2d 825 (Colo. 1992), overruled in Bertrand v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 873 P.2d 223 (Colo. 1994); Longbottom v. State Bd. of Cmty. Colls., 872 P.2d 1253 (Colo. App. 1993); Kittinger v. City of Colo. Springs, 872 P.2d 1265 (Colo. App. 1993); Walton v. State, 968 P.2d 636 (Colo. 1998); Tunget v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 992 P.2d 650 (Colo. App. 1999); State v. Nieto, 993 P.2d 493 (Colo. 2000); Harris v. Reg'l Transp. Dist., 15 P.3d 782 (Colo. App. 2000).
Because governmental immunity is in derogation of Colorado's common law, the grant of immunity is to be strictly construed, and the waiver is to be liberally or deferentially construed. Springer v. City & County of Denver, 990 P.2d 1092 (Colo. App. 1999), rev'd on other grounds, 13 P.3d 794 (Colo. 2000); Grabler v. Allen, 109 P.3d 1047 (Colo. App. 2005); Awad v. Breeze, 129 P.3d 1039 (Colo. App. 2005); L.J. v. Carricato, 2018 COA 3, 413 P.3d 1280; Lopez v. City of Grand Junction, 2018 COA 97, 488 P.3d 364.
Since grant of immunity to public entities must be strictly construed, waiver of that immunity may not be. Kittinger v. City of Colo. Springs, 872 P.2d 1265 (Colo. App. 1993).
Exceptions to waivers of immunity are to be construed strictly because the ultimate effect of the exceptions is to grant immunity. Corsentino v. Cordova, 4 P.3d 1082 (Colo. 2000).
If review of exceptions to waivers of immunity is based on analysis of legislative intent, those interpretations are still valid under the Corsentino standard. Montoya v. Trinidad State Nursing Home, 109 P.3d 1051 (Colo. App. 2005).
Exceptions to waivers of immunity are to be construed narrowly, but the waiver provisions themselves are to be construed deferentially in favor of injured persons. Quintana v. City of Westminster, 56 P.3d 1193 (Colo. App. 2002).
The issue of sovereign immunity is one of subject matter jurisdiction, and, under C.R.C.P. 12(b)(1), plaintiff has the burden to prove jurisdiction. Hallam v. City of Colo. Springs, 914 P.2d 479 (Colo. App. 1995); Denmark v. State, 954 P.2d 624 (Colo. App. 1997); Padilla v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 1 P.3d 256 (Colo. App. 1999), aff'd, 25 P.3d 1176 (Colo. 2001); Larry H. Miller Corp.-Denver v. Urban Drainage & Flood Control Dist., 64 P.3d 941 (Colo. App. 2003); Grabler v. Allen, 109 P.3d 1047 (Colo. App. 2005); Ferrel v. Colo. Dept. of Corr., 179 P.3d 178 (Colo. App. 2007); Douglas v. City & County of Denver, 203 P.3d 615 (Colo. App. 2008); City of Aspen v. Burlingame Ranch II Condo., 2024 CO 46, 551 P.3d 655.
When the jurisdictional issue involves a factual dispute, reviewing court employs the clearly erroneous standard of review in considering the trial court's findings of jurisdictional fact. If, however, the alleged facts are undisputed and the issue is purely one of law, the appellate court reviews the jurisdictional matter de novo. Springer v. City & County of Denver, 13 P.3d 794 (Colo. 2000); Grabler v. Allen, 109 P.3d 1047 (Colo. App. 2005); Colo. Special Dists. v. Lyons, 2012 COA 18, 277 P.3d 874.
Fact that a question of subject matter jurisdiction under the CGIA is intertwined with the merits of the case does not require a court to treat a C.R.C.P. 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss as a motion for summary judgment under C.R.C.P. 56. Summary judgment standards do not apply when determining issues of immunity. Ferrel v. Colo. Dept. of Corr., 179 P.3d 178 (Colo. App. 2007).
A public entity is not liable for the willful and wanton conduct of its employees unless the conduct falls within one of the waiver provisions of this section. A.B. v. Adams-Arapahoe 28J Sch. Dist., 831 F. Supp. 2d 1226 (D. Colo. 2011).
Under the theory of respondeat superior, a sheriff's office may be liable for the negligent act of its deputy that occurs in the scope of the deputy's employment and when sovereign immunity is waived under subsection (1)(a). Dodge v. Padilla, 2023 COA 67, 537 P.3d 409.
To recover under the "dangerous condition" of the CGIA, plaintiff must show as a threshold jurisdictional matter that the condition upon which the plaintiff bases the tort claim existed because of the government's act or omission in maintaining or constructing the condition rather than the government's design of the condition. Swieckowski v. City of Ft. Collins, 934 P.2d 1380 (Colo. 1997).
Statutory limitation on judgment in § 24-10-114 is not an affirmative defense and is not waived if not presented in the pleadings, at trial, or in a motion for a new trial. City of Colo. Springs v. Gladin, 198 Colo. 333, 599 P.2d 907 (1979).
It was proper for trial court to hold an evidentiary hearing after denial of state's motion to dismiss because the state took a timely interlocutory appeal after the trial court made findings of fact and ruled against dismissal. Walton v. State, 968 P.2d 636 (Colo. 1998).
"Emergency" means an unforeseen combination of circumstances or the resulting state that calls for immediate action or a pressing need. Fogg v. Macaluso, 870 P.2d 525 (Colo. App. 1993), aff'd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 892 P.2d 271 (Colo. 1995).
Whether the state has an obligation to install safety devices on a road depends on whether they are necessary to return the road to its original state of being, repair, or efficiency, as initially constructed. This question of necessity is a factual determination to be made by the trial court. Medina v. State, 35 P.3d 443 (Colo. 2001).
Applied in Gray v. City of Manitou Springs, 43 Colo. App. 60, 598 P.2d 527 (1979).
II. SUBSECTION (1).
A. Paragraph (a).
B. Paragraph (b).
C. Paragraph (c).
D. Paragraph (d).
1. Subparagraph (I).
2. Subparagraph (II).
3. Subparagraph (III).
E. Paragraph (e).
F. Paragraph (f).
For immunity to be waived under the CGIA, plaintiff's alleged injury must be directly related to the purpose of the public institution, as distinct from its operation. Awad v. Breeze, 129 P.3d 1039 (Colo. App. 2005).
No waiver of eleventh amendment immunity. State's waiver of its immunity against suit in its own courts does not constitute a waiver of its eleventh amendment immunity against suit in federal court. Verner v. Colo., 533 F. Supp. 1109 (D. Colo. 1982), aff'd, 716 F.2d 1352 (10th Cir. 1983); Griess v. Colo., 624 F. Supp. 450 (D. Colo. 1985), aff'd, 841 F.2d 1042 (10th Cir. 1988).
The various waivers of immunity in subsection (1) are not mutually exclusive. Therefore, the court of appeals erred in concluding that consideration of one possible ground for waiver of immunity, the "icy walkway waiver" in subsection (1)(d)(III), precluded consideration of another possible ground for immunity. Young v. Brighton Sch. Dist. 27J, 2014 CO 32, 325 P.3d 571.
Conduct wrongful under § 1983 cannot be immunized. Conduct by persons acting under color of state law that is wrongful under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 cannot be immunized by state law. Mucci v. Falcon Sch. Dist. No. 49, 655 P.2d 422 (Colo. App. 1982).
County is a "public entity" entitled to sovereign immunity. Am. Emp'rs Ins. Co. v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 547 F.2d 511 (10th Cir. 1976).
Charter schools established pursuant to the Charter Schools Act are public entities and, thus, absent a CGIA immunity exception, entitled to immunity from liability in claims that lie in tort or could lie in tort. King v. U.S., 53 F. Supp. 2d 1056 (D. Colo. 1999).
A charter school's unique characteristics, including its ability to contract for services, prepare its own budget, and handle its own personnel matters, does not render it a private entity. King v. U.S., 53 F. Supp. 2d 1056 (D. Colo. 1999).
Teacher and student advisor of a charter school is a public employee pursuant to this act and, as a result, is entitled to immunity. King v. U.S., 53 F. Supp. 2d 1056 (D. Colo. 1999).
CGIA does not waive immunity of a public entity from suit based on either its own willful and wanton acts or omissions or those of the entity's employees. Claim against city for vicarious liability based on employee's alleged willful and wanton conduct is barred. L.J. v. Carricato, 2018 COA 3, 413 P.3d 1280.
Police officers have qualified immunity when dealing with stranded motorist and could not be held liable for subsequent assault suffered by the motorist in the absence of conduct that was willful, malicious, or intended harm. Whitcomb v. City & County of Denver, 731 P.2d 749 (Colo. App. 1986).
A public entity and its employees are immune from tort liability if the employee is operating a police vehicle while in actual pursuit of a suspected violator of title 42, even if the employee is not using the vehicle's emergency lights or sirens, if the pursuit is made to obtain verification of or evidence of the guilt of the suspected violator. Tidwell v. City & County of Denver, 62 P.3d 1020 (Colo. App. 2002), rev'd on other grounds, 83 P.3d 75 (Colo. 2003).
The possibility that an officer's failure to use emergency lights or a siren until the final five to ten seconds of a pursuit could have contributed to an accident with another motorist is a waiver of governmental immunity under subsection (1)(a) for the officer and the town that employed the officer. Giron v. Hice, 2025 COA 17, 568 P.3d 20.
No waiver of immunity under subsection (1)(a) where injuries did not arise from operation of police vehicle but rather arose from conduct of police officer inside the vehicle. Valanzuela v. Snider, 889 F. Supp. 1409 (D. Colo. 1995).
Sovereign immunity not waived for a tort claim asserted by a mineral estate owner that publishing of unauthorized and erroneous report about coal content of owner's land diminished the land's value. City of Northglenn v. Grynberg, 846 P.2d 175 (Colo. 1993).
None of the exceptions to immunity listed in the CGIA either explicitly or implicitly waive sovereign immunity for negligence of the Colorado department of public health and environment in issuing a point source discharge permit. Aztec Minerals Corp. v. Romer, 940 P.2d 1025 (Colo. App. 1996).
Sovereign immunity not waived for bad-faith denials of no-fault auto insurance benefits. Lopez v. Reg'l Transp. Dist., 899 P.2d 254 (Colo. App. 1994).
None of the waiver provisions listed in this section waive sovereign immunity for elementary school principal's alleged negligence in failing to protect children in her custody from the negligence of third parties; therefore, trial court erred in failing to dismiss plaintiff's claims to the extent that the court relied on waiver of sovereign immunity. Richardson v. Starks, 36 P.3d 168 (Colo. App. 2001).
Amounts contracted to be paid are not "claims" within the meaning of this section. Ace Flying Serv., Inc. v. Colo. Dept. of Agric., 136 Colo. 19, 314 P.2d 278 (1957) (decided under former CRS 53, 130-2-1).
Claims arising under just compensation or due process clauses of the Colorado Constitution are not subject to the CGIA. Because the purpose of the just compensation and due process clauses is to provide a remedy for injury to private property inflicted by the government, claims arising under such clauses cannot be barred by governmental immunity. Desert Truck Sales, Inc. v. City of Denver, 821 P.2d 860 (Colo. App. 1991).
CGIA bars a claim for replevin of property that was rightfully obtained but allegedly wrongfully detained. The claim lies or could lie in tort. The CGIA bars tort claims and there is no waiver for an action in replevin for property to obtain possession of property validly seized by a public entity's police power. Woo v. El Paso County Sheriff's Office, 2020 COA 134, 490 P.3d 884, aff'd, 2022 CO 56, 528 P.3d 899.
Applying the CGIA to replevin claim does not violate plaintiff's due process rights because he had a meaningful post-seizure remedy in a related criminal case. Woo v. El Paso County Sheriff's Office, 2020 COA 134, 490 P.3d 884, aff'd, 2022 CO 56, 528 P.3d 899.
A claim for overtime pay under the Fair Labor Standards Act is not a tort claim and thus not a claim within the meaning of this section. Hartman v. Regents of the Univ. of Colo., 22 P.3d 524 (Colo. App. 2000), aff'd on other grounds, 45 P.3d 721 (Colo. 2002).
Wrongful discharge claim brought by county employees against county commissioners was barred by the CGIA; however, claim for breach of employment contract was stated by allegations that published personnel policies and procedures established an employment agreement and employees' discharge violated that agreement. Koch v. Bd. of Co. Comm'rs of Costilla Co., 774 F. Supp. 1275 (D. Colo. 1991).
Although plaintiff's claimed injury is technically discrimination under the Colorado fair housing act, the discrimination occurred exclusively due to sexual assault--an injury that undoubtedly gives rise to claims that "could lie in tort". Thus, this section compels dismissal of the claim. Trujillo v. Amity Plaza, LLC, 714 F. Supp. 3d 1302 (D. Colo. 2024).
Claim of bad faith breach of insurance contract against city is a tort and, therefore, is barred by sovereign immunity. Jordan v. City of Aurora, 876 P.2d 38 (Colo. App. 1993); Colo. Special Dists. v. Lyons, 2012 COA 18, 277 P.3d 874.
Claims against city for equitable estoppel and misrepresentation "sound in tort" and are barred under the doctrine of sovereign immunity. Olsen & Brown v. City of Englewood, 867 P.2d 96 (Colo. App. 1993).
Claim for equitable estoppel properly dismissed by trial court because such claims are deemed to be tort claims for purposes of the CGIA. Allen Homesite Group v. Colo. Water Quality Control Comm'n, 19 P.3d 32 (Colo. App. 2000); Giuliani v. Jefferson County Bd. of County Comm'rs, 2012 COA 190, 303 P.3d 131.
CGIA bars claim for damages resulting from city's delay in issuing a certificate of occupancy. Because a building permit is not a contract that promises or impliedly promises subsequent issuance of certificate of occupancy, the claim could only lie in tort. Patzer v. City of Loveland, 80 P.3d 908 (Colo. App. 2003).
Alleged flaws at intersection are all related to claimed inadequacies in design of intersection and are specifically excluded from type of claims that subsection (1) authorizes to be asserted. Szymanski v. State Dept. of Hwys., 776 P.2d 1124 (Colo. App. 1989).
Action against city for interference with performance of contract lies in tort and, therefore, is barred. Grimm Constr. v. Bd. of Water Comm'rs, 835 P.2d 599 (Colo. App. 1992).
A retaliatory discharge claim is a common-law tort claim. Although a statutory claim such as the one created by the "whistleblower" statute may be excepted, other claims of wrongful discharge are barred under the general rule of immunity stated in subsection (1). Holland v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 883 P.2d 500 (Colo. App. 1994).
Governmental immunity prevented an estoppel claim where the claim was actually based on misrepresentation and could lie in tort. The court did not determine, however, that all estoppel claims could lie in tort. Lehman v. City of Louisville, 857 P.2d 455 (Colo. App. 1992).
CGIA bars a civil conspiracy claim against a metropolitan district because such a claim is undeniably a tort claim but does not bar unjust enrichment and promissory estoppel claims when the source of both claims is a contract, invalidated for other legal reasons, that makes promises that the plaintiff seeks to enforce. Falcon Broadband v. Banning Lewis Ranch, 2018 COA 92, 474 P.3d 1231.
Action for reinstatement and back pay under the anti-discrimination provisions of the Colorado civil rights act is not an action seeking compensatory damages for personal injuries and, therefore, neither lies in tort nor could lie in tort for purposes of the CGIA. City of Colo. Springs v. Conners, 993 P.2d 1167 (Colo. 2000).
Action by health maintenance organization against department of health care policy and financing was grounded in contract law and, consequently, not barred by sovereign immunity. Parties were bound by three contracts, and health maintenance organization provided overwhelming evidence at trial that department had breached contracts by failing to calculate capitation rates in accordance with the language of the contracts and governing Medicaid payment rates. Further, trial court expressly found that liability arose from the contracts executed between the department and the health maintenance organization. Rocky Mtn. Health Maint. Org., Inc. v. Colo. Dept. of Health Care Policy & Fin., 54 P.3d 913 (Colo. App. 2001).
Public entity not immune from liability if claim is for breach of obligation arising from terms of contract. Elliott v. Colo. Dept. of Corr., 865 P.2d 859 (Colo. App. 1993); Adams ex rel. Adams v. City of Westminster, 140 P.3d 8 (Colo. App. 2005).
Private contractual right may exist against state agency regarding life insurance policy, based on statutory scheme and purpose for providing life insurance and the statutory requirement that notice of discontinuance be furnished. Elliott v. Colo. Dept. of Corr., 865 P.2d 859 (Colo. App. 1993).
CGIA does not bar an action for damages for mental suffering since such an action does not lie in tort but arises as a result of breach of contract. Hoffsetz v. Jefferson Cty. Sch. Dist. R-1, 757 P.2d 155 (Colo. App. 1988).
Seeking reimbursement only for personal injury protection benefits paid pursuant to contract with insured is not a claim in tort nor could it lie in tort, and it is not barred by the CGIA. GEICO Gen. Ins. Co. v. Pinnacol Assurance, 56 P.3d 1218 (Colo. App. 2002).
Claim of promissory estoppel properly lies in contract and is not barred by the CGIA. Where plaintiff relied on a promise of employment made by the board of county commissioners, her claim was properly for promissory estoppel, not equitable estoppel, and, therefore, was not barred. Bd. of County Comm'rs v. DeLozier, 917 P.2d 714 (Colo. 1996).
Claims for quantum meruit, rescission, restitution, and injunctive relief that arise from the parties' contract are not claims that lie or could lie in tort and, therefore, are not barred by the CGIA. CAMAS Colo., Inc. v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 36 P.3d 135 (Colo. App. 2001).
The CGIA does not necessarily bar equitable or declaratory relief. Canal company's claims against a municipality for relief regarding an easement fell entirely under property law; the claims neither depended upon liability for tortious conduct nor sought compensation for an injury caused by a breach of tort duty. Upper Platte & Beaver Canal v. Riv. Com., 250 P.3d 711 (Colo. App. 2010).
Sovereign immunity can be waived for claims seeking equitable, remedial, and noncompensatory relief. L.J. v. Carricato, 2018 COA 3, 413 P.3d 1280.
No relief could properly be obtained where claims were predicated upon tort allegations, and none of the exceptions set forth in this section apply. Bd. of Soc. Servs. v. Dept. of Soc. Servs., 902 P.2d 407 (Colo. App. 1994).
Claims asking for orders for water services cannot lie in tort. They constitute in effect a mandamus action. Jones v. Ne. Durango Water Dist., 622 P.2d 92 (Colo. App. 1980).
Public duty rule cannot be used to avoid liability where special relationship exists between public entity and plaintiff. Leake v. Cain, 720 P.2d 152 (Colo. 1986).
Special relationship rule applies when a person should reasonably foresee that his act, or failure to act, will involve unreasonable risk of harm to another; then there is a duty to avoid that harm. There is, however, no duty to prevent a third person from harming another absent a special relation between the actor and the wrongdoer or between the actor and the victim. Leake v. Cain, 720 P.2d 152 (Colo. 1986); Whitcomb v. City & County of Denver, 731 P.2d 749 (Colo. App. 1986).
For purposes of the special relationship rule, police officers do not act affirmatively until they act in some way that induces reliance on a promise, expressed or implied, that they will assist or protect the victim. Whitcomb v. City & County of Denver, 731 P.2d 749 (Colo. App. 1986).
Police officers did not voluntarily assume any duty to stranded motorist where they determined that there was no real emergency or hazard and offered to call a tow truck but took no further action and, thus, could not be held liable under the special relationship rule for subsequent assault suffered by motorist. Whitcomb v. City & County of Denver, 731 P.2d 749 (Colo. App. 1986).
Police officer's actions did not fall within one of the six limited areas for which immunity has been waived where officer failed to offer motorist a ride home following a traffic stop in which the officer ordered the driver not to drive and the motorist was subsequently assaulted. Jarvis by and through Jarvis v. Deyoe, 892 P.2d 398 (Colo. App. 1994).
Existence of a special relationship, by itself, does not operate as a waiver of immunity under the CGIA. Rather, such relationship creates a duty that may subject defendants to liability only if it is first determined that defendant's sovereign immunity is waived for the activity in question. Richardson v. Starks, 36 P.3d 168 (Colo. App. 2001).
Sovereign immunity is waived for claims brought under a statutory scheme if the scheme fits within one of the specific waiver exemptions. L.J. v. Carricato, 2018 COA 3, 413 P.3d 1280.
Whether a statutory claim lies in tort or could lie in tort depends on the factual basis underlying the claim, the nature of the injury, whether the injury arises out of conduct that is tortious or from a breach of duty recognized in tort, and whether the relief seeks to compensate the plaintiff for that injury. L.J. v. Carricato, 2018 COA 3, 413 P.3d 1280.
Enforcement actions under the solid waste act do not lie in tort because they are public actions that do not seek to compensate the state for personal injuries or specific property damage. Bd. of County Comm'rs v. Dept. of Pub. Health, 2020 COA 50, 490 P.3d 695, aff'd, 2021 CO 43, 488 P.3d 1065.
Child Protection Act of 1987 (CPA) claim against city is barred. The CGIA controls on issues of public entity immunity because the CPA does not discuss public entities. The CPA claims do not fit within any of the statutory waiver provisions, and the civil liability allowed by the CPA is rooted in tort principles, therefore, immunity of public entities is not waived. L.J. v. Carricato, 2018 COA 3, 413 P.3d 1280.
Private limited liability limited partnership created by municipal housing authority to finance low-income housing properties is an instrumentality of a public entity within the meaning of the CGIA and, therefore, a public entity itself entitled to governmental immunity under subsection (1). Martinez v. CSG Redevelopment Partners LLLP, 2019 COA 91, 469 P.3d 491.
Partnership is an instrumentality of a public entity because the authority manages the partnership and exercises exclusive control over all of its day-to-day operations and because of its public purpose in providing low-income housing. The use of some private funding doesn't negate this public purpose. Martinez v. CSG Redevelopment Partners LLLP, 2019 COA 91, 469 P.3d 491.
Remedies under the Colorado anti-discrimination act, including front pay and compensatory damages for a retaliation claim, do not sound in tort and are not barred by the CGIA. The remedies do not relieve tort-like personal injuries and are incidental to the Act's primary purpose of ending discriminatory employment practices. Williams v. Elder, 2019 COA 172, 479 P.3d 43, aff'd, 2020 CO 88, 477 P.3d 694.
A. Paragraph (a).
The definition of "motor vehicle" in this section and "mobile machinery" in § 42-1-102 (93.5) are mutually exclusive. Henderson v. City & County of Denver, 2012 COA 152, 300 P.3d 977.
The definitions of motor vehicle and mobile machinery each combine two factors: design and use. A motor vehicle is primarily designed to travel on public highways and is generally and commonly used to transport persons and property over those highways. Mobile machinery is not primarily designed to transport persons or cargo over the public highways and is commonly used in the maintenance of roadways. Henderson v. City & County of Denver, 2012 COA 152, 300 P.3d 977.
Motor vehicle does not include a street sweeper for purposes of this section. A street sweeper fits under the definition of "special mobile machinery" as defined in § 42-1-102 (93.5). Henderson v. City & County of Denver, 2012 COA 152, 300 P.3d 977.
"Operation of a motor vehicle", as used in subsection (1)(a), includes the stops such vehicles ordinarily make. Negligently stopping to discharge a passenger at an improper place is part of the "operation" of a bus for which immunity has been waived under this section. Johnson v. Reg'l Transp. Dist., 916 P.2d 619 (Colo. App. 1995).
Providing adequate security is not necessary for bus driver to operate the vehicle, and sovereign immunity is not waived where passenger was attacked by other passengers. Statutory waivers of immunity are to be interpreted narrowly. Stockwell v. Reg'l Trans. Dist., 946 P.2d 542 (Colo. App. 1997); Robinson v. Ignacio Sch. Dist., 2014 COA 45, 328 P.3d 297.
By limiting waiver of immunity in this section only to acts or omissions of public employee, the general assembly did not intend to extend the waiver to any act or omission of the public entity itself. Stockwell v. Reg'l Trans. Dist., 946 P.2d 542 (Colo. App. 1997).
A bus that is incapable of being operated on streets or highways does not fit within the term "motor vehicle". DiPaolo v. Boulder Valley Sch. Dist., 902 P.2d 439 (Colo. App. 1995).
Motor vehicle does not include a back hoe for purposes of this section. A back hoe is more in the nature of mobile machinery as defined in § 42-1-102 (43). Bain v. Town of Avon, 820 P.2d 1133 (Colo. 1991).
Sovereign immunity not waived for negligent operation of vehicles properly adapted and functioning as snowplows in maintenance of roadways at time of accident. Williams v. State Dept. of Hwys., 874 P.2d 465 (Colo. App. 1993).
Dump truck with attached snowplow blade is a motor vehicle for purposes of this section. Williams v. Dept. of Hwys., 879 P.2d 490 (Colo. App. 1994); Herrera v. City & County of Denver, 221 P.3d 423 (Colo. App. 2009).
A snowplow is a motor vehicle for purposes of this section and therefore falls within the waiver of immunity under subsection (1)(a). Roper v. Carneal, 2015 COA 13, 411 P.3d 889.
Focus must be on design and use of vehicle at time of accident to determine whether sovereign immunity is waived. Williams v. State Dept. of Hwys., 874 P.2d 465 (Colo. App. 1993).
Because snowplow operated by defendant filled a cattle guard with snow and dirt and allowed horses to escape from their enclosure, which resulted in plaintiff's injuries, trial court erred in determining that subsection (1)(a) was inapplicable and that subsection (1)(d) was the exclusive provision under which defendants' immunity could be waived. Kallage v. Alvidrez, 969 P.2d 743 (Colo. App. 1998).
Road grader operating on highway was a "motor vehicle" within the motor vehicle exception to the CGIA. For purposes of this act, "motor vehicle" includes any "vehicle on wheels having its own motor and not running on rails or tracks, for use on streets or highways". Bertrand v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 873 P.2d 223 (Colo. 1994); Kallage v. Alvidrez, 969 P.2d 743 (Colo. App. 1998).
The term "motor vehicle" includes the combination of a public entity's trailer attached to a borrowed motor vehicle, driven by public entity's agent for public entity's purposes and at public entity's request, for purposes of the CGIA. Grabler v. Allen, 109 P.3d 1047 (Colo. App. 2005).
Absent the right to possession, control, and use of an employee's vehicle, the payment of mileage reimbursement does not create a lease of the vehicle for purposes of subsection (1)(a). Ceja v. Lemire, 143 P.3d 1093 (Colo. App. 2006), aff'd on other grounds, 154 P.3d 1064 (Colo. 2007).
Payment of mileage reimbursement did not create a lease of the county employee vehicle for purposes of the CGIA, thus barring the plaintiff's claim against the county. Ceja v. Lemire, 143 P.3d 1093 (Colo. App. 2006), aff'd on other grounds, 154 P.3d 1064 (Colo. 2007).
County employee who caused an automobile accident while using his personal vehicle and acting in the course and scope of his employment was immune from liability under the CGIA. The language in § 24-10-118 (2)(a) that waives immunity under "the circumstances specified in section 24-10-106 (1)" refers not only to the act of operating a motor vehicle but also to the ownership status of the vehicle. The motor vehicle must be "owned or leased" by the public entity. Section 24-10-118 definitively expresses the intent to grant immunity to negligent employees of immune governmental entities. Ceja v. Lemire, 143 P.3d 1093 (Colo. App. 2006), aff'd, 154 P.3d 1064 (Colo. 2007).
The specific reference to § 42-4-108 (2) and (3) in subsection (1)(a) grants immunity under the CGIA to a public entity when the vehicle controlled by a public entity operates as an emergency vehicle. According to § 42-4-108 (2) and (3), this is the case when the vehicle is responding to an emergency call, or when it is in pursuit of an actual or suspected violator of the law, or when it is responding to, but not returning from, a fire alarm. The vehicle must also make use of its audible and visual signals at the time of responding. City of Grand Junction v. Sisneros, 957 P.2d 1026 (Colo. 1998).
The fact that an emergency vehicle driver has stopped at a red light before entering an intersection does not, without more, satisfy the exemption from the waiver of sovereign immunity for an emergency vehicle operating within the provisions of § 42-4-108 (2) and (3). The court must also determine whether the driver was proceeding safely after entering the intersection and while driving through it. Bilderback v. McNabb, 2020 COA 133, 474 P.3d 247.
"Pursuit" defined as a chasing with haste or the act of chasing to overtake or apprehend. Court looked to the dictionary definition of the term "pursuit" to ascertain its plain meaning. Tidwell v. City & County of Denver, 62 P.3d 1020 (Colo. App. 2002), rev'd on other grounds, 83 P.3d 75 (Colo. 2003).
The term "emergency vehicle" includes police car. Zapp v. Kukuris, 847 P.2d 150 (Colo. App. 1992).
Police car is an emergency vehicle for purposes of this section. Fogg v. Macaluso, 870 P.2d 525 (Colo. App. 1993).
Under the emergency vehicle exception provided for by subsection (1)(a) of this section and § 42-4-108 (2)(c), a trial court must find that a police officer who exceeded the speed limit in pursuit of a fleeing crime suspect did not endanger life or property before granting immunity from a lawsuit resulting from a pursuit-related traffic accident. Case remanded where the trial court dismissed the lawsuit for lack of subject matter jurisdiction based on sovereign immunity without making such a finding. Quintana v. City of Westminster, 8 P.3d 527 (Colo. App. 2000).
A public entity does not have immunity if an operator of an emergency vehicle speeds and endangers life or property in violation of § 42-4-108 (2)(c), but the public entity is liable for any claims against the operator of the emergency vehicle. Only when the operator's acts causing the injuries are willful and wanton is the operator personally liable. Corsentino v. Cordova, 4 P.3d 1082 (Colo. 2000).
An emergency driver waives governmental immunity in an accident when the driver does not activate emergency warning lights or sirens only if a plaintiff's injuries could have resulted from the driver's failure to use alerts while speeding in pursuit of a suspected or actual lawbreaker. Hice v. Giron, 2024 CO 9, 543 P.3d 385.
Operation of a motor vehicle. For a public entity to be immune from a claim arising from the operation of an emergency vehicle, both the vehicle's lights and siren must have been in operation, and any violation of a traffic regulation that gave rise to the claim must have been one of those specified in § 42-4-108 (2)(a) through (d). Sierra v. City & County of Denver, 730 P.2d 902 (Colo. App. 1986).
Immunity is not waived by subsection (1)(a) for a public employee who was driving his personally owned vehicle at the time of an accident while acting within the course and scope of his employment. Ceja v. Lemire, 154 P.3d 1064 (Colo. 2007).
Police officer was engaged in a pursuit within the provisions of § 42-4-108 (3) when the driver of a car fled the scene in a clear attempt to avoid arrest or further investigation and the officer followed the car. Tidwell v. City & County of Denver, 83 P.3d 75 (Colo. 2003).
Police officer's pursuit was not investigatory in nature when the officer already had authority to stop and arrest the driver of a car and the officer was pursuing the driver of the car for that reason; therefore, the officer was required to activate his emergency signals in order for the city to claim the protection of governmental immunity under the CGIA. Tidwell v. City & County of Denver, 83 P.3d 75 (Colo. 2003).
"Operation", as used in subsection (1)(a), is a broad term that includes both the physical defects of a motor vehicle and its movement, as well as other actions fairly incidental to those defects or movements. Harris v. Reg'l Transp. Dist., 15 P.3d 782 (Colo. App. 2000).
Since the waiver provision of subsection (1)(a) applies to injuries that result from the operation of a motor vehicle by a public employee who is acting as an operator, the term "operation" necessarily refers to actions of the operator related to the physical control of the functions of the motor vehicle. Harris v. Reg'l Transp. Dist., 15 P.3d 782 (Colo. App. 2000).
The movement of passengers into and out of a bus is a function of the bus controlled by the bus driver. Harris v. Reg'l Transp. Dist., 15 P.3d 782 (Colo. App. 2000).
Based on the broad definition of the term "operation" and the requirement that the waiver provision be strictly construed with deference in favor of the victim, the alleged negligent failure of an RTD bus driver to ensure that passengers board and disembark safely is included in the waiver of immunity under subsection (1)(a). Harris v. Reg'l Transp. Dist., 15 P.3d 782 (Colo. App. 2000).
The waiver of immunity under subsection (1)(a) is applicable if injuries result from the operation of a bus, even if the underlying cause of the injuries may have been faulty maintenance. Harris v. Reg'l Transp. Dist., 15 P.3d 782 (Colo. App. 2000).
"Operation of a motor vehicle" in subsection (1)(a) applies to acts or omissions of a public employee but does not include conduct associated with the public entity's negligent entrustment and negligent hiring, training, and supervision. Kahland v. Villarreal, 155 P.3d 491 (Colo. App. 2006).
Public employee need not act "negligently" in the operation of a motor vehicle in order for the waiver of sovereign immunity from injuries to apply for injuries that resulted from the operation of the motor vehicle as long as the plaintiff proves that operation of the motor vehicle caused the injuries. Immunity may be waived pursuant to subsection (1)(a) even if the operation of the vehicle is not the direct cause of the injury or the basis for the cause of action, but rather whether the injury resulted from it. Teran v. Reg'l Transp. Dist., 2020 COA 151, 477 P.3d 799.
Driver's failure to secure handcuffed passengers with seatbelts in a sheriff transport van falls within the waiver of immunity for the "operation of a motor vehicle". Young v. Jefferson County Sheriff, 2012 COA 185, 292 P.3d 1189.
B. Paragraph (b).
Primary purpose of a hospital is to provide medical or surgical care to sick or injured persons. Plummer v. Little, 987 P.2d 871 (Colo. App. 1999); Sereff v. Waldman, 30 P.3d 754 (Colo. App. 2000); Craven v. Univ. of Colo. Hosp. Auth., 260 F.3d 1218 (10th Cir. 2001); Awad v. Breeze, 129 P.3d 1039 (Colo. App. 2005).
Practice of medicine is within meaning of "operation of public hospital" for purposes of subsection (1)(b). Sereff v. Waldman, 30 P.3d 754 (Colo. App. 2000).
"Operation" of public hospital or other facility, within meaning of subsection (1)(b), does not include performance of functions only ancillary to, or remotely related to, primary purpose of facility. Daley v. Univ. of Colo. Health Scis. Ctr., 111 P.3d 554 (Colo. App. 2005).
Residency program operated by a public hospital under which resident physicians work at both public and nonpublic hospitals furthers the purposes of the public hospital and, therefore, constitutes the operation of a public hospital for purposes of subsection (1)(b). Sereff v. Waldman, 30 P.3d 754 (Colo. App. 2000).
Fact that alleged malpractice occurred at private hospital does not preclude determination that conduct is part of the operation of a public hospital when a physician holding a clinical faculty appointment with the residency program of a public hospital is supervising a resident physician at a nonpublic entity. Sereff v. Waldman, 30 P.3d 754 (Colo. App. 2000).
Although hospital is immune from suit for its own willful and wanton acts or omissions, or for the willful and wanton acts or omissions of its employees, hospital's sovereign immunity is nonetheless waived under subsection (1)(b). Gray v. Univ. of Colo. Hosp., 2012 COA 113, 284 P.3d 191 (conclusion that a public entity is immune from suit based on its own willful and wanton conduct disavowed in Cisneros v. Elder, 2022 CO 13M, 506 P.3d 828).
Clinic not a public hospital for purposes of this section. Plummer v. Little, 987 P.2d 871 (Colo. App. 1999); Montoya v. Trinidad State Nursing Home, 109 P.3d 1051 (Colo. App. 2005).
Nursing home not a public hospital for purposes of this section. Montoya v. Trinidad State Nursing Home, 109 P.3d 1051 (Colo. App. 2005).
Provision of risk analysis, claim review, and litigation assistance services pursuant to private contract is ancillary to primary purpose of hospital and, therefore, does not constitute operation of a public hospital. Immunity, therefore, is not waived under subsection (1)(b). Daley v. Univ. of Colo. Health Scis. Ctr., 111 P.3d 554 (Colo. App. 2005).
Personnel action only remotely related to hospital's primary purpose. Relation between hospital employee's discharge and provision of medical or surgical care to sick or injured persons is particularly tenuous with respect to administrative employees. Subsection (1)(b) cannot be construed as waiver of state's immunity with respect to personnel action. Craven v. Univ. of Colo. Hosp. Auth., 260 F.3d 1218 (10th Cir. 2001).
Sovereign immunity not waived since all plaintiff's claims involved conflicts among employees, who happened to be physicians, and related only indirectly to patient care. Such conflicts among employees do not concern the operation of a public hospital. Awad v. Breeze, 129 P.3d 1039 (Colo. App. 2005).
Specific immunity provision in § 17-27.7-103 (1) prevails over general waiver of immunity in subsection (1)(b) regarding the operation of a correctional facility or jail. Norsby v. Jensen, 916 P.2d 555 (Colo. App. 1995).
"Operation" of a correction facility includes the provision of medical care necessary for basic health for purposes of subsection (1)(b). Nieto v. State, 952 P.2d 834 (Colo. App. 1997), aff'd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 993 P.2d 493 (Colo. 2000).
State officials may be sued in their individual capacities for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and plaintiff's complaint sufficiently alleges that individual defendants acted in their personal capacities to withstand a motion to dismiss. State v. Nieto, 993 P.2d 493 (Colo. 2000).
Sovereign immunity waived in an action for injuries resulting from public entity's operation of correctional facility; however, where officer had probable cause to arrest plaintiff, confinement in detention center for a few hours was not false imprisonment. Rose v. City & County of Denver, 990 P.2d 1120 (Colo. App. 1999).
Operation of county jail does not include acts carried out in the performance of a criminal history investigation or in the making of a bond recommendation or report to a court, nor does it include the failure to serve warrants. Howard through Young v. Denver, 837 P.2d 255 (Colo. App. 1992).
A sheriff's determination not to release an inmate after the inmate has properly posted bond lies at the heart of the sheriff's duties and is related to the purpose and operation of a jail. Accordingly, sheriff is not immune from suit under subsection (1)(b). Cisneros v. Elder, 2022 COA 106, 522 P.3d 255.
Allegations of willful and wanton conduct in the operation of a jail do not raise an immunity issue. Hernandez v. City & County of Denver, 2018 COA 151, 439 P.3d 57.
Accordingly, the district court erred in resolving those allegations by way of C.R.C.P. 12(b)(1) and an evidentiary hearing described in Trinity Broad. of Denver, Inc. v. City of Westminster, 848 P.2d 916 (Colo. 1993). Hernandez v. City & County of Denver, 2018 COA 151, 439 P.3d 57.
District court erred in dismissing case on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction due to CGIA immunity when the conduct in question occurred in the operation of a jail. Immunity does not apply to injuries resulting from the negligent operation of a jail, regardless of whether conduct was willful and wanton. Hernandez v. City & County of Denver, 2018 COA 151, 439 P.3d 57.
C. Paragraph (c).
"Public building" includes fixtures. Reynolds v. State Bd. for Cmty. Colls., 937 P.2d 774 (Colo. App. 1996).
Public parking structure is a "public building" under subsection (1)(c). It falls within the ordinary meaning of "building". It is constructed and designed to be permanent. Stickle v. County of Jefferson, 2022 COA 79, 519 P.3d 751, aff'd, 2024 CO 7, 542 P.3d 688.
Although a public parking structure — like a public parking lot — can be a "public facility" under subsection (1)(e), it can also be a "public building" within the meaning of subsection (1)(c). The terms "facility" and "building" mean different things, but are not mutually exclusive. A "building" can be a type of "facility". The general assembly's use of "facility" in two waivers and "building" in a third indicates that the legislature did not intend the term "facility" to be limited to a "building". However, as ordinary usage suggests, the term "building" has a more specific meaning than the term "facility" as a "building" can be a type of "facility". Stickle v. County of Jefferson, 2022 COA 79, 519 P.3d 751, aff'd, 2024 CO 7, 542 P.3d 688.
The term "public" in the definition of "dangerous condition" does not exclude a person in a public building at a city's invitation. It is the immunity created by the CGIA, and not the exceptions thereto, that must be strictly construed. Kittinger v. City of Colo. Springs, 872 P.2d 1265 (Colo. App. 1993).
Waiver of immunity under subsection (1)(c) concerning a dangerous condition of any public building is limited to building or structural defects and cannot be used to waive immunity for actions involving only the use of a public building. Jenks v. Sullivan, 813 P.2d 800 (Colo. App. 1991), aff'd, 826 P.2d 825 (Colo. 1992); Reynolds v. State Bd. for Cmty. Colls., 937 P.2d 774 (Colo. App. 1996); Jilot v. State, 944 P.2d 566 (Colo. App. 1996); Douglas v. City & County of Denver, 203 P.3d 615 (Colo. App. 2008).
To establish a waiver of sovereign immunity resulting from a dangerous condition under subsection (1)(c), the injured party must show that the injuries occurred as a result of the physical condition of a public facility or the use thereof that: (1) Constitutes an unreasonable risk to the health or safety of the public, (2) is known to exist or should have been known to exist in the exercise of reasonable care, and (3) is proximately caused by the negligent act or omission of the public entity in constructing or maintaining such facility. Walton v. State, 968 P.2d 636 (Colo. 1998); Padilla ex rel. Padilla v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 1 P.3d 256 (Colo. App. 1999), aff'd, 25 P.3d 1176 (Colo. 2001); Springer v. City & County of Denver, 13 P.3d 794 (Colo. 2000); Douglas v. City & County of Denver, 203 P.3d 615 (Colo. App. 2008).
When disputed jurisdictional facts are inextricably intertwined with the merits, a plaintiff must demonstrate a likelihood of the existence of the facts necessary to establish a waiver of CGIA immunity. Jefferson County v. Dozier, 2025 CO 36, 570 P.3d 482.
Obligation to maintain facility includes ensuring any new design choice made in connection with maintenance does not cause a dangerous condition. A dangerous condition does not exist solely because the design of any facility is inadequate. But if an inadequate design is made in connection with a maintenance repair, a waiver of sovereign immunity is established. Stickle v. County of Jefferson, 2022 COA 79, 519 P.3d 751, aff'd, 2024 CO 7, 542 P.3d 688.
No waiver of immunity under subsection (1)(c) was intended for injuries caused by the use of facilities unless such use renders the facility itself an unreasonable risk to public safety or health. Mentzel v. Judicial Dept., 778 P.2d 323 (Colo. App. 1989).
No waiver of immunity exists under subsection (1)(c) when use of public building renders an integral part of the facility a dangerous physical condition. Longbottom v. State Bd. of Cmty. Colls. & Occupational Educ., 872 P.2d 1253 (Colo. App. 1993); Hendricks by & through Martens v. Weld, 895 P.2d 1120 (Colo. App. 1995).
A public entity does not have governmental immunity when it constructs a building through the services of an independent contractor and a dangerous condition arises from that construction. Springer v. City & County of Denver, 13 P.3d 794 (Colo. 2000).
Alleged dangerous condition, airborne asbestos released during building demolition activities, was not proximately caused by any negligent act or omission in "constructing or maintaining" a public building. As a result, immunity under subsection (1)(c) not waived. Smokebrush Found. v. City of Colo. Springs, 2018 CO 10, 410 P.3d 1236.
Plaintiff must show that the public entity's negligent act or omission proximately caused the condition in question for the dangerous condition exception to apply. Where a district court finds a public entity's response to an alleged dangerous condition is reasonable, plaintiff has failed to establish dangerous condition exception applies. Jefferson County v. Dozier, 2025 CO 36, 570 P.3d 482.
Public entity may proximately cause a condition not only by affirmatively creating it but also by its omission in failing to reasonably discover and correct the unsafe condition. Springer v. City & County of Denver, 13 P.3d 794 (Colo. 2000).
Allegation that warm air vent on outside of public building caused or contributed to formation of ice on which plaintiff slipped was not sufficient to support waiver of immunity for a dangerous condition of a public building under subsection (1)(c) because the ice was not directly caused by or attributable to a physical or structural defect of the building and was at most an indirect effect of the design of the building. Seder v. City of Ft. Collins, 987 P.2d 904 (Colo. App. 1999).
Neither grounds surrounding a public building nor driveway leading up to it are subject to a waiver of immunity under subsection (1)(c) or (1)(d)(I). Stanley v. Adams County Sch. Dist. 27J, 942 P.2d 1322 (Colo. App. 1997).
No waiver of immunity under subsection (1)(c) was intended for injuries caused by negligent use of storage closet as seclusion room. Plaintiff does not allege negligent maintenance but, instead, alleges improper actions on part of school staff in placing child out of their line of sight. Accepting plaintiff's argument would mean that any time a school child is injured as a result of being inappropriately placed out of direct line of observation by staff, governmental immunity would be waived under the "dangerous condition" exception. Neither the plain language of the statute nor the case law supports such a construction. Accordingly, the trial court did not err by neither considering nor making findings of fact as to this evidence. Padilla ex rel. Padilla v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 1 P.3d 256 (Colo. App. 1999), aff'd, 25 P.3d 1176 (Colo. 2001).
Forcing students to participate in a human-pyramid activity on an unpadded gymnasium floor is insufficient to support a waiver under subsection (1)(c). Dorsey v. Pueblo Sch. Dist. 60, 140 F. Supp. 3d 1102 (D. Colo. 2015).
Student's injury resulted from "dangerous condition" after sliding into unpadded wall in elementary school gymnasium during physical education class. Hendricks by & through Martens v. Weld, 895 P.2d 1120 (Colo. App. 1995).
Inoperable bus parked in a public building used for safety training is not part of the building that houses it and cannot be construed as a "dangerous condition of a public building" pursuant to this section. DiPaolo v. Boulder Valley Sch. Dist., 902 P.2d 439 (Colo. App. 1995).
University student's common law negligence action was within the immunity waiver for a dangerous condition of a public building where student, at the direction of the teacher, was cleaning out an overhead storage space when the extension ladder student was standing on slipped on the freshly sealed floor. Walton v. State, 968 P.2d 636 (Colo. 1998).
Determination of whether underground gasoline storage tanks constitute a dangerous condition of a public building under subsection (1)(c) depends on whether the tanks were installed in or annexed to the building as a fixture. Jilot v. State, 944 P.2d 566 (Colo. App. 1996).
Printing press was not a fixture, hence, liability was not waived for injury resulting from use of printing press inside a public building. Reynolds v. State Bd. for Cmty. Colls., 937 P.2d 774 (Colo. App. 1996).
A dry erase board that would normally have been affixed to a wall is a dangerous condition of a public building where plaintiff's injuries were attributable to the failure to secure the board properly. Booth v. Univ. of Colo., 64 P.3d 926 (Colo. App. 2002), aff'd, 78 P.3d 1098 (Colo. 2003).
The failure to post a warning sign or to supervise is not a maintenance issue. Such a failure does not involve the use of a dangerous physical condition of the building that is associated with its maintenance. Therefore, public recreation center's immunity under subsection (1)(c) was not waived. Douglas v. City & County of Denver, 203 P.3d 615 (Colo. App. 2008).
Administrative building for city's gas department was "public" for purposes of subsection (1)(c). The operations served and benefitted the public with respect to the city's provision of gas service. Smokebrush Found. v. City of Colo. Springs, 2015 COA 80, 418 P.3d 530, aff'd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 2018 CO 10, 410 P.3d 1236.
D. Paragraph (d).
1. Subparagraph (I).
The words "a public highway, road, or street" at the beginning of subsection (1)(d) include county roads. Meserole v. City of Aspen, 786 P.2d 456 (Colo. App. 1989), overruled in Bloomer v. Boulder County Bd. of Comm'rs, 799 P.2d 942 (Colo. 1990), annotated below; Madill v. County of Adams, 799 P.2d 949 (Colo. App. 1989), cert. granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded to the Colorado court of appeals for reconsideration in light of Bloomer v. Boulder County Bd. of Comm'rs, 799 P.2d 942 (Colo. 1990), 799 P.2d 949 (Colo. 1990).
"Dangerous condition" waiver of immunity applies to: (1) Any road within the corporate limits of any municipality; (2) any highway that is a part of the federal interstate highway system or the federal primary highway system; (3) any highway that is a part of the federal secondary highway system; and (4) any highway that is a part of the state highway system. This section has been construed to effect a waiver of immunity for these categories of roads only and does not effect a waiver of immunity by counties for actions arising from injuries resulting from dangerous conditions on county roads. Bloomer v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 799 P.2d 942 (Colo. 1990), overruled in part on other grounds by Bertrand v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 872 P.2d 223 (Colo. 1994); Click v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 923 P.2d 347 (Colo. App. 1996); Wark v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 47 P.3d 711 (Colo. App. 2002).
E-470 is included within the waiver of immunity in subsection (1)(d)(I). For purposes of the CGIA, E-470 constitutes a federal interstate, federal primary, or federal secondary highway system and therefore immunity is waived. Lauck v. E-470 Pub. Hwy. Auth., 187 P.3d 1148 (Colo. App. 2008).
The federal highway designations contained in subsection (1)(d)(I) were replaced with a successor designation at the federal level, known as the national highway system (NHS). E-470 is listed as an NHS route, which is sufficient to establish a waiver of immunity under the CGIA. Lauck v. E-470 Pub. Hwy. Auth., 187 P.3d 1148 (Colo. App. 2008).
If the intent of subsection (1)(d)(I) is to provide a waiver of immunity for dangerous conditions on public roads, then E-470, which is a paved, four-lane, limited access, divided highway owned, operated, and maintained by a public entity, would not be excluded from such waiver of immunity. Lauck v. E-470 Pub. Hwy. Auth., 187 P.3d 1148 (Colo. App. 2008).
Subsection (1)(d) does not waive immunity of counties for dangerous conditions present on county roads. Subsection (1)(d) waives a public entity's sovereign immunity with regard to only four categories of roads demarcated by the disjunctive "or". The clause following the first "of" modifies "dangerous condition", and only the second and subsequent "of's" create categories of roads. Bloomer v. Boulder County Bd. of Comm'rs, 799 P.2d 942 (Colo. 1990), overruled in part on other grounds, Bertrand v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 872 P.2d 223 (Colo. 1994); Wark v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 47 P.3d 711 (Colo. App. 2002).
Addition in 1992 of last sentence in subsection (1)(d)(I) did not extend the waiver of sovereign immunity to dangerous conditions on county roads. Click v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 923 P.2d 347 (Colo. App. 1996); Wark v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 47 P.3d 711 (Colo. App. 2002).
If subsection (1)(d) is stricken, county remains immune with respect to an accident occurring on a county road, because the effect would be not to extend the waiver of immunity to county roads but, rather, to rescind the waiver. Am. Emp'rs Ins. Co. v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 547 F.2d 511 (10th Cir. 1976).
Reason immunity not extended to dangerous conditions of roads or streets. The apparent purpose of the general assembly in not extending sovereign immunity to actions for injuries resulting from dangerous conditions of roads or streets was to make governments liable for failure to maintain those facilities in a condition safe for public use. Stephen v. City & County of Denver, 659 P.2d 666 (Colo. 1983); Schlitters v. State, 787 P.2d 656 (Colo. App. 1989).
If the meaning of "dangerous condition" is limited solely to the physical condition of the road, this purpose would not be fulfilled. Schlitters v. State, 787 P.2d 656 (Colo. App. 1989).
Nothing in subsection (1)(d)(I) bars liability for a public entity if it failed to remove or mitigate the danger when it had the existing means to do so, actual notice of the condition through the proper public official responsible for the roadway, and a reasonable time to act. This is true even if the public entity's negligence did not proximately cause the dangerous condition consisting of an accumulation of sand and gravel on a roadway. Mason v. Adams, 961 P.2d 540 (Colo. App. 1997).
Dangerous condition may exist if there has been a failure to maintain the roadside so as to avoid the presence of obstructions on the traveled portion of a state highway. Schlitters v. State, 787 P.2d 656 (Colo. App. 1989).
Allegations of unreasonable risk to public health or safety were sufficient to state a claim for relief under the statutory exception to sovereign immunity where the plaintiffs' complaint alleged that: (1) Condition of highway was dangerous, (2) defendants had previous knowledge of numerous similar accidents and fatalities caused by falling boulders on the highway, and (3) defendants negligently failed to install devices that would have prevented boulders from this unstable slope from falling onto the traveled portion of the highway. Schlitters v. State, 787 P.2d 656 (Colo. App. 1989).
Dangerous condition is not limited to those conditions that have their physical source in the highway itself, and, although the absence of a barricade may not have itself created a dangerous condition, evidence supported the trial court's conclusion that both the failure to maintain the barricade properly in front of the dirt embankment and the dirt embankment itself created dangerous conditions. Hallam v. City of Colo. Springs, 914 P.2d 479 (Colo. App. 1995).
The phrase "interferes with the movement of traffic" modifies "[a] dangerous condition". Thus, this section waives governmental immunity only when a dangerous condition both exists and interferes with the movement of traffic. McKinley v. City of Glenwood Springs, 2015 COA 126, 361 P.3d 1080.
Failure to post warning signs cannot serve as the basis for finding a dangerous condition and, thus, a waiver of sovereign immunity. Mason v. Adams, 961 P.2d 540 (Colo. App. 1997).
Failure to warn highway users of a hazardous condition on a highway and failure to issue a travel advisory, reroute traffic, or close a highway in response to a hazardous condition does not constitute a waiver of governmental immunity. Medina v. State, 17 P.3d 178 (Colo. App. 2000), aff'd, 35 P.3d 443 (Colo. 2001)
Dangerous condition in a roadway not found. Sierra v. City & County of Denver, 730 P.2d 902 (Colo. App. 1986); City & County of Denver v. Dennis, 2018 CO 37, 418 P.3d 489.
Complaint alleged negligent design of intersection, since the complaint did not allege that the city's acts in constructing or maintaining the intersection differed in any way from the provisions for construction and maintenance of the intersection contained in the initial design; thus, claims were barred by sovereign immunity. Willer v. City of Thornton, 817 P.2d 514 (Colo. 1991).
Sovereign immunity not waived under subsection (1)(d)(I) because overgrown trees and bushes in a median do not physically interfere with movement of traffic on the paved portion of the street. Cordova v. Pueblo W. Metro. Dist., 986 P.2d 976 (Colo. App. 1999), aff'd sub nom. Corsentino v. Cordova, 4 P.3d 1082 (Colo. 2000).
No waiver of immunity for wildlife on highway. Immunity provision of § 33-3-103 is not implicitly amended or repealed by subsection (1)(d). Deneau v. State, 883 P.2d 567 (Colo. App. 1994).
Necessary to go beyond the wording of subsection (1)(d) and look at legislative history to discern legislative intent since wording in subsection is ambiguous. City of Aspen v. Meserole, 803 P.2d 950 (Colo. 1990).
Sidewalks are specifically included in description of municipal thoroughfares in subsection (1)(d); therefore, sovereign immunity is waived by the municipality. Meserole v. City of Aspen, 786 P.2d 456 (Colo. App. 1989), aff'd, 803 P.2d 950 (Colo. 1990).
Sidewalk did not constitute a dangerous condition. Evidence did not establish that the sidewalk deviation presented a risk that "exceeded the bounds of reason". Therefore, city retained its immunity from suit. Maphis v. City of Boulder, 2022 CO 10, 504 P.3d 287.
Subsection (1)(d) does not provide immunity for city where a two-inch stub of a traffic sign interfered with and caused pedestrian to fall. City of Aspen v. Meserole, 803 P.2d 950 (Colo. 1990).
City is immune from liability for a roadway's abrupt transition at the ditch because the roadway was in the same condition as when it was originally constructed. Because the roadway remained unchanged, the city did not repair the roadway and is immune from any claims for negligence for allowing this condition to exist. Swieckowski v. City of Ft. Collins, 934 P.2d 1380 (Colo. 1997).
Subsection (1)(d)(I) waives immunity for injuries occurring in parking areas of a municipal street. The "parking thereon" phrase applies to municipal highways, roads, streets, or sidewalks. McKinley v. City of Glenwood Springs, 2015 COA 126, 361 P.3d 1080.
The meaning of "public highway, road, or street" in subsection (1)(d) does not include the paved surface of a fenced, street-level parking lot with restricted access. Jones v. City & County of Denver, 833 P.2d 870 (Colo. App. 1992).
Constructive notice of dangerous condition. An entity's employees, ignorant of the presence of a particular obstruction, may be deemed to have had notice nonetheless if, in the exercise of ordinary diligence, they should have known of it. Morgan v. Bd. of Water Works of Pueblo, 837 P.2d 300 (Colo. App. 1992).
The question of constructive notice depends upon the facts and circumstances of each particular case and is ordinarily a question to be determined by the jury. Morgan v. Bd. of Water Works of Pueblo, 837 P.2d 300 (Colo. App. 1992).
The definition of "traffic marking" appears to be ambiguous, and the court must look beyond the bare meaning of the words. Hallam v. City of Colo. Springs, 914 P.2d 479 (Colo. App. 1995).
Evidence presented supported the trial court's conclusion that a barricade is not a traffic marking, which conclusion is consistent with the principle that a legislative grant of sovereign immunity must be strictly construed and with the general assembly's purpose in not extending immunity to actions for injuries resulting from dangerous conditions of roads. Hallam v. City of Colo. Springs, 914 P.2d 479 (Colo. App. 1995).
The 1986 amendments to this section did not alter the rule that a governmental entity can be sued for injuries resulting from a dangerous condition on a highway; rather, they were meant primarily to delete "traffic signs, signals, or markings, or the lack thereof" from the statutory definition of "the phrase 'physically interferes with the movement of traffic'". Schlitters v. State, 787 P.2d 656 (Colo. App. 1989); Moldovan v. State, 829 P.2d 481 (Colo. App. 1991), aff'd, 842 P.2d 220 (Colo. 1992).
Statutory language "the phrase 'physically interferes with the movement of traffic' shall not include traffic signs, signals, or markings, or the lack thereof" excludes the failure to post warning signs from the general waiver of sovereign immunity for injuries resulting from dangerous conditions. Willer v. City of Thornton, 817 P.2d 514 (Colo. 1991).
2. Subparagraph (II).
Improper placement of stop sign is within statutory definition of "dangerous condition" for which city may be held liable. Stephen v. City & County of Denver, 659 P.2d 666 (Colo. 1983).
Failure to modify or improve traffic signals. While negligence of public entity in designing or constructing portions of street or highway system or in maintaining them free of defects or obstructions is actionable under the CGIA, failure to modify or improve them to make them safer in light of changing use is not. Karr v. City & County of Denver, 677 P.2d 1384 (Colo. App. 1984).
A temporary stop sign is a "traffic control signal" for purposes of subsection (1)(d)(II) even though it is not a power-operated device. DeForrest v. City of Cherry Hills Vill., 990 P.2d 1139 (Colo. App. 1999).
Because the singular includes the plural under the rule of statutory construction set forth in § 2-4-102, the waiver of sovereign immunity set forth in subsection (1)(d)(II) for "failure to repair a traffic signal on which conflicting directions are displayed" applies to a public entity that fails to repair multiple traffic control signals that display conflicting directions. DeForrest v. City of Cherry Hills Vill., 990 P.2d 1139 (Colo. App. 1999).
A conflict between a temporary stop sign and a traffic light is a "traffic control signal on which conflicting directions are displayed" for purposes of subsection (1)(d)(II). DeForrest v. City of Cherry Hills Vill., 990 P.2d 1139 (Colo. App. 1999).
Subsection (1)(d)(II) precluded a grant of immunity to cities and a police officer in an action resulting from a car accident that occurred at an intersection where a temporary stop sign and a traffic light gave conflicting directions. DeForrest v. City of Cherry Hills Vill., 990 P.2d 1139 (Colo. App. 1999).
Sovereign immunity not waived under subsection (1)(d) where city allegedly failed to set a pedestrian signal so that a pedestrian could cross an entire intersection before the opposing traffic received a green light; however there was no evidence that the opposing traffic had a green signal at the same time as the pedestrian signal indicating that the pedestrian was allowed to cross the intersection. Lyons v. City of Aurora, 987 P.2d 900 (Colo. App. 1999).
At an intersection controlled by both traffic and pedestrian signals, where the traffic signal had been turned 90 degrees so that it displayed green lights simultaneously in two directions but the pedestrian signal was functioning properly, the trial court did not err in determining that "conflicting directions" were not displayed to a pedestrian for purposes of subsection (1)(d)(II). Moore v. City & County of Denver, 42 P.3d 82 (Colo. App. 2002).
Malfunctioning street light may constitute a dangerous condition. Though the street light is not physically on the roadway, it still "physically interferes with the movement of traffic". Accordingly, the trial court did not err in determining that city's immunity had been waived. Lin v. City of Golden, 97 P.3d 303 (Colo. App. 2004).
3. Subparagraph (III).
Although the public entity's failure to post warning signs alone could not establish a dangerous condition, that failure was relevant to whether the entity had used existing means available to it to mitigate the danger. Martinez v. Weld County Sch. Dist. RE-1, 60 P.3d 736 (Colo. App. 2002).
Trial court did not err when it determined that plaintiff had established that defendant had actual notice of a dangerous condition when the particular place where the plaintiff fell was known to be a problem area, the build-up of ice there was a chronic and continuing problem, and the defendant had notice and knowledge of the condition. Martinez v. Weld County Sch. Dist. RE-1, 60 P.3d 736 (Colo. App. 2002).
Low-income housing facility is not a "public building open for public business" within the meaning of subsection (1)(d)(III). Although the facility is owned and operated by instrumentalities of a municipal housing authority, it functions as private residences and not as a public building. Martinez v. CSG Redevelopment Partners LLLP, 2019 COA 91, 469 P.3d 491.
E. Paragraph (e).
"Public facility" in subsection (1)(e) is an ambiguous term, as it is reasonably subject to two differing interpretations: It can be construed to encompass a single piece of playground equipment or to exclude such equipment. The term "public facility" is not defined in the CGIA, and there is no pertinent legislative history that can illuminate its intended meaning. St. Vrain Valley Sch. Dist. RE-1J v. A.R.L., 2014 CO 33, 325 P.3d 1014.
"Facility" has a different meaning than the term "building". The term "facility" applies to permanent bricks-and-mortar structures as well as to collections of individual items that, considered together, promote a broader, common purpose. St. Vrain Valley Sch. Dist. RE-1J v. A.R.L., 2014 CO 33, 325 P.3d 1014.
A "facility" must also be "public" to qualify for a recreation area waiver. The term "public" modifies and constricts the types of facilities that can qualify for a recreation area waiver in subsection (1)(e). St. Vrain Valley Sch. Dist. RE-1J v. A.R.L., 2014 CO 33, 325 P.3d 1014.
For a facility to be "public" under subsection (1)(e), it must be accessible to the public and maintained by a public entity to serve a beneficial public purpose. St. Vrain Valley Sch. Dist. RE-1J v. A.R.L., 2014 CO 33, 325 P.3d 1014.
Three-step analysis to determine whether a particular piece of property is "located in" a "recreation area". First, a court should determine what property is relevant to the analysis by determining the boundaries of the "putative recreation area". Second, the court should determine if the public entity's "primary purpose" in constructing or maintaining the recreation area is recreational. Third, assuming the primary purpose is recreational, the court should determine whether the public facility at issue was located in the boundaries of this recreation area. Daniel v. City of Colo. Springs, 2014 CO 34, 327 P.3d 891; St. Vrain Valley Sch. Dist. RE-1J v. A.R.L., 2014 CO 33, 325 P.3d 1014.
Under this analysis, the playground in which a zip line on which injury occurred was "located in" a "recreation area". The recreation area was contiguous property underlying the playground equipment. The property underlying the school is excluded because the school is designed to promote educational, not recreational, activities. Second, the primary purpose of the school in constructing or maintaining this area was to allow school children to play during their recess time. Accordingly, the primary purpose of the area was recreation. Third, the collection of playground equipment at issue in this case, the "public facility", was physically situated within the boundaries of the recreation area, the land underlying the playground equipment. St. Vrain Valley Sch. Dist. RE-1J v. A.R.L., 2014 CO 33, 325 P.3d 1014.
The common meaning of the word "maintain", its legislative history, and Colorado case law support the court of appeals finding that a failure to "maintain" means a failure to keep a facility in the same general state of being, repair, or efficiency as initially constructed. Swieckowski v. City of Ft. Collins, 934 P.2d 1380 (Colo. 1997).
Maintaining a safe work environment by diligently following personnel policies is at best ancillary to the purpose of operating a sanitation facility; therefore, claim that defendants failed to adhere to those policies is barred by the CGIA. Dobson v. City & County of Denver, 81 F. Supp. 2d 1080 (D. Colo. 1999).
Sovereign immunity not waived pursuant to subsection (1)(e) for drowning that occurred at lake in city park. Although the record was unclear whether the lake was natural or manmade, if it was natural, the city was immune from liability because the natural condition of land, even within a park, cannot lead to a waiver of immunity. Even if the lake was manmade, the risk was not unreasonable where there was no evidence to suggest the lake had steep or particularly slippery shores that were constructed by the city. Even if dangerous conditions did exist, plaintiff must show that the city knew of the risk and either originally created the risk or negligently allowed the risk to continue. DeAnzona v. City & County of Denver, 222 F.3d 1229 (10th Cir. 2000).
City's negligent failure to maintain the area surrounding a drainage ditch may support either a determination that a dangerous condition existed for purposes of subsection (1)(e) or a determination that, under subsection (1)(f), the negligent failure to maintain may have contributed to child's death and his brother's injuries. Where a drainage ditch is not properly maintained, a city may be held liable for obstacles that are not part of the original design. Powell v. City of Colo. Springs, 25 P.3d 1266 (Colo. App. 2000), aff'd on other grounds, 48 P.3d 561 (Colo. 2002) (decided prior to 2003 amendments to § 24-10-103).
Water department immune from liability arising from injuries caused by water meter pits on private property because city does not both operate and maintain such water pits. City & County of Denver v. Gallegos, 916 P.2d 509 (Colo. 1996); Horrell v. City of Aurora, 976 P.2d 315 (Colo. App. 1998); deBoer v. Ute Water Conservancy Dist., 17 P.3d 187 (Colo. App. 2000).
Water meter pit is not a public water facility when it is owned, operated, and maintained by a public entity but is located on private property and benefits solely the property on which it is located. deBoer v. Ute Water Conservancy Dist., 17 P.3d 187 (Colo. App. 2000).
A water meter pit owned by a city, located on city property, and operated and maintained by the city is a "public water facility" for purposes of subsection (1)(f). Wisdom v. City of Sterling, 36 P.3d 106 (Colo. App. 2001).
The 1986 amendment to subsection (1)(e) that deleted "public parking facilities" did not evidence the general assembly's intent to waive sovereign immunity for dangerous conditions in such facilities. In absence of clear language waiving immunity the court construed the subsection as evidencing the general assembly's intent to retain a public entity's sovereign immunity from liability for dangerous conditions in such facilities. Jones v. City & County of Denver, 833 P.2d 870 (Colo. App. 1992), overruled in Daniel v. City of Colo. Springs, 2014 CO 34, 327 P.3d 891.
The legislature's removal of the public parking facilities exception from subsection (1)(e) signaled its intent that the term "public facility" includes public parking lots. This conclusion flows from the well-established presumption that when the legislature amends a law, it intends to change that law. Thus, the legislature's removal of particular language serves as a statement of legislative intent that it did not wish to include such language. Daniel v. City of Colo. Springs, 2014 CO 34, 327 P.3d 891 (overruling Jones v. City & County of Denver, 833 P.2d 870 (Colo. 1992)).
A parking lot that serves a public golf course is a "public facility" under the recreation area waiver. Such a parking lot is "public" if it is accessible to and operated for the benefit of the general public; it is also a "facility" in light of the CGIA's history and its purposes. Daniel v. City of Colo. Springs, 2014 CO 34, 327 P.3d 891.
No waiver of sovereign immunity under subsection (1)(e) for public parking facilities because there is no clear statutory language waiving such immunity. Jones v. City & County of Denver, 833 P.2d 870 (Colo. App. 1992).
Any power or duty to maintain the visitor's parking lot at a correctional facility by the department of corrections is not directly related to the purpose of the facility. Pack v. Ark. Valley Corr. Facility, 894 P.2d 34 (Colo. App. 1995).
Department of correction's maintenance of visitor area within correctional facility is directly related to purpose of correctional facility. Flores v. Colo. Dept. of Corr., 3 P.3d 464 (Colo. App. 1999).
The term "public hospital" does not include veterinary hospitals but only those public hospitals which care for sick and injured persons. State of Colo. v. Hartsough, 790 P.2d 836 (Colo. 1990).
The term "foster home" cannot be characterized as a "hospital" or a "correctional facility" for purposes of the sovereign immunity statute. Gabriel v. City & County of Denver, 824 P.2d 36 (Colo. App. 1991).
On-site clinic at Denver international airport is operated as part of the overall health services provided by the Denver health department, and an extension of the services rendered by Denver general hospital, that serves all of the general populace in Denver; therefore, the clinic is a "public hospital" under this section. Farina v. City & County of Denver, 940 P.2d 1004 (Colo. App. 1996).
So long as the facility is owned and operated by the public entity, is devoted to a public purpose, and is beneficial to a substantial segment of the public, it is a public facility or hospital under the CGIA. Farina v. City & County of Denver, 940 P.2d 1004 (Colo. App. 1996).
An electrical vault on private property used as a restaurant is a public electrical facility for purposes of subsections (1)(e) and (1)(f); there is a public benefit from the usage of the electricity because the general public patronizes the restaurant and because the use of transformers located in such electrical vaults promotes the efficient delivery of electrical power in the town. Ellis v. Town of Estes Park, 66 P.3d 178 (Colo. App. 2002).
An individual piece of playground equipment such as a zip line does not, in and of itself, qualify as a "facility" under the recreation area waiver of subsection (1)(e) when that apparatus is divorced from the rest of the playground. However, an injury occurs on a "facility" when a zip line is a component of the larger playground. St. Vrain Valley Sch. Dist. RE-1J v. A.R.L., 2014 CO 33, 325 P.3d 1014.
However, an entire playground, considered as a whole, including the collection of playground equipment, can qualify as a "public facility". This conclusion is anchored in the dictionary definition of "facility" and is further bolstered by statutory context. Moreover, this interpretation of "facility" comports with the underlying purposes of the CGIA. St. Vrain Valley Sch. Dist. RE-1J v. A.R.L., 2014 CO 33, 325 P.3d 1014.
A collection of playground equipment at a public school qualifies as a "public facility" under the recreation area waiver because it is (1) relatively permanent or otherwise affixed to the land, (2) a man-made structure, (3) accessible to the public, and (4) maintained by a public entity to serve a beneficial, common public purpose. Injury occurred on a "facility" because claimant was injured on a zip line, a component of the playground that constitutes a facility. The injury occurred on a "public" facility because the playground was accessible and beneficial to both the greater public and the public school children attending the elementary school. St. Vrain Valley Sch. Dist. RE-1J v. A.R.L., 2014 CO 33, 325 P.3d 1014.
A non-negligently constructed and maintained piece of playground equipment cannot be a "dangerous condition" under the CGIA's recreation area waiver. In order to be a dangerous condition within the meaning of § 24-10-103 (1.3), a physical condition must be a physical or structural defect, not just an apparatus. In addition, the physical condition must be caused by some negligent act or omission of the public entity in constructing or maintaining a facility. St. Vrain Valley Sch. Dist. RE-1J v. Loveland, 2017 CO 54, 395 P.3d 751.
And the recreation area waiver does not recognize blanket claims of danger based on the design of a public facility. On the contrary, it explicitly precludes such claims. St. Vrain Valley Sch. Dist. RE-1J v. Loveland, 2017 CO 54, 395 P.3d 751.
"Public facility" located in a "recreation area" includes a college athletic field that is used for a variety of purposes, including recreation. Denmark v. State, 954 P.2d 624 (Colo. App. 1997).
A walkway that runs between a school building and a school playground is not a "public facility" for purposes of subsection (1)(e). It is also not a component of the public facility that is the school playground because it does not promote the broader overall purpose of children's play in the same way that an individual component of a playground like a swing set or sandbox does. Young v. Brighton Sch. Dist. 27J, 2014 CO 32, 325 P.3d 571.
Mere use of cabin for school-sponsored field trip does transform it into a public facility owned or maintained by school or school district. King v. U.S., 53 F. Supp. 2d 1056 (D. Colo. 1999).
Rocks placed in a circle by a group of students do not constitute construction of a "facility". King v. U.S., 53 F. Supp. 2d 1056 (D. Colo. 1999).
Circle of rocks is not a physical improvement to property under subsection (1)(e). King v. U.S., 954 P.2d 624 (D. Colo. 1999).
Immunity is waived pursuant to subsection (1)(e) only where the dangerous condition alleged of is of a physical improvement to the property, such as a building, boat dock, or fence. King v. U.S., 53 F. Supp. 2d 1056 (D. Colo. 1999).
"Public facility" refers to a facility built or constructed by a public entity rather than a natural feature such as a tree based on the use of the phrase "public facility" in subsection (1)(e), its common meaning, and its grouping with other facilities in that subsection. Accordingly, a tree in a park or recreation area is not a public facility; however, if a public entity incorporates a tree into a facility in such a manner that it becomes an integral part of the facility and is essential for the intended use of the facility, the tree may be a component of the public facility. Rosales v. City & County of Denver, 89 P.3d 507 (Colo. App. 2004), overruled in Burnett v. Colo. Dept. of Natural Res., 2015 CO 19, 346 P.3d 1005.
The legislature intended to retain immunity for injuries caused by native trees originating on unimproved property regardless of their proximity to a public facility, such as the improved area of a campsite. Burnett v. Colo. Dept. of Natural Res., 2015 CO 19, 346 P.3d 1005.
The natural condition provision governs any injuries arising from naturally occurring features of parks without consideration of their proximity to man-made objects. For injuries caused by natural dangerous conditions, immunity should be retained. This means that immunity does not apply with respect to man-made objects and does apply to natural objects. Burnett v. Colo. Dept. of Natural Res., 2015 CO 19, 346 P.3d 1005; Ackerman v. City & County of Denver, 2015 COA 96M, 373 P.3d 665.
Immunity turns on the mechanism of an injury, not the location when the injury occurs. Burnett v. Colo. Dept. of Natural Res., 2015 CO 19, 346 P.3d 1005; Ackerman v. City & County of Denver, 2015 COA 96M, 373 P.3d 665.
Subsection (1)(e) does not create a duty to maintain natural features, nor does a duty arise merely because of the features' proximity or contiguity to improved property. Burnett v. Colo. Dept. of Natural Res., 2015 CO 19, 346 P.3d 1005.
Even where the state chooses to maintain unimproved property to protect the public health and safety, it does not assume a duty to maintain the property where none otherwise existed. Such a policy encourages the provision of services to protect the public health and safety and allows public entities to allocate their limited fiscal resources. Burnett v. Colo. Dept. of Natural Res., 2015 CO 19, 346 P.3d 1005; Ackerman v. City & County of Denver, 2015 COA 96M, 373 P.3d 665.
Natural conditions of unimproved property are not transformed under subsection (1)(e) into improved property where, for the public health and safety, a public entity performs incidental maintenance. Burnett v. Colo. Dept. of Natural Res., 2015 CO 19, 346 P.3d 1005; Ackerman v. City & County of Denver, 2015 COA 96M, 373 P.3d 665.
The primary concern in implementing the CGIA was to provide the public with a sufficient avenue to tort recovery without exhausting governmental resources through excessive exposure to tort liability. Burnett v. Colo. Dept. of Natural Res., 2015 CO 19, 346 P.3d 1005.
A "natural condition of any unimproved property" includes native trees originating on unimproved property. Burnett v. Colo. Dept. of Natural Res., 2015 CO 19, 346 P.3d 1005 (overruling Rosales v. City & County of Denver, 89 P.3d 507 (Colo. App. 2004)).
Because a limb from such a tree caused victim's injuries, the natural condition provision of subsection (1)(e) immunizes the government. Burnett v. Colo. Dept. of Natural Res., 2015 CO 19, 346 P.3d 1005 (overruling Rosales v. City & County of Denver, 89 P.3d 507 (Colo. App. 2004)).
A rock formation that abuts one side of a city-owned amphitheater is not part of the amphitheater nor is the formation a public facility; it is a natural condition of unimproved property. Ackerman v. City & County of Denver, 2015 COA 96M, 373 P.3d 665.
Injured parties' location in the amphitheater does not support a waiver of immunity under subsection (1)(e) for injuries caused by a natural condition, that is, a rock falling from the rock formation. Ackerman v. City & County of Denver, 2015 COA 96M, 373 P.3d 665.
Based on the plain and ordinary meaning of "swimming", the term "swimming facility" in subsection (1)(e) refers to a facility that is both suitable and commonly used for swimming. Curtis v. Hyland Hills Park & Rec. Dist., 179 P.3d 81 (Colo. App. 2007).
An attraction in which visitors ride a raft down a plume is not a "swimming facility" for purposes of the CGIA. Curtis v. Hyland Hills Park & Rec. Dist., 179 P.3d 81 (Colo. App. 2007).
Absence of someone to regulate the spacing of people in rafts on a water attraction did not constitute a dangerous condition under (1)(e) because there was no physical defect in attraction's construction or maintenance. Curtis v. Hyland Hills Park & Rec. Dist., 179 P.3d 81 (Colo. App. 2007).
F. Paragraph (f).
City ordinance requirement for assertion of claims held void. City ordinance that requires installation of backwater check valves for assertion of claims for damages resulting from operation and maintenance of sewage lines and facilities imposes a requirement that is more onerous than that imposed by subsection (1)(f) and, therefore, is void. Fleckman v. City of Greeley, 673 P.2d 376 (Colo. App. 1983).
When a coal tar contaminant plume from a public gas facility was ongoing and continued after the CGIA's enactment, applying the CGIA's immunity waivers would not be a retroactive application of those waivers. Rather, the waivers would be applied prospectively, namely to injuries caused after the CGIA's enactment. Smokebrush Found. v. City of Colo. Springs, 2018 CO 10, 410 P.3d 1236.
In order to be within the waiver of subsection (1)(f), plaintiff must show that public entity's negligence was related to a public water facility and that the negligence arose from the operation and maintenance of that facility. deBoer v. Ute Water Conservancy Dist., 17 P.3d 187 (Colo. App. 2000).
A public entity "maintains" a public facility, for purposes of the immunity waiver in subsection (1)(f), even if it hires an independent contractor to perform the maintenance. Lopez v. City of Grand Junction, 2018 COA 97, 488 P.3d 364.
Marking a water line is not part of a district's maintenance obligations. Jacobs Invs. v. Ft. Collins-Loveland Water, 2024 COA 83, 558 P.3d 697.
Once a county chooses to operate and maintain a public water or sanitation facility, it has a duty not to do so in a negligent manner. The statutory waiver of governmental immunity for damages resulting from the operation and maintenance of a public water or sanitation facility is an acknowledgment of such a duty by the general assembly. Larry H. Miller Corp.-Denver v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 77 P.3d 870 (Colo. App. 2003).
The pertinent act or omission of the public entity in subsection (1)(f) is deemed to be an "operation" only if it is vested by law "with respect to the purposes" of the public water or sanitation facility, and sovereign immunity is waived only if the act or omission relates to the purpose of the facility. Richland Dev. Co. v. E. Cherry Creek, 934 P.2d 841 (Colo. App. 1996).
Marking a water line in response to notice of intent to excavate is not deemed to be an "operation" and does not waive a district's immunity. Jacobs Invs. v. Ft. Collins-Loveland Water, 2024 COA 83, 558 P.3d 697.
City's negligent failure to maintain the area surrounding a drainage ditch may support either a determination that a dangerous condition existed for purposes of subsection (1)(e) or a determination that, under subsection (1)(f), the negligent failure to maintain may have contributed to child's death and his brother's injuries. Where a drainage ditch is not properly maintained, a city may be held liable for obstacles that are not part of the original design. Powell v. City of Colo. Springs, 25 P.3d 1266 (Colo. App. 2000), aff'd on other grounds, 48 P.3d 561 (Colo. 2002) (decided prior to 2003 amendments to § 24-10-103).
Trial court did not err in applying statutory waiver of governmental immunity for injuries caused by operation and maintenance of a public facility where defendant city had not constructed a storm sewer line in accordance with comprehensive plan and a later line installation constituted improper operation and maintenance of the facility. Scott v. City of Greeley, 931 P.2d 525 (Colo. App. 1996).
A "sanitation facility" as used in subsection (1)(f) includes a storm drain operated and maintained by a county. Burnworth v. Adams County, 826 P.2d 368 (Colo. App. 1991).
It also includes a "cross pan" that was a part of the town's storm water drainage system designed to transport water discharged into the cross pan from a culvert to a ditch that emptied into a lake. Smith v. Town of Estes Park, 944 P.2d 571 (Colo. App. 1996).
It also includes a drainage ditch built by a city to accommodate storm water runoff. City of Colo. Springs v. Powell, 48 P.3d 561 (Colo. 2002) (decided prior to 2003 amendments to § 24-10-103).
An artificial irrigation ditch that is partially owned and maintained by a city and is an integral part of the city's storm drainage system is a sanitation facility for purposes of subsection (1)(f). The fact that the city shares the ditch with others does not foreclose tort suits. A facility that fits the definition of sanitation facility because it is a device for the collection of storm water remains a sanitation facility whether or not it contains storm water on a particular occasion. City of Longmont v. Henry-Hobbs, 50 P.3d 906 (Colo. 2002) (decided prior to 2003 amendments to § 24-10-103).
Claims regarding an unsafe design of a drainage ditch fall within the provision of the CGIA, subsection (1)(f), that allows suit for injuries resulting from the operation and maintenance of a sanitation facility. City of Colo. Springs v. Powell, 48 P.3d 561 (Colo. 2002) (decided prior to 2003 amendments to § 24-10-103).
The urban drainage and flood control district does not "operate or maintain" a "sanitation facility" within the meaning of this section; therefore, the district does not waive its sovereign immunity. Larry H. Miller Corp.-Denver v. Urban Drainage & Flood Control Dist., 64 P.3d 941 (Colo. App. 2003).
By placing "gas facility" in the context of other public utilities in subsection (1)(f), the general assembly has expressed its intent to restrict the definition of that term to include only facilities that distribute natural gas rather than gasoline. Jilot v. State, 944 P.2d 566 (Colo. App. 1996); Smokebrush Found. v. City of Colo. Springs, 2015 COA 80, 418 P.3d 530, aff'd, 2018 CO 10, 410 P.3d 1236.
Synthetic gas produced by a gas facility is a gas for purposes of subsection (1)(f). Smokebrush Found. v. City of Colo. Springs, 2018 CO 10, 410 P.3d 1236.
Coal gasification plant for city's gas department is a "public gas facility" within the meaning of subsection (1)(f). Although the CGIA does not define "public gas facility", by placing "gas facility" in the context of other public utilities, the general assembly expressed its intent to include, for purposes of immunity, facilities that distribute gaseous fuel to the public primarily for use in heating and illumination. Smokebrush Found. v. City of Colo. Springs, 2018 CO 10, 410 P.3d 1236.
The plant produced a gaseous fuel distributed to the public primarily for use in illumination. Smokebrush Found. v. City of Colo. Springs, 2018 CO 10, 410 P.3d 1236.
Coal tar contamination generated through the operation of a coal gasification plant constituted injury from the operation or maintenance of a public gas facility, and immunity is therefore waived under subsection (1)(f). Smokebrush Found. v. City of Colo. Springs, 2018 CO 10, 410 P.3d 1236.
An electrical vault on private property used as a restaurant is a public electrical facility for purposes of subsections (1)(e) and (1)(f); there is a public benefit from the usage of the electricity because the general public patronizes the restaurant and because the use of transformers located in such electrical vaults promotes the efficient delivery of electrical power in the town. Ellis v. Town of Estes Park, 66 P.3d 178 (Colo. App. 2002).
Phrase "public water facility" includes a water meter pit. Montoya v. City of Westminster Dept. of Pub. Works, 181 P.3d 1197 (Colo. App. 2008).
Operation of public water facility. Condemnation of fishing rights for recreational use does not fall within this exception to sovereign immunity. Aurora v. Commerce Grp. Corp., 694 P.2d 382 (Colo. App. 1984).
Lake in city park does not fall within the definition of a public water facility or swimming facility under subsection (1)(f). DeAnzona v. City & County of Denver, 222 F.3d 1229 (10th Cir. 2000).
Ride at amusement park constituted a "swimming facility" for purposes of waiving immunity under subsection (1)(f). Water-themed adventure ride supervised by trained lifeguards in which participants generally wear bathing suits and ride a sled down a track, glide part way across a pool of water, and, after coming to a stop in the pool, swim a short distance and then walk out of the pool constitutes a swimming facility. Anderson v. Hyland Hills Park & Recreation Dist., 119 P.3d 533 (Colo. App. 2004).
A golf cart owned and maintained by a recreation district is not a "facility" for purposes of this section. Montes v. Hyland Hills Park, 849 P.2d 852 (Colo. App. 1992).
III. SUBSECTION (1.5).
The state is exposed to significant liability if negligence actions by prisoners are allowed, because of the unique nature of prisons and the obligations imposed in operating them. Subsection (1.5) recognizes the potential liability of the state, eliminates the potential exposure to this liability, and prevents the state from being subjected to frivolous lawsuits that may be brought by inmates. Davis v. Paolino, 21 P.3d 870 (Colo. App. 2001).
The waiver of immunity in subsection (1.5)(b) applies to both intentional torts and acts of negligence. Cisneros v. Elder, 2022 CO 13M, 506 P.3d 828.
Plaintiff's claim for false imprisonment — an intentional tort — was not barred. Cisneros v. Elder, 2022 CO 13M, 506 P.3d 828.
The statutory language waiving immunity for "claimants who are incarcerated but not yet convicted" and who "can show injury due to negligence" sets a floor, not a ceiling. Cisneros v. Elder, 2022 CO 13M, 506 P.3d 828.
Immunity is waived where claimant pled guilty to a criminal charge and received a sentence of supervised probation, but was not sentenced to incarceration. Montoya v. Newman, 115 F. Supp. 3d 1263 (D. Colo. 2015).
Immunity is waived where decedent was incarcerated for violation of a protection order at the time of her death, but was not yet convicted of that offense. Because the offense of violation of a protection order had not yet been adjudicated, decedent was not convicted of the offense for which she was being incarcerated. Heidel v. Rio Blanco, 2023 COA 41, 534 P.3d 524.
Applied in Duke v. Gunnison County, 2019 COA 170, 456 P.3d 38; Cisneros v. Elder, 2022 COA 106, 522 P.3d 255.
IV. SUBSECTION (2).
Running a red light without slowing down is not "within the provisions of" § 42-4-108 (2)(b); therefore, the government may be held liable for an accident resulting from such conduct. Tunget v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 992 P.2d 650 (Colo. App. 1999).
Individual defendants were not immune from liability pursuant to subsections (2) and (3) for negligent acts committed in course of operating correctional facility, and, therefore, state is not immune pursuant to this section. State v. Nieto, 993 P.2d 493 (Colo. 2000).
V. SUBSECTION (3).
Individual defendants were not immune from liability pursuant to subsections (2) and (3) for negligent acts committed in the course of operating a correctional facility and, therefore, state is not immune under governmental immunity pursuant to this section. State v. Nieto, 993 P.2d 493 (Colo. 2000).
VI. SUBSECTION (4).
Subsection (4) bars trespass claims in damage actions against public water or public sanitation facilities. In actions for injuries resulting from a dangerous condition of, or the operation and maintenance of, a public water facility or public sanitation facility, subsection (4) operates to bar claims that would otherwise allow recovery without a showing of negligence. Colorado law does not recognize negligence-based trespass claims. Accordingly, allowing plaintiffs to pursue a trespass claim in this case is directly at odds with the requirement in subsection (4) that negligence be proven to establish liability in such actions. Lawrence v. Buena Vista Sanitation Dist. 989 P.2d 254 (Colo. App. 1999).
Subsection (4) bars trespass and nuisance claims against a board of county commissioners. Langlois v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 78 P.3d 1154 (Colo. App. 2003).
24-10-106.1. Immunity and partial waiver - claims against the state - injuries from prescribed fire - on or after January 1, 2012.
(1) Notwithstanding any other provision of this article, the state shall be immune from liability in all claims for injury that lie in tort or could lie in tort regardless of whether that may be the type of action or the form of relief chosen by the claimant except as provided otherwise in this section or section 24-10-106. In addition to any other claims for which the state waives immunity under this article, sovereign immunity is waived by the state in an action for injuries resulting from a prescribed fire started or maintained by the state or any of its employees on or after January 1, 2012.
(2) Nothing in this section shall be construed to constitute a waiver of sovereign immunity if the injury arises from any act, or failure to act, of a state employee if the act is the type of act for which the state employee would be or heretofore has been personally immune from liability.
(3) In addition to the immunity provided under subsection (1) of this section, the state shall also have the same immunity as a state employee for any act or failure to act for which a state employee would be or heretofore has been personally immune from liability.
(4) No rule of law imposing absolute or strict liability shall be applied in any action against the state for an injury resulting from a prescribed fire started or maintained by the state or any of its employees. No liability shall be imposed in any such action unless negligence is proven.
Source: L. 2012: Entire section added, (HB 12-1361), ch. 242, p. 1145, § 2, effective June 4.
24-10-106.3. Immunity and partial waiver - claims for serious bodily injury or death on public school property or at school-sponsored events resulting from incidents of school violence - short title - definitions.
(1) This section shall be known and may be cited as the "Claire Davis School Safety Act".
(2) Definitions. For purposes of this section, unless the context otherwise requires:
(a) "Charter school" means a charter school or an institute charter school established pursuant to article 30.5 of title 22, C.R.S.
(b) "Crime of violence" means that the person committed, conspired to commit, or attempted to commit one of the following crimes:
(I) Murder;
(II) First degree assault; or
(III) A felony sexual assault, as defined in section 18-3-402, C.R.S.
(c) "Incident of school violence" means an occurrence at a public school or public school-sponsored activity in which a person:
(I) Engaged in a crime of violence; and
(II) The actions described in subparagraph (I) of this paragraph (c) by that person caused serious bodily injury or death to any other person.
(d) "Public school" has the same meaning as provided in section 22-1-101, C.R.S., and includes a charter school or institute charter school.
(e) "School district" means a school district organized pursuant to article 30 of title 22, C.R.S., and the charter school institute established pursuant to section 22-30.5-503, C.R.S.
(f) "Serious bodily injury" means bodily injury that, either at the time of the actual injury or a later time, involves a substantial risk of death, a substantial risk of serious permanent disfigurement, or a substantial risk of protracted loss or impairment of the function of any part or organ of the body.
(3) Recognition of duty of care. All school districts and charter schools and their employees in this state have a duty to exercise reasonable care to protect all students, faculty, and staff from harm from acts committed by another person when the harm is reasonably foreseeable, while such students, faculty, and staff are within the school facilities or are participating in school-sponsored activities.
(4) Limited waiver of sovereign immunity. Notwithstanding any other provision of this article, a public school district or charter school is immune from liability in all claims for injury that lie in tort or could lie in tort regardless of whether that may be the type of action or the form of relief chosen by the claimant except as otherwise provided in this section or in this article. In addition to any other claims for which the "Colorado Governmental Immunity Act" waives sovereign immunity in this article, sovereign immunity is waived under the "Colorado Governmental Immunity Act" with respect to school districts and charter schools for a claim of a breach of the duty of care established in subsection (3) of this section by the school district, a charter school, or an employee of the school district or charter school arising from an incident of school violence on or after June 3, 2015, and, with respect to such claims, the provisions of article 12 of title 22, C.R.S., do not apply to school districts and charter schools. An employee of a public school, school district, or a charter school is not subject to suit under this section in his or her individual capacity unless the employee's actions or omissions are willful and wanton.
(5) A public school, school district, or charter school shall not be found negligent under this section solely as a result of not expelling or suspending any student.
(6) Nothing in this section shall be construed to constitute a waiver of sovereign immunity by a school district or charter school if the injury arises from any act, or failure to act, of an employee of the school district or charter school if the act is the type of act for which the school district or charter school employee would be or heretofore has been personally immune from liability.
(7) In addition to the immunity provided under this section, the school district and charter school shall also have the same immunity as a school district or charter school employee for any act or failure to act for which a school district or charter school employee would be or heretofore has been personally immune from liability.
(8) No rule of law imposing absolute or strict liability shall be applied in any action filed against a school district or charter school pursuant to this section for serious bodily injury or death caused by a breach of the duty of care, established pursuant to subsection (3) of this section. No liability shall be imposed in any such action unless negligence is proven.
(9) (a) Except as provided in paragraph (b) of this subsection (9), the maximum amount of damages that may be recovered under this article in any single occurrence from a school district or charter school for a claim brought under this section is governed by the limits set forth in section 24-10-114 (1).
(b) Repealed.
(10) In order to promote vigorous discovery of events leading to an incident of school violence in any action brought under this section, an offer of judgment by a defendant under section 13-17-202, C.R.S., prior to the completion of discovery, is not deemed rejected if not accepted until fourteen days after the completion of discovery, and the plaintiff is not liable for costs due to not accepting such an offer of judgment until fourteen days after the completion of discovery. If a defendant refuses to answer a complaint, or a default judgment is entered against a defendant for failure to answer a complaint, or a defendant confesses liability in an action brought under this section, the court shall allow full discovery upon request of the plaintiff.
Source: L. 2015: Entire section added, (SB 15-213), ch. 266, p. 1036, § 2, effective June 3.
Editor's note: Subsection (9)(b)(II) provided for the repeal of subsection (9)(b), effective July 1, 2018. (See L. 2015, p. 1036.)
Cross references: For the legislative declaration in SB 15-213, see section 1 of chapter 266, Session Laws of Colorado 2015.
ANNOTATION
Law reviews. For comment, "The Claire Davis School Safety Act: Why Threat Assessments in Schools Will Not Help Colorado", see 93 Denv. L. Rev. 719 (2016).
A party may not use procedural mechanisms to unilaterally resolve a case before the completion of full discovery, but the use of procedural mechanisms may be appropriate to obtain dismissal of a case after full discovery has been completed. This section does not require that a case proceed to trial. Castillo v. STEM Sch. Highlands Ranch, 2025 COA 88, 582 P.3d 1045.
Trial court did not err in dismissing as moot a case brought under the Colorado Governmental Immunity Act and this section after full discovery was completed and the defendant school deposited the maximum amount recoverable by the plaintiffs into the court's registry under C.R.C.P. 67(a) and agreed that the sum should be delivered to the plaintiffs in satisfaction of their claim, which requested only monetary damages as relief. No jury trial was required and the defendant school was not required to admit liability before the case could be dismissed as moot. Castillo v. STEM Sch. Highlands Ranch, 2025 COA 88, 582 P.3d 1045.
24-10-106.5. Duty of care.
(1) In order to encourage the provision of services to protect the public health and safety and to allow public entities to allocate their limited fiscal resources, a public entity or public employee shall not be deemed to have assumed a duty of care where none otherwise existed by the performance of a service or an act of assistance for the benefit of any person. The adoption of a policy or a regulation to protect any person's health or safety shall not give rise to a duty of care on the part of a public entity or public employee where none otherwise existed. In addition, the enforcement of or failure to enforce any such policy or regulation or the mere fact that an inspection was conducted in the course of enforcing such policy or regulation shall not give rise to a duty of care where none otherwise existed; however, in a situation in which sovereign immunity has been waived in accordance with the provisions of this article, nothing shall be deemed to foreclose the assumption of a duty of care by a public entity or public employee when the public entity or public employee requires any person to perform any act as the result of such an inspection or as the result of the application of such policy or regulation. Nothing in this section shall be construed to relieve a public entity of a duty of care expressly imposed under other statutory provision.
(2) Except as otherwise provided in section 24-10-106.3, which recognizes a duty of reasonable care upon public school districts, charter schools, and their employees, nothing in this article shall be deemed to create any duty of care.
Source: L. 86: Entire section added, p. 876, § 6, effective July 1. L. 2015: (2) amended, (SB 15-213), ch. 266, p. 1039, § 3, effective June 3.
Cross references: For the legislative declaration in SB 15-213, see section 1 of chapter 266, Session Laws of Colorado 2015.
ANNOTATION
A basic purpose of the Government Immunity Act is to allow a person to seek redress for injuries caused by a public entity, and the government immunity created by the Act, being in derogation of the common law, must be strictly construed. State v. Moldovan, 842 P.2d 220 (Colo. 1992).
The language of this section, recognizing that the state is bound by certain statutory duties, does not create an implied waiver of sovereign immunity. Imposition of a duty of care alone is insufficient to waive sovereign immunity. Dept. of Hwys. v. Mtn. States Tel., 869 P.2d 1289 (Colo. 1994).
While this provision precludes the creation of new duties for public entities or employees, it does not seek to limit prior existing common law duties. Gallegos v. City & County of Denver, 894 P.2d 14 (Colo. App. 1994), rev'd on other grounds, 916 P.2d 509 (Colo. 1996).
Even though generally there is no duty to protect students off the school premises, whether a school may, through its actions and policies, undertake such a duty (in this case rules and regulations restricting travel to school by bicycle) is a factual question to be determined by the judge or jury. Jefferson County Sch. Dist. R-1 v. Justus, 725 P.2d 767 (Colo. 1986) (case arose prior to enactment of this section).
School district did not assume duty to provide crossing guards at an intersection in the morning when kindergartners were walking home even though crossing guards were placed at the intersection in the afternoon. Jefferson County Sch. Dist. R-1 v. Gilbert, 725 P.2d 774 (Colo. 1986) (case arose prior to enactment of this section).
Applied in Fine v. Tumpkin, 330 F. Supp. 3d 1246 (D. Colo. 2018).
24-10-107. Determination of liability.
Except as otherwise provided in this article, where sovereign immunity is not a bar under section 24-10-106, liability of the public entity shall be determined in the same manner as if the public entity were a private person.
Source: L. 71: p. 1207, § 1. C.R.S. 1963: § 130-11-7. L. 86: Entire section amended, p. 877, § 7, effective July 1.
ANNOTATION
Section authorizes an award of costs against a public entity in a tort action under the Governmental Immunity Act. Nguyen v. Reg'l Transp. Dist., 987 P.2d 933 (Colo. App. 1999).
This section does not amount to an explicit legislative authorization to assess costs against a public entity in a contract action but rather applies only to tort actions. Denny Constr., Inc. v. City & County of Denver, 170 P.3d 733 (Colo. App. 2007), rev'd on other grounds, 199 P.3d 742 (Colo. 2009).
Applied in Martinez v. City of Lakewood, 655 P.2d 1388 (Colo. App. 1982); Kussman v. City & County of Denver, 671 P.2d 1000 (Colo. App. 1983).
24-10-108. Sovereign immunity a bar.
Except as provided in sections 24-10-104 to 24-10-106 and 24-10-106.3, sovereign immunity shall be a bar to any action against a public entity for injury which lies in tort or could lie in tort regardless of whether that may be the type of action or the form of relief chosen by a claimant. If a public entity raises the issue of sovereign immunity prior to or after the commencement of discovery, the court shall suspend discovery, except any discovery necessary to decide the issue of sovereign immunity and shall decide such issue on motion. The court's decision on such motion shall be a final judgment and shall be subject to interlocutory appeal.
Source: L. 71: p. 1207, § 1. C.R.S. 1963: § 130-11-8. L. 86: Entire section amended, p. 877, § 8, effective July 1. L. 92: Entire section amended, p. 1117, § 3, effective July 1. L. 2015: Entire section amended, (SB 15-213), ch. 266, p. 1039, § 4, effective June 3.
Cross references: For the legislative declaration in SB 15-213, see section 1 of chapter 266, Session Laws of Colorado 2015.
ANNOTATION
Law reviews. For article, "'Trinity' Hearings: Understanding Colorado Governmental Immunity Act Motions to Dismiss", see 33 Colo. Law. 91 (Dec. 2004). For article, "Bailment Claims Under the Colorado Government Immunity Act and the Economic Loss Doctrine", see 44 Colo. Law. 37 (Sept. 2015).
No waiver of eleventh amendment immunity. A state's waiver of its immunity against suit in its own courts does not constitute a waiver of its eleventh amendment immunity against suit in federal court. Verner v. Colo., 533 F. Supp. 1109 (D. Colo. 1982), aff'd, 716 F.2d 1352 (10th Cir. 1983).
Sovereign immunity is in derogation of the common law and must be strictly construed. Exceptions to immunity are to be narrowly interpreted to avoid imposing liability not specifically provided for in the Colorado Governmental Immunity Act (CGIA). Richland Dev. Co. v. E. Cherry Creek, 934 P.2d 841 (Colo. App. 1996).
Courts must address sovereign immunity under the CGIA at the earliest possible stage of the case, and may in its discretion defer ruling on other questions, including those related to class certifications, until after sovereign immunity has been addressed. Grand Junction Peace Officers' Ass'n v. City of Grand Junction, 2024 COA 89, 558 P.3d 1021.
The CGIA provides that a public entity shall be immune from liability in all claims for injury which lie in tort or could lie in tort unless the injury is among those for which immunity has been expressly waived. Berg v. State Bd. of Agric., 919 P.2d 254 (Colo. 1996); Foster v. Bd. of Governors of Univ. Sys., 2014 COA 18, 342 P.3d 497, overruled in City of Aspen v. Burlingame Ranch II Condo., 2024 CO 46, 551 P.3d 665, to the extent the opinion considered the economic loss rule to determine whether a claim lies in tort or could lie in tort for purposes of the CGIA.
The CGIA is less concerned with what the plaintiff is arguing and more concerned with what the plaintiff could argue. The form of the complaint is not determinative of the claim's basis in tort or contract. A court must consider the nature of the injury and the relief sought. A court will assess the nature of the injury and the relief requested on a case-by-case basis through a close examination of the pleadings and undisputed evidence. Berg v. State Bd. of Agric., 919 P.2d 254 (Colo. 1996); Robinson v. Colo. State Lottery Div., 179 P.3d 998 (Colo. 2008).
When the injury arises either out of conduct that is tortious in nature or out of the breach of a duty recognized in tort law, and when the relief seeks to compensate the plaintiff for that injury, the claim likely lies in tort or could lie in tort for purposes of the CGIA. Robinson v. Colo. State Lottery Div., 179 P.3d 998 (Colo. 2008).
The nature of the relief is not dispositive as to the question of whether a claim lies in tort. Rather, the relief requested is merely an aid in understanding the duty breached or the injury caused to determine if the claim lies or could lie in tort. Robinson v. Colo. State Lottery Div., 179 P.3d 998 (Colo. 2008); Grand Junction Peace Officers' Ass'n v. City of Grand Junction, 2024 COA 89, 558 P.3d 1021.
The dispositive question is whether the claim is a tort claim or could be a tort claim for purposes of analysis under the CGIA. Berg v. State Bd. of Agric., 919 P.2d 254 (Colo. 1996); Robinson v. Colo. State Lottery Div., 155 P.3d 409 (Colo. App. 2006), aff'd, 179 P.3d 998 (Colo. 2008); Foster v. Bd. of Governors of Univ. Sys., 2014 COA 18, 342 P.3d 497 , overruled in City of Aspen v. Burlingame Ranch II Condo., 2024 CO 46, 551 P.3d 665, to the extent the opinion considered the economic loss rule to determine whether a claim lies in tort or could lie in tort for purposes of the CGIA; City of Aspen v. Burlingame Ranch II Condo., 2024 CO 46, 551 P.3d 655 (overruling Foster v. Bd. of Governors of Univ. Sys., 2014 COA 18, 342 P.3d 497, to the extent it considered the economic loss rule as part of the CGIA inquiry); Grand Junction Peace Officers' Ass'n v. City of Grand Junction, 2024 COA 89, 558 P.3d 1021.
If a claim could arise in tort and in contract, the claim is barred under the CGIA because it could lie in tort. The economic loss doctrine does not affect or apply to the CGIA subject matter jurisdiction analysis. City of Aspen v. Burlingame Ranch II Condo., 2024 CO 46, 551 P.3d 655 (overruling Foster v. Bd. of Governors of Univ. Sys., 2014 COA 18, 342 P.3d 497, to the extent it considered the economic loss rule as part of the CGIA inquiry).
Cases that could arise in both tort and contract are barred by the CGIA, for example, where a plaintiff could either sue to rescind a contract or affirm a contract and sue in tort for damages, while claims arising solely in contract are not subject to the CGIA. Robinson v. Colo. State Lottery Div., 179 P.3d 998 (Colo. 2008).
CGIA bars a claim for replevin of property that was rightfully obtained but allegedly wrongfully detained. The claim lies or could lie in tort. The CGIA bars tort claims and there is no waiver for an action in replevin for property to obtain possession of property validly seized by a public entity's police power. Woo v. El Paso County Sheriff's Office, 2020 COA 134, 490 P.3d 884, aff'd, 2022 CO 56, 528 P.3d 899.
Applying the CGIA to replevin claim does not violate plaintiff's due process rights because he had a meaningful post-seizure remedy in a related criminal case. Woo v. El Paso County Sheriff's Office, 2020 COA 134, 490 P.3d 884, aff'd, 2022 CO 56, 528 P.3d 899.
Claims barred under the CGIA because they do not or could not lie in tort. Employees' breach of contract claims alleging that defendant trustees participating in the trust breached their fiduciary duty and violated the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing do not, and could not, lie in tort because the trustees' fiduciary duty was created by contract in the form of the trust agreements. Casey v. CHEIBA Trust, 2012 COA 134M, 310 P.3d 196, disavowed in City of Aspen v. Burlingame Ranch II Condo., 2024 CO 46, 551 P.3d 665, to the extent the opinion stands for the proposition that courts may apply the economic loss rule to determine whether a claim lies in tort or could lie in tort for purposes of the CGIA.
Similarly, employees' claim that the colleges breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing is a contractual claim not a claim that lies, or could lie, in tort. Casey v. CHEIBA Trust, 2012 COA 134M, 310 P.3d 196, disavowed in City of Aspen v. Burlingame Ranch II Condo., 2024 CO 46, 551 P.3d 665, to the extent the opinion stands for the proposition that courts may apply the economic loss rule to determine whether a claim lies in tort or could lie in tort for purposes of the CGIA.
Inverse condemnation claims do not, and could not, lie in tort. An inverse condemnation claim is neither contractual nor tortious in nature and is not subject to the CGIA. Casey v. CHEIBA Trust, 2012 COA 134M, 310 P.3d 196, disavowed in City of Aspen v. Burlingame Ranch II Condo., 2024 CO 46, 551 P.3d 665, to the extent the opinion stands for the proposition that courts may apply the economic loss rule to determine whether a claim lies in tort or could lie in tort for purposes of the CGIA.
Breach of contract claims that lie, or could lie, in tort. Employees' breach of contract claim alleging that defendants breached their fiduciary duties lies, or could lie, in tort because the contractual provisions concerning fiduciary duties, found in the trust agreements, only apply to the trustee defendants. The source of any fiduciary duty that the other defendants owe the employees thus lies outside the trust agreements, and would be found in statute or common law. Casey v. CHEIBA Trust, 2012 COA 134M, 310 P.3d 196, disavowed in City of Aspen v. Burlingame Ranch II Condo., 2024 CO 46, 551 P.3d 665, to the extent the opinion stands for the proposition that courts may apply the economic loss rule to determine whether a claim lies in tort or could lie in tort for purposes of the CGIA.
Claim for relief based on mutual or unilateral mistake lies, or could lie, in tort because this claim is based on allegations of attorney misconduct or misrepresentation, which involve a special duty that could support a tort claim. Casey v. CHEIBA Trust, 2012 COA 134M, 310 P.3d 196, disavowed in City of Aspen v. Burlingame Ranch II Condo., 2024 CO 46, 551 P.3d 665, to the extent the opinion stands for the proposition that courts may apply the economic loss rule to determine whether a claim lies in tort or could lie in tort for purposes of the CGIA.
A claim that is supported by allegations of misrepresentation or fraud is likely a claim that could lie in tort. Robinson v. Colo. State Lottery Div., 179 P.3d 998 (Colo. 2008); City of Raton v. Ark. River Power Auth., 611 F. Supp. 2d 1190 (D. Colo. 2008); Grand Junction Peace Officers' Ass'n v. City of Grand Junction, 2024 COA 89, 558 P.3d 1021.
A claim for unjust enrichment can be predicated on either tort or contract. Because this particular unjust enrichment claim is predicated on tortious conduct and the nature of the injury arises out of a misrepresentation, this claim lies in tort or could lie in tort for purposes of the CGIA. Robinson v. Colo. State Lottery Div., 179 P.3d 998 (Colo. 2008); Grand Junction Peace Officers' Ass'n v. City of Grand Junction, 2024 COA 89, 558 P.3d 1021.
The CGIA bars claim for damages resulting from city's delay in issuing a certificate of occupancy. Because a building permit is not a contract that promises or impliedly promises subsequent issuance of a certificate of occupancy, the claim could only lie in tort. Patzer v. City of Loveland, 80 P.3d 908 (Colo. App. 2003).
The CGIA does not afford state agencies protection from plaintiff's promissory estoppel claims because promissory estoppel is a distinct contract claim. Berg v. State Bd. of Agric., 919 P.2d 254 (Colo. 1996).
County is a "public entity" entitled to sovereign immunity. Am. Employers Ins. Co. v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 547 F.2d 511 (10th Cir. 1976).
If § 24-10-106 (1)(d) is struck, county remains immune. If paragraph (d) of subsection (1) is struck from § 24-10-106, a county remains immune as to an accident occurring on a county road, because the effect of striking paragraph (d) would be not to extend the waiver of immunity to county roads but, rather, to rescind the waiver as to the roads described in paragraph (d). Am. Employers Ins. Co. v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 547 F.2d 511 (10th Cir. 1976).
When claimed by a public entity before trial, the issue of governmental immunity is to be determined by the court. Generally, such issue is a question of subject matter jurisdiction to be decided pursuant to C.R.C.P. 12(b)(1). Kittinger v. City of Colo. Springs, 872 P.2d 1265 (Colo. App. 1993); Hendricks by & through Martens v. Weld, 895 P.2d 1120 (Colo. App. 1995).
Case remanded to trial court for further discovery on the issue of actual notice where trial court did not allow hold an evidentiary hearing or allow the plaintiff to conduct full discovery on the issue of whether defendant had actual notice of ice on the sidewalk outside a public building. Seder v. City of Ft. Collins, 987 P.2d 904 (Colo. App. 1999).
A state actor cannot avoid liability under a state immunity provision in an action brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. City of Lakewood v. Brace, 919 P.2d 231 (Colo. 1996).
The manner in which a claim is characterized is not controlling. When determining if a claim is barred by the CGIA, the dispositive question is whether the claim is a tort claim or could be a tort claim. City of Lakewood v. Brace, 919 P.2d 231 (Colo. 1996); City of Aspen v. Burlingame Ranch II Condo., 2024 CO 46, 551 P.3d 655.
Under the plain language of this section, the denial of a summary judgment motion asserting a sovereign immunity defense on behalf of a municipality is immediately appealable. City of Lakewood v. Brace, 919 P.2d 231 (Colo. 1996).
C.R.C.P. 54(b) certification not required for appeal from order granting or denying motion to dismiss based on governmental immunity. Richland Dev. Co. v. E. Cherry Creek Valley Water & San. Dist., 899 P.2d 371 (Colo. App. 1995).
Statutory limitation on judgment in § 24-10-114 is not an affirmative defense and is not waived if not presented in the pleadings, at trial, or in a motion for a new trial. City of Colo. Springs v. Gladin, 198 Colo. 333, 599 P.2d 907 (1979).
Later legislative enactment cannot effect a reversal of final appellate determination of the jurisdiction of the court under the CGIA. Powell v. City of Colo. Springs, 131 P.3d 1129 (Colo. App. 2005), aff'd, 156 P.3d 461 (Colo. 2007); Speight Family P'ship, LLLP v. City of Colo. Springs, 131 P.3d 1136 (Colo. App. 2005), aff'd, 155 P.3d 1099 (Colo. 2007).
Where there is a conflict between this statute and a rule which mandates that a judgment include any damages sustained, this statute governs and damages are not recoverable. Sherman v. Colo. Springs Planning Comm'n, 729 P.2d 1014 (Colo. App. 1986), aff'd, 763 P.2d 292 (Colo. 1988).
Express waiver of immunity bars defense. In claim against police officers and city, city waived immunity by confessing liability if arrestee prevailed on assault and battery claims against police, regardless of finding of negligence against city, and by stating as affirmative defense that arrestee's recovery was limited by CGIA, even though city incorrectly believed its self-insurance affected its immunity. Valdez v. City & County of Denver, 764 P.2d 393 (Colo. App. 1988) (decided under law in effect prior to 1986 amendment).
Sovereign immunity issues are neither jury questions nor matters to be determined according to summary judgment standards, but are to be determined by the court in accordance with C.R.C.P. 12(b)(1). Jarvis by & through Jarvis v. Deyoe, 892 P.2d 398 (Colo. App. 1994).
In resolving immunity issue the trial court did not limit itself to a consideration of the evidentiary materials submitted in support of and in opposition to the request for summary judgment, but instead properly conducted an evidentiary hearing and received testimony from witnesses. Cline v. Rabson, 862 P.2d 1035 (Colo. App. 1993).
A retaliatory discharge claim is a common law tort claim. Consequently, wrongful discharge claims are barred by the CGIA. Dyer v. Jefferson County Sch. Dist. R-1, 905 F. Supp. 864 (D. Colo. 1995).
Claims based on negligent misrepresentation or for estoppel of a municipality based on alleged misrepresentation are tort claims. Consequently, such claims are barred by this act. Arabasz v. Schwartzberg, 943 P.2d 463 (Colo. App. 1996).
The partial summary judgment granted to the defendant city is reviewable pursuant to this section because it was based on plaintiffs' argument that their equitable estoppel claim did not lie in tort and could not lie in tort and therefore was not barred by sovereign immunity. Kohn v. City of Boulder, 919 P.2d 822 (Colo. App. 1995).
Any appeal of the dismissal of a claim as barred by the CGIA must be sought immediately within the time limits specified in rule 4(a) of the Colorado appellate rules, or it is barred. Buckles v. State, Div. of Wildlife, 952 P.2d 855 (Colo. App. 1998).
Reference to "final judgment" does not require the public entity to pursue an interlocutory appeal whenever a trial court denies its pre-trial motion to dismiss. Rather, the section merely provides that the trial court's ruling is subject to interlocutory appeal. Walton v. State, 968 P.2d 636 (Colo. 1998) (holding contrary to Buckles v. State, 952 P.2d 855 (Colo. App. 1998)).
A trial court retains jurisdiction to hear the claims against nongovernmental defendants while an interlocutory appeal brought by a governmental entity pursuant to this section is pending. Christel v. EB Eng'g, Inc., 116 P.3d 1267 (Colo. App. 2005).
A district court's order that dismisses a plaintiff's claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction due to a public entity being immune from suit under the CGIA but leaves plaintiff's other claims unresolved may be appealed by the plaintiff in either an immediate interlocutory appeal or an appeal filed at the conclusion of the case. Smith v. City & County of Denver, 2025 COA 70, 577 P.3d 477.
Applied in Gray v. City of Manitou Springs, 43 Colo. App. 60, 598 P.2d 527 (1979); Szymanski v. State Dept. of Hwys., 776 P.2d 1124 (Colo. App. 1989); Mentzel v. Judicial Dept., 778 P.2d 323 (Colo. App. 1989); State v. Zahourek, 935 P.2d 74 (Colo. App. 1996); Robinson v. Colo. State Lottery Div., 155 P.3d 409 (Colo. App. 2006), aff'd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 179 P.3d 998 (Colo. 2008).
24-10-109. Notice required - contents - to whom given - limitations.
(1) Any person claiming to have suffered an injury by a public entity or by an employee thereof while in the course of such employment, whether or not by a willful and wanton act or omission, shall file a written notice as provided in this section within one hundred eighty-two days after the date of the discovery of the injury, regardless of whether the person then knew all of the elements of a claim or of a cause of action for such injury. Compliance with the provisions of this section shall be a jurisdictional prerequisite to any action brought under the provisions of this article, and failure of compliance shall forever bar any such action.
(2) The notice shall contain the following:
(a) The name and address of the claimant and the name and address of his attorney, if any;
(b) A concise statement of the factual basis of the claim, including the date, time, place, and circumstances of the act, omission, or event complained of;
(c) The name and address of any public employee involved, if known;
(d) A concise statement of the nature and the extent of the injury claimed to have been suffered;
(e) A statement of the amount of monetary damages that is being requested.
(3) (a) If the claim is against the state or an employee thereof, the notice shall be filed with the attorney general. If the claim is against any other public entity or an employee thereof, the notice shall be filed with the governing body of the public entity or the attorney representing the public entity. Such notice shall be effective upon mailing by registered or certified mail, return receipt requested, or upon personal service.
(b) A notice required under this section that is properly filed with a public entity's agent listed in the inventory of local governmental entities pursuant to section 24-32-116, is deemed to satisfy the requirements of this section.
(4) When the claim is one for death by wrongful act or omission, the notice may be presented by the personal representative, surviving spouse, or next of kin of the deceased.
(5) Any action brought pursuant to this article shall be commenced within the time period provided for that type of action in articles 80 and 81 of title 13, C.R.S., relating to limitation of actions, or it shall be forever barred; except that, if compliance with the provisions of subsection (6) of this section would otherwise result in the barring of an action, such time period shall be extended by the time period required for compliance with the provisions of subsection (6) of this section.
(6) No action brought pursuant to this article shall be commenced until after the claimant who has filed timely notice pursuant to subsection (1) of this section has received notice from the public entity that the public entity has denied the claim or until after ninety days has passed following the filing of the notice of claim required by this section, whichever occurs first.
(7) The notice required pursuant to this section does not apply to claims made pursuant to the waiver of governmental immunity described in section 24-10-106 (1)(j) and any action brought pursuant to part 12 of article 20 of title 13 thereto is not barred under this section.
Source: L. 71: p. 1207, § 1. C.R.S. 1963: § 130-11-9. L. 79: (1) amended, p. 862, § 2, effective July 1. L. 86: (1), (2)(b), (3), and (5) amended and (6) added, p. 877, § 9, effective July 1. L. 92: (1) amended, p. 1117, § 4, effective July 1. L. 2009: (3) amended, (HB 09-1248), ch. 252, p. 1136, § 21, effective May 14. L. 2012: (1) amended, (SB 12-175), ch. 208, p. 881, § 145, effective July 1; (3) amended, (HB 12-1244), ch. 172, p. 616, § 1, effective August 8. L. 2021: (7) added, (SB 21-088), ch. 442, p. 2927, § 4, effective January 1, 2022.
Cross references: For the legislative declaration in SB 21-088, see section 1 of chapter 442, Session Laws of Colorado 2021.
ANNOTATION
I. General Consideration.
II. Applicability.
III. Purpose of Notice Requirement.
IV. Compliance.
V. Time Periods.
I. GENERAL CONSIDERATION.
Law reviews. For article, "1988 Update on Colorado Tort Reform Legislation — Part I", see 17 Colo. Law. 1790 (1988). For article, "Substantial Compliance With Governmental Immunity Act Notice Requirements," see 21 Colo. Law. 471 (1992). For article, "Asserting Governmental Immunity by Attacking Subject Matter Jurisdiction", see 22 Colo. Law. 2551 (1993). For article, "Discovery: A Prerequisite to the Running of the Governmental Notice Period", see 24 Colo. Law. 2381 (1995).
Annotator's note. Since § 24-10-109 is similar to repealed C.R.S. 1963, § 139-35-1, relevant cases construing that provision have been included in annotations to this section.
Section does not violate the equal protection clauses of either the Colorado or United States Constitution. Fritz v. Regents of Univ. of Colo., 196 Colo. 335, 586 P.2d 23 (1978); Uberoi v. Univ. of Colo., 713 P.2d 894 (Colo. 1986).
Although section establishes two classes. This section results in the establishment of two different classes: persons damaged by a tort committed by a public entity and persons damaged by a tort committed by a private person. Fritz v. Regents of Univ. of Colo., 196 Colo. 335, 586 P.2d 23 (1978).
Section controls over more stringent city ordinance. To the extent that a city ordinance governing the notice of claim imposes more stringent requirements than those imposed by this section, this section controls. State Comp. Ins. Fund v. City of Colo. Springs, 43 Colo. App. 112, 602 P.2d 881 (1979).
Effect of a nonclaim statute is to bar substantive claims. Barnhill v. Pub. Serv. Co., 649 P.2d 716 (Colo. App. 1982), aff'd, 690 P.2d 1248 (Colo. 1984).
Limitations for § 1983 actions. While actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 are governed by state statutes of limitation, the applicable state statute of limitations is former § 13-80-106 (now § 13-80-103) and not the time limit found in this act. Mucci v. Falcon Sch. Dist. No. 49, 655 P.2d 422 (Colo. App. 1982) (decided prior to 1986 enactment of § 24-10-119).
Notice issues arising under the Colorado Governmental Immunity Act (CGIA) must be decided pursuant to C.R.C.P. 12(b)(1), rather than by summary judgment and, depending on the case, the trial court may allow limited discovery and conduct an evidentiary hearing before deciding the notice issue. Capra v. Tucker, 857 P.2d 1346 (Colo. App. 1993); Lafitte v. State Hwy. Dept., 885 P.2d 338 (Colo. App. 1994); Armstead v. Mem'l Hosp., 892 P.2d 450 (Colo. App. 1995); Miller v. Campbell, 971 P.2d 261 (Colo. App. 1998).
A plaintiff's failure to meet the 180-day notice requirement is a jurisdictional defect that may be raised by the defendant or the court at any time, but a plaintiff's failure to meet the notice requirement of subsection (3) is not jurisdictional and merely gives rise to an affirmative defense that must be timely raised by the defendant. Brock v. Nyland, 955 P.2d 1037 (Colo. 1998).
Compliance with the 180-day notice requirement is a jurisdictional prerequisite to suit. Water Dist. v. Bd. of Land Comm'rs, 968 P.2d 168 (Colo. App. 1998); Bird v. Pioneers Hosp., 121 F. Supp. 2d 1321 (D. Colo. 2000).
A challenge to the contents of a notice of claim raises an issue of "sovereign immunity" for purposes of § 24-10-118 (2.5); the trial court's ruling in this case was a "final judgment" subject to interlocutory appeal. Bresciani v. Haragan, 968 P.2d 153 (Colo. App. 1998).
A claim asserted under § 8-2-123 is subject to the notice requirement in this section. Any claims that might arise under § 8-2-123 more closely resemble claims under the whistleblower act, §§ 24-50.5-101 to 24-50.5-107, which are subject to the CGIA's notice requirement, than those under the employment practices provisions of the Colorado anti-discrimination act, §§ 24-34-400.2 to 24-34-408, which are not. Any claim that may be asserted under § 8-2-123 lies or could lie in tort and therefore is subject to the CGIA's notice requirement. Bakes v. Denver Health & Hosp. Auth., 2025 COA 47, 572 P.3d 146.
Whether the notice of claim sufficiently complied with the requirements of subsection (2) is an issue of law which is to be reviewed de novo. Bresciani v. Haragan, 968 P.2d 153 (Colo. App. 1998).
An equitable defense such as estoppel is inapplicable to this section and is not a defense to a claimant's failure to file written notice. A school district cannot by its own conduct excuse a claimant's failure to comply with the written notice requirements of this section and thereby confer upon the trial court subject-matter jurisdiction to hear claimant's claim. Mesa County Valley Sch. Dist. No. 51 v. Kelsey, 8 P.3d 1200 (Colo. 2000).
The university of Colorado is the "state" for purposes of the subsection (3) notice provision. Schmidt v. Harken, 42 P.3d 34 (Colo. App. 2001).
Applied in Roderick v. City of Colo. Springs, 193 Colo. 104, 563 P.2d 3 (1977); Lipira v. City of Thornton, 41 Colo. App. 401, 585 P.2d 932 (1978); Srb v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 43 Colo. App. 14, 601 P.2d 1082 (1979); Reussow v. Eddington, 483 F. Supp. 739 (D. Colo. 1980); In re Estate of Daigle, 634 P.2d 71 (Colo. 1981); Forrest v. County Comm'rs, 629 P.2d 1105 (Colo. App. 1981); Carroll v. Reg'l Transp. Dist., 638 P.2d 816 (Colo. App. 1981); Martinez v. El Paso County, 673 F. Supp. 1030 (D. Colo. 1987).
II. APPLICABILITY.
It is only where a plaintiff has stated a federal claim that a notice of claim provision may be struck down based on supremacy because allowing a federal claim to be limited by state law would defeat the objective of the federal law. King v. United States, 53 F. Supp. 2d 1056 (D. Colo. 1999), rev'd on other grounds, 301 F.3d 1270 (10th Cir. 2002).
Section applies to all actions which lie in tort, whether recognized at common law or created by statute. State Pers. Bd. v. Lloyd, 752 P.2d 559 (Colo. 1988).
But section does not apply to claims for prospective relief to prevent future injury, and therefore did not bar cross-claims for promissory estoppel and a declaratory judgment that a city-issued rooming and boarding permit allowing use of property for transitional housing would remain valid when the entity that had purchased the property filed the cross-claims during a legal proceeding challenging the validity of the permit. Because the permit was still valid when the entity filed the cross-claims, the entity had not yet suffered an injury triggering the notice requirements of this section. Open Door Ministries v. Lipschuetz, 2016 CO 37M, 373 P.3d 575.
Section relates to matters which have arisen when city is performing proprietary functions, as well as to any other actions which might be brought as a result of negligence for which a city may be responsible. Jacob v. City of Colo. Springs, 175 Colo. 102, 485 P.2d 889 (1971).
Claims arising under the provisions of the Colorado constitution are not authorized in the CGIA and Colorado law requires that causes of action for constitutional violations may be allowed only if there is a specific statutory authority for them. Connolly v. Beckett, 863 F. Supp. 1379 (D. Colo. 1994).
Section does not require a person contracting with state to file requests for payment with the claims commission (since abolished) where money has been previously appropriated therefor and the contract itself provides for the method of payment. Ace Flying Serv., Inc. v. Colo. Dept. of Agric., 136 Colo. 19, 314 P.2d 278 (1957) (decided under former CRS 53, § 130-2-1).
Claim that lawfully seized vehicle was unlawfully retained, could lie in tort and therefore failure to give required notice pursuant to the CGIA required that the action be dismissed. Denver v. Desert Truck Sales, Inc., 837 P.2d 759 (Colo. 1992).
Notice not required where claims arise out of breach of tenure contract. Where the plaintiff's claims arise out of a breach of the contract created by the statutory tenure provisions, the violation is a contractual one and is not covered by this article. Therefore, the plaintiff is not required to give the notice provided for in this section. Ebke v. Julesburg Sch. Dist. No. RE-1, 37 Colo. App. 349, 550 P.2d 355 (1976), aff'd, 193 Colo. 40, 562 P.2d 419 (1977).
A claim for loss of consortium constitutes an injury under the CGIA, and gives rise to a separate and individual right of recovery on behalf of the spouse claiming loss of consortium. A spouse may not maintain a claim for loss of consortium unless the spouse submits his or her own written notice of claim in accordance with the act. Smith v. Winter, 934 P.2d 885 (Colo. App. 1997).
Notice-of-claim provisions were meant to apply to suits against state employees in their individual capacities for willful and wanton conduct despite the absence of sovereign immunity. Middleton v. Hartman, 45 P.3d 721 (Colo. 2002). See also BNC Metro. Dist. 1 v. BNC Metro. Dist. 3, 2025 COA 52, 573 P.3d 129 (notice-of-claim provisions applicable to special district employees sued in their individual capacities regardless of willful and wanton conduct allegations, which were not well-pleaded in any event).
Section applies to civil actions brought under whistleblower statute, §§ 24-50.5-103 and 24-50.5-105. State Pers. Bd. v. Lloyd, 752 P.2d 559 (Colo. 1988).
Section does not apply to contract claims. State Pers. Bd. v. Lloyd, 752 P.2d 559 (Colo. 1988); Barrack v. City of Lafayette, 829 P.2d 424 (Colo. App. 1991).
Section does not apply to claims for civil rights violations. Mucci v. Falcon Sch. Dist., 655 P.2d 422 (Colo. App. 1982); Barrack v. City of Lafayette, 829 P.2d 424 (Colo. App. 1991); Conners v. City of Colo. Springs, 962 P.2d 294 (Colo. App. 1997), aff'd, 993 P.2d 1167 (Colo. 2000).
Compliance with notice provisions required where defendant sought affirmative relief in tort against the plaintiff based on a claim of tortious interference with contract. Water Dist. v. Bd. of Land Comm'rs, 968 P.2d 168 (Colo. App. 1998).
Similarly, where defendant sought affirmative relief for negligent misrepresentation that is different in kind or nature from that claim brought by the plaintiff, such a claim is also subject to the notice of claim requirements under the CGIA; however, if the defendant's counterclaim for negligent misrepresentation is viewed in part as a request to be restored to the position it was in before, in the event the contract is declared void, notice is not required. Water Dist. v. Bd. of Land Comm'rs, 968 P.2d 168 (Colo. App. 1998).
Examples of other situations in which this section does not apply are listed in Conners v. City of Colo. Springs, 962 P.2d 294 (Colo. App. 1997), aff'd, 993 P.2d 1167 (Colo. 2000).
Section does not apply where there was no actual or constructive notice to potential patients that a doctor and his assistants were functioning as public employees. Raicevich v. Plum Creek Med. P.C., 819 F. Supp. 929 (D. Colo. 1993).
Section inapplicable to bankruptcy proceedings brought against state university to set aside a foreclosure sale as a fraudulent transaction since the university waived whatever immunity it had by filing its proofs of claim. Matter of Windrush Assoc. II, 105 B.R. 195 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1989).
Claims arising under the just compensation or due process clauses of the Colorado Constitution are excluded from coverage under the CGIA. Thus, section does not apply. Desert Truck Sales v. City of Denver, 821 P.2d 860 (Colo. App. 1991).
In the case of a federal claim, the court must address the issue of preemption and determine whether applicable federal law preempts the application of the notice-of-claim provisions pursuant to this section. Middleton v. Hartman, 45 P.3d 721 (Colo. 2002).
Section not applicable to federal Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. § 215, retaliation claim against state employees in their individual capacities. FLSA preempts the notice-of-claim provisions in this section, because the requirements of this section stand as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full objective of congress in enacting the FLSA. Middleton v. Hartman, 45 P.3d 721 (Colo. 2002).
Section not applicable to federal civil rights claim. To require notice as a condition precedent to suit would unduly interfere with the federal action. Miami Intern. Realty v. Town of Mt. Crested Butte, 579 F. Supp. 68 (D. Colo. 1984); Chacon v. Zahorka, 663 F. Supp. 90 (D. Colo. 1987).
Section not applicable to federal Emergency Medical and Active Labor Act (EMTALA), 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd, claim. EMTALA preempts the CGIA's notice requirement because the state statute is potentially in direct conflict with EMTALA's statute of limitations. The state procedural requirement stands as an obstacle to the accomplishments and execution of Congress's objectives in enacting EMTALA. Bird v. Pioneers Hosp., 121 F. Supp. 2d 1321 (D. Colo. 2000).
Section not applicable in inverse condemnation action. Since an inverse condemnation action does not arise under this article, the notice of claims provision (this section) does not apply in such an action. Hayden v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 41 Colo. App. 102, 580 P.2d 830 (1978).
In indemnity action, this section should not be applied in same precise manner it is applied when an injured party is seeking damages against a municipality for alleged negligence. Brady v. City & County of Denver, 181 Colo. 218, 508 P.2d 1254 (1973).
Section 29-5-111 and this section are not to be read together. The requirements of the governmental immunity provisions are extraneous to a town's liability under the liability of peace officers provisions. Antonopoulos v. Town of Telluride, 187 Colo. 392, 532 P.2d 346 (1975).
The secondary liability of a governmental entity as an indemnitor under § 29-5-111 is different and distinct from the direct liability imposed by this article. Antonopoulos v. Town of Telluride, 187 Colo. 392, 532 P.2d 346 (1975); Brown v. Gray, 227 F.3d 1278 (10th Cir. 2000).
Therefore, claims against peace officers not limited by notice provision. The liability of a municipality's police has traditionally existed despite the doctrine of sovereign immunity. Hence, the Colorado supreme court's prospective abrogation of the doctrine and the general assembly's enactment of this article was without effect on a peace officer's vulnerability to liability. Therefore, claims against the peace officers are not limited by the notice provision of this article. Antonopoulos v. Town of Telluride, 187 Colo. 392, 532 P.2d 346 (1975).
Limitations in § 24-10-114 (1) operate independently of the amount of damages requested under this section. Pyles-Knutzen v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 781 P.2d 164 (Colo. App. 1989).
III. PURPOSE OF NOTICE REQUIREMENT.
Purpose of requirement is to give authorities prompt notice of need to investigate the matter, to allow for immediate abatement of dangerous conditions, to foster prompt settlement of meritorious claims, as well as to allow a knowledgeable compliance with the statutory requirements for budgeting and tax levies. Antonopoulos v. Town of Telluride, 187 Colo. 392, 532 P.2d 346 (1975); Jefferson County Health Svcs. Ass'n v. Feeney, 974 P.2d 1001 (Colo. 1998).
The purposes of the notice requirement are to permit a public entity to conduct a prompt investigation of the claim, to remedy any dangerous condition, to make adequate fiscal arrangements to meet any potential liability, and to prepare a defense to the claim. Barham v. Scalia, 928 P.2d 1381 (Colo. App. 1996); Mesa County Valley Sch. Dist. No. 51 v. Kelsey, 8 P.3d 1200 (Colo. 2000); Gallagher v. Univ. of N. Colo., 18 P.3d 837 (Colo. App. 2000), rev'd on other grounds, 54 P.3d 386 (Colo. 2002); Awad v. Breeze, 129 P.3d 1039 (Colo. App. 2005).
The purpose of the notice requirement, among other things, is to give the municipal authority prompt notice of the need to investigate an accident. State Comp. Ins. Fund v. City of Colo. Springs, 43 Colo. App. 112, 602 P.2d 881 (1979).
The purpose of a nonclaim statute is to impose a condition precedent, namely, filing notice within the time specified, to the enforcement of the right of action for the benefit of the party against whom the claim is made. Barnhill v. Pub. Serv. Co., 649 P.2d 716 (Colo. App. 1982), aff'd, 690 P.2d 1248 (Colo. 1984).
The purpose of the notice requirement in subsection (3) is to ensure that the governing body or attorney of a public entity be directly involved, advised, and notified of potential litigation. Brock v. Nyland, 955 P.2d 1037 (Colo. 1998).
Allowing public entities to mislead plaintiffs about how to meet the requirements of the notice provision, and then to assert the affirmative defense of noncompliance, is beyond the legitimate purposes of the notice provision. Therefore, interpretations of the statute should not permit public entities to manipulate the notice provision to dodge otherwise proper suits. Finnie v. Jefferson County Sch. Dist. R-1, 79 P.3d 1253 (Colo. 2003).
IV. COMPLIANCE.
Notice provision of the governmental immunity article stands as a condition precedent to the commencement of an action against a public entity. Antonopoulos v. Town of Telluride, 187 Colo. 392, 532 P.2d 346 (1975); Jones v. Kristensen, 38 Colo. App. 513, 563 P.2d 959 (1977), aff'd, 195 Colo. 122, 575 P.2d 854 (1978); Fritz v. Regents of Univ. of Colo., 196 Colo. 335, 586 P.2d 23 (1978); Sussman v. Univ. of Colo. Health Sciences Ctr., 706 P.2d 443 (Colo. App. 1985); Lloyd v. State Pers. Bd., 710 P.2d 1177 (Colo. App. 1985), rev'd on other grounds, 752 P.2d 559 (Colo. 1988); Mtn. Gravel & Const. v. Cortez, 721 P.2d 698 (Colo. App. 1986); McMahon v. Denver Water Bd., 780 P.2d 28 (Colo. App. 1989); Brown v. Teitelbaum, 830 P.2d 1081 (Colo. App. 1991); City of Lafayette v. Barrack, 847 P.2d 136 (Colo. 1993).
However, the provision of subsection (3) that the notice shall be effective upon mailing by registered mail or by personal service is a technical filing requirement and is not a jurisdictional prerequisite to suit. Such provision does not require that notice be filed by registered mail. Therefore, mailing of notice by regular mail satisfied the requirements of this section. Blue v. Boss, 781 P.2d 128 (Colo. App. 1989); Woodsmall v. Reg'l Transp. Dist., 800 P.2d 63 (Colo. 1990).
Absent a showing that the plaintiff was incapable of giving the requisite notice, compliance is a condition precedent to plaintiff's tort claim. Lloyd v. State Pers. Bd., 710 P.2d 1177 (Colo. App. 1985), rev'd on other grounds, 752 P.2d 559 (Colo. 1988).
The term "written notice" in this section means notice of a claim, and therefore, any documents on which the plaintiff relies to satisfy the requirements of this section necessarily must assert a claim by including a request or demand that the defendant public entity or employee pay the plaintiff an award of monetary damages. Mesa County Valley Sch. Dist. No. 51 v. Kelsey, 8 P.3d 1200 (Colo. 2000); Aspen Orthopaedics & Sports Med., L.L.C. v. Aspen Valley Hosp. Dist., 353 F.3d 832 (10th Cir. 2003).
The 180-day notice period does not commence until the claimant obtains, or reasonably could have obtained, actual knowledge of the injury. A two-year old child with brain damage cannot appreciate her injury and cannot be charged with such discovery. Cintron v. City of Colo. Springs, 886 P.2d 291 (Colo. App. 1994).
Notice sent by regular mail is not effective upon mailing. The date of mailing by regular mail has no legal significance; it is the date of receipt that governs whether notice sent by regular mail is timely. Reg'l Transp. Dist. v. Lopez, 916 P.2d 1187 (Colo. 1996); Peterson v. Arapahoe County Sheriff, 72 P.3d 440 (Colo. App. 2003).
Notice provision applies only to action brought under this article. Compliance with the notice requirement is a condition precedent only to an action brought under the provisions of this article. Antonopoulos v. Town of Telluride, 187 Colo. 392, 532 P.2d 346 (1975); Jones v. Ne. Durango Water Dist., 622 P.2d 92 (Colo. App. 1980).
"Compliance" means substantial compliance. The 1986 amendment did not intend to create a standard of absolute or literal compliance with the notice requirement, but rather intended a degree of compliance that was considerably more than minimal but less than absolute. The only fair characterization of such a degree is substantial compliance. Woodsmall v. Reg'l Transp. Dist., 800 P.2d 63 (Colo. 1990); Cassidy v. Reider, 851 P.2d 286 (Colo. App. 1993); Barham v. Scalia, 928 P.2d 1381 (Colo. App. 1996); Dicke v. Mabin, 101 P.3d 1126 (Colo. App. 2004).
Plaintiff must demonstrate strict compliance with the time requirement of the notice, but only substantial compliance with the content requirements. Hamon Contractors, Inc. v. Carter & Burgess, Inc., 229 P.3d 282 (Colo. App. 2009).
The language of the 1986 amendment does not indicate any intent on the part of the general assembly to shorten the 180-day period and thus create a trap for the unwary, when the 180th day falls on a legal holiday. Matthews v. City & County of Denver, 20 P.3d 1227 (Colo. App. 2000).
Request for payment of monetary damages is the essence of the written notice required by this section and strict compliance is required. The request for payment of monetary damages is what shows that a document is a notice of claim under section (1). Standards of strict compliance must be applied in relation to section (1), rather than other standards of compliance applicable to other subsections of the notice-of-claim statute. Mesa County Valley Sch. Dist. No. 51 v. Kelsey, 8 P.3d 1200 (Colo. 2000).
Strict compliance with written notice requirement does not require use of particular words or talismanic language. Where a document reasonably and objectively indicates that a claimant has asserted a claim for monetary damages, the document constitutes written notice under subsection (1). Bradley v. Sch. Dist. No. 1 in Denv., 2021 COA 140, 504 P.3d 979.
Although letter sent by claimant's attorney did not specifically state that claimant sought monetary damages, the letter constituted written notice under subsection (1) because it asserted that claimant was injured; described circumstances of the accident leading to claimant's injury; asserted that claimant was injured due to a dangerous condition; asserted that school district failed to exercise reasonable care; and requested the preservation of evidence. Bradley v. Sch. Dist. No. 1 in Denv., 2021 COA 140, 504 P.3d 979.
Whether a claimant has satisfied the requirements of subsection (1) presents a mixed question of law and fact. Peterson v. Arapahoe County Sheriff, 72 P.3d 440 (Colo. App. 2003); Dicke v. Mabin, 101 P.3d 1126 (Colo. App. 2004).
Trial court rather than the jury is the fact finder on the issue of notice under the statute. Trinity Broad. of Denver, Inc. v. City of Westminster, 848 P.2d 916 (Colo. 1993).
Trial courts must resolve issues of compliance with the notice requirements in this section before trial, regardless of whether the notice requirement is a jurisdictional bar to suit. Finnie v. Jefferson County Sch. Dist. R-1, 79 P.3d 1253 (Colo. 2003).
In determining whether a claimant has substantially complied with the notice requirement, a court may consider whether and to what extent the public entity has been adversely affected in its ability to defend against the claim by reason of any omission or error in the notice. Woodsmall v. Reg'l Transp. Dist., 800 P.2d 63 (Colo. 1990); Cassidy v. Reider, 851 P.2d 286 (Colo. App. 1993); Dicke v. Mabin, 101 P.3d 1126 (Colo. App. 2004); Awad v. Breeze, 129 P.3d 1039 (Colo. App. 2005).
An exact statement of the public entity's official name is not among the required contents of the notice. Cassidy v. Reider, 851 P.2d 286 (Colo. App. 1993).
Plaintiff herself was not required to deliver the notice, nor was it irrelevant that although the public entity was not correctly named in the notice, the notice was delivered to the correct address and the public entity's attorney received a faxed copy the next day. Cassidy v. Reider, 851 P.2d 286 (Colo. App. 1993).
In determining the sufficiency of a notice, a trial court must employ the C.R.C.P. 12(b)(1) standard, under which the plaintiff bears the relatively lenient burden of demonstrating that notice was properly given. If there is no evidentiary dispute, a trial court may rule on the pleadings alone. A court must, however, hold an evidentiary hearing when facts relating to immunity are in dispute. Awad v. Breeze, 129 P.3d 1039 (Colo. App. 2005).
Plaintiff has the relatively lenient burden of demonstrating that it complied with the notice requirements of this section. Tidwell v. City & County of Denver, 83 P.3d 75 (Colo. 2003); Hamon Contractors, Inc. v. Carter & Burgess, Inc., 229 P.3d 282 (Colo. App. 2009).
Where notice sufficiently identified plaintiffs and their addresses and included a concise statement of the factual basis for the claims in question, there was substantial compliance with the notice of claim requirements. Bresciani v. Haragan, 968 P.2d 153 (Colo. App. 1998).
Where notice gave both defendants the information necessary to investigate, remedy any problem, and make adequate financial arrangements to meet any potential liability, and also included a factual description that was sufficient to apprise both defendants that plaintiffs would seek to hold them liable for willful and wanton conduct, such notice substantially complied with the requirements even though the notice did not specifically use the words "willful and wanton". Carothers v. Archuleta County Sheriff, 159 P.3d 647 (Colo. App. 2006).
Trial court erred in determining that a plaintiff substantially complied with this section where the plaintiff filed notice of claim after 180 days after the date of discovery injuries. The plain language of this section with respect to the 180-day provision requires strict rather than substantial compliance. E. Lakewood Sanitation Dist. v. District Ct., 842 P.2d 233 (Colo. 1992) (holding contrary to Brown v. Teitelbaum, 830 P.2d 1081 (Colo. App. 1991)); Shandy v. Lunceford, 886 P.2d 319 (Colo. App. 1994).
Plaintiff's mailing of documents to the department of health did not amount to substantial compliance with notice provisions of this section. Bauman v. Colo. Dept. of Health, 857 P.2d 499 (Colo. App. 1993).
Accident report form and medical bills and reports received by a school district's manager do not constitute written notice of a claim pursuant to this section. Mesa County Valley Sch. Dist. No. 51 v. Kelsey, 8 P.3d 1200 (Colo. 2000).
An accident report form and medical bills and reports fail to make an explicit demand that the defendant reimburse plaintiff for her medical expenses or otherwise pay monetary damages for her injury. Mesa County Valley Sch. Dist. No. 51 v. Kelsey, 8 P.3d 1200 (Colo. 2000).
Notice of claim inadequate even though defendant knew that plaintiff was asserting a claim for her medical expenses from her oral communications, because this section requires notice of claims against public entities to be in writing. Mesa County Valley Sch. Dist. v. Kelsey, 8 P.3d 1200 (Colo. 2000).
Documents submitted to a public entity by third parties cannot constitute notice under this section where the documents were not authored by a plaintiff or her agent. Mesa County Valley Sch. Dist. No. 51 v. Kelsey, 8 P.3d 1200 (Colo. 2000); Bird v. Pioneers Hosp., 121 F. Supp. 2d 1321 (D. Colo. 2000).
At most, such documents give rise to an inference that the plaintiff could have made a claim for damages against the defendant, but not that the plaintiff was in fact making such a claim. Mesa County Valley Sch. Dist. No. 51 v. Kelsey, 8 P.3d 1200 (Colo. 2000); Bird v. Pioneers Hosp., 121 F. Supp. 2d 1321 (D. Colo. 2000).
Filing of notice with the claims department of the regional transportation district does not satisfy the requirement in subsection (3) that notice be filed with the governing body of a public entity or the attorney representing the public entity. The requirement may only be satisfied by filing notice with the governing board or attorney. Brock v. Nyland, 955 P.2d 1037 (Colo. 1998).
Subsection (3) requires substantial compliance with its terms. Courts should evaluate compliance on a case-by-case basis, considering principles of agency and equity, the purposes of the notice statute, and concerns of preventing governmental entities from misleading plaintiffs. Finnie v. Jefferson County Sch. Dist. R-1, 79 P.3d 1253 (Colo. 2003); Villalpando v. Denver Health & Hosp. Auth., 181 P.3d 357 (Colo. App. 2007).
County board of health, not the board of county commissioners, is the "governing body" of a county health department for purposes of notice under the CGIA. Jefferson County Health Svcs. Ass'n v. Feeney, 974 P.2d 1001 (Colo. 1998).
Knowledge of an accident by the employees of a city does not suffice, as formal notice is required. Jacob v. City of Colo. Springs, 175 Colo. 102, 485 P.2d 889 (1971).
Actual knowledge by the governmental entity of an incident giving rise to a claim, or of the claim itself, does not constitute compliance with the notice requirement as formal notice is required. Lloyd v. State Pers. Bd., 710 P.2d 1177 (Colo. App. 1985), rev'd on other grounds, 752 P.2d 559 (Colo. 1988); Stone Envir. Eng. Serv. v. State Dept. of Health, 762 P.2d 737 (Colo. App. 1988).
Serving a copy of an appeal of a personnel board action with an assistant attorney general does not fulfill the notice requirements of this section. Conde v. State Dept. of Pers., 872 P.2d 1381 (Colo. App. 1994).
The plain meaning of subsection (6) requires a claimant to timely file a notice of claim and properly serve such notice before filing a complaint. Filing and service of the complaint on the defendant or the defendant's attorney does not provide sufficient notice under the CGIA, and the complaint was properly dismissed. Kratzer v. Colo. Intergovernmental Risk Share Agency, 18 P.3d 766 (Colo. App. 2000).
By providing a notice of claim after an amended complaint had been filed, plaintiffs failed to comply with the subsection (6) requirement of waiting at least 90 days from the date of providing written notice of claim before instituting suit on the new claims in the amended complaint. Dicke v. Mabin, 101 P.3d 1126 (Colo. App. 2004).
Actual knowledge of a claim does not take the place of formal notice. Conde v. State Dept. of Pers., 872 P.2d 1381 (Colo. App. 1994).
Because a natural parent has no legal duty to prosecute a personal injury claim on behalf of his or her child, the actual knowledge of the parent with respect to the child's injury cannot be imputed to that child. Cintron v. City of Colo. Springs, 886 P.2d 291 (Colo. App. 1994); Muniz v. Garner, 921 F. Supp. 700 (D. Colo. 1996).
Notice may be given before injury established. This section does not preclude a party from giving notice prior to the date that the fact of injury is established. State Comp. Ins. Fund v. City of Colo. Springs, 43 Colo. App. 112, 602 P.2d 881 (1979).
A claimant must file notice of a claim with the proper authorities within 180 days after the date of discovery of the injury, regardless of whether the claimant knows all of the elements of a cause of action for such injury. Failure to file timely notice of a claim mandates dismissal of the action. Gallagher v. Univ. of N. Colo., 18 P.3d 837 (Colo. App. 2000), rev'd on other grounds, 54 P.3d 386 (Colo. 2002); Aspen Orthopaedics & Sports Med., L.L.C. v. Aspen Valley Hosp. Dist., 353 F.3d 832 (10th Cir. 2003); City & County of Denver v. Crandall, 161 P.3d 627 (Colo. 2007).
Notice held to contain sufficient information to substantially comply with the provisions of this section. Crouse v. City of Colo. Springs, 766 P.2d 655 (Colo. 1988).
Whistleblower substantially complied with the provisions of this section where the notice contained a concise statement alleging unauthorized communications to persons outside the state personnel system as the factual basis for her invasion of privacy claim. Therefore, the trial court erred in dismissing her entire whistleblower claim on that basis. Conde v. State Dept. of Pers., 872 P.2d 1381 (Colo. App. 1994).
Compliance with this section is necessary when an employee brings suit under the whistleblower statute seeking relief for injuries covered by § 24-10-103 (2). State Pers. Bd. v. Lloyd, 752 P.2d 559 (Colo. 1988); Gallagher v. Univ. of N. Colo., 18 P.3d 837 (Colo. App. 2000), rev'd on other grounds, 54 P.3d 386 (Colo. 2002).
Because the whistleblower statute was intended to create a non-contractual, statutory action that is tortious in nature, a claim brought under the statute is subject to the notice requirements of the CGIA. Conde v. State Dept. of Pers., 872 P.2d 1381 (Colo. App. 1994).
Notice given by insurer of the person claiming injury, rather than by the claimant, is sufficient to meet the statute's requirement of "substantial compliance." Isbill Assocs. v. City & County of Denver, 666 P.2d 1117 (Colo. App., 1983).
Filing complaint with district court and not serving complaint upon public entity or individual defendants held not to constitute "substantial compliance" with the notice provisions of the act. Uberoi v. Univ. of Colo., 713 P.2d 894 (Colo. 1986).
Whistleblower did not substantially comply with the provisions of this section where the notice contained no references whatsoever to incidents of retaliatory harassment or failure to promote. Conde v. State Dept. of Pers., 872 P.2d 1381 (Colo. App. 1994).
Compliance with the administrative requirements of the Employee Protection Act will not satisfy the purposes of this section's notice provision. State Pers. Bd. v. Lloyd, 752 P.2d 559 (Colo. 1988).
Trial court did not err in determining that plaintiff failed to give the statutory notice in medical malpractice action where plaintiff retained counsel and obtained a set of doctors' and hospital's medical records by December 1985 but filed no notice of claim until August 1987. Brown v. Teitelbaum, 830 P.2d 1081 (Colo. App. 1991).
Notice was insufficient to comply with statute where there was no evidence that the notices of claim sent by regular mail had been received. When a party fails to establish that proper notice was provided in compliance with the 180-day notice requirement, the party's action must be dismissed. Armstead v. Mem'l Hosp., 892 P.2d 450 (Colo. App. 1995).
Failure to file written notice is a complete defense to any action brought by an injured party against those that fall within this article. Roberts v. City of Boulder, 197 Colo. 97, 589 P.2d 934 (1979); Lloyd v. State Pers. Bd., 710 P.2d 1177 (Colo. App. 1985), rev'd on other grounds, 752 P.2d 559 (Colo. 1988); Stone Envir. Eng. Serv. v. State Dept. of Health, 762 P.2d 737 (Colo. App. 1988).
Where the injury to plaintiff's property did not constitute a taking by the county, plaintiff's failure to supply the public entity with written notice that they were bringing an action pursuant to the CGIA resulted in dismissal of the complaint. Kratzenstein v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 674 P.2d 1009 (Colo. App. 1983).
Failure to comply with provisions of this section provides trial court with basis to bar plaintiff's claim. Deason v. Lewis, 706 P.2d 1283 (Colo. App. 1985); Mtn. Gravel & Const. v. Cortez, 721 P.2d 698 (Colo. App. 1986).
Public entity not liable for judgment against employee. If a claimant fails to give the notice required by this section, a public entity cannot be liable under § 24-10-110 for a judgment against an employee in his individual capacity or for the employee's cost of defense. Kristensen v. Jones, 195 Colo. 122, 575 P.2d 854 (1978).
Proceedings subject to dismissal for failure to allege notice or waiver. By failing to allege compliance with the condition precedent of notice or waiver, a claim is insufficient, cannot be cured by amendment, and is, therefore, subject to dismissal at any stage of the proceedings. Jones v. Ne. Durango Water Dist., 622 P.2d 92 (Colo. App. 1980); Kratzer v. Colo. Intergovernmental Risk Share Agency, 18 P.3d 766 (Colo. App. 2000); Aspen Orthopaedics & Sports Med., L.L.C. v. Aspen Valley Hosp. Dist., 353 F.3d 832 (10th Cir. 2003).
The failure to allege compliance with the notice provision in an original complaint does not require dismissal of the complaint or judgment notwithstanding the verdict so long as the fact of the complying notice was established by the evidence. Morgan v. Bd. of Water Works of Pueblo, 837 P.2d 300 (Colo. App. 1992).
Strict compliance with notice provision is necessary for subject matter jurisdiction. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Denver Sch. Dist. No. 1, 787 P.2d 206 (Colo. App. 1989); Bauman v. Colo. Dept. of Health, 857 P.2d 499 (Colo. App. 1993); Barham v. Scalia, 928 P.2d 1381 (Colo. App. 1996).
When a plaintiff fails to plead compliance with the CGIA, and a court addresses the case in the context of a motion to dismiss, the court must accept as a matter of "fact" that the plaintiff failed to comply with the notice provisions. This lack of compliance, then, is a jurisdictional issue. Aspen Orthopaedics & Sports Med., L.L.C. v. Aspen Valley Hosp. Dist., 353 F.3d 832 (10th Cir. 2003).
Failure to move for dismissal until trial not waiver of notice. The fact that the defendants do not move for dismissal until the time of trial does not constitute a waiver of the notice requirement. Jones v. Ne. Durango Water Dist., 622 P.2d 92 (Colo. App. 1980).
Public entities may be equitably estopped from asserting bar of this section to prevent manifest injustice. Gray v. Reg'l Transp. Dist., 43 Colo. App. 107, 602 P.2d 879 (1979).
Even if subsection (3) requires notice to the city council as the "governing body," public entities may be equitably estopped from setting up this section as a bar to actions against it. Isbill Assocs. v. City & County of Denver, 666 P.2d 1117 (Colo. App. 1983).
City is not equitably estopped from asserting the notice requirement as a bar to actions against it unless the plaintiffs can show a change of position to their detriment in justifiable reliance on the words or conduct of the city. Morrison v. City of Aurora, 745 P.2d 1042 (Colo. App. 1987).
Notice to the defendant is not required pursuant to this section unless defendant's actions were during the performance of his duties and within the scope of his employment. Kennedy v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 776 P.2d 1159 (Colo. App. 1989); Hartman v. Regents of the Univ. of Colo., 22 P.3d 524 (Colo. App. 2000), aff'd, 45 P.3d 721 (Colo. 2002).
The plain language of subsection (3) requires a notice of claim against a public entity other than the state to be filed with the governing body of the public entity or the attorney representing the public entity and the filing of a notice of claim with the regional transportation district's risk manager does not constitute compliance with the requirements of subsection (3). Brock v. Nyland, 955 P.2d 1037 (Colo. 1998); Curlin v. Reg'l Transp. Dist., 983 P.2d 178 (Colo. App. 1999).
Where the attorney general delegated responsibility for handling claims to the university counsel in a memorandum of understanding, a plaintiff who sent notice of a claim to the university complied with the requirements of subsection (3). Booth v. Univ. of Colo., 64 P.3d 926 (Colo. App. 2002), aff'd, 78 P.3d 1098 (Colo. 2003).
Decision of the Colorado supreme court could be applied retroactively where holding that subsection (3) requires a notice of claim against a public entity other than the state to be filed with the governing body of the public entity or the attorney representing the public entity did not establish a new rule of law. Curlin v. Reg'l Transp. Dist., 983 P.2d 178 (Colo. App. 1999).
Compliance with subsection (3) is not a jurisdictional prerequisite to suit, but failure to comply with subsection (3) mandates dismissal of an action absent a showing that a public entity waived or should be estopped from raising the failure to comply as a bar to suit. Curlin v. Reg'l Transp. Dist., 983 P.2d 178 (Colo. App. 1999).
There is no requirement in this section that a notice of claim be provided to a public employee or that employee's attorney. Rather, this section only requires that a notice be sent to the attorney general when the state is involved, or to the governing body of the public entity involved or that entity's attorney. Barham v. Scalia, 928 P.2d 1381 (Colo. App. 1996).
The giving of notice may be excused under proper circumstances of mental and physical incapacity, the question of sufficiency of the circumstances being one for the jury. Jacob v. City of Colo. Springs, 175 Colo. 102, 485 P.2d 889 (1971).
Exception to notice requirement applies where disabled person sues by his legal representative. Antonopoulos v. Town of Telluride, 187 Colo. 392, 532 P.2d 346 (1975).
All persons laboring under general forms of disability included in exception. The exception to the notice requirement includes all persons laboring under any of the generally recognized forms of disability as defined in § 13-81-101 (3). Antonopoulos v. Town of Telluride, 187 Colo. 392, 532 P.2d 346 (1975).
Compliance not essential for jurisdiction. Compliance with the notice provisions of the CGIA is not essential to the court's jurisdiction. Nowakowski v. District Court, 664 P.2d 709 (Colo. 1983) (decided prior to 1986 amendment).
Failure to comply with the notice requirements of this section does not bar federal age discrimination claim. Bauman v. Colo. Dept. of Health, 857 P.2d 499 (Colo. App. 1993).
Affidavit by parties presented material issue of fact as to satisfaction of notice requirement and as to whether actions of public transit authority estopped it from raising lack of notice. Coady v. Worrell, 686 P.2d 1375 (Colo. App. 1984).
Substantial compliance with the 180-day notice provision is a condition precedent to any "action" brought under the CGIA, therefore, the time for filing minors' notice is not extended pursuant to the tolling provisions of § 13-81-103 until two years after the minors' legal representative is appointed. Brown v. Teitelbaum, 830 P.2d 1081 (Colo. App. 1991).
Where plaintiffs failed to plead compliance with the notice requirements of the CGIA, the district court should dismiss their complaint without prejudice. Plaintiffs may move for leave to file a second amended complaint and plead compliance with the CGIA notice requirements, if they believe they can cure their insufficient amended complaint. Aspen Orthopaedics & Sports Med., L.L.C. v. Aspen Valley Hosp. Dist., 353 F.3d 832 (10th Cir. 2003).
Merely taking steps to protect the legal interests of a client following initiation of a lawsuit does not qualify as a denial of a claim within the meaning of subsection (6). Treating a defendant's legal response to the complaint as a denial of a claim, when no notice of claim has previously been filed, undermines the very purposes served by the subsection (6) 90-day waiting period, namely, to allow a public entity to investigate and remedy dangerous conditions, to settle meritorious claims without incurring the expenses associated with litigation, to make necessary fiscal arrangements to cover potential liability, and to prepare for the defense of claims. Dicke v. Mabin, 101 P.3d 1126 (Colo. App. 2004).
Applied in Clark v. Tinnin, 731 F. Supp. 998 (D. Colo. 1990); Cikraji v. Snowberger, 2015 COA 66, 410 P.3d 561.
V. TIME PERIODS.
"Discovery of the injury" construed. The phrase "discovery of the injury" implicitly encompasses the discovery of the basis of the claim. Young v. State, 642 P.2d 18 (Colo. App. 1981), aff'd, 665 P.2d 108 (Colo. 1983).
"Injury" triggering notice requirement includes a decrease in the value of property, where such decrease results from government's announcement of intent to take action physically affecting property at some time in the future. City of Lafayette v. Barrack, 847 P.2d 136 (Colo. 1993).
The start of the notice period for injuries begins when an injury and its cause are discovered. Trinity Broad. of Denver, Inc. v. City of Westminster, 848 P.2d 916 (Colo. 1993); Miller v. Campbell, 971 P.2d 261 (Colo. App. 1998); City & County of Denver v. Crandall, 161 P.3d 627 (Colo. 2007).
The trigger for the 180 days in cases of death is the same as in all injuries; the period starts to run when the death and its cause are discovered. Miller v. Campbell, 971 P.2d 261 (Colo. App. 1998).
Claimant must have opportunity to discover underlying facts. There must be a reasonable opportunity for a claimant to discover the basic and material facts underlying a claim before she is duty-bound to give the statutory notice required by subsection (1). State v. Young, 665 P.2d 108 (Colo. 1983); Brown v. Teitelbaum, 830 P.2d 1081 (Colo. App. 1991).
In medical malpractice claims, patients who rely on their physicians' diagnosis of permanent injury should not be barred from suit because their trust in the physicians prevented earlier discovery of the injury. Nor should patients be compelled to file suit before they are aware of the physician's wrongful conduct. Smith v. Winter, 934 P.2d 885 (Colo. App. 1997); Miller v. Campbell, 971 P.2d 261 (Colo. App. 1998).
The CGIA's notice period places the burden on the injured party to determine the cause of the injury, to ascertain whether a governmental entity or public employee is the cause, and to notify the governmental entity within 180 days from the time when the injury is discovered. Trinity Broad. of Denver, Inc. v. City of Westminster, 848 P.2d 916 (Colo. 1993); Grossman v. City & County of Denver, 878 P.2d 125 (Colo. App. 1994); Miller v. Campbell, 971 P.2d 261 (Colo. App. 1998); City & County of Denver v. Crandall, 161 P.3d 627 (Colo. 2007).
A claimant has a duty of reasonable diligence to determine the basic and material facts underlying a potential claim against a governmental entity. Therefore, a claimant building owner who allowed four months to pass before hiring an engineer or take other appropriate steps to investigate the cause of the building's cracking foundation failed to prove the statute was unconstitutional as applied to it. Trinity Broad. of Denver, Inc. v. City of Westminster, 848 P.2d 916 (Colo. 1993).
Action against city barred where there was reasonable opportunity to discover the underlying facts and the notice was not amended nor replaced. Miller v. Mtn. Valley Ambul. Serv., 694 P.2d 362 (Colo. App. 1984).
Notice period begins to run in indemnity action when tort-feasor knows of injury. The running of the 90 (now 180) days as provided in this section should not begin to run in an indemnity action until such time as the alleged tort-feasor receives knowledge of the occurrence of a secondary injury. Brady v. City & County of Denver, 181 Colo. 218, 508 P.2d 1254 (1973).
Notice period is triggered when claimants discover or should have discovered they have been wrongfully injured. Smith v. Winter, 934 P.2d 885 (Colo. App. 1997).
And at conclusion of disability for disabled person. A disabled person is relieved from the statutory duty of giving notice until the removal of his disability. At the conclusion of the disability, the 90-day (180-day) notice requirement commences and runs as it would against any other claimant. Antonopoulos v. Town of Telluride, 187 Colo. 392, 532 P.2d 346 (1975); Fritz v. Regents of Univ. of Colo., 196 Colo. 335, 586 P.2d 23 (1978).
Notice period does not begin to run until appointment of legal representation where plaintiff was rendered incapacitated as a result of the incident that gave rise to the claim. Plaintiff suffered severe permanent brain injury and could not know, or reasonably be expected to know, of her injuries. No formal adjudication of incapacity is needed to find that 180-day period had not commenced as a result of a disability. Visser ex rel. Eder v. Mahan, 111 P.3d 575 (Colo. App. 2005).
The notice period does not begin to run until the plaintiff discovers his or her injury. Where the plaintiff was rendered unconscious as a result of the accident that gave rise to the claim and subsequently suffered memory loss due to anesthesia and the injuries suffered, the 180-day notice period did not begin to run until the plaintiff recovered his memory and thereby discovered his injury. Since the notice was filed within 171 days after plaintiff recovered his memory, the filing was timely. Bryant v. City of Lafayette, 946 P.2d 499 (Colo. App. 1997).
Premature filing of action not fatal. Dismissal with prejudice is too harsh a sanction for the filing of an action before expiration of the response period set forth in subsection (6). Lopez v. Reg'l Transp. Dist., 899 P.2d 254 (Colo. App. 1994), aff'd on other grounds, 916 P.2d 1187 (Colo. 1996).
Contrary to the plain language of subsection (1), the premature filing of a complaint prior to the expiration of the 90-day period set forth in subsection (6) was not a jurisdictional defect mandating dismissal of the action. Dicke v. Mabin, 101 P.3d 1126 (Colo. App. 2004).
Section 24-10-118 (1)(a) does not make compliance with subsection (6) of this section a jurisdictional prerequisite for suing public employees. Dicke v. Mabin, 101 P.3d 1126 (Colo. App. 2004).
Party may not wait until all elements of claim mature. Once the underlying basis of the claim is discovered, or should have been discovered, the aggrieved party may not wait until all elements of the claim mature. Young v. State, 642 P.2d 18 (Colo. App. 1981), aff'd, 605 P.2d 108 (Colo. 1983); Mtn. Gravel & Const. v. Cortez, 721 P.2d 698 (Colo. App. 1986); Morrison v. City of Aurora, 745 P.2d 1042 (Colo. App. 1987); City of Lafayette v. Barrack, 847 P.2d 136 (Colo. 1993); Abrahamson v. City of Montrose, 77 P.3d 819 (Colo. App. 2003).
Injuries from a false arrest or false imprisonment do not result from learning that the charges underlying the arrest and imprisonment were inadequate; the injuries are inherent in the acts themselves. Just as claims for false arrest and false imprisonment presumptively accrue for the purposes of a statute of limitations when the wrongful acts occur, necessarily, they presumptively accrue for purposes of filing a CGIA notice of claim no later than those dates. Masters v. Castrodale, 121 P.3d 362 (Colo. App. 2005).
A plaintiff may not invoke the continuing violation doctrine to relate his notice of a claim to conduct that caused injury more than 180 days before he filed the notice. Application of such doctrine would have the effect of allowing the plaintiff to accumulate his damages before requiring him to give notice of claim as required by this section, thereby defeating the purpose of the notice claim statute. Gallagher v. Univ. of N. Colo., 18 P.3d 837 (Colo. App. 2000), aff'd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 54 P.3d 386 (Colo. 2002).
Trial court erred in not granting defendant's motion to the extent it sought dismissal of any claim for damages that arose from conduct occurring more than 180 days prior to filing notice of claim. Gallagher v. Univ. of N. Colo., 18 P.3d 837 (Colo. App. 2000), rev'd on other grounds, 54 P.3d 386 (Colo. 2002); City & County of Denver v. Crandall, 161 P.3d 627 (Colo. 2007).
The CGIA requires timely notice of claim. The CGIA notice of claim provision is both a condition precedent and a jurisdictional prerequisite to suit under the CGIA and must be strictly applied and failure to comply with it is an absolute bar to suit. City & County of Denver v. Crandall, 161 P.3d 627 (Colo. 2007).
Claimant must demonstrate that he or she filed a timely notice of claim within 180 days from when the claimant discovered the injury due to an occurrence. City & County of Denver v. Crandall, 161 P.3d 627 (Colo. 2007).
The recurrence of symptoms outside of the 180-day period does not excuse failure to timely file under the CGIA's notice requirement. City & County of Denver v. Crandall, 161 P.3d 627 (Colo. 2007).
Tolling of the statute of limitations does not occur under subsection (5) if the 90-day waiting period expires prior to the expiration of the two-year statute of limitations. Cochran v. W. Glenwood Springs Sanitation Dist., 223 P.3d 123 (Colo. App. 2009).
Since plaintiffs failed to establish a separate and discrete occurrence, recurring symptoms from an injury first discovered outside the 180-day notice period does not excuse failure to timely file written notice of injury. City & County of Denver v. Crandall, 161 P.3d 627 (Colo. 2007).
Notice held to be timely. Nat'l Cas. Co. v. Great Sw. Ins., 833 P.2d 741 (Colo. 1992).
C.R.C.P. 6(a) and § 24-11-110 apply to this section. C.R.C.P. 6(a) and § 24-11-110 which allow an extra time period for document filing when a document is required to be filed "on any day when the public office is closed", is applicable to this section. Austin v. Weld County, 702 P.2d 293 (Colo. App. 1985).
The proper inquiry is whether sufficient evidence existed to cause a reasonable person to know that a toilet overflow that caused a fall was not merely an isolated household occurrence, but resulted from the city capping plaintiff's sewer line, an abnormal plumbing problem. Grossman v. City & County of Denver, 878 P.2d 125 (Colo. App. 1994).
Notice requirements of this article may be modified prospectively without violating the provisions of § 2-4-303. Adams County Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. District Court, 199 Colo. 284, 611 P.2d 963 (1980).
And were so modified for those under disability of minority. All applicable statutes of limitation and notice requirements began to run for those who attained the age of 18 as of the effective date of the 1977 amendment to § 13-81-101 (3), changing the age of legal disability from 21 to 18. Adams County Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. District Court, 199 Colo. 284, 611 P.2d 963 (1980).
Plaintiff's minority did not prevent the mandatory 180-day notice period from commencing to run since there was no showing that plaintiff was incapable of discovering his injury within 180 days and 1986 amendment to subsection (1) made it a "non-claim statute" that prohibits the initiation of litigation after a specified time regardless of disability. Hergenreter v. Morgan County Sch. Dist., 888 P.2d 346 (Colo. App. 1994).
A loss of consortium claim does not necessarily arise at the same time as the underlying claim. Therefore, in appropriate cases, the trial court should make a factual determination when such a claim arose in order to decide if notice of the loss of consortium claim was timely. Smith v. Winter, 934 P.2d 885 (Colo. App. 1997).
Notice, which was delayed due to lack of sufficient postage until after 180 days after discovery of injury when notice was originally mailed before end of 180-day period, but returned and re-mailed, substantially complied with notice provision. Lafitte v. State Hwy. Dept., 885 P.2d 338 (Colo. App. 1994), overruled in Reg'l Transp. Dist. v. Lopez, 916 P.2d 1187 (Colo. 1996).
The 180-day filing period pursuant to this section may not be shortened to 179 days if the final day falls on a legal holiday. Instead, the provisions of § 2-4-108 (2) are controlling. Matthews v. City & County of Denver, 20 P.3d 1227 (Colo. App. 2000).
24-10-110. Defense of public employees - payment of judgments or settlements against public employees.
(1) A public entity shall be liable for:
(a) The costs of the defense of any of its public employees, whether such defense is assumed by the public entity or handled by the legal staff of the public entity or by other counsel, in the discretion of the public entity, where the claim against the public employee arises out of injuries sustained from an act or omission of such employee occurring during the performance of his duties and within the scope of his employment, except where such act or omission is willful and wanton;
(b) (I) The payment of all judgments and settlements of claims against any of its public employees where the claim against the public employee arises out of injuries sustained from an act or omission of such employee occurring during the performance of his duties and within the scope of his employment, except where such act or omission is willful and wanton or where sovereign immunity bars the action against the public entity, if the employee does not compromise or settle the claim without the consent of the public entity; and
(II) The payment of all judgments and settlements of claims against any of its public employees where the claim against the public employee arises out of injuries sustained from an act or omission of such employee occurring during the performance of his or her duties and within the scope of employment, except where such act or omission is willful and wanton, even though sovereign immunity would otherwise bar the action, when the public employee is operating an emergency vehicle within the provisions of section 42-4-108 (2) and (3), C.R.S., if the employee does not compromise or settle the claim without the consent of the public entity.
(1.5) Where a claim against a public employee arises out of injuries sustained from an act or omission of such employee which occurred or is alleged in the complaint to have occurred during the performance of his duties and within the scope of his employment, the public entity shall be liable for the reasonable costs of the defense and reasonable attorney fees of its public employee unless:
(a) It is determined by a court that the injuries did not arise out of an act or omission of such employee occurring during the performance of his duties and within the scope of his employment or that the act or omission of such employee was willful and wanton. If it is so determined, the public entity may request and the court shall order such employee to reimburse the public entity for reasonable costs and reasonable attorney fees incurred in the defense of such employee; or
(b) The public employee compromises or settles the claim without the consent of the public entity.
(2) The provisions of subsection (1) of this section shall not apply where a public entity is not made a party defendant in an action and such public entity is not notified of the existence of such action in writing by the plaintiff or such employee within fifteen days after commencement of the action. In addition, the provisions of subsection (1) of this section shall not apply where such employee willfully and knowingly fails to notify the public entity of the incident or occurrence which led to the claim within a reasonable time after such incident or occurrence, if such incident or occurrence could reasonably have been expected to lead to a claim.
(3) Repealed.
(4) Where the public entity is made a codefendant with its public employee, it shall notify such employee in writing within fifteen days after the commencement of such action whether it will assume the defense of such employee. Where the public entity is not made a codefendant, it shall notify such employee whether it will assume such defense within fifteen days after receiving written notice from the public employee of the existence of such action.
(5) (a) In any action in which allegations are made that an act or omission of a public employee was willful and wanton, the specific factual basis of such allegations shall be stated in the complaint.
(b) Failure to plead the factual basis of an allegation that an act or omission of a public employee was willful and wanton shall result in dismissal of the claim for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
(c) In any action against a public employee in which exemplary damages are sought based on allegations that an act or omission of a public employee was willful and wanton, if the plaintiff does not substantially prevail on his claim that such act or omission was willful and wanton, the court shall award attorney fees against the plaintiff or the plaintiff's attorney or both and in favor of the public employee.
(6) The provisions of subsection (5) of this section are in addition to and not in lieu of the provisions of article 17 of title 13, C.R.S.
Source: L. 71: p. 1207, § 1. C.R.S. 1963: § 130-11-10. L. 79: (2) amended, p. 863, § 3, effective July 1. L. 81: (1), (3)(b)(I), and (3)(c) amended and (5) added, p. 1150, § 1, effective July 1. L. 82: (1)(b) amended, p. 366, § 1, effective January 1. L. 85, 1st Ex. Sess.: (4) amended, (1.5) added, and (3)(b) repealed, pp. 9, 11, §§ 5, 9, effective September 17. L. 86: (1)(b), IP(1.5), (1.5)(a), and (5) amended, (6) added, and (3)(a) and (3)(c) repealed, pp. 878, 882, §§ 10, 17, effective April 17. L. 92: (5) amended, p. 1117, § 5, effective July 1. L. 94: (1)(b)(II) amended, p. 2556, § 54, effective January 1, 1995.
ANNOTATION
Governmental immunity concerning municipal police officers matter of concurrent local and statewide concern. Governmental immunity for tortious acts of municipal police officers and, specifically, limitations on compensatory damages for personal injuries in actions against municipal governments, based on such tortious conduct, are matters of concurrent local and statewide concern. Frick v. Abell, 198 Colo. 508, 602 P.2d 852 (1979).
A municipality may provide greater monetary compensation to the victims of torts committed by the municipality's own police officers than is provided under state statutory provisions. Frick v. Abell, 198 Colo. 508, 602 P.2d 852 (1979).
State liable in 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action. In an official capacity action it is the state rather than the named party that is the interested party. Oten v. Colo. Bd. of Soc. Servs., 738 P.2d 37 (Colo. App. 1987).
Hence, the relief granted in such an action runs against the state, provided that it has received adequate notice of the suit and an opportunity to respond. Oten v. Colo. Bd. of Soc. Servs., 738 P.2d 37 (Colo. App. 1987).
Subsection (1)(a) is not a statutory exception to the corporate practice of medicine doctrine. Villalpando v. Denver Health & Hosp. Auth., 181 P.3d 357 (Colo. App. 2007).
Subsection (1.5)(a) provides for intervention as of right where public entity seeks reimbursement of reasonable attorney fees and costs advanced to a public employee later found to be acting outside of the scope of his or her employment. Once the court finds that the public employee was acting outside the scope of employment, the public entity's right to reimbursement of reasonable fees and costs is unconditional pursuant to subsection (1.5)(a). Because subsection (1.5)(a) requires that the court hearing the underlying action must award attorney fees upon request, subsection (1.5)(a) necessarily provides for intervention as of right. Lattany v. Garcia, 140 P.3d 348 (Colo. App. 2006).
Subsection (5)(c) must be strictly limited to fees incurred in defense of covered state claims only, and no award should be made under this statute for any work performed in defense of overlapping § 1983 claims absent a demonstration of entitlement to such fees under § 1988. Haynes v. City of Gunnison, 214 F. Supp. 2d 1119 (D. Colo. 2002).
Public entity not liable if required notice not given. If a claimant fails to give the notice required by § 24-10-109, a public entity cannot be liable under this section for a judgment against an employee in his individual capacity or for the employee's cost of his defense. Kristensen v. Jones, 195 Colo. 122, 575 P.2d 854 (1978).
Employees claim for indemnification and costs barred where the underlying complaint has settled without the involvement of the state and where the state was not made a party defendant to the original action and was not notified of the existence of the action in writing within 15 days after commencement of the action. Bd. of Soc. Servs. v. Dept. of Soc. Servs., 902 P.2d 407 (Colo. App. 1994).
The general assembly chose not to apply the conditions of § 42-4-108 (2) to the indemnification provisions of subsection (1)(b)(II) of this section because § 42-4-108 (2) refers only to § 24-10-106 (1)(a). Only when the operator's acts causing the injuries are willful and wanton is the operator personally liable. Corsentino v. Cordova, 4 P.3d 1082 (Colo. 2000).
State employees do not enjoy sovereign immunity when they are sued in their individual capacities for willful and wanton conduct, because relief is sought from the individuals themselves rather than from the state treasury. Middleton v. Hartman, 45 P.3d 721 (Colo. 2002).
The Governmental Immunity Act was intended to apply when the claimant seeks redress for injuries that result from tortious conduct. This act does not extend indemnification to defendants of their attorney fees where the plaintiff, the city and county of Denver, initiated a declaratory judgment proceeding seeking to determine only whether the defendants were obligated to respond to questions before an investigative body and where there are no claims for recovery for an injury. City and County of Denver v. Blatnik, 32 P.3d 593 (Colo. App. 2001).
The director and supervisors of a county department of social services are not public employees and are not entitled to indemnification from the state under this section when they are sued as a result of their official duties. Norton v. Gilman, 949 P.2d 565 (Colo. 1997).
University of Colorado will not be responsible for judgments against an employee who is sued in his individual and official capacity for willful and wanton acts such as malicious and intentional retaliation in employment practices. Hartman v. Regents of the Univ. of Colo., 22 P.3d 524 (Colo. App. 2000), aff'd on other grounds, 45 P.3d 721 (Colo. 2002).
Derivative constitutional immunity is not conferred upon indemnified employees by the state's possible assumption of an indemnification obligation in this section. Griess v. State of Colo., 841 F.2d 1042 (10th Cir. 1988).
The state cannot confer a derivative constitutional sovereign immunity upon its employees by assuming an obligation to indemnify them. The state's obligation to pay for defendants' defense costs derives not from the nature of plaintiff's claim, but from an entirely collateral, voluntary undertaking on the part of the state. This section is only an agreement between the state and its employees and cannot be invoked as a basis for cloaking individual officers with the state's sovereign immunity. The fact the state is required to indemnify defendants for defense costs does not turn plaintiff's claim into a claim against the state. Middleton v. Hartman, 45 P.3d 721 (Colo. 2002).
The protections afforded under the Colorado Governmental Immunity Act attach on the date the negligence is alleged to have occurred. Muniz v. Garner, 921 F. Supp. 700 (D. Colo. 1996).
Court erred in granting attorney fees pursuant to subsection (5)(c) when the claim was based upon a federal civil rights claim; attorney fees should have been based upon the standards for a claim under the federal civil rights laws not on the state statute. Cherry Creek Aviation, Inc. v. City of Steamboat Springs, 969 P.2d 812 (Colo. App. 1998).
Attorney fees may be awarded to a defendant pursuant to subsection (5)(c) with respect to common law claims that are separate from federal civil rights claims made in the same complaint even if the defendant simultaneously is awarded mandatory attorney fees with respect to the federal civil rights claims under federal law. Such an award does not disrupt the federal statute. Meier v. McCoy, 119 P.3d 519 (Colo. App. 2004).
Nothing in § 24-10-119 indicates that a federal court cannot apply the attorney fee provision in subsection (5)(c) to state claims over which it exercises supplemental jurisdiction. Robbins v. Jefferson County Sch. Dist. R-1, 186 F.3d 1253 (10th Cir. 1999).
Plaintiff set forth specific facts in his complaint that support his claim that public employees acted willfully and wantonly. Plaintiff met the willful component by asserting that the county sheriff and deputy sheriffs intentionally brought the media into his home to film and record his arrest. Robinson v. City & County of Denver, 39 F. Supp. 2d 1257 (D. Colo. 1999).
Plaintiff met the wanton component by asserting that, in bringing the media into his home, those defendants acted outrageously and knowingly disregarded his rights against trespass and invasion of privacy. Robinson v. City & County of Denver, 39 F. Supp. 2d 1257 (D. Colo. 1999).
Plaintiff's allegation of willful and wanton conduct by the county sheriff and deputy sheriffs was sufficient to satisfy subsection (5)(a). Therefore, those defendants sued in their individual capacities are not immune from plaintiff's state-law tort claims under the Governmental Immunity Act. Robinson v. City & County of Denver, 39 F. Supp. 2d 1257 (D. Colo. 1999).
Trial court erred when it concluded that complaint's factual allegations were not sufficiently specific to support a reasonable inference that doctor was consciously aware that his acts or omissions created danger or risk to patient's safety and that he acted, or failed to act, without regard to the danger or risk and that the allegations were insufficient because they were made upon "information and belief". Complaint's references to information and belief concerned information that was more accessible to defendants and complaint's allegations were sufficient to raise disputed issues of fact, making dismissal of the claims against doctor inappropriate. Gray v. Univ. of Colo. Hosp., 2012 COA 113, 284 P.3d 191.
Dismissal of defamation complaint against a public employee appropriate when allegations of willful and wanton conduct were not supported by specific factual allegations suggesting that the employee acted recklessly with respect to the consequences of such employee's actions. Wilson v. Meyer, 126 P.3d 276 (Colo. App. 2005).
Trial court did not err in awarding defendant attorney fees and costs when plaintiffs alleged willful, wanton, and outrageous conduct by the individual defendants and sought exemplary damages and when such claims were dismissed even though plaintiffs themselves filed a motion to dismiss the claim for exemplary damages and there was delay and confusion concerning which orders the court granted. Terry v. Sullivan, 58 P.3d 1098 (Colo. App. 2002).
This section and § 29-5-111 conflict regarding the reimbursement of defense costs for level I peace officers. The Governmental Immunity Act pertains to governmental employees generally, while § 29-5-111 defines the rights of police officers specifically. It is well settled that, in the event of apparent statutory conflict, specific language overrides general language. Therefore, in light of the conflict between the two statutes, § 29-5-111 takes precedence. Brown v. Gray, 227 F.3d 1278 (10th Cir. 2000).
Denying city's motion for limited intervention to collect reimbursement for costs expended in defense of deputy sheriffs involved in a physical altercation while off-duty and not acting under color of law was error. City had statutory right to intervene in lawsuit and its request to do so was timely. Lattany v. Garcia, 140 P.3d 348 (Colo. App. 2006).
Applied in Forrest v. County Comm'rs, 629 P.2d 1105 (Colo. App. 1981); Villalpando v. Denver Health & Hosp. Auth., 181 P.3d 357 (Colo. App. 2007).
24-10-111. Judgment against public entity or public employee - effect.
(1) Any judgment against a public entity shall constitute a complete bar to any action for injury by the claimant, by reason of the same subject matter, against any public employee whose act or omission gave rise to the claim.
(2) Any judgment against any public employee whose act or omission gave rise to the claim shall constitute a complete bar to any action for injury by the claimant, by reason of the same subject matter, against a public entity.
(3) Nothing contained in the provisions of this section shall be construed as preventing the joinder of any public entity or employee of such public entity in the same action.
Source: L. 71: p. 1209, § 1. C.R.S. 1963: § 130-11-11.
24-10-112. Compromise of claims - settlement of actions.
(1) (a) (I) A claim against the state may be compromised or settled for and on behalf of the state by the attorney general, with the concurrence of the head of the affected department, agency, board, commission, institution, hospital, college, university, or other instrumentality thereof, except as provided in part 15 of article 30 of this title.
(II) Repealed.
(b) Repealed.
(2) Claims against public entities, other than the state, may be compromised or settled by the governing body of the public entity or in such manner as the governing body may designate.
Source: L. 71: p. 1209, § 1. C.R.S. 1963: § 130-11-12. L. 85, 1st Ex. Sess.: (1) amended, p. 10, § 6, effective September 27. L. 86: (1)(a)(II) and (1)(b) repealed, p. 894, § 10, effective April 17.
ANNOTATION
Annotator's note. The following notes are taken from cases decided under former CSA C. 153, § 27, which dealt with the findings of fact and recommendations by the former Colorado claims commission.
Court cannot dictate commission's judicial decision. Where it appears that the commission is called upon to audit and examine claims, and in doing so is invested with judicial powers, a court, while it may compel it to take action, will never dictate what its decision shall be. Post Printing & Publ'g Co. v. Shafroth, 53 Colo. 129, 124 P. 176 (1912).
But will compel commission to act upon claim. The power conferred upon the commission to audit and allow claims against the state is of a judicial nature, and mandamus will not lie to compel the commission to allow a claim. But if the commission refuses to act upon a claim properly presented to it, the court will compel it to do so. People v. Auditor, 2 Colo. 97 (1873).
24-10-113. Payment of judgments.
(1) A public entity or designated insurer shall pay any compromise, settlement, or final judgment in the manner provided in this section, and an action pursuant to the Colorado rules of civil procedure shall be an appropriate remedy to compel a public entity to perform an act required under this section.
(2) The state and the governing body of any other public entity shall pay, to the extent funds are available in the fiscal year in which it becomes final, any judgment out of any funds to the credit of the public entity that are available from any or all of the following:
(a) A self-insurance reserve fund;
(b) Funds that are unappropriated for any other purpose unless the use of such funds is restricted by law or contract to other purposes;
(c) Funds that are appropriated for the current fiscal year for the payment of such judgments and not previously encumbered.
(3) If a public entity is unable to pay a judgment during the fiscal year in which it becomes final because of lack of available funds, the public entity shall levy a tax, in a separate item to cover such judgment, sufficient to discharge such judgment in the next fiscal year or in the succeeding fiscal year if the budget of the public entity has been finally adopted for the fiscal year in which the judgment becomes final before such judgment becomes final; but in no event shall such annual levy for one or more judgments exceed a total of ten mills, exclusive of existing mill levies. The public entity shall continue to levy such tax, not to exceed a total annual levy of ten mills, exclusive of existing mill levies, but in no event less than ten mills if such judgment will not be discharged by a lesser levy, until such judgment is discharged. In the event that more than one judgment is unsatisfied and a ten-mill levy is insufficient to satisfy the judgments in one year, the proceeds of the ten-mill levy shall be prorated annually among the judgment creditors in the proportion that each outstanding judgment bears to the total judgments outstanding.
Source: L. 71: p. 1209, § 1. C.R.S. 1963: § 130-11-13.
Cross references: For the appropriate remedy to compel public entity to perform an act, see C.R.C.P. 106.
24-10-113.5. Attorney general to notify general assembly.
(1) If a final money judgment is obtained against the state, payment of which requires an appropriation, and the appropriate appellate remedies have been exhausted or the time limit for such remedies has expired, the attorney general, within twenty days after such occurrence, shall certify to the speaker of the house of representatives and the president of the senate, or the director of the office of legislative legal services if the general assembly is not in session, the title of the action, the civil action number, and the amount of money due and owing for the payment in full satisfaction of the final judgment.
(2) If a claim against the state is settled and such settlement requires an appropriation by the general assembly, the attorney general, within twenty days after such settlement, shall make the certification required by subsection (1) of this section, which certification shall state the names of the parties and the amount of money necessary for the settlement.
Source: L. 79: Entire section added, p. 866, § 1, effective May 25. L. 88: (1) amended, p. 312, § 20, effective May 23.
24-10-114. Limitations on judgments - recommendation to general assembly - authorization of additional payment - lower north fork wildfire claims.
(1) (a) The maximum amount that may be recovered under this article in any single occurrence, whether from one or more public entities and public employees, shall be:
(I) For any injury to one person in any single occurrence, the sum of three hundred fifty thousand dollars;
(II) For an injury to two or more persons in any single occurrence, the sum of nine hundred ninety thousand dollars; except that, in such instance, no person may recover in excess of three hundred fifty thousand dollars.
(b) The amounts specified in subsection (1)(a) of this section shall be adjusted by an amount reflecting the percentage change over a four-year period in the United States department of labor, bureau of labor statistics, consumer price index for Denver-Aurora-Lakewood for all items and all urban consumers, or its applicable predecessor or successor index. On or before January 1, 2018, and by January 1 every fourth year thereafter, the secretary of state shall calculate the adjusted dollar amount for the immediately preceding four-year period as of the date of the calculation. The adjusted amount shall be rounded upward to the nearest one-thousand-dollar increment. The secretary of state shall certify the amount of the adjustment for the particular four-year period and shall publish the amount of the adjustment on the secretary of state's website.
(1.5) For purposes of subsection (1) of this section, an assignment or subrogation to recover damages paid or payable for an injury shall not be deemed to be a separate occurrence.
(2) The governing body of a public entity, by resolution, may increase any maximum amount set out in subsection (1) of this section that may be recovered from the public entity for the type of injury described in the resolution. The amount of the recovery that may be had shall not exceed the amount set out in such resolution for the type of injury described therein. Any such increase may be reduced, increased, or repealed by the governing body by resolution. A resolution adopted pursuant to this subsection (2) shall apply only to injuries occurring subsequent to the adoption of such resolution.
(3) Nothing in this section shall be construed to permit the recovery of damages for types of actions authorized under part 2 of article 21 of title 13, C.R.S., in an amount in excess of the amounts specified in said article.
(4) (a) A public entity shall not be liable either directly or by indemnification for punitive or exemplary damages or for damages for outrageous conduct, except as otherwise determined by a public entity pursuant to section 24-10-118 (5).
(b) A railroad operating in interstate commerce that sells to a public entity, or allows the public entity to use, such railroad's property or tracks for the provision of public passenger rail service shall not be liable either directly or by indemnification for punitive or exemplary damages or for damages for outrageous conduct to any person for any accident or injury arising out of the operation and maintenance of the public passenger rail service by a public entity.
(5) Notwithstanding the maximum amounts that may be recovered from a public entity set forth in subsection (1) of this section, an amount may be recovered from the state under this article in excess of the maximum amounts only if paragraph (a) or (b) of this subsection (5) applies:
(a) The general assembly acting by bill authorizes payment of all or a portion of any judgment against the state that exceeds the maximum amount. Any claimant may present either proof of judgment or an order of a district court granting a claimant's request for entry of judgment in the amount of an award of damages recommended by a special master or a comparable order to the general assembly and request payment of that portion of the judgment or order that exceeds the maximum amount. Any such judgment or order approved for payment by the general assembly shall be paid from the general fund.
(b) (I) Except as otherwise provided in subparagraphs (II) and (III) of this paragraph (b), the state claims board created in section 24-30-1508 (1), referred to in this paragraph (b) as the board, acting in accordance with its authority under section 24-30-1515, compromises or settles a claim on behalf of the state for the maximum liability limits under this article and determines, in its sole discretion, to recommend to the general assembly that an additional payment be made and the general assembly, by bill, authorizes all or any portion of the additional payment. In determining whether to make such recommendation, the board shall consider interests of fairness, the public interest, and the interests of the state. A recommendation made under this paragraph (b) shall not include payment for noneconomic loss or injury and shall be reduced to the extent the claimant's loss is or will be covered by another source, including, without limitation, any insurance proceeds that have been paid or will be paid, and no insurer has a right of subrogation, assignment, or any other right against the claimant or the state for any additional payment or any portion of such payment that is approved by the general assembly. Any additional payment or any portion of such payment approved by the general assembly shall be paid from the general fund. For purposes of this paragraph (b), an "additional payment" means the payment to a claimant in excess of the maximum liability limits pursuant to this paragraph (b) that may be authorized by the general assembly upon a recommendation from the board.
(II) In connection with a recommendation made by the board under subparagraph (I) of this paragraph (b) to make an additional payment to one or more claimants resulting from a claim of an injury arising out of the lower north fork wildfire in March 2012 that is received by the general assembly while the general assembly is adjourned sine die, upon certification from the department of law that the requirements of this paragraph (b) have been satisfied and on or after July 1, 2013, the office of the state controller may pay one or more additional payments to such claimants from moneys previously appropriated by bill until such specifically appropriated moneys are exhausted or replenished.
(III) In connection with any claim arising out of an injury occurring on or after May 25, 2013, that is not described in subparagraph (II) of this paragraph (b), where the board has made a recommendation to the general assembly for an additional payment under this paragraph (b) while the general assembly is adjourned sine die, the payment is authorized where all of the members of the joint budget committee have voted to authorize the additional payment; except that payment in accordance with the recommendation shall not be made until the general assembly has ratified by bill the authorization to make the payment.
Source: L. 71: p. 1210, § 1. C.R.S. 1963: § 130-11-14. L. 79: (1)(a) and (1)(b) amended, p. 863, § 4, effective July 1. L. 81: (2) amended, p. 1152, § 1, effective April 30. L. 86: IP(1) and (4) amended, p. 879, §§ 11, 12, effective July 1. L. 92: (1) amended and (5) added, p. 1118, § 6, effective January 1, 1993. L. 2006: (1.5) added, p. 455, § 3, effective April 18. L. 2007: (4) amended, p. 1025, § 2, effective July 1. L. 2012: (5) amended, (HB 12-1361), ch. 242, p. 1146, § 3, effective June 4. L. 2013: (5)(b) amended, (SB 13-288), ch. 291, p. 1560, § 1, effective May 25; (1) amended, (SB 13-023), ch. 134, p. 443, § 1, effective July 1. L. 2014: (5)(a) amended, (SB 14-223), ch. 399, p. 2007, § 1, effective June 6. L. 2015: (1) amended, (SB 15-264), ch. 259, p. 959, § 64, effective August 5. L. 2018: (1)(b) amended, (HB 18-1375), ch. 274, p. 1705, § 36, effective May 29.
Cross references: (1) For the legislative declaration contained in the 2006 act enacting subsection (1.5), see section 1 of chapter 132, Session Laws of Colorado 2006.
(2) For information concerning payments to claimants in connection with the Lower North Fork Wildfire, see section 2 of chapter 399, Session Laws of Colorado 2014.
ANNOTATION
Limitation on judgments is within province of the general assembly and does not violate claimant's rights to equal protection or due process. State is liable to victims of accident in which highway worker dislodged boulder which rolled down hill and into tour bus killing and injuring passengers to the extent set forth in law. State v. DeFoor, 824 P.2d 783 (Colo. 1992).
Accident victims, as passengers on tour bus injured by negligent highway worker, are in a class the classification of which requires a rational basis review. State v. DeFoor, 824 P.2d 783 (Colo. 1992).
Due process of law is not applicable to statute limiting recovery of damages from state. Guarantee of access to courts does not address adequacy of remedy. State v. DeFoor, 824 P.2d 783 (Colo. 1992).
General assembly may simultaneously create governmental liability and place limitations on actions brought against state. State v. DeFoor, 824 P.2d 783 (Colo. 1992).
Governmental immunity concerning municipal police officers matter of concurrent local and statewide concern. Governmental immunity for tortious acts of municipal police officers and, specifically, limitations on compensatory damages for personal injuries in actions against municipal governments, based on such tortious conduct, are matters of concurrent local and statewide concern. Frick v. Abell, 198 Colo. 508, 602 P.2d 852 (1979).
Action by estate for damages barred for failure to give the requisite notice pursuant to the Colorado Governmental Immunity Act (CGIA). DeForrest v. City of Cherry Hills Vill., 72 P.3d 384 (Colo. App. 2002).
A municipality may provide greater monetary compensation to the victims of torts committed by the municipality's own police officers than is provided under state statutory provisions. Frick v. Abell, 198 Colo. 508, 602 P.2d 852 (1979).
Limitations in subsection (1) of this section operate independently of the amount of damages requested under § 24-10-109. Pyles-Knutzen v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 781 P.2d 164 (Colo. App. 1989).
The CGIA specifies the amount of plaintiff's maximum recovery from public entities or public employees, and this rule establishes the procedure by which defendant may deposit an undisputed sum into the court registry. Rudnick v. Ferguson, 179 P.3d 26 (Colo. App. 2007).
Trial court did not err in permitting defendants to tender $150,000 into the court registry and in dismissing the case as moot without requiring defendants to confess judgment, admit their liability, or enter into a settlement with the plaintiffs. Rudnick v. Ferguson, 179 P.3d 26 (Colo. App. 2007).
The CGIA unambiguously limits the recovery that a victim may receive from public entities or employees regardless of whether the recovery was obtained by settlement or judgment, absent a finding that the public employee acted in a willful and wanton manner. DeForrest v. City of Cherry Hills Vill., 72 P.3d 384 (Colo. App. 2002).
The CGIA's cap on damages is inclusive of costs and prejudgment interest. Caylao-Do v. Logue, 2025 COA 42, 571 P.3d 909.
The statute clearly limits the total recovery by a claimant, not individual judgments obtained by a claimant. DeForrest v. City of Cherry Hills Vill., 72 P.3d 384 (Colo. App. 2002).
Claim is moot when plaintiff is offered the maximum amount that could be recovered at trial. Rudnick v. Ferguson, 179 P.3d 26 (Colo. App. 2007).
Claim is moot regardless of whether all defendants contributed to the maximum amount deposited in the court registry. Rudnick v. Ferguson, 179 P.3d 26 (Colo. App. 2007).
Subsection (1)(b) applicable where two persons own single tract. Subsection (1)(b) applies where the injury is to a single tract but two persons each own an undivided one-half interest in the property. City of Colo. Springs v. Gladin, 198 Colo. 333, 599 P.2d 907 (1979).
Maximum recovery of $150,000 pursuant to this section for injury caused to child by negligence of pharmacy at state hospital includes anything recoverable pursuant to § 13-17-202. Costs recoverable under § 13-17-202 are available only to extent recovery pursuant to this section does not equal maximum recovery available. DeCordova v. State, 878 P.2d 73 (Colo. App. 1994).
The operative injury for purposes of a wrongful death action is the wrongful death itself; thus the $150,000 per injury damages cap in the CGIA does not apply separately to each party in a wrongful death action but rather to the wrongful death action as a whole. Steedle v. Sereff, 167 P.3d 135 (Colo. 2007).
Section 24-10-103 (2) defines an "injury" as including "death"; therefore, the operative injury for purposes of a wrongful death action is the wrongful death itself, and subsection (1)(a) of this section limits damages to $150,000. Steedle v. Sereff, 167 P.3d 135 (Colo. 2007).
Punitive damage awards against public entities are prohibited under subsection (4). Lopez v. Reg'l Transp. Dist., 899 P.2d 254 (Colo. App. 1994).
Limitation on judgment in this section is not an affirmative defense and is not waived if not presented in the pleadings, at trial, or in the motion for a new trial. City of Colo. Springs v. Gladin, 198 Colo. 333, 599 P.2d 907 (1979); Lee v. Colo. Dept. of Health, 718 P.2d 221 (Colo. 1986).
CGIA does not permit a jury to enter a verdict and judgment in excess of the statutory limitations. DeForrest v. City of Cherry Hills Vill., 72 P.3d 384 (Colo. App. 2002).
Public entity exclusively responsible for payment of entire judgment. Lee v. Colo. Dept. of Health, 718 P.2d 221 (Colo. 1986).
Statute limits recovery to amounts specified. Lee v. Colo. Dept. of Health, 718 P.2d 221 (Colo. 1986).
Costs and interest may be awarded within amounts specified. Lee v. Colo. Dept. of Health, 718 P.2d 221 (Colo. 1986).
Entry of an order confirming the amount of the award and reducing the judgment to $150,000 in accordance with this section is sufficient "proof of judgment" for purposes of subsection (5). Nieto v. State, 952 P.2d 834 (Colo. App. 1997), aff'd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 993 P.2d 493 (Colo. 2000).
For dismissal of claim for exemplary damages against public entities, see Subryan v. Regents of Univ. of Colo., 789 P.2d 472 (Colo. App. 1989).
For dismissal of claim of outrageous conduct against the board of trustees of a university, see Barham v. Scalia, 928 P.2d 1381 (Colo. App. 1996).
For award of costs against a public entity, see Bd. of County Comm'rs v. Slovek, 723 P.2d 1309 (Colo. 1986).
For dismissal of claim for punitive damages against public entities, see Healy v. Counts, 536 F. Supp. 600 (D. Colo. 1982).
Dismissal of claim of outrageous conduct against municipal defendants. Hutton v. Mem'l Hosp., 824 P.2d 61 (Colo. App. 1991).
Applied in Martin v. County of Weld, 43 Colo. App. 49, 598 P.2d 532 (1979); Belfiore v. Colo. Dept. of Hwys., 847 P.2d 244 (Colo. App. 1993).
24-10-114.5. Limitation on attorney fees in class action litigation.
If the plaintiffs prevail in any class action litigation brought against any public entity, the amount of attorney fees which the plaintiffs' attorney is entitled to receive out of any award to the plaintiffs shall be determined by the court; except that such amount shall not exceed two hundred fifty thousand dollars. Such limitation shall apply where the public entity pays the attorney fees directly to the plaintiffs' attorneys or where the public entity is required to pay the attorney fees indirectly through any program it administers by reducing the benefits or amounts due to the individual plaintiffs.
Source: L. 92: Entire section added, p. 272, § 2, effective April 28.
Cross references: For provisions relating to limitations on attorney fees in class action litigation against public entities, see § 13-17-203.
24-10-115. Authority for public entities other than the state to obtain insurance.
(1) A public entity, other than the state, either by itself or in conjunction with any one or more public entities may:
(a) Insure against all or any part of its liability for an injury for which it might be liable under this article;
(b) Insure any public employee acting within the scope of his employment against all or any part of such liability for an injury for which he might be liable under this article;
(c) Insure against the expense of defending a claim for injury against the public entity or its employees, whether or not liability exists on such claim;
(d) Insure against all or part of its liability or the liability of a railroad for claims arising from the passenger rail operations of a public entity on property or tracks owned by, or purchased from, a railroad.
(2) The insurance authorized by subsection (1) of this section may be provided by:
(a) Self-insurance, which may be funded by appropriations to establish or maintain reserves for self-insurance purposes;
(b) An insurance company authorized to do business in this state which meets all of the requirements of the division of insurance for that purpose;
(c) A combination of the methods of obtaining insurance authorized in paragraphs (a) and (b) of this subsection (2);
(d) Any risk management pool of public passenger rail services authorized to be created pursuant to the federal "Product Liability Risk Retention Act of 1981", 15 U.S.C. sec. 3901 et seq., as amended.
(3) A public entity, other than the state and other than a school district, may establish and maintain an insurance reserve fund for self-insurance purposes and may include in the annual tax levy of the public entity such amounts as are determined by its governing body to be necessary for the uses and purposes of the insurance reserve fund, subject to the limitations imposed by section 29-1-301, C.R.S., or such public entity may appropriate from any unexpended balance in the general fund such amounts as the governing body shall deem necessary for the purposes and uses of the insurance reserve fund, or both. A school district shall establish and maintain an insurance reserve fund in accordance with the provisions of section 22-45-103 (1)(e), C.R.S., for liability and property damage self-insurance purposes, including workers' compensation pursuant to section 8-44-204 (2), C.R.S., using moneys allocated thereto pursuant to the provisions of section 22-54-105 (2), C.R.S. The fund established pursuant to this subsection (3) shall be kept separate and apart from all other funds and shall be used only for the payment of administrative and legal expenses necessary for the operation of the fund and for the payment of claims against the public entity which have been settled or compromised or judgments rendered against the public entity for injury under the provisions of this article and for attorney fees and for the costs of defense of claims and to secure and pay for premiums on insurance as provided in this article.
(4) Policies written pursuant to this section and section 24-10-116 shall insure all of the risks and liabilities arising under this article, including costs of defense, unless the public entity requests in writing and obtains lesser coverage, in which event the policy issued shall conspicuously itemize the risks and liabilities not covered.
(5) A self-insurance fund established by a public entity which is subject to section 29-1-108, C.R.S., shall not be construed to be unexpended funds for budgetary purposes and shall be accumulated and held over for use in subsequent years.
(6) Repealed.
(7) Policies written, self-insurance funds established, or risk management pools entered into by a public entity for the purpose of insuring a public entity as described in paragraph (d) of subsection (1) of this section shall maintain such levels of insurance as are sufficient to insure against the maximum liability permitted against a railroad or its indemnitor pursuant to 49 U.S.C. sec. 28103.
Source: L. 71: p. 1210, § 1. C.R.S. 1963: § 130-11-15. L. 77: (5) added, p. 1160, § 1, effective February 16. L. 79: (1)(a) and (1)(b) amended, p. 863, § 5, effective July 1. L. 80: (3) amended, p. 581, § 1, effective April 30. L. 86: (3), (4), and (5) R&RE and (3) amended, pp. 511, 880, 1028, §§ 2, 13, 10, effective July 1. L. 88: (3) R&RE, p. 821, § 30, effective May 24. L. 89: (6) added, p. 1004, § 5, effective October 1. L. 90: (3) amended, p. 567, § 45, effective July 1; (5) amended, p. 1435, § 2, effective January 1, 1991. L. 94: (3) amended, p. 822, § 49, effective April 27. L. 97: (6) repealed, p. 1015, § 24, effective August 6. L. 2007: (1)(d), (2)(d), and (7) added, p. 1026, §§ 3, 4, 5, effective July 1.
Editor's note: Subsection (6) was enacted in House Bill No. 1143, enacted by the General Assembly at its first regular session in 1989, as a conforming amendment necessitated by the authorization for the operation of the university of Colorado university hospital by a nonprofit-nonstock corporation. The Colorado Supreme Court subsequently declared House Bill No. 1143 unconstitutional in its entirety. See Colorado Association of Public Employees v. Board of Regents, 804 P.2d 138 (Colo. 1990). Senate Bill 91-225, enacted by the General Assembly at its first regular session in 1991, authorized the operation of university hospital by a newly created university of Colorado hospital authority. For further explanation of the circumstances surrounding the enactment of Senate Bill 91-225, see the legislative declaration contained in section 1 of chapter 99, Session Laws of Colorado 1991.
Cross references: For authorization for state and counties to procure insurance against liability, see § 24-14-102.
ANNOTATION
Law reviews. For article, "Property Tax Assessments in Colorado", see 12 Colo. Law. 563 (1983). For article, "Colorado Municipal Liability After Annexing of Potential Superfund Site", see 16 Colo. Law. 258 (1987).
Self-insurance not considered "insurance coverage" so as to effect waiver of sovereign immunity. Corbin by Corbin v. City and County of Denver, 735 P.2d 214 (Colo. App. 1987) (decided prior to 1986 amendments).
Applied in Beacom v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 657 P.2d 440 (Colo. 1983).
24-10-115.5. Authority for public entities to pool insurance coverage.
(1) Public entities may cooperate with one another to form a self-insurance pool to provide all or part of the insurance coverage authorized by this article or by section 29-5-111, C.R.S., for the cooperating public entities. Any such self-insurance pool may provide such coverage by the methods authorized in sections 24-10-115 (2) and 24-10-116 (2), by any different methods if approved by the commissioner of insurance, or by any combination thereof. Any such insurance pool shall be formed pursuant to the provisions of part 2 of article 1 of title 29, C.R.S. The provisions of articles 10.5 and 47 of title 11, C.R.S., shall apply to moneys of such self-insurance pool.
(2) Any self-insurance pool authorized by subsection (1) of this section shall not be construed to be an insurance company nor otherwise subject to the laws of this state regulating insurance or insurance companies; except that the pool shall comply with the applicable provisions of sections 10-1-203 and 10-1-204 (1) to (5).
(3) Prior to the formation of a self-insurance pool, there shall be submitted to the commissioner of insurance a complete written proposal of the pool's operation, including, but not limited to, the administration, claims adjusting, membership, and capitalization of the pool. The commissioner shall review the proposal within thirty days after receipt to assure that proper insurance techniques and procedures are included in the proposal. After such review, the commissioner shall have the right to approve or disapprove the proposal. If the commissioner approves the proposal, he shall issue a certificate of authority. The costs of such review shall be paid by the public entities desiring to form such a pool. Any such payment received by the commissioner is hereby appropriated to the division of insurance in addition to any other funds appropriated for its normal operation.
(4) Each self-insurance pool for public entities created in this state shall file, with the commissioner of insurance on or before March 30 of each year, a written report in a form prescribed by the commissioner, signed and verified by its chief executive officer as to its condition. Such report shall include a detailed statement of assets and liabilities, the amount and character of the business transacted, and the moneys reserved and expended during the year.
(5) The commissioner of insurance, or any person authorized by him, shall conduct an insurance examination at least once a year to determine that proper underwriting techniques and sound funding, loss reserves, and claims procedures are being followed. This examination shall be paid for by the self-insurance pool out of its funds at the same rate as provided for foreign insurance companies under section 10-1-204 (9), C.R.S.
(6) (a) The certificate of authority issued to a public entity under this section may be revoked or suspended by the commissioner of insurance for any of the following reasons:
(I) Insolvency or impairment;
(II) Refusal or failure to submit an annual report as required by subsection (4) of this section;
(III) Failure to comply with the provisions of its own ordinances, resolutions, contracts, or other conditions relating to the self-insurance pool;
(IV) Failure to submit to examination or any legal obligation relative thereto;
(V) Refusal to pay the cost of examination as required by subsection (5) of this section;
(VI) Use of methods which, although not otherwise specifically proscribed by law, nevertheless render the operation of the self-insurance pool hazardous, or its condition unsound, to the public;
(VII) Failure to otherwise comply with the law of this state, if such failure renders the operation of the self-insurance pool hazardous to the public.
(b) If the commissioner of insurance finds upon examination, hearing, or other evidence that any participating public entity has committed any of the acts specified in paragraph (a) of this subsection (6) or any act otherwise prohibited in this section, the commissioner may suspend or revoke such certificate of authority if he deems it in the best interest of the public. Notice of any revocation shall be published in one or more daily newspapers in Denver which have a general state circulation. Before suspending or revoking any certificate of authority of a public entity, the commissioner shall grant the public entity fifteen days in which to show cause why such action should not be taken.
(7) Any public entity pool formed under this article and under article 13 of title 29, C.R.S., and the members thereof, may combine and commingle all funds appropriated by the members and received by the pool for liability or property insurance or self-insurance or for other purposes of the pool.
(8) (a) Any self-insurance pool organized pursuant to this section may invest in securities meeting the investment requirements established in part 6 of article 75 of this title and may also invest in membership claim deductibles and in any other security or other investment authorized for such pools by the commissioner of insurance.
(b) Any public entity which is a member of a self-insurance pool which is organized pursuant to this section or any instrumentality formed by two or more of such members may invest in subordinated debentures issued by such self-insurance pool.
(9) In addition to liability coverage pursuant to subsection (1) of this section and property coverage pursuant to section 29-13-102, a self-insurance pool authorized by subsection (1) of this section may provide workers' compensation coverage pursuant to section 8-44-204.
Source: L. 77: Entire section added, p. 1161, § 1, effective March 16. L. 79: (2), (3), and (4) amended and (6) added, p. 863, § 6, effective July 1. L. 86: (1) amended, p. 880, § 14, effective July 1. L. 88: (1) amended, p. 427, § 2, effective April 20. L. 89: (9) added, p. 1019, § 1, effective April 4; (8) added, p. 1106, § 4, effective July 1. L. 90: (9) amended, p. 568, § 46, effective July 1. L. 92: (2) and (5) amended, pp. 1500, 1613, §§ 37, 169, effective July 1. L. 99: (4) amended, p. 686, § 4, effective August 4. L. 2014: (9) amended, (SB 14-172), ch. 325, p. 1427, § 3, effective January 1, 2015. L. 2017: (2) amended, (HB 17-1231), ch. 284, p. 1576, § 15, effective January 1, 2018. L. 2024: (9) amended, (SB 24-089), ch. 247, p. 1626, § 3, effective May 24.
ANNOTATION
Under the plain language of this section, public entity self-insurance pools such as Colorado intergovernmental risk sharing agency are not to be construed to be insurance companies and are not otherwise subject to state laws regulating insurance companies except §§ 10-1-203, 10-1-204 (1) to (5) and (10). City of Arvada v. Colo. Intergovernmental Risk Sharing Agency, 988 P.2d 184 (Colo. App. 1999), aff'd, 19 P.3d 10 (Colo. 2001).
24-10-116. State required to obtain insurance.
(1) The state shall obtain insurance to:
(a) Insure itself against all or any part of any liability for an injury for which it might be liable under this article;
(b) Insure any of its public employees acting within the scope of their employment against all or any part of his liability for injury for which he might be liable under this article;
(c) Insure against the expense of defending a claim for injury against the state or its public employees, whether or not liability exists on such claim.
(2) The insurance required under subsection (1) of this section may be provided by:
(a) Self-insurance, which may be funded by appropriations to establish or maintain reserves for self-insurance purposes;
(b) An insurance company authorized to do business in this state which meets all the requirements of the division of insurance for that purpose;
(c) A combination of the methods of obtaining insurance authorized in paragraphs (a) and (b) of this subsection (2).
Source: L. 71: p. 1211, § 1. C.R.S. 1963: § 130-11-16.
Cross references: For creation of the state risk management fund to provide self-insurance for claims against the state, see part 15 of article 30 of this title.
ANNOTATION
Compliance with notice provisions of Colorado governmental immunity act is not essential to the court's jurisdiction. Nowakowski v. District Court, 664 P.2d 709 (Colo. 1983).
Filing complaint with district court and not serving complaint upon public entity or individual defendants held not to constitute "substantial compliance" with the notice provisions of the act. Uberoi v. Univ. of Colo., 713 P.2d 894 (Colo. 1986).
Should a police officer go beyond scope of law, he may become civilly liable and is not shielded by the doctrine of official immunity. Walker v. City of Denver, 720 P.2d 619 (Colo. App. 1986).
24-10-117. Execution and attachment not to issue.
Neither execution nor attachment shall issue against a public entity in any action for injury or proceeding initiated under the provisions of this article.
Source: L. 71: p. 1211, § 1. C.R.S. 1963: § 130-11-17.
24-10-118. Actions against public employees - requirements and limitations.
(1) Any action against a public employee, whether brought pursuant to this article, section 29-5-111, C.R.S., the common law, or otherwise, which lies in tort or could lie in tort regardless of whether that may be the type of action or the form of relief chosen by the claimant and which arises out of injuries sustained from an act or omission of such employee which occurred or is alleged in the complaint to have occurred during the performance of his duties and within the scope of his employment, unless the act or omission causing such injury was willful and wanton, shall be subject to the following requirements and limitations, regardless of whether or not such action against a public employee is one for which the public entity might be liable for costs of defense, attorney fees, or payment of judgment or settlement under section 24-10-110:
(a) Compliance with the provisions of section 24-10-109, in the forms and within the times provided by section 24-10-109, shall be a jurisdictional prerequisite to any such action against a public employee, and shall be required whether or not the injury sustained is alleged in the complaint to have occurred as the result of the willful and wanton act of such employee, and failure of compliance shall forever bar any such action against a public employee. Any such action against a public employee shall be commenced within the time period provided for that type of action in articles 80 and 81 of title 13, C.R.S., relating to limitation of actions, or it shall be forever barred.
(b) The maximum amounts that may be recovered in any such action against a public employee shall be as provided in section 24-10-114 (1), (2), and (3).
(c) A public employee shall not be liable for punitive or exemplary damages arising out of an act or omission occurring during the performance of his duties and within the scope of his employment, unless such act or omission was willful and wanton.
(d) The fact that a plaintiff sues both a public entity and a public employee shall not be deemed to increase any of the maximum amounts that may be recovered in any such action as provided in this section or in section 24-10-114.
(2) (a) A public employee shall be immune from liability in any claim for injury, whether brought pursuant to this article, section 29-5-111, C.R.S., the common law, or otherwise, which lies in tort or could lie in tort regardless of whether that may be the type of action or the form of relief chosen by a claimant and which arises out of an act or omission of such employee occurring during the performance of his duties and within the scope of his employment unless the act or omission causing such injury was willful and wanton; except that no such immunity may be asserted in an action for injuries resulting from the circumstances specified in section 24-10-106 (1).
(b) Any member of any state board, commission, or other advisory body appointed pursuant to statute, executive order, or otherwise, and any other person acting as a consultant or witness before any such body, shall be immune from liability in any civil action brought against said person for acts occurring while the person was acting as such a member, consultant, or witness, if such person was acting in good faith within the scope of such person's respective capacity, makes a reasonable effort to obtain the facts of the matter as to which action was taken, and acts in the reasonable belief that the action taken by such person was warranted by the facts.
(2.5) If a public employee raises the issue of sovereign immunity prior to or after the commencement of discovery, the court shall suspend discovery; except that any discovery necessary to decide the issue of sovereign immunity shall be allowed to proceed, and the court shall decide such issue on motion. The court's decision on such motion shall be a final judgment and shall be subject to interlocutory appeal.
(3) Nothing in this section shall be construed to allow any action which lies in tort or could lie in tort regardless of whether that may be the type of action or the form or relief chosen by a claimant to be brought against a public employee except in compliance with the requirements of this article.
(4) The immunities provided for in this article shall be in addition to any common-law immunity applicable to a public employee.
(5) Notwithstanding any provision of this article to the contrary, a public entity may, if it determines by resolution adopted at an open public meeting by the governing body of the public entity that it is in the public interest to do so, defend a public employee against a claim for punitive damages or pay or settle any punitive damage claim against a public employee.
Source: L. 79: Entire section added, p. 865, § 7, effective July 1. L. 85, 1st Ex. Sess.: IP(1) amended and (1)(c), (1)(d), (2), and (3) added, pp. 10, 11, §§ 7, 8, effective September 27. L. 86: Entire section added, p. 881, § 15, effective July 1 . L. 92: (1)(a) and (2) amended and (2.5) added, p. 1118, § 7, effective July 1.
ANNOTATION
This section definitively expresses the intent to grant immunity to negligent employees of immune governmental entities. The language in subsection (2)(a) that waives immunity under "the circumstances specified in section 24-10-106 (1)" refers not only to the act of operating a motor vehicle but also to the ownership status of the vehicle. The motor vehicle must be "owned or leased" by the public entity. Therefore, county employee who caused an automobile accident while using his personal vehicle and acting in the course and scope of his employment was immune from liability under the Colorado Governmental Immunity Act (CGIA). Ceja v. Lemire, 143 P.3d 1093 (Colo. App. 2006), aff'd, 154 P.3d 1064 (Colo. 2007).
It is only where a plaintiff has stated a federal claim that a notice of claim provision may be struck down based on supremacy because allowing a federal claim to be limited by state law would defeat the objective of the federal law. King v. U.S., 53 F. Supp. 2d 1056 (D. Colo. 1999).
Trial court did not err in determining that plaintiff failed to give the statutory notice in medical malpractice action where plaintiff retained counsel and obtained a set of doctors' and hospital's medical records by December 1985 but filed no notice of claim until August 1987. Brown v. Teitelbaum, 830 P.2d 1081 (Colo. App. 1991).
Substantial compliance with the 180-day notice provision is a condition precedent to any "action" brought under the CGIA, therefore, the time for filing minors' notice is not extended pursuant to the tolling provisions of § 13-81-103 until two years after the minors' legal representative is appointed. Brown v. Teitelbaum, 830 P.2d 1081 (Colo. App. 1991).
Under the CGIA, proper notice of injury is a jurisdictional prerequisite when an alleged injurious act by a public employee occurs or is alleged to have occurred during the performance of the employee's duties and within the scope of the employee's employment. Capra v. Tucker, 857 P.2d 1346 (Colo. App. 1993).
Subsection (1)(a) of this section does not make compliance with § 24-10-109 (6) a jurisdictional prerequisite for suing public employees. Dicke v. Mabin, 101 P.3d 1126 (Colo. App. 2004).
Failure to comply with notice provisions in the CGIA barred bringing of tort action against a public employee for conduct occurring in scope of her employment. Running of notice prevented court from exercising subject matter jurisdiction and the court had no authorization to create exception to the no fault act. Shandy v. Lunceford, 886 P.2d 319 (Colo. App. 1994).
There is no requirement in this section that a notice of claim be provided to a public employee or that employee's attorney. Rather, this section only requires that a notice be sent to the attorney general when the state is involved, or to the governing body of the public entity involved or that entity's attorney. Barham v. Scalia, 928 P.2d 1381 (Colo. App. 1996). But see BNC Metro. Dist. 1 v. BNC Metro. Dist. 3, 2025 COA 52, 573 P.3d 129 (affirming dismissal of plaintiff metropolitan districts' claims against individual defendant directors of districts for failure to provide notice).
Failure to provide notice barred claims by public entity against its employees where lack of notice was undisputed and plaintiff metropolitan districts failed to sufficiently allege individual defendants acted outside the scope of their employment as members of the plaintiff districts' boards of directors. BNC Metro. Dist. 1 v. BNC Metro. Dist. 3, 2025 COA 52, 573 P.3d 129.
Accident occurred during the performance of defendant's duties and within the scope of defendant's employment for the purpose of triggering the jurisdictional notice requirement of subsection (1)(a) upon a showing that the defendant was required to drive a patrol car to and from his private residence to perform his job properly, the state paid all operating costs of the vehicle while defendant was on call, and the defendant was not allowed to use the patrol car for personal reasons. Capra v. Tucker, 857 P.2d 1346 (Colo. App. 1993).
The question of whether a public employee acts within the scope of his employment is a question of sovereign immunity. As such, it is proper for a trial court to decide for the purposes of immunity whether an employee was acting within the scope of his employment on a C.R.C.P. 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The trial court, however, must resolve disputed issues of fact before it decides whether it has subject matter jurisdiction over the claim. Gallagher v. Univ. of N. Colo., 54 P.3d 386 (Colo. 2002).
"Willful and wanton" conduct was adequately pleaded. Holland v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 883 P.2d 500 (Colo. App. 1994).
Since the CGIA does not define the term "willful and wanton", the court followed a majority of courts that have addressed the issue and applied the definition set forth in the exemplary damages statute, § 13-21-102(1)(b). Cossio v. City & County of Denver, 986 F. Supp. 1340 (D. Colo. 1997); O'Hayre v. Bd. of Educ. for Jefferson County Sch. Dist. R-1, 109 F. Supp. 2d 1284 (D. Colo. 2000); Dahn v. Adoption Alli., 164 F. Supp. 3d 1294 (D. Colo. 2016), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Dahn v. Amedei, 867 F.3d 1178 (10th Cir. 2017).
Mere negligence does not make conduct willful and wanton. To be willful and wanton, conduct must exhibit a conscious disregard for the danger. In re Estate of Bleck, 2016 CO 58, 379 P.3d 315.
State trooper's decision to end a traffic stop of a vehicle by following the vehicle to its destination instead of issuing a citation is not willful and wanton conduct. The decision was not needless or reckless but was simply a choice between logical alternatives that a reasonable officer would entertain. Moody v. Ungerer, 885 P.2d 200 (Colo. 1994).
Under the factual circumstances, police officer's actions were not willful and wanton and therefore did not approach the level of culpable conduct required to abrogate the immunity conferred by the CGIA where officer failed to offer a motorist a ride home following a traffic stop in which the officer ordered the driver not to drive, and the motorist was subsequently assaulted. Jarvis by and through Jarvis v. Deyoe, 892 P.2d 398 (Colo. App. 1994).
County sheriffs entitled to qualified immunity where the court found no evidence that their actions were willful and wanton. Conduct of sheriffs involved in executing an in rem seizure warrant did not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known. Trujillo v. Simer, 934 F. Supp. 1217 (D. Colo. 1996).
Outrageous conduct claims predicated on a lack of conduct, not on willful and wanton conduct, barred by operation of § 24-10-110 (5). Dahn v. Adoption Alli., 164 F. Supp. 3d 1294 (D. Colo. 2016), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Dahn v. Amedei, 867 F.3d 1178 (10th Cir. 2017).
Allegations that a school principal assaulted and battered a student were sufficient to meet the standard for willful and wanton claims. O'Hayre v. Bd. of Educ. for Jefferson County Sch. Dist. R-1, 109 F. Supp. 2d 1284 (D. Colo. 2000).
The plaintiff need not specifically use the word "intent" to plead an intentional act. O'Hayre v. Bd. of Educ. for Jefferson County Sch. Dist. R-1, 109 F. Supp. 2d 1284 (D. Colo. 2000).
Because a jury could find that public school teacher's actions in restraining a developmentally disabled child were willful and wanton, teacher not entitled to summary judgment. A.B. v. Adams-Arapahoe 28J Sch. Dist., 831 F. Supp. 2d 1226 (D. Colo. 2011).
Under the CGIA and the Child Protection Act of 1987, a public employee who is a mandatory reporter is immune from liability for reporting or failing to report child abuse unless the employee's conduct is willful and wanton. L.J. v. Carricato, 2018 COA 3, 413 P.3d 1280.
Public employees' actions are willful and wanton when the employees are consciously aware that their acts or omissions create danger or risk to the safety of others, and they act or fail to act without regard to the danger or risk. A complaint must allege specific facts to support a reasonable inference the employee was consciously aware of the risk or danger and acted without regard to the danger or risk. L.J. v. Carricato, 2018 COA 3, 413 P.3d 1280.
Public employee's knowledge and conscious disregard of a health danger to another may be sufficient to render the employee's conduct willful or wanton, it is not necessary for the employee to know the specific cause of potential injury or death for the employee's omissions to constitute willful or wanton conduct. Duke v. Gunnison County, 2019 COA 170, 456 P.3d 38.
Where police officer's use of deadly force against a fleeing felony suspect was objectively reasonable under the fourth amendment, the officer's use of force cannot, as a matter of law, be deemed to be in conscious disregard of the danger posed by that exercise of force for purposes of the CGIA. Estate of George v. City of Rifle, 85 F.4th 1300 (10th Cir. 2023).
Where the court has determined that an equitable estoppel claim is not barred by sovereign immunity, as it does not lie in tort and could not lie in tort, whether or not a public employee's behavior was willful or wanton is irrelevant. Kohn v. City of Boulder, 919 P.2d 822 (Colo. App. 1995).
Trial court erred in limiting damages in regard to issues of material fact as to whether police officer's conduct was willful and wanton. DeForrest v. City of Cherry Hills Vill., 72 P.3d 384 (Colo. App. 2002).
This section provides for interlocutory review of a trial court's resolution of the issue — no matter the grounds — of sovereign immunity. All immunity created by subsection (2)(a) is sovereign immunity because subsection (2.5) makes any distinction between sovereign immunity and qualified immunity untenable for purposes of the CGIA. In re Estate of Bleck, 2016 CO 58, 379 P.3d 315.
Whether a public employee's conduct is willful and wanton under subsection (2)(a) implicates the public employee's sovereign immunity. Because a trial court must resolve all issues relating to sovereign immunity before trial, it errs if it fails to determine whether a public employee's conduct is willful and wanton before trial. In re Estate of Bleck, 2016 CO 58, 379 P.3d 315.
A challenge to the contents of a notice of claim raises an issue of "sovereign immunity" for purposes of subsection (2.5); the trial court's ruling in this case was a "final judgment" subject to interlocutory appeal. Bresciani v. Haragan, 968 P.2d 153 (Colo. App. 1998).
Reference to "final judgment" does not require the public entity to pursue an interlocutory appeal whenever a trial court denies its pre-trial motion to dismiss. Rather, the section merely provides that the trial court's ruling is subject to interlocutory appeal. Walton v. State, 968 P.2d 636 (Colo. 1998) (holding contrary to Buckles v. State, 952 P.2d 855 (Colo. App. 1998)).
A court may properly defer a ruling on a class certification motion until it has resolved the issue of subject matter jurisdiction under the CGIA, given that the court must suspend discovery except for any discovery necessary to decide the issue of sovereign immunity when a sovereign immunity question is raised. Grand Junction Peace Officers' Ass'n v. City of Grand Junction, 2024 COA 89, 558 P.3d 1021.
When a summary judgment motion based on sovereign immunity is denied, the governmental entity or public employee may pursue an interlocutory review. Such a right also exists for defendants in 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims pursuant to the principle of neutrality. Furlong v. Gardner, 956 P.2d 545 (Colo. 1998).
The failure of a public employee to perform his or her duties adequately does not convert the action into one based upon conduct outside the scope of his employment. Yonker by & through Helstrom v. Thompson, 939 P.2d 530 (Colo. App. 1997).
Trial court did not err in determining plaintiff districts failed to sufficiently allege individual director defendants were acting outside the scope of their employment where plaintiffs' allegations were limited to routine actions in work of members of a special district's board of directors, including entering into contracts, transferring money between districts and to a developer, and holding elections. BNC Metro. Dist. 1 v. BNC Metro. Dist. 3, 2025 COA 52, 573 P.3d 129.
C.R.C.P. 54(b) certification not required for appeal from order granting or denying motion to dismiss based on governmental immunity. Richland Dev. Co. v. E. Cherry Creek Valley Water & San. Dist., 899 P.2d 371 (Colo. App. 1995).
Alleged willful and wanton conduct by public employees may not support an assertion of claims in tort against the public entity employer. Ramos v. City of Pueblo, 28 P.3d 979 (Colo. App. 2001); Carothers v. Archuleta County Sheriff, 159 P.3d 647 (Colo. App. 2006).
Applied in Patel v. Thomas, 793 P.2d 632 (Colo. App. 1990); Carothers v. Archuleta County Sheriff, 159 P.3d 647 (Colo. App. 2006); Holub v. Gdowski, 68 F. Supp. 3d 1329 (D. Colo. 2014), aff'd, 802 F.3d 1149 (10th Cir. 2015).
24-10-119. Applicability of article to claims under federal law.
The provisions of this article shall apply to any action against a public entity or a public employee in any court of this state having jurisdiction over any claim brought pursuant to any federal law, if such action lies in tort or could lie in tort regardless of whether that may be the type of action or the form of relief chosen by the claimant.
Source: L. 86: Entire section added, p. 882, § 16, effective July 1 .
ANNOTATION
Reference to "courts of this state," was not intended to include federal courts hearing federal claims. Greiss v. Colo., 841 F.2d 1042 (10th Cir. 1988); Goodwin v. Debekker, 807 F. Supp. 101 (D. Colo. 1992).
Nothing in this section indicates that a federal court cannot apply the attorney fee provision, § 24-10-110 (5)(c), to state claims over which it exercises supplemental jurisdiction. Robbins v. Jefferson County Sch. Dist. R-1, 186 F.3d 1253 (10th Cir. 1999).
24-10-120. Severability.
If any provision of this article or the application thereof to any person or circumstances is held invalid, such invalidity shall not affect other provisions or applications of the article which can be given effect without the invalid provision or application, and to this end the provisions of this article are declared to be severable.
Source: L. 86: Entire section added, p. 882, § 16, effective July 1.
ARTICLE 11
Holidays
24-11-101. Legal holidays - effect.
24-11-102. Additional holidays - effect. (Repealed)
24-11-103. Saturday half holiday - effect. (Repealed)
24-11-104. Arbor Day - tree planting.
24-11-105. Governor to issue proclamation.
24-11-106. Good Roads Day. (Repealed)
24-11-107. Proclamation of governor. (Repealed)
24-11-108. Susan B. Anthony Day.
24-11-109. Leif Erikson Day.
24-11-110. Effect of closing public offices.
24-11-111. Colorado Day.
24-11-112. Farm Workers Day.
24-11-113. Public lands day.
24-11-114. Welcome Home Vietnam Veterans Day.
24-11-115. Lunar New Year Day.
24-11-116. Jury Appreciation Day.
24-11-117. Women Veterans Appreciation Day - legislative declaration.
24-11-118. Living Organ Donor Recognition Day.
24-11-101. Legal holidays - effect.
(1) The following days, viz: The first day of January, commonly called New Year's day; the third Monday in January, which shall be observed as the birthday of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.; the third Monday in February, commonly called Washington-Lincoln day; the last Monday in May, commonly called Memorial day; the nineteenth day of June, commonly called Juneteenth; the fourth day of July, commonly called Independence day; the first Monday in September, commonly called Labor day; the first Monday in October, commonly called Frances Xavier Cabrini day; the eleventh day of November, commonly called Veterans' day; the fourth Thursday in November, commonly called Thanksgiving day; the twenty-fifth day of December, commonly called Christmas day; and any day appointed or recommended by the governor of this state or the president of the United States as a day of fasting or prayer or thanksgiving, are hereby declared to be legal holidays and shall, for all purposes whatsoever, as regards the presenting for payment or acceptance and the protesting and giving notice of the dishonor of bills of exchange, drafts, bank checks, promissory notes, or other negotiable instruments and also for the holding of courts, be treated and considered as is the first day of the week commonly called Sunday.
(2) In case any of said holidays or any other legal holiday so designated falls upon a Sunday, then the Monday following shall be considered as the holiday, and all notes, bills, drafts, checks, or other negotiable instruments falling due or maturing on either of said days shall be deemed to be payable on the next succeeding business day. In case the return or adjourned day in any suit, matter, or hearing before any court comes on any day referred to in this section, such suit, matter, or proceeding, commenced or adjourned as aforesaid, shall not, by reason of coming on any such day, abate, but the same shall stand continued to the next succeeding day at the same time and place, unless the next day is Sunday, when in such case the same shall stand continued to the next succeeding secular or business day at the same time and place. Nothing in this section shall prevent the issuing or serving of process on any of the days mentioned in this section or on Sunday.
(3) The provisions of this section shall not operate to prohibit agencies in the executive branch of state government from doing business on any of the legal holidays named in this article. Employees under the jurisdiction of the state personnel system who are required to work on any of the legal holidays named in this article shall be granted an alternate day off in the same fiscal year or be paid in accordance with the state personnel system or state fiscal rules.
Source: L. 03: p. 246, § 1. R.S. 08: § 2940. C.L. § 3802. L. 33: p. 548, § 1. CSA: C. 79, § 1. L. 53: p. 345, § 1. CRS 53: § 67-1-1. L. 55: p. 439, § 1. C.R.S. 1963: § 67-1-1. L. 69: p. 480, § 1. L. 75: (1) amended, p. 792, § 1, effective June 29. L. 79: (3) added, p. 867, § 1, effective May 24. L. 84: (1) amended, p. 669, § 1, effective January 1, 1986. L. 2018: (3) amended, (SB 18-111), ch. 86, p. 687, § 2, effective August 8. L. 2020: (1) amended, (HB 20-1031), ch. 43, p. 143, § 2, effective September 14. L. 2022: (1) amended, (SB 22-139), ch. 149, p. 958, § 4, effective May 2.
Cross references: (1) For closing days of banks and effect, see § 11-105-103; for the definition of "business day" under the "Uniform Consumer Credit Code", which definition exempts holidays, see § 5-1-301 (6); for the school holidays, see § 22-1-112; for the computation of time for civil actions, see C.R.C.P. 6; for the execution of writ of attachment on Sunday or legal holiday, see C.R.C.P. 102(j).
(2) For the legislative declaration in SB 18-111, see section 1 of chapter 86, Session Laws of Colorado 2018. For the legislative declaration in HB 20-1031, see section 1 of chapter 43, Session Laws of Colorado 2020. For the legislative declaration in SB 22-139, see section 1 of chapter 149, Session Laws of Colorado 2022.
ANNOTATION
Jury verdict may be received on a legal holiday, because it is a ministerial act performed for the jury in a judicial proceeding. Carr v. People, 99 Colo. 477, 63 P.2d 1221 (1936).
24-11-102. Additional holidays - effect. (Repealed)
Source: L. 03: p. 245, § 1. R.S. 08: § 2490. C.L.: § 3802. L. 33: p. 548, § 1. CSA: C. 79, § 1. L. 53: p. 346, § 2. CRS 53: § 67-1-2. L. 55: p. 440, § 2. C.R.S. 1963: § 67-1-2. L. 67: p. 71, § 1. L. 69: p. 480, § 2. L. 84: (1) amended, p. 670, § 2, effective January 1, 1986. L. 88: Entire section repealed, p. 895, § 1, effective May 19.
24-11-103. Saturday half holiday - effect. (Repealed)
Source: L. 1893: p. 287, § 1. R.S. 08: § 2941. L. 19: p. 429, § 1. C.L. § 3803. CSA: C. 79, § 2. CRS 53: § 67-1-3. C.R.S. 1963: § 67-1-3. L. 95: Entire section repealed, p. 198, § 11, effective April 13.
24-11-104. Arbor Day - tree planting.
The third Friday in April of each year shall be set apart and known as "Arbor Day", to be observed by the people of this state in the planting of forest trees for the benefit and adornment of public and private grounds, places, and ways and in such other efforts and undertakings as shall be in harmony with the general character of the day so established.
Source: L. 1889: p. 21, § 1. R.S. 08: § 2942. C.L. § 3804. CSA: C. 79, § 3. CRS 53: § 67-1-4. C.R.S. 1963: § 67-1-4. L. 67: p. 798, § 4.
24-11-105. Governor to issue proclamation.
Annually, at the proper season, the governor shall issue a proclamation calling the attention of the people to the provisions of section 24-11-104 and recommending and enjoining their due observance. The commissioner of education shall promote, by all proper means, the observance of the day.
Source: L. 1889: p. 21, § 3. R.S. 08: § 2944. C.L. § 3806. CSA: C. 79, § 5. CRS 53: § 67-1-6. C.R.S. 1963: § 67-1-5. L. 67: p. 799, § 5.
24-11-106. Good Roads Day. (Repealed)
Source: L. 11: p. 446, § 1. C.L. § 3814. CSA: C. 79, § 6. CRS 53: § 67-1-7. C.R.S. 1963: § 67-1-6. L. 95: Entire section repealed, p. 200, § 15, effective April 13.
24-11-107. Proclamation of governor. (Repealed)
Source: L. 11: p. 447, § 3. C.L. § 3816. CSA: C. 79, § 8. CRS 53: § 67-1-9. C.R.S. 1963: § 67-1-7. L. 67: p. 799, § 6. L. 95: Entire section repealed, p. 200, § 16, effective April 13.
24-11-108. Susan B. Anthony Day.
The fifteenth day of February in each year, the same being the anniversary of the birth of Susan B. Anthony, shall be known as "Susan B. Anthony Day" and may be observed in the public schools of the state by suitable study and classroom discussion which set forth the importance of the great contribution she made to the cause of freedom.
Source: L. 41: p. 460, § 1. CSA: C. 79, § 9. CRS 53: § 67-1-10. C.R.S. 1963: § 67-1-8.
24-11-109. Leif Erikson Day.
The ninth day of October in each year, the same being the anniversary of the discovery of North America in the year 1000 A.D. by Leif Erikson, shall be known as "Leif Erikson Day", and appropriate observance may be held in all public schools of the state in tribute to the discoverer of the North American continent.
Source: L. 43: p. 290, § 1. CSA: C. 79, § 10. CRS 53: § 67-1-11. C.R.S. 1963: § 67-1-9.
24-11-110. Effect of closing public offices.
If, on any day when the public office concerned is closed, or on a Saturday, any document is required to be filed with any public office of the state of Colorado, its departments, agencies, or institutions, or with any public office of any political subdivision of the state, or any appearance or return is required to be made at any such public office, or any official or employee of such public office is required to perform any act or any duty of his office, then any such filing, appearance, return, act, or duty so required or scheduled shall neither be abated nor defaulted, but the same shall stand continued to the next succeeding full business day at such public office at the same time and place.
Source: L. 63: p. 552, § 1. C.R.S. 1963: § 67-1-10. L. 88: Entire section amended, p. 895, § 3, effective April 9. L. 95: Entire section amended, p. 199, § 13, effective April 13.
ANNOTATION
Public utilities commission is a "public office" within the terms of this section. Thus, where the last day for filing a petition for rehearing falls on a Sunday, when the commission offices are closed, the filing of the petition on a Monday is timely. Denver Clean-Up Serv., Inc. v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 174 Colo. 329, 483 P.2d 974 (1971).
Summons and complaint mistakenly ordering court appearance on a Sunday does not excuse the obligation to appear in court nor purge the court of jurisdiction over the person. Banos v. El Paso County Court, 804 P.2d 259 (Colo. App. 1990).
With a 180-day filing requirement, plaintiff was permitted to file notice of a claim on the 181st day because the City and County of Denver's offices were closed on the 180th day. Matthews v. City & County of Denver, 20 P.3d 1227 (Colo. App. 2000).
This section shall not be construed as resulting in a tolling, waiver, or extension of the 180-day filing requirement pursuant to § 24-10-109. Rather, this section merely allows the 180-day period to be given effect and provide a uniform method for determining when a statutory period begins and ends. Matthews v. City & County of Denver, 20 P.3d 1227 (Colo. App. 2000).
This section cannot be read in isolation to expand the limitations period. In expanding the limitations period, effect must be given to the more specific provisions in § 13-80-102 (1)(a). Morin v. ISS Facility Servs., Inc., 2021 COA 55, 487 P.3d 1289.
Neither C.R.C.P. 6(a) nor this section extends the two-year statute of limitations under § 13-80-102 (1)(a) when the expiration day falls on a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday. Morin v. ISS Facility Servs., Inc., 2021 COA 55, 487 P.3d 1289.
Applied in Fleming v. City of Lakewood, 723 P.2d 166 (Colo. App. 1986).
24-11-111. Colorado Day.
On the first Monday of August in each year, commonly called "Colorado Day", appropriate observance may be held by the public in tribute to the anniversary of the 1876 admission of the state of Colorado into the United States of America.
Source: L. 88: Entire section added, p. 895, § 2, effective April 9.
24-11-112. Farm Workers Day.
(1) The thirty-first day of March in 2026 and 2027 shall be known as "Farm Workers Day" and appropriate observance may be held by the public and in all public schools of the state in tribute to the principles of social justice and respect for human dignity.
(2) The head of a state agency may allow an employee of the agency to have a day off with pay on farm workers day in lieu of any other legal holiday described in section 24-11-101 (1) that occurs in the same state fiscal year on a weekday, other than a weekday on which an election is held throughout the state, on which the state agency is required to be open but on which the operations of the agency are required to be maintained at only a minimum level.
(3) On farm workers day, each state agency shall remain open and conduct the operations of the agency at no less than a minimum level.
(4) A holiday allowed under this section is in lieu of a legal holiday described in section 24-11-101 (1). The total number of legal holidays in a state fiscal year available to an employee of a state agency is not changed by this section.
Source: L. 2001: Entire section added, p. 153, § 1, effective March 27. L. 2026: (1), (2), and (3) amended, (HB 26-1339), ch. 31, p. 139, § 2, effective March 31.
Cross references: For the legislative declaration in HB 26-1339, see section 1 of chapter 31, Session Laws of Colorado 2026.
24-11-113. Public lands day.
(1) The third Saturday in May in each year is known as "Public Lands Day", and appropriate observance may be held by the public and in all public schools of the state in tribute to the importance of public lands in the state.
(2) Annually the governor shall issue a proclamation calling for the celebration of public lands day.
Source: L. 2016: Entire section added, (SB 16-021), ch. 167, p. 531, § 1, effective August 10.
24-11-114. Welcome Home Vietnam Veterans Day.
The thirtieth day of March in each year is known as "Welcome Home Vietnam Veterans Day", and appropriate observance may be held by the public and in all public schools of the state in tribute to the service and sacrifice of Vietnam veterans.
Source: L. 2021: Entire section added, (SB 21-024), ch. 22, p. 107, § 2, effective March 30.
Cross references: For the legislative declaration in SB 21-024, see section 1 of chapter 22, Session Laws of Colorado 2021.
24-11-115. Lunar New Year Day.
The first Friday of February in each year is known as "Lunar New Year Day". Appropriate observance may be held by the public and in all public schools of the state.
Source: L. 2023: Entire section added, (HB 23-1271), ch. 335, p. 2016, § 2, effective August 7.
Cross references: For the legislative declaration in HB 23-1271, see section 1 of chapter 335, Session Laws of Colorado 2023.
24-11-116. Jury Appreciation Day.
(1) The fifth day of September in each year, the same being the anniversary of one of the most famous jury verdicts in United States history, is known as "Jury Appreciation Day". Appropriate observance by suitable means may be held by the public, by all jury commissioners, and in all public schools of the state to recognize the importance of jury service to the community, the importance of jury trials to the state, and the great contribution jury trials make to the cause of freedom. All efforts and undertakings in celebrating Jury Appreciation Day must be in harmony with the general character of the day so established.
(2) Annually, the governor shall issue a proclamation calling for the recognition of Jury Appreciation Day.
(3) On Jury Appreciation Day, each state agency shall remain staffed at a minimum level to conduct the usual operations of the agency.
(4) A holiday allowed pursuant to this section is in lieu of a legal holiday described in section 24-11-101 (1). The total number of legal holidays in a state fiscal year available to an employee of a state agency is not changed by this section.
Source: L. 2023: Entire section added, (SB 23-282), ch. 253, p. 1436, § 2, effective August 7.
Cross references: For the legislative declaration in SB 23-282, see section 1 of chapter 253, Session Laws of Colorado 2023.
24-11-117. Women Veterans Appreciation Day - legislative declaration.
(1) The general assembly finds and declares that:
(a) Throughout our nation's history, over three million women have volunteered to serve our country by providing military service to the United States of America. Women have courageously served and historically trailblazed throughout the years, including disguising themselves as male soldiers during the American revolution and civil war; serving in the United States Army nurse corps, signal corps, and in clerical positions during world war I when women did not have the right to vote; and serving as mechanics, clerical workers, truck drivers, ferry and shuttle pilots, and in air combat tactics during world war II.
(b) There are currently over eight thousand five hundred Colorado women serving in the six branches of the armed forces and over forty-seven thousand Colorado women veterans. On March 1, 2013, the first female major general was chosen to be the superintendent of the United States Air Force academy, and in 2016, the United States Army enlisted a Colorado female into the infantry for the first time. In 2020, Governor Jared Polis appointed the first female adjutant general of Colorado.
(c) There are currently twenty-one states and United States territories that recognize June 12 as a day to recognize women veterans, including Alaska, California, Florida, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Mississippi, Nebraska, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Carolina, the U.S. Virgin Islands, Utah, and Wisconsin;
(d) Women veterans have long fought for equal recognition of their contributions to the safety and security of our nation;
(e) After service, women veterans face higher rates of unemployment and homelessness than their male counterparts;
(f) Women veterans, especially those with dependent children, face higher rates of poverty than their male counterparts;
(g) Women veterans face rates of post-traumatic stress as much as three times higher than their male counterparts;
(h) As many as one in twelve women are sexually assaulted while on active duty;
(i) Women veterans die by suicide at six times the rate of their civilian counterparts;
(j) Despite the disproportionate impacts that military service has had on the women who served, their needs have yet to be fully recognized by national, state, and local veterans service organizations;
(k) Women veterans continue to be denied access to services otherwise available to their male counterparts, including access to shelters that accommodate women or their dependent children, reproductive and other health-care services, mental health services specializing in sexual trauma, and other resources that recognize the challenges faced by women veterans;
(l) Despite these sometimes overwhelming challenges, women continue to volunteer to serve and are the fastest growing segment of United States military and veteran populations; and
(m) In order to honor the courage and sacrifice of women veterans, bring attention to the unique challenges they face, and affirm the state of Colorado's commitment to meeting the needs of our women veterans and their families, the general assembly finds it necessary to establish a women veterans appreciation day, and this day shall be used not only as an occasion to honor their service, but as an annual call to veterans organizations statewide to review their programs and work towards improving outcomes for women veterans.
(2) The twelfth day of June in each year is known as "Women Veterans Appreciation Day", and appropriate observance may be held by the public and in all public schools of the state in tribute to the service and sacrifice of women veterans.
Source: L. 2024: Entire section added, (HB 24-1236), ch. 434, p. 3041, § 1, effective August 7.
24-11-118. Living Organ Donor Recognition Day.
The eleventh day of April each year is known as "Living Organ Donor Recognition Day". Appropriate observance may be held by the public and in all public schools of the state.
Source: L. 2024: Entire section added, (HB 24-1132), ch. 331, p. 2246, § 5, effective June 3.
ARTICLE 12
Oaths and Affirmations
24-12-101. Form of oath or affirmation for public office - requirements for oath or affirmation.
24-12-102. Form of oaths or affirmations for purposes other than public office.
24-12-103. Who may administer oaths or affirmations.
24-12-104. Officers in armed forces empowered to perform notarial acts.
24-12-105. Appointees of officers of home rule cities and city and counties.
24-12-106. False swearing or affirming, perjury.
24-12-107. Oaths taken out of state.
24-12-108. Tax returns - applications for refunds.
24-12-101. Form of oath or affirmation for public office - requirements for oath or affirmation.
(1) When a person is required to take an oath or affirmation before the person enters upon the discharge of a public office or position, the form of the oath or affirmation is as follows:
I [name], do [select swear, affirm, or swear by the everliving God] that I will support the constitution of the United States, the constitution of the state of Colorado, and the laws of the state of Colorado, and will faithfully perform the duties of the office of [name of office or position] upon which I am about to enter to the best of my ability.
If choosing to swear an oath, the person swearing shall do so with an uplifted hand.
(2) The oath or affirmation must be:
(a) In writing and signed by the person taking the oath or affirmation;
(b) Administered as provided in section 24-12-103; and
(c) Taken, signed, administered, and filed as specified in subsection (3) of this section before the person enters upon the public office or position.
(3) Officers of the executive department, judges of the supreme and subsidiary courts, and district attorneys shall file their oaths or affirmations of office with the secretary of state. Every other person required by law to file an oath or affirmation of office shall file with the county clerk of the county wherein the person was elected or appointed.
Source: R.S. p. 482, § 1. G.L. § 1925. G.S. § 2471. R.S. 08: § 4669. C.L. § 7958. CSA: C. 115, § 1. CRS 53: § 98-1-1. C.R.S. 1963: § 98-1-1. L. 2018: Entire section amended, (HB 18-1138), ch. 88, p. 691, § 2, effective August 8; (1) amended, (SB 18-242), ch.355, p. 2115, § 1, effective August 8.
Cross references: (1) For constitutional requirements of oaths, see §§ 8 and 9 of art. XII, Colo. Const.
(2) For the legislative declaration in HB 18-1138, see section 1 of chapter 88, Session Laws of Colorado 2018.
ANNOTATION
Law reviews. For article, "Fearing Hell as Essential to Validity of Affidavit", see 18 Dicta 144 (1941).
Unlikely that notary public invokes "everliving God" to witness truth of statement. Under most office arrangements where the handling and notarization of papers are routine and perfunctory, as where the notary public is familiar with a signature, it is unlikely that "the everliving God" is invoked to witness the truth of a statement. Rogers v. People, 161 Colo. 317, 422 P.2d 377 (1966).
24-12-102. Form of oaths or affirmations for purposes other than public office.
Whenever any person is required to take or subscribe an oath, and in all cases where an oath is to be administered upon any lawful occasion, and the person has conscientious scruples against taking an oath, the person is permitted to make a solemn affirmation in lieu of an oath. Whenever any person is required to take an oath or affirmation, other than an oath for public office or position in accordance with section 24-12-101, the person shall take or subscribe the oath or affirmation in the manner specified in the particular law that imposes the requirement.
Source: R.S. p. 482, § 2. G.L. § 1926. G.S. § 2472. R.S. 08: § 4670. C.L. § 7959. CSA: C. 115, § 2. CRS 53: § 98-1-2. C.R.S. 1963: § 98-1-2. L. 72: p. 563, § 33. L. 2018: Entire section amended, (HB 18-1138), ch. 88, p. 692, § 3, effective August 8.
Cross references: (1) For perjury in the first degree, see § 18-8-502.
(2) For the legislative declaration in HB 18-1138, see section 1 of chapter 88, Session Laws of Colorado 2018.
ANNOTATION
It is not unconstitutional to require an oath or affirmation of jurors. People v. Velarde, 616 P.2d 104 (Colo. 1980).
24-12-103. Who may administer oaths or affirmations.
(1) All courts in this state and each judge, justice, magistrate, referee, clerk, and deputy clerk; court reporters who hold the registered professional reporter, certified verbatim reporter, or certified verbatim reporter - stenotype certification or higher; members and referees of the division of labor standards and statistics; members of the public utilities commission; and notaries public have power to administer oaths or affirmations to witnesses and others concerning a matter, thing, process, or proceeding pending, commenced, or to be commenced before them.
(2) The courts, judges, magistrates, referees, clerks, and deputy clerks within their respective districts or counties; court reporters who hold the registered professional reporter, certified verbatim reporter, or certified verbatim reporter - stenotype certification or higher; a person designated by the governing body, or an officer of the body; and notaries public within a county of this state have the power to administer all oaths or affirmations of office and other oaths or affirmations required to be taken by a person upon a lawful occasion and to take affidavits and depositions concerning a matter or thing, process, or proceeding pending, commenced, or to be commenced in a court or on an occasion an affidavit or a deposition is authorized or by law required to be taken.
Source: R.S. p. 482, § 3. G.L. § 1927. G.S. § 2473. R.S. 08: § 4671. C.L. § 7960. CSA: C. 115, § 3. L. 45: p. 495, § 1. CRS 53: § 98-1-3. C.R.S. 1963: § 98-1-3. L. 64: p. 293, § 235. L. 65: p. 893, § 1. L. 91: Entire section amended, p. 365, § 38, effective April 9. L. 2016: Entire section amended, (HB 16-1323), ch. 131, p. 380, § 17, effective August 10. L. 2018: Entire section amended, (HB 18-1138), ch. 88, p. 692, § 4, effective August 8. L. 2022: Entire section amended, (SB 22-020), ch. 57, p. 263, § 1, effective March 30. L. 2025: Entire section amended, (HB 25-1301), ch. 306, p. 1604, § 1, effective May 30.
Cross references: (1) For the authority of county clerks to administer oaths, see § 30-10-416; for the power of the public utilities commission to administer oaths, see § 40-6-103 (1).
(2) For the legislative declaration in HB 18-1138, see section 1 of chapter 88, Session Laws of Colorado 2018.
ANNOTATION
There is no affidavit unless an authorized official administers the oath. Zimmerman v. Indus. Comm'n, 108 Colo. 552, 120 P.2d 636 (1941).
Those officials empowered to administer oaths are enumerated in this section. Zimmerman v. Indus. Comm'n, 108 Colo. 552, 120 P.2d 636 (1941).
However, the secretary of the industrial commission is not mentioned therein, and there is no specific statutory provision investing this officer with such power. Zimmerman v. Indus. Comm'n, 108 Colo. 552, 120 P.2d 636 (1941) (decided prior to the abolition of the industrial commission in 1986).
Function of notary public is to take affidavits and depositions. Affidavits and depositions, when made, are legal papers, and the taking of them has been recognized as the function of a notary public from the earliest times. People ex rel. Attorney Gen. v. Wicks, 101 Colo. 397, 74 P.2d 665 (1937).
Thus, notary public authorized to administer oath to surety on bail bond. The affidavit of a surety on a bail bond as to his ownership of property, or other qualifications as a surety, is one "authorized or by law required to be taken", within the meaning of this section, and under this section a notary public has the authority to administer the oath. People v. Pollock, 65 Colo. 275, 176 P. 329 (1918).
24-12-104. Officers in armed forces empowered to perform notarial acts.
(1) In addition to the acknowledgment of instruments and the performance of other notarial acts in the manner and form and as otherwise authorized by law, instruments may be acknowledged, documents attested, oaths and affirmations administered, depositions and affidavits executed, and other notarial acts performed before or by any commissioned officer in active service of the armed forces of the United States or any such officer performing inactive-duty training with the equivalent rank of second lieutenant or higher in any component part of the armed forces of the United States, by or for any person who is a member of the armed forces of the United States, or is serving as a merchant seaman outside the limits of the United States included within the fifty states and the District of Columbia, or is outside said limits by permission, assignment, or direction of any department or official of the United States government, in connection with any activity pertaining to the prosecution of any war in which the United States is then engaged.
(2) Such acknowledgment of instruments, attestation of documents, administration of oaths and affirmations, execution of depositions and affidavits, and performance of other notarial acts, whenever made or taken, are hereby declared legal, valid, and binding, and instruments and documents so acknowledged, authenticated, or sworn to shall be admissible in evidence and eligible to record in this state under the same circumstances and with the same force and effect as if such acknowledgment, attestation, oath, affirmation, deposition, affidavit, or other notarial act had been made or taken within this state before or by a duly qualified officer or official as otherwise provided by law.
(3) In the taking of acknowledgments and the performing of other notarial acts requiring certification, a certificate indorsed upon or attached to the instrument or document that shows the date of the notarial act and that states, in substance, that the person appearing before the officer acknowledged the instrument as his or her act or made or signed the instrument or document under oath or affirmation shall be sufficient for all intents and purposes. The instrument or document shall not be rendered invalid by the failure to state the place of execution or acknowledgment.
(4) If the signature, rank, and branch of service or subdivision thereof of any such commissioned officer appears upon such instrument or document or certificate, no further proof of the authority of such officer so to act shall be required, and such action by such commissioned officer shall be prima facie evidence that the person making such oath or acknowledgment is within the purview of this section.
(5) If any instrument is acknowledged substantially as provided in this section, whether such acknowledgment has been taken before or after February 27, 1943, such acknowledgment shall be prima facie evidence of proper execution of such instrument and shall carry with it the presumptions provided for by section 38-35-101, C.R.S.
Source: L. 43: p. 218, § 2. CSA: C. 115, § 3A. L. 47: p. 355, § 3A. CRS 53: § 98-1-4. C.R.S. 1963: § 98-1-4. L. 91: (1) amended, p. 1379, § 1, effective May 18. L. 2018: (3) amended, (HB 18-1138), ch. 88, p. 693, § 5, effective August 8.
Cross references: (1) For acknowledgments by persons in the armed forces, see § 38-30-127.
(2) For the legislative declaration in HB 18-1138, see section 1 of chapter 88, Session Laws of Colorado 2018.
ANNOTATION
Law reviews. For article, "Curative Statutes of Colorado Respecting Titles to Real Estate", see 26 Dicta 281 (1949).
24-12-105. Appointees of officers of home rule cities and city and counties.
In all home rule cities and city and counties, the charters of which provide that officers, boards, or commissions named therein shall perform the acts and duties required of county officers by the state constitution or by general law, any deputy, employee, or appointee of such officer, board, or commission may administer any oath or affirmation which, by the state constitution or general law, might be administered by the county officer whose duties are performed by such officer, board, or commission making such appointment or employing such deputy, so long as such deputy, employee, or appointee is employed in such capacity.
Source: L. 35: p. 1113, § 1. CSA: C. 115, § 4. CRS 53: § 98-1-5. C.R.S. 1963: § 98-1-5.
Cross references: For constitutional provisions on home rule cities and towns, see art. XX, Colo. Const.
24-12-106. False swearing or affirming, perjury.
All oaths and affirmations, affidavits, and depositions administered or taken shall subject any person who swears or affirms falsely and willfully, in the matter material to any issue or point in question, to the penalties inflicted by law on persons guilty of perjury in the first degree.
Source: R.S. p. 483, § 5. G.L. § 1929. G.S. § 2475. R.S. 08: § 4673. C.L. § 7961. CSA: C. 115, § 5. CRS 53: § 98-1-6. C.R.S. 1963: § 98-1-6. L. 72: p. 563, § 34.
Cross references: For perjury in the first degree, see § 18-8-502.
ANNOTATION
Three elements are necessary to complete the crime of perjury: (1) Signing a false statement; (2) wilfully and corruptly taking the oath or affirming the same; and (3) making an oath before authorized officer in a manner prescribed by statute. Rogers v. People, 161 Colo. 317, 422 P.2d 377 (1966).
Surety making false affidavit on financial condition guilty of perjury. Where one offers himself as surety in bail bond and makes, before notary public, false affidavit as to his financial condition, he is guilty of perjury. People v. Pollock, 65 Colo. 275, 176 P. 329 (1918).
In prosecutions for perjury, the uncorroborated oath of one witness is not enough to establish the falsity of the testimony of the accused. Rather, the offense must be proved by the testimony of two witnesses, or the testimony of one witness and by other independent and corroborating circumstances which are deemed of equal weight of the testimony of another witness. Moreover, the corroboration of a single witness for the prosecution must contradict in definite and positive terms the statement of the accused. Lindsay v. People, 119 Colo. 438, 204 P.2d 878 (1949).
24-12-107. Oaths taken out of state.
All oaths and affirmations required or authorized to be taken by any statute of this state, when the person required to make the same resides out of or is absent from this state, may be made before and administered by any notary public or clerk of any court of record of the state wherein such person may be, such notary or clerk certifying the same under his notarial seal or the seal of such court.
Source: R.S. p. 483, § 6. G.L. § 1930. G.S. § 2476. R.S. 08: § 4674. C.L. § 7962. CSA: C. 115, § 6. CRS 53: § 98-1-7. C.R.S. 1963: § 98-1-7.
24-12-108. Tax returns - applications for refunds.
Any person required to make any return or any application for refund or protest against any deficiency assessment involving any tax imposed by the sales, use, income, motor fuel, and motor vehicle tax laws under oath or affirmation, in lieu of such oath or affirmation, may make a written verification or declaration that it is true and correct and that it is made under the penalties of perjury in the first degree, and the same is valid and complete without any attestation before a notary public or other officer if the signature thereto is witnessed by a legally competent person.
Source: L. 43: p. 445, § 1. CSA: C. 115, § 7. CRS 53: § 98-1-8. C.R.S. 1963: § 98-1-8. L. 72: p. 563, § 35.
Cross references: For perjury in the first degree, see § 18-8-502.
ARTICLE 13
Official Bonds
24-13-101. Clerks of district courts. (Repealed)
24-13-102. Suits on clerk's bond. (Repealed)
24-13-103. Bond filed with secretary of state. (Repealed)
24-13-104. Judge to examine bond. (Repealed)
24-13-105. County board to examine bonds - new bond.
24-13-106. Parties interested may offer evidence.
24-13-107. Record of examination.
24-13-108. Failure to file new bond - vacancy.
24-13-109. Release of sureties - notice.
24-13-110. Duty of county clerk and recorder.
24-13-111. Effect of new bond - release.
24-13-112. Embezzlement - vacancy.
24-13-113. Failure to file bond.
24-13-114. Officers failing to deliver, not to act - penalty.
24-13-115. Effect of release of sureties.
24-13-116. Approval of bonds - clerk of county board.
24-13-117. Approval of bonds to be of record.
24-13-118. Neglect to examine bonds - penalty.
24-13-119. Officers shall not become sureties.
24-13-120. Forfeiture of office by becoming surety.
24-13-121. Official bond payable to people.
24-13-122. Freeholders only acceptable as surety. (Repealed)
24-13-123. Statement of surety - contents. (Repealed)
24-13-124. Approval or rejection of bonds.
24-13-125. Official bonds - expense of premiums.
24-13-126. Premiums, how paid.
24-13-101. Clerks of district courts. (Repealed)
Source: R.S. p. 484, § 1. G.L. § 1931. G.S. § 2477. L. 07: p. 272, § 1. R.S. 08: § 4679. L. 11: p. 215, § 1. C.L. § 7963. CSA: C. 117, § 1. CRS 53: § 99-1-1. C.R.S. 1963: § 99-1-1. L. 2013: Entire section repealed, (HB 13-1053), ch. 41, p. 112, § 1, effective March 15.
24-13-102. Suits on clerk's bond. (Repealed)
Source: R.S. p. 484, § 2. G.L. § 1932. G.S. § 2478. R.S. 08: § 4680. C.L. § 7964. CSA: C. 117, § 2. CRS 53: § 99-1-2. C.R.S. 1963: § 99-1-2. L. 2013: Entire section repealed, (HB 13-1053), ch. 41, p. 112, § 1, effective March 15.
24-13-103. Bond filed with secretary of state. (Repealed)
Source: R.S. p. 484, § 3. G.L. § 1933. G.S. § 2479. R.S. 08: § 4681. C.L. § 7965. CSA: C. 117, § 3. CRS 53: § 99-1-3. C.R.S. 1963: § 99-1-3. L. 2013: Entire section repealed, (HB 13-1053), ch. 41, p. 112, § 1, effective March 15.
24-13-104. Judge to examine bond. (Repealed)
Source: R.S. p. 484, § 5. G.L. § 1935. L. 1883: p. 245, § 1. G.S. § 2481. R.S. 08: § 4683. C.L. § 7967. CSA: C. 117, § 5. CRS 53: § 99-1-4. C.R.S. 1963: § 99-1-4. L. 2013: Entire section repealed, (HB 13-1053), ch. 41, p. 112, § 1, effective March 15.
24-13-105. County board to examine bonds - new bond.
It is the duty of the board of county commissioners of each county, at each regular term, on the first day of each term, to examine and inquire into the sufficiency of the official bond of the county treasurer, sheriff, coroner, county assessor, county clerk and recorder, and county surveyor and all other official bonds given by any county officer, as required by law. If it appears that one or more of the sureties on the official bond of any such county officer have removed from the county, died, or become insolvent or of doubtful solvency, the board of county commissioners shall cause such officer to be summoned to appear before said board, on a day to be named in said summons, to show cause why he should not be required to give a new bond, with sufficient surety. If, at the appointed time, he fails to satisfy said board as to the sufficiency of the present surety, an order shall be entered of record by said board, requiring such officer to file in the office of the county clerk and recorder, within twenty days, a new bond, to be approved as required by law, unless the number and pecuniary ability of other sureties on the bond are such as to satisfy the board that the bond is sufficient, notwithstanding the fact that one or more of the sureties on said bond may have removed, died, or become insolvent or of doubtful solvency, in which case the bond in question, in the discretion of said board, may be held to be sufficient.
Source: R.S. p. 485, § 6. G.L. § 1936. G.S. § 2482. R.S. 08: § 4684. C.L. § 7968. CSA: C. 117, § 6. CRS 53: § 99-1-5. C.R.S. 1963: § 99-1-5. L. 64: p. 294, § 236.
ANNOTATION
Finding of insufficiency prerequisite to requiring new bond. The board of county commissioners has no jurisdiction to require the filing of a new bond without a finding of the insufficiency of the original one. People ex rel. Carr v. Brown, 23 Colo. 425, 48 P. 661 (1897).
District judge has no jurisdiction to require county commissioner to give new bond, because bonds of county commissioners are within the meaning of the term "other official bonds, given by any county officer, as required by law". People ex rel. Jones v. District Court, 18 Colo. 293, 32 P. 819 (1893).
24-13-106. Parties interested may offer evidence.
All persons interested in the sufficiency of the official bond of any of the officers or persons named in section 24-13-105 may appear at the prescribed time and place and shall be allowed to introduce any evidence lawfully tending to prove the removal, death, insolvency, or doubtful solvency of any surety on such official bond, and the officer or person interested, or any of his sureties, may also appear and introduce any evidence lawfully tending to establish the sufficiency of such official bond.
Source: R.S. p. 486, § 8. G.L. § 1938. G.S. § 2484. R.S. 08: § 4685. C.L. § 7969. CSA: C. 117, § 7. CRS 53: § 99-1-6. C.R.S. 1963: § 99-1-6. L. 2013: Entire section amended, (HB 13-1053), ch. 41, p. 112, § 2, effective March 15.
24-13-107. Record of examination.
It is the duty of the board of county commissioners to enter upon their respective records, at the time prescribed in section 24-13-105 for an examination, that an examination and inquiry into the sufficiency of the official bonds within their cognizance has been made and that they severally are deemed sufficient or insufficient as the facts may justify.
Source: R.S. p. 486, § 9. G.L. § 1939. G.S. § 2485. R.S. 08: § 4686. C.L. § 7970. CSA: C. 117, § 8. CRS 53: § 99-1-7. C.R.S. 1963: § 99-1-7. L. 2013: Entire section amended, (HB 13-1053), ch. 41, p. 112, § 3, effective March 15.
ANNOTATION
Finding of insufficiency prerequisite to requiring new bond. The board of county commissioners has no jurisdiction to require the filing of a new bond without a finding of the insufficiency of the original one. People ex rel. Carr v. Brown, 23 Colo. 425, 48 P. 661 (1897).
24-13-108. Failure to file new bond - vacancy.
If any officer or person enumerated in section 24-13-105 fails to file a new bond within the prescribed time when so required by an order entered of record requiring the filing of such new bond, the officer in default shall be deemed to have vacated his office, and the same steps shall be taken to fill such vacancy thus created as are taken to fill a vacancy by the death or resignation of such officer.
Source: R.S. p. 486, § 10. G.L. § 1940. G.S. § 2486. R.S. 08: § 4687. C.L. § 7971. CSA: C. 117, § 9. CRS 53: § 99-1-8. C.R.S. 1963: § 99-1-8. L. 2013: Entire section amended, (HB 13-1053), ch. 41, p. 112, § 4, effective March 15.
ANNOTATION
Two proceedings are authorized for failure to find a new bond: One is to be initiated by the board of county commissioners and is predicated upon the insufficiency of the officer's original bond under § 24-13-105, and the other is a bondsman who is unwilling to be security for the officer under § 24-13-109. It follows, therefore, that an information to oust or exclude an officer from his office, because of his failure to file a new bond, must, by apt averments, bring the case within one of these provisions. People ex rel. Carr v. Brown, 23 Colo. 425, 48 P. 661 (1897).
24-13-109. Release of sureties - notice.
Any person who is the surety of any sheriff, coroner, county clerk and recorder, county treasurer, county surveyor, or other county officer shall have the power of releasing himself from further liability as such surety for such officer by filing in the office of the county clerk and recorder a notice that he is no longer willing to be surety for such officer. If the person so desiring to be released from such surety is suretyship for the county clerk and recorder, in addition to such filing of notice, he shall deliver a copy of the notice to the chairman of the board of county commissioners or, if he is absent, to some other member of said board.
Source: R.S. p. 486, § 11. G.L. § 1941. G.S. § 2487. R.S. 08: § 4688. C.L. § 7972. CSA: C. 117, § 10. CRS 53: § 99-1-9. C.R.S. 1963: § 99-1-9. L. 64: p. 294, § 237. L. 2013: Entire section amended, (HB 13-1053), ch. 41, p. 113, § 5, effective March 15.
ANNOTATION
Sufficient notice by the surety is a jurisdictional fact in a proceeding under § 24-13-108. People ex rel. Carr v. Brown, 23 Colo. 425, 48 P. 661 (1897).
24-13-110. Duty of county clerk and recorder.
When any notice is filed with the county clerk and recorder, he shall immediately give notice thereof to such officer, who shall thereupon file other surety, to be approved by the board of county commissioners if the same is then in session or if a session thereof is commenced within ten days after notice has been given, but, if said board is not in session nor a session thereof is commenced within ten days thereafter, the officer within ten days shall file said bond with the county clerk and recorder, who shall judge of the sufficiency of said bond, subject to the decision and approval of said board of county commissioners at their first meeting thereafter. If such notice relates to the surety of the county clerk and recorder, it is the duty of the county commissioner to whom the copy of such notice is given immediately to require said clerk to file other surety to be approved by the board of county commissioners in like manner, but, if said board is not in session, the county commissioner to whom such notice may be given may approve such surety, subject to the decision and approval of the said board at its first meeting thereafter.
Source: R.S. p. 487, § 12. G.L. § 1942. G.S. § 2488. R.S. 08: § 4689. C.L. § 7973. CSA: C. 117, § 11. CRS 53: § 99-1-10. C.R.S. 1963: § 99-1-10. L. 2013: Entire section amended, (HB 13-1053), ch. 41, p. 113, § 6, effective March 15.
ANNOTATION
Board's discretion in refusing to approve bond not controlled by mandamus. When the board of county commissioners adjudges a bond to be insufficient and refuses to approve the same, mandamus will not lie to control the board's discretion in the matter. Bd. of County Comm'rs v. Crotty, 9 Colo. 318, 12 P. 151 (1886).
24-13-111. Effect of new bond - release.
If a new bond is given by any officer, then the former sureties shall be entirely released and discharged from all liability incurred by any such officer as to any business which may have been transacted from and after the time of the approval of the new bond, and the sureties to the new bond shall be liable for all official delinquencies of said officer, whether of omission or commission, which may occur after approval of the new bond.
Source: R.S. p. 487, § 14. G.L. § 1944. G.S. § 2490. R.S. 08: § 4691. C.L. § 7975. CSA: C. 117, § 13. CRS 53: § 99-1-12. C.R.S. 1963: § 99-1-12.
ANNOTATION
Surety is not discharged or released at all unless new bond is filed. People ex rel. Carr v. Brown, 23 Colo. 425, 48 P. 661 (1897).
24-13-112. Embezzlement - vacancy.
If any master, clerk of the district court, sheriff, coroner, county judge, county treasurer, county assessor, county clerk and recorder, or other officer embezzles or appropriates to his own use any money which may be paid to him by virtue of his office and is convicted therefor, the court pronouncing such judgment shall declare the office held by such officer to be vacant, and such vacancy shall be filled as provided by law.
Source: R.S. p. 488, § 15. G.L. § 1945. G.S. § 2491. R.S. 08: § 4692. C.L. § 7976. CSA: C. 117, § 14. CRS 53: § 99-1-13. C.R.S. 1963: § 99-1-13. L. 64: p. 295, § 239.
24-13-113. Failure to file bond.
It is the duty of such sheriff, coroner, county treasurer, county assessor, county clerk and recorder, or other officer, if he fails to give bond, to deliver over to his sureties forthwith all books, moneys, vouchers, papers, and every description of property whatever, pertaining to his office; and the sureties, at any time after failure to file bond, may maintain an action of replevin or other appropriate action to recover such property, money, or effects from their principal.
Source: R.S. p. 488, § 16. G.L. § 1946. G.S. § 2492. R.S. 08: § 4693. C.L. § 7977. CSA: C. 117, § 15. CRS 53: § 99-1-14. C.R.S. 1963: § 99-1-14. L. 64: p. 295, § 240. L. 2013: Entire section amended, (HB 13-1053), ch. 41, p. 113, § 7, effective March 15.
24-13-114. Officers failing to deliver, not to act - penalty.
If any officer designated in section 24-13-105 fails to deliver any money, property, or effects to his sureties or acts or attempts to act in the performance of the duties of his office after failing to give a new bond, he is guilty of a misdemeanor and, upon conviction thereof, shall be punished by a fine of not less than five hundred dollars nor more than five thousand dollars.
Source: R.S. p. 488, § 17. G.L. § 1947. G.S. § 2493. R.S. 08: § 4694. C.L. § 7978. CSA: C. 117, § 16. CRS 53: § 99-1-15. C.R.S. 1963: § 99-1-15. L. 2013: Entire section amended, (HB 13-1053), ch. 41, p. 114, § 8, effective March 15.
24-13-115. Effect of release of sureties.
The provisions of this article shall not be so construed as to operate as a release of the sureties of any of the aforesaid officers for liabilities incurred previous to the filing of a new bond.
Source: R.S. p. 488, § 18. G.L. § 1948. G.S. § 2494. R.S. 08: § 4695. C.L. § 7979. CSA: C. 117, § 17. CRS 53: § 99-1-16. C.R.S. 1963: § 99-1-16.
ANNOTATION
Applied in People ex rel. Carr v. Brown, 23 Colo. 425, 48 P. 661 (1897).
24-13-116. Approval of bonds - clerk of county board.
The county treasurer, county assessor, county clerk and recorder, or any county officer shall file his official bond in the office of the county clerk and recorder, which bond shall be executed as required by law and shall be approved by the board of county commissioners in open session. If said board is not in session on the filing of such bond, then the county clerk and recorder shall judge of its sufficiency, subject to the final decision and approval of said board at its first meeting thereafter. If said board is not in session, the county clerk and recorder, in filing his bond, shall present the same to the chairman of the board of county commissioners or, in case of his absence or inability to act, to one of the other members of said board, who shall judge of its sufficiency, subject to the decision and approval of said board at its first meeting thereafter.
Source: R.S. p. 488, § 20. G.L. § 1950. G.S. § 2496. R.S. 08: § 4697. C.L. § 7981. CSA: C. 117, § 19. CRS 53: § 99-1-17. C.R.S. 1963: § 99-1-17. L. 64: p. 296, § 241.
Cross references: For approval of county surveyor's bond, see § 30-10-901.
ANNOTATION
Bond of county clerk filed with same officer as superior. In the absence of a special statutory provision, the bond of a clerk of a county court may be properly filed with the same officer as the bond of his superior. Bd. of County Comm'rs v. Von Bernuth, 79 Colo. 300, 245 P. 490 (1926).
Delivery of statutory bond may be sufficient, without official approval, to bond sureties where the officer has begun his duties or where the obligee has indicated satisfaction and relied upon it to his advantage. Irvin v. Crook, 17 Colo. 16, 28 P. 549 (1891).
24-13-117. Approval of bonds to be of record.
It is the duty of the board of county commissioners to make an entry in the records of said board of its approval of all official bonds, and, when so approved by said board, the county clerk and recorder shall record the same in the records of said county for inspection by all persons.
Source: R.S. p. 489, § 22. G.L. § 1952. G.S. § 2498. R.S. 08: § 4699. C.L. § 7983. CSA: C. 117, § 21. CRS 53: § 99-1-19. C.R.S. 1963: § 99-1-19.
24-13-118. Neglect to examine bonds - penalty.
If any board of county commissioners willfully neglects to inquire and examine into the sufficiency of any of the official bonds named in this article, each member of the board is guilty of a public omission of duty and is liable in damages to any person who may receive injury by such neglect, to be recovered before any court of competent jurisdiction in this state by a civil action.
Source: R.S. p. 489, § 23. G.L. § 1953. G.S. § 2499. R.S. 08: § 4700. C.L. § 7984. CSA: C. 117, § 22. CRS 53: § 99-1-20. C.R.S. 1963: § 99-1-20.
24-13-119. Officers shall not become sureties.
No district judge, district attorney, county commissioner, county attorney, county clerk and recorder, or county judge shall become a surety on any official bond given by any county officer in this state.
Source: L. 1879: p. 27, § 1. G.S. § 2501. R.S. 08: § 4702. C.L. § 7986. CSA: C. 117, § 24. CRS 53: § 99-1-22. C.R.S. 1963: § 99-1-22. L. 64: p. 296, § 242.
24-13-120. Forfeiture of office by becoming surety.
No such officer shall become surety on any bond or obligation given to any board of county commissioners in this state. A violation of this section or section 24-13-119 shall work a forfeiture of any office held by such officer.
Source: L. 1879: p. 27, § 2. G.S. § 2502. R.S. 08: § 4703. C.L. § 7987. CSA: C. 117, § 25. CRS 53: § 99-1-23. C.R.S. 1963: § 99-1-23.
24-13-121. Official bond payable to people.
Every official bond of any county officer, if not otherwise provided by law, shall be payable to the people of the state of Colorado, and an action shall lie thereon to the use of any party aggrieved in the name of the people.
Source: G.L. § 563. G.S. § 663. R.S. 08: § 4704. C.L. § 7988. CSA: C. 117, § 26. CRS 53: § 99-1-24. C.R.S. 1963: § 99-1-24.
ANNOTATION
No objection to action by state for use of county. There is no valid objection to the title of an action brought by the people of the state of Colorado for the use of a county. Bell v. People ex rel. Garfield County, 92 Colo. 585, 22 P.2d 857 (1933).
24-13-122. Freeholders only acceptable as surety. (Repealed)
Source: L. 1889: p. 106, § 1. R.S. 08: § 4705. C.L. § 7989. CSA: C. 117, § 27. CRS 53: § 99-1-25. C.R.S. 1963: § 99-1-25. L. 2018: Entire section repealed, (HB 18-1140), ch. 41, p. 463, § 3, effective August 8.
Cross references: For the legislative declaration in HB 18-1140, see section 1 of chapter 41, Session Laws of Colorado 2018.
24-13-123. Statement of surety - contents. (Repealed)
Source: L. 1889: p. 106, § 2. R.S. 08: § 4706. C.L. § 7990. CSA: C. 117, § 28. CRS 53: § 99-1-26. C.R.S. 1963: § 99-1-26. L. 72: p. 564, § 36. L. 2018: Entire section repealed, (HB 18-1140), ch. 41, p. 463, § 4, effective August 8.
Cross references: For the legislative declaration in HB 18-1140, see section 1 of chapter 41, Session Laws of Colorado 2018.
24-13-124. Approval or rejection of bonds.
Nothing in this section shall be construed to abridge, limit, or restrict the powers vested by law in boards of county commissioners to approve or reject, in their discretion, the bonds of county officers in their respective counties, to accept or refuse any surety offered thereon, and to require a new bond to be given in any case when they may deem the bond of any county officer insufficient from any cause for the public security.
Source: L. 1889: p. 106, § 3. R.S. 08: § 4707. C.L. § 7991. CSA: C. 117, § 29. CRS 53: § 99-1-27. C.R.S. 1963: § 99-1-27. L. 2018: Entire section amended, (HB 18-1140), ch. 41, p. 463, § 5, effective August 8.
Cross references: For the legislative declaration in HB 18-1140, see section 1 of chapter 41, Session Laws of Colorado 2018.
24-13-125. Official bonds - expense of premiums.
Any state, county, municipal, district, or court officer required by law to give a bond or other obligation as such officer may include, as part of the lawful expenses of executing and performing the duties of his office, such reasonable premium as may be charged by a company authorized under the laws of this state so to do for becoming his surety on such bond or obligation and such reasonable premium as may be charged by such company for becoming surety upon the bond of any deputy, clerk, or employee of such officer who is required by law or by such officer to give bond. Such premium shall not exceed one-half of one percent per annum on the amount or penalty of each bond or obligation.
Source: L. 19: p. 317, § 1. C.L. § 7992. CSA: C. 117, § 30. CRS 53: § 99-1-28. C.R.S. 1963: § 99-1-28.
24-13-126. Premiums, how paid.
The expenses provided in section 24-13-125, in the case of state officers and their deputies, clerks, or employees, shall be paid from the state treasury, and the general assembly shall make the necessary appropriations therefor. In the case of all other officers and their deputies, clerks, or employees, such expenses shall be paid from any fund provided by such county, municipality, district, precinct, or court for the payment thereof or for the payment of the incidental or contingent expenses of any such officer, or the same shall be paid by such officer from any fund in his possession from which he is authorized to pay the expenses or salaries of his office.
Source: L. 19: p. 317, § 2. C.L. § 7993. CSA: C. 117, § 31. CRS 53: § 99-1-29. C.R.S. 1963: § 99-1-29.
ARTICLE 14
Liability - State and County Employees
24-14-101. Definitions.
24-14-102. Authorize purchase of liability insurance and crime insurance in lieu of a public official personal surety bond - definitions.
24-14-103. Approval of seller - premium cost.
24-14-104. Amount of coverage - limitations.
24-14-105. Limitation of actions.
24-14-101. Definitions.
As used in this article, unless the context otherwise requires:
(1) "Agent" means any person duly authorized by an officer or employee to perform an act within the course of his service or employment.
(2) "Employee" means any employee of the state or its governmental subdivisions.
(3) "Officer" means any elected or appointed public official.
(4) "State" means any agency or department of the state of Colorado, a county, or a city and county.
Source: L. 62: p. 177, § 1. C.R.S. 1963: § 72-16-1.
24-14-102. Authorize purchase of liability insurance and crime insurance in lieu of a public official personal surety bond - definitions.
(1) The head of a department of the state of Colorado, with the approval of the governor or, in the case of the county or city and county, the chief executive officer or board of county commissioners, subject to appropriations being available therefor, is hereby authorized to procure insurance, through the department of personnel as provided in the "Procurement Code", articles 101 to 112 of this title 24, for the purpose of insuring its officers, employees, and agents against any liability, other than a liability that may be insured against under the "Workers' Compensation Act of Colorado", articles 40 to 47 of title 8, for injuries or damages resulting from their negligence or other tortious conduct during the course of their service or employment. Counties or cities and counties are authorized to insure their officers, employees, and agents against similar liabilities.
(2) (a) Whenever a person is required by law to provide or purchase a personal surety bond as a condition of serving in a public elected, appointed, or employed position, the public entity for which the person will serve may, in lieu of the required bond, purchase crime insurance to protect the public entity from any dishonesty, theft, or fraud by the person. However, this section does not apply to the bond required of the state treasurer pursuant to section 24-22-101.
(b) If a public entity purchases crime insurance in lieu of a personal surety bond pursuant to this subsection (2), the public official or employee is relieved of all statutory requirements related to the personal surety bond, including requirements as to the type, provider, form, amount, or filing of the personal surety bond. The public entity is likewise relieved of any statutory requirements related to the personal surety bond of the public official or employee.
(c) Crime insurance purchased pursuant to this subsection (2) must be purchased from an insurance provider licensed in the state of Colorado. The public entity shall pay the premiums for the insurance.
(d) As used in this subsection (2), unless the context otherwise requires:
(I) "Crime insurance" means a form of insurance to protect public assets from loss due to dishonesty, theft, or fraud by a public official.
(II) "Personal surety bond" means a bond, surety, surety bond, surety company bond, corporate surety bond, corporate fidelity bond, individual bond, schedule bond, blanket bond, or official bond.
(III) "Public entity" means the state of Colorado, principal departments listed in section 24-1-110, public colleges and universities, state or local commissions, state or local authorities, counties, cities, cities and counties, towns, municipalities, districts, special districts, boards, and school districts.
Source: L. 62: p. 177, § 2. C.R.S. 1963: § 72-16-2. L. 81: Entire section amended, p. 1286, § 5, effective January 1, 1982. L. 90: Entire section amended, p. 568, § 47, effective July 1. L. 96: Entire section amended, p. 1516, § 46, effective June 1. L. 2018: Entire section amended, (HB 18-1140), ch. 41, p. 463, § 6, effective August 8.
Cross references: (1) For the "Workers' Compensation Act of Colorado", see articles 40 to 47 of title 8; for authority for public entities other than the state to obtain insurance, see § 24-10-115.
(2) For the legislative declaration in HB 18-1140, see section 1 of chapter 41, Session Laws of Colorado 2018.
ANNOTATION
Law reviews. For comment on Am. Bus Lines v. Am. Sur. Co., appearing below, see 43 Den. L.J. 238 (1966).
Section is only applicable to state, county, and city departments. This section only applies to agencies or departments of the state, or to counties or cities and counties. Maloney v. City & County of Denver, 35 Colo. App. 167, 530 P.2d 1004 (1974).
It does not apply to political subdivisions. Maloney v. City & County of Denver, 35 Colo. App. 167, 530 P.2d 1004 (1974).
Therefore, it cannot apply to school boards or school districts. Maloney v. City & County of Denver, 35 Colo. App. 167, 530 P.2d 1004 (1974).
Section is authorization statute and was not designed to limit scope of coverage. Am. Bus Lines v. Am. Sur. Co., 238 F. Supp. 589 (D. Colo. 1965).
"Permissive use", rather than "scope of employment", is the proper test of coverage with respect to a liability policy covering state vehicles and extending coverage to use with the state's permission. Am. Bus Lines v. Am. Sur. Co., 238 F. Supp. 589 (D. Colo. 1965).
Therefore, employee driving state vehicle for repairs covered. A state employee who had driven a state vehicle for repairs and was returning it at the time of an accident was using the truck with the state's permission and was acting within his scope of employment, even though he had earlier violated regulations by going to his home and the home of a friend and by drinking beer. Am. Bus Lines v. Am. Sur. Co., 238 F. Supp. 589 (D. Colo. 1965).
24-14-103. Approval of seller - premium cost.
Any policy of insurance shall be obtained from an insurer authorized to transact business in this state and deemed by the department of personnel or the appropriate governing body of the governmental subdivision to be responsible and financially sound considering the extent of the coverage required. The premium for such insurance shall be a proper charge against the state or the appropriate governmental subdivision.
Source: L. 62: p. 178, § 3. C.R.S. 1963: § 72-16-3. L. 81: Entire section amended, p. 1291, § 16, effective January 1, 1982. L. 96: Entire section amended, p. 1516, § 47, effective June 1.
24-14-104. Amount of coverage - limitations.
(1) The extent of the insurance coverage shall be limited as follows:
(a) For any bodily injury and property damage to one person in any single occurrence, the sum of one hundred fifty thousand dollars;
(b) For any bodily injury and property damage to two or more persons in any single occurrence, the sum of four hundred thousand dollars; except that, in such instance, no person may recover in excess of one hundred fifty thousand dollars.
Source: L. 62: p. 178, § 4. C.R.S. 1963: § 72-16-4. L. 71: p. 1213, § 6. L. 72: p. 600, § 92. L. 81: (1) amended, p. 1152, § 2, effective April 30.
24-14-105. Limitation of actions.
No action arising against an officer, employee, or agent of the state or state governmental subdivision for which insurance coverage is provided in this article shall be brought unless the same is brought within the time period prescribed in section 13-80-102 or 13-80-102.5, C.R.S., except as set forth in section 13-80-103 (1)(b) and (1)(c), C.R.S.
Source: L. 62: p. 178, § 6. C.R.S. 1963: § 72-16-6. L. 86: Entire section amended, p. 704, § 16, effective May 23. L. 88: Entire section amended, p. 627, § 3, effective July 1.
ANNOTATION
Section does not apply to school districts. Maloney v. City & County of Denver, 35 Colo. App. 167, 530 P.2d 1004 (1974).
ARTICLE 15
Seals
24-15-101. Seals.
24-15-101. Seals.
Whenever this title requires the use of a seal in the performance of any duties, it shall be sufficient that a rubber stamp with a facsimile affixed thereon of the seal required to be used is placed or stamped with indelible ink upon the document requiring the seal.
Source: L. 75: Entire article added, p. 489, § 5, effective July 14.
ARTICLE 15.5
Flag of the United States
24-15.5-101. Display of flag of the United States - definitions.
24-15.5-101. Display of flag of the United States - definitions.
(1) Any state agency that purchases a flag of the United States for display may only display such flag if it has been made in the United States.
(2) For purposes of this article, "state agency" means any department, commission, council, board, bureau, committee, institution of higher education, agency, or other governmental unit of the executive, legislative, or judicial branch of state government.
Source: L. 2008: Entire article added, p. 94, § 1, effective September 11, 2009.
ARTICLE 16
Public Works Fiscal Responsibility Accounting Act of 1981
24-16-101. Short title.
24-16-102. Legislative declaration.
24-16-103. Definitions.
24-16-104. Prohibition of division of works of public improvement construction.
24-16-105. Account and record of costs.
24-16-106. Rules and regulations.
24-16-107. Audit.
24-16-108. Repeal. (Repealed)
24-16-101. Short title.
This article shall be known and may be cited as the "Public Works Fiscal Responsibility Accounting Act of 1981".
Source: L. 81: Entire article added, p. 1154, § 1, effective July 1.
24-16-102. Legislative declaration.
The general assembly hereby finds, determines, and declares that there is a present need for information concerning the true cost of government public work projects which are performed in whole or in part by employees of or use of equipment, machinery, or materials owned by the state of Colorado.
Source: L. 81: Entire article added, p. 1154, § 1, effective July 1.
24-16-103. Definitions.
As used in this article, unless the context otherwise requires:
(1) "Agency of government" means any state agency, department, division, board, bureau, commission, institution, or section which is a budgetary unit exercising purchasing authority or discretion.
(2) "Contract" means any agreement for public works for a fixed or determinable amount duly awarded after advertisement and competitive bid.
(3) "Cost" means the total cost of labor, materials, provisions, supplies, equipment rentals, equipment purchases, insurance, supervision, engineering, clerical and accounting services, the value of the use of equipment, including depreciation, owned by an agency of government, and reasonable estimates of other administrative costs not otherwise directly attributable to the project which may be reasonably apportioned to such project in accordance with generally accepted cost accounting principles and standards.
(4) "Generally accepted cost accounting principles and standards" means those accounting principles and standards promulgated by the cost accounting standards board of the American institute of certified public accountants which pertain to contractors engaged in the performance of government contracts.
(5) "Project" means any public work for which appropriation or expenditure of funds may be reasonably expected to exceed twenty-five thousand dollars in the aggregate for any fiscal year.
(6) "Public work" means any construction, alteration, repair, or improvement of any land, building, structure, facility, road, highway, or other public improvement suitable for and intended for use in the promotion of the public health, welfare, or safety or maintenance programs for the upkeep of public roads, highways, or bridge structures; except that "public works" does not include routine maintenance that is not definable by a stop or start time or by geographical limits.
(7) "Responsible agency of government" means the agency of government which has fiscal accountability for a project.
(8) "Responsible official" means the person having overall responsibility, including delegated authority, for keeping the accounting records of the responsible agency of government.
Source: L. 81: Entire article added, p. 1154, § 1, effective July 1.
24-16-104. Prohibition of division of works of public improvement construction.
It is unlawful for any person to divide a works of public improvement construction into two or more separate projects for the sole purpose of evading or attempting to evade the requirements of this article.
Source: L. 81: Entire article added, p. 1155, § 1, effective July 1.
24-16-105. Account and record of costs.
Whenever an agency of government undertakes any public work project by any means or method other than by contract, it shall cause to be kept and preserved a full, true, and accurate record of the cost of such project. Such records shall be kept and maintained by a responsible official on behalf of the responsible agency of government. To the extent the responsible agency of government contracts with any other agency of government in connection with a project, such other agency shall provide all necessary data or information to enable the responsible agency of government to document a full, true, and accurate record of the cost of such project, which data or information shall be kept in an orderly manner by the responsible agency of government for a period of at least six years after completion of the project. All such records shall be considered public records and shall be made available for public inspection.
Source: L. 81: Entire article added, p. 1155, § 1, effective July 1.
Cross references: For the inspection of public records, see part 2 of article 72 of this title.
24-16-106. Rules and regulations.
On or after July 1, 1981, but before January 1, 1982, the department of personnel shall promulgate rules and regulations which are designed to implement the provisions of this article. In promulgating such rules and regulations, the controller may seek the advice of the advisory committee on governmental accounting appointed pursuant to section 29-1-503, C.R.S., but the advice of such committee shall not be binding upon the controller. He shall at all times be concerned with the promulgation and implementation of rules and regulations concerning the obligation of agencies of government to keep certain project records, even if duplicative, in accordance with generally accepted cost accounting principles and standards. Upon request of local government officials, the department of personnel may assist local government officials in implementing cost accounting procedures.
Source: L. 81: Entire article added, p. 1155, § 1, effective July 1. L. 95: Entire section amended, p. 640, § 32, effective July 1. L. 96: Entire section amended, p. 1516, § 48, effective June 1.
Cross references: For the legislative declaration contained in the 1995 act amending this section, see section 112 of chapter 167, Session Laws of Colorado 1995.
24-16-107. Audit.
If any agency of government is alleged to be in violation of or in material noncompliance with this article 16 or the rules promulgated by the office of the state controller, the legislative audit committee must be advised, in writing, of the activities alleged to be in violation or noncompliance. The legislative audit committee shall give notice to the agency, which shall have ten days to respond to such allegation. If the said committee thereafter determines that there is a reasonable probability of a violation or material noncompliance, the committee shall take appropriate action and may direct the state auditor to conduct an audit and review of the records being kept by such agency. If the state auditor determines that the agency has violated or has not complied or is not complying with this article 16 or the rules, a written report shall be issued to the agency detailing the areas of violation or noncompliance and curative recommendations. The agency shall implement the recommendations of the state auditor within a time period set by the state auditor not to exceed six months.
Source: L. 81: Entire article added, p. 1156, § 1, effective July 1. L. 2010: Entire section amended, (HB 10-1181), ch. 351, p. 1630, § 25, effective June 7. L. 2017: Entire section amended, (SB 17-294), ch. 264, p. 1401, § 67, effective May 25.
24-16-108. Repeal. (Repealed)
Source: L. 81: Entire article added, p. 1156, § 1, effective July 1. L. 86: Entire section repealed, p. 883, § 1, effective February 27.
ARTICLE 17
State Department Financial Responsibility and Accountability
PART 1
STATE DEPARTMENT FINANCIAL RESPONSIBILITY AND ACCOUNTABILITY
24-17-101. Short title.
24-17-102. Control system to be maintained.
24-17-103. Annual report to controller.
24-17-104. Public inspection.
PART 2
STATE CONTINGENCY-BASED CONTRACTS
24-17-201. Short title.
24-17-202. Legislative declaration.
24-17-203. Definitions.
24-17-204. Review of contingency-based contracts by office of state planning and budgeting.
24-17-205. Existing legal requirements not superseded.
PART 3
PAYMENTS TO NONPROFIT GRANTEES
24-17-301. Definitions.
24-17-302. Dispensation of payments under grant agreements with nonprofit grantees.
PART 1
STATE DEPARTMENT FINANCIAL RESPONSIBILITY AND ACCOUNTABILITY
24-17-101. Short title.
This part 1 shall be known and may be cited as the "State Department Financial Responsibility and Accountability Act".
Source: L. 88: Entire article added, p. 897, § 1, effective July 1. L. 2004: Entire section amended, p. 1126, § 2, effective May 27.
24-17-102. Control system to be maintained.
(1) Each principal department of the executive department of the state government listed in section 24-1-110 shall institute and maintain systems of internal accounting and administrative control within said department, which shall be applicable to all agencies within said department and which shall provide for:
(a) A plan of organization that specifies such segregation of duties as may be necessary to assure the proper safeguarding of state assets;
(b) Restrictions permitting access to state assets only by authorized persons in the performance of their assigned duties;
(c) Adequate authorization and record-keeping procedures to provide effective accounting control over state assets, liabilities, revenues, and expenditures;
(d) Personnel of quality and integrity commensurate with their assigned responsibilities;
(e) An effective process of internal review and adjustment for changes in conditions.
Source: L. 88: Entire article added, p. 897, § 1, effective July 1.
24-17-103. Annual report to controller.
Not later than December 31 of each year following April 9, 1988, the head of each principal department shall file, with the controller, the state auditor, and the governor, a written statement that the department's systems of internal accounting and control either do or do not fully comply with the requirements of section 24-17-102. In the event that the statement filed indicates that the systems employed by the department are not in compliance with section 24-17-102, the statement shall further detail specific weaknesses known to exist, together with plans and schedules for correcting any such weaknesses.
Source: L. 88: Entire article added, p. 898, § 1, effective July 1.
24-17-104. Public inspection.
The report required under section 24-17-103 shall be available for inspection by members of the public, and the controller shall make copies available for that purpose upon request.
Source: L. 88: Entire article added, p. 898, § 1, effective July 1.
PART 2
STATE CONTINGENCY-BASED CONTRACTS
24-17-201. Short title.
This part 2 shall be known and may be cited as the "State Contingency-Based Contracts Act".
Source: L. 2004: Entire part added, p. 1124, § 1, effective May 27.
24-17-202. Legislative declaration.
(1) The general assembly hereby finds and declares that:
(a) Under certain circumstances, contingency-based contracts can benefit the state by reducing state agencies' fixed contractual costs and linking state agency expenditures to the achievement of desired results, but contingency-based contracts can also have unintended adverse consequences that impact state finances in ways that a contracting state agency might not foresee.
(b) Contracting is a function of the executive branch of state government, but the power to appropriate state moneys is a legislative function, and it is necessary and appropriate to provide limited legislative guidance to the executive branch regarding contingency-based contracts in order to protect state finances and the appropriations process from possible unintended adverse effects of contingency-based contracts.
(2) The general assembly further finds and declares that:
(a) Existing statutes expressly authorize certain state agencies to enter into contingency-based contracts in specified circumstances, and these statutes reflect the considered judgment of the general assembly that contingency-based contracts are appropriate in those circumstances. It is not the intent of the general assembly to subject contingency-based contracts entered into pursuant to specific statutory authorization to the requirements of this part 2.
(b) Because the office of state planning and budgeting is the executive branch agency that makes state economic forecasts for the executive branch and oversees the participation of the executive branch in the state budgeting process, it is the state agency best suited to determine, in accordance with the guidelines set forth in this part 2, whether a contingency-based contract not expressly authorized by statute is appropriate.
Source: L. 2004: Entire part added, p. 1124, § 1, effective May 27.
24-17-203. Definitions.
As used in this part 2, unless the context otherwise requires:
(1) "Contingency-based contract" means a contract entered into by a state agency and a vendor for services that:
(a) Requires all or part of the vendor's compensation to be computed by multiplying a stated percentage times the amount of measurable savings in the state agency's expenditures or costs of operation that are demonstrably attributable to the vendor's services under the contract; and
(b) Is entered into without the authority of a state statute that specifically authorizes the agency to enter into such a contract.
(2) "Office" means the office of state planning and budgeting created in section 24-37-102.
Source: L. 2004: Entire part added, p. 1125, § 1, effective May 27.
24-17-204. Review of contingency-based contracts by office of state planning and budgeting.
(1) No contingency-based contract shall be deemed valid unless the head of the principal department of state government entering into the contract or containing the agency entering into the contract submits the contract and an analysis of the contract to the office as required by paragraph (b) of subsection (2) of this section and the office approves the contract and transmits its approval in writing to the department. The state controller shall also promptly forward each contingency-based contract that it reviews pursuant to section 24-30-202 to the office.
(2) (a) Whenever a principal department of state government or another state agency enters into a contingency-based contract, the department or agency shall prepare an analysis of the contract that addresses:
(I) The extent to which the contract requires the vendor's compensation to be computed on a contingency basis and the maximum potential contractual liability to pay contingency-based compensation to the vendor;
(II) The extent to which it is necessary to offer contingency-based compensation to the vendor and the amount of any reduction in fixed contractual costs achieved by offering contingency-based compensation;
(III) The extent to which the contractually specified performance measure used to determine contingency-based compensation is appropriate and capable of being accurately determined;
(IV) The extent to which the contingency-based compensation specified in the contract might affect the state budgeting and appropriations process; and
(V) Any other factors that the department or agency deems relevant to consider in evaluating the contract.
(b) The head of a principal department of state government entering into a contingency-based contract or containing an agency entering into a contingency-based contract shall sign both the contract and the analysis prepared pursuant to paragraph (a) of this subsection (2) and shall submit both the contract and the analysis to the office so that the office may approve or disapprove the contract.
(c) Upon receipt of a contingency-based contract and analysis, the office shall review and either approve or disapprove the contract. The office shall promptly transmit written notification of a decision to approve a contingency-based contract to the head of the principal department that submitted the contract to the office and the joint budget committee of the general assembly. The office shall promptly transmit written notification of a decision to disapprove a contingency-based contract only to the head of the principal department that submitted the contract to the office.
Source: L. 2004: Entire part added, p. 1125, § 1, effective May 27.
24-17-205. Existing legal requirements not superseded.
The provisions of this part 2 shall not be construed to repeal, supersede, or otherwise affect any other statutory provisions that limit the use of or require review or approval of contingency-based contracts. Nothing in this part 2 shall be construed to authorize or prohibit a state agency from entering into a contingency-based contract in the absence of a statute that specifically authorizes the state agency to enter into such a contract.
Source: L. 2004: Entire part added, p. 1126, § 1, effective May 27.
PART 3
PAYMENTS TO NONPROFIT GRANTEES
24-17-301. Definitions.
As used in this part 3, unless the context otherwise requires:
(1) "Administering state agency" means any department, commission, council, board, bureau, committee, institution of higher education, agency, or other governmental unit of the executive, legislative, or judicial branch of state government, including the office of the governor, that administers a grant.
(2) "Grant" means an agreement in which an administering state agency as grantor transfers anything of value to a grantee to carry out a public purpose of support or stimulation authorized by law instead of acquiring property or services for the direct benefit or use of the administering state agency. A grant may include a distribution of money. A grant does not include donations.
(3) "Grantee" means a recipient of a grant that is a nonprofit organization and that has submitted written proof of such classification to the administering state agency that awarded the grant.
(4) "Nonprofit organization" means a charitable organization, as defined in section 39-26-102 (2.5).
Source: L. 2026: Entire part added, (HB 26-1274), ch. 385, p. 2412, § 1, effective August 12.
24-17-302. Dispensation of payments under grant agreements with nonprofit grantees.
(1) Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary, an administering state agency may advance a payment to a grantee only for a state-funded grant subject to the following requirements:
(a) The administering state agency shall:
(I) Have an existing process or develop a new process that is approved by the state controller to dispense an advance payment pursuant to this section;
(II) Disclose the availability of advance payment in any notice of a grant funding opportunity, grant solicitation, request for applications, or other announcement issued to prospective grantees. The disclosure must include:
(A) The eligibility criteria and documentation required to request an advance payment pursuant to this section;
(B) The process by which a grantee may request an advance payment from the administering state agency; and
(C) The approval process of the advance payment request;
(III) Ensure that any advance payment to a grantee is the minimum amount needed to achieve the outcome of actual, immediate cash requirements of the grantee in carrying out the grant objective; and
(IV) Use the office of the state controller's risk assessment tool to determine whether a grantee is high, medium, or low risk and allow advance payment only to a grantee that is determined to be low risk. An administering state agency may modify the considerations in the risk assessment tool depending on the specific situation.
(b) The grantee shall:
(I) Provide an itemized budget to the administering state agency for the eligible costs that the advance payment will cover, the indirect or other costs that the grantee needs to operate, a spending timeline, and a workplan developed in a form and manner specified by the administering state agency;
(II) Submit documentation, as required by the administering state agency, to support the need for advance payment, which may include invoices, contracts, estimates, payroll records, and financial records to demonstrate the minimum amount needed to achieve the grant objective and be timed with actual, immediate, cash requirements of the grantee;
(III) If required by the administering state agency and stipulated within the grant agreement, obtain insurance in an amount commensurate with the assessed risk determined by the administering state agency pursuant to subsection (1)(a)(IV) of this section;
(IV) Establish procedures to minimize the amount of time that elapses between the transfer of money and the expenditure of the money by the grantee;
(V) Provide a progress report to the administering state agency following the expenditure of an advance payment that includes a summary of work completed, proof of expenditure, and other associated information as determined by the administering state agency; and
(VI) Disclose its internal controls including the background of the grantee's management, the management's commitment to integrity and ethical values, a risk assessment that identifies the risks of achieving the objectives of the grant, control activities such as authorization and segregation of duties, preventative, detective, and corrective controls, information systems including the financial system that will be used to track and report grant spending, and monitoring of the grant.
(c) Advance payments authorized pursuant to this section are limited to the minimum immediate cash requirement of the grantee that are necessary to achieve the grant objective. The grantee shall propose the minimum amount needed to achieve the grant objective and the controller of the administering state agency shall review and determine whether to accept the amount or propose an alternative amount based on the requirements specified in subsections (1)(a) and (1)(b) of this section. The controller of the administering state agency shall forward advance payment requests to the state controller for approval.
(2) A grantee shall return to the administering state agency all unused money provided as an advance payment but not expended within the grant agreement timeline.
(3) A grantee that is paid a percentage of the total value of the payments under a grant agreement with an administering state agency immediately upon executing the grant agreement must comply with all of the reporting requirements specified in the grant agreement.
(4) If an administering state agency or the office of the state controller denies a grantee's request for advance payment, the administering state agency shall provide the grantee with a written explanation of the deficiencies in the application for advance payment that determined the decision to deny the request. The administering state agency shall make the elements and results of the risk assessment determined pursuant to subsection (1)(a)(IV) of this section available to the grantee.
(5) Nothing in this section prevents an administering state agency, in providing funding to a grantee as described in this section, from using a waiver process available through fiscal rules adopted by the state controller or rules adopted by a federal governmental entity to dispense a percentage of the total value of the payments under the grant agreement to the grantee immediately upon executing or renewing the grant agreement.
(6) Nothing in this section limits, prohibits, or supercedes any existing payment or grant-making authority or powers of a state agency.
Source: L. 2026: Entire part added, (HB 26-1274), ch. 385, p. 2413, § 1, effective August 12.
ARTICLE 18
Standards of Conduct
PART 1
CODE OF ETHICS
24-18-101. Legislative declaration.
24-18-102. Definitions.
24-18-103. Public trust - breach of fiduciary duty.
24-18-104. Rules of conduct for all public officers, members of the general assembly, local government officials, and employees.
24-18-105. Ethical principles for public officers, local government officials, and employees.
24-18-106. Rules of conduct for members of the general assembly.
24-18-107. Ethical principles for members of the general assembly.
24-18-108. Rules of conduct for public officers and state employees.
24-18-108.5. Rules of conduct for members of boards and commissions.
24-18-109. Rules of conduct for local government officials and employees.
24-18-110. Voluntary disclosure.
24-18-111. Powers of the secretary of state. (Repealed)
24-18-112. Board of ethics for the executive branch - created - duties.
24-18-113. Board of ethics for the general assembly - created - duties.
PART 2
PROSCRIBED ACTS RELATED TO CONTRACTS AND CLAIMS
24-18-201. Interests in contracts.
24-18-202. Interest in sales or purchases.
24-18-203. Voidable contracts.
24-18-204. Dealings in warrants and other claims prohibited.
24-18-205. Settlements to be withheld on affidavit.
24-18-206. Penalty.
PART 3
USE OF FACIAL RECOGNITION SERVICES BY STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT AGENCIES
24-18-301. Definitions.
24-18-302. Notice of intent to use facial recognition service - accountability reports - public review and comment - notice - exemption.
24-18-303. Use of facial recognition service - meaningful human review of certain decisions required.
24-18-304. Use of facial recognition service - testing required before use in certain contexts - testing capability required - exemption.
24-18-305. Use of facial recognition service - training of users required.
24-18-306. Use of facial recognition service - record keeping required.
24-18-307. Use of facial recognition service by law enforcement agencies - surveillance and tracking - prohibited uses - warrants.
24-18-308. Use of facial recognition service by agencies - disclosure to criminal defendant required - warrants.
24-18-309. Use of facial recognition service - applicability and exemptions.
PART 1
CODE OF ETHICS
24-18-101. Legislative declaration.
The general assembly recognizes the importance of the participation of the citizens of this state in all levels of government in the state. The general assembly further recognizes that, when citizens of this state obtain public office, conflicts may arise between the public duty of such a citizen and his or her private interest. The general assembly hereby declares that the prescription of some standards of conduct common to those citizens involved with government is beneficial to all residents of the state. The provisions of this part 1 recognize that some actions are conflicts per se between public duty and private interest while other actions may or may not pose such conflicts depending upon the surrounding circumstances.
Source: L. 88: Entire article added, p. 899, § 1, effective July 1.
24-18-102. Definitions.
As used in this part 1, unless the context otherwise requires:
(1) "Business" means any corporation, limited liability company, partnership, sole proprietorship, trust or foundation, or other individual or organization carrying on a business, whether or not operated for profit.
(2) "Compensation" means any money, thing of value, or economic benefit conferred on or received by any person in return for services rendered or to be rendered by himself or another.
(3) "Employee" means any temporary or permanent employee of a state agency or any local government, except a member of the general assembly and an employee under contract to the state.
(4) "Financial interest" means a substantial interest held by an individual which is:
(a) An ownership interest in a business;
(b) A creditor interest in an insolvent business;
(c) An employment or a prospective employment for which negotiations have begun;
(d) An ownership interest in real or personal property;
(e) A loan or any other debtor interest; or
(f) A directorship or officership in a business.
(5) "Local government" means the government of any county, city and county, city, town, special district, or school district.
(6) "Local government official" means an elected or appointed official of a local government, but does not include an employee of a local government. "Local government official" includes a member of the board of commissioners of any airport authority created pursuant to article 3 of title 41.
(7) "Official act" or "official action" means any vote, decision, recommendation, approval, disapproval, or other action, including inaction, which involves the use of discretionary authority.
(8) "Public officer" means any elected officer, the head of a principal department of the executive branch, and any other state officer. "Public officer" does not include a member of the general assembly, a member of the judiciary, any local government official, or any member of a board, commission, council, or committee who receives no compensation other than a per diem allowance or necessary and reasonable expenses.
(9) "State agency" means the state; the general assembly and its committees; every executive department, board, commission, committee, bureau, and office; every state institution of higher education, whether established by the state constitution or by law, and every governing board thereof; and every independent commission and other political subdivision of the state government except the courts.
Source: L. 88: Entire article added, p. 899, § 1, effective July 1. L. 90: (1) amended, p. 447, § 10, effective April 18. L. 91: (8) amended, p. 837, § 1, effective March 29. L. 2023: (6) amended, (HB 23-1156), ch. 60, p. 217, § 6, effective August 7.
ANNOTATION
Negotiations for future employment began when respondent submitted his resume to potential employer as contemplated in subsection (4)(c). Colo. Ethics Watch v. McCasky, Indep. Ethics Comm'n 11-03.
The generalized interests held by members of a county planning commission when drafting and adopting the county's master plan are insufficient to rise to the level of a "financial interest" as defined in subsection (4). Indep. Ethics Comm'n Letter Ruling 24-01.
County administrator's actions in making purchases on behalf of the county and signing the purchase order were not "official acts" as defined in subsection (7) because these routine tasks were more administrative than discretionary to effect a decision that had already been made. Matter of LeValley, Indep. Ethics Comm'n Complaint 19-25.
The county planning commission's recommendation to the board of county commissioners is an "official act" within the meaning of subsection (7). Indep. Ethics Comm'n Letter Ruling 24-01.
Acceptance of gift of season ski passes by nearby town for its employees may lead the public to conclude that the ski area has received, or its employees may receive, some benefit from the town employees in return. Public employees should avoid any conduct that may violate the public trust or appear to violate the public trust. Indep. Ethics Comm'n Advisory Opinion 14-21.
24-18-103. Public trust - breach of fiduciary duty.
(1) The holding of public office or employment is a public trust, created by the confidence which the electorate reposes in the integrity of public officers, members of the general assembly, local government officials, and employees. A public officer, member of the general assembly, local government official, or employee shall carry out his duties for the benefit of the people of the state.
(2) A public officer, member of the general assembly, local government official, or employee whose conduct departs from his fiduciary duty is liable to the people of the state as a trustee of property and shall suffer such other liabilities as a private fiduciary would suffer for abuse of his trust. The district attorney of the district where the trust is violated may bring appropriate judicial proceedings on behalf of the people. Any moneys collected in such actions shall be paid to the general fund of the state or local government. Judicial proceedings pursuant to this section shall be in addition to any criminal action which may be brought against such public officer, member of the general assembly, local government official, or employee.
Source: L. 88: Entire article added, p. 900, § 1, effective July 1.
ANNOTATION
This section, when read in conjunction with the rest of the standards of conduct, establishes an ethical standard of conduct concerning activities that could allow covered individuals to improperly benefit financially from their public employment. Thus, allegations that a public official breached his or her fiduciary duty under this section by using public employment for improper personal financial gain fell within the ambit of the independent ethics commission's (IEC's) jurisdiction under § 5 of art. XXIX of the state constitution. Gessler v. Smith, 2018 CO 48, 419 P.3d 964.
Given the allegations against the former secretary of state, the IEC properly exercised jurisdiction under § 5 of art. XXIX of the state constitution. The claims were predicated on allegations that the secretary improperly used his discretionary funds for personal financial gain — specifically, that he used state funds for partisan purposes and that he accepted a reimbursement for personal purposes. The allegations clearly implicate the ethical standard of conduct set forth in this section and thus fall within the IEC's jurisdiction under § 5 of article XXIX. Gessler v. Smith, 2018 CO 48, 419 P.3d 964.
A private actor may not assert a claim under this section as the statutory language mentions judicial proceedings brought only by a district attorney on behalf of the people. Grand Junction Peace Officers' Ass'n v. City of Grand Junction, 2024 COA 89, 558 P.3d 1021.
A breach of fiduciary duty claim under this section is be subject to the Colorado Governmental Immunity Act because it lies in tort or could lie in tort. Grand Junction Peace Officers' Ass'n v. City of Grand Junction, 2024 COA 89, 558 P.3d 1021.
Secretary of state breached the public trust for private gain in violation of this section by using funds from his discretionary account for purposes other than official business. Colo. Ethics Watch v. Gessler, Indep. Ethics Comm'n 12-07.
Acceptance of gifts from partner nonprofit organ procurement organization by driver's license examiners may result in appearance of impropriety. Indep. Ethics Comm'n Advisory Opinion 14-08.
Employment opportunities sought by compliance investigator in the financial unit of the marijuana enforcement division of the department of revenue present a potential violation of the public trust and a potential conflict of interest and could inhibit compliance investigator's ability to carry out regulatory duties in an impartial manner for the benefit of the state. Indep. Ethics Comm'n Advisory Opinion 19-05.
Parties' stipulation that, by admitting to facts sufficient to prove embezzlement of public property and official misconduct, respondent has admitted to breach of public trust and fiduciary duty pursuant to this section. King v. King, Indep. Ethics Comm'n 14-16.
Failure of county commissioner to disclose his personal or private interest in a matter being voted on, failure to recuse himself from the matter, and attempts to influence his fellow commissioners in violation of rules of conduct for local government officials constitutes a breach of the public trust for private gain. Matter of Flower, Indep. Ethics Comm'n Complaint 20-73.
There is no breach of public trust sufficient to constitute an ethics violation where town clerk, prior to approval by the town board of trustees, recorded a vacation of an alleyway that bisected a private organization's property. In re Ricotta, Indep. Ethics Comm'n Complaint 17-25.
24-18-104. Rules of conduct for all public officers, members of the general assembly, local government officials, and employees.
(1) Proof beyond a reasonable doubt of commission of any act enumerated in this section is proof that the actor has breached his fiduciary duty and the public trust. A public officer, a member of the general assembly, a local government official, or an employee shall not:
(a) Disclose or use confidential information acquired in the course of his official duties in order to further substantially his personal financial interests; or
(b) Accept a gift of substantial value or a substantial economic benefit tantamount to a gift of substantial value:
(I) Which would tend improperly to influence a reasonable person in his position to depart from the faithful and impartial discharge of his public duties; or
(II) Which he knows or which a reasonable person in his position should know under the circumstances is primarily for the purpose of rewarding him for official action he has taken.
(2) An economic benefit tantamount to a gift of substantial value includes without limitation:
(a) A loan at a rate of interest substantially lower than the commercial rate then currently prevalent for similar loans and compensation received for private services rendered at a rate substantially exceeding the fair market value of such services; or
(b) The acceptance by a public officer, a member of the general assembly, a local government official, or an employee of goods or services for his or her own personal benefit offered by a person who is at the same time providing goods or services to the state or a local government under a contract or other means by which the person receives payment or other compensation from the state or local government, as applicable, for which the officer, member, official, or employee serves, unless the totality of the circumstances attendant to the acceptance of the goods or services indicates that the transaction is legitimate, the terms are fair to both parties, the transaction is supported by full and adequate consideration, and the officer, member, official, or employee does not receive any substantial benefit resulting from his or her official or governmental status that is unavailable to members of the public generally.
(3) The following are not gifts of substantial value or gifts of substantial economic benefit tantamount to gifts of substantial value for purposes of this section:
(a) Campaign contributions and contributions in kind reported as required by section 1-45-108, C.R.S.;
(b) An unsolicited item of trivial value;
(b.5) A gift with a fair market value of fifty-three dollars or less that is given to the public officer, member of the general assembly, local government official, or employee by a person other than a professional lobbyist.
(c) An unsolicited token or award of appreciation as described in section 3 (3)(c) of article XXIX of the state constitution;
(c.5) Unsolicited informational material, publications, or subscriptions related to the performance of official duties on the part of the public officer, member of the general assembly, local government official, or employee;
(d) Payment of or reimbursement for reasonable expenses paid by a nonprofit organization or state and local government in connection with attendance at a convention, fact-finding mission or trip, or other meeting as permitted in accordance with the provisions of section 3 (3)(f) of article XXIX of the state constitution;
(e) Payment of or reimbursement for admission to, and the cost of food or beverages consumed at, a reception, meal, or meeting that may be accepted or received in accordance with the provisions of section 3 (3)(e) of article XXIX of the state constitution;
(f) A gift given by an individual who is a relative or personal friend of the public officer, member of the general assembly, local government official, or employee on a special occasion.
(g) Payment for speeches, appearances, or publications that may be accepted or received by the public officer, member of the general assembly, local government official, or employee in accordance with the provisions of section 3 of article XXIX of the state constitution that are reported pursuant to section 24-6-203 (3)(d);
(h) Payment of salary from employment, including other government employment, in addition to that earned from being a member of the general assembly or by reason of service in other public office;
(i) A component of the compensation paid or other incentive given to the public officer, member of the general assembly, local government official, or employee in the normal course of employment; and
(j) Any other gift or thing of value a public officer, member of the general assembly, local government official, or employee is permitted to solicit, accept, or receive in accordance with the provisions of section 3 of article XXIX of the state constitution, the acceptance of which is not otherwise prohibited by law.
(4) The provisions of this section are distinct from and in addition to the reporting requirements of section 1-45-108, C.R.S., and section 24-6-203, and do not relieve an incumbent in or elected candidate to public office from reporting an item described in subsection (3) of this section, if such reporting provisions apply.
(5) The amount of the gift limit specified in paragraph (b.5) of subsection (3) of this section, set at fifty-three dollars as of August 8, 2012, shall be identical to the amount of the gift limit under section 3 of article XXIX of the state constitution, and shall be adjusted for inflation contemporaneously with any adjustment of the constitutional gift limit pursuant to section 3 (6) of article XXIX.
Source: L. 88: Entire article added, p. 901, § 1, effective July 1. L. 92: (3)(g) and (3)(h) amended, p. 874, § 103, effective January 1, 1993. L. 94: (3) amended and (4) added, p. 1827, § 4, effective January 1, 1995. L. 2012: (2) amended, (SB 12-146), ch. 93, p. 306, § 1, effective April 12; (3) amended and (5) added, (HB 12-1070), ch. 167, p. 584, § 4, effective August 8.
ANNOTATION
Subsection (1) prohibits a state employee from disclosing or using any information he may acquire in the course of his official duties which, by virtue of his position with the state, is not available to competitors, but is advantageous to his software company's interests. Indep. Ethics Comm'n Advisory Opinion 21-01.
It is a violation of this section for a clerk and recorder's office to accept a gift box from the Denver Broncos the motivation for which was likely to thank the office for providing individual players with private appointments for official services and with a private entrance policy not available to the general public. Indep. Ethics Comm'n Advisory Opinion 14-01 (the portion of Advisory Opinion 14-01 that considers the value of a gift to be the sum total of gifts to a specific agency's employees overturned in Letter Ruling 22-01).
Driver's license examiners would likely know that gifts from partner nonprofit organ procurement organization are given in return for official action taken, such as asking driver's license applicants for a monetary donation, designating an organ donor by putting a Y on the driver's license, or educating applicants who choose to be donors, and therefore would violate subsection (1)(b)(II). Indep. Ethics Comm'n Advisory Opinion 14-08.
A legislator may accept an award and complimentary ticket to reception where award is presented under subsections (3)(c) and (3)(e) even if legislator knows or a reasonable person in legislator's position would know that the purpose of the award and complimentary ticket is to reward legislator for official action taken. Indep. Ethics Comm'n Letter Ruling 24-02.
It is not a violation of this section for driver's license office employees to accept a lunch incentive from a nonprofit organization for promoting National Donate Life Month since the value of the lunch would be less than the $75 limit set forth in subsection (3)(b.5) and could be viewed as an incentive given to the employee in the normal course of employment under subsection (3)(i). Indep. Ethics Comm'n Advisory Opinion 23-01.
Employment opportunities sought by compliance investigator in the financial unit of the marijuana enforcement division of the department of revenue present a potential conflict of interest and a potential violation of the public trust and could inhibit compliance investigator's ability to carry out regulatory duties in an impartial manner for the benefit of the state. Indep. Ethics Comm'n Advisory Opinion 19-05.
There is no conflict or appearance of impropriety created by the president of History Colorado paying fair market value from his personal funds to fly on the personal plane of one of History Colorado's largest donors to participate in a trip to Washington, D.C. Indep. Ethics Comm'n Advisory Opinion 13-09.
It would not violate this section for sheriff's deputies to receive lift tickets or season ski passes in exchange for their off-duty law enforcement services to a ski resort when the value provided by each deputy to the resort is equal to or greater than the retail price of the daily lift ticket or season pass. Indep. Ethics Comm'n Letter Ruling 22-03.
24-18-105. Ethical principles for public officers, local government officials, and employees.
(1) The principles in this section are intended as guides to conduct and do not constitute violations as such of the public trust of office or employment in state or local government.
(2) A public officer, a local government official, or an employee should not acquire or hold an interest in any business or undertaking which he has reason to believe may be directly and substantially affected to its economic benefit by official action to be taken by an agency over which he has substantive authority.
(3) A public officer, a local government official, or an employee should not, within six months following the termination of his office or employment, obtain employment in which he will take direct advantage, unavailable to others, of matters with which he was directly involved during his term of employment. These matters include rules, other than rules of general application, which he actively helped to formulate and applications, claims, or contested cases in the consideration of which he was an active participant.
(4) A public officer, a local government official, or an employee should not perform an official act directly and substantially affecting a business or other undertaking to its economic detriment when he has a substantial financial interest in a competing firm or undertaking.
(5) Public officers, local government officials, and employees are discouraged from assisting or enabling members of their immediate family in obtaining employment, a gift of substantial value, or an economic benefit tantamount to a gift of substantial value from a person whom the officer, official, or employee is in a position to reward with official action or has rewarded with official action in the past.
Source: L. 88: Entire article added, p. 902, § 1, effective July 1. L. 2012: (5) added, (SB 12-146), ch. 93, p. 307, § 2, effective April 12.
ANNOTATION
It would not violate this section for a former employee of the department of health care policy and financing to enter into a contract with a consulting company to work on project management issues relating to a major health care provider where the state agency indicated there is no conflict. Indep. Ethics Comm'n Letter Ruling 10-02.
It would violate this section for a former employee of the department of human services to enter into a contract or seek employment before the passage of six months with one of the direct service organizations that continues to contract with the department since the former employee has information not readily available to others as a result of the former state employment. Indep. Ethics Comm'n Letter Ruling 14-02.
This section specifically prevents a state employee from revealing information unavailable to others that the employee has acquired through his or her employment with the state when the employee is in the process of seeking employment outside of state government. Indep. Ethics Comm'n Advisory Opinion 13-13.
There was no violation of this section where city council member voted on a matter in which she had neither a personal or private interest nor a financial interest. Arnett v. Brandau, Indep. Ethics Comm'n 12-06.
24-18-106. Rules of conduct for members of the general assembly.
(1) Proof beyond a reasonable doubt of commission of any act enumerated in this section is proof that the member of the general assembly committing the act has breached his fiduciary duty and the public trust. A member of the general assembly shall not accept a fee, a contingent fee, or any other compensation, except his official compensation provided by statute, for promoting or opposing the passage of legislation.
(2) It shall not be a breach of fiduciary duty and the public trust for a member of the general assembly to:
(a) Use state facilities or equipment to communicate or correspond with a member's constituents, family members, or business associates;
(b) Accept or receive a benefit as an indirect consequence of transacting state business; or
(c) Accept the payment of or reimbursement for actual and necessary expenses for travel, board, and lodging from any organization declared to be a joint governmental agency of this state under section 2-3-311 (2), C.R.S., if:
(I) (A) The expenses are related to the member's attendance at a convention or meeting of the joint governmental agency at which the member is scheduled to deliver a speech, make a presentation, participate on a panel, or represent the state of Colorado or for some other legitimate state purpose;
(B) The travel, board, and lodging arrangements are appropriate for purposes of the member's attendance at the convention or meeting;
(C) The duration of the member's stay is no longer than is reasonably necessary for the member to accomplish the purpose of his or her attendance at the convention or meeting;
(D) The member is not currently and will not subsequent to the convention or meeting be in a position to take any official action that will benefit the joint governmental agency; and
(E) The attendance at conventions or meetings of the joint governmental agency has been approved by the executive committee of the legislative council or by the leadership of the house of the general assembly to which the member belongs; or
(II) The general assembly pays regular monthly, annual, or other periodic dues to the joint governmental agency that are invoiced expressly to cover travel, board, and lodging expenses for the attendance of members at conventions or meetings of the joint governmental agency.
(3) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, no member of the general assembly shall lobby, solicit lobbying business or contracts, or otherwise establish a lobbying business or practice respecting issues before the general assembly prior to the expiration of his or her term. Where the member tenders his or her resignation prior to the expiration of his or her term, the requirements of this subsection (3) shall apply up through the date of the member's resignation from office.
Source: L. 88: Entire article added, p. 902, § 1, effective July 1. L. 2003: (3) added, p. 1230, § 1, effective July 1. L. 2010: (2) amended, (SB 10-099), ch. 184, p. 662, § 4, effective August 11.
Cross references: For the legislative declaration in the 2010 act amending subsection (2), see section 1 of chapter 184, Session Laws of Colorado 2010.
24-18-107. Ethical principles for members of the general assembly.
(1) The principles in this section are intended only as guides to a member of the general assembly in determining whether or not his conduct is ethical.
(2) A member of the general assembly who has a personal or private interest in any measure or bill proposed or pending before the general assembly shall disclose the fact to the house of which he is a member and shall not vote thereon. In deciding whether or not he has such an interest, a member shall consider, among other things, the following:
(a) Whether the interest impedes his independence of judgment;
(b) The effect of his participation on public confidence in the integrity of the general assembly; and
(c) Whether his participation is likely to have any significant effect on the disposition of the matter.
(3) An interest situation does not arise from legislation affecting the entire membership of a class.
(4) If a member of the general assembly elects to disclose the interest, he shall do so as provided in the rules of the house of representatives or the senate, but in no case shall failure to disclose constitute a breach of the public trust of legislative office.
Source: L. 88: Entire article added, p. 902, § 1, effective July 1.
24-18-108. Rules of conduct for public officers and state employees.
(1) Proof beyond a reasonable doubt of commission of any act enumerated in this section is proof that the actor has breached his fiduciary duty.
(2) A public officer or a state employee shall not:
(a) Engage in a substantial financial transaction for his private business purposes with a person whom he inspects, regulates, or supervises in the course of his official duties;
(b) Assist any person for a fee or other compensation in obtaining any contract, claim, license, or other economic benefit from his agency;
(c) Assist any person for a contingent fee in obtaining any contract, claim, license, or other economic benefit from any state agency; or
(d) Perform an official act directly and substantially affecting to its economic benefit a business or other undertaking in which he either has a substantial financial interest or is engaged as counsel, consultant, representative, or agent.
(3) A head of a principal department or a member of a quasi-judicial or rule-making agency may perform an official act notwithstanding paragraph (d) of subsection (2) of this section if his participation is necessary to the administration of a statute and if he complies with the voluntary disclosure procedures under section 24-18-110.
(4) Repealed.
Source: L. 88: Entire article added, p. 903, § 1, effective July 1. L. 91: (4) repealed, p. 837, § 2, effective March 29.
ANNOTATION
The housing division of the department of local affairs may hire a qualified individual whose business has outstanding loans with the division where the individual would not have the ability to take an official act relating to the current contracts, have access to computer files or data regarding his contracts, and would not be able to inspect or manipulate agency data relating to his contracts. Independent Ethics Commission Advisory Opinion 11-11.
Subsection (2)(d) prohibits a state employee's performance of any official act that directly and substantially provides economic benefits to his software company, including the use of discretionary authority, decisions, recommendations, approvals, disapprovals, and inaction. Indep. Ethics Comm'n Advisory Opinion 21-01.
24-18-108.5. Rules of conduct for members of boards and commissions.
(1) Proof beyond a reasonable doubt of commission of any act enumerated in this section is proof that the actor has breached his fiduciary duty.
(2) A member of a board, commission, council, or committee who receives no compensation other than a per diem allowance or necessary and reasonable expenses shall not perform an official act which may have a direct economic benefit on a business or other undertaking in which such member has a direct or substantial financial interest.
Source: L. 91: Entire section added, p. 837, § 3, effective March 29.
ANNOTATION
Because this section applies only to an "official act", a member of the county planning commission may speak to the board of county commissioners as a member of the public because, in doing so, they would not be exercising the use of discretionary authority as a member of the planning commission. Indep. Ethics Comm'n Letter Ruling 22-02.
Similarly, close physical proximity of a county commissioner's property to a short-term rental, the regulation of which was a matter before the board of county commissioners, would not pose a disqualifying conflict of interest because it is unlikely to confer a "direct economic benefit" on a business in which the commissioner has a "direct or substantial financial interest" unless the commissioner has a direct or substantial financial interest in a business that directly benefits from short-term rentals. Indep. Ethics Comm'n Letter Ruling 22-02.
24-18-109. Rules of conduct for local government officials and employees.
(1) Proof beyond a reasonable doubt of commission of any act enumerated in this section is proof that the actor has breached his fiduciary duty and the public trust.
(2) A local government official or local government employee shall not:
(a) Engage in a substantial financial transaction for his private business purposes with a person whom he inspects or supervises in the course of his official duties;
(b) Perform an official act directly and substantially affecting to its economic benefit a business or other undertaking in which he either has a substantial financial interest or is engaged as counsel, consultant, representative, or agent; or
(c) Accept goods or services for his or her own personal benefit offered by a person who is at the same time providing goods or services to the local government for which the official or employee serves, under a contract or other means by which the person receives payment or other compensation from the local government, unless the totality of the circumstances attendant to the acceptance of the goods or services indicates that the transaction is legitimate, the terms are fair to both parties, the transaction is supported by full and adequate consideration, and the official or employee does not receive any substantial benefit resulting from his or her official or governmental status that is unavailable to members of the public generally.
(3) (a) A member of the governing body of a local government who has a personal or private interest in any matter proposed or pending before the governing body shall disclose such interest to the governing body and shall not vote thereon and shall refrain from attempting to influence the decisions of the other members of the governing body in voting on the matter.
(b) A member of the governing body of a local government may vote notwithstanding paragraph (a) of this subsection (3) if his participation is necessary to obtain a quorum or otherwise enable the body to act and if he complies with the voluntary disclosure procedures under section 24-18-110.
(4) It shall not be a breach of fiduciary duty and the public trust for a local government official or local government employee to:
(a) Use local government facilities or equipment to communicate or correspond with a member's constituents, family members, or business associates; or
(b) Accept or receive a benefit as an indirect consequence of transacting local government business.
(5) (a) Notwithstanding any other provision of this article 18, it is neither a conflict of interest nor a breach of fiduciary duty or the public trust for a local government official who is a member of the governing body of a local government to serve on a board of directors of a nonprofit entity and, when serving on the governing body, to vote on matters that may pertain to or benefit the nonprofit entity.
(b) (I) Except as provided in subsection (5)(b)(II) of this section, a local government official is not required to provide or file a disclosure or otherwise comply with the requirements of subsection (3) of this section unless the local government official has a financial interest in, or the local government official or an immediate family member receives services from, the nonprofit entity independent of the official's membership on the board of directors of the nonprofit entity.
(II) A local government official who serves on the board of directors of a nonprofit entity shall publicly announce his or her relationship with the nonprofit entity before voting on a matter that provides a direct and substantial economic benefit to the nonprofit entity.
Source: L. 88: Entire article added, p. 903, § 1, effective July 1. L. 2012: (2)(c) added, (SB 12-146), ch. 93, p. 307, § 3, effective April 12. L. 2017: (5) added, (HB 17-1293), ch. 291, p. 1610, § 1, effective August 9.
ANNOTATION
A local official should avoid engaging in financial business with the entity he represents, but if he does, he should not participate in the vote on the matter or urge his fellow local officials to vote a particular way. Indep. Ethics Comm'n Advisory Opinion 12-01.
Member of a town's board of trustees must refrain from performing any official act that directly and substantially benefits the member's business economically and must not vote or attempt to influence the decisions of other board members when he or she has a personal or private interest in the outcome. Indep. Ethics Comm'n Advisory Opinion 16-05.
Member of a board of county commissioners who also serves on that county's board of health and local board of equalization would not have a conflict of interest in the county boards' future regulation of short-term rentals in the county since he closed his personal short-term rental business and, therefore, there is no possibility that any official action he would take would directly and substantially affect, to its economic benefit, a business or other undertaking in which he has a substantial financial interest. Indep. Ethics Comm'n Advisory Opinion 21-02.
Individual seeking to hold office as county assessor or treasurer/public trustee while continuing his employment in the banking or mortgage industry must continually evaluate procedures and practices to insure the public is treated fairly, avoiding discretionary practices that would enrich the office holder or his business interests. Indep. Ethics Comm'n Advisory Opinion 17-10.
County administrator's actions in making purchases from husband's business and signing the purchase orders did not violate subsection (2)(b) since the county administrator did not exercise her judgment and choice in completing the routine tasks necessary to effect a decision that had already been made by another; therefore, her actions did not involve the use of discretionary authority. Matter of LeValley, Indep. Ethics Comm'n Complaint 19-25.
Town clerk did not violate subsection (2)(b) because she did not have a substantial financial interest in, and was not a representative or agent of, a private organization when she recorded a vacation of an alleyway that bisected the organization's property prior to approval of the vacation by the town board of trustees. In re Ricotta, Indep. Ethics Comm'n Complaint 17-25.
Town trustee who also served as a nonvoting liaison between the board of trustees and an advisory board and who served on the board of directors of a nonprofit organization did not violate this section regarding the advisory board's decision to participate in and allocate money to an event hosted by the nonprofit organization. The town trustee did not engage in any official acts in his role as liaison to the advisory board, and the advisory board is not a "governing body" under this statute. Matter of Brooks, Indep. Ethics Comm'n Complaint 23-02.
However, as a representative or agent for a private organization, a member of the town's board of trustees violated subsection (2)(b) when he took official action by voting to remove an encumbrance on the organization's property which vote directly and substantially benefitted the organization. In re Ricotta, Indep. Ethics Comm'n Complaint 17-31.
Respondent violated subsections (2) and (3)(a) since he took official action by voting on an increased contribution to an entity with which he had begun negotiations for future employment and therefore had a personal or private interest in the vote on the entity's budget. Colo. Ethics Watch v. McCasky, Indep. Ethics Comm'n 11-03.
County commissioner respondent violated subsection (3)(a) when she voted on a matter in which she had a personal or private interest by voting in favor of a consent agenda that included a warrant to reimburse the respondent for legal fees she had incurred in defending a separate ethics complaint before the state ethics commission. Matter of Cozad, Indep. Ethics Comm'n Complaint 18-08.
Individual who holds a dual role as both a county commissioner and a director on the board of a regional transportation authority has neither breached her fiduciary duty nor the public trust under subsection (2)(b) since she receives no personal economic benefit from her service on the authority and since she represents the county's interests on the board, but is not expected to represent the authority's interests in the official business of the county. Indep. Ethics Comm'n Advisory Opinion 17-04.
County employee is not prohibited from running for a city council position while maintaining employment with the county, but must recuse from voting or working on any matter that presents a conflict of interest on matters involving both the county and city. Additionally, the delegation of tasks to subordinate county employees whom the county employee supervises would not alleviate conflict of interest concerns for the county employee regarding matters affecting both the county and city. Indep. Ethics Comm'n Advisory Opinion 25-01.
The general policy recommendations of a county's master plan do not "directly and substantially" affect, to its economic benefit, a business or other undertaking in which a member of the county planning commission has a substantial interest or is engaged as counsel, consultant, representative, or agent as contemplated in subsection (2)(b). Indep. Ethics Comm'n Letter Ruling 24-01.
The term "other undertaking" in subsection (2)(b) does not include a regional transportation authority which is a separate public body politic and corporate of the state. Indep. Ethics Comm'n Advisory Opinion 17-04.
There is no violation of subsection (3)(a) where city council member voted on a matter in which she did not have a personal or private interest. Arnett v. Brandau, Indep. Ethics Comm'n 12-06.
Subsection (3)(a) specifically addresses actions of a governing body of which a local government official is a member and not the official's actions related to another governing body of which they are not a member; therefore, a member of the county planning commission may attend a meeting of the board of county commissioners and speak freely as a member of the public at those meetings so long as they do not purport to speak on behalf of the planning commission or in their capacity as a member of the planning commission. Indep. Ethics Comm'n Letter Ruling 22-02.
Similarly, a member of the board of county commissioners would not violate this section when voting on or participating in discussions regarding short-term rental regulations, unless the member has an interest different in kind from that of the general public such that recusal would be merited. Indep. Ethics Comm'n Letter Ruling 22-02.
Mayor's actions in presiding over a city council meeting at which a purchase of land was approved and signing the purchase resolution did not violate subsection (2)(b) or (3)(a) since the land purchase did not directly and substantially affect to his economic benefit the mayor's business interest and therefore the mayor did not derive any personal or private benefit from the land purchase. Matter of Wood, Indep. Ethics Comm'n Complaint 20-21.
Mayor's actions in negotiating a payment arrangement between his nonprofit corporation and the complainant's concessions business did not violate subsections (2)(a), (2)(b), or (3)(a) because he had neither inspected nor supervised the complainant's business in his official capacity as mayor and he had taken no "official act" as mayor that would have directly and substantially affected his nonprofit corporation to its economic benefit since he had not voted on either the contract between the complainant's business and the municipality or the municipality's issuance of a liquor license to the complainant's business. Matter of Bowman, Indep. Ethics Comm'n Complaint 20-18.
And there is no violation of subsection (3)(a) where there was no evidence that city council member derived a personal or private benefit above and beyond that of the general public as a result of his vote on the land-purchase matter before the city council. Matter of Kasper, Indep. Ethics Comm'n Complaint 20-22.
Member of town's board of trustees violated subsection (3)(a) when he voted to retain all of the town employees, including his wife who was the town clerk. In re Ricotta, Indep. Ethics Comm'n Complaint 17-31.
County commissioner violated subsection (3)(a) by failing to disclose his personal or private interest in the issue of overtime pay to employees of the county public health agency, by failing to recuse himself from voting, and by attempting to influence his fellow commissioners in voting on the matter knowing his wife was the primary beneficiary of that vote and the commissioner therefore stood to benefit financially by the board's approval of the overtime pay. Matter of Flower, Indep. Ethics Comm'n Complaint 20-73.
County planning commission's members' roles on local nonprofit boards do not constitute a conflict of interest under subsection (5)(a), because members of the county planning commission are not members of "the governing body of a local government", which, for a county, is the board of county commissioners, and because the master plan recommended by the members of the county planning commission is an advisory document with broad recommendations that do not directly and substantially affect the nonprofits. Indep. Ethics Comm'n Letter Ruling 24-01.
24-18-110. Voluntary disclosure.
A member of a board, commission, council, or committee who receives no compensation other than a per diem allowance or necessary and reasonable expenses, a member of the general assembly, a public officer, a local government official, or an employee may, prior to acting in a manner which may impinge on his fiduciary duty and the public trust, disclose the nature of his private interest. Members of the general assembly shall make disclosure as provided in the rules of the house of representatives and the senate, and all others shall make the disclosure in writing to the secretary of state, listing the amount of his financial interest, if any, the purpose and duration of his services rendered, if any, and the compensation received for the services or such other information as is necessary to describe his interest. If he then performs the official act involved, he shall state for the record the fact and summary nature of the interest disclosed at the time of performing the act. Such disclosure shall constitute an affirmative defense to any civil or criminal action or any other sanction.
Source: L. 88: Entire article added, p. 904, § 1, effective July 1. L. 91: Entire section amended, p. 838, § 4, effective March 29.
24-18-111. Powers of the secretary of state. (Repealed)
Source: L. 88: Entire article added, p. 904, § 1, effective July 1. L. 2010: Entire section repealed, (HB 10-1404), ch. 405, p. 2003, § 2, effective June 10.
24-18-112. Board of ethics for the executive branch - created - duties.
(1) There is hereby created a board of ethics for the executive branch of state government in the office of the governor. The board shall consist of five members to be appointed by and serve at the pleasure of the governor.
(2) The board of ethics for the executive branch shall:
(a) Comment, when requested by the governor, on each proposed gubernatorial appointment, including the heads of the principal departments and the senior members of the governor's office based upon the provisions of this article;
(b) Upon written request of the governor, review complaints of any violation of the provisions of this article by a member of the executive branch of state government;
(c) Make written recommendations to the governor concerning his requests; and
(d) Review appeals brought before the board of ethics pursuant to section 24-30-1003 (4).
Source: L. 88: Entire article added, p. 905, § 1, effective July 1. L. 94: (2) amended, p. 1249, § 2, effective July 1.
24-18-113. Board of ethics for the general assembly - created - duties.
(1) (a) There is hereby created a board of ethics for the general assembly. The board shall consist of four legislative members. One member shall be appointed by and serve at the pleasure of the majority leader of the house of representatives; one member shall be appointed by and serve at the pleasure of the majority leader of the senate; one member shall be appointed by and serve at the pleasure of the minority leader of the house of representatives; and one member shall be appointed by and serve at the pleasure of the minority leader of the senate.
(b) The terms of the members appointed by the majority and minority leaders of the house of representatives and the senate and who are serving on March 22, 2007, shall be extended to and expire on or shall terminate on the convening date of the first regular session of the sixty-seventh general assembly. As soon as practicable after such convening date, the majority and minority leaders of the house of representatives and the senate shall each appoint or reappoint members in the same manner as provided in paragraph (a) of this subsection (1). Thereafter, the terms of members appointed or reappointed by the majority and minority leaders of the house of representatives and the senate shall expire on the convening date of the first regular session of each general assembly, and all subsequent appointments and reappointments by the majority and minority leaders of the house of representatives and the senate shall be made as soon as practicable after such convening date. The person making the original appointment or reappointment shall fill any vacancy by appointment for the remainder of an unexpired term. Members appointed or reappointed by the majority and minority leaders of the house of representatives and the senate shall continue in office until the member's successor is appointed.
(c) The members of the board of ethics for the general assembly are entitled to receive compensation and reimbursement of expenses as provided in section 2-2-326, C.R.S.
(2) The board of ethics for the general assembly shall, upon written request of a member of the general assembly, issue advisory opinions concerning issues relating to the requesting member's conduct and the provisions of this article.
Source: L. 88: Entire article added, p. 905, § 1, effective July 1. L. 2007: (1) amended, p. 181, § 13, effective March 22. L. 2014: (1)(c) added, (SB 14-153), ch. 390, p. 1963, § 13, effective June 6.
PART 2
PROSCRIBED ACTS RELATED TO CONTRACTS AND CLAIMS
24-18-201. Interests in contracts.
(1) Members of the general assembly, public officers, local government officials, or employees shall not be interested in any contract made by them in their official capacity or by any body, agency, or board of which they are members or employees. A former employee may not, within six months following the termination of his employment, contract or be employed by an employer who contracts with a state agency or any local government involving matters with which he was directly involved during his employment. For purposes of this section, the term:
(a) "Be interested in" does not include holding a minority interest in a corporation.
(b) "Contract" does not include:
(I) Contracts awarded to the lowest responsible bidder based on competitive bidding procedures;
(II) Merchandise sold to the highest bidder at public auctions;
(III) Investments or deposits in financial institutions which are in the business of loaning or receiving moneys;
(IV) A contract with an interested party if, because of geographic restrictions, a local government could not otherwise reasonably afford itself of the subject of the contract. It shall be presumed that a local government could not otherwise reasonably afford itself of the subject of a contract if the additional cost to the local government is greater than ten percent of a contract with an interested party or if the contract is for services that must be performed within a limited time period and no other contractor can provide those services within that time period.
(V) A contract with respect to which any member of the general assembly, public officer, local government official, or employee has disclosed a personal interest and has not voted thereon or with respect to which any member of the governing body of a local government has voted thereon in accordance with section 24-18-109 (3)(b) or 31-4-404 (3), C.R.S. Any such disclosure shall be made: To the governing body, for local government officials and employees; in accordance with the rules of the house of representatives and the senate, for members of the general assembly; and to the secretary of state, for all others.
Source: L. 88: Entire article added, p. 905, § 1, effective July 1.
ANNOTATION
Local government officials should not be interested in any contract made by them in their official capacity and an official who has a private interest in any matter proposed or pending before the governing body should disclose the interest to the governing body and not vote on it; however, this section specifically exempts any contract awarded to the lowest responsible bidder based on competitive bidding procedures. Indep. Ethics Comm'n Advisory Opinion 12-01.
This section prohibits an executive department employee from having an interest in any contract either made by him in his official capacity or made by the department or any of its boards or commissions, even if the employee is not a party to the contract, but it does not prohibit the employee from exploring contractual opportunities with the federal government, on behalf of his software company. Indep. Ethics Comm'n Advisory Opinion 21-01.
It would not pose a violation of this section for a retired community college accounting professor to enter into a contract with the college since he was not involved in the accounting procedures at the college when he was employed there and the proposed contract does not involve a matter in which he was directly involved as a professor. Indep. Ethics Comm'n Advisory Opinion 10-08.
It would not violate this section for a former employee of the department of health care policy and financing to enter into a contract with a consulting company to work on project management issues relating to a major health care provider, where the state agency indicated there is no conflict. Indep. Ethics Comm'n Letter Ruling 10-02.
Considering the numerous layers of subcontracting among various entities, the six-month waiting period does not apply to an employee of the department of corrections seeking a position with a subcontractor of a subcontractor of a county correctional facility that, in turn, has an intergovernmental agreement with the employee's employer, the department of corrections, to provide services. Indep. Ethics Comm'n Advisory Opinion 17-05; Indep. Ethics Comm'n Advisory Opinion 17-06; Indep. Ethics Comm'n Letter Ruling 17-02.
It would violate this section for a former employee of the department of human services to enter into a contract or seek employment before the passage of six months with one of the direct service organizations that continues to contract with the department since the former employee possesses knowledge not readily available to members of the public as a result of the former state employment. Indep. Ethics Comm'n Letter Ruling 14-02.
It does not violate this section and the six-month waiting period does not apply to a former employee who seeks to contract out her consulting services to entities that contract with the department with which she had previously been employed because she was not directly involved in the execution of contracts and the development of programs while she was employed with the state department and because her consulting employment would not put entities that do not utilize her consulting services at a competitive disadvantage. Indep. Ethics Comm'n Letter Ruling 17-02.
It would not be a violation of this section and the six-month waiting period for a former government employee to seek employment contracts in the same field and using the same certifications, so long as the contracted work does not involve projects with which the former government employee was directly involved in their government work. Indep. Ethics Comm'n Letter Ruling 25-01.
Because employee's duties as area maintenance manager for the governor's office of information technology (OIT) have been reassigned and he no longer has responsibilities or duties over the site in question and the employee has made a full disclosure to his supervisors and there is no information that he took advantage of information unavailable to others not in government employment, the employee is not in violation of this section if he leases properties owned by a limited liability corporation controlled by his wife to the OIT. Indep. Ethics Comm'n Advisory Opinion 13-05.
A state agency is in the best position to determine whether a state employee's future employment outside of state government poses a conflict of interest given the agency's superior understanding of the duties performed by the state employee involved. Indep. Ethics Comm'n Advisory Opinion 13-13; Indep. Ethics Comm'n Advisory Opinion 17-05.
There is no violation of the public trust or appearance of impropriety if state employee receives profits from his patented design since he developed the design at the request of the employer, patented it only after obtaining permission from the agency, and agreed to put the needs of the people of the state first by not charging the department for present or future use of the design. Indep. Ethics Comm'n Advisory Opinion 15-04.
24-18-202. Interest in sales or purchases.
Public officers and local government officials shall not be purchasers at any sale or vendors at any purchase made by them in their official capacity.
Source: L. 88: Entire article added, p. 906, § 1, effective July 1.
24-18-203. Voidable contracts.
Every contract made in violation of any of the provisions of section 24-18-201 or 24-18-202 shall be voidable at the instance of any party to the contract except the officer interested therein.
Source: L. 88: Entire article added, p. 906, § 1, effective July 1.
24-18-204. Dealings in warrants and other claims prohibited.
State officers, county officers, city and county officers, city officers, and town officers, as well as all other local government officials, and their deputies and clerks, are prohibited from purchasing or selling or in any manner receiving to their own use or benefit or to the use or benefit of any person or persons whatever any state, county, city and county, city, or town warrants, scrip, orders, demands, claims, or other evidences of indebtedness against the state or any county, city and county, city, or town thereof except evidences of indebtedness issued to or held by them for services rendered as such officer, deputy, or clerk, and evidences of the funded indebtedness of such state, county, city and county, city, or town.
Source: L. 88: Entire article added, p. 906, § 1, effective July 1.
24-18-205. Settlements to be withheld on affidavit.
(1) Every officer charged with the disbursement of public moneys who is informed by affidavit establishing probable cause that any officer whose account is about to be settled, audited, or paid by him has violated any of the provisions of this part 2 shall suspend such settlement or payment and cause such officer to be prosecuted for such violation by the district attorney of the appropriate jurisdiction.
(2) If there is judgment for the defendant upon such prosecution, the proper officer may proceed to settle, audit, or pay such account as if no such affidavit had been filed.
Source: L. 88: Entire article added, p. 906, § 1, effective July 1.
24-18-206. Penalty.
A person who knowingly commits an act proscribed in this part 2 commits a class 2 misdemeanor and shall be punished as provided in section 18-1.3-501. In addition to the penalties provided in section 18-1.3-501, the court may impose a fine of no more than twice the amount of the benefit the person obtained or was attempting to obtain in violating a provision of this part 2.
Source: L. 2009: Entire section added, (SB 09-035), ch. 109, p. 455, § 1, effective August 5. L. 2021: Entire section amended, (SB 21-271), ch. 462, p. 3224, § 405, effective March 1, 2022.
PART 3
USE OF FACIAL RECOGNITION SERVICES BY STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT AGENCIES
24-18-301. Definitions.
As used in this part 3, unless the context otherwise requires:
(1) "Accountability report" means a report developed pursuant to section 24-18-302 (2).
(2) "Agency" means:
(a) An agency of the state government or of a local government; or
(b) A state institution of higher education.
(3) "Decisions that produce legal effects concerning individuals or similarly significant effects concerning individuals" means decisions that:
(a) Result in the provision or denial of financial and lending services, housing, insurance, education enrollment, criminal justice, employment opportunities, health-care services, or access to basic necessities such as food and water; or
(b) Impact the civil rights of individuals.
(4) "Enroll", "enrolled", or "enrolling" means:
(a) The process by which a facial recognition service:
(I) Creates a facial template from one or more images of an individual; and
(II) Adds the facial template to a gallery that is used by the facial recognition service for recognition or persistent tracking of individuals; or
(b) The act of adding an existing facial template directly into a gallery that is used by a facial recognition service.
(5) (a) "Facial recognition service" means technology that analyzes facial features to facilitate the identification, verification, or persistent tracking of individuals in still or video images.
(b) "Facial recognition service" does not include:
(I) The analysis of facial features to grant or deny access to an electronic device;
(II) A generally available consumer product, including a tablet or smartphone, that allows for the analysis of facial features in order to facilitate the user's ability to manage an address book or still or video images for personal or household use; or
(III) The use of an automated or semiautomated process by a law enforcement agency for the purpose of redacting a recording for release or disclosure to protect the privacy of a subject depicted in the recording, so long as the process does not generate or result in the retention of any biometric data or surveillance information.
(6) "Facial template" means a machine-interpretable pattern of facial features that is extracted from one or more images of an individual by a facial recognition service.
(7) "Identification" means the use of a facial recognition service by an agency to determine whether an unknown individual matches any individual whose identity is known to the agency and who has been enrolled by reference to that identity in a gallery used by the facial recognition service.
(8) "Local government" means a statutory or home rule municipality, a county, or a city and county.
(9) "Meaningful human review" means review or oversight by one or more individuals who are trained in accordance with section 24-18-305 and who have the authority to alter a decision under review.
(10) "Nonidentifying demographic data" means data that is not linked or reasonably linkable to an identified or identifiable individual and includes information about an individual's gender, race, ethnicity, age, or location.
(11) (a) "Ongoing surveillance" means the continual use of a facial recognition service by an agency to track in real time the physical movements of a specified individual through one or more public places.
(b) "Ongoing surveillance" does not include a single recognition or attempted recognition of an individual if no attempt is made to subsequently track that individual's movement over time after the individual has been recognized.
(12) "Persistent tracking" means the use of a facial recognition service by an agency to track the movements of an individual on a persistent basis without identification or verification of the individual. Tracking becomes persistent as soon as:
(a) The facial template that permits the tracking is maintained for more than forty-eight hours after first enrolling that template; or
(b) Data created by the facial recognition service is linked to any other data such that the individual who has been tracked is identified or identifiable.
(13) "Recognition" means the use of a facial recognition service by an agency to determine whether an unknown individual matches:
(a) Any individual who has been enrolled in a gallery used by the facial recognition service; or
(b) A specific individual who has been enrolled in a gallery used by the facial recognition service.
(14) "Reporting authority" means:
(a) For a local government agency, the city council, county commission, or other local government agency in which legislative powers are vested; and
(b) For a state agency, the office of information technology created in section 24-37.5-103.
(15) "Verification" means the use of a facial recognition service by an agency to determine whether an individual is a specific individual whose identity is known to the agency and who has been enrolled by reference to that identity in a gallery used by the facial recognition service.
Source: L. 2022: Entire part added, (SB 22-113), ch. 463, p. 3284, § 4, effective August 10.
24-18-302. Notice of intent to use facial recognition service - accountability reports - public review and comment - notice - exemption.
(1) On and after August 10, 2022, an agency that uses or intends to develop, procure, or use a facial recognition service shall file with its reporting authority a notice of intent to develop, procure, use, or continue to use the facial recognition service and specify a purpose for which the technology is to be used.
(2) Except as described in subsection (8) of this section, after filing the notice of intent described in subsection (1) of this section, and prior to developing, procuring, using, or continuing to use a facial recognition service, an agency shall produce an accountability report for the facial recognition service. An accountability report must include:
(a) (I) The name, vendor, and version of the facial recognition service; and
(II) A description of its general capabilities and limitations, including reasonably foreseeable capabilities outside the scope of the agency's proposed use;
(b) (I) The type of data inputs that the facial recognition service uses;
(II) How data is generated, collected, and processed; and
(III) The type of data the facial recognition service is reasonably likely to generate;
(c) A description of the purpose and proposed use of the facial recognition service, including:
(I) What decision will be used to make or support the facial recognition service; and
(II) The intended benefits of the proposed use, including any data or research demonstrating those benefits;
(d) A clear use and data management policy, including protocols for the following:
(I) How, when, and by whom the facial recognition service will be deployed or used; to whom data will be available; the factors that will be used to determine where, when, and how the technology is deployed; and other relevant information, such as whether the technology will be operated continuously or used only under specific circumstances;
(II) If the facial recognition service will be operated or used by an entity on the agency's behalf, a description of the entity's access and any applicable protocols;
(III) Any measures taken to minimize inadvertent collection of additional data beyond the amount necessary for the specific purpose for which the facial recognition service will be used;
(IV) Data integrity and retention policies applicable to the data collected using the facial recognition service, including how the agency will maintain and update records used in connection with the service, how long the agency will keep the data, and the processes by which data will be deleted;
(V) What processes will be required prior to each use of the facial recognition service;
(VI) Data security measures applicable to the facial recognition service, including:
(A) How data collected using the facial recognition service will be securely stored and accessed; and
(B) If an agency intends to share access to the facial recognition service or the data from that facial recognition service with any third party that is not a law enforcement agency, the rules and procedures by which the agency will ensure that the third party complies with the agency's use and data management policy;
(VII) The agency's training procedures, including those implemented in accordance with section 24-18-305, and how the agency will ensure that all personnel who operate the facial recognition service or access its data are knowledgeable about and able to ensure compliance with the use and data management policy before using the facial recognition service; and
(VIII) Any other policies that will govern use of the facial recognition service;
(e) The agency's testing procedures, including its processes for periodically undertaking operational tests of the facial recognition service in accordance with section 24-18-304;
(f) Information concerning the facial recognition service's rate of false matches, potential impacts on protected subpopulations, and how the agency will address error rates that are determined independently to be greater than one percent;
(g) A description of any potential impacts of the facial recognition service on civil rights and liberties, including potential impacts to privacy and potential disparate impacts on marginalized communities, including the specific steps the agency will take to mitigate the potential impacts; and
(h) The agency's procedures for receiving feedback, including the channels for receiving feedback, from individuals affected by the use of the facial recognition service and from the community at large, as well as the procedures for responding to feedback.
(3) Prior to finalizing an accountability report, an agency shall:
(a) Allow for a public review and comment period;
(b) Hold at least three public meetings to obtain feedback from communities; and
(c) Consider the issues raised by the public through the public meetings.
(4) At least ninety days before an agency puts a facial recognition service into operational use, the agency shall post the final adopted accountability report on the agency's public website and submit it to the agency's reporting authority. The reporting authority shall post the most recent version of each submitted accountability report on its public website.
(5) An agency shall update its final accountability report and submit the updated accountability report to the agency's reporting authority at least every two years.
(6) An agency seeking to procure a facial recognition service must require each vendor to disclose any complaints or reports of bias regarding the vendor's facial recognition service.
(7) An agency seeking to use a facial recognition service for a purpose not disclosed in the agency's existing accountability report must:
(a) Seek and consider public comments and community input concerning the proposed new use; and
(b) In response to such comments and input, adopt an updated accountability report as described in this section.
(8) The requirements of subsections (2), (3), (4), (5), and (7) of this section concerning accountability reports do not apply to an agency's procurement or use of a facial recognition service if:
(a) The facial recognition service is part of a generally available consumer product;
(b) The facial recognition service is included in the consumer product only for personal or household use; and
(c) The agency certifies publicly that the facial recognition service is not the reason for the agency's procurement or use of the consumer product and will not be used for governmental purposes.
Source: L. 2022: Entire part added, (SB 22-113), ch. 463, p. 3286, § 4, effective August 10.
24-18-303. Use of facial recognition service - meaningful human review of certain decisions required.
An agency using a facial recognition service to make decisions that produce legal effects concerning individuals or similarly significant effects concerning individuals must ensure that those decisions are subject to meaningful human review.
Source: L. 2022: Entire part added, (SB 22-113), ch. 463, p. 3289, § 4, effective August 10.
24-18-304. Use of facial recognition service - testing required before use in certain contexts - testing capability required - exemption.
(1) Except as described in subsection (4) of this section, before deploying a facial recognition service in a context in which it will be used to make decisions that produce legal effects concerning individuals or similarly significant effects concerning individuals, an agency must test the facial recognition service in operational conditions. An agency must take reasonable steps to ensure best quality results by following all guidance provided by the developer of the facial recognition service.
(2) (a) Except as described in subsection (4) of this section, an agency that deploys a facial recognition service shall require the facial recognition service provider to make available an application programming interface or other technical capability, chosen by the provider, to enable legitimate, independent, and reasonable tests of the facial recognition service for accuracy and to identify unfair performance differences across distinct subpopulations, including subpopulations that are defined by visually detectable characteristics such as:
(I) Race, skin tone, ethnicity, gender, age, or disability status; or
(II) Other protected characteristics that are objectively determinable or self-identified by the individuals portrayed in the testing dataset.
(b) If the results of independent testing identify material unfair performance differences across subpopulations, the provider must develop and implement a plan to mitigate the identified performance differences within ninety days after receipt of the results.
(c) Subsection (2)(a) of this section does not require a provider to disclose proprietary material or make available an application programming interface or other technical capability in a manner that would increase the risk of cyber attacks. Providers bear the burden of minimizing these risks when making an application programming interface or other technical capability available for testing purposes.
(3) Nothing in this section requires an agency to collect or provide data to a facial recognition service provider to satisfy the requirements in subsection (1) of this section.
(4) The requirements of subsections (1) and (2) of this section do not apply if the facial recognition service provider is a participant in the face recognition vendor test ongoing project of the national institute of standards and technology.
Source: L. 2022: Entire part added, (SB 22-113), ch. 463, p. 3289, § 4, effective August 10.
24-18-305. Use of facial recognition service - training of users required.
(1) An agency using a facial recognition service must conduct periodic training of all individuals who operate a facial recognition service or who process personal data obtained from the use of a facial recognition service.
(2) The training required by subsection (1) of this section must include coverage of:
(a) The capabilities and limitations of the facial recognition service;
(b) Procedures to interpret and act on the output of the facial recognition service; and
(c) To the extent applicable to the deployment context, the meaningful human review requirement for decisions that produce legal effects concerning individuals or similarly significant effects concerning individuals.
Source: L. 2022: Entire part added, (SB 22-113), ch. 463, p. 3290, § 4, effective August 10.
24-18-306. Use of facial recognition service - record keeping required.
An agency using a facial recognition service shall maintain records of its use of the service that are sufficient to facilitate public reporting and auditing of compliance with the agency's use and data management policies developed as part of the agency's accountability report pursuant to section 24-18-302 (2)(d).
Source: L. 2022: Entire part added, (SB 22-113), ch. 463, p. 3290, § 4, effective August 10.
24-18-307. Use of facial recognition service by law enforcement agencies - surveillance and tracking - prohibited uses - warrants.
(1) A law enforcement agency shall not use a facial recognition service to engage in ongoing surveillance, conduct real-time or near real-time identification, or start persistent tracking unless:
(a) The law enforcement agency obtains a warrant authorizing such use;
(b) Such use is necessary to develop leads in an investigation;
(c) The law enforcement agency has established probable cause for such use; or
(d) The law enforcement agency obtains a court order authorizing the use of the service for the sole purpose of locating or identifying a missing person or identifying a deceased person. A court may issue an ex parte order under this subsection (1)(d) if a law enforcement officer certifies and the court finds that the information likely to be obtained is relevant to locating or identifying a missing person or identifying a deceased person.
(2) A law enforcement agency shall not apply a facial recognition service to any individual based on the individual's religious, political, or social views or activities; participation in a particular noncriminal organization or lawful event; or actual or perceived race, ethnicity, citizenship, place of origin, immigration status, age, disability, gender, gender expression, gender identity, sexual orientation, or other characteristic protected by law.
(3) A law enforcement agency shall not use a facial recognition service to create a record depicting any individual's exercise of rights guaranteed by the first amendment of the United States constitution and by section 10 of article II of the state constitution.
(4) A law enforcement agency shall not use the results of a facial recognition service as the sole basis to establish probable cause in a criminal investigation. The results of a facial recognition service may be used in conjunction with other information and evidence lawfully obtained by a law enforcement officer to establish probable cause in a criminal investigation.
(5) A law enforcement agency shall not substantively manipulate an image for use in a facial recognition service in a manner not consistent with the facial recognition service provider's intended use and training.
Source: L. 2022: Entire part added, (SB 22-113), ch. 463, p. 3291, § 4, effective August 10.
24-18-308. Use of facial recognition service by agencies - disclosure to criminal defendant required - warrants.
(1) An agency shall disclose its use of a facial recognition service on a criminal defendant to that defendant in a timely manner prior to trial.
(2) In January of each year, any judge who has issued or extended a warrant for the use of a facial recognition service as described in section 24-18-307 during the preceding year, or who has denied approval of such a warrant during that year, shall report to the state court administrator:
(a) The fact that a warrant or extension was applied for;
(b) The fact that the warrant or extension was granted as applied for, was modified, or was denied;
(c) The period of surveillance authorized by the warrant and the number and duration of any extensions of the warrant;
(d) The identity of the applying investigative or law enforcement officer and agency making the application and the person authorizing the application; and
(e) The nature of the public spaces where the surveillance was conducted.
(3) In January of each year, any agency that has applied for a warrant or an extension of a warrant for the use of a facial recognition service to engage in any surveillance as described in section 24-18-307 shall provide to the agency's reporting authority a report summarizing nonidentifying demographic data of individuals named in warrant applications as subjects of surveillance with the use of a facial recognition service.
Source: L. 2022: Entire part added, (SB 22-113), ch. 463, p. 3291, § 4, effective August 10.
24-18-309. Use of facial recognition service - applicability and exemptions.
(1) Notwithstanding any provision of this part 3 to the contrary, this part 3 does not apply to:
(a) An agency that:
(I) Is required to use a specific facial recognition service pursuant to a federal regulation or order, or that uses a facial recognition service in partnership with a federal agency to fulfill a congressional mandate, fulfill aviation security directives, or comply with federal law;
(II) Uses a facial recognition service in association with a federal agency to verify the identity of individuals presenting themselves for travel at an airport; or
(III) Uses a facial recognition service in connection with a physical access control system in order to grant or deny access to a secure area;
(b) The use of a facial recognition service solely for research purposes by a state agency so long as the use does not result in or affect any decisions that produce legal effects concerning individuals or similarly significant effects concerning individuals; or
(c) A utility.
Source: L. 2022: Entire part added, (SB 22-113), ch. 463, p. 3292, § 4, effective August 10.
ARTICLE 18.2
Demographic Information
24-18.2-101. Collection of demographic information - required categories - definition.
24-18.2-101. Collection of demographic information - required categories - definition.
(1) As used in this section, unless the context otherwise requires:
(a) "Form" means a document that collects population-level demographic data that is not individually identifiable.
(b) "State" means the government of this state, and every state department, including the department of education, agency, board, commission, institution of higher education, special purpose authority, as defined in section 24-77-102 (15), or authorized agent of the state.
(2) (a) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (2)(b)(I) of this section, a form issued by the state or a state agency that requests that the individual completing the form disclose the individual's race or ethnicity must include, in addition to spaces for any other racial or ethnic categories required by the federal office of management and budget, a space to indicate that the individual's race or ethnicity is Middle Eastern, North African, or South Asian.
(b) (I) The state is exempt from the requirements of subsection (2)(a) of this section if:
(A) The demographic data collected in the form is reported by the state to the federal government; and
(B) The federal government rejects or will reject the demographic data reported by the state because it includes Middle Eastern, North African, or South Asian as a primary demographic category.
(II) When exercising the exemption, the state shall include Middle Eastern, North African, or South Asian as a demographic subcategory of the non-specific racial category on the form.
Source: L. 2025: Entire article added, (SB 25-050), ch. 181, p. 777, § 1, effective September 1, 2026.
ARTICLE 18.3
Social Media Civility
24-18.3-101. Bullying, harassment, and intimidation - state elected official - social media - legislative declaration - definitions.
24-18.3-101. Bullying, harassment, and intimidation - state elected official - social media - legislative declaration - definitions.
(1) (a) The general assembly finds and declares that the private social media administered by a state elected official or designee is a private account and does not create a public forum;
(b) A state elected official has no duty to create or maintain private social media and no state law, ordinance, or regulation compels creation or maintenance of private social media by a state elected official; and
(c) Therefore, the general assembly determines that it is appropriate to acknowledge in law that a state elected official or designee has discretion to restrict or remove a user of private social media that is administered by the state elected official or designee for any reason, including bullying, harassment or intimidation of other users of the private social media administered by the state elected official or designee.
(2) As used in this section, unless the context otherwise requires:
(a) "Bullying" means intending to coerce or cause any physical, mental, or emotional harm to any individual by written expression, an electronic act or gesture, or a pattern of behavior.
(b) "Harassment" means:
(I) Directly or indirectly initiating communication with an individual or directing language toward another individual, anonymously or otherwise, by data network, instant message, computer, computer network, computer system, or any other interactive electronic medium in a manner intended to alarm or cause substantial emotional distress or threaten bodily injury or property damage; or
(II) Making any obscene comment, suggestion, request, or proposal by computer, computer network, computer system, or any other electronic medium.
(c) "Intimidation" means directly or indirectly inflicting or threatening the infliction of any injury, damage, harm, or loss upon an individual.
(d) "Obscene" means a patently offensive description of sexual acts or solicitation to commit sexual acts.
(e) "Private social media" means social media that is not supported by the resources of the state government and is not required by state law, ordinance, or regulation to be created or maintained by a state elected official.
(f) "Social media" means any electronic medium, including an interactive computer service, telephone network, or data network that allows users to create, share, and view user-generated content including videos, still photographs, blogs, video blogs, podcasts, instant messages, electronic mail, or internet website profiles.
(g) "State elected official" means an individual serving in an elected position in the state government.
(3) A state elected official may permanently or temporarily restrict or bar an individual from using the private social media that is administered by a state elected official or their designee for any reason, including bullying, harassment, or intimidation, in the state elected official's sole discretion.
(4) This section is not intended to infringe upon any right guaranteed to any individual by the first amendment to the United States constitution or section 10 of article II of the Colorado constitution or to prevent the expression of any religious, political, or philosophical views.
Source: L. 2023: Entire article added, (HB 23-1306), ch. 378, p. 2267, § 1, effective June 5.
ARTICLE 18.5
Independent Ethics Commission
24-18.5-101. Independent ethics commission - establishment - membership - subpoena power - definitions.
24-18.5-101. Independent ethics commission - establishment - membership - subpoena power - definitions.
(1) As used in this article, unless the context otherwise requires:
(a) "Article XXIX" means article XXIX of the state constitution approved by the voters at the 2006 general election.
(b) "Commission" means the independent ethics commission created in section 5 (1) of article XXIX.
(2) (a) The independent ethics commission, originally established in the office of administrative courts in the department of personnel created in section 24-30-1001, is hereby transferred to and established in the judicial department as an independent agency, effective on June 10, 2010. The commission shall consist of five members. The appointing authorities for the commission members, the order of appointment of such members, and other requirements pertaining to commission membership shall be as specified in section 5 (2) of article XXIX. Subject to the requirements of paragraph (b) of this subsection (2), the member appointed by the senate pursuant to section 5 (2)(a)(I) of article XXIX shall be appointed by the president of the senate with the approval of two-thirds of the members elected to the senate. Subject to the requirements of paragraph (b) of this subsection (2), the member appointed by the house of representatives pursuant to section 5 (2)(a)(II) of article XXIX shall be appointed by the speaker of the house of representatives with the approval of two-thirds of the members elected to the house of representatives.
(b) In connection with the appointment of commission members, no more than two members appointed to the commission shall be affiliated with the same political party.
(c) The commission members shall be appointed to four-year terms; except that the first member appointed by the senate and the first member appointed by the governor shall initially serve two-year terms. Appointments to the commission by the senate and the house of representatives shall be made no later than May 1, 2007, and the initial terms of commission members shall commence July 1, 2007.
(3) Commission members shall serve without compensation; except that commission members shall be reimbursed for the actual and necessary expenses that they incur in carrying out their duties and responsibilities as commission members.
(4) In accordance with the provisions of section 5 of article XXIX, the powers and duties of the commission shall be as follows:
(a) To hear complaints, issue findings, and assess penalties on ethics issues arising under article XXIX and other standards of conduct and reporting requirements as provided by law; and
(b) (I) To issue advisory opinions and letter rulings on ethics issues arising under article XXIX and other standards of conduct and reporting requirements as provided by law.
(II) The commission shall prepare a response to a request for an advisory opinion from a public officer, member of the general assembly, local government official, or government employee as to whether particular action by such officer, member, official, or employee satisfies the requirements of article XXIX as soon as practicable after the request is made to the commission.
(III) Any person who is not a public officer, member of the general assembly, local government official, or government employee may submit a request to the commission for a letter ruling concerning whether potential conduct of the person making the request satisfies the requirements of article XXIX. In such case, the commission shall issue a response to the request as soon as practicable.
(IV) Each advisory opinion or letter ruling, as applicable, issued by the commission shall be a public document and shall be promptly posted on a website that shall be maintained by the commission; except that, in the case of a letter ruling, the commission shall redact the name of the person requesting the ruling or other identifying information before it is posted on the website.
(5) (a) Subject to the provisions of paragraph (c) of this subsection (5), the commission shall dismiss as frivolous any complaint filed under article XXIX that fails to allege that a public officer, member of the general assembly, local government official, or government employee has accepted or received any gift or other thing of value for private gain or personal financial gain.
(b) For purposes of this subsection (5):
(I) "Official act" shall have the same meaning as set forth in section 24-18-102 (7).
(II) "Private gain" or "personal financial gain" means any money, forbearance, forgiveness of indebtedness, gift, or other thing of value given or offered by a person seeking to influence an official act that is performed in the course and scope of the public duties of a public officer, member of the general assembly, local government official, or government employee.
(c) This subsection (5) is repealed if the Colorado supreme court holds, in response to one or more written questions submitted by the general assembly pursuant to section 3 of article VI of the state constitution, that the standard of accepting or receiving "any gift or other thing of value for private gain or personal financial gain" specified in paragraph (a) of this subsection (5) is unconstitutional in applying section 3 (1) or (2) of article XXIX.
(6) Pursuant to the provisions of section 5 (1) of article XXIX, the commission shall adopt reasonable rules as may be necessary for the purpose of administering and enforcing the provisions of article XXIX and any other standards of conduct and reporting requirements as provided by law. Any rules shall be promulgated in accordance with the requirements of article 4 of this title.
(7) Subject to available appropriations, the commission may employ such staff as it deems necessary to enable it to carry out its functions in accordance with the requirements of this article and article XXIX.
(8) No subpoena requiring the attendance of a witness or the production of documents shall be issued by the commission unless a motion to issue any such subpoena has been made by one member of the commission and approved by no fewer than four members of the commission.
(9) Any final action of the commission concerning a complaint shall be subject to judicial review by the district court for the city and county of Denver.
(10) Any state employee on the staff of the commission as of June 10, 2010, shall be transferred with the agency and shall become an employee of the agency.
Source: L. 2007: Entire article added, p. 650, § 1, effective April 26. L. 2010: (2)(a) and (4)(b)(II) amended and (10) added, (HB 10-1404), ch. 405, p. 2002, § 1, effective June 10. L. 2011: (2)(b) amended, (HB 11-1315), ch. 191, p. 737, § 1, effective May 19.
ANNOTATION
Law reviews. For article, "The Practitioner's Guide to Amendment 41 and the Colorado Independent Ethics Commission", see 38 Colo. Law. 37 (Oct. 2009).
As personification of state, governor proper party defendant in suit contesting constitutionality of article XXIX (amendment 41) at time of its filing. The evaluation of whether a person or entity is a proper party in a lawsuit must be determined in light of relevant facts and circumstances. Here, there was no alternative entity for plaintiffs to sue in order to challenge article XXIX. Colorado has long recognized the practice of naming the governor, in his role as state's chief executive, as proper defendant in cases where a party seeks to "enjoin or mandate enforcement of a statute, regulation, ordinance, or policy". The only appropriate state agent for litigation purposes was the governor. Prior to creation of the independent ethics commission (commission), the governor was appropriate party defendant in a constitutional challenge. Developmental Pathways v. Ritter, 178 P.3d 524 (Colo. 2008).
Considering both language of article XXIX and voters' intent in initiating it, article XXIX is self-executing in that it does not require any further action by the general assembly to be effective. A constitutional provision is self-executing when the provision appears to take immediate effect and no further action by the general assembly is required to implement the right given. Here, article XXIX can take effect without any further action by the general assembly. Its provisions do not merely lay out bare principles without any means of implementation; rather, the article has a built-in mechanism for operation. It provides for the creation of the commission that, once in existence, will be independent of the general assembly and will promulgate necessary rules to implement and enforce gift bans and other ethical standards. There is no indication that voters intended to require further legislative action with respect to article XXIX. To the contrary, voters used initiative process to avoid possibility that general assembly would prevent them from establishing commission that would enforce gift bans against general assembly's members as well as other government employees. Developmental Pathways v. Ritter, 178 P.3d 524 (Colo. 2008).
Because preliminary injunction issued before commission came into existence and before it had opportunity to act in furtherance of this article, plaintiffs failed to present a ripe as-applied constitutional challenge. Relief plaintiffs seek is only available in a successful facial challenge, not in an as-applied challenge. In order for plaintiffs to obtain a declaration that article is unconstitutional as applied, there must be an actual application or at least a reasonable possibility of enforcement or threat of enforcement. As of the time of suit, the commission was not yet in existence, and it had not yet acted to enforce the gift bans. No enforcement or threat of enforcement of the gift bans had occurred. Therefore, concerns expressed by plaintiffs were merely speculative interpretations of what might occur once commission is operative. As such, district court did not have jurisdiction to grant preliminary injunction. Developmental Pathways v. Ritter, 178 P.3d 524 (Colo. 2008).
Article XXIX vests the general assembly with authority to enact legislation involving situations where the commission has enforced a penalty against an official. But the general assembly cannot enact legislation that "limit[s] or restrict[s]" the commission's powers. Because article XXIX only permits the general assembly to act with respect to the commission's enforcement actions, the general assembly cannot constitutionally enact legislation pertaining to any commission decisions that do not involve enforcing penalties. While the general assembly may authorize judicial review of an enforcement decision by the commission, it may not encroach upon the commission's decision not to enforce. Therefore, the commission's decision to dismiss a complaint as frivolous is not subject to the judicial review provision in subsection (9). Colo. Ethics Watch v. Indep. Ethics Comm'n, 2016 CO 21, 369 P.3d 270.
As counsel for a government entity, requestor is authorized to submit a request for a letter ruling under subsection (4)(b)(III). Indep. Ethics Comm'n Letter Ruling 24-01.
The scope of subsection (9) is necessarily limited to enforcement actions. But the commission's dismissal of a complaint as frivolous does not involve the enforcement of penalties; rather, it represents the commission's decision not to enforce. Thus, subsection (9) sanctions judicial review of the commission's enforcement decision without unconstitutionally trespassing on the commission's power to dismiss frivolous complaints. Colo. Ethics Watch v. Indep. Ethics Comm'n, 2016 CO 21, 369 P.3d 270.
Subsection (9) establishes a district court's subject matter jurisdiction over matters involving the commission. The plain language of subsection (9) limits that jurisdiction to review of "final action[s] of the commission concerning a complaint." Thus, to the extent the commission's access to records rule (records rule) may be read to grant the district court jurisdiction to review the IEC's nonfinal actions, it is invalid. Dunafon v. Krupa, 2020 COA 149, 477 P.3d 785.
District court did not have subject matter jurisdiction under subsection (9) to review appellant's request for records pursuant to records rule. The commission's denial of appellant's records did not involve enforcing any penalties and is not a final decision concerning the complaint against him. The commission may decide not to enforce a penalty against appellant but should it do so, he can seek judicial review of that decision and the commission's denial of his records request at that point. Dunafon v. Krupa, 2020 COA 149, 477 P.3d 785.
ARTICLE 19
Payment of Postemployment Compensation to Government-supported Employees
24-19-101. Legislative declaration.
24-19-102. Definitions.
24-19-103. Prohibition against postemployment compensation - exception.
24-19-104. Terms of employment contracts - public inspection.
24-19-105. Settlement agreements - public inspection - filing with the department of personnel.
24-19-106. Existing employment contracts - contract extensions.
24-19-107. Open records.
24-19-108. Exceptions - definition.
24-19-109. Enforcement of article - civil suit.
24-19-101. Legislative declaration.
(1) The general assembly hereby finds and declares that:
(a) The payment of compensation to government-supported officials or employees after such officials or employees have ended their employment creates unnecessary costs, which ultimately are borne by the taxpayers of this state.
(b) In order to reduce government costs, it is necessary for the state to limit the payment of postemployment compensation to government-supported officials and employees.
(c) The continued payment of compensation to any official or employee after such official or employee has ended his or her service with a governmental unit or government-financed entity not only affects the finances of such governmental unit or government-financed entity, but also has a serious impact on the state as a whole because of the total effect of such compensation payment arrangements on the ability of state and local governments to provide services using the scarce resources that are available. Further, the general assembly finds and declares that the provision of large payments to government-supported officials and employees after their employment has ended has caused grave damage to the trust of the citizens of this state in their state and local government officials. Because of these concerns, the general assembly finds and declares that this is a matter of statewide concern.
Source: L. 93: Entire article added, p. 662, § 1, effective July 1.
24-19-102. Definitions.
For the purposes of this article, unless the context otherwise requires:
(1) "Government-financed entity" means any organization, group, or other entity if:
(a) Such entity is composed of members which are governmental units or who are officials or employees of governmental units; and
(b) At least fifty percent of the annual operating budget for such entity is derived from dues, contributions, or other payments received from governmental units.
(2) "Government-supported official or employee" means any person who is employed or who was employed by a governmental unit or by a government-financed entity and who is or was a manager, an official, or an administrator for such governmental unit or government-financed entity.
(3) (a) "Governmental unit" means the state of Colorado, any department, division, section, unit, office, commission, board, institution, institution of higher education, or other agency of the executive, legislative, or judicial branch of the state government, or any local government, authority, public corporation, body politic, or other instrumentality of the state.
(b) "Governmental unit" does not include the university of Colorado hospital authority created pursuant to section 23-21-503, C.R.S., or the Denver health and hospital authority created in section 25-29-103, C.R.S.
(4) "Local government" means a county, municipality, city and county, or school district or a special district created pursuant to the "Special District Act", article 1 of title 32, C.R.S.
(5) (a) "Postemployment compensation" means compensation paid to a government-supported official or employee after termination of such government-supported official or employee's employment from a particular employment position with a governmental unit or a government-financed entity or after termination of the performance of actual services for such governmental unit or government-financed entity in such employment position if such compensation was not earned prior to such termination or, for an official or employee who becomes employed in a new position with the governmental unit or government-financed entity after such termination, if such compensation was not earned in the new position. "Postemployment compensation" shall include, but is not limited to, the provision of any unearned postemployment employee benefits. "Postemployment compensation" does not include the following:
(I) Any retirement benefits earned by a government-supported official or employee during the employment of such official or employee with a governmental unit or government-financed entity;
(II) Any payment made as a part of a bona fide early retirement program that is available to a class of five or more government-supported officials or employees;
(III) Any payments of deferred compensation that have been earned by a government-supported official or employee during the employment of such official or employee with a governmental unit or government-financed entity;
(IV) Any workers' compensation payment; or
(V) Any unemployment compensation payment.
(b) The term "postemployment compensation" includes any retirement benefits or any payments of deferred compensation to be paid into a retirement fund or deferred compensation plan after termination of performance of actual services for the particular employment position in the usual course of said employment. The prohibition of postemployment compensation is intended to eliminate any employment contract provision that binds the employer to make payments into a retirement fund or deferred compensation program after termination of performance of actual services in an employment position. Said prohibition is not intended to forbid the receipt of benefits or payments earned during actual performance of services if these benefits or payments are to be credited to or received by the employee after termination of actual performance of services for an employment position.
(c) Unless otherwise excluded by the provisions of this article, the term "postemployment compensation" includes any payment made to a government-supported official or employee after the term of employment of such official or employee in a particular employment position has ended pursuant to a settlement agreement between a governmental unit or government-financed entity and the official or employee; except that such payment is not postemployment compensation if such payment is made as part of a bona fide settlement of a legitimate legal dispute.
Source: L. 93: Entire article added, p. 663, § 1, effective July 1. L. 96: (3)(a), IP(5)(a), and (5)(b) amended and (5)(c) added, p. 849, § 1, effective May 23. L. 2015: (3)(b) amended, (HB 15-1239), ch. 153, p. 460, § 1, effective August 5.
24-19-103. Prohibition against postemployment compensation - exception.
(1) Except as provided in subsection (2) of this section, notwithstanding any other provision of law to the contrary, no governmental unit or government-financed entity shall pay postemployment compensation to any government-supported official or employee.
(2) (a) At the option of the appointing authority for any government-supported official or employee, such official or employee may be provided postemployment compensation that consists of the payment of up to a maximum of three months of salary for such official or employee and the provision of up to a maximum of three months of employee benefits for such official or employee. No postemployment compensation shall be provided other than cash payments and the provision of employee benefits. Postemployment compensation may be approved and provided only if the government-supported official or employee who is to receive such compensation was employed by the governmental unit or government-financed entity for less than five years; except that postemployment compensation may be approved and provided for an official or employee of a state institution of higher education or of the Auraria higher education center, regardless of the length of employment.
(b) Postemployment compensation may be provided to any government-supported official or employee only if the appointing authority for the official or employee takes positive action to approve such compensation. The provisions of this subsection (2) shall not be construed to authorize any employment contract term requiring the provision of postemployment compensation in violation of the provisions of section 24-19-104. Postemployment compensation payments shall be solely the option of the appointing authority for a government-supported official or employee and no official or employee shall be entitled to or have any right to receive any postemployment compensation.
(3) Any employment contract, employment contract extension, or other agreement between a governmental unit or government-financed entity and a government-supported official or employee that is not substantially in compliance with this section is null and void. Any payment made to any person by a governmental unit or government-financed entity in violation of this section is illegal and the recipient of such payment shall return the payment to the governmental unit or government-financed entity.
Source: L. 93: Entire article added, p. 664, § 1, effective July 1. L. 96: (3) added, p. 850, § 2, effective May 23. L. 2010: (2)(a) amended, (SB 10-003), ch. 391, p. 1852, § 30, effective June 9.
Cross references: For the legislative declaration in the 2010 act amending subsection (2)(a), see section 1 of chapter 391, Session Laws of Colorado 2010.
24-19-104. Terms of employment contracts - public inspection.
(1) Except as expressly permitted pursuant to subsection (1.5) of this section, if any governmental unit or government-financed entity enters into an employment contract or employment contract extension with a government-supported official or employee, such employment contract or employment contract extension shall contain terms that clearly state that:
(a) Such employment contract is subject to termination by either party to such contract at any time during the term of such contract and that such official or employee shall be deemed to be an employee-at-will;
(b) No compensation, whether as a buy-out of the remaining term of the contract, as liquidated damages, or as any other form of remuneration, shall be owed or paid to such government-supported official or employee upon or after the termination of such contract except for compensation that was earned prior to termination prorated to the date of termination; and
(c) If the contract is not substantially in compliance with the prohibition against payment of postemployment compensation, the contract is null and void.
(1.5) (a) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (1)(a) of this section, each system of higher education and each campus of each state institution of higher education may have in effect employment contracts or employment contract extensions having a duration not more than five years with not more than six government-supported officials or employees if:
(I) The governing board of the institution determines that the contract or extension is necessary for the hiring or retaining of the employee in light of prevailing market conditions and competitive employment practices in other states;
(II) The contract contains a clause that the institution remains free to terminate the contract or extension without penalty if sufficient funds are not appropriated.
(b) Nothing in this subsection (1.5) shall be construed to exempt any governmental unit or government-financed entity from the requirements of section 24-19-103.
(c) Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph (a) of subsection (1) of this section or paragraph (a) of this subsection (1.5), each system of higher education and each campus of each state institution of higher education may have in effect an unlimited number of employment contracts or employment contract extensions having a duration of not more than five years with an unlimited number of government-supported officials or employees if the employment contracts or employment contract extensions are for research to be performed in university settings. A contract executed pursuant to this paragraph (c) shall include a provision that the contract shall become unenforceable if, during the term of the contract, the system of higher education or campus of a state institution of higher education that is a party to the contract:
(I) Ceases to be an enterprise, as defined in section 20 (2)(d) of article X of the state constitution; and
(II) Lacks present cash reserves sufficient to pledge irrevocably to satisfy the terms of the contract.
(d) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (1)(a) or (1.5)(a) of this section, each system of higher education and each campus of each state institution of higher education may, subject to the approval of the chief executive officer of the system or institution and any rules or limitations established by the chief executive officer, have in effect an unlimited number of term employment contracts or term employment contract extensions having a duration of five years or fewer with an unlimited number of government-supported officials or employees if the term employment contracts or term employment contract extensions are for half-time or longer, non-tenure-track classroom teaching appointments or librarian appointments. A person employed in a classroom teaching appointment pursuant to a term employment contract or term employment contract extension described in this subsection (1.5) may have duties in addition to classroom teaching, as described in the contract or contract extension. A term employment contract or term employment contract extension executed pursuant to this subsection (1.5) must include a provision stating the contract or contract extension is unenforceable if, during the term of the contract or contract extension, the system of higher education or campus of a state institution of higher education that is a party to the contract:
(I) Ceases to be an enterprise, as defined in section 20 (2)(d) of article X of the state constitution; and
(II) Lacks present cash reserves sufficient to pledge irrevocably to satisfy the terms of the contract.
(2) If any governmental unit or government-financed entity enters into an employment contract or employment contract extension with any government-supported official or employee on or after July 1, 1993, such governmental unit or government-financed entity shall make the terms of such contract available to the public for inspection and copying during regular business hours.
(3) The provisions of this section shall not be interpreted to authorize the termination of any government-supported official or employee for any reason that is contrary to applicable federal, state, or local law.
(4) (a) No governmental unit or government-financed entity shall enter into an employment contract with a government-supported official or employee or extend an existing employment contract with a government-supported official or employee if such employment contract or contract extension contains any provisions that are intended to evade the requirements of this article. Contractual provisions that are prohibited under the provisions of subsection (1) of this section include, but are not limited to, any provision that allows a government-supported official or employee to earn an unreasonably large portion of contractual compensation during the early stages of the term of employment of such government-supported official or employee.
(b) The provisions of paragraph (a) of this subsection (4) shall not be interpreted to prohibit the reimbursement of any actual relocation expenses of government-supported officials or employees or the payment of reasonable incentives for accepting employment to government-supported officials or employees.
Source: L. 93: Entire article added, p. 665, § 1, effective July 1. L. 96: (1)(a) and (1)(b) amended and (1)(c) added, pp. 850, 849, §§ 3, 1, effective May 23. L. 98: IP(1) amended and (1.5) added, p. 312, § 1, effective April 17. L. 2007: (1.5)(c) added, p. 65, § 1, effective March 15; (1.5)(c) amended, p. 1476, § 1, effective May 30. L. 2012: (1.5)(d) added, (HB 12-1144), ch. 99, p. 330, § 1, effective August 8. L. 2014: IP(1.5)(d) amended, (HB 14-1256), ch. 91, p. 340, § 1, effective March 27. L. 2023: IP(1.5)(a) and IP(1.5)(d) amended, (SB 23-048), ch. 26, p. 91, § 1, effective August 7.
24-19-105. Settlement agreements - public inspection - filing with the department of personnel.
(1) (a) Notwithstanding any other law to the contrary, if any settlement agreement between a governmental unit or government-financed entity and a government-supported official or employee settles any employment dispute between such parties and involves the payment of any compensation to such official or employee after the term of employment of such official or employee in a particular employment position has ended, information regarding any amounts paid or benefits provided under such settlement agreement shall be a matter of public record. Any governmental unit or government-financed entity that is a party to such a settlement agreement shall make such information available for public inspection and copying during regular business hours.
(b) If a state governmental unit enters into a settlement agreement to settle any employment dispute with a government-supported official or employee, the state governmental unit shall file a copy of the final settlement agreement with the department of personnel, which shall be a public record pursuant to the provisions of part 2 of article 72 of this title.
(2) The provisions of subsection (1) of this section shall apply to:
(a) Any settlement agreement entered into on or after July 1, 1993; and
(b) Any settlement agreement entered into prior to July 1, 1993, if no other provision of law would prohibit public disclosure of the provisions of such settlement agreement.
Source: L. 93: Entire article added, p. 666, § 1, effective July 1. L. 96: (1) amended, p. 851, § 4, effective May 23.
ANNOTATION
Provisions in a settlement agreement prohibiting discussion or disclosure of the circumstances surrounding a school district superintendent's resignation and prohibiting disparaging comments or remarks are enforceable and are not void as contravening the public policy expressed in article II, § 10, of the Colorado Constitution and the open records act, §§ 24-72-101 to 24-72-402, C.R.S. Pierce v. St. Vrain Valley Sch. Dist., 981 P.2d 600 (Colo. 1999).
24-19-106. Existing employment contracts - contract extensions.
The provisions of this article shall not apply to any employment contract which was in existence before July 1, 1993; except that the provisions of this article shall apply to any extension of an existing contract if such contract does not contain any term which would prohibit the application of the provisions of this article to such contract extension.
Source: L. 93: Entire article added, p. 666, § 1, effective July 1.
24-19-107. Open records.
If a governmental unit is required under the provisions of this article to make any employment contracts or any information regarding amounts paid or benefits provided under any settlement agreements available to the public, such employment contracts or information shall be deemed to be public records, as such term is defined in section 24-72-202 (6), and shall be subject to the provisions of part 2 of article 72 of this title.
Source: L. 93: Entire article added, p. 666, § 1, effective July 1.
24-19-108. Exceptions - definition.
(1) The provisions of this article 19 shall not apply to the following:
(a) Any employee employed by the state government or any other governmental unit who is to hold his or her position of employment during efficient service or until reaching retirement age under an employment system denominated as civil service, classified service, or any similar employment system classification;
(b) Any tenured or tenure track faculty member whose primary job assignment is teaching, research, or both teaching and research and who is employed at a state institution of higher education or any specialty track faculty member whose primary job assignment is clinical care and who is employed at a state institution of higher education;
(c) Any employee employed by a unit of local government whose governing body is directly elected by the electors of such local government;
(d) Any certified employee who is separated from state service due to lack of work, lack of funds, or reorganization and who receives postemployment compensation or other benefits authorized by a layoff plan established by the state personnel director pursuant to section 24-50-124 (1)(d)(I); or
(e) Any employee employed at a state institution of higher education whose position is funded by revenues generated through auxiliary activities. For purposes of this subsection (1)(e), "auxiliary activities" means institutional activities managed and accounted for as self-supporting activities.
Source: L. 93: Entire article added, p. 667, § 1, effective July 1. L. 95: (1)(b) amended, p. 57, § 7, effective March 20. L. 2012: (1)(b) and (1)(c) amended and (1)(d) added, (HB 12-1321), ch. 260, p. 1340, § 3, effective September 1. L. 2017: IP(1), (1)(c), and (1)(d) amended and (1)(e) added, (SB 17-041), ch. 52, p. 163, § 1, effective August 9.
Cross references: In 2012, subsections (1)(b) and (1)(c) were amended and (1)(d) added by the "Modernization of the State Personnel System Act". For the short title and the legislative declaration, see sections 1 and 2 of chapter 260, Session Laws of Colorado 2012.
24-19-109. Enforcement of article - civil suit.
If any governmental unit or government-financed entity makes any payment or enters into any agreement in violation of this article, the provisions of this article may be enforced through a civil suit filed in a court of competent jurisdiction.
Source: L. 96: Entire section added, p. 851, § 5, effective May 23.
ARTICLE 19.5
Alternative Forms of Payment to the State
24-19.5-101. Definitions.
24-19.5-102. Acceptance of alternative forms of payment for the payment of moneys payable to the state - allocation of costs.
24-19.5-103. Limitations on convenience fees for the use of alternative forms of payment.
24-19.5-104. Master agreements - authority of state treasurer.
24-19.5-105. Provider of alternative forms of payment required to make payment.
24-19.5-101. Definitions.
As used in this article, unless the context otherwise requires:
(1) "Alternative forms of payment" means forms of payment, including but not limited to credit, charge, or debit cards, other than cash or check.
(2) "Collector state governmental entity" means any state governmental entity that collects moneys payable to the state that the state governmental entity must remit to one or more other state or local governmental entities.
(3) "Moneys payable to the state" means moneys owed or paid to any state governmental entity other than bail bonds, judicial bonds, or other moneys that the state governmental entity must return to the payer upon the satisfaction of one or more specified conditions by the payer.
(4) "Provider of alternative forms of payment" means a person or entity, including but not limited to an issuer of credit, charge, or debit cards, that provides its customers with the ability to use one or more alternative forms of payment.
(5) "State governmental entity" means the state, any department, agency, or other entity of the state, any state-sponsored institution of higher education, or any authorized agent of any of the foregoing.
Source: L. 99: Entire article added, p. 426, § 1, effective August 4.
24-19.5-102. Acceptance of alternative forms of payment for the payment of moneys payable to the state - allocation of costs.
(1) Any state governmental entity responsible for the collection of moneys payable to the state may accept one or more alternative forms of payment for the payment of such moneys in accordance with the provisions of this article.
(2) A collector state governmental entity that chooses to accept one or more alternative forms of payment for the payment of moneys payable to the state that the collector state governmental entity must remit to one or more other governmental entities shall either:
(a) Remit to such other governmental entities the gross amount of any payments made by alternative forms of payment that the collector state governmental entity is required to remit to such other governmental entities notwithstanding the deduction of any moneys from such gross amount by any provider of alternative forms of payment pursuant to a master agreement or other agreement authorized by this article; or
(b) Enter into an intergovernmental agreement with each such other governmental entity regarding the allocation of the costs of accepting such alternative forms of payment.
Source: L. 99: Entire article added, p. 427, § 1, effective August 4.
24-19.5-103. Limitations on convenience fees for the use of alternative forms of payment.
(1) and (2) (Deleted by amendment, L. 2003, p. 1441, § 1, effective April 29, 2003.)
(3) A state governmental entity may impose a convenience fee on persons who use alternative forms of payment, but the amount of any convenience fee imposed on or after April 29, 2003, shall not exceed the actual additional cost incurred by the state governmental agency to process the transaction by alternative form of payment. Any convenience fee on a transaction involving an alternative form of payment shall be imposed in accordance with the master agreement negotiated by the state treasurer and the rules of the alternative payment provider.
Source: L. 99: Entire article added, p. 427, § 1, effective August 4. L. 2003: Entire section amended, p. 1441, § 1, effective April 29.
24-19.5-104. Master agreements - authority of state treasurer.
(1) The state treasurer may negotiate and enter into one or more contractual master agreements with providers of alternative forms of payment in accordance with law. To ensure that state governmental entities accept alternative forms of payment in the most consumer-oriented, uniform, and cost-effective manner possible, any state governmental entity that wishes to accept one or more alternative forms of payment shall do so by joining in any master agreements entered into by the state treasurer with respect to such alternative forms of payment. However, the existence of a master agreement covering a particular alternative form of payment shall not require any state governmental entity to accept such alternative form of payment.
(2) The state treasurer shall enter into no more than one master agreement covering any particular alternative form of payment. Any provider of alternative forms of payment that wishes to have one or more state governmental entities accept the alternative forms of payment that it provides shall be a party to any master agreements covering such alternative forms of payment and shall be subject to the same terms and conditions as all other providers of alternative forms of payment that are parties to such agreements. However, this subsection (2) shall not require the state treasurer to include any particular provider of alternative forms of payment as a party to any master agreement.
(3) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (1) of this section, the following state governmental entities may accept alternative forms of payment without joining a master agreement entered into by the state treasurer:
(a) Judicial or legislative state governmental entities that are not part of the executive branch of state government; and
(b) State governmental entities that, on or before August 4, 1999, were accepting one or more alternative forms of payment for the payment of moneys payable to the state and had one or more contracts with one or more providers of alternative forms of payment that enabled the state governmental entity to accept such alternative forms of payment.
(4) No later than sixty days following the end of any given fiscal year, the state treasurer shall report to the joint budget committee the total amount of:
(a) Gross payments payable to the state that were made to state governmental entities by alternative forms of payment pursuant to master agreements during such fiscal year; and
(b) Net revenues remitted to state governmental entities by providers of alternative forms of payment pursuant to master agreements during such fiscal year.
(5) The state treasurer may promulgate rules governing master agreements, including but not limited to rules governing the negotiation and administration of such agreements. The state treasurer shall promulgate such rules in accordance with article 4 of this title.
Source: L. 99: Entire article added, p. 427, § 1, effective August 4.
24-19.5-105. Provider of alternative forms of payment required to make payment.
Any provider of alternative forms of payment that approves a transaction made by an alternative form of payment for the payment of moneys to a state governmental entity shall remit to the state governmental entity the net revenue of the approved transaction due to the state governmental entity.
Source: L. 99: Entire article added, p. 429, § 1, effective August 4.
ARTICLE 19.7
Recovery of Federal Reimbursement for Costs Associated with Illegal Immigration
24-19.7-101. Legislative declaration.
24-19.7-102. Illegal immigration - recovery of state's costs - attorney general to pursue remedies.
24-19.7-101. Legislative declaration.
(1) The general assembly finds that:
(a) The costs incurred by Colorado in addressing illegal immigration have increased in the last three years and are placing a burden on the state's budgetary and human resources;
(b) The areas in which these costs have dramatically increased include, but are not limited to, identifying illegal immigrants, processing illegal immigrants through the criminal justice system, incarcerating illegal immigrants, and providing education, medical assistance, health care, and foster care for illegal immigrants;
(c) At the same time, federal funding to assist states in dealing with illegal immigration has decreased, yet the federal government is asking state governments to do even more with their own funds to enforce federal immigration laws and preserve homeland security, which are essentially federal responsibilities; and
(d) The federal government is in arrears on its obligation to reimburse states for costs incurred by the states in dealing with illegal immigration.
(2) The general assembly, therefore, determines that it is necessary for the state of Colorado to protect its interests and seek the recovery of reimbursement available under federal law for the costs incurred by this state in dealing with illegal immigration.
Source: L. 2006, 1st Ex. Sess.: Entire article added, p. 32, § 1, effective July 31.
24-19.7-102. Illegal immigration - recovery of state's costs - attorney general to pursue remedies.
(1) On and after July 31, 2006, the attorney general, on behalf of the state of Colorado, shall pursue all available remedies to recover any moneys owing from the federal government to the state for the reimbursement of costs incurred by the state in dealing with illegal immigration.
(2) On or before December 31, 2006, and on or before December 31, 2007, the attorney general shall file a written report with the governor, the president of the senate, the speaker of the house of representatives, and the chair of the joint budget committee that details the progress and status of the attorney general's pursuit of remedies.
Source: L. 2006, 1st Ex. Sess.: Entire article added, p. 33, § 1, effective July 31.
ARTICLE 19.8
Directive to the Attorney General to Demand Federal Enforcement of Existing Federal Immigration Laws
24-19.8-101. Legislative declaration.
24-19.8-101. Legislative declaration.
The general assembly hereby finds and declares that the failure to enforce immigration laws at the federal level places an undue burden on state government resources and that there is a limitation on what can be done at the state level to enforce the federal laws and to implement laws at the state level. The general assembly further finds that the state of Colorado spends a disproportionate share of its limited tax revenue on public services and benefits such as health care, law enforcement, criminal defense and incarceration, and education that are provided to illegal aliens as a result of the federal government's failure to enforce immigration laws. Therefore, the Colorado state attorney general shall initiate or join other states in a lawsuit against the United States attorney general to demand the enforcement of all existing federal immigration laws by the federal government.
Source: L. Referred 2006: Entire article added, L. 2006, 1st Ex. Sess., p. 4, § 1, effective December 31.
ANNOTATION
Complaint brought by the state of Colorado pursuant to this section dismissed because it raised nonjusticiable issues under the political question doctrine, the state lacked standing to bring the claims, and the state failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted because the claims are not yet ripe. People ex rel. Suthers v. Gonzales, 558 F. Supp. 2d 1158 (D. Colo. 2007).
ARTICLE 19.9
Restrictions on Travel-related Expenditures by Public Entities
24-19.9-101. Definitions.
24-19.9-102. Restrictions on travel-related expenditures - covered persons - mandatory reimbursement of excess - exemptions.
24-19.9-103. Enforcement - complaint procedure - sanctions.
24-19.9-101. Definitions.
As used in this article, unless the context otherwise requires:
(1) "Covered person" means a member of the board of directors or comparable governing body, officer, or employee of a public entity.
(2) "Institution of higher education" means a state university or college, community college, local district college, or area technical college described in title 23, C.R.S.
(3) "Public entity" means any instrumentality of the state that is not an agency of the state and that is not subject to administrative direction by any department, commission, bureau, or agency of the state and includes any service authority, law enforcement authority, special purpose authority, or institution of higher education. "Public entity" shall not include any county, municipality, school district, or any special district formed pursuant to title 32, C.R.S.
(4) "Special purpose authority" shall have the same meaning as set forth in section 24-77-102 (15).
(5) "Travel-related expenditures" means expenditures made by a public entity to cover expenses incurred by a covered person for lodging, meals, and incidental expenses in connection with travel undertaken by the covered person for business-related purposes.
Source: L. 2011: Entire article added, (HB 11-1211), ch. 214, p. 938, § 1, effective July 1. L. 2016: (2) amended, (HB 16-1082), ch. 58, p. 151, § 38, effective August 10.
24-19.9-102. Restrictions on travel-related expenditures - covered persons - mandatory reimbursement of excess - exemptions.
(1) (a) In the absence of extenuating circumstances, no public entity may make travel-related expenditures on behalf of any covered person in an amount that would exceed, on a daily basis, two times the maximum allowable federal per diem rate that governs the location in which the person is traveling, rounded up to the nearest whole dollar, as determined by the United States general services administration, as of October 1 of the calendar year immediately preceding the fiscal year in which the per diem rate is to be used.
(b) Notwithstanding any other provision of this section, the public entity may make:
(I) Lodging expenditures that are above two times the federal per diem rate for travel-related expenditures in connection with an educational conference where an entity other than the public entity is hosting the conference and the person or entity organizing the conference selected the conference hotel or hotels; or
(II) Travel expenditures that are directly related to a program or a business purpose of a state institution of higher education or a state hospital authority.
(c) In the circumstances described in subparagraph (I) or (II) of paragraph (b) of this subsection (1), the public entity shall make available for review by its governing body or for public inspection, upon the provision of reasonable notice, itemization of any expenditures satisfying such exceptions to the requirements of this section.
(d) Notwithstanding any other provision of this article, "travel-related expenditures" shall not include the actual costs of travel undertaken by the covered person for business-related purposes including, without limitation, airline fares, taxicab fares, automobile rentals, or reimbursement for automobile mileage expenses.
(2) If the public entity makes travel-related expenditures on behalf of a covered person in excess of the amount authorized by subsection (1) of this section, the covered person shall reimburse the fund of the public entity from which such moneys were diverted for the entire sum in excess of such authorized amount.
(3) A public entity shall make no travel-related expenditures on behalf of the spouse or a member of the immediate family of a covered person. In the event a public entity makes travel-related expenditures on behalf of the spouse or a member of the immediate family of a covered person, the covered person shall reimburse the fund of the public entity from which such moneys were diverted for the entire sum spent by the entity on such expenditures.
Source: L. 2011: Entire article added, (HB 11-1211), ch. 214, p. 939, § 1, effective July 1.
24-19.9-103. Enforcement - complaint procedure - sanctions.
(1) Any person who believes that a violation of section 24-19.9-102 has occurred may file a written complaint with the secretary of state within one hundred eighty days of the date of the alleged violation. The secretary of state shall refer the complaint to an administrative law judge within three days of the filing of the complaint. The administrative law judge shall hold a hearing within fifteen days of the referral of the complaint and shall render a decision within fifteen days of the hearing. The defendant shall be granted an extension of up to thirty days upon the defendant's motion or longer upon a showing of good cause. If the administrative law judge determines that such violation has occurred, such decision shall include any appropriate order, sanction, or relief, including:
(a) An order directing the covered person, or the spouse or a member of the immediate family of a covered person, as applicable, on whose behalf travel-related expenditures were made by the public entity in violation of section 24-19.9-102, to reimburse the fund of the public entity from which such moneys were diverted for some or all of the expenditures in accordance with the requirements of section 24-19.9-102;
(b) Injunctive relief; or
(c) A restraining order to enjoin the continuance of the violation.
(2) The decision of the administrative law judge shall be final and subject to review by the court of appeals, pursuant to section 24-4-106 (11). The secretary of state and the administrative law judge are not necessary parties to the review. The decision may be enforced by the secretary of state or, if the secretary of state does not file an enforcement action within thirty days of the decision, in a private cause of action by the person filing the complaint. Any private action brought under this section shall be brought within one year of the date of the violation in state district court. The prevailing party in a private enforcement action shall be entitled to reasonable attorney fees and costs.
Source: L. 2011: Entire article added, (HB 11-1211), ch. 214, p. 940, § 1, effective July 1.
STATE OFFICERS
ARTICLE 20
Governor
PART 1
GOVERNOR
24-20-101. Office at seat of government - secretary.
24-20-102. Journal to be kept - contents.
24-20-103. Keep military record - entries.
24-20-104. Publication policy - reports to general assembly.
24-20-105. Lieutenant governor - governor - succession to office.
24-20-106. Governor may employ counsel.
24-20-107. Expenses allowed on certificate of governor.
24-20-108. Action by governor - emergency proclamation.
24-20-109. Right of senate to reconfirm new governor's appointment of reappointed executive director.
24-20-110. Transfer of employees to office of innovation and technology.
24-20-111. Climate change position created - duties - report.
24-20-112. Implementation of section 16 of article XVIII of the Colorado constitution - criteria for pesticide use - education oversight and materials - rules.
24-20-113. Governor to provide technical assistance in federal land issues.
24-20-114. Director of water project permitting - water permitting coordination fund - repeal. (Repealed)
24-20-115. Appointments by the governor - diversity - definition.
PART 2
INSURRECTION - FIREARMS PROHIBITED
24-20-201. Insurrection - firearms prohibited. (Repealed)
24-20-202. Permit to bear arms. (Repealed)
24-20-203. Constitutional rights preserved.
24-20-204. Violation - penalty. (Repealed)
PART 3
AN EMERGENCY CAUSED BY OR RELATED TO THE USE OF ENERGY
24-20-301 to
24-20-310. (Repealed)
PART 4
OFFICE OF ENERGY CONSERVATION
24-20-401 to
24-20-409. (Repealed)
PART 5
GOVERNOR'S COMMISSION ON COMMUNITY SERVICE
24-20-501. Governor's commission on community service - creation - definition.
24-20-502. Membership and organization - definition.
24-20-503. Powers and duties.
PART 1
GOVERNOR
Cross references: For the election of the governor and his term of office, see § 1 of art. IV, Colo. Const., and § 1-4-204; for provisions concerning the governor-elect, see article 8 of this title; for the compensation of the governor and president of the senate, speaker of the house of representatives, minority leader of the senate, or minority leader of the house of representatives while acting as governor, see § 24-9-101; for discretionary funds of the governor, see § 24-9-105; for the creation of the office of state planning and budgeting in the office of the governor, see § 24-37-102; for the authority of the governor to set aside bids for public printing, see § 24-70-216.
24-20-101. Office at seat of government - secretary.
The governor shall keep his office at the seat of government, in which shall be transacted the business of the executive; and he shall keep a secretary at said office during his absence.
Source: G.L. § 1089. G.S. § 1322. R.S. 08: § 6146. C.L. § 44. CSA: C. 156, § 1. CRS 53: § 132-1-1. C.R.S. 1963: § 132-1-1.
24-20-102. Journal to be kept - contents.
The governor shall cause a journal to be kept in the executive office, in which shall be made an entry of every official act done by him, at the time when done. If, in case of an emergency, acts are done elsewhere than in such office, an entry thereof shall be made in the journal as soon thereafter as possible.
Source: G.L. § 1090. G.S. § 1323. R.S. 08: § 6147. C.L. § 45. CSA: C. 156, § 2. CRS 53: § 132-1-2. C.R.S. 1963: § 132-1-2.
ANNOTATION
Assignment to duty of adjutant general not "official act". The assignment to duty of the adjutant general is not such an official act as would be required by this and the following section to be entered in the executive journal. MacGinnis v. Newlon, 82 Colo. 228, 257 P. 1085 (1927).
And adjutant general's right to salary not affected by failure to enter order. If it should be necessary under this and the following section for the governor to enter an order of the assignment to duty of the adjutant general on the executive journal, a failure in that respect would not in the least affect the latter's right to recover his salary. MacGinnis v. Newlon, 82 Colo. 228, 257 P. 1085 (1927).
24-20-103. Keep military record - entries.
The governor shall cause a military record to be kept, in which shall be made an entry of every act done by him as commander in chief of the militia.
Source: G.L. § 1091. G.S. § 1324. R.S. 08: § 6148. C.L. § 46. CSA: C. 156, § 3. CRS 53: § 132-1-3. C.R.S. 1963: § 132-1-3.
24-20-104. Publication policy - reports to general assembly.
(1) Repealed.
(2) The governor shall review all reports on the operations of all agencies in the executive branch submitted by the heads of the principal departments in accordance with the provisions of section 24-1-136. Upon approval, the governor shall make available to each member of the general assembly, at the opening of each regular session, a copy of each such report, accounting to the general assembly for the efficient discharge of all responsibilities assigned by law or directive to the executive branch of state government. The governor shall notify, in the most cost-effective manner available, each member of the general assembly of the availability of the reports and offering to provide each member with a copy of the reports.
Source: G.L. § 1095. G.S. § 1328. R.S. 08: § 6152. C.L. § 47. CSA: C. 156, § 4. CRS 53: § 132-1-4. C.R.S. 1963: § 132-1-4. L. 64: p. 114, § 5. L. 83: (2) amended and (1) repealed, pp. 834, 846, §§ 38, 86, effective July 1. L. 99: (2) amended, p. 686, § 5, effective August 4.
24-20-105. Lieutenant governor - governor - succession to office.
Succession to the office of the lieutenant governor and to the office of the governor shall be as provided for in section 13 of article IV of the state constitution.
Source: G.L. § 1096. G.S. § 1329. R.S. 08: § 6153. C.L. § 51. CSA: C. 156, § 8. CRS 53: § 132-1-5. C.R.S. 1963: § 132-1-5. L. 69: p. 1109, § 1. L. 78: Entire section amended, p. 266, § 67, effective May 23.
ANNOTATION
Formerly, when governor resigned, senate president pro tempore performed lieutenant governor's duties. When governor resigns, the lieutenant governor becomes governor, but the president pro tempore of the senate does not become lieutenant governor de jure; he is only entitled to perform the duties and receive the emoluments of lieutenant governor only so long as he is president pro tempore. People ex rel. Parks v. Cornforth, 34 Colo. 107, 81 P. 871 (1905) (decided prior to 1974 amendment of § 13 of art. IV, Colo. Const.).
Lieutenant governor's salary cannot be increased by a legislative allowance of expenses for traveling and other official duties. Leckenby v. Post Printing & Publ'g Co., 65 Colo. 443, 176 P. 490 (1918).
24-20-106. Governor may employ counsel.
Whenever the governor is satisfied that an action or proceeding has been commenced which may affect the rights or interests of the state, with the consent of the attorney general, he may employ counsel to assist the proper officer to protect such rights or interests; and when any civil action or proceeding has been or is about to be commenced by the proper officer in behalf of the state, the governor may employ additional counsel to assist in the cause.
Source: G.L. § 1093. G.S. § 1326. R.S. 08: § 6150. C.L. § 48. CSA: C. 156, § 5. CRS 53: § 132-1-6. C.R.S. 1963: § 132-1-6.
Cross references: For the duty of the attorney general to prosecute and defend suits upon request of the governor, see § 24-31-101.
24-20-107. Expenses allowed on certificate of governor.
Expenses incurred under section 24-20-106 and in causing the laws to be executed may be allowed by the governor and upon his certificate shall be audited and paid from any money in the treasury not otherwise appropriated.
Source: G.L. § 1094. G.S. § 1327. R.S. 08: § 6151. C.L. § 49. CSA: C. 156, § 6. CRS 53: § 132-1-7. C.R.S. 1963: § 132-1-7.
24-20-108. Action by governor - emergency proclamation.
Upon recommendation of the coordinator of environmental problems, the governor may, after thorough investigation and evaluation of the situation, take such action as may be necessary to prevent or minimize any significant risk of serious danger to the public health arising from any activity, condition, or the use of any material. In such event, the governor may issue an emergency proclamation and may order a moratorium or prohibition which may restrict, limit, or control such activity, condition, or use; but no such order shall be effective for an initial period of longer than fifteen days, and the effective period of such order shall not be extended for more than fifteen days beyond the initial period.
Source: L. 70: p. 361, § 1. C.R.S. 1963: § 132-1-10.
24-20-109. Right of senate to reconfirm new governor's appointment of reappointed executive director.
When the executive director of a principal department of state government is appointed by the governor with the consent of the senate to serve at the pleasure of the governor, he shall be subject to reconfirmation of the senate if, after initial election of a new governor, he is reappointed to the same position by such new governor.
Source: L. 86: Entire section added, p. 884, § 1, effective May 23.
Cross references: For the general provision on appointment of executive directors by the governor, see § 24-1-108.
24-20-110. Transfer of employees to office of innovation and technology.
On July 1, 1999, certain employees of the Colorado advanced technology institute prior to said date shall be transferred to and become employees of the office of technology and innovation created in the office of the governor. Any such employees who are classified employees in the state personnel system at the time of the transfer shall retain all rights to the personnel system and retirement benefits pursuant to the laws of this state, and their services shall be deemed to have been continuous. All transfers and any abolishment of positions in the state personnel system shall be made and processed in accordance with state personnel system laws and regulations. The transfer of employees pursuant to this section shall be made in accordance with the provisions of section 12 of House Bill 99-1359, enacted at the first regular session of the sixty-second general assembly.
Source: L. 99: Entire section added, p. 885, § 11, effective July 1.
24-20-111. Climate change position created - duties - report.
(1) (a) There shall be a position created by the governor within the executive branch, which position must include the term "climate change" in its title, to assess climate change issues in the state.
(b) The organizational location of the position created under paragraph (a) of this subsection (1) of this section shall be at the discretion of the governor and may utilize existing resources as appropriate. In order to reduce the costs associated with creating the climate change position, nothing in this section precludes the person named to the position established under paragraph (a) of this subsection (1) of this section from holding other titles or performing other functions within any department or office of the executive branch.
(2) The duties of the position created pursuant to subsection (1) of this section include, at a minimum:
(a) Development and periodic update of a climate action plan or similar document that sets forth a strategy, including specific policy recommendations, that the state could use to address climate change and reduce its greenhouse gas emissions; and
(b) Collaboration with other entities regarding climate change preparedness studies.
(3) (a) The governor or his or her designee shall submit an annual report to the house agriculture, livestock, and natural resources committee, the house transportation and energy committee, and the senate agriculture, natural resources, and energy committee, or any successor committees, on climate change issues generally, the current climate action plan developed under this section, and the specific ways in which climate change affects the state. The report may address, as appropriate, the correlations between climate change and wildfires, bark beetle infestation, snowpack, water storage, drought, and statewide emissions of greenhouse gases. The report shall include information regarding efforts to reduce emissions of gases and to reform practices known to exacerbate climate change effects. The report shall also include additional prospective proposals to prepare the state for the effects of climate change and proposals to further reduce the factors that contribute to climate change within Colorado.
(b) The development of a climate action plan in accordance with this section must take into account previous action plans developed by the state and goals and directives contained in executive orders issued by the governor.
(c) The report required by this subsection (3) is exempt from the automatic expiration described in section 24-1-136 (11).
Source: L. 2013: Entire section added, (HB 13-1293), ch. 312, p. 1642, § 2, effective May 28.
Cross references: For the legislative declaration in the 2013 act adding this section, see section 1 of chapter 312, Session Laws of Colorado 2013.
24-20-112. Implementation of section 16 of article XVIII of the Colorado constitution - criteria for pesticide use - education oversight and materials - rules.
(1) The governor shall designate a state agency to promulgate rules to designate criteria that identify pesticides that may be used in the cultivation of marijuana as authorized pursuant to article 10 of title 44. The designated agency may consult with other state agencies in promulgating the rules. The agency shall publish a list of pesticides that meet the criteria on its website.
(2) The governor shall designate a state agency to work with a private advisory group to develop good cultivation and handling practices for the marijuana industry. The designated agency is encouraged to assist in the formation of a private advisory group. If a private advisory group develops good cultivation and handling practices, an entity licensed pursuant to article 10 of title 44 that follows those practices may include a statement of compliance on its label after receiving certification of compliance. The designated agency may consult with other state agencies to receive technical assistance.
(3) The governor shall designate a state agency to work with a private advisory group to develop good laboratory practices for the retail marijuana industry. The designated agency is strongly encouraged to assist in the formation of a private advisory group. The designated agency may consult with other state agencies to receive technical assistance.
(4) The governor shall designate a state agency that must establish an educational oversight committee composed of members with relevant experience in marijuana issues. The committee shall develop and implement recommendations for education of all necessary stakeholders on issues related to marijuana use, cultivation, and any other relevant issues. The committee shall encourage professions to include marijuana education, if appropriate, as a part of continuing education programs.
(5) The governor shall designate a state agency that shall establish educational materials regarding appropriate retail marijuana use and prevention of marijuana use by those under twenty-one years of age. In establishing educational materials, to the greatest extent possible, the state agency shall utilize established best practices and existing federal and state resources.
Source: L. 2013: Entire section added, (SB 13-283), ch. 332, p. 1891, § 7, effective May 28. L. 2016: (1) amended, (SB 16-015), ch. 10, p. 23, § 1, effective August 10. L. 2018: (1) and (2) amended, (HB 18-1023), ch. 55, p. 588, § 15, effective October 1. L. 2019: (1) and (2) amended, (SB 19-224), ch. 315, p. 2938, § 20, effective January 1, 2020.
24-20-113. Governor to provide technical assistance in federal land issues.
(1) (a) The governor, in cooperation with the executive director of the department of natural resources, the commissioner of agriculture, and the executive director of the department of local affairs, shall make available to interested local governments technical support to aid local governments in:
(I) Entering into cooperating agency relationships with federal agencies;
(II) Sharing information and expertise with federal land managers;
(III) Developing local land use plans within the meaning of part 1 of article 28 of title 30 and article 23 of title 31, C.R.S.;
(IV) Hiring consultants to perform analyses of local government interests;
(V) Entering into memoranda of understanding with federal land management agencies; or
(VI) Implementing similar methods to improve coordination, cooperation, and collaboration in federal land management decision-making.
(b) The governor may establish an advisory committee to provide technical assistance as described in paragraph (a) of this subsection (1) for one or more federal land management decision-making processes if the governor determines that the advisory committee would provide effective and efficient technical support for collaborative engagement.
(2) The governor, in cooperation with the executive director of the department of natural resources, the commissioner of agriculture, and the executive director of the department of local affairs, shall notify local governments of the availability of technical assistance as described in subsection (1) of this section.
Source: L. 2015: Entire section added, (HB 15-1225), ch. 187, p. 621, § 2, effective May 13.
Cross references: For the legislative declaration in HB 15-1225, see section 1 of chapter 187, Session Laws of Colorado 2015.
24-20-114. Director of water project permitting - water permitting coordination fund - repeal. (Repealed)
Source: L. 2016: Entire section added, (SB 16-200), ch. 251, p. 1027, § 1, effective August 10.
Editor's note: Subsection (5) provided for the repeal of this section, effective September 1, 2019. (See L. 2016, p. 1027.)
24-20-115. Appointments by the governor - diversity - definition.
(1) As used in this section, "board" means any statewide board, commission, committee, or task force authorized by the general assembly in which all of its members are appointed by the governor.
(2) Effective January 1, 2022, when making appointments to or filling vacancies of any board, the governor shall make reasonable efforts, to the extent an application for board membership is submitted to the governor, to consider appointing members that, along with meeting the board's specified membership requirements, reflect the geographic and demographic diversity of the entire state, including members from both rural and urban parts of the state, and members of diverse political, racial, disability, and cultural groups and of diverse sexual orientations and genders.
Source: L. 2021: Entire section added, (HB 21-1212), ch. 180, p. 975, § 1, effective September 7.
PART 2
INSURRECTION - FIREARMS PROHIBITED
24-20-201. Insurrection - firearms prohibited. (Repealed)
Source: L. 14: p. 4, § 1. C.L. § 5495. CSA: C. 68, § 6. CRS 53: § 53-4-1. C.R.S. 1963: § 53-4-1. L. 2003: Entire section repealed, p. 2176, § 2, effective June 3.
24-20-202. Permit to bear arms. (Repealed)
Source: L. 14: p. 4, § 2. C.L. § 5496. CSA: C. 68, § 7. CRS 53: § 53-4-2. C.R.S. 1963: § 53-4-2. L. 2003: Entire section repealed, p. 2177, § 3, effective June 3.
24-20-203. Constitutional rights preserved.
Nothing in this part 2 shall be construed so as to call in question the right of any person to keep and bear arms in the defense of his home, person, or property or in aid of the civil power when thereto legally summoned.
Source: L. 14: p. 5, § 3. C.L. § 5497. CSA: C. 68, § 8. CRS 53: § 53-4-3. C.R.S. 1963: § 53-4-3.
24-20-204. Violation - penalty. (Repealed)
Source: L. 14: p. 5, § 4. C.L. § 5498. CSA: C. 68, § 9. CRS 53: § 53-4-4. C.R.S. 1963: § 53-4-4. L. 2003: Entire section repealed, p. 2177, § 4, effective June 3.
PART 3
AN EMERGENCY CAUSED BY OR RELATED TO THE USE OF ENERGY
24-20-301 to 24-20-310. (Repealed)
Source: L. 81: Entire part repealed, p. 1161, § 1, effective February 1, 1982.
Editor's note: This part 3 was added in 1979. For amendments to this part 3 prior to its repeal in 1982, consult the Colorado statutory research explanatory note and the table itemizing the replacement volumes and supplements to the original volume of C.R.S. 1973 beginning on page vii in the front of this volume.
PART 4
OFFICE OF ENERGY CONSERVATION
24-20-401 to 24-20-409. (Repealed)
Editor's note: (1) This part 4 was added in 1980 and was not amended prior to its repeal in 1981. For the text of this part 4 prior to 1981, consult the Colorado statutory research explanatory note and the table itemizing the replacement volumes and supplements to the original volume of C.R.S. 1973 beginning on page vii in the front of this volume.
(2) Section 24-20-409 provided for the repeal of this part 4, effective July 1, 1981. (See L. 80, p. 590.)
PART 5
GOVERNOR'S COMMISSION ON COMMUNITY SERVICE
Cross references: For the legislative declaration in HB 18-1324, see section 1 of chapter 188, Session Laws of Colorado 2018.
24-20-501. Governor's commission on community service - creation - definition.
The governor's commission on community service, referred to in this part 5 as the "commission", is created in the office of the lieutenant governor.
Source: L. 2018: Entire part added, (HB 18-1324), ch. 188, p. 1264, § 2, effective August 8.
24-20-502. Membership and organization - definition.
(1) The commission consists of at least fifteen, but not more than twenty, voting members as follows:
(a) The commissioner of education or the commissioner's designee; and
(b) At least fourteen, but not more than nineteen, members appointed by the governor as follows:
(I) A representative of a community-based agency or organization in the state;
(II) A representative of local government;
(III) A representative of local labor organizations;
(IV) An individual between the ages of sixteen and twenty-five, inclusive, who is a participant or supervisor of a service program for school-age youth or of a campus-based or national service program;
(V) A representative of a national service program;
(VI) A representative of business;
(VII) An individual with expertise in the educational, training, and development needs of youth, particularly disadvantaged youth;
(VIII) An individual with experience in promoting the involvement of adults age fifty-five and older in service and volunteerism; and
(IX) At least six, but not more than ten, individuals who have knowledge in the fields of community service, volunteerism, literacy, mentoring, or other subject areas as necessary for the needs of the commission's programs.
(c) A representative of the corporation for national and community service, referred to in this part 5 as the "corporation", shall be an ex officio nonvoting member of the commission. The governor may appoint additional ex officio nonvoting members in accordance with 42 U.S.C. sec. 12582.
(3) Not more than a minimum majority of the voting members of the commission may be affiliated with the same political party.
(4) (a) In making appointments, the governor shall ensure, to the maximum extent possible, that the membership of the commission is diverse.
(b) Members appointed by the governor serve terms of three years; except that the terms shall be staggered so that no more than a minimum majority of the appointed members' terms expire in the same year.
(c) The governor may reappoint a member for one additional consecutive term. In the event of a vacancy in an appointed position, the governor shall appoint a member to fill the position for the remainder of the term.
(5) The voting members of the commission shall annually elect one of the voting members to serve as chair for a term of one year.
(6) Members serve without compensation; except that members are entitled to reimbursement for actual and necessary travel expenses incurred in the performance of their duties.
(7) On or before January 1 of each year, the commission shall submit a report to the governor summarizing the activities of the commission during the preceding year.
Source: L. 2018: Entire part added, (HB 18-1324), ch. 188, p. 1264, § 2, effective August 8. L. 2022: (3), (4)(b), and (7) amended, (SB 22-013), ch. 2, p. 46, § 56, effective February 25.
24-20-503. Powers and duties.
(1) The commission shall meet at least six times per year and may meet more frequently at the discretion of the commission.
(2) Commission members shall abide by all federal and state regulations relating to the establishment of the commission. The commission may adopt bylaws and policies as necessary to fulfill the purposes of this part 5.
(3) In accordance with 42 U.S.C. sec. 12638, the primary duties, responsibilities, and functions of the commission include:
(a) Recommending to the governor a three-year comprehensive national and community service plan for the state that is developed through an open and public process, is updated annually, and ensures outreach to diverse community-based agencies that serve underrepresented populations;
(b) Administering a competitive process in compliance with federal regulations to select service programs to be included in the applications to the corporation;
(c) Assisting in the development of service grant programs;
(d) Preparing for the governor an application to the corporation to receive funding and educational awards for programs selected pursuant to 42 U.S.C. sec. 12582;
(e) Administering, overseeing, and monitoring the performance and progress of funded programs, including working with the governor and the corporation to implement comprehensive, nonduplicative evaluation and monitoring systems;
(f) Providing technical assistance to local nonprofit organizations and other entities in planning programs, applying for funds, and implementing high-quality programs;
(g) Developing mechanisms for recruitment and placement of people interested in participating in service programs;
(h) Assisting the department of education in preparing the application to the corporation for programs described in 42 U.S.C. sec. 12525;
(i) Assisting in the provision of health care and childcare benefits under 42 U.S.C. sec. 12594 to participants in service programs that receive assistance under 42 U.S.C. sec. 12571;
(j) Coordinating commission activities with other state agencies that administer federal financial assistance programs under the federal "Community Service Block Grant Act", 42 U.S.C. sec. 9901, et seq.;
(k) Coordinating the commission's efforts with the priorities and initiatives of the governor's office through continued discussion and consideration of the governor's recommendations;
(l) Preparing the application of the state under 42 U.S.C. sec. 12582 for the approval of service positions that include the national service education award;
(m) Making recommendations to the corporation with respect to priorities for programs receiving assistance under the federal "Domestic Volunteer Service Act of 1973", 42 U.S.C. sec. 4950, et seq.;
(n) Developing projects, training methods, curriculum materials, and other materials and activities related to national service programs that receive assistance directly from the corporation or from the state using assistance provided under 42 U.S.C. sec. 12571 for use by programs that request such projects, methods, materials, and activities; and
(o) Conducting such other state programs as are consistent with or authorized by the corporation.
(4) To accomplish the purposes of this part 5, the commission may:
(a) Delegate nonpolicy-making duties to a state agency or public or private nonprofit organizations, subject to such requirements as the corporation may prescribe, or as necessary to implement a federal program or requirement; and
(b) Seek, accept, and expend gifts, grants, or donations from private or public sources.
(5) At the request of the commission, the office of the lieutenant governor shall provide office space, equipment, and staff services as necessary to implement this part 5.
Source: L. 2018: Entire part added, (HB 18-1324), ch. 188, p. 1265, § 2, effective August 8.
ARTICLE 21
Secretary of State - Department of State
PART 1
GENERAL PROVISIONS
24-21-101. Office at seat of government - duties - bond.
24-21-102. Custody of state property. (Repealed)
24-21-103. Countersign commissions - record.
24-21-104. Fees of secretary of state.
24-21-104.5. General fund appropriation - cash fund appropriation - elections - legislative intent.
24-21-104.7. Acceptance of gifts and grants.
24-21-104.9. County reimbursements for voting equipment - local elections assistance cash fund - creation - repeal. (Repealed)
24-21-105. Deputy - responsibility.
24-21-106. May employ clerical assistance.
24-21-107. Publications.
24-21-108. Hearings.
24-21-109. Documents in court proceedings - designation of person to attend court proceedings.
24-21-110. Applications for licenses - authority to suspend licenses - rules.
24-21-111. Electronic filing - authority - electronic access - passwords - rules.
24-21-111.5. Electronic filing system - improvements - integration with other systems.
24-21-112. Electronic verification program - notice - definitions.
24-21-113. Secretary of state business software licensing - business computer systems maintenance and enhancement cash fund.
24-21-114. Secretary of state collection of business information.
24-21-115. Durable medical equipment supplier license - definition - rules.
24-21-116. Business intelligence center program - creation - public data - contests - legislative declaration - definitions.
24-21-117. Encryption and data integrity techniques - research and development.
PART 2
ADDRESS CONFIDENTIALITY FOR VICTIMS OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, A SEXUAL OFFENSE, OR
STALKING
24-21-201 to
24-21-214. (Repealed)
PART 3
REDACTION OF TAX IDENTIFICATION NUMBERS
24-21-301. Definitions.
24-21-302. Redaction of tax identification number from secured transaction records - liability - rules.
PART 4
ELECTRONIC RECORDING TECHNOLOGY BOARD
24-21-401. Definitions.
24-21-402. Electronic recording technology board - creation - enterprise status.
24-21-403. Core goals - powers and duties - rules.
24-21-404. Electronic recording technology fund - electronic filing - grants - repeal.
24-21-405. Authority to issue bonds.
24-21-406. Reporting - annual - five-year report.
24-21-407. Repeal of part.
PART 5
REVISED UNIFORM LAW ON NOTARIAL ACTS
24-21-501. Short title.
24-21-502. Definitions.
24-21-503. Applicability.
24-21-504. Authority to perform notarial act.
24-21-505. Requirements for certain notarial acts.
24-21-506. Personal appearance required - definition.
24-21-507. Identification of individual.
24-21-508. Authority to refuse to perform notarial act.
24-21-509. Signature if individual unable to sign.
24-21-510. Notarial act in this state.
24-21-511. Notarial act in another state.
24-21-512. Notarial act under authority of federally recognized Indian tribe.
24-21-513. Notarial act under federal authority.
24-21-514. Foreign notarial act.
24-21-514.5. Audio-video communication - definitions.
24-21-514.7. Interpreters - use in facilitation of notarial acts - limitations.
24-21-515. Certificate of notarial act.
24-21-516. Short form certificates.
24-21-517. Official stamp.
24-21-518. Stamping device.
24-21-519. Journal.
24-21-520. Notification regarding performance of notarial act on electronic record - selection of technology.
24-21-521. Commission as notary public - qualifications - no immunity or benefit.
24-21-522. Examination of notary public.
24-21-523. Grounds to deny, refuse to renew, revoke, suspend, or condition commission of notary public.
24-21-524. Database of notaries public.
24-21-525. Prohibited acts.
24-21-526. Validity of notarial acts.
24-21-527. Rules - definitions.
24-21-528. Disposition of fees.
24-21-529. Notary's fees.
24-21-530. Change of name or address.
24-21-531. Official misconduct by a notary public - liability of notary or surety.
24-21-532. Willful impersonation.
24-21-533. Wrongful possession of journal or seal.
24-21-534. Certification restrictions.
24-21-535. Notary public commission in effect.
24-21-536. Saving clause.
24-21-537. Uniformity of application and construction.
24-21-538. Relation to "Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act".
24-21-539. Effective date.
24-21-540. Repeal of part.
PART 6
BINGO AND RAFFLES LAW
24-21-601. Short title.
24-21-602. Definitions.
24-21-603. Fraud and deception prohibited.
24-21-604. Legislative declaration - consideration for tickets - conditions - rules.
24-21-605. Licensing and enforcement authority - powers - rules - duties - license suspension or revocation proceedings - definitions.
24-21-606. Fees - department of state cash fund.
24-21-607. Bingo-raffle license - fee.
24-21-608. Landlord licensees - stipulations.
24-21-609. Application for bingo-raffle license.
24-21-610. Games managers - certification.
24-21-611. Application for landlord license - fee.
24-21-612. Application for manufacturer license.
24-21-613. Application for supplier license.
24-21-614. Application for manufacturer's agent license or supplier's agent license.
24-21-615. Persons permitted to conduct games of chance - form of bingo-raffle licenses - display.
24-21-616. Form of landlord license - display - fee.
24-21-617. General conduct games of chance - premises - equipment - expenses - rules.
24-21-618. Conduct of bingo games.
24-21-619. Conduct of pull tabs - license revocation - rules - definitions.
24-21-620. Conduct of raffles - rules.
24-21-621. Persons permitted to manufacture and distribute games of chance equipment - reporting requirements.
24-21-622. Bingo-raffle licensee's statement of receipts - expenses - fee - definitions.
24-21-623. Examination of books and records - rules.
24-21-624. Forfeiture of license - ineligibility to apply for license.
24-21-625. Volunteer services - legislative declaration - immunity.
24-21-626. Unfair trade practices.
24-21-627. Common members - bingo-raffle licensees - definition.
24-21-628. Enforcement.
24-21-629. Penalties for violation.
24-21-630. Colorado charitable gaming board - creation.
24-21-631. Board - duties.
24-21-632. Repeal of part - review of functions.
PART 1
GENERAL PROVISIONS
24-21-101. Office at seat of government - duties - bond.
(1) The secretary of state shall keep office at the seat of government and perform all the duties which may be required of the secretary of state by law. The secretary of state shall have charge of and keep all the acts and resolutions of the territorial legislature and of the general assembly of the state, the enrolled copy of the constitution of the state, and all bonds, books, records, maps, registers, and papers of a public character which may be deposited, to be kept in the office. The secretary of state shall give a bond to the state of Colorado in the sum of ten thousand dollars, conditioned for the faithful discharge of the duties of the office, said bond to be approved by the governor and attorney general and to be deposited in the office of the state treasurer.
(2) The secretary of state shall have such other powers, duties, and functions as are prescribed for heads of principal departments in the "Administrative Organization Act of 1968", article 1 of this title.
Source: G.L. § 1098. G.S. § 1331. L. 1879: p. 60, § 1. R.S. 08: § 6155. C.L. § 52. CSA: C. 156, § 9. CRS 53: § 132-2-1. C.R.S. 1963: § 132-2-1. L. 94: Entire section amended, p. 564, § 9, effective April 6.
Cross references: For the powers and duties of the secretary of state relating to elections, see § 1-1-107; for the duties relating to initiated measures, see article 40 of title 1; for the duties relating to the "Uniform Commercial Code", see title 4; for the duties relating to corporations, see title 7; for the duties relating to the licensing of bingo and raffles, see part 6 of this article 21; for the duties relating to the registration of federal tax liens, see article 25 of title 38; for the powers relating to standards of conduct for government officers and employees, see part 1 of article 18 of this title; for designation of the secretary of state as custodian of the seal of the state, see § 24-80-903; for the salary of secretary of state, see § 24-9-101; for discretionary funds of the secretary of state, see § 24-9-105; for the election of the secretary of state, see § 3 of art. IV, Colo. Const., and § 1-4-204.
24-21-102. Custody of state property. (Repealed)
Source: G.L. § 1099. G.S. § 1332. R.S. 08: § 6156. C.L.: § 53. CSA: C. 156, § 10. CRS 53: § 132-2-2. C.R.S. 1963: § 132-2-2. L. 76: Entire section repealed, p. 609, § 38, effective July 1.
24-21-103. Countersign commissions - record.
All commissions issued by the governor shall be countersigned by the secretary of state, who shall register each commission in a book to be kept for that purpose, specifying the office, name of officer, date of commission, and term of office.
Source: G.L. § 1100. G.S. § 1333. R.S. 08: § 6157. C.L. § 54. CSA: C. 156, § 11. CRS 53: § 132-2-3. C.R.S. 1963: § 132-2-3.
24-21-104. Fees of secretary of state.
(1) (a) (I) The secretary of state shall charge fees, which shall be determined and collected pursuant to subsection (3) of this section, for:
(A) Filing each body corporate and politic document;
(B) Filing each facsimile signature;
(C) Each notary public's commission;
(D) Each foreign commission;
(E) Each official certificate;
(F) Administering each oath;
(G) Each filing made in accordance with sections 6-13-201 and 6-13-202;
(H) Any transcripts or copies of papers and records, computer tapes, microfilm, or microfiche; and
(I) Any other papers officially executed and other official work that is done in the secretary of state's office.
(II) The secretary of state shall not deliver any commission, file for record any certificate, or do any other official work until the applicable fee for the work has first been paid.
(III) At the time of service of any subpoena upon the secretary of state or any of his or her deputies or employees, a fee of fifty dollars and a fee of ten dollars for meals and mileage at the rate prescribed for state officers and employees in section 24-9-104 for each mile actually and necessarily traveled in going to and returning from the place named in the subpoena shall be paid to the department of state cash fund. If the person named in the subpoena is required to attend the place named in the subpoena for more than one day, the sum of forty-four dollars for each day of attendance shall be paid, in advance, to the department of state cash fund to cover the expenses of the person named in the subpoena.
(b) Notwithstanding the amount specified for any fee in paragraph (a) of this subsection (1), the secretary of state by rule or as otherwise provided by law may reduce the amount of one or more of the fees if necessary pursuant to section 24-75-402 (3), to reduce the uncommitted reserves of the fund to which all or any portion of one or more of the fees is credited. After the uncommitted reserves of the fund are sufficiently reduced, the secretary of state by rule or as otherwise provided by law may increase the amount of one or more of the fees as provided in section 24-75-402 (4).
(2) Except as otherwise provided by statute, the secretary of state is authorized to maintain an accounts receivable system for the collection of fees charged for papers officially executed and all other official work which may be done in his office.
(3) (a) This subsection (3) shall apply, where referenced by statute, to all fees charged by the secretary of state.
(b) The department of state shall adjust its fees so that the revenue generated from the fees approximates its direct and indirect costs, including the cost of maintenance and improvements necessary for the distribution of electronic records; except that the department may reduce its fees to generate revenue in an amount less than costs if necessary pursuant to section 24-75-402 (3). Such costs shall not include the costs paid by the amounts appropriated by the general assembly from the general fund to the department of state for elections pursuant to section 24-21-104.5. Such fees shall remain in effect for the fiscal year following the adjustment. All fees collected by the department shall be transmitted to the state treasurer, who shall credit the same to the department of state cash fund, which fund is hereby created. All money credited to the department of state cash fund shall be used as provided in this section and shall not be deposited in or transferred to the general fund of this state or any other fund. The money credited or transferred to the department of state cash fund is available for appropriation by the general assembly to the department of state in the general appropriation bill or pursuant to section 24-9-105 (2).
(c) Beginning July 1, 1984, and each July 1 thereafter, whenever moneys appropriated to the department of state during the prior fiscal year are unexpended, said moneys shall be made a part of the appropriation to the department of state for the next fiscal year, and such amount shall not be raised from fees collected by the department of state. If a supplemental appropriation is made to the department of state for its activities, the fees of the department of state shall be adjusted by an additional amount that is sufficient to compensate for such supplemental appropriation. Funds appropriated to the department of state in the general appropriation bill from the department of state cash fund shall be designated as cash funds and shall not exceed the amount anticipated to be raised from fees collected by the department of state.
(d) (I) Notwithstanding any provision of paragraph (b) of this subsection (3) to the contrary, for the fiscal year beginning July 1, 1984, the general assembly, acting by bill, may direct the state treasurer to deduct from the department of state cash fund any unappropriated moneys in said fund and to credit such moneys to the general fund.
(II) Repealed.
(III) Notwithstanding any provision of paragraph (b) of this subsection (3) to the contrary, on July 1, 1997, the state treasurer shall deduct one million dollars from the department of state cash fund and transfer such sum to the state rail bank fund created in section 43-1-1309, C.R.S.
(IV) and (V) Repealed.
(VI) Notwithstanding any provision of paragraph (b) of this subsection (3) to the contrary, on July 1, 1998, the state treasurer shall deduct three million dollars from the department of state cash fund and transfer such sum to the state public school fund created in section 22-54-114, C.R.S.
(VII) Notwithstanding any provision of paragraph (b) of this subsection (3) to the contrary, in addition to any transfers authorized in H.B. 98-1234, on July 1, 1998, the state treasurer shall deduct one million dollars from the department of state cash fund and transfer such sum to the state public school fund created in section 22-54-114, C.R.S.
(VIII) Notwithstanding any provision of paragraph (b) of this subsection (3) to the contrary, on July 1, 1998, the state treasurer shall deduct one million seven hundred thousand dollars from the department of state cash fund and transfer such sum to the children's basic health plan trust fund created in section 25.5-8-105, C.R.S.
(IX) Repealed.
(X) Notwithstanding any provision of paragraph (b) of this subsection (3) to the contrary, on March 27, 2002, the state treasurer shall deduct one million two hundred thousand dollars from the department of state cash fund and transfer such sum to the general fund.
(XI) Notwithstanding any provision of paragraph (b) of this subsection (3) to the contrary, on March 5, 2003, the state treasurer shall deduct two million two hundred thousand dollars from the department of state cash fund and transfer such sum to the general fund.
(XII) Notwithstanding any provision of paragraph (b) of this subsection (3) to the contrary, on March 5, 2003, the state treasurer shall deduct five hundred thousand dollars from the department of state cash fund and transfer such sum to the general fund.
(XII.5) to (XV) Repealed.
(e) (Deleted by amendment, L. 97, p. 1484, § 1, effective July 1, 1997.)
(f) Repealed.
(g) All moneys collected by the office of the secretary of state pursuant to section 4-9-525, C.R.S., shall be transferred to the state treasurer and credited to the department of state cash fund pursuant to this subsection (3).
(h) (Deleted by amendment, L. 98, p. 1331, § 42, effective June 1, 1998.)
(i) and (j) Repealed.
(k) On July 1, 2022, the state treasurer shall transfer eight million four hundred thirty-five thousand dollars from the general fund to the department of state cash fund for use by the department for the fiscal year commencing on July 1, 2022, to establish a credit program to reduce certain business fees calculated under subsection (3)(b) of this section. The credit program set forth in this subsection (3)(k) to reduce certain business fees shall end on or before June 30, 2023, unless otherwise extended by the general assembly.
(4) For fiscal years beginning on or after July 1, 2015, and for purposes of section 24-75-402, the alternative maximum reserve for the department of state cash fund is equal to sixteen and five-tenths percent of the total amount the department of state expended from the fund during the fiscal year, plus an amount equal to the amount of unexpended money from an appropriation to the department of state from the fund for the fiscal year to reimburse county clerk and recorders in accordance with section 24-21-104.5 for election costs.
Source: G.L. § 1161. G.S. § 1416. R.S. 08: § 2519. C.L. § 7867. CSA: C. 66, § 1. L. 45: p. 339, § 1. CRS 53: § 132-2-4. C.R.S. 1963: § 132-2-4. L. 71: p. 1235, § 1. L. 76: Entire section amended, p. 594, § 3, effective July 1. L. 77: Entire section amended, p. 1167, § 1, effective June 19. L. 81: (1) amended and (3) added, p. 430, § 7, effective July 1. L. 83: Entire section amended, p. 861, § 1, effective July 1. L. 84: (3)(d) added, p. 672, § 1, effective May 11. L. 85: (3)(d) amended, p. 805, § 1, effective May 16; (3)(b) amended, p. 802, § 4, effective July 1. L. 87: (3)(e) added, p. 932, § 2, effective July 1. L. 92: (3)(e)(I) amended, p. 1009, § 1, effective July 1. L. 95: (3)(b) amended and (3)(f) to (3)(h) added, p. 1142, § 19, effective July 1. L. 96: (3)(b) and (3)(c) amended, p. 1441, § 2, effective June 1. L. 97: (3)(d) and (3)(e) amended, p. 1484, § 1, effective July 1. L. 98: (3)(d)(IV) added, p. 877, § 2, effective May 26; (3)(d)(V) added, p. 867, § 2, effective May 26; (3)(d)(VI) added, p. 975, § 22, effective May 27; (1), (3)(b), and (3)(h) amended, (3)(d)(IV) and (3)(d)(V) repealed, and (3)(d)(VII), (3)(d)(VIII), and (3)(d)(IX) added, pp. 1331, 1363, 1364, 1360, 1362, §§ 42, 129, 131, 117, 125, 133, effective June 1; (3)(b) amended and (3)(i) added, p. 27, § 5, effective July 1. L. 99: (3)(f)(II) amended, p. 752, § 22, effective July 1. L. 2000: (3)(d)(II) repealed, p. 1861, § 74, effective August 2. L. 2001: (3)(g) amended, p. 1446, § 40, effective July 1. L. 2002: (3)(d)(X) added, p. 152, § 8, effective March 27; (3)(b) amended, p. 859, § 11, effective May 30; (3)(b) amended and (3)(j) added, p.1653, § 15, effective August 7. L. 2003: (3)(d)(XI) added, p. 496, § 4, effective March 5; (3)(d)(XII) added, p. 457, § 13, effective March 5. L. 2006: (3)(d)(VIII) amended, p. 2007, § 69, effective July 1. L. 2007: (3)(b) amended, p. 910, § 3, effective May 17. L. 2008: (3)(d)(XIII) and (3)(d)(XIV) added, p. 1815, § 1, effective June 2. L. 2009: (3)(d)(XII.5) added, (SB 09-208), ch. 149, p. 622, § 16, effective April 20. L. 2010: (3)(d)(XV) added, (SB 10-143), ch. 268, p. 1226, § 1, effective May 25. L. 2011: (3)(d)(XIII) and (3)(d)(XIV) repealed, (HB 11-1080), ch. 256, p. 1123, § 7, effective June 2. L. 2012: (3)(b) amended and (3)(i) repealed, (HB 12-1274), ch. 214, p. 924, § 10, effective August 8. L. 2014: (3)(d)(XII.5) amended, (HB 14-1341), ch. 126, p. 449, § 1, effective April 18. L. 2016: (4) added, (SB 16-089), ch. 44, p. 106, § 1, effective March 23. L. 2017: (1)(a) amended, (HB 17-1092), ch. 78, p. 248, § 5, effective August 9. L. 2020: (3)(d)(IX) repealed, (SB 20-136), ch. 70, p. 289, § 29, effective September 14. L. 2022: (3)(b) amended and (3)(k) added, (HB 22-1001), ch. 163, p. 1017, § 2, effective May 16.
Editor's note: (1) Amendments to subsection (3)(b) by Senate Bill 98-194 and House Bill 98-1043 were harmonized.
(2) Subsection (3)(f)(II)(B) provided for the repeal of subsection (3)(f), effective January 1, 2000. (See L. 99, p. 752.)
(3) Amendments to subsection (3)(b) by House Bill 02-1326 and House Bill 02-1321 were harmonized.
(4) Subsection (3)(d)(XII) was originally numbered as (3)(d)(XI) in Senate Bill 03-191 but has been renumbered on revision for ease of location.
(5) Subsection (3)(j)(II) provided for the repeal of subsection (3)(j), effective July 1, 2003. (See L. 2002, p. 1653.)
(6) Subsection (3)(d)(IX) refers to the Colorado tourism promotion fund in § 24-32-1306. Part 13 of article 32 was repealed August 1, 2000.
(7) Subsection (3)(d)(XV)(D) provided for the repeal of subsection (3)(d)(XV), effective July 1, 2011. (See L. 2010, p. 1226.)
(8) Subsection (3)(d)(XII.5)(B) provided for the repeal of subsection (3)(d)(XII.5), effective July 1, 2014.
Cross references: For the legislative declaration in SB 20-136, see section 1 of chapter 70, Session Laws of Colorado 2020. For the legislative declaration in HB 22-1001, see section 1 of chapter 163, Session Laws of Colorado 2022.
ANNOTATION
Law reviews. For article, "Legislative Update", see 11 Colo. Law. 2142 (1982).
For cases dealing with the historical background to this section, see Airy v. People, 21 Colo. 144, 40 P. 362 (1895); Bd. of Comm'rs v. Clapp, 9 Colo. App. 161, 48 P. 157 (1897); Bd. of Comm'rs v. Hall, 9 Colo. App. 538, 49 P. 370 (1897); Adams v. People, 25 Colo. 532, 55 P. 806 (1898); Price v. Bd. of Comm'rs, 22 Colo. App. 315, 124 P. 353 (1912).
Secretary's assessment of 1% of all gross revenues for games of chance suppliers and manufacturers constituted a fee and not an illegal tax under art. III of the state constitution. Bingo Games Supply Co., Inc. v. Meyer, 895 P.2d 1125 (Colo. App. 1995).
Plaintiff failed to establish a triable issue of fact regarding whether the secretary's post-TABOR fee adjustments for the department's direct and indirect costs violated TABOR. Griswold v. Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus., 2019 CO 79, 449 P.3d 373.
24-21-104.5. General fund appropriation - cash fund appropriation - elections - legislative intent.
(1) The general assembly is authorized to appropriate money from the department of state cash fund to the department of state to cover the costs of the local county clerk and recorders relating to the conduct of presidential primary elections, general elections, and November odd-year elections. If the amount of money in the department of state cash fund is insufficient to cover such costs, the general assembly may appropriate additional general fund money to cover such costs after exhausting all money in the department of state cash fund. The intent of the general assembly is to authorize the appropriation of department of state cash fund money and general fund money to the department of state to offset some of the costs of local county clerk and recorders associated with the additional election duties and requirements resulting from the preparation and conduct of presidential primary elections and from the passage of section 20 of article X of the state constitution and from the increased number of initiatives that are being filed.
(2) For a presidential primary election, as defined in section 1-4-1202 (2), the general assembly shall appropriate money from the general fund to cover the costs of the election incurred by the state arising from the preparation and conduct of a presidential primary election in accordance with part 12 of article 4 of title 1. In addition, by means of an appropriation from the general fund, the state shall also reimburse the counties for all of the actual direct costs they incur arising from the preparation and conduct of such election in accordance with part 12 of article 4 of title 1. By rule promulgated in accordance with article 4 of this title 24, the secretary of state shall determine the type of actual direct costs for which the counties are entitled to reimbursement pursuant to section 1-4-1203 (5) and this subsection (2).
(3) The general assembly shall annually appropriate money from the general fund to the department of state as necessary to pay for the costs of implementing the provisions of House Bill 21-1071, enacted in 2021.
Source: L. 96: Entire section added, p. 1441, § 1, effective June 1. L. 99: Entire section amended, p. 943, § 5, effective May 28. L. 2000: Entire section amended, p. 657, § 4, effective August 2. L. 2003: Entire section amended, p. 496, § 5, effective March 5. L. 2006: Entire section amended, p. 2035, § 24, effective June 6. Initiated 2016: Entire section amended, Proposition 107, effective upon proclamation of the Governor, December 27, 2016. See L. 2017, p. 2820. L. 2017: Entire section amended, (SB 17-305), ch. 216, p. 844, § 7, effective August 9. L. 2021: (3) added, (HB 21-1071), ch. 367, p. 2422, § 15, effective July 1, 2022.
Editor's note: This section was amended by initiative in 2016. The vote count on Proposition 107 at the general election held November 8, 2016, was as follows:
FOR: 1,701,599
AGAINST: 953,246
Cross references: For the declaration of the people of Colorado in Proposition 107, see section 1 on p. 2815, Session Laws of Colorado 2017.
24-21-104.7. Acceptance of gifts and grants.
The department of state may receive and expend any gift or grant, including federal funds, if such gift or grant involves no state funds and is available for the purpose of exercising the powers and performing the duties of the secretary of state as specified in section 1-1-107, C.R.S. Subject to appropriation by the general assembly, the department may provide matching funds when necessary to receive any such gift or grant.
Source: L. 2002: Entire section added, p. 1641, § 36, effective June 7.
24-21-104.9. County reimbursements for voting equipment - local elections assistance cash fund - creation - repeal. (Repealed)
Source: L. 2019: Entire section added, (HB 19-1278), ch. 326, p. 3035, § 49, effective August 9. L. 2020: (1) amended, (HB 20-1132), ch. 3, p. 5, § 1, effective March 4.
Editor's note: Subsection (7) provided for the repeal this section, effective July 1, 2021. (See L. 2019, p. 3035.)
Cross references: For the short title ("Colorado Votes Act") in HB 19-1278, see section 1 of chapter 326, Session Laws of Colorado 2019.
24-21-105. Deputy - responsibility.
The secretary of state may appoint a deputy to act for him if he deems it necessary, who shall have full authority to act in all things relating to the office. The secretary shall be responsible for all acts of such deputy.
Source: G.L. § 1102. G.S. § 1335. R.S. 08: § 6159. C.L. § 60. CSA: C. 156, § 17. CRS 53: § 132-2-5. C.R.S. 1963: § 132-2-5.
Cross references: For compensation of the deputy secretary of state, see § 24-9-102.
ANNOTATION
Deputy is authorized to pass upon validity of objections to nominating petitions. Although petitions for nominating independent candidates for offices to be voted on by the entire state are properly filed with the secretary of state, the secretary is not vested solely with the decision-making power in passing upon the validity of objections to such petitions, because the secretary has the power to appoint a deputy to act for the secretary if the secretary deems it necessary, and the deputy shall have full authority to act in all things relating to the office. Olshaw v. Buchanan, 186 Colo. 362, 527 P.2d 545 (1974).
But both secretary and deputy cannot have full authority in given case. Under this section, either the deputy has full authority in a given case or the secretary has, but not both. This is to prevent the possibility of simultaneous but conflicting opinions by the secretary and the deputy on the same questions. Olshaw v. Buchanan, 186 Colo. 362, 527 P.2d 545 (1974).
24-21-106. May employ clerical assistance.
The secretary of state is hereby authorized to employ, in addition to his deputy, clerical assistants pursuant to section 13 of article XII of the state constitution.
Source: L. 1889: p. 339, § 1. L. 1891: p. 195, § 1. R.S. 08: § 6160. C.L. § 61. CSA: C. 156, § 18. CRS 53: § 132-2-6. C.R.S. 1963: § 132-2-6.
24-21-107. Publications.
(1) Repealed.
(2) Publications by the secretary of state circulated in quantity outside the executive branch shall be issued in accordance with the provisions of section 24-1-136. Any fee collected pursuant to this subsection (2) shall be deposited in the department of state cash fund created in section 24-21-104 (3).
Source: L. 68: p. 94, § 36. C.R.S. 1963: § 132-2-7. L. 83: Entire section amended, pp. 834, 862, §§ 39, 2, effective July 1. L. 96: (1) repealed, p. 1263, § 173, effective August 7.
24-21-108. Hearings.
The secretary of state, when authorized by law to conduct a hearing, shall conduct such hearing in conformance with the provisions of section 24-4-105; except that hearings related to petitions or certificates of designation or nomination filed under section 1-4-901, C.R.S., shall not be required to be conducted under the provisions of section 24-4-105.
Source: L. 76: Entire section added, p. 595, § 4, effective July 1. L. 80: Entire section amended, p. 410, § 15, effective January 1, 1981.
24-21-109. Documents in court proceedings - designation of person to attend court proceedings.
Subject to provisions of section 13-25-115, C.R.S., documents from the office of secretary of state used in court proceedings shall be acknowledged, exemplified, verified, or attested to in a manner which shall make unnecessary the personal appearance of the secretary of state in a court proceeding to acknowledge, exemplify, verify, or attest to the validity of such documents. The secretary of state may designate a person to attend court proceedings if the secretary of state is subpoenaed for the purpose of acknowledging, exemplifying, verifying, or attesting to the validity of documents furnished by that office. The revenues derived from fees as established in section 24-21-104 (1) shall be deposited in the department of state cash fund created in section 24-21-104 (3).
Source: L. 76: Entire section added, p. 595, § 4, effective July 1. L. 83: Entire section amended, p. 862, § 3, effective July 1. L. 93: Entire section amended, p. 864, § 38, effective July 1, 1994. L. 2002: Entire section amended, p. 1860, § 160, effective July 1; entire section amended, p. 1724, § 159, effective October 1.
24-21-110. Applications for licenses - authority to suspend licenses - rules.
(1) Every application by an individual for a license issued by the department of state or any authorized agent of such department shall require the applicant's name, address, and social security number.
(2) The department of state or any authorized agent of the department shall deny, suspend, or revoke any license pursuant to the provisions of section 26-13-126, C.R.S., and any rules promulgated in furtherance thereof, if the department or agent thereof receives a notice to deny, suspend, or revoke from the state child support enforcement agency because the licensee or applicant is out of compliance with a court or administrative order for current child support, child support debt, retroactive child support, child support arrearages, or child support when combined with maintenance or because the licensee or applicant has failed to comply with a properly issued subpoena or warrant relating to a paternity or child support proceeding. Any such denial, suspension, or revocation shall be in accordance with the procedures specified by rule of the department of state, rules promulgated by the state board of human services, and any memorandum of understanding entered into between the department of state or an authorized agent thereof and the state child support enforcement agency for the implementation of this section and section 26-13-126, C.R.S.
(3) (a) The department of state shall enter into a memorandum of understanding with the state child support enforcement agency, which memorandum shall identify the relative responsibilities of the department of state and the state child support enforcement agency in the department of human services with respect to the implementation of this section and section 26-13-126, C.R.S.
(b) The appropriate rule-making body of the department of state is authorized to promulgate rules to implement the provisions of this section.
(4) For purposes of this section, "license" means any recognition, authority, or permission that the department of state or any authorized agent of such department is authorized by law to issue for an individual to practice a profession or occupation or for an individual to participate in any recreational activity. "License" may include, but is not necessarily limited to, any license, certificate, certification, letter of authorization, or registration issued for an individual to practice a profession or occupation or for an individual to participate in any recreational activity.
Source: L. 97: Entire section added, p. 1278, § 20, effective July 1.
Editor's note: Section 51(2) of chapter 236, Session Laws of Colorado 1997, provides that the act enacting this section applies to all orders whether entered on, before, or after July 1, 1997.
24-21-111. Electronic filing - authority - electronic access - passwords - rules.
(1) (a) Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary, the secretary of state may require any filing to be made by electronic means as determined by the secretary of state.
(b) In order to ensure the security of the secretary of state's online business filing system, the secretary shall implement, under such conditions as the secretary may determine, a password-protected system for and take appropriate actions to address fraudulent activities against altering data in any filings, updates, or other filing requirements under title 7, C.R.S., while still allowing for access to and retrieval of publicly available records, including a certificate of good standing, without a password.
(2) Where a document is stored by the secretary of state or the department of state and available to the public by electronic means, the secretary of state, to the extent it is reasonable and feasible, may designate electronic access as the sole means of access to the document.
(3) The secretary of state may use a phase-in period or any other method to mitigate hardship caused by mandatory electronic services that are required pursuant to subsections (1) and (2) of this section. The secretary of state may provide exceptions from such mandatory electronic services where hardship or other good cause is shown. If the secretary of state requires any filing to be made by electronic means or designates electronic access as the sole means of access to a document, the secretary of state shall assure that such filing may be made or such access attained by means that do not require use by the public of customized or specially designed electronic hardware or software.
(4) As used in this section, unless the context otherwise requires:
(a) "Document" means a document, record, or other information.
(b) "Filing" means a document required or permitted by law to be filed with the department of state or the secretary of state or a document required or permitted by law to be delivered to the department or the secretary of state and filed by the department or the secretary of state.
Source: L. 2004: Entire section added, p. 1174, § 1, effective May 27. L. 2011: (1) amended, (HB 11-1095), ch. 220, p. 952, § 1, effective May 27.
24-21-111.5. Electronic filing system - improvements - integration with other systems.
(1) At the earliest practicable date, the secretary of state shall develop and implement enhancements to the online business filing information systems. The enhancements must include at least the following:
(a) Enhancements to user accounts that:
(I) Allow for the association of multiple business records in one account;
(II) Allow a user to file multiple documents at one time;
(III) Create a system that allows a user to pay for multiple filings at one time; and
(IV) Create, at the secretary's discretion, the ability for a user to store payment information, view the user's balance, view the user's transaction history, and add money to the user's account;
(b) Enhancements for registered agents and to record management systems that allow a registered agent to quickly identify the business entities and charitable organizations for which the registered agent is listed and to determine when reports are due;
(c) Enhancements for external certifications that allow users to obtain certified documents, certificates of fact, and any other similar authentications that the secretary deems necessary;
(d) Enhancements that allow for the online filing of documents that would guide the user through the filing process;
(e) Enhancements that allow for the integration of any documents filed pursuant to title 7, C.R.S., with any documents filed pursuant to article 16 of title 6, C.R.S., as well as any changes the secretary deems necessary to implement such integration, including changes involving the filing of registration statements, amendments, and renewals, and changes to the search function; and
(f) Enhancements that allow users greater search functionality, provide more useful and specific search results, and allow for greater usability.
Source: L. 2012: Entire section added, (SB 12-123), ch. 171, p. 610, § 1, effective May 11.
24-21-112. Electronic verification program - notice - definitions.
(1) As used in this section:
(a) "Electronic verification program" or "e-verify program" means the electronic employment verification program that is authorized in 8 U.S.C. sec. 1324a and jointly administered by the United States department of homeland security and the social security administration, or its successor program.
(b) "Employer" means a person transacting business in Colorado who, at any time, employs another person to perform services of any nature and who has control of the payment of wages for such services or is the officer, agent, or employee of the person having control of the payment of wages.
(2) The secretary of state, in consultation with the department of labor and employment, shall post on the secretary of state's website information pertaining to the prohibition against hiring or continuing to employ an unauthorized alien, as defined in 8 U.S.C. sec. 1324a (h)(3), and the availability of and the requirements for participation in the electronic verification program as a means for employers to verify the work eligibility status of new employees. The website posting required by this subsection (2) shall appear in the same format as required by section 8-2-124 (2)(a), C.R.S., and shall appear in a conspicuous location on the secretary of state's website. The secretary of state's website shall also provide a link to the e-verify website available through the internet portal for the United States citizenship and immigration services, or its successor agency.
Source: L. 2008: Entire section added, p. 896, § 2, effective August 5.
24-21-113. Secretary of state business software licensing - business computer systems maintenance and enhancement cash fund.
(1) The secretary of state may charge fees for the licensing or sale of business and licensing software developed by the department of state.
(2) The secretary of state shall transmit all fees collected pursuant to subsection (1) of this section to the state treasurer, who shall credit them to the business computer systems maintenance and enhancement cash fund, which fund is hereby created. The secretary of state shall use the moneys credited to the fund only for the maintenance or enhancement of the department of state's business computer systems. Moneys transferred to the fund shall not be deposited in or transferred to the general fund of this state or any other fund. The moneys credited to the fund are available for appropriation by the general assembly to the department of state in the general appropriation bill.
Source: L. 2012: Entire section added, (SB 12-123), ch. 171, p. 614, § 8, effective May 11.
24-21-114. Secretary of state collection of business information.
Beginning thirty days after January 1, 2014, the secretary of state shall request that each individual who files documents with the secretary of state pursuant to part 3 of article 90 of title 7, C.R.S., submit information to the secretary of state upon initial registration of a business and when updating a business registration. The secretary of state shall request that each reporting entity, as that term is defined in section 7-90-102 (58), C.R.S., to which the filing relates, submit the following information about the reporting entity: Gender; race, including whether the person is Latino, African American, Asian, Anglo, Native American, or other; veteran status; whether the reporting entity is a person with a disability; and the national American industry classification system code or its successor code of the reporting entity's business, if applicable. The individual is not required to submit the information. The secretary of state shall make the information available to the public on the secretary of state's website in a searchable manner by the information submitted.
Source: L. 2013: Entire section added, (HB 13-1167), ch.160, p. 516, § 1, effective January 1, 2014.
24-21-115. Durable medical equipment supplier license - definition - rules.
(1) As used in this section:
(a) "Durable medical equipment supplier" means a person or entity that:
(I) Currently bills or plans to bill the medicare program for services or products listed in the centers for medicare and medicaid durable medical equipment, prosthetics, orthotics, and supplies competitive bid product categories in this state in the current calendar year; or
(II) Intends to bid for services or products listed in the centers for medicare and medicaid durable medical equipment, prosthetics, orthotics, and supplies competitive bid product categories in this state in the current calendar year.
(b) "Durable medical equipment supplier" does not include:
(I) A person or entity that supplies or provides insulin infusion pumps and related supplies or services;
(II) A person or entity that supplies or provides products that are part of medicare's national mail order program;
(III) A pharmacy located in Colorado that has a current pharmacy accreditation exemption that is accepted and recognized by the national supplier clearinghouse that enables the pharmacy to be enrolled in Medicare to supply durable medical equipment without having the accreditation;
(IV) A practitioner identified in 42 U.S.C. sec. 1395u (b)(18)(C) or a physician, if the practitioner or the physician is supplying or providing durable medical equipment to his or her own patients as part of the practitioner's or physician's own services; or
(V) A person or entity that supplies or provides devices directly to a practitioner identified in 42 U.S.C. sec. 1395u (b)(18)(C) or a physician that requires a prescription for dispensing to the patient as part of his or her own services, whether mailed to the practitioner or physician for fitting or directly mailed to the patient.
(2) (a) In order to do business in Colorado, a durable medical equipment supplier must be licensed by the secretary of state.
(b) A durable medical equipment supplier license is not required as a condition of enrollment as a provider in the medical assistance program described in title 25.5, C.R.S.
(3) An applicant for a durable medical equipment supplier license must:
(a) Complete the license application as directed by the secretary of state;
(b) Submit to the secretary of state a notarized affidavit attesting that:
(I) The applicant has at least one accredited physical facility that is staffed during reasonable business hours and is within one hundred miles of any Colorado resident medicare beneficiary being served by the applicant.
(II) The applicant has sufficient inventory and staff to service or repair products; and
(III) The applicant is accredited by an accrediting organization recognized and accepted by the federal centers for medicare and medicaid services;
(c) Provide to the secretary of state a street address and a local business telephone number; and
(d) Pay an annual fee established by the secretary of state, not to exceed five hundred dollars.
(4) The durable medical equipment supplier licensee shall prominently display the license at each of its physical business locations. The license may be duplicated for this purpose.
(5) The secretary of state shall refer all complaints concerning durable medical equipment suppliers, durable medical equipment, or services to the federal centers for medicare and medicaid.
(6) The secretary of state shall implement this section on or before December 31, 2014. The secretary of state may promulgate rules to implement this section.
Source: L. 2014: Entire section added, (HB 14-1369), ch. 256, p. 1019, § 2, effective May 22. L. 2015: (1), (2), and (3)(b)(I) amended, (HB 15-1211), ch. 48, p. 117, § 1, effective March 26. L. 2026: (1)(b)(IV) and (1)(b)(V) amended, (SB 26-169), ch. 311, p. 1804, § 27, effective August 12.
Cross references: For the legislative declaration in HB 14-1369, see section 1 of chapter 256, Session Laws of Colorado 2014.
24-21-116. Business intelligence center program - creation - public data - contests - legislative declaration - definitions.
(1) (a) The general assembly hereby finds and declares that:
(I) Public data is a valuable resource that can assist businesses with strategic planning and decision-making;
(II) State agencies collect volumes of public business and economic data, but this data is often held in legacy systems or difficult-to-use formats and made available on disparate websites;
(III) The data would be more easily accessible if it was made available on a single, publicly available platform, such as the Colorado information marketplace;
(IV) The data is more valuable if it is machine-readable and formatted in a manner that allows for reference across data sets;
(V) The private sector can be an important partner in creating tools that analyze the data for greater insight;
(VI) The department of state, which has expertise with a digital business registry and other public data, has received appropriations in the annual general appropriations act and successfully operated a business intelligence center as a pilot project; and
(VII) The continuation of the business intelligence center program will provide businesses with greater access to public data, which will foster a better business environment in the state.
(b) Now, therefore, it is the intent of the general assembly to create a business intelligence center program in state law to streamline access to public data and provide resources to make the data more useful.
(2) As used in this section:
(a) Repealed.
(b) "Department" means the department of state.
(c) "Program" means the business intelligence center program created in subsection (3) of this section.
(d) "Public data" means data collected by a state agency or local government that is not required by law to be confidential.
(e) "State agency" means any department, commission, council, board, bureau, committee, institution of higher education, agency, or other governmental unit of the executive branch of state government.
(3) The business intelligence center program is created within the department of state. The purpose of the program is to streamline access to public data and to provide resources to make the data more useful. In operating the program, the department may:
(a) Assist state agencies in formatting and publishing data to a publicly available platform in a machine-readable format;
(b) Provide resources to facilitate the more effective use of public data;
(c) Solicit feedback from the business community to identify the types of public data and research tools that would be helpful;
(d) Conduct public contests to develop application software or other tools to help businesses effectively use public data, which contests may include cash awards and other incentives; and
(e) Assist local governments in publishing public data.
(4) Repealed.
(5) The department may contract with public or private entities to operate any part of the program.
(6) A public contest conducted by the department in accordance with subsection (3)(d) of this section is not subject to the "Procurement Code", articles 101 to 112 of this title 24.
(7) A state agency is not required to provide any public data to the department under the program. A state agency's participation in the program is voluntary. If a state agency accepts the department's assistance, the state agency controls the scope, timeline, and format of the publication of the public data.
(8) The secretary of state may seek, accept, and expend gifts, grants, or donations from private or public sources for direct and indirect program costs. Any state money received in accordance with this subsection (8) is deposited into the department of state cash fund created in section 24-21-104 (3) and continuously appropriated to the department for direct and indirect program costs.
Source: L. 2016: Entire section added, (HB 16-1014), ch. 318, p. 1282, § 2, effective August 10. L. 2017: (2)(c) and (6) amended, (SB 17-294), ch. 264, p. 1401, § 68, effective May 25. L. 2026: (2)(a) and (4) repealed, (HB 26-1180), ch. 45, p. 207, § 1, effective August 12.
24-21-117. Encryption and data integrity techniques - research and development.
In conjunction with the efforts of the office of information technology regarding cyber coding cryptology for state records pursuant to section 24-37.5-407, the department of state, in conjunction with upgrades to the department of state's business suite, shall consider research, development, and implementation for appropriate encryption and data integrity techniques, including distributed ledger technologies such as blockchains. After accepting business licensing records, the department of state shall consider ensuring the integrity of those transactions by secure methods, including distributed ledger technologies, to protect against falsification, create visibility to identify external hacking threats, and to improve internal data security. When distributing department of state data to other departments and agencies, the department of state shall consider using distributed ledger technologies, including blockchains, as a means of protecting data across jurisdictions.
Source: L. 2018: Entire section added, (SB 18-086), ch. 319, p. 1916, § 2, effective May 30.
PART 2
ADDRESS CONFIDENTIALITY FOR VICTIMS OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, A SEXUAL OFFENSE, OR STALKING
24-21-201 to 24-21-214. (Repealed)
Source: L. 2011: Entire part repealed, (HB 11-1080), ch. 256, p. 1108, § 1, effective June 2.
Editor's note: This part 2 was added in 2007. For amendments to this part 2 prior to its repeal in 2011, consult the 2010 Colorado Revised Statutes and the Colorado statutory research explanatory note beginning on page vii in the front of this volume. This part 2 was relocated to part 21 of article 30 of this title. Former C.R.S. section numbers are shown in editor's notes following those sections that were relocated in said part 21.
PART 3
REDACTION OF TAX IDENTIFICATION NUMBERS
Editor's note: Section 3 of chapter 336, Session Laws of Colorado 2009, provides that the act adding this part 3 applies to any secured transaction record in the possession of the secretary of state before, on, or after June 1, 2009.
24-21-301. Definitions.
As used in this part 3, unless the context otherwise requires:
(1) "Redact" means to obscure information contained in a copy of a secured transaction record.
(2) "Secured transaction record" means a record that has been filed in the office of the secretary of state pursuant to part 5 of article 9 or article 9.5 or 9.7 of title 4, C.R.S.
(3) "Tax identification number" means a grouping of numerical digits in a secured transaction record that the secretary of state deems likely to be the social security number or individual taxpayer identification number of an individual identified in such secured transaction record.
Source: L. 2009: Entire part added, (SB 09-283), ch. 336, p. 1778, § 1, effective June 1.
24-21-302. Redaction of tax identification number from secured transaction records - liability - rules.
(1) The secretary of state may redact any tax identification number contained in a secured transaction record and, for this purpose, may use commercially available or other redaction software or other methods determined by the secretary of state to be cost effective.
(2) Subject to the provisions of section 4-9-522, C.R.S., the secretary of state shall retain the unredacted original of a secured transaction record that contains a tax identification number. Notwithstanding any provision of part 2 of article 72 of this title or any other provision of law, the secretary of state shall not be required to open any such unredacted original to public inspection; except that a complete copy of the unredacted original of such secured transaction record shall be furnished upon application to the secretary of state for a certified copy of that specific secured transaction record.
(3) (a) Any person who believes that the secretary of state has redacted information in a copy of a specific secured transaction record other than the social security number or individual taxpayer identification number of an individual identified in such secured transaction record may apply to the secretary of state for the restoration of such redacted information.
(b) If, upon application pursuant to paragraph (a) of this subsection (3), the secretary of state determines that such redacted information is not the social security number or individual taxpayer identification number of an individual identified in such secured transaction record, the secretary of state shall restore such redacted information so that the information is perceivable, accessible, and open to public inspection.
(c) Nothing in this section shall preclude the restoration of redacted information that the secretary of state determines should not have been redacted.
(4) The secretary of state shall not be liable for redacting or failing to redact a tax identification number pursuant to this section.
(5) The secretary of state may promulgate rules in accordance with article 4 of this title to administer the provisions of this section, including any rules necessary to establish procedures for requesting the redaction of a tax identification number or the restoration of redacted information that is not the social security number or individual taxpayer identification number of an individual identified in such secured transaction record.
Source: L. 2009: Entire part added, (SB 09-283), ch. 336, p. 1778, § 1, effective June 1.
PART 4
ELECTRONIC RECORDING TECHNOLOGY BOARD
24-21-401. Definitions.
As used in this part 4, unless the context otherwise requires:
(1) "Board" means the electronic recording technology board created in section 24-21-402 (1).
(2) "Electronic" means relating to technology having electrical, digital, magnetic, wireless, optical, electromagnetic, or similar capabilities.
(3) "Electronic filing system" means the document management system used by a clerk and recorder to comply with the statutory requirements set forth in part 4 of article 10 of title 30, C.R.S., for:
(a) Electronic documents received for recording or filing in the clerk and recorder's office; and
(b) Paper documents received for recording or filing in the clerk and recorder's office that are converted from paper, microfilm, or microfiche into an electronic format.
(4) "Fund" means the electronic recording technology fund created in section 24-21-404 (1).
Source: L. 2016: Entire part added, (SB 16-115), ch. 356, p. 1478, § 3, effective June 10.
24-21-402. Electronic recording technology board - creation - enterprise status.
(1) (a) The electronic recording technology board is created in the department of state. The board is a type 1 entity, as defined in section 24-1-105. The board consists of the secretary of state, or the secretary of state's designee, and eight other members appointed as follows:
(I) One member from the real estate section of the Colorado bar association appointed by the governor;
(II) One member from the title industry appointed by the governor;
(III) One member from the mortgage lending industry appointed by the secretary of state;
(IV) Three members who are clerk and recorders from a first or second class county as designated in section 30-1-101, C.R.S., with one appointed by the speaker of the house of representatives and the other two appointed by the secretary of state; and
(V) Two members who are clerk and recorders from a third, fourth, or fifth class county as designated in section 30-1-101, C.R.S., with one appointed by the president of the senate and the other appointed by the secretary of state.
(b) All of the board members other than the secretary of state, or the secretary's designee, serve two-year terms; except that the terms shall be staggered so that no more than five members' terms expire in the same year.
(c) Board members serve without compensation; except that board members are entitled to reimbursement from the fund for actual and necessary expenses incurred in the performance of their duties. A vacancy on the board is filled in the same manner as the original appointment was made. A person appointed to fill a vacancy serves for the remainder of the unexpired term.
(2) The board constitutes an enterprise for purposes of section 20 of article X of the state constitution so long as it retains the authority to issue revenue bonds under section 24-21-405 and receives less than ten percent of its total revenues in grants from all Colorado state and local governments combined. The business purpose of the board is to develop and modernize electronic filing systems throughout the state. So long as it constitutes an enterprise under this section, the board is not subject to any provisions of section 20 of article X of the state constitution.
Source: L. 2016: Entire part added, (SB 16-115), ch. 356, p. 1478, § 3, effective June 10. L. 2022: (1)(b) amended, (SB 22-013), ch. 2, p. 46, § 57, effective February 25; IP(1)(a) amended, (SB 22-162), ch. 469, p. 3352, § 6, effective August 10.
Cross references: For the short title (the "Debbie Haskins 'Administrative Organization Act of 1968' Modernization Act") in SB 22-162, see section 1 of chapter 469, Session Laws of Colorado 2022.
24-21-403. Core goals - powers and duties - rules.
(1) The general assembly hereby declares that the core goals in developing and modernizing electronic filing systems are to:
(a) Assure the security, accuracy, and preservation of public records required to be maintained by a clerk and recorder;
(b) Maintain the privacy of personal identifying information, online public access to which is not necessary to the proper functioning of land title records or other public records required to be maintained by a clerk and recorder;
(c) Assure that the sequence in which documents are received by a clerk and recorder for recording or filing is accurately reflected, to the greatest extent practicable, in the records of the clerk and recorder, regardless of whether documents are received electronically or by other means;
(d) Provide for online public access to public records maintained by a clerk and recorder; and
(e) Assure that electronic filing systems used in different counties are similar so as to facilitate the submission and searching of electronic records.
(2) In order to accomplish its business purpose, the board may impose an electronic filing surcharge of up to two dollars that is uniformly collected on all documents received by a county clerk and recorder for recording or filing on or after January 1, 2017, through April 30, 2029.
(2.5) The surcharge described in subsection (2) of this section is not applicable on any document filed or recorded by the county clerk and recorder if the document is exempted from fees pursuant to section 30-1-103 (1).
(3) The board shall:
(a) Develop a strategic plan that incorporates the core goals;
(b) Determine functionality standards for an electronic filing system that support the core goals;
(c) Issue a request for proposal for electronic filing system equipment and software that the counties may choose to acquire;
(d) Develop best practices for an electronic filing system;
(e) Provide training to clerk and recorders related to electronic filing systems;
(f) Award grants in accordance with section 24-21-404; and
(g) Prepare reports in accordance with section 24-21-406.
(4) The board may:
(a) Issue bonds in accordance with section 24-21-405; and
(b) Promulgate any rules necessary to administer the provisions of this part 4.
Source: L. 2016: Entire part added, (SB 16-115), ch. 356, p. 1479, § 3, effective June 10. L. 2021: (2) amended, (HB 21-1225), ch. 289, p. 1710, § 2, effective September 7. L. 2024: (2) amended, (HB 24-1269), ch. 394, p. 2719, § 9, effective July 1, 2025. L. 2026: (2.5) added, (SB 26-144), ch. 135, p. 599, § 1, effective June 1.
Editor's note: Section 55(1) of chapter 135 (SB 26-144), Session Laws of Colorado 2026, provides that the act changing this section applies to any fee imposed, assessed, or collected by a county treasurer on or after June 1, 2026.
24-21-404. Electronic recording technology fund - electronic filing - grants - repeal.
(1) (a) The electronic recording technology fund is created in the state treasury and consists of money credited thereto in accordance with section 30-10-421 (3)(a), C.R.S. The money in the fund is continuously appropriated to the board to award grants under subsection (2) of this section and for any other purpose authorized by this part 4, including any direct and indirect administrative expenses.
(b) The money in the fund shall not be deposited in or transferred to the general fund or any other fund. All interest and income derived from the investment and deposit of money in the fund are credited to the fund. Any unexpended and unencumbered money in the fund at the end of a fiscal year shall remain in the fund and not be credited or transferred to the general fund or another fund.
(2) (a) The board shall use money in the fund to award grants to counties to:
(I) Establish, maintain, improve, or replace their electronic filing systems; and
(II) Improve the security of a county's general information technology systems, if the improvement is necessary to improve the security of the county's electronic filing system.
(b) (I) The board shall award grants, whenever possible, in a manner that is designed to achieve the core goals specified in section 24-21-403 (1) over a reasonable period. In making grants to maintain existing electronic filing systems, the board shall give priority to rural counties and to counties that do not have sufficient revenue from the surcharge proceeds retained in accordance with section 30-10-421 (3)(b) to maintain their electronic filing systems. The board shall develop a grant application process and award grants based on a scoring system that incorporates the core goals.
(II) The board may approve a grant application to establish, maintain, improve, or replace an electronic filing system notwithstanding that a portion of the grant will be used to enable the system to receive, store, manage, and provide online access to public documents that are maintained by the county clerk and recorder but that are not related to real property.
(3) A county that receives a grant from the board shall cooperate with the board in its preparation of the report required by section 24-21-406 (1).
(4) (a) Notwithstanding any provision of subsection (1)(b) of this section to the contrary, on June 30, 2026, the state treasurer shall transfer two hundred thousand dollars from the fund to the general fund.
(b) This subsection (4) is repealed, effective July 1, 2027.
Source: L. 2016: Entire part added, (SB 16-115), ch. 356, p. 1480, § 3, effective June 10. L. 2021: (2) amended, (HB 21-1225), ch. 289, p. 1711, § 3, effective September 7. L. 2026: (4) added, (HB 26-1405), ch. 396, p. 2480, § 7, effective June 4.
24-21-405. Authority to issue bonds.
The board may, by resolution, authorize and issue revenue bonds that are payable only from the money in the fund. Bonds may be issued only after approval by both houses of the general assembly acting either by bill or joint resolution and after approval by the governor in accordance with section 39 of article V of the state constitution.
Source: L. 2016: Entire part added, (SB 16-115), ch. 356, p. 1481, § 3, effective June 10.
24-21-406. Reporting - annual - five-year report.
(1) Notwithstanding section 24-1-136 (11), on or before September 1, 2017, and each September 1 thereafter until September 1, 2028, the board shall prepare a report that, for each grant made during the prior fiscal year, describes the:
(a) County that received the grant;
(b) Grant amount;
(c) Purpose of the grant; and
(d) Grant outcomes.
(2) The board shall follow-up with a county that receives a grant as necessary for the department of state to complete the report. The department shall publish a copy of the report on the department's website.
(3) On or before January 1, 2021, and before January 1, 2029, the board shall report to the general assembly about the overall success of the grant program established by this part 4.
Source: L. 2016: Entire part added, (SB 16-115), ch. 356, p. 1481, § 3, effective June 10. L. 2021: IP(1) and (3) amended, (HB 21-1225), ch. 289, p. 1711, § 4, effective September 7. L. 2024: IP(1) and (3) amended, (HB 24-1269), ch. 394, p. 2719, § 10, effective July 1, 2025.
24-21-407. Repeal of part.
Notwithstanding section 2-3-1203 (1)(a), this part 4 is repealed, effective September 1, 2029. Prior to such repeal, the board shall be reviewed as provided in section 2-3-1203.
Source: L. 2016: Entire part added, (SB 16-115), ch. 356, p. 1481, § 3, effective June 10. L. 2021: Entire section amended, (HB 21-1225), ch. 289, p. 1711, § 5, effective September 7. L. 2024: Entire section amended, (HB 24-1269), ch. 394, p. 2719, § 11, effective July 1, 2025.
PART 5
REVISED UNIFORM LAW ON NOTARIAL ACTS
Editor's note: The effective date of this part 5 in Senate Bill 17-132 was changed from August 9, 2017, to July 1, 2018, by Senate Bill 17-294. (See L. 2017, p. 1418.)
Law reviews: For article, "Colorado's New Uniform Electronic Wills Act", see 51 Colo. Law. 46 (Feb. 2022).
24-21-501. Short title.
The short title of this part 5 is the "Revised Uniform Law on Notarial Acts".
Source: L. 2017: Entire part added, (SB 17-132), ch. 207, p. 787, § 2, effective July 1, 2018.
24-21-502. Definitions.
In this part 5:
(1) "Acknowledgment" means a declaration by an individual before a notarial officer that the individual has signed a record for the purpose stated in the record and, if the record is signed in a representative capacity, that the individual signed the record with proper authority and signed it as the act of the individual or entity identified in the record.
(1.3) "Audio-video communication" means communication by which an individual is able to see, hear, and communicate with a remotely located individual in real time using electronic means.
(1.7) "Credential" means a tangible record evidencing the identity of an individual.
(2) "Electronic" means relating to technology having electrical, digital, magnetic, wireless, optical, electromagnetic, or similar capabilities.
(3) "Electronic record" means a record containing information that is created, generated, sent, communicated, received, or stored by electronic means.
(4) "Electronic signature" means an electronic symbol, sound, or process attached to or logically associated with an electronic record and executed or adopted by an individual with the intent to sign the electronic record.
(5) "In a representative capacity" means acting as:
(a) An authorized officer, agent, partner, trustee, or other representative for a person other than an individual;
(b) A public officer, personal representative, guardian, or other representative, in the capacity stated in a record;
(c) An agent or attorney-in-fact for a principal; or
(d) An authorized representative of another in any other capacity.
(5.5) "Interpreter" means an individual who provides interpreter services when a notarial officer and an individual executing a record do not communicate in the same language.
(6) "Notarial act" means an act, whether performed with respect to a tangible or electronic record, that a notarial officer may perform under the law of this state. The term includes taking an acknowledgment, administering an oath or affirmation, taking a deposition or other sworn testimony, taking a verification on oath or affirmation, witnessing or attesting a signature, certifying a copy, and noting a protest of a negotiable instrument.
(7) "Notarial officer" means a notary public or other individual authorized to perform a notarial act.
(8) "Notary public" means an individual commissioned to perform a notarial act by the secretary of state.
(9) "Official stamp" means a physical image affixed to a tangible record or an electronic image attached to or logically associated with an electronic record.
(10) "Person" means an individual, corporation, business trust, statutory trust, estate, trust, partnership, limited liability company, association, joint venture, public corporation, government or governmental subdivision, agency, or instrumentality, or any other legal or commercial entity.
(10.5) "Real-time" or "in real time" means, with respect to an interaction between individuals by means of audio-video communication, that the individuals can see and hear each other substantially simultaneously and without interruption or disconnection. Delays of a few seconds that are inherent in the method of communication do not prevent the interaction from being considered to have occurred in real time.
(11) "Record" means information that is inscribed on a tangible medium or that is stored in an electronic or other medium and is retrievable in perceivable form.
(11.3) "Remotely located individual" means an individual who is not in the physical presence of the notary public who performs a notarial act under this section.
(11.5) "Remote notarization" means an electronic notarial act performed with respect only to an electronic record by means of real-time audio-video communication in accordance with section 24-21-514.5 and rules adopted by the secretary of state.
(11.7) "Remote notarization system" means an electronic device or process that:
(a) Allows a notary public and a remotely located individual to communicate with each other simultaneously by sight and sound; and
(b) When necessary and consistent with other applicable law, facilitates communication with a remotely located individual who has a vision, hearing, or speech impairment.
(12) "Sign" means, with present intent to authenticate or adopt a record:
(a) To execute or adopt a tangible symbol; or
(b) To attach to or logically associate with the record an electronic symbol, sound, or process.
(13) "Signature" means a tangible symbol or an electronic signature that evidences the signing of a record.
(14) "Stamping device" means:
(a) A physical device capable of affixing to a tangible record an official stamp; or
(b) An electronic device or process capable of attaching to or logically associating with an electronic record an official stamp.
(15) "State" means a state of the United States, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, the United States Virgin Islands, or any territory or insular possession subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.
(15.5) "Tamper-evident" means the use of a set of applications, programs, hardware, software, or other technologies that will display evidence of any changes made to an electronic record.
(16) "Verification on oath or affirmation" means a declaration, made by an individual on oath or affirmation before a notarial officer, that a statement in a record is true.
Source: L. 2017: Entire part added, (SB 17-132), ch. 207, p. 787, § 2, effective July 1, 2018. L. 2020: (1.3), (1.7), (10.5), (11.3), (11.5), (11.7), and (15.5) added, (SB 20-096), ch. 130, p. 558, § 2, effective December 31. L. 2023: (5.5) added, (SB 23-153), ch. 212, p. 1098, § 1, effective September 1.
Cross references: For the legislative declaration in SB 20-096, see section 1 of chapter 130, Session Laws of Colorado 2020.
24-21-503. Applicability.
This part 5 applies to a notarial act performed on or after July 1, 2018.
Source: L. 2017: Entire part added, (SB 17-132), ch. 207, p. 789, § 2, effective July 1, 2018.
24-21-504. Authority to perform notarial act.
(1) A notarial officer may perform a notarial act authorized by this part 5 or by law of this state other than this part 5.
(2) A notarial officer shall not perform a notarial act with respect to a record in which the officer has a disqualifying interest. For the purposes of this section, a notarial officer has a disqualifying interest in a record if:
(a) The officer or the officer's spouse, partner in a civil union, ancestor, descendent, or sibling is a party to or is named in the record that is to be notarized; or
(b) The officer or the officer's spouse or partner in a civil union may receive directly, and as a proximate result of the notarization, any advantage, right, title, interest, cash, or property exceeding in value the sum of any fee properly received in accordance with this part 5.
(3) A notarial act performed in violation of this section is voidable.
Source: L. 2017: Entire part added, (SB 17-132), ch. 207, p. 789, § 2, effective July 1, 2018.
24-21-505. Requirements for certain notarial acts.
(1) A notarial officer who takes an acknowledgment of a record shall determine, from personal knowledge or satisfactory evidence of the identity of the individual, that the individual appearing before the officer and making the acknowledgment has the identity claimed and that the signature on the record is the signature of the individual.
(2) A notarial officer who takes a verification of a statement on oath or affirmation shall determine, from personal knowledge or satisfactory evidence of the identity of the individual, that the individual appearing before the officer and making the verification has the identity claimed and that the signature on the statement verified is the signature of the individual.
(3) A notarial officer who witnesses or attests to a signature shall determine, from personal knowledge or satisfactory evidence of the identity of the individual, that the individual appearing before the officer and signing the record has the identity claimed.
(4) (a) A notarial officer who certifies a copy of a record or an item that was copied shall determine that the copy is a full, true, and accurate transcription or reproduction of the record or item.
(b) A notarial officer shall not certify a copy of a record that can be obtained from any of the following offices in this state:
(I) A clerk and recorder of public documents;
(II) The secretary of state;
(III) The state archives; or
(IV) An office of vital records.
(c) A notarial officer shall not certify a copy of a record if the record states on its face that it is illegal to copy the record.
(5) (a) A notarial officer who makes or notes a protest of a negotiable instrument shall determine the matters set forth in section 4-3-505 (b) of the "Uniform Commercial Code".
(b) A notary public shall not make or note a protest of a negotiable instrument unless the notary is an employee of a financial institution acting in the course and scope of the notary's employment with the financial institution.
Source: L. 2017: Entire part added, (SB 17-132), ch. 207, p. 789, § 2, effective July 1, 2018.
24-21-506. Personal appearance required - definition.
(1) If a notarial act relates to a statement made in or a signature executed on a record, the individual making the statement or executing the signature shall appear personally before the notarial officer.
(2) As used in this section, "appear personally" means:
(a) Being in the same physical location as another individual and close enough to see, hear, communicate with, and exchange tangible identification credentials with that individual; or
(b) Interacting with a remotely located individual by means of real-time audio-video communication in compliance with section 24-21-514.5 and rules adopted by the secretary of state.
Source: L. 2017: Entire part added, (SB 17-132), ch. 207, p. 790, § 2, effective July 1, 2018. L. 2020: Entire section amended, (SB 20-096), ch. 130, p. 559, § 3, effective December 31.
Cross references: For the legislative declaration in SB 20-096, see section 1 of chapter 130, Session Laws of Colorado 2020.
24-21-507. Identification of individual.
(1) A notarial officer has personal knowledge of the identity of an individual appearing before the officer if the individual is personally known to the officer through dealings sufficient to provide reasonable certainty that the individual has the identity claimed.
(2) A notarial officer has satisfactory evidence of the identity of an individual appearing before the officer if the officer can identify the individual:
(a) By means of:
(I) A passport, driver's license, or government-issued nondriver identification card that is current or expired not more than one year before performance of the notarial act; or
(II) Another form of government identification issued to the individual that is current or expired not more than one year before performance of the notarial act, contains the signature or a photograph of the individual, and is satisfactory to the officer; or
(b) By a verification on oath or affirmation of a credible witness personally appearing before the officer and known to the officer or whom the officer can identify on the basis of a passport, driver's license, or government-issued nondriver identification card that is current or expired not more than one year before performance of the notarial act.
(3) A notarial officer may require an individual to provide additional information or identification credentials necessary to assure the officer of the identity of the individual.
Source: L. 2017: Entire part added, (SB 17-132), ch. 207, p. 790, § 2, effective July 1, 2018.
24-21-508. Authority to refuse to perform notarial act.
(1) A notarial officer may refuse to perform a notarial act if the officer is not satisfied that:
(a) The individual executing the record is competent or has the capacity to execute the record; or
(b) The individual's signature is knowingly and voluntarily made.
(2) A notarial officer may refuse to perform a notarial act unless refusal is prohibited by law other than this part 5.
Source: L. 2017: Entire part added, (SB 17-132), ch. 207, p. 791, § 2, effective July 1, 2018.
24-21-509. Signature if individual unable to sign.
(1) If an individual is physically unable to sign a record, the individual may, in the presence of the notarial officer, direct an individual other than the notarial officer to sign the individual's name on the record. The notarial officer shall insert "Signature affixed by (name of other individual) at the direction of (name of individual)" or words of similar import under or near the signature.
(2) A notary public may use signals or electronic or mechanical means to take an acknowledgment from, administer an oath or affirmation to, or otherwise communicate with any individual in the presence of the notary public when it appears that the individual is unable to communicate verbally or in writing.
Source: L. 2017: Entire part added, (SB 17-132), ch. 207, p. 791, § 2, effective July 1, 2018.
24-21-510. Notarial act in this state.
(1) A notarial act may be performed in this state by:
(a) A notary public of this state;
(b) A judge, clerk, or deputy clerk of a court of this state; or
(c) Any other individual authorized to perform the specific act by the law of this state.
(2) The signature and title of an individual performing a notarial act in this state are prima facie evidence that the signature is genuine and that the individual holds the designated title.
(3) The signature and title of a notarial officer described in subsection (1)(a) or (1)(b) of this section conclusively establish the authority of the officer to perform the notarial act.
Source: L. 2017: Entire part added, (SB 17-132), ch. 207, p. 792, § 2, effective July 1, 2018.
24-21-511. Notarial act in another state.
(1) A notarial act performed in another state has the same effect under the law of this state as if performed by a notarial officer of this state if the act performed in that state is performed by:
(a) A notary public of that state;
(b) A judge, clerk, or deputy clerk of a court of that state; or
(c) Any other individual authorized by the law of that state to perform the notarial act.
(2) The signature and title of an individual performing a notarial act in another state are prima facie evidence that the signature is genuine and that the individual holds the designated title.
(3) The signature and title of a notarial officer described in subsection (1)(a) or (1)(b) of this section conclusively establish the authority of the officer to perform the notarial act.
Source: L. 2017: Entire part added, (SB 17-132), ch. 207, p. 792, § 2, effective July 1, 2018.
24-21-512. Notarial act under authority of federally recognized Indian tribe.
(1) A notarial act performed under the authority and in the jurisdiction of a federally recognized Indian tribe has the same effect as if performed by a notarial officer of this state if the act performed in the jurisdiction of the tribe is performed by:
(a) A notary public of the tribe;
(b) A judge, clerk, or deputy clerk of a court of the tribe; or
(c) Any other individual authorized by the law of the tribe to perform the notarial act.
(2) The signature and title of an individual performing a notarial act under the authority of and in the jurisdiction of a federally recognized Indian tribe are prima facie evidence that the signature is genuine and that the individual holds the designated title.
(3) The signature and title of a notarial officer described in subsection (1)(a) or (1)(b) of this section conclusively establish the authority of the officer to perform the notarial act.
Source: L. 2017: Entire part added, (SB 17-132), ch. 207, p. 792, § 2, effective July 1, 2018.
24-21-513. Notarial act under federal authority.
(1) A notarial act performed under federal law has the same effect under the law of this state as if performed by a notarial officer of this state if the act performed under federal law is performed by:
(a) A judge, clerk, or deputy clerk of a court;
(b) An individual in military service or performing duties under the authority of military service who is authorized to perform notarial acts under federal law;
(c) An individual designated a notarizing officer by the United States department of state for performing notarial acts overseas; or
(d) Any other individual authorized by federal law to perform the notarial act.
(2) The signature and title of an individual acting under federal authority and performing a notarial act are prima facie evidence that the signature is genuine and that the individual holds the designated title.
(3) The signature and title of an officer described in subsection (1)(a), (1)(b), or (1)(c) of this section conclusively establish the authority of the officer to perform the notarial act.
Source: L. 2017: Entire part added, (SB 17-132), ch. 207, p. 793, § 2, effective July 1, 2018.
24-21-514. Foreign notarial act.
(1) In this section, "foreign state" means a government other than the United States, a state, or a federally recognized Indian tribe.
(2) If a notarial act is performed under authority and in the jurisdiction of a foreign state or constituent unit of the foreign state or is performed under the authority of a multinational or international governmental organization, the act has the same effect under the law of this state as if performed by a notarial officer of this state.
(3) If the title of office and indication of authority to perform notarial acts in a foreign state appears in a digest of foreign law or in a list customarily used as a source for that information, the authority of an officer with that title to perform notarial acts is conclusively established.
(4) The signature and official stamp of an individual holding an office described in subsection (3) of this section are prima facie evidence that the signature is genuine and the individual holds the designated title.
(5) An apostille in the form prescribed by the Hague Convention of October 5, 1961, and issued by a foreign state party to the convention conclusively establishes that the signature of the notarial officer is genuine and that the officer holds the indicated office.
(6) A consular authentication issued by an individual designated by the United States department of state as a notarizing officer for performing notarial acts overseas and attached to the record with respect to which the notarial act is performed conclusively establishes that the signature of the notarial officer is genuine and that the officer holds the indicated office.
Source: L. 2017: Entire part added, (SB 17-132), ch. 207, p. 793, § 2, effective July 1, 2018.
24-21-514.5. Audio-video communication - definitions.
(1) As used in this section:
(a) "Credential analysis" means a process or service that complies with any rules adopted by the secretary of state through which a third party affirms the validity of a government-issued identification credential through the review of public or proprietary data sources.
(b) "Dynamic, knowledge-based authentication assessment" means an identity assessment that is based on a set of questions formulated from public or private data sources for which the remotely located individual taking the assessment has not previously provided an answer and that meets any rules adopted by the secretary of state.
(c) "Outside the United States" means a location outside the geographic boundaries of the United States, Puerto Rico, the United States Virgin Islands, and any territory or insular possession subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.
(d) "Public key certificate" means an electronic credential that is used to identify a remotely located individual who signed an electronic record with the credential.
(e) "Remote presentation" means transmission to the notary public through communication technology of an image of a government-issued identification credential that is of sufficient quality to enable the notary public to:
(I) Identify the remotely located individual seeking the notary public's services; and
(II) Perform credential analysis.
(2) (a) Except as provided in subsection (2)(b) of this section, a notary public may perform a remote notarization only with respect to an electronic record and in compliance with this section and any rules adopted by the secretary of state for a remotely located individual who is located:
(I) In this state;
(II) Outside of this state but within the United States; or
(III) Outside the United States if:
(A) The notary public has no actual knowledge that the notarial act is prohibited in the jurisdiction in which the remotely located individual is physically located at the time of the act; and
(B) The remotely located individual confirms to the notary public that the requested notarial act and the record relate to: A matter that will be filed with or is currently before a court, governmental entity, or other entity in the United States; property located in the United States; or a transaction substantially connected to the United States.
(b) A notary public shall not use a remote notarization system to notarize:
(I) A record relating to the electoral process; or
(II) Except as provided in the "Colorado Uniform Electronic Wills Act", part 13 of article 11 of title 15, a will, codicil, document purporting to be a will or codicil, or any acknowledgment required under section 15-11-502 or 15-11-504.
(3) Before a notary public performs the notary public's initial notarization using a remote notarization system, the notary public shall notify the secretary of state that the notary public will be performing remote notarizations and shall identify each remote notarization system that the notary public intends to use. The remote notarization system must conform to this part 5 and any rules adopted by the secretary of state. The notice must be submitted in the format required by the secretary of state and must:
(a) Include an affirmation that the notary public has read and will comply with this section and all rules adopted by the secretary of state; and
(b) Be accompanied by proof that the notary public has successfully completed any training and examination required by the secretary of state.
(4) A notary public who performs a notarial act for a remotely located individual by means of audio-video communication must:
(a) Be located within this state at the time the notarial act is performed;
(b) Execute the notarial act in a single, real-time session;
(c) Confirm that any record that is signed, acknowledged, or otherwise presented for notarization by the remotely located individual is the same record signed by the notary public;
(d) Confirm that the quality of the audio-video communication is sufficient to make the determinations required for the notarial act under this part 5 and any other law of this state; and
(e) Identify the venue for the notarial act as the jurisdiction within the state of Colorado where the notary public is physically located while performing the act.
(5) A remote notarization system used to perform remote notarizations must:
(a) Require the notary public, the remotely located individual, and any required witness to access the system through an authentication procedure that complies with rules adopted by the secretary of state regarding security and access;
(b) Enable the notary public to verify the identity of the remotely located individual and any required witness by means of personal knowledge or satisfactory evidence of identity in compliance with subsection (6) of this section; and
(c) Confirm that the notary public, the remotely located individual, and any required witness are viewing the same record and that all signatures, changes, and attachments to the record are made in real time.
(6) (a) A notary public shall determine from personal knowledge or satisfactory evidence of identity as described in subsection (6)(b) of this section that the remotely located individual appearing before the notary public by means of audio-video communication is the individual that he or she purports to be.
(b) A notary public has satisfactory evidence of identity if the notary public can identify the remotely located individual who personally appears before the notary public by means of audio-video communication by using at least one of the following methods:
(I) The oath or affirmation of a credible witness who personally knows the remotely located individual, is personally known to the notary public, and is in the physical presence of the notary public or the remotely located individual during the remote notarization;
(II) Remote presentation and credential analysis of a government-issued identification credential, and the data contained on the credential, that contains the signature and a photograph of the remotely located individual, and at least one of the following:
(A) A dynamic, knowledge-based authentication assessment by a trusted third party that complies with rules adopted by the secretary of state;
(B) A valid public key certificate that complies with rules adopted by the secretary of state; or
(C) An identity verification by a trusted third party that complies with rules adopted by the secretary of state; or
(III) Any other method that complies with rules adopted by the secretary of state.
(7) Without limiting the authority of a notary public under section 24-21-508 to refuse to perform a notarial act, a notary public may refuse to perform a notarial act under this section if the notary public is not satisfied that the requirements of this section are met.
(8) The certificate of notarial act for a remote notarization must, in addition to complying with the requirements of section 24-21-515, indicate that the notarial act was performed using audio-video communication technology.
(9) (a) A notary public shall create an audio-video recording of a remote notarization if:
(I) The notary public first discloses to the remotely located individual the fact of the recording and the details of its intended storage, including where and for how long it will be stored;
(II) The remotely located individual explicitly consents to both the recording and the storage of the recording; and
(III) The recording is stored and secured in compliance with rules adopted by the secretary of state.
(b) The audio-video recording required by this subsection (9) must be in addition to the journal entry for the notarial act where required by section 24-21-519. The recording must include the information described in this subsection (9)(b). A notary public shall make a good-faith effort to not include any other information on the recording. Any other information included on the recording is not admissible in any court of law, legal proceeding, or administrative hearing for any purpose, nor is the information admissible in any proceeding in any other court of law, legal proceeding, or administrative hearing if Colorado law applies with respect to remote notarization. The recording must include:
(I) At the commencement of the recording, a recitation by the notary public of information sufficient to identify the notarial act, including the name of the notary public, the date and time of the notarial act, a description of the nature of the document or documents to which the notarial act is to relate, the identity of the remotely located individual whose signature is to be the subject of the notarial act and of any person who will act as a credible witness to identify the individual signer, and the method or methods by which the remotely located individual and any credible witness will be identified to the notary public;
(II) A declaration by the remotely located individual that the individual's signature on the record is knowingly and voluntarily made;
(III) If the remotely located individual for whom the notarial act is being performed is identified by personal knowledge, an explanation by the notary public as to how the notary public knows the remotely located individual and how long the notary public has known the remotely located individual;
(IV) If the remotely located individual for whom the notarial act is being performed is identified by a credible witness:
(A) A statement by the notary public as to how the notary public knows the credible witness and how long the notary public has known the credible witness; and
(B) An explanation by the credible witness as to how the credible witness knows the remotely located individual and how long the credible witness has known the remotely located individual; and
(V) The statements, acts, and conduct necessary to perform the requested notarial act or supervision of signing or witnessing of the subject record.
(c) The provisions of section 24-21-519 that relate to the security, inspection, copying, and retention and disposition of a notary public's journal apply equally to the security, inspection, copying, and retention and disposition of audio-video recordings allowed by this section.
(d) The failure of a notary public to perform a duty or meet a requirement specified in this subsection (9) does not invalidate a remote notarization performed by the notary public. A notary public is not liable to any person for damages claimed to arise from a failure to perform a duty or meet a requirement specified in subsection (9)(b) of this section.
(10) Regardless of the physical location of the remotely located individual at the time of the notarial act, the validity of a remote notarization performed by a notary in this state is governed by the laws of this state, including any rules adopted by the secretary of state pursuant to this part 5.
(11) To be eligible for approval by the secretary of state under section 24-21-527 (1)(h), a provider of a remote notarization system or storage system must:
(a) Certify to the secretary of state that the provider and the system comply with the requirements of this section and the rules adopted under section 24-21-527;
(b) Maintain a usual place of business in this state or, if a foreign entity, appoint and maintain a registered agent, in accordance with section 7-90-701 by filing a statement of foreign entity authority in accordance with section 7-90-803, with authority to accept service of process in connection with a civil action or other proceeding; and
(c) Not use, sell, or offer to sell to another person or transfer to another person for use or sale any personal information obtained under this section that identifies a remotely located individual, a witness to a remote notarization, or a person named in a record presented for remote notarization, except:
(I) As necessary to facilitate performance of a notarial act;
(II) To effect, administer, enforce, service, or process a record provided by or on behalf of the individual or the transaction of which the record is a part;
(III) In accordance with this part 5 and the rules adopted pursuant to this part 5 or other applicable federal, state, or local law, or to comply with a lawful subpoena or court order; or
(IV) In connection with a proposed or actual sale, merger, transfer, or exchange of all or a portion of a business or operating unit of the provider, if the personal information concerns only customers of the business or unit and the transferee agrees to comply with the restrictions set forth in this subsection (11).
(12) Subject to applicable law other than this article 21, if a record is privileged pursuant to section 13-90-107 (1)(b), the corresponding electronic record secured and stored by the remote notarization system as provided in this article 21 remains privileged.
Source: L. 2020: Entire section added, (SB 20-096), ch. 130, p. 559, § 4, effective December 31. L. 2021: (2)(b)(II) amended, (HB 21-1004), ch. 3, p. 11, § 2, effective January 21; (2)(b)(II) amended, (SB 21-266), ch. 423, p. 2801, § 17, effective July 2.
Cross references: For the legislative declaration in SB 20-096, see section 1 of chapter 130, Session Laws of Colorado 2020.
24-21-514.7. Interpreters - use in facilitation of notarial acts - limitations.
(1) If a notarial officer and an individual for whom a notarial act is to be performed do not communicate in the same language, an interpreter who communicates in a language in common with both the notarial officer and the individual may be used to facilitate the notarial act. A notarial officer may rely on representations made by the interpreter on behalf of the individual for whom the notarial act is performed as factual. Any errors in interpretation are not attributable to the notarial officer, and the notarial officer is not liable in any disputes arising from such errors.
(2) An interpreter shall appear personally, as defined in section 24-21-506 (2), before the notarial officer. An interpreter appearing personally before the notarial officer shall be identified pursuant to section 24-21-507 or, if appearing personally by means of real-time audio-video communication, pursuant to section 24-21-514.5.
(3) (a) An interpreter shall not provide interpreter services when the interpreter has a disqualifying interest in the transaction. For the purposes of this subsection (3), an interpreter has a disqualifying interest in a transaction if:
(I) The interpreter or the interpreter's spouse, partner in a civil union, ancestor, descendent, or sibling is a party to or is named in the record that is to be notarized; or
(II) The interpreter or the interpreter's spouse or partner in a civil union may receive directly and as a proximate result of the notarization any advantage, right, title, interest, cash, or property. This subsection (3)(a)(II) does not apply to a reasonable fee received by the interpreter for providing interpreter services.
(b) A notarial act is voidable if interpreter services are provided in violation of this subsection (3) in relation to the notarial act.
(4) (a) If a notarial officer does not communicate in the same language as the individual executing the record with respect to which the notarial officer is performing a notarial act, the notarial officer is not liable in any legal action regarding a dispute that directly results from an error in interpretation.
(b) A party who files an action for damages based on a violation of this part 5 related to a notarial act that a notarial officer performed in accordance with this section has the burden of proof in establishing that the dispute is related to a cause other than the interpretation.
(5) Nothing in this section limits a notarial officer's authority to refuse to perform a notarial act as set forth in section 24-21-508.
(6) In addition to complying with the requirements of section 24-21-515, the certificate of notarial act for a remote notarization that was performed using an interpreter must indicate that the notarial act was performed using an interpreter and include the name and credential or certification number, if any, of the interpreter.
Source: L. 2023: Entire section added, (SB 23-153), ch. 212, p. 1098, § 2, effective September 1.
24-21-515. Certificate of notarial act.
(1) A notarial act must be evidenced by a certificate. The certificate must:
(a) Be executed contemporaneously with the performance of the notarial act;
(b) Be signed and dated by the notarial officer and, if the notarial officer is a notary public, be signed in the same manner as on file with the secretary of state;
(c) Identify the county and state in which the notarial act is performed; and
(d) Contain the title of office of the notarial officer.
(e) Repealed.
(2) If a notarial act regarding a tangible record is performed by a notary public, an official stamp must be affixed to the certificate. If a notarial act is performed regarding a tangible record by a notarial officer other than a notary public and the certificate contains the information specified in subsections (1)(b), (1)(c), and (1)(d) of this section, an official stamp may be affixed to the certificate. If a notarial act regarding an electronic record is performed by a notarial officer and the certificate contains the information specified in subsections (1)(b), (1)(c), and (1)(d) of this section, an official stamp may be attached to or logically associated with the certificate.
(3) A certificate of a notarial act is sufficient if it meets the requirements of subsections (1) and (2) of this section and:
(a) Is in a short form set forth in section 24-21-516;
(b) Is in a form otherwise permitted by the law of this state;
(c) Is in a form permitted by the law applicable in the jurisdiction in which the notarial act was performed; or
(d) Sets forth actions of the notarial officer that are sufficient to meet the requirements of the notarial act as provided in sections 24-21-505, 24-21-506, and 24-21-507 and, if applicable, section 24-21-514.5 or law of this state other than this part 5.
(4) By executing a certificate of a notarial act, a notarial officer certifies that the officer has complied with the requirements and made the determinations specified in sections 24-21-504, 24-21-505, and 24-21-506 and, if applicable, section 24-21-514.5.
(5) A notarial officer shall not affix the officer's signature to, or logically associate it with, a certificate until the notarial act has been performed.
(6) If a notarial act is performed regarding a tangible record, a certificate must be part of, or securely attached to, the record. If a notarial act is performed regarding an electronic record, the certificate must be affixed to, or logically associated with, the electronic record. If the secretary of state has established standards pursuant to section 24-21-527 for attaching, affixing, or logically associating the certificate, the process must conform to the standards.
Source: L. 2017: Entire part added, (SB 17-132), ch. 207, p. 794, § 2, effective July 1, 2018. L. 2020: (3)(d) and (4) amended, (SB 20-096), ch. 130, p. 565, § 5, effective December 31. L. 2023: (1)(c) and (1)(d) amended and (1)(e) repealed, (SB 23-153), ch. 212, p. 1099, § 3, effective September 1.
Cross references: For the legislative declaration in SB 20-096, see section 1 of chapter 130, Session Laws of Colorado 2020.
24-21-516. Short form certificates.
(1) The following short form certificates of notarial acts are sufficient for the purposes indicated, if completed with the information required by section 24-21-515 (1) and (2):
(a) For an acknowledgment in an individual capacity:
State of _________________
County of _______________
This record was acknowledged before me on ____(date)____ by ____(name(s) of
individual(s))____
_______________________
Signature of notarial officer
Stamp
((Title of office))
My commission expires: _______________
(b) For an acknowledgment in a representative capacity:
State of _________________
County of _______________
This record was acknowledged before me on ____(date)____ by ____(name(s) of
individual(s))____ as (type of authority, such as officer or trustee) of (name of
party on behalf of whom record was executed).
____________________________
Signature of notarial officer
Stamp
((Title of office))
My commission expires: _______________
(c) For a verification on oath or affirmation:
State of _________________
County of _______________
Signed and sworn to (or affirmed) before me on ____(date)____ by ____(name(s) of
individual(s) making statement)____
________________________
Signature of notarial officer
Stamp
((Title of office))
My commission expires: _______________
(d) For witnessing or attesting a signature:
State of _________________
County of _______________
Signed before me on ____(date)_____ by ____(name(s) of individual(s))____
_______________________
Signature of notarial officer
Stamp
((Title of office))
My commission expires: _______________
(e) For certifying a copy of a record:
State of _________________
County of _______________
I certify that this is a true and correct copy of a record in the possession of
___________________________________.
Dated _______________
__________________________
Signature of notarial officer
Stamp
((Title of office))
My commission expires: _____________
Source: L. 2017: Entire part added, (SB 17-132), ch. 207, p. 795, § 2, effective July 1, 2018.
24-21-517. Official stamp.
(1) The official stamp of a notary public must:
(a) Be rectangular and contain only the outline of the seal and the following information printed within the outline of the seal:
(I) The notary public's name, as it appears on the notary's certificate of commission;
(II) The notary's identification number;
(III) The notary's commission expiration date;
(IV) The words "state of Colorado"; and
(V) The words "notary public"; and
(b) Be capable of being copied together with the record to which it is affixed or attached or with which it is logically associated.
(2) A notary public shall not provide, keep, or use a seal embosser.
Source: L. 2017: Entire part added, (SB 17-132), ch. 207, p. 797, § 2, effective July 1, 2018.
24-21-518. Stamping device.
(1) A notary public is responsible for the security of the notary public's stamping device and may not allow another individual to use the device to perform a notarial act. On resignation from, or the revocation or expiration of, the notary public's commission, or on the expiration of the date set forth in the stamping device, if any, the notary public shall disable the stamping device by destroying, defacing, damaging, erasing, or securing it against use in a manner that renders it unusable. On the death or adjudication of incompetency of a notary public, the notary public's personal representative or guardian or any other person knowingly in possession of the stamping device shall render it unusable by destroying, defacing, damaging, erasing, or securing it against use in a manner that renders it unusable.
(2) If a notary public's stamping device is lost or stolen, the notary public or the notary public's personal representative or guardian shall notify the secretary of state in writing within thirty days after discovering that the device is lost or stolen.
Source: L. 2017: Entire part added, (SB 17-132), ch. 207, p. 797, § 2, effective July 1, 2018.
24-21-519. Journal.
(1) A notary public shall maintain a journal in which the notary public chronicles all notarial acts that the notary public performs. The notary public shall retain the journal for ten years after the performance of the last notarial act chronicled in the journal.
(2) (a) A journal may be created on a tangible medium or in an electronic format. If a journal is maintained on a tangible medium, it must be a permanent, bound register with numbered pages. If a journal is maintained in an electronic format, it must be in a permanent, tamper-evident electronic format complying with the rules of the secretary of state.
(b) A notary public who performs a remote notarization shall maintain a journal in an electronic format with regard to each remote notarization.
(3) An entry in a journal must be made contemporaneously with performance of a notarial act and contain the following information:
(a) The date and time of the notarial act;
(b) A description of the record, if any, and type of notarial act;
(c) The full name and address of each individual for whom the notarial act is performed;
(d) The signature or electronic signature of each individual for whom the notarial act is performed;
(e) If identity of the individual is based on personal knowledge, a statement to that effect;
(f) If identity of the individual is based on satisfactory evidence, a brief description of the method of identification and the type of identification credential presented, if any;
(g) The full name and address of any interpreter who provided interpreter services to facilitate the notarial act;
(h) The certification or credential number of any interpreter who provided interpreter services to facilitate the notarial act; and
(i) The fee, if any, charged by the notary public.
(4) A notary public is responsible for the security of the notary public's journal. A notary public shall keep the journal in a secure area under the exclusive control of the notary, and shall not allow any other notary to use the journal.
(5) Upon written request of any member of the public, which request must include the name of the parties, the type of document, and the month and year in which a record was notarized, a notary public may supply a certified copy of the line item representing the requested transaction. A notary public may charge the fee allowed in section 24-21-529 for each certified copy of a line item, and shall record the transaction in the notary's journal.
(6) The secretary of state may audit or inspect a notary public's journal without restriction. A notary public shall surrender the notary's journal to the secretary of state upon receiving a written request.
(7) A certified peace officer, as defined in section 16-2.5-102, acting in the course of an official investigation may inspect a notary public's journal without restriction.
(8) If a notary public's journal is lost or stolen, the notary public shall notify the secretary of state in writing within thirty days after discovering that the journal is lost or stolen.
(9) On resignation from, or the revocation or expiration of, a notary public's commission, the notary public shall retain the notary public's journal in accordance with subsection (1) of this section and inform the secretary of state where the journal is located.
(10) (a) Instead of retaining a journal as provided in subsections (1) and (9) of this section, a current or former notary public may:
(I) Transmit the journal to the state archives established pursuant to part 1 of article 80 of this title 24; or
(II) Leave the journal with the notary's firm or employer in the regular course of business.
(b) If notary public acts pursuant to subsection (10)(a) of this section, the notary public is no longer subject to subsection (5) of this section and shall notify the secretary of state in writing whether the notary has transmitted the journal to the state archives or the firm or employer, including the contact information for the firm or employer if the notary leaves the journal with the notary's firm or employer.
(c) Instead of maintaining a journal as required by subsection (1) of this section, a notary public may maintain the original or a copy, including an electronic record, of a document that contains the information otherwise required to be entered in the notary's journal if the notary's firm or employer retains the original, copy, or electronic record in the regular course of business.
(11) On the death or adjudication of incompetency of a current or former notary public, the notary public's personal representative or guardian or any other person knowingly in possession of the journal shall transmit it to the state archives established pursuant to part 1 of article 80 of this title 24. The person shall notify the secretary of state in writing when the person transmits the journal to the state archives.
Source: L. 2017: Entire part added, (SB 17-132), ch. 207, p. 798, § 2, effective July 1, 2018. L. 2020: (2) amended, (SB 20-096), ch. 130, p. 565, § 6, effective December 31. L. 2023: IP(3), (3)(f), and (3)(g) amended and (3)(h) and (3)(i) added, (SB 23-153), ch. 212, p. 1100, § 4, effective September 1.
Cross references: For the legislative declaration in SB 20-096, see section 1 of chapter 130, Session Laws of Colorado 2020.
24-21-520. Notification regarding performance of notarial act on electronic record - selection of technology.
(1) A notary public may select one or more tamper-evident technologies to perform notarial acts with respect to electronic records. A person may not require a notary public to perform a notarial act with respect to an electronic record with a technology that the notary public has not selected.
(2) Before a notary public performs the notary public's initial notarial act with respect to an electronic record, a notary public shall notify the secretary of state that the notary public will be performing notarial acts with respect to electronic records and identify the technology the notary public intends to use. If the secretary of state has established standards for approval of technology pursuant to section 24-21-527, the technology must conform to the standards. If the technology conforms to the standards, the secretary of state shall approve the use of the technology.
(3) In every instance, the electronic signature of a notary public must contain or be accompanied by the following elements, all of which must be immediately perceptible and reproducible in the electronic record to which the notary's electronic signature is attached: The notary's name, as it appears on the notary's certificate of commission; the notary's identification number; the words "notary public" and "state of Colorado"; a document authentication number issued by the secretary of state; and the words "my commission expires" followed by the expiration date of the notary's commission. A notary's electronic signature must conform to any standards promulgated by the secretary of state.
Source: L. 2017: Entire part added, (SB 17-132), ch. 207, p. 800, § 2, effective July 1, 2018.
24-21-521. Commission as notary public - qualifications - no immunity or benefit.
(1) An individual qualified under subsection (3) of this section may apply to the secretary of state for a commission as a notary public. The applicant shall comply with and provide the information required by rules established by the secretary of state and pay any application fee. In accordance with section 24-21-111 (1), the secretary of state may require, at the secretary of state's discretion, the application required by this section, and any renewal of the application, to be made by electronic means designated by the secretary of state.
(2) In accordance with section 42-1-211, the department of state and the department of revenue shall allow for the exchange of information and data collected by the systems used by the departments to collect information on legal names and signatures of all applicants for driver's licenses or state identification cards.
(3) An applicant for a commission as a notary public must:
(a) Be at least eighteen years of age;
(b) Be a citizen or permanent legal resident of the United States or otherwise lawfully present in the United States;
(c) Be a resident of or have a place of employment or practice in this state;
(d) Be able to read and write English;
(e) Not be disqualified to receive a commission under section 24-21-523; and
(f) Have passed the examination required under section 24-21-522 (1).
(4) The secretary of state shall verify the lawful presence in the United States of each applicant by:
(a) Accepting one of the following documents from the applicant:
(I) A United States military card or a military dependent's identification card;
(II) A United States Coast Guard Merchant Mariner card;
(III) A Native American tribal document;
(IV) A valid Colorado driver's license or a Colorado identification card issued pursuant to article 2 of title 42, unless the applicant holds a license or card issued pursuant to part 5 of article 2 of title 42;
(V) A valid driver's license or identification card issued by another state, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, the United States Virgin Islands, or any territory or insular possession subject to the jurisdiction of the United States that is compliant with the federal "REAL ID Act", as amended;
(VI) A valid United States passport;
(VII) A valid United States permanent resident card; or
(VIII) Any other valid type of identification that requires proof of lawful presence in the United States to obtain; and
(b) Executing an affidavit stating that the applicant is:
(I) A United States citizen or legal permanent resident; or
(II) Otherwise lawfully present in the United States pursuant to federal law.
(5) Before issuance of a commission as a notary public, an applicant for the commission shall take the following affirmation in the presence of a person qualified to administer an affirmation in this state:
I, __(name of applicant)__, solemnly affirm, under the penalty of perjury in the second degree, as defined in section 18-8-503, Colorado Revised Statutes, that I have carefully read the notary law of this state, and, if appointed and commissioned as a notary public, I will faithfully perform, to the best of my ability, all notarial acts in conformance with the law.
(Signature of applicant)
Subscribed and affirmed before me this __________ day of __________, 20 _____.
(Official signature and seal of person qualified to administer affirmation)
(6) On compliance with this section, the secretary of state shall issue a commission as a notary public to an applicant for a term of four years, unless revoked in accordance with section 24-21-523. An applicant who has been denied appointment and commission may appeal the decision in accordance with article 4 of this title 24.
(7) A commission to act as a notary public authorizes the notary public to perform notarial acts. The commission does not provide the notary public any immunity or benefit conferred by law of this state on public officials or employees.
Source: L. 2017: Entire part added, (SB 17-132), ch. 207, p. 800, § 2, effective July 1, 2018. L. 2021: (4) amended, (SB 21-199), ch. 351, p. 2284, § 10, effective July 1, 2022.
24-21-522. Examination of notary public.
(1) An applicant for a commission as a notary public who does not hold a commission in this state must pass an examination administered by the secretary of state or an entity approved by the secretary of state. The examination must be based on the course of study described in subsection (2) of this section.
(2) The secretary of state or an entity approved by the secretary of state shall offer regularly a course of study to applicants who do not hold commissions as notaries public in this state. The course must cover the laws, rules, procedures, and ethics relevant to notarial acts. The office of the secretary of state may enter into a contract with a private contractor or contractors to conduct notary training programs. The contractor or contractors may charge a fee for any such training program.
Source: L. 2017: Entire part added, (SB 17-132), ch. 207, p. 801, § 2, effective July 1, 2018.
24-21-523. Grounds to deny, refuse to renew, revoke, suspend, or condition commission of notary public.
(1) The secretary of state may deny, refuse to renew, revoke, suspend, or impose a condition on a commission as notary public for:
(a) Failure to comply with this part 5;
(b) A substantial and material misstatement or omission of fact in the application for a commission as a notary public submitted to the secretary of state;
(c) Notwithstanding section 24-5-101, a conviction of the applicant or notary public of any felony or, in the prior five years, a misdemeanor involving dishonesty;
(d) A finding against, or admission of liability by, the applicant or notary public in any legal proceeding or disciplinary action based on the applicant's or notary public's fraud, dishonesty, or deceit;
(e) Failure by the notary public to discharge any duty required of a notary public, whether by this part 5, rules of the secretary of state, or any federal or state law;
(f) Use of false or misleading advertising or representation by the notary public representing that the notary has a duty, right, or privilege that the notary does not have;
(g) Violation by the notary public of a rule of the secretary of state regarding a notary public;
(h) Denial, refusal to renew, revocation, suspension, or conditioning of a notary public commission in another state;
(i) A finding by a court of this state that the applicant or notary public has engaged in the unauthorized practice of law;
(j) Failure to comply with any term of suspension or condition imposed on the commission of a notary public under this section; or
(k) Performance of any notarial act while not currently commissioned by the secretary of state.
(2) Whenever the secretary of state or the secretary of state's designee believes that a violation of this part 5 has occurred, the secretary of state or the secretary of state's designee may investigate the violation. The secretary of state or the secretary of state's designee may also investigate possible violations of this part 5 upon a signed complaint from any person. However, this section does not authorize the secretary of state or the secretary of state's designee to investigate a potential violation concerning an action taken by an interpreter during a notarial act.
(3) If the secretary of state denies, refuses to renew, revokes, suspends, or imposes conditions on a commission as a notary public, the applicant or notary public is entitled to timely notice and hearing in accordance with the "State Administrative Procedure Act", article 4 of this title 24.
(4) When a complaint or investigation results in a finding of misconduct that, in the secretary of state's discretion, does not warrant initiation of a disciplinary proceeding, the secretary of state may take nondisciplinary action. For the purposes of this subsection (4), nondisciplinary action includes the issuance of a letter of admonition, which may be placed in the notary public's file.
(5) The authority of the secretary of state to deny, refuse to renew, suspend, revoke, or impose conditions on a commission as a notary public does not prevent a person from seeking and obtaining other criminal or civil remedies provided by law.
(6) A person whose notary commission has been revoked pursuant to this part 5 may not apply for or receive a commission and appointment as a notary.
Source: L. 2017: Entire part added, (SB 17-132), ch. 207, p. 802, § 2, effective July 1, 2018. L. 2023: (2) amended, (SB 23-153), ch. 212, p. 1100, § 5, effective September 1.
24-21-524. Database of notaries public.
(1) The secretary of state shall maintain an electronic database of notaries public:
(a) Through which a person may verify the authority of a notary public to perform notarial acts; and
(b) Which indicates whether a notary public has notified the secretary of state that the notary public will be performing notarial acts on electronic records.
Source: L. 2017: Entire part added, (SB 17-132), ch. 207, p. 803, § 2, effective July 1, 2018.
24-21-525. Prohibited acts.
(1) A commission as a notary public does not authorize an individual to:
(a) Assist persons in drafting legal records, give legal advice, or otherwise practice law;
(b) Act as an immigration consultant or an expert on immigration matters;
(c) Represent a person in a judicial or administrative proceeding relating to immigration to the United States, United States citizenship, or related matters; or
(d) Receive compensation for performing any of the activities listed in this subsection (1).
(2) A notary public shall not engage in false or deceptive advertising.
(3) A notary public, other than an attorney licensed to practice law in this state, shall not use the term "notario" or "notario publico".
(4) A notary public, other than an attorney licensed to practice law in this state, shall not advertise or represent that the notary public may assist persons in drafting legal records, give legal advice, or otherwise practice law. If a notary public who is not an attorney licensed to practice law in this state in any manner advertises or represents that the notary public offers notarial services, whether orally or in a record, including broadcast media, print media, and the internet, the notary public shall include the following statement, or an alternate statement authorized or required by the secretary of state, in the advertisement or representation, prominently and in each language used in the advertisement or representation: "I am not an attorney licensed to practice law in the state of Colorado and I may not give legal advice or accept fees for legal advice. I am not an immigration consultant, nor am I an expert on immigration matters. If you suspect fraud, you may contact the Colorado attorney general's office or the Colorado supreme court." If the form of advertisement or representation is not broadcast media, print media, or the internet and does not permit inclusion of the statement required by this subsection (4) because of size, it must be displayed prominently or provided at the place of performance of the notarial act before the notarial act is performed.
(5) A notary public, other than an attorney licensed to practice law in this state, shall not engage in conduct that constitutes a deceptive trade practice pursuant to section 6-1-727.
(6) Except as otherwise allowed by law, a notary public shall not withhold access to or possession of an original record provided by a person that seeks performance of a notarial act by the notary public.
(7) A notary public shall not perform any notarial act with respect to a record that is blank or that contains unfilled blanks in its text.
Source: L. 2017: Entire part added, (SB 17-132), ch. 207, p. 803, § 2, effective July 1, 2018.
24-21-526. Validity of notarial acts.
Except as otherwise provided in section 24-21-504 (2), the failure of a notarial officer to perform a duty or meet a requirement specified in this part 5 does not invalidate a notarial act performed by the notarial officer. The validity of a notarial act under this part 5 does not prevent an aggrieved person from seeking to invalidate the record or transaction that is the subject of the notarial act or from seeking other remedies based on law of this state other than this part 5 or law of the United States. This section does not validate a purported notarial act performed by an individual who does not have the authority to perform notarial acts.
Source: L. 2017: Entire part added, (SB 17-132), ch. 207, p. 804, § 2, effective July 1, 2018.
24-21-527. Rules - definitions.
(1) The secretary of state may adopt rules to implement this part 5 in accordance with article 4 of this title 24. Rules adopted regarding the performance of notarial acts with respect to electronic records may not require, or accord greater legal status or effect to, the implementation or application of a specific technology or technical specification. The rules may:
(a) Prescribe the manner of performing notarial acts regarding tangible and electronic records;
(b) Include provisions to ensure that any change to or tampering with a record bearing a certificate of a notarial act is self-evident;
(c) Include provisions to ensure integrity in the creation, transmittal, storage, or authentication of electronic records or signatures;
(d) Prescribe the process of granting, renewing, conditioning, denying, suspending, or revoking a notary public commission and assuring the trustworthiness of an individual holding a commission as notary public, including rules for use of the electronic filing system;
(e) Include provisions to prevent fraud or mistake in the performance of notarial acts;
(f) Provide for the administration of the examination under section 24-21-522 (1) and the course of study under section 24-21-522 (2);
(g) Prescribe the manner of performing notarial acts using audio-video communication technology, including provisions to ensure the security, integrity, and accessibility of records relating to those acts; and
(h) Prescribe requirements for the approval and use of remote notarization systems and storage systems.
(2) In adopting, amending, or repealing rules about notarial acts with respect to electronic records, the secretary of state shall consider, so far as is consistent with this part 5:
(a) The most recent standards regarding electronic records promulgated by national bodies, such as the National Association of Secretaries of State;
(b) Standards, practices, and customs of other jurisdictions that substantially enact this part 5; and
(c) The views of governmental officials and entities and other interested persons.
(3) (a) As used in this subsection (3):
(I) "Interim period" means the period beginning on March 30, 2020, and ending on December 31, 2020.
(II) "Temporary rule" means rule 5 of the notary program rules as adopted by the secretary of state effective March 30, 2020, and published at 8 CCR 1505-11, and any analogous successor emergency rule of the notary program that authorizes remote notarizations.
(b) and (c) Repealed.
(d) A notarial act performed during the interim period with respect to a remotely located individual that complied with the temporary rule is not invalid due to the lack of express statutory authority for the notarial act.
(e) and (f) Repealed.
Source: L. 2017: Entire part added, (SB 17-132), ch. 207, p. 805, § 2, effective July 1, 2018. L. 2020: (1)(e) amended and (1)(g), (1)(h), and (3) added, (SB 20-096), ch. 130, p. 565, § 7, effective June 26.
Editor's note: Subsection (3)(f) provided for the repeal of subsections (3)(b), (3)(c), (3)(e), and (3)(f), effective December 31, 2020. (See L. 2020, p. 565.)
Cross references: For the legislative declaration in SB 20-096, see section 1 of chapter 130, Session Laws of Colorado 2020.
24-21-528. Disposition of fees.
(1) The secretary of state shall collect all fees pursuant to this article 21 in the manner required by section 24-21-104 (3) and shall transmit them to the state treasurer, who shall credit them to the department of state cash fund created in section 24-21-104 (3)(b).
(2) The general assembly shall make annual appropriations from the department of state cash fund for expenditures of the secretary of state incurred in the performance of the secretary of state's duties under this part 5.
Source: L. 2017: Entire part added, (SB 17-132), ch. 207, p. 805, § 2, effective July 1, 2018.
24-21-529. Notary's fees.
(1) Except as specified in subsection (2) of this section, the fees of a notary public may be, but must not exceed, fifteen dollars for each document attested by a person before a notary, except as otherwise provided by law. The fee for each such document must include all duties and functions required to complete the notarial act in accordance with this part 5.
(2) In lieu of the fee authorized in subsection (1) of this section, a notary public may charge a fee, not to exceed twenty-five dollars, for the notary's electronic signature.
Source: L. 2017: Entire part added, (SB 17-132), ch. 207, p. 806, § 2, effective July 1, 2018. L. 2023: Entire section amended, (SB 23-153), ch. 212, p. 1100, § 6, effective May 17.
24-21-530. Change of name or address.
A notary public shall notify the secretary of state within thirty days after he or she changes his or her name, business address, or residential address. In the case of a name change, the notary public shall include a sample of the notary's handwritten official signature on the notice. Pursuant to section 24-21-104 (3), the secretary of state shall determine the amount of, and collect, the fee, payable to the secretary of state, for recording notice of change of name or address.
Source: L. 2017: Entire part added, (SB 17-132), ch. 207, p. 806, § 2, effective July 1, 2018.
24-21-531. Official misconduct by a notary public - liability of notary or surety.
(1) A notary public who knowingly and willfully violates the duties imposed by this part 5 commits official misconduct and is guilty of a petty offense.
(2) A notary public and the surety or sureties on his or her bond are liable to the persons involved for all damages proximately caused by the notary's official misconduct.
(3) Nothing in this part 5 shall be construed to deny a notary public the right to obtain a surety bond or insurance on a voluntary basis to provide coverage for liability.
Source: L. 2017: Entire part added, (SB 17-132), ch. 207, p. 806, § 2, effective July 1, 2018. L. 2021: (1) amended, (SB 21-271), ch. 462, p. 3224, § 406, effective March 1, 2022.
24-21-532. Willful impersonation.
A person who acts as, or otherwise willfully impersonates, a notary public while not lawfully appointed and commissioned to perform notarial acts commits a petty offense and shall be punished as specified in section 18-1.3-503.
Source: L. 2017: Entire part added, (SB 17-132), ch. 207, p. 806, § 2, effective July 1, 2018. L. 2021: Entire section amended, (SB 21-271), ch. 462, p. 3224, § 407, effective March 1, 2022.
24-21-533. Wrongful possession of journal or seal.
A person who unlawfully possesses and uses a notary's journal, an official seal, a notary's electronic signature, or any papers, copies, or electronic records relating to notarial acts commits a petty offense and shall be punished as specified in section 18-1.3-503.
Source: L. 2017: Entire part added, (SB 17-132), ch. 207, p. 806, § 2, effective July 1, 2018. L. 2021: Entire section amended, (SB 21-271), ch. 462, p. 3224, § 408, effective March 1, 2022.
24-21-534. Certification restrictions.
(1) The secretary of state may issue certificates or apostilles attesting to the authenticity of a notarial act performed by a commissioned notary public.
(2) The secretary of state shall not certify a signature of a notary public on:
(a) A record that is not properly notarized in accordance with the requirements of this part 5;
(b) A record:
(I) Regarding allegiance to a government or jurisdiction;
(II) Relating to the relinquishment or renunciation of citizenship, sovereignty, in itinere status or world service authority; or
(III) Setting forth or implying for the bearer a claim of immunity from the law of this state or federal law.
Source: L. 2017: Entire part added, (SB 17-132), ch. 207, p. 806, § 2, effective July 1, 2018.
24-21-535. Notary public commission in effect.
A commission as a notary public in effect on July 1, 2018, continues until its date of expiration. A notary public who applies to renew a commission as a notary public on or after July 1, 2018, is subject to and shall comply with this part 5. A notary public, in performing notarial acts after July 1, 2018, shall comply with this part 5.
Source: L. 2017: Entire part added, (SB 17-132), ch. 207, p. 807, § 2, effective July 1, 2018.
24-21-536. Saving clause.
This part 5 does not affect the validity or effect of a notarial act performed before July 1, 2018.
Source: L. 2017: Entire part added, (SB 17-132), ch. 207, p. 807, § 2, effective July 1, 2018.
24-21-537. Uniformity of application and construction.
In applying and construing this part 5, consideration must be given to the need to promote uniformity of the law with respect to its subject matter among states that enact it.
Source: L. 2017: Entire part added, (SB 17-132), ch. 207, p. 807, § 2, effective July 1, 2018.
24-21-538. Relation to "Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act".
This part 5 modifies, limits, and supersedes the "Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act", 15 U.S.C. sec. 7001 et seq., but does not modify, limit, or supersede section 101 (c) of that act, 15 U.S.C. sec. 7001 (c), or authorize electronic delivery of any of the notices described in section 103 (b) of that act, 15 U.S.C. sec. 7003 (b).
Source: L. 2017: Entire part added, (SB 17-132), ch. 207, p. 807, § 2, effective July 1, 2018.
24-21-539. Effective date.
This part 5 takes effect on July 1, 2018.
Source: L. 2017: Entire part added, (SB 17-132), ch. 207, p. 807, § 2, effective July 1, 2018.
24-21-540. Repeal of part.
This part 5 is repealed, effective September 1, 2032. Before its repeal, this part 5 is scheduled for review in accordance with section 24-34-104.
Source: L. 2017: Entire part added, (SB 17-132), ch. 207, p. 807, § 2, effective July 1, 2018. L. 2023: Entire section amended, (SB 23-153), ch. 212, p. 1100, § 7, effective May 17.
PART 6
BINGO AND RAFFLES LAW
Editor's note: This part 6 was added with relocations in 2017. Former C.R.S. section numbers are shown in editor's notes following those sections that were relocated. For a detailed comparison of this part 6, see the comparative tables located in the back of the index.
24-21-601. Short title.
The short title of this part 6 is the "Bingo and Raffles Law".
Source: L. 2017: Entire part added with relocations, (SB 17-232), ch. 233, p. 908, § 2, effective May 23.
Editor's note: This section is similar to former § 12-9-101 as it existed prior to 2017.
ANNOTATION
This article permits certain organizations, for example, religious and charitable, to obtain a license under specified conditions for conducting bingo games and raffles. Smaldone v. People, 173 Colo. 385, 479 P.2d 973 (1971) (decided under former law).
The fact that certain types of gambling were allowed pursuant to this article did not deny the petitioner, who was charged with gambling violations, equal protection of the law, especially where § 18-10-101 et seq., under which charges of gambling were issued against the petitioner, applied equally to all persons and made no classifications or distinctions. Smaldone v. People, 173 Colo. 385, 479 P.2d 973 (1971) (decided under former law).
24-21-602. Definitions.
As used in this part 6, unless the context otherwise requires:
(1) "Bingo" means:
(a) A strip bingo game; or
(b) A game of chance played, with or without the aid of an electronic device, for prizes using cards or sheets containing five rows of five squares bearing numbers, except for the center square, which is a free space. Traditional bingo also requires that the letters "B I N G O" appear in order over each column. The holder of a card or sheet matches the numbers on such card or sheet to numbers randomly drawn. The game is won when a previously designated arrangement of numbers on such card or sheet is covered.
(2) "Bingo aid computer system" means a computer system that interfaces with and controls the use of electronic devices used as aids in the game of bingo.
(3) "Bingo-raffle licensee" means any qualified organization to which a bingo-raffle license has been issued by the licensing authority.
(4) "Bingo-raffle manufacturer" means a person, other than a bingo-raffle licensee, who makes, assembles, produces, or otherwise prepares pull tabs, bingo cards or sheets, electronic devices used as aids in the game of bingo, or other equipment or parts thereof for games of chance. "Bingo-raffle manufacturer" does not include a person who prints raffle tickets, other than pull tabs, for and at the request of a bingo-raffle licensee.
(5) "Bingo-raffle supplier" means a person, other than a bingo-raffle licensee, who sells, distributes, or otherwise furnishes pull tabs, bingo cards or sheets, electronic devices used as aids in the game of bingo, or other games of chance equipment. "Bingo-raffle supplier" does not include a person who prints raffle tickets, other than pull tabs, for and at the request of a bingo-raffle licensee.
(5.5) Repealed.
(6) "Board" means the Colorado charitable gaming board created in section 24-21-630.
(7) "Card" means either a disposable and nonreusable paper bingo card identified by color, serial number, and card number, or a reusable bingo card intended for repeated use, including but not limited to a hard card or shutter card. "Card" does not include an electronic representation or electronic image of a bingo card.
(8) "Charitable gaming" means bingo, pull tab games, and raffles.
(9) "Charitable organization" means any organization, not for pecuniary profit, that is operated for the relief of poverty, distress, or other condition of public concern within this state and that has been so engaged for five years prior to making application for a license under this part 6.
(10) "Chartered branch or lodge or chapter of a national or state organization" means any such branch or lodge or chapter that is a civic or service organization, not for pecuniary profit, and authorized by its written constitution, charter, articles of incorporation, or bylaws to engage in a fraternal, civic, or service purpose within this state and that has been so engaged for five years prior to making application for a license under this part 6.
(11) "Commercial bingo facility" means premises rented by a bingo-raffle licensee for the purpose of conducting games of chance.
(12) "Commercial landlord" means any person renting or offering to rent a commercial bingo facility to any bingo-raffle licensee.
(13) "Deal" means each separate package or series of packages of pull tabs with the same name, form number, and serial number.
(14) "Dues-paying membership" means those members of an organization who pay regular monthly, annual, or other periodic dues or who are excused from paying such dues by the bylaws, articles of incorporation, or charter of the organization and those who contribute voluntarily to the corporation or organization to which they belong for the support of such corporation or organization.
(15) "Educational organization" means any organization within this state, not organized for pecuniary profit, whose primary purpose is educational in nature and designed to develop the capabilities of individuals by instruction and that has been in existence for five years prior to making application for a license under this part 6.
(16) "Equipment" means: With respect to bingo or lotto, the receptacle and numbered objects drawn from it, the master board upon which such objects are placed as drawn, the cards or sheets bearing numbers or other designations to be covered and the objects used to cover them, the board or signs, however operated, used to announce or display the numbers or designations as they are drawn, public address system, and all other articles essential to the operation, conduct, and playing of bingo or lotto; or, with respect to raffles, implements, devices, and machines designed, intended, or used for the conduct of raffles and the identification of the winning number or unit and the ticket or other evidence or right to participate in raffles. "Equipment" includes electronic devices used as aids in the game of bingo.
(17) "Exempt organization" means an organization:
(a) That is exempt from taxation under section 501 (c)(3) of the federal "Internal Revenue Code of 1954", as amended;
(b) Of the type commonly known as a community chest, which organizes and carries out intensive, limited-time, and community-wide fund drive campaigns by volunteer workers soliciting charitable contributions from a broad base of citizens and businesses in the community with the objective of providing financial support to other organizations that are exempt from taxation under section 501 (c)(3) of the federal "Internal Revenue Code of 1954", as amended, and that provides charitable, educational, civic, health, or human services within the same community and that has the further objective of minimizing the necessity for multiple, overlapping, and competing fund drives by such recipient organizations to enable them to deliver such services;
(c) That assists in acquiring noncash prizes donated by participating private businesses or government agencies as an ancillary means of creating interest in a charitable fund-raising drive held by such business or agency;
(d) That collects voluntary contributions and distributes more than eighty percent of such contributions to other organizations that are exempt from taxation under section 501 (c)(3) of the federal "Internal Revenue Code of 1954", as amended, and that provide charitable, educational, civic, health, or human services;
(e) On behalf of whose fund-raising drives drawings are held by participating private businesses or government agencies, which drawings are open only to the employees of such businesses or agencies and are not open to the general public;
(f) Whose fund-raising drives are jointly planned and managed by the participating private businesses and government agencies; and
(g) Whose fund-raising drives include only the awarding of noncash prizes by the participating private businesses or government agencies.
(18) "Fraternal organization" means any organization within this state, including college and high school fraternities, not for pecuniary profit, that is a branch, lodge, or chapter of a national or state organization and exists for the common business, brotherhood, or other interests of its members and that has so existed for five years prior to making application for a license under this part 6. "Fraternal organization" also includes a graduate or alumni division or branch of a college fraternity, which division or branch holds a charter issued by the state of Colorado and that meets all other criteria set forth in this subsection (18). As used in this subsection (18), "fraternity" includes a sorority.
(19) "Game of chance" means that specific kind of game of chance commonly known as bingo or lotto in which prizes are awarded on the basis of designated numbers or symbols on a card conforming to numbers or symbols selected at random and that specific kind of game of chance commonly known as raffles that is conducted by drawing for prizes or the allotment of prizes by chance, by the selling of shares or tickets or rights to participate in such a game.
(20) "Gross receipts" means receipts from the sale of shares, tickets, or rights in any manner connected with participation in a game of chance or the right to participate therein, including any admission fee or charge, the sale of equipment or supplies, the sale or lease of electronic devices used as aids in the game of bingo, and all other miscellaneous receipts.
(21) "Labor organization" means any organization, not for pecuniary profit, within this state that exists for the purpose, in whole or in part, of dealing with employers concerning grievances, labor disputes, wages, rates of pay, hours of employment, or conditions of work and that has existed for such purpose and has been so engaged for five years prior to making application for a license under this part 6.
(22) "Landlord licensee" means the holder of a current, valid commercial landlord license.
(23) "Lawful purposes" means the lawful purposes of organizations permitted to conduct games of chance, as provided in section 2 of article XVIII of the state constitution.
(24) "Lawful use" means the devotion of the entire net proceeds of a game of chance exclusively to lawful purposes.
(25) "License" means any license or certification issued by the licensing authority pursuant to this part 6, including, without limitation, the certification of a games manager pursuant to section 24-21-610.
(26) "Licensed agent" means an individual who holds a current, valid agent's license for a bingo-raffle manufacturer or supplier.
(27) "Licensee" means the holder of any license or certification issued by the licensing authority pursuant to this part 6. "Licensee" includes the former holder of such license or certification for purposes of investigation of activities that took place during the period in which such license or certification was effective.
(28) "Licensing authority" means the secretary of state or his or her duly authorized deputy.
(29) "Manufacturer's agent" means an individual who represents a manufacturer in any of its activities in connection with the presales, driver sales, or distribution with excess stock of pull tabs, bingo cards or sheets, electronic devices used as aids in the game of bingo, or other games of chance equipment; except employees of commercial delivery services.
(30) "Manufacturer licensee" means the holder of a current, valid Colorado manufacturer license.
(31) "Member" means an individual who has qualified for membership in a qualified organization pursuant to its bylaws, articles of incorporation, charter, rules, or other written statement.
(32) "Net proceeds" means the receipts less such expenses, charges, fees, and deductions as are specifically authorized under this part 6.
(33) "Occasion" means a single gathering or session at which a series of successive bingo games is played.
(34) "Person" means a natural person, firm, association, corporation, or other legal entity.
(35) "Premises" means any room, hall, enclosure, or outdoor area used for the purpose of playing a game of chance.
(36) "Pull tab game" means a type of game of chance commonly known as a pickle, break-open, jar raffle, last sale ticket, or seal card for which tickets are preprinted with markings distinguishing winners and nonwinners, each ticket so made that its markings and winning or nonwinning status cannot be known or revealed until the ticket is broken or torn apart.
(37) (a) "Qualified organization" means any bona fide chartered branch, lodge, or chapter of a national or state organization or any bona fide religious, charitable, labor, fraternal, educational, voluntary firefighters', or veterans' organization operating without profit to its members that has been in existence continuously for a period of five years immediately prior to the making of an application for a license under this part 6 and that has had, during the entire five-year period, a dues-paying membership engaged in carrying out the objects of said corporation or organization.
(b) "Qualified organization" includes, without limitation:
(I) A political party; and
(II) The Colorado state fair authority.
(38) "Raffle" means a game in which a participant buys a ticket for a chance at a prize with the winner determined by a random method as determined by rules of the licensing authority, or a pull tab ticket as described in subsection (36) of this section. The term "raffle" does not include any activity that is authorized or regulated by the state lottery division pursuant to article 40 of title 44 or the "Limited Gaming Act of 1991", article 30 of title 44.
(39) "Religious organization" means any organization, church, body of communicants, or group, not for pecuniary profit, gathered in common membership for mutual support and edification in piety, worship, and religious observances or a society, not for pecuniary profit, of individuals united for religious purposes at a definite place, which organization, church, body of communicants, group, or society has been so gathered or united for five years prior to making application for a license under this part 6.
(40) "Sheet" means a leaf of paper upon which is printed one or more disposable bingo cards.
(40.5) "Strip bingo game" means a type of bingo that is played with a paper strip card of up to five connected paper bingo faces, with each bingo face containing a concealed grouping of preprinted symbols, free spaces, and numbers ranging from one to seventy-five.
(41) "Supplier's agent" means an individual who represents a bingo-raffle supplier in the course of the bingo-raffle supplier's presales, driver sales, or distribution with excess bingo-supplier stock, electronic devices used as aids in the game of bingo, or chance equipment on hand; except that the term does not include employees of commercial delivery services.
(42) "Supplier licensee" means the holder of a current, valid Colorado supplier license.
(43) "Veterans' organization" means any organization within this state or any branch, lodge, or chapter of a national or state organization within this state, not for pecuniary profit, the membership of which consists of individuals who were members of the armed services or forces of the United States, that has been in existence for five years prior to making application for a license under this part 6.
(44) "Voluntary firefighters' organization" means any organization within this state, not for pecuniary profit, established by the state or any of its political subdivisions that has been in existence for five years prior to making application for a license under this part 6.
Source: L. 2017: Entire part added with relocations, (SB 17-232), ch. 233, p. 908, § 2, effective May 23. L. 2018: (38) amended, (HB 18-1375), ch. 274, p. 1725, § 92, effective October 1. L. 2022: (1) and (13) amended and (5.5) added, (HB 22-1093), ch. 366, p. 2607, § 1, effective April 1, 2023. L. 2024: (1)(a) and (6) amended, (5.5) repealed, and (40.5) added, (HB 24-1326), ch. 420, p. 2866, § 1, effective June 5.
Editor's note: This section is similar to former § 12-9-102 as it existed prior to 2017.
ANNOTATION
Organizations that operate outside the state are excluded from obtaining licenses for games of chance. Only the branches, lodges, or chapters of such organizations within the state, if otherwise qualified, are eligible for licenses. Am. Hist. Soc. of Germans v. Meyer, 794 P.2d 1025 (Colo. App. 1989) (decided under former law).
Any reference in this article to games of chance includes raffles, except as otherwise specified, since raffles are games of chance. Am. Hist. Soc. of Germans v. Meyer, 794 P.2d 1025 (Colo. App. 1989) (decided under former law).
24-21-603. Fraud and deception prohibited.
(1) A bingo-raffle licensee, landlord licensee, supplier licensee, manufacturer licensee, or any member or agent thereof engaged in any charitable gaming activity shall not, directly or indirectly:
(a) Employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud or deceive;
(b) Intentionally make any untrue or misleading statement of fact; or
(c) Engage in any act, practice, or course of conduct constituting fraud or deceit.
Source: L. 2017: Entire part added with relocations, (SB 17-232), ch. 233, p. 913, § 2, effective May 23.
Editor's note: This section is similar to former § 12-9-102.3 as it existed prior to 2017.
24-21-604. Legislative declaration - consideration for tickets - conditions - rules.
(1) The general assembly hereby finds and declares that prize promotions involving the conduct of free product giveaways through the use of free chances for purposes of commercial advertisement, the creation of goodwill, the promotion of new products or services, or the collection of names should not be subject to regulation under this part 6. The giveaways described in this subsection (1) are exempt from regulation under this part 6 when all of the conditions set forth in this section are satisfied.
(2) No award of prizes by chance for a purpose set forth in subsection (1) of this section is a lottery or game of chance, nor is any share, ticket, or right to participate in an award of prizes deemed to have been sold or charged for, notwithstanding that the award is made to persons who have paid a fee entitling them to general admission to the grounds or premises on which the award is made, if each share or ticket by means of which the award is made is given away free of charge and without any obligation on the part of the person receiving it.
(3) (a) (I) A licensee may conduct a prize promotion on the licensed premises, whether the premises are rented or owned by the licensee. A licensee shall clearly disclose, in the rental agreement or otherwise, the promotion and its cost, if any, to the licensee, pursuant to rules adopted by the licensing authority.
(II) A landlord licensee shall not require a bingo-raffle licensee to participate in or conduct a promotion under this section, nor may a games manager for any occasion assist in any promotion conducted during an occasion by a landlord licensee. Prizes offered as part of a promotion are not prizes subject to limitation under section 24-21-617 (5).
(b) Before conducting a promotion under this section, the licensee shall provide evidence of ownership, free and clear, of the prizes to be offered unless all of the prizes are available for viewing on the premises on the day they are to be awarded. The licensee offering any promotional prize shall disclose, at the beginning of the promotion, full and complete information identifying the prizes to be awarded and the method by which the prizes may be won.
(c) Within ten days after the award of any prize, the licensee shall file with the licensing authority a written report containing a description of the prize, the value of the prize, and such other information as the licensing authority may require by rule. Any prize offered pursuant to this section must be awarded by the end of the calendar quarter in which it was offered.
(d) The licensing authority may establish by rule the maximum amount or value of a cash prize or a prize of a product or service that may be awarded; except that such maximum amount must be at least one thousand dollars.
(4) Repealed.
Source: L. 2017: Entire part added with relocations, (SB 17-232), ch. 233, p. 913, § 2, effective May 23. L. 2024: (4) repealed, (HB 24-1326), ch. 420, p. 2867, § 2, effective June 5.
Editor's note: This section is similar to former § 12-9-102.5 as it existed prior to 2017.
24-21-605. Licensing and enforcement authority - powers - rules - duties - license suspension or revocation proceedings - definitions.
(1) The secretary of state is hereby designated as the "licensing authority" of this part 6. As licensing authority, the secretary of state's powers and duties are as follows:
(a) (I) To grant or refuse to grant bingo-raffle licenses under this part 6 and to grant or refuse to grant licenses to landlords, manufacturers, manufacturers' agents, suppliers, and suppliers' agents. If any such license application has not been approved or disapproved within forty-five days after the licensing authority has received all information that constitutes a complete application, the license shall be deemed to be approved. The licensing authority shall notify the applicant upon receipt of all information that the licensing authority deems a complete application. Such notification shall be the start of the forty-five-day period in which the licensing authority shall affirmatively act upon the application. The licensing authority's failure to act upon an application within forty-five days after receipt shall not preclude the licensing authority from later filing a complaint challenging the application on the ground that it is in conflict with the Colorado constitution or this part 6. All such licenses and applications for such licenses shall be made available for inspection by the public. In addition, the licensing authority has the power and the responsibility, after investigation and hearing before an administrative law judge, to suspend or revoke any license issued by the licensing authority, in accordance with any order of such administrative law judge. When a license is ordered suspended or revoked, the licensee shall surrender the license to the licensing authority on or before the effective date of the suspension or revocation. No license is valid beyond the effective date of the suspension or revocation, whether surrendered or not. Any bingo-raffle license may be temporarily suspended for a period not to exceed ten days pending any prosecution, investigation, or public hearing.
(II) The licensing authority may impose a reasonable fine for any violation of this part 6 or any rule adopted pursuant to this part 6, not to exceed two hundred fifty dollars per citation. The imposition of any such fine may be appealed to an administrative law judge.
(III) An applicant may request administrative review of a refusal by the licensing authority to grant or renew a license in accordance with subsection (3) of this section. To be entitled to administrative review, the applicant must request the review in writing within sixty days after the date of the licensing authority's refusal.
(IV) If a licensee or bingo-raffle affiliate fails within forty-five days after a written request by the licensing authority to voluntarily produce records at the office of the licensing authority, or if a licensee fails to file a report within the time required by this part 6, or if such report is not properly verified or is not fully, accurately, and truthfully completed on its face, the licensing authority may refuse to renew the licensee's license until the licensee has corrected such failure or deficiency. If the licensing authority refuses to renew a license pursuant to this subsection (1)(a)(IV), the licensee shall not engage in activity authorized by such license until such license is renewed.
(b) To supervise the administration and enforcement of this part 6 and to adopt, amend, and repeal rules governing the holding, operating, and conducting of games of chance, the purchase of equipment, the establishment of a schedule of reasonable fines, not to exceed two hundred fifty dollars per citation, for violation by licensees of this part 6 or of rules adopted pursuant to this part 6, to the end that games of chance shall be held, operated, and conducted only by licensees for the purposes and in conformity with the state constitution and the provisions of this part 6;
(c) To provide forms for and supervise the filing of any reports made by mail, computer, electronic mail, or any other electronic device by any licensee. As soon as possible after July 1, 2006, the licensing authority shall ensure that delivery of a document subject to this part 6 by an applicant or a licensee may be accomplished electronically without the necessity for presentation of a physical original document, report, or image, if all required information is included and is readily retrievable from the data transmitted. The licensing authority may, by rule, require certain organizations to file reports and other documents electronically. All electronically filed documents shall be stored by the licensing authority in an electronic or other medium and shall be retrievable by the licensing authority in an understandable and readable form. Notwithstanding any other provision of law requiring the signature of, or execution by, a person on a document, no such signature shall be required when the document is submitted electronically. Causing a document to be delivered to the licensing authority by an applicant or a licensee shall constitute the affirmation or acknowledgment of the individual causing the delivery, under penalty of perjury, that the document is the individual's act and deed or the act and deed of the organization or entity on whose behalf the document was delivered and that the facts stated in the document are true.
(d) Upon application by any licensee, to issue a letter ruling granting approval for any new concept, method, technology, practice, or procedure that may be applied to, or used in the conduct of, games of chance that are not in conflict with the constitution or this part 6. Application for such approval shall be submitted in a form prescribed by the licensing authority. If an application is not acted upon within forty-five days after receipt by the licensing authority, the licensee may implement such concept, method, technology, practice, or procedure so long as it is not in conflict with the constitution or this part 6; except that the licensing authority's failure to act upon an application within forty-five days after receipt shall not preclude the licensing authority from later filing a complaint challenging such concept, method, technology, practice, or procedure on the ground that it is in conflict with the constitution or this part 6. An adverse ruling on such application may be appealed to an administrative law judge.
(e) To keep records of all actions and transactions relating to licensing and enforcement activity;
(f) To prepare and transmit annually, in the form and manner prescribed by the heads of the principal departments pursuant to section 24-1-136, a report accounting to the governor for the efficient discharge of all responsibilities assigned by law or directive to the authority, and to issue publications of the authority intended for circulation in quantity outside the executive branch in accordance with section 24-1-136;
(g) To license devices for reading pull tabs as provided in section 24-21-619; except that the licensing authority shall not impose or collect any fee for the issuance of such a license.
(2) For the purpose of any investigation or examination of records, the licensing authority or any officer designated by the licensing authority may require, at the office of the licensing authority, the production of any books, papers, correspondence, memoranda, agreements, or other documents or records that the licensing authority deems relevant or material to the inquiry. In case of refusal to obey a request for the production of documents issued to any licensee or an affiliate of a licensee, the district court of the city and county of Denver, upon application by the licensing authority, may issue an order requiring that person to appear before the licensing authority or the officer designated by the licensing authority to produce documents or to give evidence touching upon the matter under investigation or in question. Failure to obey the order of the court may be punished by the court as a contempt of court.
(3) The licensing authority may revoke, suspend, annul, limit, modify, or refuse to grant or renew a license in accordance with section 24-4-104. Hearings that are held to administratively review the licensing authority's decision to refuse to grant or renew a license or to determine whether a licensee's license should be revoked, suspended, annulled, limited, or modified shall be conducted by an administrative law judge appointed pursuant to part 10 of article 30 of this title 24 and shall be held in the manner and pursuant to the rules and procedures described in sections 24-4-104, 24-4-105, and 24-4-106. An administrative law judge shall hold and conclude hearings in accordance with the rules, with reasonable dispatch and without unnecessary delay, and shall issue a decision within ten days after the hearing.
(4) (a) Upon a finding by an administrative law judge of a violation of this part 6, the rules adopted pursuant to this part 6, or any other provision of law, such as would warrant the revocation, suspension, annulment, limitation, or modification of a license, in addition to any other penalties that may be imposed, the licensing authority may declare the violator ineligible to conduct a game of bingo and to apply for a license pursuant to this part 6 for a period not exceeding one year after the date of the declaration or a shorter period designated by the licensing authority pursuant to this subsection (4). The licensing authority shall designate a shorter period of license ineligibility only in the absence of aggravating factors associated with the violation for which the revocation was imposed. Aggravating factors include willfulness, intent, a previous intentional violation of this part 6, and violations involving theft or fraud. The declaration of ineligibility may be extended to include, in addition to the violator, any of its subsidiary organizations, its parent organization, or otherwise, affiliated with the violator when, in the opinion of the licensing authority, the circumstances of the violation warrant such action.
(b) The decision of the administrative law judge in any controversy concerning licensing, the imposition of a fine, or the approval of any proposed new concept, method, technology, practice, or procedure is final and subject to review by the court of appeals, pursuant to section 24-4-106 (11).
(5) Upon an administrative or judicial finding of a violation of this part 6, the rules adopted pursuant to this part 6, or any other provision of law, such as would warrant the suspension or revocation of a license, the licensing authority, in addition to any other penalties that may be imposed, may issue an order excluding the violator or any owner, officer, director, or games manager of the violator from the licensed premises during the conduct of games of chance.
Source: L. 2017: Entire part added with relocations, (SB 17-232), ch. 233, p. 914, § 2, effective May 23. L. 2024: (1)(a)(II) and (1)(b) amended, (HB 24-1326), ch. 420, p. 2867, § 3, effective June 5.
Editor's note: This section is similar to former § 12-9-103 as it existed prior to 2017.
ANNOTATION
Under circumstances in which the secretary of state stopped the operation of a raffles game, former subsection (2)(a) required that a hearing be held within 10 days after the notice of suspension. Because the hearing was not held within this period, the secretary of state lost jurisdiction to proceed with the suspension hearing and to suspend the licensee's license. Am. Hist. Soc. of Germans v. Meyer, 794 P.2d 1025 (Colo. App. 1989) (decided under former law).
24-21-606. Fees - department of state cash fund.
(1) All fees collected by the licensing authority pursuant to this part 6 shall be transmitted to the state treasurer, who shall credit them to the department of state cash fund created in section 24-21-104 (3)(b), also referred to in this section as the "fund". The money in the fund is subject to annual appropriation by the general assembly for the purposes of financing the licensing and enforcement activities of the secretary of state as specified in this part 6.
(2) (a) Fees authorized by this part 6 shall be established by the licensing authority, in consultation with the board, in amounts sufficient to ensure that the total revenue generated by the collection of such fees approximates the direct and indirect costs incurred by the licensing authority in carrying out its duties under this part 6. The amounts of all fees shall be reviewed annually. The licensing authority shall furnish to the board both an annual and a quarterly accounting of all fee and fine revenues received and expenditures made pursuant to this part 6, together with a list of all fees in effect.
(b) The cost of implementing the electronic application and report filing system required by section 24-21-605 (1)(c), including the cost of promulgating any new or amended rules for use of the system, shall be recovered through a temporary fee increase or surcharge assessed on licensees during the first five years of operation of the system. The licensing authority shall establish the temporary fee or surcharge on a sliding or graduated scale, based on the quarterly gross receipts of each licensee that is required to file quarterly reports or pay fees under section 24-21-621 (4) or 24-21-622 (6)(b), and in an amount sufficient to recover all of such costs within the five-year period.
(3) All fines assessed pursuant to this part 6 shall be paid to the state treasurer who shall credit the same to the general fund of the state.
Source: L. 2017: Entire part added with relocations, (SB 17-232), ch. 233, p. 918, § 2, effective May 23.
Editor's note: This section is similar to former § 12-9-103.5 as it existed prior to 2017.
24-21-607. Bingo-raffle license - fee.
(1) A bona fide chartered branch, lodge, or chapter of a national or state organization or any bona fide religious, charitable, labor, fraternal, educational, voluntary firefighters', or veterans' organization or any association, successor, or combination of association and successor of any of these organizations that operates without profit to its members, has been in existence continuously for a period of five years immediately prior to the making of application for a bingo-raffle license under this part 6, and has had during the entire five-year period dues-paying members engaged in carrying out the objects of the corporation or organization is eligible for a bingo-raffle license to be issued by the licensing authority under this part 6. If a license is revoked, the bingo-raffle licensee and holder thereof is not eligible to apply for another license under subsection (2) of this section for no more than one year after the date of the revocation.
(2) The bingo-raffle licenses provided by this part 6 shall be issued by the licensing authority to applicants qualified under this part 6 upon payment of a fee established in accordance with section 24-21-606 (2). Licenses expire at the end of the calendar year in which they were issued by the licensing authority and may be renewed by the licensing authority upon the filing of an application for renewal thereof provided by the licensing authority and the payment of the fee established for the renewal. No license granted under this part 6 or any renewal thereof is transferable. The fees required to be paid for a new or renewal license shall be deposited in the department of state cash fund created in section 24-21-104 (3)(b).
Source: L. 2017: Entire part added with relocations, (SB 17-232), ch. 233, p. 918, § 2, effective May 23.
Editor's note: This section is similar to former § 12-9-104 as it existed prior to 2017.
ANNOTATION
Licensees, if otherwise qualified, are entitled to only one license each and are limited to one location for each license. All licensees, except exempt umbrella charitable organizations, must hold their games of chance at one location. Am. Hist. Soc. of Germans v. Meyer, 794 P.2d 1025 (Colo. App. 1989) (decided under former law).
Five-year period of operation requirement not met by charitable organization that had separated from another charitable organization two years before applying for a bingo-raffle license. Applicant organization was not a "successor" because it did not completely take the place of the organization it separated from. Ginny's Kids Int'l, Inc. v. Office of the Sec'y of State, 29 P.3d 333 (Colo. App. 2000) (decided under former law).
24-21-608. Landlord licensees - stipulations.
(1) A person other than a landlord licensee shall not rent or offer to rent to any bingo-raffle licensee any premises to be used to conduct games of chance. A lease of the premises for a bingo occasion must be for a period of at least five consecutive hours unless the landlord licensee and bingo-raffle licensee agree to a shorter or longer period. The amount of rent to be charged, and the method used to calculate such rent, shall be established by agreement between the parties.
(2) No landlord licensee or any employee of a landlord licensee shall require, induce, or coerce a bingo-raffle licensee to enter into any contract, agreement, or lease contrary to this part 6.
(3) No landlord licensee or any employee of a landlord licensee shall require, induce, or coerce a bingo-raffle licensee to purchase supplies or equipment, or to purchase or lease electronic devices used as aids in the game of bingo, from a particular supplier, distributor, or manufacturer as a condition of conducting games of chance at a commercial bingo facility.
(4) Rent charged to a bingo-raffle licensee by a landlord licensee for the use of a commercial bingo facility shall cover all expenses and items reasonably necessary for the use of the commercial bingo facility for a bingo occasion including, but not limited to, insurance and maintenance for such facility, adequate and secure storage space, restrooms, janitorial services, and utilities.
(5) No activity or business other than licensed games of chance may be conducted in a commercial bingo facility within space leased to a bingo-raffle licensee during the time allocated to the bingo-raffle licensee with the exception of the sale of food, beverages, bingo-related merchandise and supplies, the operation of an automated cash service device, and such other activities and businesses as the bingo-raffle licensee may agree to. A landlord licensee may conduct other businesses and activities in space not included in the bingo-raffle licensee's rental agreement and in which games of chance are not held.
(6) A landlord licensee or any employee or agent of a landlord licensee shall not be a party responsible for or assisting with the conduct, management, or operation of any game of chance within Colorado; except that a landlord licensee that is also a bingo-raffle licensee may conduct such activities as its bingo-raffle license allows exclusively on its own behalf.
(7) Notwithstanding subsection (6) of this section, a landlord, supplier, or manufacturer licensee may instruct and train a bingo-raffle licensee in the repair, operation, and maintenance of bingo-raffle equipment, subject to specific criteria established by rule.
(8) Every landlord licensee shall file with the licensing authority all leases, agreements, and other documents required in order for a bingo-raffle licensee to lease its commercial bingo facility.
Source: L. 2017: Entire part added with relocations, (SB 17-232), ch. 233, p. 919, § 2, effective May 23.
Editor's note: This section is similar to former § 12-9-104.5 as it existed prior to 2017.
24-21-609. Application for bingo-raffle license.
(1) Each applicant for a bingo-raffle license to be issued under this section shall file with the licensing authority a written application in the form prescribed by the licensing authority, duly executed and verified, and in which shall be stated:
(a) The name and address of the applicant;
(b) Sufficient facts relating to its incorporation and organization to enable the licensing authority to determine whether or not it is a bona fide chartered branch, lodge, or chapter of a national or state organization or a bona fide religious, charitable, labor, fraternal, educational, voluntary firefighters', or veterans' organization that operates without profit to its members, has been in existence continuously for a period of five years immediately prior to the making of said application for such license, and has had during the entire five-year period dues-paying members engaged in carrying out the objectives of said applicant;
(c) The names and addresses of its officers;
(d) The specific kind of games of chance intended to be held, operated, and conducted by the applicant;
(e) (I) The place where such games of chance are intended to be held, operated, and conducted by the applicant under the license applied for; or
(II) In the case of the application of an exempt organization, the place or places where drawings are intended to be held, operated, and conducted by the organization under the license applied for;
(f) A statement that no commission, salary, compensation, reward, or recompense will be paid to any person for holding, operating, or conducting such games of chance or for assisting therein except as otherwise provided in this part 6;
(g) Such other information deemed advisable by the licensing authority to ensure that the applicant falls within the restrictions set forth by the state constitution.
(2) (a) In each application there shall be designated active members of the applicant organization under whom the games of chance described in the application are to be held, operated, and conducted, and to the application shall be appended a statement executed by the applicant and by the members so designated that they will be responsible for the holding, operation, and conduct of such games of chance in accordance with the terms of the license and this part 6.
(b) Each designated games manager must have been an active member of the applicant for at least the six months immediately preceding the member's designation as a games manager and shall be certified by the licensing authority pursuant to section 24-21-610 before assuming games management duties.
(3) In the event any premises are to be leased or rented in connection with the holding, operating, or conducting of any game of chance under this part 6, a written statement shall accompany the application signed and verified by the applicant, which must state the address of the leased or rented premises and the amount of rent that will be paid for said premises and which must certify that the premises are to be rented from a landlord licensee.
Source: L. 2017: Entire part added with relocations, (SB 17-232), ch. 233, p. 920, § 2, effective May 23. L. 2024: (2)(b) amended, (HB 24-1326), ch. 420, p. 2867, § 4, effective June 5.
Editor's note: This section is similar to former § 12-9-105 as it existed prior to 2017.
ANNOTATION
Jar raffle games may not be supervised or operated by employees of members of the nonprofit organization that is licensed to hold the jar raffle game. Am. Hist. Soc. of Germans v. Meyer, 794 P.2d 1025 (Colo. App. 1989) (decided under former law).
24-21-610. Games managers - certification.
(1) The licensing authority shall issue a games manager certification to any qualified applicant who has demonstrated sufficient knowledge of this part 6, as determined by the licensing authority, and who has paid the fee established in accordance with section 24-21-606 (2). A games manager certification shall be valid for a time period to be determined by the licensing authority by rule, and may be denied, suspended, or revoked for any violation of this part 6 or any rule or order of the licensing authority promulgated or issued pursuant to this part 6.
(2) A person is not eligible for certification or to act as a games manager in the conduct of a game of chance pursuant to this part 6 unless the person is eighteen years of age or older.
(3) A person is not eligible for certification or to act as a games manager in the conduct of any game of chance pursuant to this part 6 if the person has been convicted of any misdemeanor involving gambling or any felony.
(4) Unless authorized by the licensing authority in accordance with the rules of the licensing authority, a person shall not be designated or serve as a games manager for more than three bingo-raffle licensees simultaneously. The licensing authority may promulgate rules establishing the circumstances under which a person may be designated and serve as games manager for more than three bingo-raffle licensees.
Source: L. 2017: Entire part added with relocations, (SB 17-232), ch. 233, p. 921, § 2, effective May 23.
Editor's note: This section is similar to former § 12-9-105.1 as it existed prior to 2017.
24-21-611. Application for landlord license - fee.
(1) Each applicant for a landlord license shall file with the licensing authority a written application, duly executed and verified, in the form presented by the licensing authority, which application shall include, but not be limited to, the following information:
(a) The name and address of the landlord and, if such commercial landlord is a corporation, partnership, association, or other business entity, the names and addresses of all partners, associates, and persons holding an ownership interest of ten percent or more;
(b) The name and address of the landlord's resident agent if the commercial landlord does not reside in Colorado and the location in Colorado where its records will be available to the licensing authority;
(c) The location of the premises for which the applicant is seeking such license;
(d) A statement by the landlord or the chief executive officer of the landlord that the landlord is familiar with the provisions of this part 6 as to commercial bingo facilities and landlords thereof and accepts responsibility for compliance with such provisions;
(e) A statement by the landlord or the chief executive of the landlord that the primary purpose of the premises described in subsection (1)(c) of this section is the conduct of bingo occasions.
(2) Each application shall designate an individual who shall act as agent for the landlord and who shall receive all communications concerning the license.
(3) Each application must include an affidavit signed by the applicant stating whether the landlord has been convicted of any felony, theft by deception, or gambling-related offense as defined in article 10 of title 18 within the previous ten years. If the landlord is a corporation, limited liability company, or partnership, the affidavit must make the verification as to each officer and director of the corporation, each member and manager of the limited liability company, or each partner and associate of the partnership. A person that has been convicted of any felony, theft by deception, or gambling-related offense as defined in article 10 of title 18 within the previous ten years is ineligible for a license issued pursuant to this section. A person that has been convicted of any felony, theft by deception, or gambling-related offense as defined in article 10 of title 18 within more than the previous ten years shall disclose the information related to the conviction required by the licensing authority.
(4) A landlord license expires at the end of the calendar year in which it was issued. Each license issued shall be conspicuously displayed at the premises for which the license has been issued. No landlord license is transferable. The annual fee for each landlord license shall be established in accordance with section 24-21-606 (2).
Source: L. 2017: Entire part added with relocations, (SB 17-232), ch. 233, p. 921, § 2, effective May 23.
Editor's note: This section is similar to former § 12-9-105.3 as it existed prior to 2017.
24-21-612. Application for manufacturer license.
(1) Each application for a manufacturer license must include, but not be limited to, the following information:
(a) The name and address of the applicant;
(b) The name and address of the manufacturer and, if the manufacturer is a corporation, the name and address of each officer, director, and shareholder holding an ownership interest of ten percent or more;
(c) A description of the equipment manufactured in connection with games of chance activities in Colorado;
(d) The name and address of the resident agent of the manufacturer if the applicant does not reside in Colorado and the location in Colorado where the records of the manufacturer will be available to the licensing authority;
(e) The names and addresses of the Colorado suppliers and agents of the manufacturer; and
(f) A statement by the manufacturer or the chief executive officer of the manufacturer that such manufacturer is familiar with the provisions of this part 6 as to bingo-raffle manufacturers and accepts responsibility for compliance with such provisions.
(2) Each application for a manufacturer license must include a statement regarding whether the applicant; its owners; its officers or directors if a corporation; or its members, managers, partners, or associates if another business entity, has been convicted of any felony, theft by deception, or gambling-related offense as defined in article 10 of title 18. A person that has been convicted of any felony, theft by deception, or gambling-related offense as defined in article 10 of title 18 within the previous ten years is ineligible for a license issued pursuant to this section. A person that has been convicted of any felony, theft by deception, or gambling-related offense as defined in article 10 of title 18 within more than the previous ten years shall disclose the information related to the conviction required by the licensing authority.
(3) Any bingo-raffle manufacturer, upon filing a true, complete, written, verified application in the form presented by the licensing authority, together with the fee for the license, is eligible for a manufacturer license. A manufacturer license shall be renewed annually, on or before March 31 of each year in which such licensee engages in or anticipates engaging in a licensed activity. A manufacturer license is nontransferable. The annual fee for each license shall be established in accordance with section 24-21-606 (2).
Source: L. 2017: Entire part added with relocations, (SB 17-232), ch. 233, p. 922, § 2, effective May 23.
Editor's note: This section is similar to former § 12-9-105.5 as it existed prior to 2017.
24-21-613. Application for supplier license.
(1) Each application for a supplier license must include, but not be limited to, the following information:
(a) The name and address of the applicant;
(b) The name and address of the supplier and, if the supplier is a corporation, the name and address of each officer, director, and shareholder holding an ownership interest of ten percent or more;
(c) A description of the equipment and supplies sold or distributed in connection with games of chance activities in Colorado;
(d) The name and address of the resident agent of the supplier if the applicant does not reside in Colorado and the location in Colorado where the records of the supplier will be available to the licensing authority;
(e) The names and addresses of the Colorado manufacturers and Colorado agents of the supplier; and
(f) A statement by the supplier or the chief executive officer of the supplier that such supplier is familiar with the provisions of this part 6 as to bingo-raffle suppliers and accepts responsibility for compliance with such provisions.
(2) Each application for a supplier license must include a statement regarding whether the applicant; its owners; its officers or directors if a corporation; or its members, managers, partners, or associates if another business entity, has been convicted of any felony, theft by deception, or offense involving gambling as defined in article 10 of title 18. A person that has been convicted of any felony, theft by deception, or gambling-related offense as defined in article 10 of title 18 within the previous ten years is ineligible for a license issued pursuant to this section. A person that has been convicted of any felony, theft by deception, or gambling-related offense as defined in article 10 of title 18 within more than the previous ten years shall disclose the information related to the conviction required by the licensing authority.
(3) Any bingo-raffle supplier, upon filing a true, complete, written, verified application in the form presented by the licensing authority, together with the fee for the license, is eligible for a supplier license. A supplier license shall be renewed annually, on or before March 31 of each year in which such licensee engages in or anticipates engaging in a licensed activity. A supplier license is nontransferable. The annual fee for each license shall be established in accordance with section 24-21-606 (2).
Source: L. 2017: Entire part added with relocations, (SB 17-232), ch. 233, p. 923, § 2, effective May 23.
Editor's note: This section is similar to former § 12-9-105.7 as it existed prior to 2017.
24-21-614. Application for manufacturer's agent license or supplier's agent license.
(1) Each application for a manufacturer's agent license or supplier's agent license must include, but not be limited to, the following information:
(a) The name and address of the applicant;
(b) The name and address of the supplier or manufacturer represented by the applicant;
(c) A statement by the applicant that the applicant has read, understands, and will comply with this part 6 as to manufacturer's and supplier's agents and the conditions of the agent's license;
(d) A statement by the chief executive officer of the manufacturer or supplier represented by the agent, which statement acknowledges consent to representation by the applicant; and
(e) The location in Colorado where the agent's records of sales and distributions of bingo and raffle equipment and supplies will be available to the licensing authority.
(2) Each agent's application must include a statement regarding whether the applicant has been convicted of any felony, theft by deception, or offense involving gambling as defined in article 10 of title 18. A person that has been convicted of any felony, theft by deception, or gambling-related offense as defined in article 10 of title 18 within the previous ten years is ineligible for a license issued pursuant to this section. A person that has been convicted of any felony, theft by deception, or gambling-related offense as defined in article 10 of title 18 within more than the previous ten years shall disclose the information related to the conviction required by the licensing authority.
(3) Any supplier's agent or manufacturer's agent, upon filing a complete, written, verified application in the form presented by the licensing authority, together with the fee for the license, is eligible for a manufacturer's or supplier's agent license. A manufacturer's or supplier's agent license shall be renewed annually, on or before March 31 of each year in which such licensee engages in or anticipates engaging in a licensed activity. Neither a manufacturer's agent license nor a supplier's agent license is transferable. The annual fee for each license shall be established in accordance with section 24-21-606 (2).
Source: L. 2017: Entire part added with relocations, (SB 17-232), ch. 233, p. 924, § 2, effective May 23. L. 2024: (1)(c) amended, (HB 24-1326), ch. 420, p. 2867, § 5, effective June 5.
Editor's note: This section is similar to former § 12-9-105.9 as it existed prior to 2017.
24-21-615. Persons permitted to conduct games of chance - form of bingo-raffle licenses - display.
(1) A person, firm, or organization within this state shall not conduct a game of chance without a bingo-raffle license issued by the licensing authority. Only an active member of the organization to which the bingo-raffle license is issued may hold, operate, or conduct games of chance under a license issued under this part 6, and a person shall not assist in the holding, operating, or conducting of any games of chance under a bingo-raffle license except an active member or a member of an organization or association that is an auxiliary to the licensee, a member of an organization or association of which the licensee is an auxiliary, or a member of an organization or association that is affiliated with the licensee by being, with it, auxiliary to another organization or association. A licensee shall incur or pay only bona fide expenses in a reasonable amount for goods, wares, and merchandise furnished or services rendered that are reasonably necessary for the holding, operating, or conducting of a game of chance.
(2) Each bingo-raffle license must contain a statement of the name and address of the licensee and the place where bingo or lotto games or the drawing of the raffles is to be held. If the bingo-raffle licensee moves from the games or drawing location listed on its license, the bingo-raffle licensee must notify the licensing authority in writing prior to commencing bingo or conducting a raffle drawing at the new location. The licensing authority may issue a letter of authorization to move the location of the bingo or lotto games or the drawing of the raffles. The letter of authorization must remain with the original license and must be available for inspection at the place where games or drawings are to be held. A license issued for an exempt organization must include the place or places where drawings are to be held. Except as specified in subsection (4) of this section, each bingo-raffle license issued for the conduct of any games of chance must be conspicuously displayed at the place where the game is to be conducted or the drawings held at all times during the conduct thereof. An exempt organization may comply with this section by providing written notice of a license to all employees of a participating private business or government agency holding a fund-raising drive that includes a drawing on behalf of the organization. The notice must state that the license is available for public inspection during reasonable business hours and must specify where the license is maintained for inspection.
(3) A licensee shall conspicuously display, at the place where a game is being conducted, its license issued for the conduct of games of chance at all times during the conduct of the game and for at least thirty minutes after the last game has been concluded.
(4) Notwithstanding subsection (2) of this section, a bingo-raffle licensee conducting a pull tab game for the benefit of its members and guests on premises that are owned by it, or leased by it for purposes other than the conduct of a bingo occasion, may display a copy of its license, in a format approved by the licensing authority, on the premises during any time the licensee is also conducting a bingo or raffle occasion at a separate location.
Source: L. 2017: Entire part added with relocations, (SB 17-232), ch. 233, p. 925, § 2, effective May 23.
Editor's note: This section is similar to former § 12-9-106 as it existed prior to 2017.
24-21-616. Form of landlord license - display - fee.
(1) Each landlord license must contain a statement of the name and address of the licensee and the location of the premises. Each license issued shall be conspicuously displayed at the premises for which the license has been issued.
(2) A landlord license shall be issued to qualified applicants by the licensing authority upon payment of a fee and completion and approval of the landlord license application pursuant to section 24-21-611. The license expires at the end of the calendar year in which it was issued by the licensing authority and may be renewed upon the filing and approval of an application for renewal provided by the licensing authority and the payment of a fee. No landlord license is transferable. The fees required to be paid for new and renewed licenses shall be established in accordance with section 24-21-606 (2).
Source: L. 2017: Entire part added with relocations, (SB 17-232), ch. 233, p. 926, § 2, effective May 23.
Editor's note: This section is similar to former § 12-9-106.5 as it existed prior to 2017.
24-21-617. General conduct games of chance - premises - equipment - expenses - rules.
(1) A licensee shall not hold, operate, or conduct a game of bingo or lotto more often than as specified by the licensing authority by rule.
(2) A person or licensee shall not permit any person under eighteen years of age to purchase the opportunity to participate in any game of chance or purchase a ticket in a pull tab game.
(3) A person or licensee shall not permit any person under fourteen years of age to assist in the conduct of bingo or pull tabs.
(4) A licensee shall not offer or give an alcoholic beverage as a prize in a game of chance.
(5) The licensing authority shall establish by rule the method of play and amount of prizes that may be awarded; except that the maximum prize that may be awarded must be at least five hundred dollars.
(6) Food offered in the course of a volunteer duty shift and consumed on the premises where the game of chance is being conducted is not remuneration if the retail value of the food offered does not exceed the maximum amount per volunteer set by rule.
(7) (a) The officers of a bingo-raffle licensee shall designate one or more bona fide, active members of the licensee as its games managers to be in charge of and primarily responsible for the conduct of the games of bingo or lotto on each occasion. The games managers shall supervise all activities on the occasion for which they are in charge and are responsible for making all required reports. The games managers, governing board of the licensee, and the individual acting in the role of a treasurer on behalf of the licensee must be familiar with all applicable provisions of state law, the rules of the licensing authority, and the license. The governing board of the licensee is ultimately responsible for the maintenance of books and records and the filing of the reports pursuant to this section. At least one games manager shall be present on the premises continuously during the games and for a period sufficient to ensure that all books and records for the occasion have been closed and that all supplies and equipment have been secured.
(b) An exempt organization may designate more than one of its bona fide, active members in order to comply with this subsection (7).
(8) The officers of a bingo-raffle licensee shall designate an officer to be in full charge of and primarily responsible for the proper utilization of the entire net proceeds of any game in accordance with the state law.
(9) The premises where any game of chance is being held, operated, or conducted, or is intended to be held, operated, or conducted, or where it is intended that any equipment be used, must be kept open to inspection at all times by the licensing authority, its agents and employees, and peace officers of any political subdivision of the state.
(10) (a) In conducting a bingo or pull tab game, a bingo-raffle licensee may operate equipment if the bingo-raffle licensee:
(I) Leases the equipment from a manufacturer licensee or supplier licensee on premises that are owned, leased, or rented by the licensee, used as the licensee's principal place of business, and controlled so that admittance to the premises is limited to the licensee's members and bona fide guests;
(II) Owns the equipment; or
(III) Leases equipment that is owned or leased by a landlord licensee.
(b) Nothing in this subsection (10) prohibits a bingo-raffle licensee from leasing electronic devices used as aids in the game of bingo.
(11) A licensee shall not possess, use, sell, offer for sale, or put into play any bingo or pull tab game, ticket, card, or sheet unless it conforms to the definitions and requirements of this part 6 and was purchased by the licensee from a licensed bingo-raffle manufacturer or supplier or from a licensed agent of a bingo-raffle manufacturer or supplier. A licensee shall not possess, use, sell, offer for sale, or put into play any electronic device used as an aid in the game of bingo or any other equipment unless it conforms to the requirements of this part 6 and was purchased or leased by the licensee from a licensed bingo-raffle manufacturer or supplier or from a licensed agent of a bingo-raffle manufacturer or supplier.
(12) In order to possess, use, sell, offer for sale, or put into play any bingo or pull tab game, ticket, card, or sheet, a licensee must have at the location of the game an invoice from its licensed supplier showing at least the name, description, and serial number of the pull tab deal, card, or sheet.
(13) The licensing authority shall establish, by rule, safeguards to protect the bingo-raffle licensee's players against defaults in charitable gaming debts owed or to become payable by the bingo-raffle licensee.
(14) The net proceeds derived from the holding of games of chance must be devoted, within one year, to the lawful purposes of the organization permitted to conduct the game of chance. Any organization desiring to hold the net proceeds of games of chance for a period longer than one year must apply to the licensing authority for special permission and, upon good cause shown, the licensing authority may grant the request.
(15) The licensing authority may require a licensee that does not report, during any one-year licensing period, positive net proceeds to show cause before the licensing authority why its right to conduct games of chance should not be suspended or revoked. The licensing authority may establish by rule the conditions for suspending, revoking, or refusing to renew a license to conduct charitable gaming for failure to report positive net proceeds.
(16) A bingo-raffle licensee may, directly or through a third party, presell tickets to a charitable gaming event.
Source: L. 2017: Entire part added with relocations, (SB 17-232), ch. 233, p. 926, § 2, effective May 23. L. 2022: (2), (11), and (12) amended, (HB 22-1093), ch. 366, p. 2608, § 2, effective April 1, 2023. L. 2024: (1) amended and (16) added, (HB 24-1326), ch. 420, p. 2868, § 6, effective June 5.
Editor's note: This section is similar to former § 12-9-107 as it existed prior to 2017.
24-21-618. Conduct of bingo games.
(1) In the playing of bingo, only persons who are physically present on the premises where the game is actually conducted may participate as players in the game.
(2) (a) A person shall not act as a caller or assistant to the caller in the conduct of any game of bingo unless the person has been a member in good standing of the bingo-raffle licensee conducting the game or one of its licensed auxiliaries for at least three months immediately prior to the date of the game, is of good moral character, and never has been convicted of a misdemeanor involving gambling or any felony.
(b) An owner, co-owner, or lessee of premises or, if a corporation is the owner of the premises, any officer, director, or stockholder owning more than ten percent of the outstanding stock must not be a person responsible for or assisting in the holding, operating, or conducting of any game of bingo.
(3) (a) The equipment used in the playing of bingo and the method of play must be such that each card has an equal opportunity to win. The objects or balls to be drawn must be essentially the same as to size, shape, weight, balance, and all other characteristics that may influence their selection. All objects or balls must be present in the receptacle before each game begins. All numbers announced must be plainly and clearly audible to all the players present. Where more than one room is used for any one game, the receptacle and the caller must be present in the room where the greatest number of players are present, and all numbers announced must be plainly audible to the players in the aforesaid room and also audible to the players in the other rooms.
(b) The receptacle and the caller must be visible to all the players at all times except where more than one room is used for any one game, in which case subsection (3)(a) of this section applies.
(c) The particular arrangement of numbers required to be covered in order to win the game and the amount of the prize must be clearly and audibly described and announced to the players immediately before each game begins.
(d) An operator shall not reserve or allow to be reserved any bingo cards for use by players except braille cards or other cards for use by legally blind players. A person who is legally blind may use personal braille cards when a licensed organization does not provide such cards. A licensed organization may inspect and reject any personal braille card. A person who is legally blind or an individual with a disability may use a braille card or hard card in place of a purchased disposable paper bingo card.
(e) Any player may call for a verification of all numbers drawn at the time a winner is determined and for a verification of the objects or balls remaining in the receptacle and not yet drawn. The verification shall be made in the immediate presence of the member designated to be in charge of the occasion, but if that member is also the caller, then in the immediate presence of any officer of the licensee.
(4) When any merchandise prize is awarded in a game of bingo, its value is its current retail price. A merchandise prize is not redeemable or convertible into cash directly or indirectly.
(5) (a) Notwithstanding the limitations stated in section 24-21-617 (5), during a bingo occasion a bingo-raffle licensee may also start a single game of progressive bingo, in an amount established by rule by the licensing authority, in which the game is won when a previously designated arrangement of numbers or spaces on the card or sheet is covered within a previously designated number of objects or balls drawn. If the game is not won within the drawing of the previously designated number of objects or balls, the game must be replayed either during each subsequent occasion the licensee conducts at the same location or during each subsequent occasion that falls on the same day of the week at the same location, using the previously designated arrangement of numbers or spaces.
(b) A bingo-raffle licensee may award a consolation prize for a game of progressive bingo. The bingo-raffle licensee determines the amount of the consolation prize. Notice of the amount must be conspicuously displayed before the beginning of the bingo-raffle occasion, and the amount is included as part of the aggregate amount of all prizes offered or given in games played on a single occasion, as set forth in subsection (5)(a) of this section. If a consolation prize is offered and the progressive prize is not won, the game continues until the previously designated arrangement of numbers or spaces on the card or sheet is covered, regardless of the number of balls drawn, in order to determine the winner of the consolation prize. If a consolation prize is not offered, the progressive game ends when the last of the previously designated number of balls is drawn and must be replayed in accordance with subsection (5)(a) of this section. If a consolation prize is offered and the progressive prize is won, the licensee may opt to award the consolation prize during that occasion. If the consolation prize is awarded, the licensee must include the total amount of the consolation prize in the total amount of any subsequent games offered in the session, not to exceed the maximum allowed for the occasion.
(c) A bingo-raffle licensee may fund a secondary jackpot from ten percent of the gross proceeds collected from the sale of progressive cards or sheets at the occasion where the game is offered. Notwithstanding the limitation stated in subsection (5)(a) of this section, the amount in the secondary jackpot may be used to start a single game of progressive bingo after a previous progressive jackpot is won.
(d) The licensing authority may establish by rule the maximum jackpot that may be awarded in a progressive bingo game; except that the maximum jackpot must be at least fifteen thousand dollars.
(e) The licensing authority may establish by rule the maximum number of progressive bingo games, not less than one, that may be conducted during an occasion. In order to ensure that all prizes offered are timely awarded, the licensing authority may limit by rule the number of occasions in which a progressive bingo game may be conducted before a prize must be awarded; except that the maximum number of occasions must be at least thirty.
(6) (a) Equipment, prizes, and supplies for games of bingo must not be purchased or sold at prices in excess of the usual price thereof. A licensee shall not sell or offer for sale any game of chance, or supplies for a game of chance, that is not authorized by this part 6 or by rules adopted by the licensing authority pursuant to this part 6.
(b) Cards and sheets that are designed or intended for use with electronic devices used as aids in the game of bingo shall not be purchased or sold at prices in excess of the usual price of cards and sheets that are not designed or intended for use with electronic devices used as aids in the game of bingo. Charges imposed by any manufacturer, supplier, agent thereof, or bingo-raffle licensee for cards and sheets that are designed or intended for use with electronic devices used as aids in the game of bingo shall be stated and imposed separately from any charges imposed by the manufacturer, supplier, agent thereof, or bingo-raffle licensee for the purchase, lease, or use of electronic devices used as aids in the game of bingo. Manufacturers, suppliers, and their agents shall not include costs attributable to the manufacture or distribution of electronic devices used as aids in the game of bingo in charges imposed for the purchase or lease of equipment, including cards and sheets.
(7) (a) If a card or sheet is played with the aid of an electronic device, a winning bingo may be determined and verified either by reference to the card or sheet or by reference to the electronic device. Nothing in this part 6 authorizes the playing of bingo solely by means of an electronic device.
(b) A bingo-raffle licensee shall adequately mark, destroy, or dispose of cards or sheets played with the aid of an electronic device in order to prevent the reuse of those cards or sheets.
(c) The licensing authority may establish by rule the maximum number of bingo cards that a bingo player who plays using the aid of an electronic device is permitted to use with the aid of such a device per game; except that the maximum number must be at least one hundred.
(d) A bingo-raffle licensee is not required to use or offer the use of electronic devices used as aids in the game of bingo during a bingo session.
(8) (a) With the application for a letter ruling pursuant to section 24-21-605 (1)(d) for the approval of a new type of electronic device used in the aid of bingo, the manufacturer of the device must provide the following to the licensing authority:
(I) A prototype of the new type of electronic device used in the aid of bingo with a prototype bingo aid computer system and a user's manual used for such electronic device; and
(II) A certification by the manufacturer that the new type of electronic device used in the aid of bingo and all such electronic devices used in the state meet the following standards:
(A) The electronic device provides a means for the input of numbers announced by a bingo caller;
(B) The electronic device compares the numbers entered to the numbers contained on bingo cards previously stored in the electronic database of the electronic device;
(C) The electronic device identifies winning bingo patterns; and
(D) The electronic device signals when a winning bingo pattern is achieved.
(b) The licensing authority shall return the prototype electronic device used in the aid of bingo, the prototype bingo aid computer system, and the user's manual submitted pursuant to subsection (8)(a)(I) of this section no later than forty-five days after receiving the items.
(c) When a complaint regarding an electronic device used in the aid of bingo that is in use in the state of Colorado has been filed with the licensing authority, the manufacturer of the device shall provide to the licensing authority a sample of the device and bingo aid computer system to assist the investigation by the licensing authority. The licensing authority shall return the electronic device and bingo aid computer system no later than forty-five days after receiving them unless they are needed longer to complete the investigation.
(d) Any electronic device used in the aid of bingo, bingo aid computer system, or user's manual for such a device that is in the custody of the licensing authority pursuant to this section is not a public record.
(9) A bingo aid computer system used by a bingo-raffle licensee for bingo sessions must meet the following standards:
(a) The system must contain a record of all transactions occurring during a bingo-raffle session. The record must be retained in memory until the transactions have been totaled, printed, and cleared by the bingo-raffle licensee, regardless of whether the power supply has been interrupted.
(b) The system must be able to compute and total all transactions processed by the system during a bingo-raffle session and to print all information required by the licensing authority, in the form prescribed by the licensing authority.
(c) The system must maintain and control the time, date of sale, and transaction number, keeping the information secure enough that only a manufacturer's qualified personnel can change or reset the information. The manufacturer's qualified personnel shall retain a detailed record for each service call that involves a change of the time, date of sale, or transaction number.
(10) If an electronic device used as an aid in the game of bingo complies with subsections (8)(a)(II)(A) to (8)(a)(II)(D) of this section, and if the bingo aid computer system for the electronic device substantially complies with the requirements of subsection (9) of this section, the licensing authority shall approve the electronic device and computer system for use by a letter ruling pursuant to section 24-21-605 (1)(d).
(11) In the conduct of any strip bingo game or any occasion that includes a strip bingo game:
(a) A bingo-raffle licensee may use any style of strip bingo game authorized by this part 6 or by the rules adopted pursuant to this part 6;
(b) The maximum prize for a strip bingo game must not exceed one thousand dollars;
(c) Both strip bingo games and traditional bingo games may be played during the same occasion; and
(d) The total amount of prizes awarded for all bingo games at a single occasion must not exceed fifteen thousand dollars.
Source: L. 2017: Entire part added with relocations, (SB 17-232), ch. 233, p. 928, § 2, effective May 23. L. 2022: (7)(c) amended, (HB 22-1093), ch. 366, p. 2608, § 3, effective April 1, 2023. L. 2024: (3)(d) amended and (11) added, (HB 24-1326), ch. 420, p. 2868, § 7, effective June 5.
Editor's note: This section is similar to former § 12-9-107.1 as it existed prior to 2017.
24-21-619. Conduct of pull tabs - license revocation - rules - definitions.
(1) A licensee shall not sell, offer for sale, or put into play any pull tab ticket except at the location of and during its licensed bingo occasions or upon premises that are:
(a) Owned, leased, or rented by the bingo-raffle licensee, used as its principal place of business, and controlled so that admittance to the premises is limited to the bingo-raffle licensee's members and bona fide guests; or
(b) Owned, leased, or rented by a landlord licensee.
(2) A bingo-raffle licensee may offer a prize to the purchaser of a last sale ticket in a pull tab game, deal, or series without regard to its winning or nonwinning status as revealed if broken or torn apart.
(3) A bingo-raffle licensee may offer one or more event pull tab series. For the purposes of this subsection (3):
(a) "Event pull tab series" means a pull tab series that includes a predetermined number of paper pull tabs that allow a player to advance to an event round.
(b) "Event round" means a secondary element of chance where the prizes are determined based on pull tabs that match specific winning numbers drawn in a bingo game and the winning numbers shall fall within numbers one to seventy-five, inclusive.
(4) (a) A bingo-raffle licensee may offer a progressive pull tab game in which a prize may be carried over and increased from one deal to another until a prize is awarded. The game may include a subsequent pull tab deal bearing a different serial number from that offered in a previous deal. A licensee shall not offer or give a prize greater, in amount or value, than five thousand dollars in any progressive pull tab game. The licensing authority may limit by rule the types of progressive pull tab games allowed to be sold by supplier licensees.
(b) When a deal of progressive pull tabs is received in two or more packages, boxes, or other containers, all of the progressive pull tabs from the respective packages, boxes, or other containers must be placed out for play at the same time.
(5) (a) A licensee shall not possess, use, sell, offer for sale, or put into play any computerized or electromechanical facsimile of a pull tab game.
(b) A licensee shall not possess, use, sell, offer for sale, or put into play any device that reveals the winning or nonwinning status of a pull tab ticket unless the device has been tested, approved, and licensed pursuant to subsection (6) of this section and not subsequently altered or tampered with.
(c) Any of the following persons that are found to have violated subsection (5)(a) of this section are subject to immediate and permanent revocation of all licenses issued under this part 6:
(I) The manufacturer of the device;
(II) The supplier through which the device was supplied;
(III) The landlord licensee on whose premises the device was found; and
(IV) The bingo-raffle licensee of the occasion during which the device was present.
(6) (a) The licensing authority shall test, inspect, and license every mechanical, electronic, or electromechanical device that reveals the winning or nonwinning status of a pull tab ticket before the device is used in charitable gaming. The licensing authority shall employ an independent contractor to conduct the tests and inspections, the cost of which shall be borne by the manufacturer or supplier seeking approval of the device. The licensing authority shall not issue a license for a device until the device is secured in a manner prescribed by the licensing authority and the contractor receives payment in full for the cost of all tests and inspections.
(b) Every person shipping or importing into Colorado a device subject to subsection (6)(a) of this section shall provide the licensing authority with a copy of the shipping invoice at the time of shipment. The invoice must contain, at a minimum, the destination of the shipment and the serial number and description of each device being transported.
(c) Every person receiving a device subject to subsection (6)(a) of this section shall, upon receipt of the device, provide the licensing authority with the serial number and description of each device received and information describing the location of each device. The requirements of this subsection (6)(c) apply regardless of whether the device is received from a licensed supplier or from any other source.
(d) A device licensed pursuant to this subsection (6) is licensed for and may only be used in one specific licensed location identified by the licensing authority. Any movement of the device from the licensed location for use at another licensed location shall be reported to and must be approved by the licensing authority in advance.
(e) The licensing authority may adopt rules and prescribe all necessary forms in furtherance of this subsection (6).
(f) Notwithstanding any other provision of this part 6, the licensing authority shall not license:
(I) A pull tab game that is stored, electronically or otherwise, within a device and designed to be played on such device; or
(II) Any device that qualifies as a slot machine pursuant to section 9 (4)(c) of article XVIII of the Colorado constitution.
(g) The prohibition contained in subsection (6)(f) of this section does not prohibit the licensing of:
(I) A device that merely dispenses pull tab tickets to players; or
(II) A device that merely reads or validates a pull tab ticket inserted by a player, if:
(A) The pull tab ticket itself displays its winning or nonwinning status so that use of the device is not required to determine such status; and
(B) The device cannot be used in a manner that would qualify it as a slot machine pursuant to section 9 (4)(c) of article XVIII of the Colorado constitution.
Source: L. 2017: Entire part added with relocations, (SB 17-232), ch. 233, p. 932, § 2, effective May 23. L. 2022: IP(3) and (3)(a) amended, (HB 22-1093), ch. 366, p. 2608, § 4, effective April 1, 2023.
Editor's note: This section is similar to former § 12-9-107.2 as it existed prior to 2017.
ANNOTATION
Jar raffle games may not be supervised or operated by employees of members of the non-profit organization that is licensed to hold the jar raffle game. Am. Hist. Soc. of Germans v. Meyer, 794 P.2d 1025 (Colo. App. 1989) (decided under former law).
24-21-620. Conduct of raffles - rules.
(1) The licensing authority shall not require an exempt organization to use raffle tickets in any particular form or displaying any particular information that would cause undue expense to the exempt organization and therefore interfere with the charitable fund-raising drive of the organization.
(2) (a) A bingo-raffle licensee may offer a progressive raffle in which a jackpot may be carried over and increased from one drawing to another until the jackpot is awarded. If the jackpot is not awarded at a drawing, the bingo-raffle licensee shall conduct a new drawing at the same location at a time and date determined by the bingo-raffle licensee.
(b) A bingo-raffle licensee may award a consolation prize for a progressive raffle. The bingo-raffle licensee may designate the consolation prize as either a specified amount or a specified percentage of the gross proceeds collected from the sale of raffle tickets for a particular drawing. The bingo-raffle licensee may determine the amount of the jackpot based on the gross proceeds collected from the sale of raffle tickets for a particular drawing plus the value of the jackpot carried over from previous drawings in which the jackpot was not awarded. If a consolation prize is offered and the progressive prize is won, the licensee may opt to award the consolation prize for that particular drawing.
(c) If the bingo-raffle licensee offers a consolation prize, the bingo-raffle licensee shall, before the drawing:
(I) Designate the specific amount or specific percentage of the gross proceeds collected from the sale of raffle tickets that the consolation prize equals; and
(II) Conspicuously display the amount or percentage of the gross proceeds collected that the consolation prize equals.
(d) The licensing authority may establish by rule the maximum jackpot that a bingo-raffle licensee may award for a progressive raffle; except that, notwithstanding section 24-21-617 (5), the maximum jackpot must be at least fifteen thousand dollars. The maximum jackpot does not include the aggregate amount of consolation prizes awarded.
(e) The licensing authority may establish by rule the maximum number of progressive raffles that a bingo-raffle licensee may conduct simultaneously. To ensure that all prizes offered are timely awarded, the licensing authority may limit by rule the number of drawings that a bingo-raffle licensee may conduct before a jackpot must be awarded; except that the maximum number of drawings must be at least thirty.
(f) (I) The licensing authority may establish by rule the permitted methods of conducting a progressive raffle.
(II) The licensing authority may not prohibit those methods of conducting a progressive raffle in which the participant whose ticket number is drawn wins both a prize for the winning ticket number and a chance to win the jackpot.
Source: L. 2017: Entire part added with relocations, (SB 17-232), ch. 233, p. 934, § 2, effective May 23.
Editor's note: This section is similar to former § 12-9-107.3 as it existed prior to 2017.
24-21-621. Persons permitted to manufacture and distribute games of chance equipment - reporting requirements.
(1) A person other than a manufacturer licensee or licensed agent shall not act as a bingo-raffle manufacturer within Colorado. The manufacture of electronic devices used as aids in the game of bingo, and the printing of raffle tickets other than pull tabs, as designed and requested by a licensee, does not constitute the manufacture of games of chance equipment; except that such electronic devices are subject to the reporting requirements of subsections (4) and (5) of this section, and the fees established by the licensing authority in accordance with section 24-21-606 (2) and subsection (4) of this section.
(2) An individual shall not act for or represent a landlord, manufacturer, or supplier licensee with respect to an activity covered by such license unless such individual is the licensee's owner, officer, director, partner, member, or ten percent or more shareholder of record with the licensing authority, or is the manufacturer's or supplier's licensed agent. A manufacturer or supplier licensee shall not allow any person not authorized by this subsection (2) to represent it or serve as its agent with regard to any Colorado transaction.
(3) Except to the extent otherwise provided in section 24-21-615 (1), a manufacturer or supplier licensee or licensed agent shall not buy, receive, sell, lease, furnish, or distribute any pull tabs, bingo cards or sheets, electronic devices used as aids in the game of bingo, or other games of chance equipment from or to any person within Colorado other than manufacturer or supplier licensees or agents and bingo-raffle licensees; except that:
(a) A landlord licensee, supplier, or manufacturer or its agent may sell, donate, or distribute cards, sheets, equipment, or electronic devices used as aids in the game of bingo for the playing of bingo not for resale to nursing homes and other entities that distribute the cards, sheets, or electronic devices and allow playing of the game free of charge, without consideration given or received by any person for the privilege of playing; and
(b) A bingo-raffle licensee may sell or donate its used equipment to another bingo-raffle licensee.
(4) Every manufacturer and supplier licensee shall file, upon forms prescribed by the licensing authority, quarterly reports on its licensed activities within Colorado. The reports must be accompanied by quarterly fees established by the licensing authority in accordance with section 24-21-606 (2) and deposited in the department of state cash fund created in section 24-21-104 (3)(b). The reports shall be filed with the licensing authority no later than April 30, July 31, October 31, and January 31 of each year licensed, and each report must cover the preceding calendar quarter. Reports must enumerate by quantity, purchaser or lessee, and price the pull tabs, bingo cards or sheets, electronic devices used as aids in the game of bingo, and other games of chance equipment manufactured, conveyed, or distributed within Colorado or for use or distribution in Colorado and must include the licensee's total sales, including amounts realized from leases, of equipment and electronic devices used as aids in the game of bingo and the names and addresses of all Colorado suppliers or agents of the licensee and shall be signed and verified by the owner or the chief executive officer of the licensee. These quarterly reports are not public records as defined in section 24-72-202.
(5) Every manufacturer or supplier licensee, and every licensed agent for such licensee, shall keep and maintain complete and accurate records, in accord with generally accepted accounting principles, of all licensed activities. The records shall include invoices for all games of chance equipment or electronic devices used as aids in the game of bingo conveyed or distributed within Colorado, or for use or distribution in Colorado, which invoices are specific as to the nature, description, quantity, and serial numbers of the pull tabs, bingo cards or sheets, electronic devices used as aids in the game of bingo, and other equipment so conveyed or distributed. The records shall also show all receipts and expenditures made in connection with licensed activities, including, but not limited to, records of sales by dates, purchasers, and items sold or leased, monthly bank account reconciliations, disbursement records, and credit memos for any returned items. These records shall be maintained for a period of at least three years.
(6) A manufacturer or supplier licensee or licensed agent must not be a person responsible for or assisting in the conduct, management, or operation of any game of chance within Colorado.
Source: L. 2017: Entire part added with relocations, (SB 17-232), ch. 233, p. 935, § 2, effective May 23.
Editor's note: This section is similar to former § 12-9-107.5 as it existed prior to 2017.
ANNOTATION
Secretary of state was not required to promulgate rules under the State Administrative Procedure Act in order to implement the reporting requirement under this section. Bingo Games Supply Co., Inc. v. Meyer, 895 P.2d 1125 (Colo. App. 1995) (decided under former law).
24-21-622. Bingo-raffle licensee's statement of receipts - expenses - fee - definitions.
(1) (a) On or before April 30, July 31, October 31, and January 31 of each year, every bingo-raffle licensee shall file with the licensing authority upon forms prescribed by the licensing authority a duly verified statement covering the preceding calendar quarter showing the amount of the gross receipts derived during said periods from games of chance, the expenses incurred or paid, and a brief description of the classification of such expenses, the net proceeds derived from games of chance, and the uses to which such net proceeds have been or are to be applied. Each licensee shall maintain and keep such books and records as may be necessary to substantiate the particulars of each such report.
(b) Exempt organizations are not subject to the requirements of this subsection (1), except to the extent that they shall file with the licensing authority statements showing the amount of the gross proceeds from their fund-raising drives and identifying all organizations receiving portions of such proceeds and the amounts received by each such organization.
(2) (a) If a bingo-raffle licensee fails to file reports within the time required or if reports are not properly verified or not fully, accurately, and truthfully completed, any existing license may be suspended until such time as the default has been corrected.
(b) Exempt organizations are subject to the requirements of this subsection (2) only to the extent that such requirements apply to subsection (1)(b) of this section.
(3) (a) All money collected or received from the sale of admission, extra regular cards, bingo strip cards, special game cards, sale of supplies, and all other receipts from the games of traditional and strip bingo games, raffles, and pull tab games shall be deposited in a special checking or savings account, or both, of the licensee, which must contain only this money. If the licensee conducts progressive games of chance, the licensee may maintain one additional checking or savings account, which must contain only money received from the sale of progressive games. The licensee may withdraw money from these accounts only by consecutively numbered checks or withdrawal slips or by electronic transactions referenced by transaction number or date. A check or withdrawal slip must not be drawn to "cash" or a fictitious payee. The licensee shall maintain all of its books and records in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles.
(b) Exempt organizations are not subject to this subsection (3).
(4) No part of the net proceeds, after they have been given over to another organization, shall be used by the donee organization to pay any person for services rendered or materials purchased in connection with the conducting of bingo by the donor organization.
(5) No item of expense shall be incurred or paid in connection with holding, operating, or conducting a game of chance pursuant to a bingo-raffle license except bona fide expenses of a reasonable amount. Such expenses include those incurred in connection with all games of chance, for the following purposes:
(a) Advertising and marketing;
(b) Legal fees related to any action brought by the licensing authority against the bingo-raffle licensee in connection with games of chance;
(c) The purchase of goods, wares, and merchandise furnished to the licensee for the purpose of operating games of chance pursuant to this part 6;
(d) The purchase or lease of electronic devices used as aids in the game of bingo;
(e) Payment for services rendered that are reasonably necessary for repairs of equipment and operating or conducting games of chance;
(f) Rent, if the premises are rented, or for janitorial services if not rented;
(g) Accountant's fees; and
(h) License fees.
(6) (a) For the purposes enumerated in subsection (5) of this section, the following terms have the following meanings:
(I) "Goods, wares, and merchandise" means prizes, equipment, and articles of a minor nature.
(II) "Services rendered" means:
(A) The repair of equipment;
(B) Compensation to bookkeepers or accountants for services in preparing financial reports for a reasonable amount as determined by the licensing authority by rule. A landlord, manufacturer, or supplier licensee, or employee of a landlord, manufacturer, or supplier licensee, shall not act as a bookkeeper or accountant for a bingo-raffle licensee, nor shall a landlord, manufacturer, or supplier licensee offer or provide accounting or bookkeeping services in connection with the preparation of financial reports on bingo-raffle activities, except for the transfer or encoding of data necessitated by the sale, upgrade, or maintenance of accounting software sold or leased to a bingo-raffle licensee by a landlord, manufacturer, or supplier licensee. A landlord licensee that is also a bingo-raffle licensee may act as a bookkeeper or accountant on such licensee's own behalf.
(C) The rental of premises;
(D) A reasonable amount for janitorial service as determined by the licensing authority in rules for each occasion; and
(E) A reasonable amount for security expense based on established need as determined by the licensing authority in rules for each occasion.
(b) There shall be paid to the licensing authority an administrative fee, established in accordance with section 24-21-606 (2), upon the gross receipts of any game of chance held, operated, or conducted under this part 6; except that an exempt organization shall not be charged more than twenty dollars per year. All administrative fees collected by the licensing authority under this part 6 shall be deposited in the department of state cash fund created in section 24-21-104 (3)(b).
(7) Each licensee, at the time each financial report is submitted to the licensing authority, shall pay to the order of the licensing authority the amount of administration expense provided in subsection (6) of this section.
Source: L. 2017: Entire part added with relocations, (SB 17-232), ch. 233, p. 937, § 2, effective May 23. L. 2022: (3)(a) amended, (HB 22-1093), ch. 366, p. 2608, § 5, effective April 1, 2023. L. 2024: (3)(a) amended, (HB 24-1326), ch. 420, p. 2868, § 8, effective June 5.
Editor's note: This section is similar to former § 12-9-108 as it existed prior to 2017.
ANNOTATION
Rent is a legitimate permitted expense for all games of chance, including raffles. A reasonable rental may be paid to an establishment for a licensee's jar raffles operations. Am. Hist. Soc. of Germans v. Meyer, 794 P.2d 1025 (Colo. App. 1989) (decided under former law).
The administrative fee imposed on a bingo-raffle licensee under subsection (6) is required to be calculated on the aggregate profit from all games of chance conducted by the licensee. Catholic Media Groups, Inc. v. Meyer, 879 P.2d 480 (Colo. App. 1994) (decided under former law).
24-21-623. Examination of books and records - rules.
The licensing authority and its agents have power to examine or cause to be examined the books and records of any licensee to which any license is issued pursuant to this part 6 insofar as they may relate to any transactions connected with activities under the license. The licensing authority may require by rule that licensees that have failed to keep proper books and records, or to maintain their books and records in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles, adopt certain internal financial controls and attend training to ensure the integrity of the reporting of games of chance activities pursuant to this part 6.
Source: L. 2017: Entire part added with relocations, (SB 17-232), ch. 233, p. 939, § 2, effective May 23.
Editor's note: This section is similar to former § 12-9-109 as it existed prior to 2017.
24-21-624. Forfeiture of license - ineligibility to apply for license.
A person who makes a false statement in an application for a license or in any statement annexed thereto, fails to keep sufficient books and records to substantiate the quarterly reports required under section 24-21-622, falsifies any books or records insofar as they relate to any transaction connected with the holding, operating, and conducting of a game of chance under the license, or violates this part 6 or any term of the license, if convicted, in addition to suffering any other penalties that may be imposed, shall forfeit any license issued to it under this part 6 and is ineligible to apply for a license under this part 6 for no more than one year thereafter.
Source: L. 2017: Entire part added with relocations, (SB 17-232), ch. 233, p. 939, § 2, effective May 23.
Editor's note: This section is similar to former § 12-9-110 as it existed prior to 2017.
24-21-625. Volunteer services - legislative declaration - immunity.
(1) The Colorado constitution recognizes that the conduct of charitable gaming activities is directly related to the need of nonprofit organizations to fulfill their lawful purposes. Notwithstanding this recognition, however, the willingness of bingo-raffle volunteers to offer their services has been increasingly deterred by a perception that they put personal assets at risk should a tort action be filed seeking damages arising from their volunteer activities.
(2) All bingo-raffle volunteers are immune from civil actions and liabilities pursuant to section 13-21-115.5, which provides that volunteers are not personally liable for their acts or omissions if they are acting in good faith and within the scope of their official function and duty for a charitable organization, with respect to such organization's conduct of games of chance. Bingo-raffle volunteers are not liable under this section if the harm is not caused by willful and wanton misconduct, gross negligence, reckless misconduct, or a conscious, flagrant indifference to the rights or safety of the individual harmed.
Source: L. 2017: Entire part added with relocations, (SB 17-232), ch. 233, p. 940, § 2, effective May 23.
Editor's note: This section is similar to former § 12-9-111 as it existed prior to 2017.
24-21-626. Unfair trade practices.
(1) The provisions of the "Unfair Practices Act", article 2 of title 6, and the "Colorado State Antitrust Act of 2023", article 4 of title 6, are specifically applicable to charitable gaming activities conducted by any licensee. Within thirty days after receiving a complaint alleging a violation of either of the acts, the licensing authority shall transmit the complaint to the attorney general.
(2) The licensing authority shall revoke the license of a licensee that violates any provision of article 2 of title 6 or article 4 of title 6 for a period of one year after the date of the finding of the violation. Upon the expiration of such period, the licensee may apply for the issuance of a new license.
Source: L. 2017: Entire part added with relocations, (SB 17-232), ch. 233, p. 940, § 2, effective May 23. L. 2023: (1) amended, (HB 23-1192), ch. 427, p. 2518, § 3, effective June 7.
Editor's note: This section is similar to former § 12-9-112 as it existed prior to 2017.
24-21-627. Common members - bingo-raffle licensees - definition.
(1) For the purposes of this section, "bingo-raffle licensee affiliate" means the following:
(a) A person that directly or indirectly through one or more intermediaries controls, is controlled by, or is under common control with, a bingo-raffle licensee specified; or
(b) A person that has an officer, director, member, manager, partner, games manager, salaried employee, or immediate family member in common with a bingo-raffle licensee.
(2) Proceeds from a bingo or raffle game that are transferred from a bingo-raffle licensee to a bingo-raffle licensee's affiliate shall not be used to pay the salary, remuneration, or expenses of any officer, director, member, manager, partner, games manager, or employee of such affiliate. The donee entity or organization shall deposit all such transferred proceeds in a segregated account that contains only such donations, and the transferred proceeds shall not be commingled with other funds of the donee entity or organization. The licensing authority and its agents may examine or cause to be examined the books and records of any donee entity or organization insofar as they may relate to account or to any transactions connected with bingo or raffle proceeds.
Source: L. 2017: Entire part added with relocations, (SB 17-232), ch. 233, p. 940, § 2, effective May 23.
Editor's note: This section is similar to former § 12-9-112.5 as it existed prior to 2017.
24-21-628. Enforcement.
It is the duty of all sheriffs and police officers to enforce this part 6, to receive complaints, to initiate investigations, and to arrest and complain against any person violating this part 6. It is the duty of the district attorney of the respective districts of this state to prosecute all violations of this part 6 in the manner and form as is now provided by law for the prosecutions of crimes and misdemeanors, and it is a violation of this part 6 for any such person knowingly to fail to perform his or her duty under this section.
Source: L. 2017: Entire part added with relocations, (SB 17-232), ch. 233, p. 941, § 2, effective May 23.
Editor's note: This section is similar to former § 12-9-113 as it existed prior to 2017.
24-21-629. Penalties for violation.
Every licensee and every officer, agent, or employee of the licensee and every other person or corporation who willfully violates or who procures, aids, or abets in the willful violation of this part 6 commits a petty offense and shall be punished as provided in section 18-1.3-503; except that, if the underlying factual basis of the violation constitutes a crime as defined by any other provision of law, then the person may be charged, prosecuted, and punished in accordance with such other provision of law.
Source: L. 2017: Entire part added with relocations, (SB 17-232), ch. 233, p. 941, § 2, effective May 23. L. 2021: Entire section amended, (SB 21-271), ch. 462, p. 3225, § 409, effective March 1, 2022.
Editor's note: This section is similar to former § 12-9-114 as it existed prior to 2017.
24-21-630. Colorado charitable gaming board - creation.
(1) There is created, within the department of state, the Colorado charitable gaming board.
(2) The board consists of seven members, all of whom must be citizens of the United States who have been residents of the state for at least the past two years. A member must not have been convicted of a felony or gambling-related offense, notwithstanding section 24-5-101. No more than three of the seven members may be members of the same political party; except that the political party affiliation of the secretary of state's designee shall not be considered for purposes of determining compliance with this requirement. The secretary of state's designee shall convene the board's first meeting as soon as practicable but not later than sixty days after a majority of the seven board members are appointed in accordance with this section. At the first meeting of each fiscal year, a majority of the members must choose a chair and vice-chair of the board from the membership. Membership and operation of the board must additionally meet the following requirements:
(a) (I) Three members of the board must be bona fide members of a bingo-raffle licensee that is classified as a religious organization, a charitable organization, a labor organization, an educational organization, a veterans' organization, a fraternal organization, or a voluntary firefighter's organization; except that no more than one member shall be appointed from any one such classification;
(II) and (III) Repealed.
(IV) One member of the board must be a supplier licensee;
(V) One member of the board must be a landlord licensee;
(VI) One member of the board must be a registered elector of the state who is not employed by or an officer or director of a licensee, does not have a financial interest in any license, and does not have an active part in the conduct or management of games of chance by any bingo-raffle licensee; and
(VII) One member of the board must be the secretary of state's designee.
(b) (I) The governor shall appoint the three members of the board who are categorized as bona fide members of a bingo-raffle licensee.
(II) The governor shall appoint the member of the board who is a supplier licensee and the member of the board who is a landlord licensee.
(III) The secretary of state shall appoint the member of the board who is a registered elector and the member of the board who is the secretary of state's designee.
(c) All appointments are for terms of four years. No member of the board is eligible to serve more than two consecutive terms.
(d) Any vacancy on the board must be filled for the unexpired term in the same manner as the original appointment; except that, in the event of an extended vacancy of more than three meetings or the failure of the governor to appoint a new member within three months of the vacancy, the secretary of state may appoint a replacement member. The member appointed to fill such vacancy shall be from the same category described in subsection (2)(a) of this section as the member vacating the position.
(e) A member of the board having a direct personal or private interest in any matter before the board must disclose such fact on the board's record. Members may disqualify themselves for any cause deemed by them to be sufficient.
(f) The appointing officer shall terminate the term of any member of the board who misses more than two consecutive regular board meetings without good cause, or who no longer meets the requirements for membership imposed by this section. The member's successor must be appointed in the manner provided for appointments under this section.
(g) Board members are entitled to receive as compensation for their services seventy-five dollars for each day spent in the conduct of board business, not to exceed five hundred dollars per member per year, and are entitled to be reimbursed for necessary travel and other reasonable expenses incurred in the performance of their official duties.
(h) Prior to commencing a term of service, each person nominated to serve on the board, other than the secretary of state's designee, must file with the secretary of state a financial disclosure statement in the form required and prescribed by the licensing authority and as commonly used for other Colorado boards and commissions. Such statement must be renewed as of each January 1 during the member's term of office.
(i) The board shall hold at least six meetings each year and such additional meetings as the members may deem necessary. In addition, special meetings may be called by the chair, any three board members, or the licensing authority if written notification of the meeting is delivered to each member at least seventy-two hours before the meeting. Notwithstanding section 24-6-402, in emergency situations in which a majority of the board certifies that exigencies of time require that the board meet without delay, the requirements of public notice and of seventy-two hours' actual advance written notice to members may be dispensed with, and board members as well as the public must receive such notice as is reasonable under the circumstances.
(j) A majority of the board constitutes a quorum, and the concurrence of a majority of the members present is required for any final determination by the board.
(k) The board shall keep a complete and accurate record of all its meetings.
(l) A majority of the board constitutes a quorum, but the concurrence of a majority of all members is required for any final action or determination by the board.
(m) The members of the board may invite additional individuals and representatives of entities to attend working group meetings and participate in such meetings as nonvoting members of the board.
(n) The secretary of state may employ staff to assist the board in carrying out its duties and to ensure that the board maintains its regular meeting schedule set forth in subsection (2)(i) of this section.
Source: L. 2017: Entire part added with relocations, (SB 17-232), ch. 233, p. 941, § 2, effective May 23. L. 2024: (1), IP(2), (2)(a)(I), (2)(a)(V), (2)(a)(VI), (2)(b), (2)(d), (2)(e), (2)(f), (2)(g), (2)(h), and (2)(i) amended, (2)(a)(II) and (2)(a)(III) repealed, and (2)(a)(VII), (2)(l), (2)(m), and (2)(n) added (HB 24-1326), ch. 420, p. 2869, § 9, effective June 5.
Editor's note: This section is similar to former § 12-9-201 as it existed prior to 2017.
24-21-631. Board - duties.
(1) In addition to any other duties set forth in this part 6, the board shall:
(a) Conduct a continuous study of charitable gaming throughout the state for the purpose of improving charitable gaming and ascertaining any defects in this part 6 or in the rules promulgated pursuant to this part 6; and
(b) Commencing on and after January 1, 2025, at the discretion of the board, submit a report to the general assembly containing recommendations for changes to this part 6, which report shall be submitted on or before October 31, 2025, and on or before October 31 of each year thereafter.
(2) The licensing authority is encouraged to collaborate with the board on proposals developed by the board concerning subjects including but not limited to:
(a) The types of charitable gaming activities to be conducted, the existing rules and potential new rules for those activities, and the number of occasions per year upon which a licensee may hold, operate, or conduct a game of bingo or lotto;
(b) The types of charitable gaming activities to be conducted in the future based upon a continuing review of the available state-of-the-art equipment in Colorado and other states and the policies and procedures approved and implemented by other states for the conduct of charitable gaming activities, provided that no new type of charitable gaming activity is recommended by the board for approval for licensing or play, or approved by the licensing authority for licensing or play, that does not comport with the limitations of section 2 (3) of article XVIII of the state constitution concerning the conduct only of the specific game of chance commonly known as bingo or lotto or the specific game of chance commonly known as raffles; and
(c) An annual review of at least ten percent of all charitable gaming rules and a complete review of all charitable gaming rules every five years.
(3) The board shall offer advice to the licensing authority upon subjects including but not limited to:
(a) The requirements, qualifications, and grounds for the issuance of all types of permanent and temporary licenses required for the conduct of charitable gaming;
(b) The requirements, qualifications, and grounds for the revocation, suspension, and summary suspension of all licenses required for the conduct of charitable gaming;
(c) Activities that constitute fraud, cheating, or illegal activities;
(d) The granting of licenses with special conditions or for limited periods, or both;
(e) The establishment of a schedule of reasonable fines to be assessed for violations of this part 6 or any rule adopted pursuant to this part 6;
(f) The amount of fees for licenses issued by the licensing authority and for the performance of administrative services pursuant to this part 6;
(g) The establishment of criteria under which a person may serve as a games manager;
(h) The content and conduct of classes or training seminars to benefit bingo-raffle charitable licensees, officers, and volunteers to better account for funds collected from games of chance;
(i) Standardized rules, procedures, and policies to clarify and simplify the auditing of licensees' records; and
(j) The conditions for a licensee's plan for disposal of any equipment and the distribution of any remaining net proceeds upon termination of a bingo-raffle license for the licensee's failure to timely or sufficiently renew such license.
Source: L. 2017: Entire part added with relocations, (SB 17-232), ch. 233, p. 943, § 2, effective May 23. L. 2024: Entire section R&RE, (HB 24-1326), ch. 420, p. 2871, § 10, effective June 5.
Editor's note: This section is similar to former § 12-9-202 as it existed prior to 2017.
24-21-632. Repeal of part - review of functions.
This part 6 is repealed, effective September 1, 2031. Before the repeal, the licensing functions of the licensing authority and the functions of the Colorado charitable gaming board in the department of state are scheduled for review in accordance with section 24-34-104.
Source: L. 2017: Entire part added with relocations, (SB 17-232), ch. 233, p. 944, § 2, effective May 23. L. 2024: Entire section amended, (HB 24-1326), ch. 420, p. 2873, § 11, effective June 5.
Editor's note: This section is similar to former § 12-9-301 as it existed prior to 2017.
ARTICLE 22
State Treasurer
24-22-101. Oath or affirmation - bond and sureties - conditions of bond.
24-22-102. State treasurer may administer oaths.
24-22-103. Seal of office.
24-22-104. Access to all state offices.
24-22-105. Acceptance of gifts, legacies, and devises - display by state historical society permitted.
24-22-106. Care of records - delivery to successor in office.
24-22-107. Duties and powers of state treasurer.
24-22-108. Willful neglect of duty - penalty.
24-22-109. Willful refusal to pay warrant or check - penalty.
24-22-110. Personal profit on state money unlawful - penalty.
24-22-111. Unlawful acts of other persons - penalty.
24-22-112. Power of state treasurer to issue and sell notes. (Repealed)
24-22-113. Power of state treasurer to loan money to the Colorado financial reporting system project - repeal. (Repealed)
24-22-114. Business training and promotion cash fund - repeal. (Repealed)
24-22-115. Tobacco litigation settlement cash fund - health-care supplemental appropriations and overexpenditures account - creation - repeal.
24-22-115.5. Legislative declaration - tobacco litigation settlement trust fund - creation. (Repealed)
24-22-115.6. Miscellaneous tobacco litigation settlement moneys.
24-22-116. Legislative declaration - exclusion of tobacco litigation settlement moneys from fiscal year spending.
24-22-117. Tobacco tax cash fund - accounts - creation - legislative declaration - repeal.
24-22-118. Revenue from nicotine products and additional tobacco taxes - 2020 tax holding fund - preschool programs cash fund - creation - definitions.
24-22-101. Oath or affirmation - bond and sureties - conditions of bond.
(1) On or before the second Tuesday in January after his or her election, the state treasurer shall take an oath or affirmation in accordance with section 24-12-101 and shall give a bond to the people of the state of Colorado in the sum of one million dollars, with not less than ten individual sureties or one or more surety companies authorized to do business in this state. The bond and each surety shall be approved by the governor and the attorney general and held in the custody of the secretary of state.
(2) The conditions of said bond shall be in substance that the state treasurer and all persons employed in the treasury department under his supervision shall faithfully discharge their respective duties and trusts and that the state treasurer shall be held responsible against all risks and losses whatsoever for all state moneys coming into his hands or received by the treasury department.
(3) If the bond is furnished by one or more surety companies, the entire premium therefor shall be paid by the state, and the general assembly shall appropriate the amount thereof.
(4) Whenever the governor, with the concurrence of the attorney general, deems the surety on said bond to be insufficient for the said sum of one million dollars, he may demand, and the state treasurer shall give, additional bond with sureties, at the cost of the state, to be approved by the governor and the attorney general.
Source: L. 71: R&RE, p. 1236, § 1. C.R.S. 1963: § 132-3-1. L. 2018: (1) amended, (HB 18-1138), ch. 88, p. 696, § 19, effective August 8.
Cross references: (1) For the salary of the state treasurer, see § 24-9-101; for discretionary funds of the state treasurer, see § 24-9-105; for the election of the state treasurer, see § 3 of art. IV, Colo. Const., and § 1-4-204.
(2) For the legislative declaration in HB 18-1138, see section 1 of chapter 88, Session Laws of Colorado 2018.
ANNOTATION
Treasurer and sureties are absolutely liable for all public moneys received. The absolute liability of the state treasurer and his sureties for all public moneys received by him as treasurer is fixed by § 12 of art. X, Colo. Const. State v. Walsen, 17 Colo. 170, 28 P. 1119 (1892).
24-22-102. State treasurer may administer oaths.
The state treasurer has power to administer all oaths and affirmations required by law in matters concerning the duties of his office.
Source: L. 71: R&RE, p. 1237, § 1. C.R.S. 1963: § 132-3-2.
24-22-103. Seal of office.
The state treasurer shall keep a seal of office, which shall be used to authenticate all writings, instruments, and documents certified from his office.
Source: L. 71: R&RE, p. 1237, § 1. C.R.S. 1963: § 132-3-3.
24-22-104. Access to all state offices.
The state treasurer shall have full and free access to the offices of all departments, institutions, and agencies of the state government for the inspection and examination of such books, records, accounts, and papers as concern any of his duties.
Source: L. 71: R&RE, p. 1237, § 1. C.R.S. 1963: § 132-3-4.
24-22-105. Acceptance of gifts, legacies, and devises - display by state historical society permitted.
(1) The state treasurer shall accept gifts, legacies, and devises of money and other property to the state, in the name of and on behalf of the state, with the approval of the governor and subject to the disposition thereof by the general assembly in accordance with the direction of the donor or devisor.
(2) The state treasurer is authorized to loan to the state historical society any items presented to the governor as gifts to the state that the treasurer has accepted pursuant to subsection (1) of this section. The state historical society may display the items at the state museum or at similar or related venues across the state.
Source: L. 71: R&RE, p. 1237, § 1. C.R.S. 1963: § 132-3-5. L. 2014: Entire section amended, (HB 14-1286), ch. 132, p. 460, § 1, effective August 6.
24-22-106. Care of records - delivery to successor in office.
The state treasurer shall exercise diligence and care in the safekeeping and preservation of all books, records, papers, documents, and other things pertaining to his office and in the custody and safekeeping of all securities of which he is the official custodian and shall deliver the same to his successor in office or to any person authorized by law to receive the same.
Source: L. 71: R&RE, p. 1237, § 1. C.R.S. 1963: § 132-3-6.
24-22-107. Duties and powers of state treasurer.
(1) The state treasurer shall prepare and submit to the governor a quarterly report showing the condition of the state treasury, the amount of state moneys on hand and on deposit, the amount of securities held in custody, a list of the funds and accounts carried on the records of the treasury department, and such other information as he may deem appropriate.
(2) He shall furnish information in writing to the governor or either house of the general assembly, whenever requested, upon any subject pertaining to the treasury department or touching upon any duty of his office.
(3) Repealed.
(4) He may issue publications circulated in quantity outside the executive branch of state government in accordance with the provisions of section 24-1-136.
(5) He shall perform any other duty which may be required by law.
(6) The state treasurer shall be the state's cash management officer responsible for the efficient management of all state cash and shall perform the duties necessary to carry out such function, in consultation with the governor.
(6.5) The state treasurer may provide technical assistance to any state or local governmental entity, upon the request of such entity, concerning the efficient management of the entity's public funds. Such technical assistance may include, but is not limited to, providing advice or recommendations relative to cash management, investments, and banking services. The treasurer shall not be liable to any state or local governmental entity for any loss of public funds resulting from the technical assistance provided to such entity by the treasurer if the treasurer, in the good faith performance of the treasurer's duties as a public official, has complied with the standards established in part 6 of article 75 of this title for the investment of public funds in securities. A state or local governmental entity may reimburse the treasurer for any reasonable travel expenses incurred by the treasurer in providing technical assistance pursuant to this subsection (6.5) to such state or local governmental entity.
(7) The state treasurer shall have such other powers, duties, and functions as are prescribed for heads of principal departments in the "Administrative Organization Act of 1968", article 1 of this title.
Source: L. 71: R&RE, p. 1237, § 1. C.R.S. 1963: § 132-3-7. L. 83: (3) and (4) amended, p. 834, § 40, effective July 1. L. 90: (6) added, p. 1183, § 1, effective May 23. L. 94: (7) added, p. 565, § 10, effective April 6. L. 99: (3) repealed, p. 687, § 6, effective August 4. L. 2000: (6.5) added, p. 897, § 1, effective August 2.
Cross references: For the duty of the state treasurer as custodian of the unemployment compensation fund, see § 8-77-101; for the duty to invest the moneys in the risk management fund, see § 24-30-1511; for the duty to report on the amount of money in the lottery fund and to invest such fund, see § 44-40-111 (4) and (6); for the duty to invest state moneys, see § 24-75-208; for duties under the "Funds Management Act of 1986", see part 9 of article 75 of this title; for the duty to report on the amount of money in the state highway supplementary fund, see § 43-1-219.
ANNOTATION
Neither this section nor any other constitutional or statutory provision addresses the authority of the state treasurer to distribute information advocating support of or opposition to a pending ballot measure — even if the measure concerns fiscal matters. The Fair Campaign Practices Act is the controlling law with respect to that authority. Coffman v. Colo. Common Cause, 102 P.3d 999 (Colo. 2004).
24-22-108. Willful neglect of duty - penalty.
If the state treasurer willfully neglects or refuses to perform any duty imposed upon him by law, or is guilty of bribery, compensation for past official behavior, soliciting unlawful compensation, or trading in public office, or accepts or receives any fee or reward not allowed by law for the performance of any legal duty, or knowingly does any act not authorized by law or in any manner other than as required by law, he is guilty of a misdemeanor in office and, upon conviction thereof, shall be punished by a fine of not less than one hundred dollars nor more than one thousand dollars, and, upon any such conviction, the court may adjudge that he be removed from office.
Source: L. 71: R&RE, p. 1238, § 1. C.R.S. 1963: § 132-3-8. L. 72: p. 568, § 48.
ANNOTATION
Law reviews. For article, "The Spirit of the Code", see 12 Dicta 244 (1935).
24-22-109. Willful refusal to pay warrant or check - penalty.
If the state treasurer willfully refuses to pay any warrant or any check lawfully drawn upon him or her, the state treasurer shall forfeit and pay to the holder thereof four times the amount thereof, which forfeiture may be recovered by action of debt against the state treasurer and the sureties on his or her official bond, or otherwise according to law, and the state treasurer commits a class 2 misdemeanor.
Source: L. 71: R&RE, p. 1238, § 1. C.R.S. 1963: § 132-3-9. L. 2014: Entire section amended, (HB 14-1391), ch. 328, p. 1449, § 4, effective June 5. L. 2021: Entire section amended, (SB 21-271), ch. 462, p. 3225, § 410, effective March 1, 2022.
24-22-110. Personal profit on state money unlawful - penalty.
A person holding the office of state treasurer or a person employed in the department of the treasury who, directly or indirectly, accepts or receives from any other person, for himself or herself or otherwise than on behalf of the state, any fee, reward, or compensation, either in money or other property or thing of value, in consideration of the deposit or investment of state money with any other person or in consideration of any agreement or arrangement touching upon the use of state money commits a class 5 felony and shall be punished as provided in section 18-1.3-401.
Source: L. 71: R&RE, p. 1238, § 1. C.R.S. 1963: § 132-3-10. L. 73: p. 172, § 3. L. 77: Entire section amended, p. 879, § 50, effective July 1, 1979. L. 89: Entire section amended, p. 844, § 109, effective July 1. L. 2002: Entire section amended, p. 1531, § 242, effective October 1. L. 2023: Entire section amended, (HB 23-1293), ch. 298, p. 1796, § 62, effective October 1.
Editor's note: The effective date for amendments made to this section by chapter 216, L. 77, was changed from July 1, 1978, to April 1, 1979, by chapter 1, First Extraordinary Session, L. 78, and was subsequently changed to July 1, 1979, by chapter 157, § 23, L. 79. See People v. McKenna, 199 Colo. 452, 611 P.2d 574 (1980).
Cross references: (1) For a similar provision, see § 24-30-202 (15).
(2) For the legislative declaration contained in the 2002 act amending this section, see section 1 of chapter 318, Session Laws of Colorado 2002.
24-22-111. Unlawful acts of other persons - penalty.
Any person who, directly or indirectly, pays or gives to any person holding the office of state treasurer or to any person employed in the treasury department under the supervision of the state treasurer any fee, reward, or compensation, either in money or other property or thing of value, in consideration of the deposit or investment of state moneys with any person or in consideration of any agreement or arrangement touching upon the use of state moneys commits a class 6 felony and shall be punished as provided in section 18-1.3-401, C.R.S.
Source: L. 71: R&RE, p. 1238, § 1. C.R.S. 1963: § 132-3-11. L. 77: Entire section amended, p. 879, § 51, effective July 1, 1979. L. 89: Entire section amended, p. 844, § 110, effective July 1. L. 2002: Entire section amended, p. 1531, § 243, effective October 1.
Editor's note: The effective date for amendments made to this section by chapter 216, L. 77, was changed from July 1, 1978, to April 1, 1979, by chapter 1, First Extraordinary Session, L. 78, and was subsequently changed to July 1, 1979, by chapter 157, § 23, L. 79. See People v. McKenna, 199 Colo. 452, 611 P.2d 574 (1980).
Cross references: (1) For a similar provision, see § 24-30-202 (16).
(2) For the legislative declaration contained in the 2002 act amending this section, see section 1 of chapter 318, Session Laws of Colorado 2002.
24-22-112. Power of state treasurer to issue and sell notes. (Repealed)
Source: L. 84: Entire section added, p. 739, § 2, effective April 22. L. 86: Entire section repealed, p. 970, § 2, effective July 1.
24-22-113. Power of state treasurer to loan money to the Colorado financial reporting system project - repeal. (Repealed)
Source: L. 90: Entire section added, p. 1183, § 2, effective May 23. L. 95: (1) amended, p. 640, § 33, effective July 1. L. 96: (1) amended, p. 1516, § 49, effective June 1.
Editor's note: Subsection (2) provided for the repeal of this section, effective July 1, 1998. (See L. 90, p. 1183.)
24-22-114. Business training and promotion cash fund - repeal. (Repealed)
Source: L. 97: Entire section added, p. 1485, § 2, effective July 1.
Editor's note: Subsection (2) provided for the repeal of this section, effective July 1, 1998. (See L. 97, p. 1485.)
24-22-115. Tobacco litigation settlement cash fund - health-care supplemental appropriations and overexpenditures account - creation - repeal.
(1) (a) There is hereby created in the state treasury the tobacco litigation settlement cash fund. The cash fund consists of all moneys transmitted to the state treasurer in accordance with the terms of the master settlement agreement, the smokeless tobacco master settlement agreement, and the consent decree approved and entered by the court in the case denominated State of Colorado, ex rel. Gale A. Norton, Attorney General v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.; American Tobacco Co., Inc.; Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.; Liggett & Myers, Inc.; Lorillard Tobacco Co., Inc.; Philip Morris, Inc.; United States Tobacco Co.; B.A.T. Industries, P.L.C.; The Council For Tobacco Research--U.S.A., Inc.; and Tobacco Institute, Inc., Case No. 97 CV 3432, in the district court for the city and county of Denver. Except as provided in subsection (2) of this section, all interest derived from the deposit and investment of moneys in the cash fund shall be credited to the cash fund; except that, beginning with the fiscal year 2001-02, and each fiscal year thereafter, all interest derived from the deposit and investment of moneys in the cash fund shall be credited to the breast and cervical cancer prevention and treatment fund created pursuant to section 25.5-5-308, C.R.S. Except as provided in subsection (2) of this section, all moneys in the cash fund shall be subject to appropriation by the general assembly for such purposes as may be authorized by law in accordance with the terms of the settlement agreements and the consent decree.
(b) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (1)(d) of this section, on and after July 1, 2011, all unexpended and unencumbered moneys in the cash fund shall remain in the fund until expended in order to reduce the share of allocations made from current-year receipts of settlement moneys as required by section 24-75-1104.5 (1.3).
(c) and (d) Repealed.
(2) (a) There is hereby created in the state treasury, as an account within the tobacco litigation settlement cash fund established pursuant to subsection (1) of this section, the tobacco settlement defense account, which shall be used by the department of law: To defend the state in lawsuits arising out of challenges to or arising under the provisions of the master settlement agreement, the smokeless tobacco master settlement agreement, and the consent decree approved and entered by the court in the case denominated State of Colorado, ex rel. Gale A. Norton, Attorney General v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.; American Tobacco Co., Inc.; Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.; Liggett & Myers, Inc.; Lorillard Tobacco Co., Inc.; Philip Morris, Inc.; United States Tobacco Co.; B.A.T. Industries, P.L.C.; The Council For Tobacco Research--U.S.A., Inc.; and Tobacco Institute, Inc., Case No. 97 CV 3432, in the district court for the city and county of Denver, or duly enacted Colorado laws related to the tobacco litigation settlement, including, but without limitation, this section, section 24-22-116, and parts 2 and 3 of article 28 of title 39, C.R.S.; to defend the state against claims of entitlement to tobacco litigation settlement moneys by any person, as defined in section 2-4-401 (8), C.R.S.; to enforce and defend all rights and obligations of the state under said settlement agreements, decree, or laws; and to resolve any dispute with any participating manufacturer, as defined in section 39-28-302 (6), C.R.S., or nonparticipating manufacturer, as defined in section 39-28-302 (5), C.R.S., that arises under the provisions of said settlement agreements, decree, or laws. The tobacco settlement defense account may also be used by the department of revenue to help administer, coordinate, and support the activities of the department of revenue and the department of law, including the investigation of and response to settlement agreement manufacture and distribution reporting irregularities identified by the department of law. Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (1) of this section, the tobacco settlement defense account consists of all tobacco litigation settlement moneys received by the attorney general and transmitted to the state treasurer to compensate the state for attorney fees, court costs, or other expenses incurred by the state in obtaining the tobacco litigation settlement, all tobacco litigation settlement moneys transferred to the account as required by section 24-75-1104.5 (1.7)(i), and all interest derived from the deposit and investment of moneys in the tobacco settlement defense account. Any moneys received by the state treasurer to compensate the state for attorney fees, court costs, or other expenses, including all interest derived from the deposit and investment of such moneys after receipt by the state treasurer, shall be transferred to the tobacco settlement defense account for use in accordance with the provisions of this subsection (2).
(b) All money in the tobacco settlement defense account is subject to annual appropriation by the general assembly to the department of law and the department of revenue. Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (1) of this section, at the end of any fiscal year, all unexpended and unencumbered money and all money not appropriated for the following fiscal year in the tobacco settlement defense account remain in the tobacco settlement defense account to be used for the purposes set forth in this subsection (2).
(c) to (g) Repealed.
(h) (I) Notwithstanding any provision of this section to the contrary, on June 30, 2026, the state treasurer shall transfer two hundred fifty thousand dollars from the tobacco settlement defense account within the tobacco litigation settlement cash fund to the general fund.
(II) This subsection (2)(h) is repealed, effective July 1, 2027.
(3) (Deleted by amendment, L. 2007, p. 141, § 1, effective March 22, 2007.)
(4) and (5) Repealed.
Source: L. 99: Entire section added, p. 192, § 1, effective March 31; entire section amended, p. 1402, § 1, effective June 5. L. 2000: Entire section amended, p. 756, § 1, effective May 23. L. 2001, 2nd Ex. Sess.: (1) amended, p. 8, § 1, effective November 1. L. 2002: (2)(c) added, p. 153, § 9, effective March 27. L. 2003: (2)(d) added, p. 461, § 1, effective March 5; (1) amended, p. 2543, § 2, effective June 5; (1) amended and (2)(e) and (2)(f) added, pp. 2560, 2561, §§ 1, 2, effective June 5; (1) amended, p. 2501, § 2, effective June 5. L. 2004: (1) amended and (3) added, p. 1705, § 1, effective June 4; (1) amended, p. 1566, § 3, effective January 1, 2005. L. 2006: (1) and (3) amended, p. 1036, § 5, effective May 25; (1) amended, p. 2007, § 70, effective July 1. L. 2007: (1) and (3) amended, p. 141, § 1, effective March 22; (2)(a) amended, p. 1262, § 1, effective May 25; (4) added, p. 1996, § 1, effective June 1. L. 2008: (4)(a) amended, p. 388, § 1, effective April 10. L. 2009: (4)(a) amended, (HB 09-1223), ch. 103, p. 379, § 1, effective April 3; (1)(b) amended, (SB 09-210), ch. 124, p. 528, § 1, effective April 16; (2)(g) added, (HB 09-1173), ch. 372, p. 2016, § 1, effective August 5. L. 2011: (1)(b) amended, (SB 11-225), ch. 189, p. 728, § 1, effective May 19; (4)(c) added, (SB 11-226), ch. 190, p. 733, § 2, effective May 19. L. 2012: (1)(b) amended, (HB 12-1247), ch. 53, p. 192, § 2, effective March 22. L. 2013: (2)(a) amended, (HB 13-1180), ch. 200, p. 812, § 1, effective May 11. L. 2015: (2)(a) and (2)(b) amended, (SB 15-188), ch. 103, p. 298, § 1, effective April 16. L. 2016: (1) and (2)(a) amended and (2)(c), (2)(d), (2)(e), (2)(f), and (4) repealed, (HB 16-1408), ch. 153, pp. 462, 472, § § 5, 26, effective July 1. L. 2018: (1)(c) added, (SB 18-280), ch. 409, p. 2400, § 1, effective June 6. L. 2020: (1)(b) and (2)(b) amended and (1)(d) added, (HB 20-1380), ch. 170, p. 780, § 1, effective June 29. L. 2022: (2)(b) amended, (SB 22-212), ch. 421, p. 2977, § 53, effective August 10. L. 2024: (5) added, (HB 24-1208), ch. 16, p. 42, § 2, effective March 6. L. 2026: (2)(h) added, (HB 26-1405), ch. 396, p. 2481, § 8, effective June 4.
Editor's note: (1) Section 4 of chapter 181, Session Laws of Colorado 2000, provides that the act amending this section applies to all moneys transmitted to the state treasurer before, on, or after May 23, 2000, to compensate the state for attorney fees, court costs, and other expenses incurred by the state in obtaining the tobacco litigation settlement.
(2) Amendments to subsection (1) by Senate Bill 03-268, Senate Bill 03-282, and Senate Bill 03-342 were harmonized. Amendments to subsection (1) by House Bill 06-1310 and Senate Bill 06-219 were harmonized.
(3) Subsection (2)(g)(II) provided for the repeal of subsection (2)(g), effective July 1, 2011. (See L. 2009, p. 2016.)
(4) Subsection (1)(c)(II) provided for the repeal of subsection (1)(c), effective July 1, 2019. (See L. 2018, p. 2400.)
(5) Subsection (1)(d)(II) provided for the repeal of subsection (1)(d), effective July 1, 2021. (See L. 2020, p. 780.)
(6) Subsection (5)(b) provided for the repeal of subsection (5), effective July 1, 2025. (See L. 2024, p. 42.)
24-22-115.5. Legislative declaration - tobacco litigation settlement trust fund - creation. (Repealed)
Source: L. 99: Entire section added, p. 1403, § 2, effective June 5. L. 2000: (2) amended and (3) added, p. 595, § 4, effective May 18. L. 2002: (2) amended, p. 564, § 7, effective May 24. L. 2003: (2) amended, p. 461, § 2, effective March 5; (2) amended and (3)(a.5) added, pp. 2544, 2547, §§ 3, 4, effective June 5. L. 2004: (2)(a)(II), (2)(a)(III), and (2)(a.7)(I) amended and (2)(d) added, p. 1706, § 2, effective June 4. L. 2006: (2)(a.7)(I) amended, p. 1037, § 6, effective May 25. L. 2007: (2)(a)(II) amended, p. 142, § 2, effective March 22. L. 2016: Entire section repealed, (HB 16-1408), ch. 153, p. 472, § 26, effective July 1.
24-22-115.6. Miscellaneous tobacco litigation settlement moneys.
(1) Notwithstanding the provisions of section 24-22-115, any tobacco litigation settlement moneys received by the state are subject to appropriation by the general assembly if the purpose for which the moneys may be expended is not specified or approved by a court or other non-Colorado authority.
(2) When any agency of state government proposes that any tobacco litigation settlement moneys are custodial in nature, the agency shall notify the joint budget committee in writing and shall explain the basis for determining that the moneys are custodial and shall set forth the purpose for which the agency intends to expend such moneys.
Source: L. 99: Entire section added, p. 1403, § 2, effective June 5. L. 2000: Entire section amended, p. 758, § 3, effective May 23. L. 2016: (1) amended, (HB 16-1408), ch. 153, p. 463, § 6, effective July 1.
Editor's note: Section 4 of chapter 181, Session Laws of Colorado 2000, provides that the act amending this section applies to all moneys transmitted to the state treasurer before, on, or after May 23, 2000, to compensate the state for attorney fees, court costs, and other expenses incurred by the state in obtaining the tobacco litigation settlement.
24-22-116. Legislative declaration - exclusion of tobacco litigation settlement moneys from fiscal year spending.
(1) The general assembly hereby finds and declares that:
(a) In 1992, the voters of this state approved section 20 of article X of the state constitution, which limits fiscal year spending of state government;
(b) Section 20 (2)(e) of article X defines "fiscal year spending" to include all revenues and expenditures except those for refunds and those from certain sources, such as federal funds and damage awards;
(c) In exercising its legislative prerogative to enact legislation to implement section 20 of article X as it relates to state government, the general assembly enacted article 77 of this title during the 1993 regular session;
(d) As part of this implementing legislation, the general assembly defined certain terms that were necessary for the implementation of section 20 of article X but were not defined by the constitutional provision;
(e) The general assembly defined "damage award" to include any pecuniary compensation received by the state as a result of any judgment or allowance in favor of the state;
(f) The exclusion from state fiscal year spending of monetary awards to the state as the result of court action is consistent with the purpose of section 20 of article X, which is to protect taxpayers from unwarranted tax increases, since such monetary awards are not revenue raised by the state from taxpayers;
(g) The inclusion in state fiscal year spending of revenue over which the state has no control might imperil other state projects and programs, since fluctuations in such revenue can cause the state to exceed its constitutional spending limit and the refund of excess revenue could take away from another part of the state's budget;
(h) Due to this potential impact, the inclusion of such monetary awards in state fiscal year spending would discourage or prevent the state from pursuing legal action to protect the state's interests as authorized by law;
(i) All of the moneys received by the state in accordance with the terms of the master settlement agreement, the smokeless tobacco master settlement agreement, and the consent decree entered by the court in the case denominated State of Colorado, ex rel. Gale A. Norton, Attorney General v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.; American Tobacco Co., Inc.; Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.; Liggett & Myers, Inc.; Lorillard Tobacco Co., Inc.; Philip Morris, Inc.; United States Tobacco Co.; B.A.T. Industries, P.L.C.; The Council For Tobacco Research--U.S.A., Inc.; and Tobacco Institute, Inc., Case No. 97 CV 3432, in the district court for the city and county of Denver, and credited to the tobacco litigation settlement cash fund created in section 24-22-115 (1), including moneys transferred to the tobacco settlement defense account created in said cash fund pursuant to section 24-22-115 (2), are in settlement of the state of Colorado's antitrust, consumer protection, public nuisance, racketeering, and other statutory claims for relief against defendants in said action;
(j) (I) The moneys received by the state in accordance with said master settlement agreements and said consent decree are in settlement of nine statutory claims for relief made by the state against defendants in said action, three of which were based upon violations of the "Colorado Consumer Protection Act", two of which were based upon violations of the "Colorado Organized Crime Control Act", two of which were based upon violations of state public nuisance statutes, and only one of which was based upon violations of the "Colorado Antitrust Act of 1992" and the impact of such violations on increased health-care costs and expenditures of the state; and
(II) The state will take any legal action necessary to oppose any claim of the federal government to any portion of the moneys received by the state in accordance with said master settlement agreements and said consent decree for claims not related to such increased health-care costs and expenditures and for any amount of such moneys in excess of federal payments made for such increased health-care costs and expenditures;
(k) Monetary awards to the state as the result of said court action, including those distributed to local governments, satisfy the definition of "damage awards" and therefore are excluded from fiscal year spending.
(2) (a) (I) For purposes of section 20 of article X of the state constitution and article 77 of this title, any moneys credited to the tobacco litigation settlement cash fund in accordance with section 24-22-115 (1), including moneys transferred to the tobacco settlement defense account created in said cash fund pursuant to section 24-22-115 (2), are damage awards, as defined in section 24-77-102 (2), or interest accruing on such damage awards. Any moneys credited to or expended from the tobacco litigation settlement cash fund, including the tobacco settlement defense account, are not included in state fiscal year spending, as defined in section 24-77-102 (17), for any state fiscal year.
(II) Repealed.
(b) For purposes of section 20 of article X of the state constitution and article 77 of this title, any moneys expended from the tobacco litigation settlement cash fund created in section 24-22-115 (1), including the tobacco settlement defense account created in said cash fund pursuant to section 24-22-115 (2), and received by any local government are damage awards or interest accruing on such damage awards and are not included in the fiscal year spending of the receiving local government for any budget year.
Source: L. 99: Entire section added, p. 192, § 1, effective March 31; (1)(i) and (2) amended, p. 1404, § 3, effective June 5. L. 2000: (1)(i) and (2) amended, p. 757, § 2, effective May 23. L. 2003: (2)(a) amended, p. 2547, § 5, effective June 5. L. 2016: (1)(i), (2)(a)(I), and (2)(b) amended, (HB 16-1408), ch. 153, p. 464, § 7, effective July 1.
Editor's note: (1) Section 4 of chapter 181, Session Laws of Colorado 2000, provides that the act amending subsections (1)(i) and (2) applies to all moneys transmitted to the state treasurer before, on, or after May 23, 2000, to compensate the state for attorney fees, court costs, and other expenses incurred by the state in obtaining the tobacco litigation settlement.
(2) Subsection (2)(a)(II)(B) provided for the repeal of subsection (2)(a)(II), effective December 15, 2003, unless the state treasurer and the tobacco litigation settlement financing corporation entered into at least one property sale contract pursuant to article 82.5 of this title. No such contract had been entered into as of December 15, 2003. (See L. 2003, p. 2547.)
Cross references: For the "Colorado Consumer Protection Act", see article 1 of title 6; for the "Colorado Organized Crime Control Act", see article 17 of title 18; for the "Colorado State Antitrust Act of 2023", see article 4 of title 6.
24-22-117. Tobacco tax cash fund - accounts - creation - legislative declaration - repeal.
(1) (a) There is hereby created in the state treasury the tobacco tax cash fund, which fund is referred to in this section as the "cash fund". The cash fund consists of money collected from the cigarette and tobacco taxes imposed pursuant to section 21 of article X of the state constitution and money transferred in accordance with section 24-22-118 (2). All interest and income derived from the deposit and investment of money in the cash fund shall be credited to the cash fund; except that all interest and income derived from the deposit and investment of money in the cash fund during the 2008-09, 2009-10, 2010-11, and 2011-12 fiscal years shall be credited to the general fund. Any unexpended and unencumbered money remaining in the cash fund at the end of a fiscal year shall remain in the cash fund and shall not be credited or transferred to the general fund or any other fund, except as otherwise provided in this section.
(b) Repealed.
(c) For each fiscal year from the 2004-05 fiscal year through the 2007-08 fiscal year and for the 2012-13 fiscal year and each fiscal year thereafter, the general assembly shall annually appropriate three percent of the moneys estimated to be deposited in that fiscal year into the cash fund, plus three percent of the interest and income earned on the deposit and investment of moneys in the cash fund, and, for the 2008-09, 2009-10, 2010-11, and 2011-12 fiscal years, the general assembly shall annually appropriate three percent of the moneys estimated to be deposited in that fiscal year into the cash fund, for health-related purposes to provide revenue for the state's general fund and the old age pension program and for municipal and county governments to compensate proportionately for tax revenue reductions attributable to lower cigarette and tobacco sales resulting from the implementation of the tax imposed pursuant to section 21 of article X of the state constitution, as follows:
(I) (A) Twenty percent of the moneys specified in this paragraph (c) to the state's general fund for health-related purposes.
(B) Beginning in fiscal year 2006-07 and for fiscal year 2007-08 through fiscal year 2010-11, of the moneys specified in sub-subparagraph (A) of this subparagraph (I), fifty percent shall be appropriated for the purposes of providing immunizations performed by county or district public health agencies in areas that were served by county public health nursing services prior to July 1, 2008, and fifty percent shall be appropriated to the pediatric specialty hospital fund, created in paragraph (e) of subsection (2) of this section, for the purposes of augmenting hospital reimbursement rates for regional pediatric trauma centers as defined in section 25-3.5-703 (4)(f), C.R.S., under the "Colorado Medical Assistance Act", articles 4, 5, and 6 of title 25.5, C.R.S.
(B.5) Beginning in fiscal year 2011-12 and for each fiscal year thereafter, of the moneys specified in sub-subparagraph (A) of this subparagraph (I), fifty percent shall be appropriated for the purposes of providing immunizations performed by county or district public health agencies in areas that were served by county public health nursing services prior to July 1, 2008, and fifty percent shall be appropriated for expenditures in the children's basic health plan created in article 8 of title 25.5, C.R.S.
(C) Repealed.
(II) Fifty percent of the moneys specified in this paragraph (c) to provide health-related services under the "Colorado Medical Assistance Act", articles 4 to 6 of title 25.5, C.R.S., for persons who qualify to receive old age pensions; and
(III) Thirty percent of the moneys specified in this paragraph (c) to the department of revenue to be apportioned to municipal and county governments in amounts consistent with the provisions of section 39-22-623, C.R.S.
(2) There are created in the state treasury the following funds:
(a) (I) The health care expansion fund to be administered by the department of health care policy and financing. The state treasurer and the controller shall transfer an amount equal to forty-six percent of the moneys deposited into the cash fund, plus forty-six percent of the interest and income earned on the deposit and investment of moneys in the cash fund, to the health care expansion fund; except that, for fiscal year 2004-05, the state treasurer and the state controller shall transfer an amount equal to forty-six percent of the moneys deposited into the cash fund less the amount of money sufficient to fund the reinstatement of medical assistance benefits for legal immigrants as provided for in House Bill 05-1086, enacted at the first regular session of the sixty-fifth general assembly, and except that, for the 2008-09, 2009-10, 2010-11, and 2011-12 fiscal years, the state treasurer and the controller shall transfer to the health care expansion fund only an amount equal to forty-six percent of the moneys deposited into the cash fund. All interest and income derived from the deposit and investment of moneys in the health care expansion fund shall be credited to the health care expansion fund; except that all interest and income derived from the deposit and investment of moneys in the health care expansion fund during the 2008-09, 2009-10, 2010-11, and 2011-12 fiscal years shall be credited to the general fund. Any unexpended and unencumbered moneys remaining in the health care expansion fund at the end of a fiscal year shall remain in the fund and shall not be credited or transferred to the general fund or any other fund.
(II) Except as provided in subsection (2)(a)(III) of this section, for fiscal year 2005-06 and each fiscal year thereafter, money in the health care expansion fund shall be annually appropriated by the general assembly to the department of health care policy and financing for the following purposes:
(A) To increase eligibility in the children's basic health plan, article 8 of title 25.5, C.R.S., for children and pregnant women from one hundred eighty-five percent to two hundred percent of the federal poverty line;
(B) To remove the asset test under the medical assistance program, articles 4, 5, and 6 of title 25.5, C.R.S., for children and families;
(C) To expand the number of children who can be enrolled in the children with complex health needs program, section 25.5-6-904, and the children's extensive support waiver program;
(D) To increase eligibility in the medical assistance program, articles 4, 5, and 6 of title 25.5, C.R.S., to at least sixty percent of the federal poverty line for a parent of a child who is eligible for the medical assistance program or the children's basic health plan, article 8 of title 25.5, C.R.S.;
(E) To fund medical assistance to legal immigrants pursuant to section 25.5-5-201, C.R.S.;
(F) To pay for enrollment increases above the average enrollment for state fiscal year 2003-04 in the children's basic health plan, article 8 of title 25.5, C.R.S., or, for state fiscal year 2011-12 and for each fiscal year thereafter, to pay for costs associated with children enrolled in the medical assistance program, articles 4, 5, and 6 of title 25.5, C.R.S., whose family income is more than one hundred percent but does not exceed one hundred thirty-three percent of the federal poverty line and who would have been eligible for enrollment in the children's basic health plan prior to September 1, 2011;
(G) To provide up to five hundred forty thousand dollars for cost-effective marketing to increase the enrollment of eligible children and pregnant women in the children's basic health plan, article 8 of title 25.5, C.R.S.;
(H) To provide presumptive eligibility to pregnant women under the medical assistance program, articles 4, 5, and 6 of title 25.5, C.R.S.; and
(I) To provide funding for extending medicaid eligibility for persons who are in the foster care system immediately prior to emancipation, as set forth in section 25.5-5-101 (1)(e), C.R.S.
(III) Moneys transferred to the health care expansion fund in fiscal year 2004-05, less the amount necessary for the administrative costs of the department of health care policy and financing to facilitate the program expansions specified in subparagraph (II) of this paragraph (a), shall remain in the health care expansion fund as a reserve. Beginning in fiscal year 2005-06 and for each fiscal year thereafter, ten percent of the moneys transferred in each fiscal year to the health care expansion fund and any unexpended and unencumbered moneys remaining in the health care expansion fund at the end of a fiscal year shall remain in the fund and be added to the reserve until the first time the reserve balance is equal to the amount annually transferred to the health care expansion fund. Moneys in the health care expansion fund that are designated as reserve moneys, up to one-half of the amount annually transferred to the health care expansion fund, may be expended only if the appropriations necessary to sustain the populations specified in subparagraph (II) of this paragraph (a) exceed the annual transfer of moneys to the health care expansion fund.
(IV) and (V) Repealed.
(b) (I) The primary care fund to be administered by the department of health care policy and financing. The state treasurer and the controller shall transfer an amount equal to nineteen percent of the money deposited into the cash fund, plus nineteen percent of the interest and income earned on the deposit and investment of the money, to the primary care fund. In addition to the money transferred from the cash fund, the primary care fund consists of gifts received pursuant to subsection (2)(b)(VI) of this section and any other money the general assembly may appropriate or transfer into the primary care fund. All interest and income derived from the deposit and investment of money in the primary care fund is credited to the primary care fund. Any unexpended and unencumbered money remaining in the primary care fund at the end of a fiscal year remains in the fund and is not credited or transferred to the general fund or any other fund.
(II) For fiscal year 2005-06 and each fiscal year thereafter, moneys in the primary care fund shall be annually appropriated by the general assembly to the department of health care policy and financing for comprehensive primary care as specified in part 3 of article 3 of title 25.5, C.R.S.
(III) to (V) Repealed.
(VI) The state department may seek and accept gifts from private or public sources for the purposes of this subsection (2)(b).
(c) (I) The tobacco education programs fund is to be administered by the department of public health and environment. The state treasurer and the controller shall transfer an amount equal to sixteen percent of the money deposited into the cash fund, plus sixteen percent of the interest and income earned on the deposit and investment of such money and the amounts specified in section 24-22-118 (2), to the tobacco education programs fund; except that, for the 2008-09, 2009-10, 2010-11, and 2011-12 fiscal years, the state treasurer and the controller shall transfer to the tobacco education programs fund only an amount equal to sixteen percent of the money deposited into the cash fund. All interest and income derived from the deposit and investment of money in the tobacco education programs fund shall be credited to the tobacco education programs fund; except that all interest and income derived from the deposit and investment of money in the tobacco education programs fund during the 2008-09, 2009-10, 2010-11, and 2011-12 fiscal years shall be credited to the general fund. Any unexpended and unencumbered money remaining in the tobacco education programs fund at the end of a fiscal year shall remain in the fund and shall not be credited or transferred to the general fund or any other fund.
(II) The interest and income derived from the deposit and investment of moneys in the tobacco education programs fund and credited to the tobacco education programs fund may be used to give credit to a wholesaler or distributor for taxes paid on cigarettes or other tobacco products that are bad debts pursuant to sections 39-28-104 and 39-28.5-107, C.R.S.; except that the interest earned on the tobacco education programs fund shall be used only for that portion of the bad debt attributable to the taxes imposed pursuant to section 21 of article X of the state constitution.
(III) For fiscal year 2005-06 and each fiscal year thereafter, moneys in the tobacco education programs fund shall be annually appropriated by the general assembly as follows:
(A) To the prevention services division of the department of public health and environment for the tobacco education, prevention, and cessation programs specified in part 8 of article 3.5 of title 25, C.R.S.; and
(B) Up to three hundred fifty thousand dollars to the division of liquor enforcement in the department of revenue for the purpose of enforcing laws relating to the sale of tobacco to minors.
(III.5) For fiscal year 2011-12 and for each fiscal year thereafter, the general assembly may annually appropriate moneys in the tobacco education programs fund to the department of health care policy and financing in order to allow the department to obtain federal matching funds for the Colorado quitline program.
(IV) Repealed.
(V) (A) On June 30, 2027, the state treasurer shall transfer from the tobacco education programs fund to the preschool programs cash fund created in section 26.5-4-209 (1)(a) ten million dollars of money that originated from the 2020 tax holding fund created in section 24-22-118.
(B) This subsection (2)(c)(V) is repealed, effective June 30, 2028.
(d) (I) The prevention, early detection, and treatment fund to be administered by the department of public health and environment. The state treasurer and the controller shall transfer an amount equal to sixteen percent of the moneys deposited into the cash fund, plus sixteen percent of the interest and income earned on the deposit and investment of those moneys, to the prevention, early detection, and treatment fund; except that, for the 2008-09, 2009-10, 2010-11, and 2011-12 fiscal years, the state treasurer and the controller shall transfer to the prevention, early detection, and treatment fund only an amount equal to sixteen percent of the moneys deposited into the cash fund. All interest and income derived from the deposit and investment of moneys in the prevention, early detection, and treatment fund shall be credited to the prevention, early detection, and treatment fund; except that all interest and income derived from the deposit and investment of moneys in the prevention, early detection, and treatment fund during the 2008-09, 2009-10, 2010-11, and 2011-12 fiscal years shall be credited to the general fund. Any unexpended and unencumbered moneys remaining in the prevention, early detection, and treatment fund at the end of a fiscal year shall remain in the fund and shall not be credited or transferred to the general fund or any other fund. The moneys in the prevention, early detection, and treatment fund shall be annually appropriated by the general assembly to the department of public health and environment for allocation by the department consistent with the provisions of this paragraph (d).
(II) Of the moneys appropriated annually by the general assembly to the department of public health and environment pursuant to subparagraph (I) of this paragraph (d), moneys shall be annually allocated by the department of public health and environment for breast and cervical cancer screenings pursuant to section 25-4-1505, C.R.S., in the following amounts not to exceed five million dollars in any fiscal year:
(A) For the 2005-06 fiscal year, fourteen percent of the amount appropriated pursuant to subparagraph (I) of this paragraph (d);
(B) For the 2006-07 fiscal year, sixteen percent of the amount appropriated pursuant to subparagraph (I) of this paragraph (d);
(C) For the 2007-08 fiscal year, eighteen percent of the amount appropriated pursuant to subparagraph (I) of this paragraph (d); and
(D) For the 2008-09 fiscal year and each fiscal year thereafter, twenty percent of the amount appropriated pursuant to subparagraph (I) of this paragraph (d).
(III) For fiscal year 2005-06, and each fiscal year thereafter, fifteen percent of the money transferred to the prevention, early detection, and treatment fund shall be transferred to the health disparities grant program fund created in subsection (2)(f) of this section for the health disparities and community grant program in part 22 of article 4 of title 25.
(IV) and (IV.5) Repealed.
(V) (A) For fiscal year 2008-09 and each fiscal year thereafter, after the allocations made pursuant to subparagraphs (II) and (III) of this paragraph (d), moneys in the prevention, early detection, and treatment fund shall be annually appropriated by the general assembly to the prevention services division of the department of public health and environment for the cancer, cardiovascular disease, and chronic pulmonary disease prevention, early detection, and treatment program established in part 3 of article 20.5 of title 25, C.R.S.
(B) and (C) Repealed.
(VI) Pursuant to the declaration of a state fiscal emergency as described in subparagraph (III) of paragraph (b) of subsection (6) of this section, notwithstanding any provisions of subparagraphs (II), (III), (IV.5), and (V) of this paragraph (d) to the contrary, for fiscal year 2011-12, the general assembly shall appropriate moneys in the prevention, early detection, and treatment fund for the purposes described in subparagraphs (II), (III), (IV.5), and (V) of this paragraph (d), as well as any other health-related purpose and to serve populations enrolled in the children's basic health plan and the Colorado medical assistance program at the programs' respective levels of enrollment as of January 1, 2005.
(e) Repealed.
(f) (I) The health disparities grant program fund to be administered by the department of public health and environment. Money must be transferred to the health disparities grant program fund as described in subsection (2)(d)(III) of this section. The health disparities grant program fund also consists of any other money appropriated to the health disparities grant program fund by the general assembly. All interest and income derived from the deposit and investment of money in the health disparities grant program fund must be credited to the health disparities grant program fund. Any unexpended or unencumbered money remaining in the health disparities grant program fund at the end of the fiscal year must remain in the fund and shall not be credited to the general fund or any other fund. The money in the health disparities grant program fund must be annually appropriated by the general assembly to the department of public health and environment for allocation by the department of public health and environment consistent with the provisions of subsection (2)(d) of this section.
(II) to (IV) Repealed.
(3) For purposes of section 20 of article X of the state constitution and article 77 of this title, any moneys collected or expended from the imposition of the cigarette and tobacco tax imposed pursuant to section 21 of article X of the state constitution are not included in fiscal year spending, as defined in section 20 of article X of the state constitution, and are excluded from the spending limit contained in section 24-75-201.1 and any corresponding spending limits on local governments receiving such revenues.
(4) Moneys appropriated to the health care expansion fund, the primary care fund, and the prevention, early detection, and treatment fund shall be used to supplement revenues that are appropriated by the general assembly for health-related purposes as of January 1, 2005, and shall not be used to supplant those appropriations.
(5) The moneys generated by the implementation of the tax pursuant to section 21 of article X of the state constitution shall be appropriated by the general assembly and utilized by the recipients of the moneys only for such purposes as are specified in section 21 of article X of the state constitution. The moneys shall not be utilized:
(a) For the purposes of lobbying as defined in section 24-6-301 (3.5)(a); or
(b) To support or oppose any ballot issue or ballot question.
(6) (a) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the general assembly may use revenue generated by the implementation of the cigarette and tobacco taxes pursuant to sections 39-28-103.5 and 39-28.5-102.5, C.R.S., and section 21 of article X of the state constitution for any health-related purpose and to serve populations enrolled in the children's basic health plan and the Colorado medical assistance program at the respective program levels of enrollment as of January 1, 2005. Such use of revenue shall be preceded by a declaration of a state fiscal emergency, which shall be adopted by a joint resolution, approved by a two-thirds majority vote of the members of the senate and of the house of representatives, and signed by the governor. The declaration shall apply only to a single fiscal year.
(b) to (d) Repealed.
(7) The general assembly hereby finds and declares that for purposes of this section and section 21 (5) of article X of the state constitution, interest or income credited to the general fund pursuant to paragraph (a) of subsection (1) of this section and paragraphs (a) to (d) and (f) of subsection (2) of this section are not revenues generated by operation of section 21 (2) of article X of the state constitution.
Source: L. 2005: Entire section added, p. 916, § 2, effective June 2. L. 2006: IP(2)(a)(II) amended and (2)(a)(IV) added, p. 1122, § 2, effective May 25; (2)(d)(III) amended and (2)(f) added, p. 1746, § 1, effective June 6; (1)(c)(I)(B), (1)(c)(II), (2)(a)(II), (2)(b)(II), IP(2)(d)(II), (2)(d)(IV)(A), and (2)(e) amended, p. 2008, § 71, effective July 1. L. 2007: (2)(e) amended, p. 143, § 3, effective March 22; (2)(a)(II)(G) and (2)(a)(II)(H) amended and (2)(a)(II)(I) added, p. 897, § 2, effective May 15. L. 2008: (2)(d)(IV.5) added and (2)(d)(V) amended, p. 799, § 1, effective May 14; (1)(c)(I)(B) amended, p. 2052, § 5, effective July 1. L. 2009: (1)(a), IP(1)(c), (2)(a)(I), (2)(b)(I), (2)(c)(I), (2)(c)(II), (2)(d)(I), and (2)(f) amended and (7) added, (SB 09-270), ch. 208, p. 944, § 1, effective May 1; (1)(c)(I)(C) added, (SB 09-264), ch. 204, p. 926, § 1, effective May 1; (2)(b)(III) and (2)(c)(IV) added and (2)(d)(V) and (6) amended, (SB 09-271), ch. 334, pp. 1772, 1773, §§ 1, 2, 3, 4, effective June 1. L. 2010: (2)(b)(III)(A) amended, (HB 10-1321), ch. 48, p. 181, § 3, effective March 29; (2)(a)(V) added and (2)(f) amended, (HB 10-1320), ch. 134, p. 441, §§ 1, 2, effective April 15; (2)(b)(IV) and (6)(c) added, (HB 10-1378), ch. 213, pp. 926, 927, §§ 1, 2, effective May 27; (2)(c)(IV), (2)(d)(V)(B), (2)(f), and (6)(b) amended and (2)(d)(V)(C) added, (HB 10-1381), ch. 216, p. 934, § 1, effective May 27; (2)(a)(II)(A) and (2)(a)(II)(D) amended, (HB 10-1422), ch. 419, p. 2082, § 60, effective August 11. L. 2011: (1)(c)(I)(B) and (2)(e) amended and (1)(c)(I)(B.5) added, (SB 11-216), ch. 149, p. 516, § 1, effective May 5; (2)(b)(V) and (6)(d) added, (SB 11-219), ch. 188, pp. 724, 725, §§ 1, 2, effective June 3; (2)(c)(IV)(C) and (6)(b)(III) amended and (2)(c)(IV)(D), (2)(d)(VI), (2)(f)(IV), and (6)(b)(IV) added, (SB 11-211), ch. 145, pp. 503, 504, §§ 1-4, effective June 3; IP(1)(c) and (1)(c)(II) amended, (SB 11-210), ch. 187, p. 721, § 4, effective July 1; IP(2)(a)(II) and (2)(a)(II)(F) amended, (SB 11-008), ch. 100, p. 292, § 1, effective September 1. L. 2012: (2)(c)(III.5) added, (HB 12-1202), ch. 4, p. 7, § 1, effective March 1. L. 2013: (2)(d)(IV.5) amended, (SB 13-232), ch. 153, p. 499, § 1, effective April 29. L. 2014: (2)(a)(II)(I) amended, (SB 14-067), ch. 12, p. 116, § 10, effective February 27; IP(2)(d)(II) amended, (HB 14-1045), ch. 137, p. 470, § 2, effective July 1; (2)(d)(IV.5) repealed and (2)(d)(V)(A) amended, (SB 14-109), ch. 104, p. 388, § 1, effective July 1. L. 2020: (1)(a) and (2)(c)(I) amended, (HB 20-1427), ch. 248, p. 1206, § 21, effective (see editor's note). L. 2021: (2)(d)(III) and (2)(f)(I) amended, (SB 21-181), ch. 429, p. 2839, § 1, effective July 6. L. 2025: IP(2), IP(2)(a)(II), and (2)(a)(II)(C) amended, (HB 25-1003), ch. 50, p. 233, § 3, effective July 1; IP(2) and (2)(b)(I) amended and (2)(b)(VI) added, (HB 25-1288), ch. 260, p. 1331, § 2, effective May 27. L. 2026: (2)(c)(V) added, (HB 26-1404), ch. 177, p. 1019, § 1, effective May 27.
Editor's note: (1) Amendments to the introductory portion to subsection (2)(a)(II) by Senate Bill 06-135 and Senate Bill 06-219 were harmonized.
(2) Subsection (1)(b)(II) provided for the repeal of subsection (1)(b), effective January 1, 2006. (See L. 2005, p. 916.)
(3) (a) Subsection (2)(a)(IV)(B) provided for the repeal of subsection (2)(a)(IV), effective July 1, 2007. (See L. 2006, p. 1122.)
(b) Subsection (2)(d)(IV)(B) provided for the repeal of subsection (2)(d)(IV), effective July 1, 2007. (See L. 2005, p. 916.)
(4) Amendments to subsection (2)(f) by House Bill 10-1320 and House Bill 10-1381 were harmonized.
(5) (a) Subsection (1)(c)(I)(C) provided for the repeal of said subsection (1)(c)(I)(C), effective July 1, 2011. (See L. 2009, p. 926.)
(b) Subsection (2)(a)(V)(B) provided for the repeal of subsection (2)(a)(V), effective July 1, 2011. (See L. 2010, p. 441.)
(c) Subsection (2)(b)(III)(B) provided for the repeal of subsection (2)(b)(III), effective July 1, 2011. (See L. 2009, p. 1772.)
(d) Subsection (2)(d)(V)(B) provided for the repeal of said subsection (2)(d)(V)(B), effective July 1, 2011. (See L. 2009, p. 1773.)
(e) Subsection (2)(f)(II)(B) provided for the repeal of subsection (2)(f)(II), effective July 1, 2011. (See L. 2010, p. 441.)
(6) (a) For the amendments to subsection (2)(e) that were in effect from May 5, 2011, to September 15, 2011, see chapter 149, Session Laws of Colorado 2011. (L. 2011, p. 516.)
(b) Subsection (2)(e)(III) provided for the repeal of subsection (2)(e), effective September 15, 2011. (See L. 2011, p. 516.)
(7) (a) Subsection (2)(a)(IV)(B) provided for the repeal of subsection (2)(b)(IV), effective July 1, 2012. (See L. 2010, p. 926.)
(b) Subsection (2)(d)(V)(C) provided for the repeal of subsection (2)(d)(V)(C), effective July 1, 2012. (See L. 2010, p. 934.)
(c) Subsection (2)(f)(III)(B) provided for the repeal of subsection (2)(f)(III), effective July 1, 2012. (See L. 2010, p. 934.)
(d) Subsection (6)(c)(II) provided for the repeal of subsection (6)(c), effective July 1, 2012. (See L. 2010, p. 927.)
(8) (a) Subsection (2)(b)(V)(B) provided for the repeal of subsection (2)(b)(V), effective July 1, 2013. (See L. 2011, p. 724.)
(b) Subsection (2)(c)(IV)(D) provided for the repeal of subsection (2)(c)(IV), effective July 1, 2013. (See L. 2011, p. 503.)
(c) Subsection (2)(f)(IV)(B) provided for the repeal of subsection (2)(f)(IV), effective July 1, 2013. (See L. 2011, p. 504.)
(d) Subsection (6)(b)(IV) provided for the repeal of subsection (6)(b), effective July 1, 2013. (See L. 2011, p. 504.)
(e) Subsection (6)(d)(II) provided for the repeal of subsection (6)(d), effective July 1, 2013. (See L. 2011, p. 725.)
(9) Section 27(2) of chapter 248 (HB 20-1427), Session Laws of Colorado 2020, provides that changes to this section take effect on the date of the governor's proclamation or January 1, 2021, whichever is later, only if, at the November 2020 statewide election, a majority of voters approve the ballot issue referred in accordance with section 39-28-401. The ballot question was referred to the registered electors on November 3, 2020, and was approved with the following vote count:
FOR: 2,134,608
AGAINST: 1,025,182
Cross references: For the legislative declaration contained in the 2005 act enacting this section, see section 1 of chapter 241, Session Laws of Colorado 2005. For the legislative declaration in HB 25-1288, see section 1 of chapter 260, Session Laws of Colorado 2025.
24-22-118. Revenue from nicotine products and additional tobacco taxes - 2020 tax holding fund - preschool programs cash fund - creation - definitions.
(1) The 2020 tax holding fund is hereby created in the state treasury. The fund consists of money credited to the fund pursuant to sections 39-28-110 (1)(b), 39-28.5-108 (1)(b), and 39-28.6-109 (2).
(2) The state treasurer shall transfer the money in the 2020 tax holding fund as follows:
(a) For the fiscal year commencing on July 1, 2020:
(I) Five million four hundred seventy-five thousand dollars to the tobacco tax cash fund created in section 24-22-117 (1);
(II) Two million twenty-five thousand dollars to the general fund;
(III) Eleven million one hundred sixty-six thousand dollars to the housing development grant fund created in section 24-32-721 (1);
(IV) Five hundred thousand dollars to the eviction legal defense fund created in section 13-40-127 (2);
(V) Twenty-five million dollars to the rural schools cash fund created in section 22-54-142; and
(VI) The remainder to the state education fund created in section 17 (4) of article IX of the state constitution.
(b) For the fiscal year commencing on July 1, 2021:
(I) Ten million nine hundred fifty thousand dollars to the tobacco tax cash fund created in section 24-22-117 (1);
(II) Four million fifty thousand dollars to the general fund;
(III) Eleven million one hundred sixty-seven thousand dollars to the housing development grant fund created in section 24-32-721 (1);
(IV) Five hundred thousand dollars to the eviction legal defense fund created in section 13-40-127 (2);
(V) Thirty million dollars to the rural schools cash fund created in section 22-54-142; and
(VI) The remainder to the state education fund created in section 17 (4) of article IX of the state constitution;
(c) For the fiscal year commencing on July 1, 2022:
(I) Ten million nine hundred fifty thousand dollars to the tobacco tax cash fund created in section 24-22-117 (1);
(II) Four million fifty thousand dollars to the general fund;
(III) Eleven million one hundred sixty-seven thousand dollars to the housing development grant fund created in section 24-32-721 (1);
(IV) Five hundred thousand dollars to the eviction legal defense fund created in section 13-40-127 (2);
(V) Thirty-five million dollars to the rural schools cash fund created in section 22-54-142; and
(VI) The remainder to the state education fund created in section 17 (4) of article IX of the state constitution;
(d) For the fiscal year commencing on July 1, 2023:
(I) Ten million nine hundred fifty thousand dollars to the tobacco tax cash fund created in section 24-22-117 (1);
(II) Four million fifty thousand dollars to the general fund; and
(III) The remainder to the preschool programs cash fund created in section 26.5-4-209;
(e) For each fiscal year commencing on or after July 1, 2024, but before July 1, 2027:
(I) Ten million nine hundred fifty thousand dollars to the tobacco tax cash fund created in section 24-22-117 (1);
(II) Four million fifty thousand dollars to the general fund;
(III) Twenty million dollars to the tobacco education programs fund created in section 24-22-117 (2)(c)(I); and
(IV) The remainder to the preschool programs cash fund created in section 26.5-4-209;
(f) For each fiscal year commencing on or after July 1, 2027:
(I) Ten million nine hundred fifty thousand dollars to the tobacco tax cash fund created in section 24-22-117 (1);
(II) Four million fifty thousand dollars to the general fund;
(III) Thirty million dollars to the tobacco education programs fund created in section 24-22-117 (2)(c)(I); and
(IV) The remainder to the preschool programs cash fund created in section 26.5-4-209;
(g) The state treasurer shall make the transfers required by this subsection (2) on an ongoing basis throughout the fiscal year. If there is insufficient revenue to transfer the specific amounts required by this subsection (2) for a fiscal year, then the state treasurer shall proportionally reduce each of the transfers.
(3) Repealed.
(4) The state auditor shall annually conduct a financial audit of the use of the money allocated and appropriated under this section.
Source: L. 2020: Entire section added, (HB 20-1427), ch. 248, p. 1207, § 22, effective (see editor's note). L. 2022: (2)(d)(III), (2)(e)(IV), and (2)(f)(IV) amended, (HB 22-1295), ch. 123, p. 844, § 65, effective July 1; (3) repealed, (HB 22-1295), ch. 123, p. 870, § 135, effective July 1.
Editor's note: (1) Section 27(2) of chapter 248 (HB 20-1427), Session Laws of Colorado 2020, provides that this section takes effect on the date of the governor's proclamation or January 1, 2021, whichever is later, only if, at the November 2020 statewide election, a majority of voters approve the ballot issue referred in accordance with section 39-28-401. The ballot question was referred to the registered electors on November 3, 2020, and was approved with the following vote count:
FOR: 2,134,608
AGAINST: 1,025,182
(2) Subsection (3) of this section was relocated to § 26.5-4-209.
ARTICLE 25
Colorado Interagency Working Group on School Safety
24-25-101. Legislative declaration.
24-25-101.5. Definitions.
24-25-102. Colorado interagency working group on school safety - creation - membership - operation - immunity.
24-25-103. Duties of the working group - mission.
24-25-104. Colorado working group on school safety cash fund - created - gifts, grants, and donations.
24-25-105. Repeal of article. (Repealed)
24-25-101. Legislative declaration.
(1) The general assembly finds and declares that:
(a) Ensuring the safety of students, teachers, and other employees while at school is a paramount concern for the citizens of Colorado;
(b) Improving the effective administration of school safety programs and funding is critical to providing safe schools; and
(c) Maintaining school safety through the most cost-effective use of limited state resources is in the interest of the people of the state of Colorado.
(2) Therefore, the general assembly declares that a working group comprised of state and local agency officials must be formed to increase coordination of school safety programs across state government and annually report to the governor, the speaker of the house of representatives, and the president of the senate on their activities.
Source: L. 2020: Entire article added, (SB 20-023), ch. 247, p. 1181, § 1, effective July 7.
24-25-101.5. Definitions.
As used in this article 25, unless the context otherwise requires:
(1) "Cash fund" means the Colorado working group on school safety cash fund created in section 24-25-104 (1).
(2) "Working group" means the Colorado interagency working group on school safety created in section 24-25-102 (1).
Source: L. 2025: Entire section added, (SB 25-275), ch. 377, p. 2060, § 136, effective August 6.
24-25-102. Colorado interagency working group on school safety - creation - membership - operation - immunity.
(1) There is created in the department of public safety the Colorado interagency working group on school safety. The working group has the powers and duties specified in this article 25.
(2) The working group consists of fourteen members, as follows:
(a) The executive director of the department of public safety, or his or her designee, who shall serve as the chair of the working group;
(b) The commissioner of education, or his or her designee, who shall serve as the vice-chair of the working group;
(c) The executive director of the department of public health and environment, or his or her designee;
(d) The executive director of the department of human services, or his or her designee;
(e) The attorney general, or his or her designee;
(f) The director of the school safety resource center;
(g) The director of the division of fire prevention and control or his or her designee;
(h) The state architect or his or her designee;
(i) A school district superintendent who serves an urban or suburban school district, appointed by an organization that represents school executives;
(j) A school district superintendent who serves a rural school district, appointed by an organization that represents school executives;
(k) A chief of police appointed by an organization that represents Colorado chiefs of police;
(l) A county sheriff appointed by an organization that represents Colorado county sheriffs; and
(m) Two members who are either a student or parent who attended a school or had a child attend a school at the time a school shooting occurred at the school, one appointed by the majority leader of the senate and one appointed by the minority leader of the senate.
(3) The members of the working group serve without compensation but the members appointed by the governor may be reimbursed for any actual and necessary travel expenses incurred in the performance of their duties pursuant to this article 25.
(4) The working group shall meet at least once per quarter to review information necessary for making recommendations.
(5) The working group may contract with a consultant to optimize the alignment and effectiveness of the school safety efforts in Colorado and identify evidence-based best practices. The general assembly may appropriate money to the working group for a consultant if requested by the working group.
(6) Members of the working group, employees, and consultants are immune from suit in any civil action based upon any official act performed in good faith pursuant to this article 25.
(7) The department of public safety shall convene the first meeting of the working group no later than December 31, 2022.
(8) Repealed.
Source: L. 2020: Entire article added, (SB 20-023), ch. 247, p. 1182, § 1, effective July 7. L. 2022: (1) and (7) amended and (8) added, (HB 22-1274), ch. 456, p. 3261, § 2, effective August 10. L. 2025: (1) amended, (SB 25-275), ch. 377, p. 2060, § 137, effective August 6.
Editor's note: Subsection (8)(b) provided for the repeal of subsection (8), effective July 1, 2023. (See L. 2022, p. 3261.)
24-25-103. Duties of the working group - mission.
(1) The mission of the working group is to enhance school safety through the cost-effective use of public resources. The work of the working group will focus on evidence-based best practices.
(2) The working group shall:
(a) Study and implement recommendations of the state auditor's report regarding school safety released September 2019;
(b) Consider program organization and recommend reorganization if necessary;
(c) Identify shared metrics to examine program effectiveness;
(d) Facilitate interagency coordination and communication;
(e) Increase transparency and accessibility of state grants and resources, particularly for school districts without a grant writer, which includes improving outreach and may include developing common grant applications;
(f) Facilitate and address data sharing, including allowable data sharing at the local level, when appropriate and allowable under state and federal law; and
(g) Address school safety program challenges in a coordinated way.
(3) The working group may use available resources, modalities, and nonmembers from interested members of the community to focus on specific subject matters.
(4) The school safety resource center serves as the clearinghouse for all materials produced by the working group.
(5) The division of criminal justice in the department of public safety, in consultation with the department of education, shall provide resources for data collection, research, analysis, and publication of the working group's findings and reports.
Source: L. 2020: Entire article added, (SB 20-023), ch. 247, p. 1183, § 1, effective July 7.
24-25-104. Colorado working group on school safety cash fund - created - gifts, grants, and donations.
(1) The department of public safety and the working group are authorized to accept gifts, grants, or donations, including in-kind donations from private or public sources, for the purposes of this article 25. All private and public money received through gifts, grants, or donations by the department of public safety or by the working group must be transmitted to the state treasurer, who shall credit the same to the Colorado working group on school safety cash fund, which is created in the state treasury. The state treasurer shall invest any money in the cash fund not expended for the purposes of this article 25 as provided in section 24-36-113. All interest and income derived from the investment and deposit of money in the cash fund must be credited to the cash fund. Any unexpended and unencumbered money remaining in the cash fund at the end of any fiscal year remains in the cash fund and shall not be credited or transferred to the general fund or any other fund.
(2) The department of public safety is not required to solicit gifts, grants, or donations from any source for the purposes of this article 25.
Source: L. 2020: Entire article added, (SB 20-023), ch. 247, p. 1184, § 1, effective July 7. L. 2025: (1) amended, (SB 25-275), ch. 377, p. 2060, § 138, effective August 6.
24-25-105. Repeal of article. (Repealed)
Source: L. 2020: Entire article added, (SB 20-023), ch. 247, p. 1184, § 1, effective July 7. L. 2022: Entire section repealed, (HB 22-1274), ch. 456, p. 3262, § 3, effective August 10.
Editor's note: This section was numbered as § 22-25-105 in SB 20-023 but was renumbered on revision for ease of location.
PRINCIPAL DEPARTMENTS
Cross references: For statutory provisions relating to the other principal departments of state government, see article 1 of title 8 (department of labor and employment); article 1 of title 17 (department of corrections); part 1 of article 2 of title 22 (department of education); article 1 of title 23 (department of higher education); article 21 of this title (department of state); part 1 of article 50 of this title (department of personnel); part 1 of article 1 of title 25 (department of public health and environment); article 1 of title 25.5 (department of health care policy and financing); article 1 of title 26 (department of human services); article 90 of title 27 (department of human services); title 28 (department of military and veterans affairs); article 1 of title 35 (department of agriculture); and part 1 of article 1 of title 43 (department of transportation).
ARTICLE 30
Department of Personnel - State Administrative Support Services
PART 1
GENERAL PROVISIONS
24-30-101. Department of personnel - state support services.
24-30-102. Construction of terms.
24-30-103. Property conveyed or leased to federal government. (Repealed)
24-30-104. Burnham Yard rail property site - required development planning.
24-30-105. Statewide language access assessment - report - legislative declaration - definitions.
PART 2
ACCOUNTS AND CONTROL
24-30-201. Accounts and control - controller.
24-30-202. Procedures - vouchers, warrants, and checks - rules - penalties - definitions - repeal.
24-30-202.4. Collection of debts due the state - state agency options - controller's duties - offsetting disbursements - definitions.
24-30-202.5. Assistant state solicitors general.
24-30-202.7. Lottery winnings offset - definitions.
24-30-203. Refunds of money erroneously collected.
24-30-203.5. Recovery audits - legislative declaration - contracting - reporting - definitions - repeal. (Repealed)
24-30-204. Fiscal year.
24-30-205. Duties of controller.
24-30-206. Work program - allotments - revision. (Repealed)
24-30-207. Reports of revenue and expenditures.
24-30-208. "Information Coordination Act" - policy - functions of the division of accounts and control. (Repealed)
24-30-209. Statewide financial and human resources information technology systems - billing process - statewide financial information technology systems cash fund - creation.
24-30-210. Cash fund solvency fund - creation - loans - report - legislative declaration.
PART 3
DIVISION OF BUDGETING
24-30-301 to
24-30-307. (Repealed)
PART 4
MOTOR VEHICLE POOLS
24-30-401 to
24-30-403. (Repealed)
PART 5
DIVISION OF PUBLIC WORKS
24-30-501 to
24-30-509. (Repealed)
PART 6
DIVISION OF AUTOMATED DATA PROCESSING
24-30-601 to
24-30-607. (Repealed)
PART 7
CLAIMS AGAINST STATE - CLAIMS COMMISSION
24-30-701 to
24-30-711. (Repealed)
PART 8
INCENTIVE AWARD SUGGESTION SYSTEM
24-30-801 to
24-30-805. (Repealed)
PART 9
TELECOMMUNICATIONS COORDINATION WITHIN STATE GOVERNMENT
24-30-901 to
24-30-909. (Repealed)
PART 10
OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE COURTS
24-30-1001. Office of administrative courts - administrative courts cash fund - creation.
24-30-1002. Appropriation of moneys.
24-30-1003. Administrative law judges - appointment - qualifications - standards of conduct.
PART 11
DIVISION OF CENTRAL SERVICES
24-30-1101. Legislative findings and declarations.
24-30-1102. Definitions.
24-30-1103. Central services.
24-30-1104. Functions of the department - definitions - rules.
24-30-1105. Powers of the executive director - penalties.
24-30-1106. Appeal from decisions of director.
24-30-1107. Existing and new equipment, personnel, applications, and systems subject to approval of director.
24-30-1108. Revolving fund - service charges - pricing policy.
24-30-1109. Reports. (Repealed)
24-30-1110. Division subject to termination. (Repealed)
24-30-1111. Postage meters - penalty for private use.
24-30-1112. Permanent assignment of vehicles - state agency - verification of minimum mileage - revocation.
24-30-1113. Assignment of vehicles to state agency officers or employees - report to legislative audit committee - definition.
24-30-1114. Restrictions on assignment of vehicles.
24-30-1115. Motor fleet management fund - creation.
24-30-1116. Vanpooling - state-owned vehicles - revolving account. (Repealed)
24-30-1117. Exclusive authority to acquire state-owned motor vehicles.
24-30-1118. Statewide travel management program - creation - duties of department - mandatory use by state employees - repeal. (Repealed)
PART 12
PRODUCTS AND SERVICES OF PERSONS WITH SEVERE DISABILITIES
24-30-1201. Definitions.
24-30-1202. Central nonprofit agency - procurement list. (Repealed)
24-30-1203. Purchasing requirements.
24-30-1204. Cooperation between state agencies.
PART 13
STATE BUILDINGS
24-30-1301. Definitions.
24-30-1302. State buildings - transfer.
24-30-1302.5. Office of the state architect.
24-30-1303. Office of the state architect - responsibilities.
24-30-1303.1. Code appeals board - creation - duties. (Repealed)
24-30-1303.5. Office of the state architect to prepare and maintain inventory of state property - vacant facilities.
24-30-1303.7. Controlled maintenance projects - flexibility in administering appropriations.
24-30-1303.8. Governor's mansion maintenance fund - creation - report.
24-30-1303.9. Eligibility for state controlled maintenance funding - legislative declaration.
24-30-1304. Life-cycle cost - legislative findings and declaration.
24-30-1305. Life-cycle cost - application - definitions.
24-30-1305.5. High performance standards - report - legislative declaration - definition.
24-30-1306. Acceptance of gifts and grants.
24-30-1307. Legislative declaration.
24-30-1308. Controlled maintenance funds - leased or rented facilities - secure facilities. (Repealed)
24-30-1309. Eligibility of certain buildings for controlled maintenance. (Repealed)
24-30-1310. Funding for capital construction, controlled maintenance, or capital renewal - definitions. (Repealed)
24-30-1311. Statewide planning function - responsibilities.
24-30-1312. Accessibility signage for facilities.
24-30-1313. Capitol complex renovation fund - created - repeal.
24-30-1314. Capitol complex renovation - report - repeal. (Repealed)
PART 14
NEGOTIATION OF CONSULTANTS' CONTRACTS
24-30-1401. Legislative declaration.
24-30-1402. Definitions.
24-30-1403. Professional services - listings - preliminary selections.
24-30-1404. Contracts - definition.
24-30-1405. Public notice.
24-30-1406. Criminal liability.
24-30-1407. Prior existing design plans.
24-30-1408. Emergency contracts.
PART 15
RISK MANAGEMENT
24-30-1501. Legislative declaration.
24-30-1502. Definitions.
24-30-1503. Risk management system.
24-30-1503.5. Risk management system - independent program.
24-30-1504. Powers and duties of the department.
24-30-1505. Powers of the executive director.
24-30-1506. Claims investigation, claims adjustment, and support services.
24-30-1507. Legal services.
24-30-1508. State claims board - creation.
24-30-1509. Powers and duties of the board.
24-30-1510. Risk management fund - creation - authorized and unauthorized payments.
24-30-1510.3. Risk management fund - state employee workers' compensation account - assessment of risks to institutions of higher education.
24-30-1510.5. Self-insured property fund - creation - authorized and unauthorized payments - executive director authorized to make payments.
24-30-1510.6. Claims arising prior to September 15, 1985. (Repealed)
24-30-1510.7. Workers' compensation for state employees - state employees' workers' compensation settlement agreements - definition.
24-30-1511. State treasurer to invest funds.
24-30-1511.5. State self-insurance funds - transfers - definition.
24-30-1512. Risk management fund and self-insured property fund not subject to insurance laws.
24-30-1513. State auditor - examination - report.
24-30-1514. Report. (Repealed)
24-30-1515. Compromise or settlement of claims - authority.
24-30-1516. Rules and regulations.
24-30-1517. Applicability.
24-30-1518. Repeal of part. (Repealed)
24-30-1519. Insurance policies.
24-30-1520. Authorization by law to settle claims or to pay judgments.
PART 16
GENERAL GOVERNMENT COMPUTER CENTER (GGCC)
24-30-1601 to
24-30-1608. (Repealed)
PART 17
COMMISSION ON INFORMATION MANAGEMENT
24-30-1701 to
24-30-1704. (Repealed)
PART 18
STATEWIDE TELECOMMUNICATIONS NETWORK
24-30-1801. Legislative declaration.
24-30-1801.5. Definitions. (Deleted by amendment)
24-30-1802. Advisory commission on telecommunications. (Repealed)
24-30-1803. Telecommunications plan - staff. (Deleted by amendment)
24-30-1804. Institutions of higher education - statewide telecommunications network.
24-30-1805. Demonstration project. (Deleted by amendment)
24-30-1806. Policy recommendations. (Deleted by amendment)
PART 19
STATE BUILDING ENERGY MANAGEMENT PLANS
24-30-1901 to
24-30-1907. (Repealed)
PART 20
UTILITY COST-SAVINGS MEASURES
24-30-2001. Definitions.
24-30-2002. Contracts for energy analysis and recommendations.
24-30-2003. Energy cost-savings contracts.
PART 21
ADDRESS CONFIDENTIALITY PROGRAM
24-30-2101. Short title.
24-30-2102. Legislative declaration.
24-30-2103. Definitions.
24-30-2104. Address confidentiality program - creation - substitute address - uses - service by mail - application assistance centers.
24-30-2105. Filing and certification of applications - authorization card.
24-30-2106. Change of name, address, or telephone number.
24-30-2107. Certification cancellation - records.
24-30-2108. Address use by state or local government agencies.
24-30-2109. Disclosure of actual address prohibited.
24-30-2110. Request for disclosure.
24-30-2111. Disclosure of address or unique identifying information in criminal and civil proceedings.
24-30-2112. Participation in the program - orders relating to allocation of parental responsibilities or parenting time.
24-30-2113. Rule-making authority.
24-30-2114. Surcharge - collection and distribution - address confidentiality program surcharge fund - creation - definitions.
24-30-2115. Address confidentiality program fund - creation - appropriations.
PART 22
LAURA HERSHEY DISABILITY SUPPORT ACT
24-30-2201 to
24-30-2213. (Repealed)
PART 23
OFFICE OF SUSTAINABILITY
24-30-2301. Legislative declaration.
24-30-2302. Definitions.
24-30-2303. Office of sustainability - creation - duties.
24-30-2304. Revolving fund - definition.
24-30-2305. Inflation reduction act elective pay - central submission of applications - cash fund - definition.
PART 24
PATHWAYS TO PUBLIC SERVICE PROGRAM
24-30-2401. Definitions.
24-30-2402. Pathways to public service program - creation - purpose - duties of the department.
PART 1
GENERAL PROVISIONS
Cross references: For the department of personnel as official custodian and trustee of all state archives and public records, see § 24-80-102.
24-30-101. Department of personnel - state support services.
On and after July 1, 1995, in an effort to eliminate unnecessary functions, avoid duplication, reduce costs, increase efficiency, and improve services to the state and the public, the rights, powers, duties, functions, obligations, and divisions of the department of administration are transferred to the department of personnel.
Source: L. 68: p. 95, § 45. C.R.S. 1963: § 3-25-1. L. 71: p. 103, § 3. L. 86: Entire section amended, p. 887, § 14, effective May 23. L. 95: Entire section R&RE, p. 626, § 4, effective July 1.
Cross references: (1) For the "Administrative Organization Act of 1968", see article 1 of this title.
(2) For the legislative declaration contained in the 1995 act repealing and reenacting this section, see section 112 of chapter 167, Session Laws of Colorado 1995.
ANNOTATION
Law reviews. For article, "Challenges to Agency Rules in Adjudicatory-Type Hearings", see 17 Colo. Law. 1991 (1988). For article, "Colorado's Central Panel of ALJs: The Hidden Executive Branch Judiciary", see 19 Colo. Law. 1307 (1990).
24-30-102. Construction of terms.
On and after July 1, 1995, when any law of this state refers to the executive director of the department of administration, said law shall be construed as referring to the executive director of the department of personnel, also referred to as the state personnel director as specified in section 14 of article XII of the state constitution. When any law of this state refers to the department of administration, said law shall be construed as referring to the department of personnel.
Source: L. 68: p. 95, § 45. C.R.S. 1963: § 3-25-2. L. 70: p. 101, § 1. L. 71: p. 118, § 6. L. 75: (8) added, p. 796, effective June 20; (1)(g), (2)(f), and (2)(g) added, p. 794, § 1, effective July 1; (1)(h) added, p. 815, § 1, effective July 18. L. 77: (2)(g) amended, p. 1169, § 1, effective March 26; (8) repealed, p. 1182, § 4, effective June 20; (1)(a) amended, p. 281, § 33, effective June 29; (1)(d), (1)(e), (5), and (6) repealed, p. 282, § 34, effective June 29. L. 87: (2)(d) repealed, pp. 349, 936, §§ 4, 1, effective July 1. L. 95: Entire section R&RE, p. 626, § 5, effective July 1. L. 2006: Entire section amended, p. 1499, § 33, effective June 1.
Cross references: For the legislative declaration contained in the 1995 act repealing and reenacting this section, see section 112 of chapter 167, Session Laws of Colorado 1995.
24-30-103. Property conveyed or leased to federal government. (Repealed)
Source: L. 70: p. 102, § 2. C.R.S. 1963: § 3-25-3. L. 77: Entire section repealed, p. 282, § 34, effective June 29.
24-30-104. Burnham Yard rail property site - required development planning.
The executive director of the department of personnel shall engage with stakeholders including the city and county of Denver, the department of transportation, the department of local affairs, the regional transportation district created in section 32-9-105, and the communities, including disproportionately impacted communities, as defined in section 24-4-109 (2)(b)(II), and registered neighborhood organizations in the vicinity of the Burnham Yards rail property to create a site plan to support transit-oriented development at the Burnham Yard rail property site and potential recommendations for how to suballocate parcels for various beneficial uses at the site. The executive director shall, in consultation with the other governmental stakeholders named in this section, actively reach out to the communities, including disproportionately impacted communities, and registered neighborhood organizations in the vicinity of the Burnham Yards rail property regarding all stages of the development of the property, provide meaningful opportunities for members of those communities to express their views regarding the development of the property, and endeavor to identify groups or individuals from those communities who are interested in and capable of representing the interests of those communities throughout the development process. The executive director shall also identify any additional stakeholders, and as appropriate already engaged stakeholders, to engage with who may have an interest in developing the suballocated parcels for the best use such as the department of local affairs for affordable housing, local housing authorities, and the great outdoors Colorado program for potential green space development. The site plan must consider opportunities for the site including front range passenger rail service, multi-family and affordable housing development, community benefits, green spaces, parkland, recreational opportunities, retail, and links to transit and multi-modal options to connect the site to the surrounding community. The site plan must promote the development and operation of quality public-private partnership opportunities and include a well-defined framework to facilitate collaboration between public and private entities in infrastructure development and operation and enable investment of public and private capital.
Source: L. 2022: Entire section added, (SB 22-176), ch. 387, p. 2755, § 2, effective June 7. L. 2023: Entire section amended, (HB 23-1233), ch. 245, p. 1331, § 16, effective May 23.
Cross references: For the legislative declaration in SB 22-176, see section 1 of chapter 387, Session Laws of Colorado 2022. For the legislative declaration in HB 23-1233, see section 1 of chapter 245, Session Laws of Colorado 2023.
24-30-105. Statewide language access assessment - report - legislative declaration - definitions.
(1) Legislative declaration. The general assembly finds and declares that:
(a) Almost nine hundred thousand Coloradans speak a language other than English, with the top five languages being Spanish, Chinese, Vietnamese, German, and Russian, and more than three hundred thousand Coloradans face linguistic barriers to accessing state government services and programs;
(b) Providing language access for state government services and programs is key to improving their effectiveness and supporting successful integration and inclusion of immigrants and their families into Colorado's civic, economic, and social life;
(c) It is the intent of the office of new Americans in the Colorado department of labor and employment to work administratively, in concert with the appropriate office of the department of personnel, to establish an interim language access working group made up of the principal departments of the state;
(d) Once established, the interim language access working group will work to draft a statewide language access policy for the consideration of the governor;
(e) Upon approval of the draft policy by the governor, a language access universal policy will be adopted and published by the division of human resources within the department of personnel;
(f) The language access assessment created in this section will assess the effectiveness of the language access universal policy in meeting the needs of multilingual Coloradans and will assess the readiness of principal departments to meet the statewide language access standards; and
(g) Upon completion of the assessment and not later than December 31, 2026, the interim language access working group will dissolve and transition to a community of practice maintained by the appropriate office of the department of personnel. To the extent possible, the department of personnel will work to ensure representation in the community of practice from linguistically diverse individuals and other community members with professional or lived experience with language access initiatives and from across state agencies, while limiting total participation to twenty people. The ongoing work of the language access community of practice will be informed by the work of the interim language access working group and will focus on implementing the language access universal policy with ongoing observation of best practices in the principal departments.
(2) Definitions. As used in this section, unless the context otherwise requires:
(a) "Department" means the department of personnel created in section 24-1-128.
(b) "Executive director" means the executive director of the department of personnel.
(c) "Language access assessment" or "assessment" means the statewide assessment on language access readiness required by subsection (3) of this section.
(d) "Language access universal policy" means the statewide policy standards for language access identified by the interim language access working group initiated by the office of new Americans and the department in 2025.
(e) "Linguistically diverse individuals" means individuals seeking to access state government services in the language of their choice who may have English language proficiency that requires language support in certain contexts. "Linguistically diverse individuals" includes individuals with limited English proficiency as provided by Title VI of the "Civil Rights Act of 1964," 42 U.S.C. sec. 2000d et seq.; federal executive order 13166, "Improving Access to Services for Persons with Limited English Proficiency," as published in 65 Fed. Reg. 50121 (August 11, 2000); and other federal anti-discrimination statutes.
(f) "Office of new Americans" means the Colorado office of new Americans created in section 8-3.7-103.
(g) "Other covered entity" means a public or private entity that receives state funding or contracts to administer programs or services for the public, including receiving state funding through grants, purchase-of-service contracts, or any other arrangement by which the state provides or otherwise makes available assistance in the form of money to a person for the purpose of rendering services to the public.
(h) "Principal department" means a principal department listed in section 24-1-110; except that "principal department" does not include the department of state, the department of the treasury, or the department of law.
(i) "Third-party entity" means an entity that has entered into an agreement with the department to conduct all or part of the language access assessment.
(3) Statewide language access assessment.
(a) The executive director, in partnership with the office of new Americans, shall assess or contract for an assessment of the readiness of principal departments to meet the language access standards outlined in the language access universal policy. In addition to any area of assessment deemed appropriate by the executive director, the office of new Americans, or the third-party entity, the assessment must identify:
(I) The needs of principal departments to meet the standards outlined in the language access universal policy, including requests for guidance, training, and technical assistance;
(II) Relevant language access materials from principal departments, including language access plans, position descriptions related to language access, procedures related to language access, and technical assistance or training materials;
(III) Information on current language services contracts, expenditures, and funding sources related to language access;
(IV) The public-facing responsibilities of principal departments, including designating which principal departments and their subcontractors do and do not have frequent contact with linguistically diverse individuals; and
(V) Other covered entities that may be subject to the standards outlined in the language access universal policy.
(b) A principal department shall provide any nonconfidential data and non-personally identifiable information that is necessary to complete the assessment, as available, upon request of the executive director or the third-party entity.
(c) (I) The executive director may enter into an agreement with one or more third-party entities to conduct all or part of the assessment.
(II) A third-party entity that enters into an agreement with the executive director to conduct all or part of the assessment must have demonstrated expertise in working with state governments on language access initiatives, such as developing language access policies or plans.
(III) The third-party entity may be from outside Colorado.
(4) Report.
(a) At the conclusion of the assessment and not later than December 31, 2026, the executive director, the office of new Americans, or the third-party entity, as appropriate, shall create a report summarizing the findings and recommendations of the assessment, including recommendations concerning:
(I) Improving efficiency, increasing quality of service, reducing cost, avoiding duplicative work, building on existing best practices, and minimizing administrative burden with respect to the provision of linguistically accessible government services and programs to linguistically diverse individuals;
(II) Addressing gaps and improving meaningful service through changes to language access services, practices, and procedures;
(III) Evaluating potential technological options for increasing language access, such as artificial intelligence; and
(IV) Determining what infrastructure is needed to ensure full and sustainable implementation of the standards outlined in the language access universal policy.
(b) The report must include an executive summary of the findings and recommendations that does not exceed two pages. The executive summary must be written in plain language and must be available in English and the other five most commonly spoken languages in the state by population of linguistically diverse individuals.
(c) (I) The executive director shall make the report on the assessment publicly available on the department's website.
(II) The director of the office of new Americans shall make the report on the assessment publicly available on the office's website.
(III) Upon request, the executive director or the director of the office of new Americans shall provide a copy of the report in any requested language.
(d) In January 2027, the department shall include, as part of its presentation during its "SMART Act" hearing required by section 2-7-203, a summary of the information included in the report required by this subsection (4) concerning the language access assessment.
Source: L. 2025: Entire section added, (HB 25-1153), ch. 315, p. 1646, § 1, effective May 30.
PART 2
ACCOUNTS AND CONTROL
24-30-201. Accounts and control - controller.
(1) The powers, duties, and functions concerning accounts and control as set forth in this part 2 are the responsibility of the state controller. The executive director of the department of personnel shall appoint the controller, subject to section 13 of article XII of the state constitution. The controller must be bonded in such amount as the executive director shall fix. The powers and duties of the controller are:
(a) To keep in continuous touch with the operations, plans, and needs of the several departments and other agencies of the state and with the sources and amounts of revenue and other receipts of the state;
(b) Repealed.
(c) To examine and approve work programs and quarterly allotments to the several departments and changes therein;
(d) To examine and approve all statements and reports on the financial condition and estimated future financial condition and the operations of the state government and the several budget units before any such reports are released to the governor, to the general assembly, or for publication; receive and deal with all requests for information as to financial conditions and operations of the state; and prepare such statements of unit costs and other cost statistics as may be required from time to time or requested by the governor or the general assembly;
(e) To manage the finances and financial affairs of the state, except as otherwise provided in section 5 (2) of article VIII of the state constitution and by law for institutions of higher education and for the Auraria higher education center;
(f) To coordinate all the procedures for financial administration and financial control so as to integrate them into an adequate and unified system, including the devising, prescribing, and installing of accounting forms, records, and procedures for all state agencies;
(g) To conduct all central accounting and fiscal reporting for the state as a whole;
(h) To maintain a current audit of all cash, cash receipts, and receivables; to preaudit and control the incurring of obligations; and to preaudit all disbursements;
(i) To issue warrants and checks for the payment of claims against the state;
(j) To assist state agencies in their efforts to recover money owing to the state;
(k) To control all supply stocks, property, and equipment in use and enforce the keeping of inventory accounts.
(l) Repealed.
(2) The powers, duties, and functions of the department of personnel include the powers, duties, and functions concerning accounts and control and the office of the controller. The office of the controller is a type 2 entity, as defined in section 24-1-105.
Source: L. 41: p. 52, § 12. CSA: C. 3, § 12. L. 47: p. 221, § 2. CRS 53: § 3-3-1. L. 59: p. 147, § 2. C.R.S. 1963: § 3-3-1. L. 64: p. 113, § 2. L. 68: pp. 99, 100, §§ 47, 49. L. 70: p. 107, § 4. L. 71: p. 1211, § 2. L. 73: p. 169, § 2. L. 75: (1)(j) added, p. 798, § 1, effective July 1. L. 79: (1)(k) added, p. 873, § 1, effective July 1. L. 84: (1)(l) added, p. 673, § 1, effective July 1. L. 86: (1)(b) repealed, pp. 961, 964, §§ 4, 4, effective May 27. L. 95: IP(1) and (1)(j) amended and (2) added, p. 641, § 34, effective July 1. L. 96: IP(1), (1)(j), and (2) amended, p. 1494, § 2, effective June 1. L. 99: (1)(l) amended, p. 687, § 7, effective August 4. L. 2009: (1)(l) amended, (HB 09-1218), ch. 132, p. 569, § 1, effective July 1. L. 2010: (1)(e) amended, (SB 10-003), ch. 391, p. 1848, § 24, effective June 9; (1)(l) and (2) amended, (HB 10-1422), ch. 419, p. 2082, § 61, effective August 11. L. 2014: (1)(i) amended, (HB 14-1391), ch. 328, p. 1449, § 5, effective June 5. L. 2017: IP(1) amended and (1)(l) repealed, (HB 17-1058), ch. 18, p. 57, § 1, effective March 8. L. 2021: (1)(j) amended, (SB 21-055), ch. 12, p. 76, § 10, effective March 21. L. 2022: (2) amended, (SB 22-162), ch. 469, p. 3419, § 192, effective August 10.
Cross references: (1) For the legislative declaration contained in the 1995 act amending the introductory portion to subsection (1) and subsection (1)(j) and enacting subsection (2), see section 112 of chapter 167, Session Laws of Colorado 1995. For the legislative declaration in the 2010 act amending subsection (1)(e), see section 1 of chapter 391, Session Laws of Colorado 2010.
(2) For the short title (the "Debbie Haskins 'Administrative Organization Act of 1968' Modernization Act") in SB 22-162, see section 1 of chapter 469, Session Laws of Colorado 2022.
ANNOTATION
Governor's veto of appropriation provision held proper. MacManus v. Love, 179 Colo. 218, 499 P.2d 609 (1972).
"Under the provisions of law" in former subsection (1)(b) must be read to limit the controller's authority over transfers to those transfers authorized by some source independent of this section. Colo. General Assembly v. Lamm, 700 P.2d 508 (Colo. 1985).
To read former subsection (1)(b) as applying to any transfer, not just those authorized by a source independent of this statute, would bring about an unconstitutional result, since it would amount to a delegation of the legislative appropriation power to the chief executive. Colo. General Assembly v. Lamm, 700 P.2d 508 (Colo. 1985).
24-30-202. Procedures - vouchers, warrants, and checks - rules - penalties - definitions - repeal.
(1) No disbursements shall be made in payment of any liability incurred on behalf of the state, other than from petty cash or by any alternative means of payment approved by fiscal rule promulgated by the controller, unless there has been previously filed with the office of the state controller a commitment voucher. The commitment voucher may be in the form of an advice of employment, a purchase order, a copy of a contract, or a travel authorization or in other form appropriate to the type of transaction as prescribed by the controller. Any state contract involving the payment of money by the state shall contain a clause providing that the contract shall not be deemed valid until it has been approved by the controller or such assistant as he or she may designate; except that a state contract for a major information technology project as defined in section 24-37.5-102 (19) shall contain a clause providing that the contract shall not be deemed valid until it has been approved by the chief information officer or the chief information officer's designee. Such contracts entered into on or after July 1, 1997, shall also contain a clause notifying the other party to the contract of the controller's authority to withhold debts owed to state agencies under the vendor offset intercept system pursuant to section 24-30-202.4 (3.5)(a)(I) and the types of debts that are subject to withholding under said system. The form and content of and procedures for filing such vouchers shall be prescribed by the fiscal rules promulgated by the controller.
(2) The controller, or such assistant as he may designate, shall examine each commitment voucher to ascertain whether or not the proposed expenditure is authorized by the appropriation and allotment to which it is proposed to be charged, whether or not the prices or rates are in accordance with law or administrative rules or are fair and reasonable and whether or not the amount of the expenditure exceeds the unencumbered balance of the allotment. The controller or his designated assistant shall record his approval or disapproval either on the face of each voucher or by electronically entering such approval or disapproval in the state computer-based accounting system. The head of the state department, institution, or other agency involved shall be notified of any proposed expenditures that are disallowed.
(3) In no event shall the head of any state department, institution, or other agency or the controller, either by himself or through any assistant designated by him, approve any commitment voucher involving expenditure of any sum in excess of the unencumbered balance of the appropriation to which the resulting disbursement would be charged. No person shall incur or order or vote for the incurrence of any obligation against the state in excess of or for any expenditure not authorized by appropriation and approved commitment voucher except as expressly authorized by this section. Any such obligation so raised in contravention of this section shall not be binding against the state but shall be null and void ab initio and incapable of ratification by any administrative authority of the state to give effect thereto against the state. But every person incurring or ordering or voting for the incurrence of such obligation and his surety shall be jointly and severally liable therefor.
(4) The controller is hereby authorized to grant special authority for any department, institution, or other agency, during any fiscal year, to make specific purchases of supplies or materials to be used in the next ensuing fiscal year or to enter into contracts in anticipation of appropriations already made or to be made for the next ensuing fiscal year for any purpose authorized by any existing law, including contracts by the department of transportation for state highway reconstruction, repair, maintenance, and capacity expansion projects to be funded by the revenues appropriated out of the capital construction fund under section 24-75-302 (2), but in no case for any amount exceeding that necessary to meet the requirements for the first quarter of the next fiscal year. No such purchase order shall be issued nor contract entered into unless such purchase order or contract has been approved and countersigned by the controller or the controller's authorized agent, whose duty it shall be to see that the special authority so granted is not exceeded; except that this restriction shall not apply to contracts for capital outlay projects for which appropriations have been provided for obligations to be incurred in two or more fiscal years. Payments made at the close of a fiscal year under such authority shall be treated as deferred charges to the appropriations and expenses of the next ensuing fiscal year until the beginning of such year.
(4.3) (a) The controller may retroactively adjust encumbrances against appropriations for contracts and grants authorized pursuant to the authority to spend money from the "American Rescue Plan Act of 2021" cash fund, created in section 24-75-226 (4)(a)(II), if the funding source for the contract or grant is subsequently refinanced. Any retroactive contract or grant encumbrance adjustments between funding sources authorized in this section are not permitted to increase the total encumbrance.
(b) This subsection (4.3) is repealed, effective July 1, 2027.
(5) (a) No money of the state or for which the state is responsible shall be withdrawn from the treasury or otherwise disbursed for any purpose except to pay obligations under expenditures authorized by appropriation and allotment and not in excess of the amount so authorized. Each such expenditure shall have been authorized by the head of the department, institution, or other agency by or for which the expenditure was made. Such authorization shall contain the manual or facsimile signature of the head of the department, institution, or agency or any assistant designated by him. The controller, or his authorized agent, shall have approved a commitment voucher therefor, and a claim on a prescribed form shall have been submitted to and approved by the controller or his agent. The provisions of this section shall not be construed to apply to withdrawals of funds from any state depository bank for immediate redeposit in any other state depository bank or for investment.
(b) If a state department, institution, or agency enters into a contract to purchase real property or any interest therein that has a total purchase price of more than one hundred thousand dollars, the contract must contain a contingency clause that requires the state to secure an appraisal of the subject real property or interest therein prior to closing by an independent appraiser licensed in the state of Colorado to substantiate the purchase price and that makes the closing of the purchase contingent on the approval of the contract by the state controller. When the state department, institution, or agency entering into the contract receives the appraisal, the state department, institution, or agency shall provide a copy of the appraisal to the state controller. This subsection (5)(b) shall not apply to the acquisition of property by the department of transportation for the construction, maintenance, or supervision of the public highways of this state, nor shall it apply to any additional financed purchase of an asset or certificate of participation agreement entered into pursuant to the master lease program authorized by part 7 of article 82 of this title 24.
(c) (I) If a state department, institution, or agency enters into an option to purchase real property or any interest therein that has a total purchase price of more than one hundred thousand dollars, the appraisal requirement described in paragraph (b) of this subsection (5) must occur prior to closing on the purchase of the real property or interest therein.
(II) Prior to a state department, institution, or agency entering into an option to purchase real property or any interest therein that has a total purchase price of more than one hundred thousand dollars, the state department, institution, or agency shall obtain a written broker opinion of value completed by an independent broker licensed in the state of Colorado or an appraisal by an independent appraiser licensed in the state of Colorado of the subject property in order to complete a thorough analysis of the property or interests therein being considered. The opinion of value or the appraisal must be forwarded to the state controller prior to the state controller approving the option to purchase contract.
(5.5) Any commitment voucher that provides that the financial obligations of the state in subsequent fiscal years are contingent upon funds for that purpose being appropriated, budgeted, and otherwise made available shall not be deemed to create any state multiple-fiscal year direct or indirect debt or other financial obligation whatsoever for purposes of section 20 (4)(b) of article X of the state constitution. If a financed purchase of an asset or certificate of participation agreement is subject to the requirement of specific authorization by the general assembly under part 8 of article 82 of this title 24, such committees shall make a recommendation to the general assembly concerning whether to authorize the financed purchase of an asset or certificate of participation agreement. The department of personnel and the Colorado commission on higher education shall maintain comparative data which will assist in determining the relative costs to the state, over the entire term of the arrangement, of financing the purchase or lease of property through pay-as-you-go methods, certificates of participation, or other arrangements.
(6) The controller shall prescribe the form of warrants and checks to be drawn upon the state treasurer. All warrants and checks for approved expenditures and claims shall be drawn and issued under direction of the controller or his or her authorized agent and transmitted to the department of the treasury to be recorded.
(7) Each warrant and check drawn and issued shall be signed by the controller and countersigned by the state treasurer. Facsimiles of such signature and countersignature may be affixed by a mechanical device. The signature of the controller on a warrant or check, however affixed, shall constitute full and complete authority to the state treasurer to pay the amount thereof upon presentation to him or her.
(8) Each warrant or check drawn and issued shall bear a notation clearly printed in a prominent position upon its face stating that it shall be void after six months from its date of issue. Upon satisfactory proof furnished of loss or destruction, during said six-month period, of any warrant or check drawn and issued in payment of an approved expenditure or claim, the controller shall cause a duplicate of such lost or destroyed warrant or check to be drawn and issued in favor of the original payee or his or her assignee, as the case may be. The issuing state agency shall thereupon void said original warrant or check, and, if it thereafter is presented for payment, the state treasurer shall refuse payment thereof.
(8.5) Any other provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding, the controller may, after adequate notification to the state treasurer, make payment by means of an electronic fund transfer. Payment by electronic fund transfer shall be in lieu of payment by state warrant or check and shall discharge the controller's obligation with respect to payment. Any unauthorized use of the electronic fund transfer capability shall be reported to the controller within twenty-four hours after occurrence or disclosure becomes known. Immediately upon discovery of unauthorized use, measures that will prevent further unauthorized use shall be implemented.
(9) (a) Every warrant and check drawn and issued that has not been presented to the state treasurer for payment and remains unpaid shall be canceled pursuant to fiscal rules promulgated by the state controller and transferred to the unclaimed property trust fund created in section 38-13-801 (1)(a); except that the amount of any warrant or check drawn on the wildlife cash fund created in section 33-1-112 (1), other than a warrant or check refunding a license fee submitted as part of an unsuccessful limited license application, shall be credited to that fund and the amount of any warrant or check representing money received by the federal government shall be processed in accordance with federal program guidelines for disposition of those moneys.
(b) If at any time thereafter application is made to the controller for reissuance of any warrant or check that has been canceled and expunged from the records and it appears that the expenditure or claim that the canceled warrant or check represented is still valid and unpaid, the controller shall issue a new warrant or check, and the amount thereof shall be charged to the fund or account to which the amount of the canceled warrant or check was previously credited.
(c) In the event of any conflict between this subsection (9) and any provision of the "Revised Uniform Unclaimed Property Act", article 13 of title 38, the provisions of the "Revised Uniform Unclaimed Property Act" shall control; except that this subsection (9) shall control with regard to:
(I) A tax warrant or check;
(II) Repealed.
(III) That portion of a warrant or check representing moneys received from the federal government;
(IV) A warrant or check drawn on the wildlife cash fund created in section 33-1-112 (1), C.R.S., other than a warrant or check refunding a license fee submitted as part of an unsuccessful limited license application.
(d) Notwithstanding any provision of this subsection (9) to the contrary, the provisions of this subsection (9) shall not apply to any warrant or check drawn by an institution of higher education or by the Auraria higher education center that is exempt from the state fiscal rules pursuant to paragraph (b) of subsection (13) of this section.
(10) The attorney general shall be the legal adviser of the controller and to the attorney general shall be referred any question concerning the legality of any obligation by or claim against the state.
(11) It is the duty of the controller to keep up to date a detailed list of all sources from which moneys accrue to the state, classified according to the departments, institutions, and other agencies responsible for the collection of the moneys, showing for each of the several units: The several kinds of taxes, fees, and other charges collected or to be collected; the name of the person responsible for collecting public moneys from each such source; and the name of the employee actually engaged in collecting, handling, and depositing such moneys. The controller has the power, and it is his duty with respect to each state tax, to prescribe or approve such accounts and procedures as will provide adequate accounting and current internal audit control of unpaid taxes and other charges and the proceeds of collections and as will furnish the information required for the maintenance of the general accounts of the state. The controller has the power and it is his duty to prescribe the forms to be used by the several units for licenses, permits, and certificates for which fees are prescribed by law and to establish controls of the supplies of such forms.
(12) The controller shall prescribe and cause to be installed a unified and integrated system of accounts for the state. Except as otherwise provided in sections 24-75-201 (2) and 25.5-4-201, C.R.S., such system shall be based upon the accrual system of accounting, as enunciated by the governmental accounting standards board, which shall include:
(a) A set of budgetary control accounts for each fund, which shall be maintained pursuant to the accounts and control functions of the department of personnel;
(b) A set of general controlling proprietary and operating accounts for each fund, which shall be maintained pursuant to the accounts and control functions of the department of personnel, recording the transactions of the fund in summary form and showing the actual current assets, prepaid expenses, current liabilities, deferred credits to income, reserves, actual income, actual expenditures, and current surplus or deficit as the case may be;
(c) A uniform classification of the sources of revenue and nonrevenue receipts, which shall be observed by all the departments, institutions, and other agencies;
(d) A standard classification of the departments, institutions, and other agencies and their principal functions, by major functions of government;
(e) A standard classification of expenditures by activities;
(f) A unified classification of ordinary recurring expenses, extraordinary expenses, and capital outlays, respectively, by the kinds of commodities and services involved, which shall be observed in reporting expenditures, in preparing budget estimates, and in allotting appropriations.
(13) (a) The controller shall promulgate fiscal rules to carry out the functions assigned and the procedures prescribed by this section. Such rules relating to the forms, records, and procedures involved in financial administration shall be binding upon the several departments, institutions, including institutions of higher education except as otherwise provided in paragraph (b) of this subsection (13), and other agencies of the state and upon their several officers and employees.
(b) It is the intent of the general assembly that fiscal rules promulgated by the controller shall be applicable to any institution of higher education; except that the governing board of an institution of higher education that has adopted fiscal procedures and has determined that the fiscal procedures provide adequate safeguards for the proper expenditure of the moneys of the institution may elect to exempt the institution from the fiscal rules promulgated by the controller pursuant to this subsection (13), including any procedures or forms required by law to be promulgated by the controller and any review or approval required to be performed by the controller, and shall not be required to comply with rules promulgated pursuant to this subsection (13) or with the provisions of subsection (1), (5)(b), (20.1), (22), or (26) of this section. The provisions of this paragraph (b) shall also apply to the board of directors of the Auraria higher education center with regard to the expenditure of moneys of the auraria higher education center.
(c) Repealed.
(d) An institution of higher education, including the auraria higher education center, that is exempt from the state fiscal rules pursuant to paragraph (b) of this subsection (13) shall continue to provide to the controller such information as is necessary to enable the controller to meet the obligations set forth in subsection (11) of this section and sections 24-17-102 and 24-30-204; except that an institution of higher education shall be required to provide only such data and reports as are readily accessible to the institution or presently generated by the institution.
(14) If the controller or any other state employee knowingly draws or issues any warrant or check upon the state treasurer not authorized by law, he or she commits a class 2 misdemeanor.
(15) Any person holding the office of state treasurer or controller or any other state officer or employee who, directly or indirectly, receives from any person, body of persons, association, or corporation, for himself or herself or otherwise than in behalf of the state, any reward, compensation, or profit, either in money or other property or thing of value, in consideration of the loan to or deposit with any such person, body of persons, association, or corporation of any public money or other property belonging to the state or in the consideration of the approval or payment of any claim against the state or any other agreement or arrangement touching the use of such money or uses or knowingly permits the use of any such money for any purposes not authorized by law commits a class 6 felony and shall be punished as provided in section 18-1.3-401, C.R.S.
(16) Any person who, directly or indirectly, pays or gives to anyone holding the office of state treasurer or controller or to any other state officer or employee or other person any reward or compensation, either in money or other property or things of value, in consideration of the loan to or deposit with any such person, body of persons, association, or corporation of any public money belonging to the state or for which the state is responsible or in consideration of the approval or payment of any claim against the state or of any other agreement or arrangement touching the use of such money commits a class 6 felony and shall be punished as provided in section 18-1.3-401, C.R.S.
(17) Any state officer or employee who willfully neglects or refuses to perform the officer's or employee's duty as prescribed in this section or as prescribed in the fiscal rules promulgated by the controller in conformity with this section commits a civil infraction.
(18) (a) to (e) Repealed.
(f) All state agencies are required to make and preserve records of employees' wages and hours and other conditions and practices of employment.
(g) to (j) Repealed.
(19) If any money of the state is paid out from any appropriation or fund for any purpose and such money, or any part thereof, is for any reason subsequently refunded to the state, the controller is authorized to order the money so refunded to be credited to the fund or appropriation from which it was originally paid.
(20) Repealed.
(20.1) The controller, or the controller's designee, is hereby authorized, upon written request made to the controller, to allow any state department, institution, or agency to draw upon its appropriation a sum set by fiscal rule promulgated by the controller, which fiscal rule may not authorize a sum in excess of two thousand five hundred dollars, and considered appropriate for the circumstances, to be used for the payment of incidental expenses. Items of postage, express, telegrams, and other incidental expenses may be paid from such moneys. At the end of each month, or as often as is practicable, the department, institution, or agency making such incidental expenditures shall submit a voucher to the controller covering the total amount of such expenditures and shall submit a list of all such expenditures, together with proper receipts, if any, and the controller shall draw the controller's warrant or check against the proper appropriation to cover all items of expenditures that the controller approves. The controller is also authorized, upon the request of any state department, institution, or agency, to allow a reasonable advance of moneys to employees and officials for authorized travel on official state business not to exceed an amount set by fiscal rule promulgated by the controller.
(21) If, as a result of fire or other insured loss to state property, the state receives moneys from any insurance company, the controller is authorized to deposit such moneys in an account from which he may, without regard to the provisions of part 3 of article 37 of this title and without further legislative action, reimburse contractors for repair, replacement, or reconstruction of state properties damaged or destroyed under a contract executed in accordance with state contracting laws and procedures in effect at the time of the execution of the contract. If the amount of insurance recovery exceeds the actual cost of such repair, replacement, or reconstruction, any balance remaining in said account after payment of actual costs shall revert to the general fund. With respect to the loss or damage to state property which is not insured or the loss or damage to state property which is insured but the insurance does not fully cover the loss or damage, the controller may, with the approval of the governor, without further legislative action, reimburse contractors for the repair, replacement, or reconstruction of such state property up to a maximum amount of one hundred thousand dollars; except that the controller is not authorized to provide for reimbursement for repair, replacement, or reconstruction of state property if the state is self-insured for loss or damage to state property.
(22) The controller shall make uniform and equitable fiscal rules controlling the types of perquisites which may be allowed state employees in the executive branch of government in addition to their regular salaries. Such rules shall include the eligibility of employees to receive such perquisites, the charges to be made for such perquisites, and the method of payment of such charges to the state. Before such rules become effective, they shall be approved by the governor. No employee shall have authority to grant to himself or herself or to any other employee under his or her supervision any perquisite, nor shall any employee receive any perquisite without full payment therefor, except as provided for by statute or by the rules of the controller as authorized in this section. Charges prescribed by such rules shall be reviewed annually by the controller.
(23) Repealed.
(24) (a) The controller shall promulgate fiscal rules requiring that disbursements made in the payment of any liability incurred on behalf of the executive branch of this state be made within forty-five days after such liability was incurred or shall pay interest from the forty-fifth day at a rate of one percent per month on the unpaid balance until the account is paid in full.
(b) As used in subsection (24)(a) of this section, "liability incurred on behalf of the state" means the receipt of supplies, as defined in section 24-101-301 (47), or services, as defined in section 24-101-301 (42), and receipt of a correct notice of the amount due, by the state agency procuring such supplies or services from a nongovernmental entity. No liability is incurred on behalf of the state if a good faith dispute exists as to the state's obligation to pay all or a portion of the account. Nothing in this subsection (24) shall be construed to affect any provision for the time of payment in a written contract between a state agency procuring services or supplies and a nongovernmental entity.
(25) (a) (Deleted by amendment, L. 2005, p. 278, § 9, effective August 8, 2005.)
(b) On July 1, 1985, the controller shall, by fiscal rule, provide for the assessment of a reasonable monetary penalty based on cost against any person who issues a check returned for insufficient funds to any state department, institution, or agency in payment of fees, fines, or other moneys due the state.
(c) For the purposes of this subsection (25), "insufficient funds" means not having a sufficient balance in account with a bank or other drawee for the payment of a check when presented for payment within thirty days after issue.
(d) The penalty provided for in this subsection (25) shall be assessed in addition to any other penalties provided by law except for the penalty provided in section 24-35-114 relating to checks issued to the department of revenue.
(26) The controller shall promulgate equitable fiscal rules concerning travel policies applicable to state employees, including methods of transportation, travel advances, reimbursements, travel allowances, use of travel agents, and use of state or privately owned vehicles, and may promulgate such rules for the implementation of a state travel policy as he deems necessary to assure fair and reasonable expenditures.
(27) To avoid the imposition of duplicative or excessively burdensome or numerous reporting requirements upon state-supported institutions of higher education and to encourage the promulgation of reporting rules that, to the extent possible, require such institutions to provide only data and reports readily accessible to or presently generated by such institutions, the controller shall consult with the Colorado commission on higher education before adopting, amending, or repealing rules affecting or creating reporting requirements applicable to such institutions.
(28) (a) As used in this subsection (28):
(I) (A) "Charitable food organization" means a charitable organization, including a faith-based organization, exempt from federal taxation under the provisions of the federal "Internal Revenue Code of 1986", as amended, that distributes food directly or indirectly for hunger relief in the community.
(B) "Charitable food organization" includes a school food authority as defined in section 22-32-120 (8).
(II) "State agricultural products" means agricultural products produced in the state in accordance with section 24-103-907 (3)(a).
(b) The controller shall promulgate fiscal rules to clarify that state agencies may, under review of the state controller, provide for advance payment for the purchase of state agricultural products by a charitable food organization using state grant money, and may include, as the controller deems necessary, rules for the implementation of the advance payment policy including proper accounting, compliance with industry standards, and determination that the advance payment provides a benefit to the state at least equal to the cost and risk of the advance payment.
Source: L. 47: p. 224, § 3. CSA: C. 3, § 12(1). L. 49: pp. 199, 200, 683, §§ 1, 1, 4. CRS 53: § 3-3-2. L. 57: pp. 120, 121, §§ 1, 1. L. 61: pp. 130-132, §§ 1, 1, 1. L. 63: pp. 125, 230, §§ 1, 2. C.R.S. 1963: § 3-3-2. L. 65: p. 142, § 1. L. 69: pp. 74, 75, §§ 1, 1. L. 70: p. 107, § 4. L. 71: pp. 85, 87, 89, 91, §§ 1, 1, 1, 1. L. 72: p. 576, § 1. L. 73: p. 168, § 1. L. 75: (23) added, p. 801, § 1, effective July 1. L. 76: (20) amended, p. 610, § 1, effective April 16; (21) amended, p. 305, § 43, effective May 20. L. 77: (5)(a) amended, p. 1170, § 1, effective May 27; (18) R&RE, p. 1171, § 1, effective July 1; (15) and (16) amended, p. 879, § 52, effective July 1, 1979. L. 80: (13) amended, p. 570, § 2, effective March 17. L. 83: (20) amended and (13)(c), (20.1), and (24) added, pp. 858, 859, 860, 882, §§ 2, 4, 5, 1, effective July 1. L. 84: (25) added and (18)(j) and (20) amended, pp. 675, 677, §§ 1, 2, effective July 1. L. 85: (26) added, p. 875, § 11, effective June 6. L. 86: (18)(a), (18)(e), and (18)(h) amended and (18)(j) repealed, pp. 889, 890, §§ 1, 3, effective April 13. L. 86, 2nd Ex. Sess.: (21) amended, p. 68, § 14, effective August 25. L. 87: (20.1) amended, pp. 934, 1118, §§ 1, 2, effective April 22. L. 88: (3) amended, p. 912, § 2, effective March 18; (21) amended, p. 1431, § 11, effective June 11. L. 89: (15) and (16) amended, p. 844, § 111, effective July 1. L. 90: (26) amended, p. 1307, § 1, effective July 1. L. 91: (2) amended and (8.5) added, p. 881, § 1, effective March 12; (5)(b) amended, p. 1058, § 14, effective July 1. L. 92: IP(12) amended, p. 1080, § 1, effective March 14; (18)(h) repealed, p. 1056, § 1, effective May 21. L. 93: (5.5) added, p. 2031, § 1, effective June 9; (18)(a) to (18)(e), (18)(g), and (18)(i) repealed, p. 35, § 1, effective July 1. L. 95: (5.5) amended, p. 641, § 35, effective July 1; (9)(c) added, p. 522, § 1, effective July 1; (27) added, p. 40, § 3, effective January 1, 1996. L. 96: (18)(f) amended and (23) repealed, p. 1495, §§ 3, 4, effective June 1; (10), (12)(a), and (12)(b) amended, p. 1517, § 50, effective June 3; (4) amended, p. 1869, § 3, effective June 6. L. 97: (20.1) amended, p. 49, § 1, effective March 21; (1) amended, p. 941, § 1, effective July 1. L. 98: IP(12) amended, p. 849, § 4, effective May 26. L. 99: (5.5) and (26) amended, p. 688, § 8, effective August 4. L. 2001: (1) amended, p. 114, § 1, effective August 8. L. 2002: (15) and (16) amended, p. 1531, § 244, effective October 1. L. 2003: IP(12) amended, p. 14, § 1, effective March 5; (8) amended, p. 557, § 1, effective August 6; (9)(c)(II) repealed, p. 721, § 2, effective August 6. L. 2005: (25)(a) amended, p. 278, § 9, effective August 8. L. 2006: IP(12) amended, p. 2010, § 72, effective July 1. L. 2008: (9)(a) amended and (9)(c)(IV) added, p. 1075, §§ 1, 2, effective May 22. L. 2010: (1) and (20.1) amended, (HB 10-1181), ch. 351, pp. 1630, 1619, §§ 26, 1, effective June 7; (9)(d) added and (13) and (22) amended, (SB 10-003), ch. 391, pp. 1849, 1848, §§ 26, 25, effective June 9. L. 2013: (5)(b) amended and (5)(c) added, (HB 13-1235), ch. 375, p. 2206, § 1, effective June 5. L. 2014: (6) to (9), (14), and (20.1) amended, (HB 14-1391), ch. 328, p. 1449, § 6, effective June 5. L. 2017: (26) amended, (HB 17-1058), ch. 18, p. 58, § 2, effective March 8; (9)(a) amended, (SB 17-046), ch. 116, p. 414, § 1, effective August 9; (24)(b) amended, (HB 17-1051), ch. 99, p. 350, § 64, effective August 9. L. 2018: (1) amended, (HB 18-1421), ch. 395, p. 2354, § 1, effective June 6. L. 2019: IP(9)(c) amended, (SB 19-088), ch. 110, p. 467, § 7, effective July 1, 2020. L. 2021: (5)(b) and (5.5) amended, (HB 21-1316), ch. 352, p. 2024, § 31, effective July 1; (1) amended, (HB 21-1236), ch. 211, p. 1116, § 16, effective September 7; (14) and (17) amended, (SB 21-271), ch. 462, p. 3225, § 411, effective March 1, 2022. L. 2023: (28) added, (HB 23-1087), ch. 45, p. 170, § 1, effective August 7. L. 2024: (4.3) added, (HB 24-1466), ch. 429, p. 2934, § 7, effective June 5. L. 2025: (9)(a) amended, (SB 25-300), ch. 428, p. 2449, § 29, effective August 6.
Editor's note: (1) The effective date for amendments made to this section by chapter 216, L. 77, was changed from July 1, 1978, to April 1, 1979, by chapter 1, First Extraordinary Session, L. 78, and was subsequently changed to July 1, 1979, by chapter 157, § 23, L.79. See People v. McKenna, 199 Colo. 452, 611 P.2d 574 (1980).
(2) Subsection (13)(c)(II) provided for the repeal of subsection (13)(c), effective June 30, 1985, and subsection (20) provided for the repeal of subsection (20), effective June 30, 1985. (See L. 83, p. 859.)
Cross references: For the legislative declaration contained in the 1995 act amending subsection (5.5), see section 112 of chapter 167, Session Laws of Colorado 1995. For the legislative declaration contained in the 2002 act amending subsections (15) and (16), see section 1 of chapter 318, Session Laws of Colorado 2002. For the legislative declaration in the 2010 act adding subsection (9)(d) and amending subsections (13) and (22), see section 1 of chapter 391, Session Laws of Colorado 2010. For the legislative declaration in HB 24-1466, see section 1 of chapter 429, Session Laws of Colorado 2024.
ANNOTATION
Law reviews. For article, "The Fair Labor Standards Act: Criminal and Civil Liability", see 14 Colo. Law. 1802 (1985).
Section not meant to avoid paying on contracts. A state department cannot receive the benefits of a contract and then refuse to pay for the benefits, based on minor divergences from the statutory prerequisites prescribed by this section. Adams County Cmty. Center for Retarded & Seriously Handicapped, Inc. v. Dept. of Institutions, 197 Colo. 448, 594 P.2d 1046 (1979).
Exempt employee entitled to compensatory time, but not to cash payment, for overtime he worked even though time was not used up before he left state employment. Dias v. Dept. of Institutions, 740 P.2d 545 (Colo. App. 1987).
24-30-202.4. Collection of debts due the state - state agency options - controller's duties - offsetting disbursements - definitions.
(1) A state agency is responsible for the collection of any debt owed to it. The controller shall advise the various state agencies concerning the collection of debts due the state through the agencies, in accordance with the fiscal rules promulgated by the controller in accordance with subsection (2) of this section, to achieve the prompt collection of debts due the agencies.
(2) (a) The controller shall promulgate fiscal rules for collection of debts due to a state agency; except that the fiscal rules do not apply to those debts under the jurisdiction of the department of revenue referred to in section 24-35-108 (1)(a). The controller shall include in the fiscal rules any requirements for a state agency to refer a debt to private counsel or a private collection agency under subsection (2)(b) of this section or to certify a debt to the department of revenue under subsection (2.5) of this section.
(b) A state agency may refer the debt to a private counsel or private collection agency. The controller shall establish a list of private counsel or private collection agencies that a state agency may contract with for debt collection services. The controller must select the private counsel or private collection agencies included in the list of private counsel or private collection agencies through competition pursuant to the "Procurement Code", articles 101 to 112 of this title 24.
(2.5) A state agency may certify the amount of a debt due to the state to the department of revenue in order for the department to provide lottery offsets in accordance with section 24-30-202.7, and an offset of a state tax refund due the debtor under section 39-21-108 (3), and to the registry operator in order for the registry operator to provide limited gaming offsets in accordance with the "Gambling Payment Intercept Act", part 6 of article 35 of this title 24.
(3) (a) (Deleted by amendment, L. 2021.)
(b) (Deleted by amendment, L. 91, p. 839, § 1, effective January 1, 1992.)
(c) The controller, with the consent of the state treasurer, is authorized to release or compromise any debt due the state, but only in accordance with the rules applicable thereto. Such rules may provide delegated authority and criteria for release and compromise of debts and may include provisions to prohibit the referral of debts for tax offset based on the age or amounts of debts.
(d) Proceeds of debts collected by a state agency or by a private counsel or private collection agency are accounted for and paid into the fund from which the receivable was derived, and if the fund is no longer in existence, it is paid into the general fund.
(e) Repealed.
(f) and (g) (Deleted by amendment, L. 2021.)
(3.5) (a) (I) The controller shall approve disbursements from state funds from the state's central accounting system in accordance with section 24-30-202 (2). If there is an unpaid balance or debt owed, a state agency may direct the controller to withhold the amount of the disbursement that does not exceed the amount of:
(A) Any unpaid child support debt as set forth in section 14-14-104, or child support arrearages that are the subject of enforcement services provided pursuant to section 26-13-106, as certified by the department of human services;
(B) Any unpaid balance of tax, accrued interest, or other charges specified in article 21 of title 39, that is subject to offset under section 39-21-108 (3), and owing by the payee according to the records of the controller;
(C) Any unpaid debt owing to the state or any agency thereof by a payee, the amount of which is found to be owing as a result of a final agency determination or the amount of which has been reduced to judgment;
(D) Any unpaid loan due to the student loan division of the department of higher education as set forth in section 23-3.1-104 (1)(p), found to be owing to the division by a payee as a result of final agency determination; or
(E) Any amount required to be paid to the unemployment compensation fund pursuant to articles 70 to 82 of title 8, the amount of which has been determined to be owing as a result of a final agency determination or judicial decision or that has been reduced to judgment by the division of unemployment insurance in the department of labor and employment.
(II) Any money withheld for payment of child support debt or child support arrearages pursuant to subsection (3.5)(a)(I) of this section is deposited with the state treasurer for disbursement by the department of human services. For all names and amounts certified by the department of human services pursuant to section 26-13-111, the controller shall provide to the department of human services the payees' names and associated amounts deposited with the state treasurer pursuant to this subsection (3.5)(a)(II) and any other identifying information as required by the department of human services.
(III) Any money withheld for payment of an unpaid balance of tax, interest, or other charges specified in subsection (3.5)(a)(I) of this section and subject to offset under section 39-21-108 (3), is deposited with the state treasurer. For all names and amounts submitted by the executive director of the department of revenue pursuant to section 39-21-114 (10), the controller shall provide to the department the payees' names and associated amounts deposited with the state treasurer pursuant to this subsection (3.5)(a)(III).
(IV) Any money withheld for payment of an unpaid debt owing to the state pursuant to subsection (3.5)(a)(I) of this section is deposited with the state treasurer. For all names and amounts certified by a state agency pursuant to subsection (3.5)(a) of this section, the controller shall provide to the state agency the payees' names and associated amounts deposited with the state treasurer pursuant to this subsection (3.5)(a)(IV).
(V) All money withheld for payment of a student loan division debt pursuant to subsection (3.5)(a)(I) of this section is deposited with the state treasurer for disbursement by the state treasurer to the division. For all names and amounts certified by the division pursuant to section 23-3.1-104 (1)(q), the controller shall provide to the division the payees' names and associated amounts deposited with the state treasurer pursuant to this subsection (3.5)(a)(V).
(VI) The controller shall deposit with the state treasurer any money withheld for payment of unemployment compensation debt pursuant to subsection (3.5)(a)(I) of this section, and the state treasurer shall credit the money to the unemployment compensation fund. For all names and amounts certified by the division of unemployment insurance, the controller shall provide to the division the payees' names and associated amounts deposited with the state treasurer pursuant to this subsection (3.5)(a)(VI).
(VII) The controller shall pay any approved disbursement in excess of the unpaid balance or debt to the approved payee.
(b) In the event that there are debts for unpaid child support, as set forth in section 26-13-111, debts for an unpaid balance of tax, interest, or other charges pursuant to article 21 of title 39, and other debts owing to the state or any agency thereof as set forth in subsection (3.5)(a)(I) of this section, the amount withheld pursuant to subsection (3.5)(a)(I) of this section is credited to the unpaid debts and is applied first to those unpaid debts in the order they appear in this subsection (3.5)(b), and any remaining amounts withheld pursuant to subsection (3.5)(a)(I) of this section is applied based on the priority determined by the controller.
(c) (Deleted by amendment, L. 2021.)
(4) (Deleted by amendment, L. 99, p. 689, § 9, effective August 4, 1999.)
(5) (Deleted by amendment, L. 2021.)
(6) Any contract awarded to private counsel or private collection agency shall require that the contractor remain licensed under the contractor's respective occupational licensing statutes or rules during the term of the contract. The contract shall require that a private counsel or private collection agency shall at all times act in compliance with the provisions of the "Colorado Fair Debt Collection Practices Act", article 16 of title 5, and in compliance with any rules promulgated by the controller.
(7) (Deleted by amendment, L. 2021.)
(8) (a) A collection fee for a private collection agency shall not exceed eighteen percent of the debt, and the fee for private counsel shall not exceed twenty-five percent of the debt. All fees collected and retained by a private collection agency or private counsel as payment for services collecting a debt that are not deposited in the state treasury are not subject to article 36 of title 24 or section 20 of article X of the state constitution.
(b) The debtor is liable for repayment of the total amount of a debt due to the state, including collection fee charged by the private collection agency or private counsel, plus allowable fees and costs pursuant to subsection (8)(c) of this section and the delinquency charge pursuant to section 24-79.5-102.
(c) If a debt due to the state is litigated and the state prevails, in addition to the collection fee, the debtor shall also be liable for the following:
(I) Reasonable attorney fees as may be determined by the court;
(II) Court costs as described in section 13-16-122; and
(III) Fees incurred by the state's attorney in processing the litigation and collection of any judgment.
(d) If a debt due to the state is in the form of a check, draft, or order not paid upon presentment, the state agency is entitled, in addition to a collection fee, if applicable, to collect damages as specified in section 13-21-109 (1)(b)(II) and (2)(a).
(9) and (10) (Deleted by amendment, L. 2021.)
Source: L. 75: Entire section added, p. 798, § 2, effective July 1. L. 83: (2) amended, p. 793, § 3, effective June 3. L. 84: (3)(a) and (3)(d) amended and (3)(e) added, p. 1013, § 2, effective April 27. L. 91: (3)(a) amended and (7) added, p. 802, § 1, effective May 24; (2), (3)(a)(I), (3)(b), (3)(d), (3)(e), and (4) amended and (5) and (6) added, p. 839, § 1, effective January 1, 1992. L. 95: (1), (2), and (3)(a) amended, p. 642, § 36, effective July 1. L. 97: (3.5) added, p. 941, § 2, effective July 1. L. 99: (3)(d), (4), and (7) amended, p. 689, § 9, effective August 4. L. 2002: (3)(a)(II) amended, p. 101, § 4, effective August 7. L. 2006: (1), (2), (3)(c), (3)(d), and (5) amended and (2.5), (8), and (9) added, p. 1159, § 2, effective May 25. L. 2010: (2), (8)(a), and (8)(b) amended, (HB 10-1181), ch. 351, p. 1619, § 2, effective June 7; (2) and (3)(a)(II) amended, (SB 10-003), ch. 391, p. 1850, § 28, effective June 9. L. 2011: (3)(f) added, (SB 11-226), ch. 190, p. 733, § 3, effective May 19; (3)(g) added, (SB 11-051), ch. 286, p. 1331, § 1, effective August 10. L. 2012: IP(3.5)(a)(I), (3.5)(a)(I)(E), and (3.5)(a)(VI) amended, (HB 12-1120), ch. 27, p. 107, § 22, effective June 1. L. 2013: (2.5) amended and (10) added, (SB 13-247), ch. 296, p. 1581, § 1, effective August 7. L. 2017: (6) and IP(9) amended, (HB 17-1238), ch. 260, p. 1173, § 20, effective August 9. L. 2018: (2) amended, (HB 18-1047), ch. 155, p. 1096, § 9, effective April 23; (8)(a) amended, (HB 18-1057), ch. 314, p. 1896, § 2, effective July 1, 2019. L. 2021: Entire section amended, (SB 21-055), ch. 12, p. 67, § 1, effective March 21.
Editor's note: (1) Amendments to subsection (3)(a) by Senate Bill 91-15 and Senate Bill 91-140 were harmonized.
(2) Amendments to subsection (2) by Senate Bill 10-003 and House Bill 10-1181 were harmonized.
(3) The effective date for amendments to this section by House Bill 12-1120 (chapter 27, Session Laws of Colorado 2012) was changed from August 8, 2012, to June 1, 2012, by House Bill 12S-1002 (First Extraordinary Session, chapter 2, p. 2432, Session Laws of Colorado 2012.)
(4) Subsection (3)(e)(II) provided for the repeal of subsection (3)(e), effective July 1, 2021. (See L. 2021, p. 67.)
Cross references: For the legislative declaration contained in the 1995 act amending subsections (1), (2), and (3)(a), see section 112 of chapter 167, Session Laws of Colorado 1995. For the legislative declaration in the 2010 act amending subsections (2) and (3)(a)(II), see section 1 of chapter 391, Session Laws of Colorado 2010.
ANNOTATION
The general rule is that the failure to exhaust administrative remedies prior to seeking judicial relief is a jurisdictional defect. This is especially true in cases involving tax matters, and thus, if there are complete, adequate, and speedy administrative remedies available for alleged tax irregularities, a taxpayer must exhaust them. Kendal v. Cason, 791 P.2d 1227 (Colo. App. 1990).
Taxpayers' claim that offsets of their tax refunds against their debts violated the statutory scheme because their debts had not been reduced to judgment could have been raised at administrative hearing. Each of the debts involved was under $500 and the taxpayers were given the opportunity for an administrative hearing before the offset as required by this section. Kendal v. Cason, 791 P.2d 1227 (Colo. App. 1990).
24-30-202.5. Assistant state solicitors general.
The state solicitor general shall appoint such assistants as are reasonably necessary to perform the legal services which the controller may require to carry out the duties of collection of debts due the state.
Source: L. 75: Entire section added, p. 799, § 2, effective July 1. L. 96: Entire section amended, p. 1517, § 51, effective June 1.
24-30-202.7. Lottery winnings offset - definitions.
(1) As used in this section, unless the context otherwise requires:
(a) "Debtor" means a person who owes an outstanding debt.
(b) "Outstanding debt" means any unpaid debt due to the state that is certified by a state agency pursuant to section 24-30-202.4 (2.5), including the collection fee and any allowable fees and costs pursuant to section 24-30-202.4 (8).
(2) A state agency shall provide to the department of revenue the social security number of the debtor, the amount of the debtor's outstanding debt, and any other identifying information required by the department of revenue.
(3) Upon receiving notification from the department of revenue that a lottery cash prize winner appears among those certified by a state agency, the department of revenue shall notify the debtor, in writing, that the state intends to offset the debtor's outstanding debt against the debtor's winnings from the state lottery.
(4) Upon notification by the department of revenue of amounts deposited with the state treasurer pursuant to section 44-40-113, the proceeds of the outstanding debt collected shall be accounted for and deposited into the fund or funds required pursuant to section 24-30-202.4 (3)(d).
(5) The executive director of the department of personnel shall promulgate rules pursuant to article 4 of this title establishing procedures to implement this section.
Source: L. 2011: Entire section added, (SB 11-051), ch. 286, p. 1331, § 2, effective August 10. L. 2013: (1)(b) amended, (SB 13-247), ch. 296, p. 1583, § 2, effective August 7. L. 2018: (4) amended, (HB 18-1027), ch. 31, p. 363, § 10, effective October 1; (4) amended, (HB 18-1375), ch. 274, p. 1706, § 37; effective October 1. L. 2021: (1)(b), (2), and (3) amended, (SB 21-055), ch. 12, p. 77, § 11, effective March 21.
24-30-203. Refunds of money erroneously collected.
(1) In all cases not otherwise provided for by specific statute, whenever any money not owed or belonging to the state of Colorado is collected or received by the state of Colorado through mistake either of law or of fact, upon proper showing made to the satisfaction of the head of the department of the state of Colorado that collected or received such money and upon proper voucher drawn by such department head and approved by the governor and controller, the controller is authorized to draw a warrant or check to refund such money to the person from whom it was collected or received. Such refund shall be made from the fund into which such money was deposited. No refund made under the authority of this section shall be made unless a claim therefor is filed within one year after such money is collected or received by the state of Colorado.
(2) Nothing in this section shall alter, modify, or amend the procedure, time of filing claims, or methods of processing or paying refunds specifically provided for in other statutes.
Source: L. 47: p. 810, §§ 1, 2. CSA: C. 153, §32(1). CRS 53: § 130-2-5. C.R.S. 1963: §130-2-5. L. 2014: (1) amended, (HB 14-1391), ch. 328, p. 1451, § 7, effective June 5.
ANNOTATION
Payments recoverable where claim properly and timely filed. Where a claim is properly and timely filed within this section through an action by a racing association against the state treasurer and the racing commission to recover "breakage" payments paid under protest, such payments are recoverable. Colo. Racing Comm'n v. Brush Racing Ass'n, 136 Colo. 279, 316 P.2d 582 (1957).
24-30-203.5. Recovery audits - legislative declaration - contracting - reporting - definitions - repeal. (Repealed)
Source: L. 2010: Entire section added, (HB 10-1176), ch. 402, p. 1937, § 1, effective June 10. L. 2011: (1)(a), (1)(b)(I), (1)(b)(II), IP(2)(b), (2)(c), (3)(a), (3)(b)(II), (4), (5), and (6)(c) amended and (8) and (9) added, (HB 11-1307), ch. 270, p. 1226, § 1, effective June 2. L. 2013: (3)(a), (4)(b), and (6)(c) amended, (HB 13-1286), ch. 311, p. 1640, § 1, effective May 28. L. 2021: (10) added, (SB 21-222), ch. 92, p. 374, § 1, effective May 4.
Editor's note: Subsection (10) provided for the repeal of this section, effective July 1, 2022. (See L. 2021, p. 374.)
24-30-204. Fiscal year.
(1) The fiscal year of the state government shall commence on July 1 and end on June 30 of each year. This fiscal year shall be followed in making appropriations and in financial reporting and shall be uniformly adopted by all departments, institutions, and agencies in the state government except the department of transportation, which shall prepare and submit its budget as required by law. Financial statements for the fiscal year shall be submitted by each department, institution, or agency to the controller no later than August 25. Notwithstanding section 24-1-136 (11)(a)(I), the controller shall prepare financial statements in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles and submit these financial statements to the governor and the general assembly no later than September 20. The controller may grant an extension, not to exceed twenty days, to any department, institution, or agency because of administrative hardship in complying with this section.
(2) (a) For fiscal years commencing on or after July 1, 1992, in addition to the financial statements required pursuant to subsection (1) of this section, all departments, institutions, and agencies in the state government shall submit a quarterly report of financial information to the controller no later than thirty days after the last day of each fiscal year quarter. Such report shall include such financial information as deemed reasonable and necessary by the controller. Such report shall include, but shall not be limited to, sufficient financial information for the controller to determine if such department, institution, or agency is properly crediting monthly revenues and accruals and is properly billing the federal government, in a timely manner, for reimbursement of state moneys expended for federal programs. The controller shall work with all departments to develop a format for such quarterly report of each department, institution, and agency.
(b) Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph (a) of this subsection (2), a governing board that implements a capital construction or acquisition project as described in section 23-1-106 (9), C.R.S., is not required to submit for the project quarterly reports as described in paragraph (a) of this subsection (2).
(3) The official books of the state shall be closed no later than thirty-five days after the end of the fiscal year. As of this date, all adjusted revenue, expenditures, and expense accounts shall be closed into the state accounting system in order to divide the financial details of the state into comparable periods.
Source: L. 41: p. 55, § 14. CSA: C. 3, § 14. CRS 53: § 3-3-4. C.R.S. 1963: § 3-3-4. L. 81: Entire section amended, p. 1162, § 1, effective May 29. L. 91: Entire section amended, p. 1058, § 15, effective July 1. L. 92: Entire section amended, p. 1080, § 2, effective March 4. L. 94: Entire section amended, p. 828, § 2, effective July 1, 1995. L. 2011: (2) amended, (HB 11-1301), ch. 297, p. 1430, § 28, effective August 10. L. 2016: (2)(b) amended, (SB 16-204), ch. 222, p. 852, § 3, effective June 6. L. 2017: (1) amended, (HB 17-1058), ch. 18, p. 58, § 3, effective March 8.
Cross references: For the budget procedure by the Colorado department of transportation, see § 43-1-113.
24-30-205. Duties of controller.
The controller shall be devoted full time to the duties of the office and shall follow no other gainful employment. During the consideration of the budget and appropriation bills by the general assembly, it is the controller's duty, upon demand by either house of the general assembly or any committee thereof, to appear before the same and render any testimony, explanation, or assistance required. The controller shall have the technical and clerical assistance as, in the opinion of the governor, the execution of the controller's duties requires. The controller shall be furnished with suitable office space for the performance of the controller's duties.
Source: L. 41: p. 55, § 16. CSA: C. 3, § 16. CRS 53: § 3-3-6. C.R.S. 1963: § 3-3-6. L. 96: Entire section amended, p. 1495, § 5, effective June 1.
24-30-206. Work program - allotments - revision. (Repealed)
Source: L. 41: p. 56, § 17. CSA: C. 3, § 17. CRS 53: § 3-3-7. C.R.S. 1963: § 3-3-7. L. 88: Entire section amended, p. 908, § 1, effective March 18. L. 91: Entire section amended, p. 865, § 1, effective April 20. L. 96: (1)(a) amended, p. 789, § 1, effective May 23; (1)(a) and (1)(b) amended, p. 1517, § 52, effective June 1. L. 97: Entire section repealed, p. 1095, § 8, effective May 27; entire section repealed, p. 378, § 12, effective August 6.
24-30-207. Reports of revenue and expenditures.
(1) Repealed.
(2) On or before September 15 of each year, the controller shall prepare and transmit to the executive director of the department of revenue a graphic summary of statewide revenue and expenditures of the state as published in the controller's comprehensive annual financial report. The executive director of the department of revenue shall print such summary each year in a prominent location on the state income tax instruction booklet. The summary shall be for the last complete fiscal year.
(3) For the 1997-98 fiscal year and for each fiscal year thereafter, the controller shall prepare a report for the state ascertaining the amount of uncommitted reserves, as defined in section 24-75-402 (2)(h), credited to each state cash fund, as defined by section 24-75-402 (2)(b). The state controller shall include in the report the amount of the capital reserve that is excluded from the definition of "uncommitted reserves" in accordance with section 24-75-402 (2)(h)(I). The state auditor shall audit such report. Such report must be delivered to the office of state planning and budgeting and to the joint budget committee of the general assembly on or before September 20 of each year.
Source: L. 41: p. 57, § 18. CSA: C. 3, § 18. CRS 53: § 3-3-8. C.R.S. 1963: § 3-3-8. L. 68: p. 100, § 48. L. 83: Entire section amended, p. 884, § 1, effective May 31. L. 96: (1) repealed, p. 1271, § 202, effective August 7. L. 98: (3) added, p. 1317, § 2, effective June 1. L. 2015: (3) amended, (HB 15-1280), ch. 176, p. 573, § 2, effective May 11.
Editor's note: Section 5 of chapter 176 (HB 15-1280), Session Laws of Colorado 2015, provides that changes to this section by the act apply to fiscal years that begin on or after July 1, 2014.
Cross references: For the legislative declaration contained in the 1996 act repealing subsection (1), see section 1 of chapter 237, Session Laws of Colorado 1996.
24-30-208. "Information Coordination Act" - policy - functions of the division of accounts and control. (Repealed)
Source: L. 83: Entire section repealed, p. 846, § 86, effective July 1.
Cross references: For the present provision concerning information coordination, see § 24-1-136.
24-30-209. Statewide financial and human resources information technology systems - billing process - statewide financial information technology systems cash fund - creation.
(1) The executive director of the department of personnel or the executive director's designee shall develop a method for billing users of the department's statewide financial and human resources information technology systems services for the full cost of the service, including materials; depreciation related to capital costs; labor; and administrative overhead. Any moneys generated from the billing required pursuant to this subsection (1) shall be deposited in the statewide financial information technology systems cash fund created in subsection (2) of this section.
(2) (a) There is hereby created in the state treasury the statewide financial information technology systems cash fund. The fund consists of moneys deposited into the fund pursuant to subsection (1) of this section. The moneys in the fund are annually appropriated to the department of personnel for the costs of information technology maintenance and upgrades and for the direct and indirect costs of the department in connection with statewide financial and human resources information technology systems.
(b) All interest earned on the investment of moneys in the statewide financial information technology systems cash fund is credited to the fund. Any unexpended and unencumbered moneys in the fund at the end of any fiscal year remain in the fund and do not revert to the general fund or any other fund.
Source: L. 2015: Entire section added, (SB 15-246), ch. 134, p. 412, § 1, effective May 1.
24-30-210. Cash fund solvency fund - creation - loans - report - legislative declaration.
(1) The general assembly hereby finds and declares that:
(a) When fee-funded programs use multi-year licensing and service periods, state agencies may have revenue shortfalls during off-cycle years in which revenue collections are dramatically lower than they are in on-cycle years;
(b) The COVID-19 pandemic has reduced fee revenue or disrupted the fee cycle for many state programs, which exacerbates the need for a multi-year, cash-management solution to smooth out revenue fluctuations;
(c) Fee-funded state programs should be able to weather the current and future economic downturns without resorting to large, short-term fee increases on businesses and Coloradans as they are recovering from the downturn; and
(d) Providing fee-funded programs adequate, multi-year flexibility to manage cash flows while also maintaining the existing safeguards against overcharging fee payers for services is an important state function.
(2) The cash fund solvency fund, referred to in this section as the "fund", is hereby created in the state treasury. The fund consists of money credited to the fund pursuant to subsection (4) of this section and any other money that the general assembly may appropriate or transfer to the fund. The state treasurer shall credit all interest and income derived from the deposit and investment of money in the cash fund solvency fund to the fund.
(3) (a) Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary, upon the request of the office of state planning and budgeting, the state controller may transfer money from the fund to another cash fund if the state controller determines that:
(I) The primary source of revenue in the cash fund is from fee revenue;
(II) The fee revenue is collected on a multi-year licensing and service period or there has been an unexpected, significant decrease in fee revenue collected; and
(III) The cash fund will have a deficit based on current expenditures in the absence of a significant fee increase, unless a loan is made to the cash fund.
(b) After a transfer to a cash fund under subsection (3)(a) of this section, the state controller shall transfer the same amount of money from the cash fund back to the cash fund solvency fund in one or more installments. The state controller shall establish the terms of the repayment transfers, which may be over multiple fiscal years.
(4) On July 1, 2021, the state treasurer shall transfer three million one hundred thousand dollars from the general fund to the fund.
(5) Notwithstanding section 24-1-136 (11), on or before November 1, 2021, and each November 1 thereafter, the state controller shall annually report to the joint budget committee and the office of state planning and budgeting about any transfers that have been made under this section, the terms of the repayment transfers, and the amount that has been repaid.
Source: L. 2021: Entire section added, (SB 21-283), ch. 303, p. 1819, § 1, effective June 23.
PART 3
DIVISION OF BUDGETING
24-30-301 to 24-30-307. (Repealed)
Source: L. 76: Entire part repealed, p. 306, § 44, effective May 20.
Editor's note: This part 3 was numbered as article 31 of chapter 3, C.R.S. 1963. For amendments to this part 3 prior to its repeal in 1976, consult the Colorado statutory research explanatory note and the table itemizing the replacement volumes and supplements to the original volume of C.R.S. 1973 beginning on page vii in the front of this volume.
PART 4
MOTOR VEHICLE POOLS
24-30-401 to 24-30-403. (Repealed)
Source: L. 92: Entire part repealed, p. 1007, § 5, effective July 1.
Editor's note: (1) This part 4 was numbered as article 4 of chapter 3, C.R.S. 1963. For amendments to this part 4 prior to its repeal in 1992, consult the Colorado statutory research explanatory note and the table itemizing the replacement volumes and supplements to the original volume of C.R.S. 1973 beginning on page vii in the front of this volume.
(2) Provisions relating to motor vehicle pools are now located in part 11 of this article.
PART 5
DIVISION OF PUBLIC WORKS
24-30-501 to 24-30-509. (Repealed)
Source: L. 75: Entire part repealed, p. 822, § 21, effective July 18.
Editor's note: (1) This part 5 was numbered as article 1 of chapter 106, C.R.S. 1963. For amendments to this part 5 prior to its repeal in 1975, consult the Colorado statutory research explanatory note and the table itemizing the replacement volumes and supplements to the original volume of C.R.S. 1973 beginning on page vii in the front of this volume.
(2) When the division of public works was abolished in 1975, its powers, duties, and functions were transferred to the office of state planning and budgeting. These were then repealed in 1979; except that the substantive provisions of § 24-30-508, concerning the provision of maintenance for the state capitol buildings group, were retained in § 24-82-101.
PART 6
DIVISION OF AUTOMATED DATA PROCESSING
24-30-601 to 24-30-607. (Repealed)
Source: L. 87: Entire part repealed, p. 984, § 7, effective July 1.
Editor's note: This part 6 was numbered as article 26 of chapter 3, C.R.S. 1963. For amendments to this part 6 prior to its repeal in 1987, consult the Colorado statutory research explanatory note and the table itemizing the replacement volumes and supplements to the original volume of C.R.S. 1973 beginning on page vii in the front of this volume.
PART 7
CLAIMS AGAINST STATE - CLAIMS COMMISSION
24-30-701 to 24-30-711. (Repealed)
Source: L. 77: Entire part repealed, p. 1176, § 2, effective January 1, 1978.
Editor's note: This part 7 was numbered as article 10 of chapter 130, C.R.S. 1963. For amendments to this part 7 prior to its repeal in 1978, consult the Colorado statutory research explanatory note and the table itemizing the replacement volumes and supplements to the original volume of C.R.S. 1973 beginning on page vii in the front of this volume.
PART 8
INCENTIVE AWARD SUGGESTION SYSTEM
24-30-801 to 24-30-805. (Repealed)
Source: L. 2004: Entire part repealed, p. 304, § 2, effective April 7.
Editor's note: This part 8 was numbered as article 20 of chapter 3, C.R.S. 1963. For amendments to this part 8 prior to its repeal in 2004, consult the Colorado statutory research explanatory note and the table itemizing the replacement volumes and supplements to the original volume of C.R.S. 1973 beginning on page vii in the front of this volume.
PART 9
TELECOMMUNICATIONS COORDINATION WITHIN STATE GOVERNMENT
24-30-901 to 24-30-909. (Repealed)
Source: L. 2008: Entire part repealed, p. 1131, § 18, effective May 22.
Editor's note: This part 9 was numbered as article 30 of chapter 3, C.R.S. 1963. For amendments to this part 9 prior to its repeal in 2008, consult the Colorado statutory research explanatory note and the table itemizing the replacement volumes and supplements to the original volume of C.R.S. 1973 beginning on page vii in the front of this volume. The provisions of this part 9 were relocated to part 5 of article 37.5 of this title. For the location of specific provisions, see the editor's notes following those sections that were relocated in said part 5.
PART 10
OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE COURTS
Law reviews: For article, "Hidden in Plain Sight: The Office of Administrative Courts' ADR Program", see 43 Colo. Law. 31 (Jan. 2014).
24-30-1001. Office of administrative courts - administrative courts cash fund - creation.
(1) Effective July 1, 2005, there is created the office of administrative courts in the department of personnel, the head of which is the executive director of the department of personnel. The office of administrative courts is a type 2 entity, as defined in section 24-1-105, and exercises its powers and performs its duties and functions under the department of personnel.
(2) The executive director of the department of personnel shall establish and maintain administrative offices and courts for the office of administrative courts in Denver, and in the southern region and on the western slope of the state, in addition to such other offices and courts as the executive director deems necessary to carry out the powers, duties, and functions of the office of administrative courts.
(3) The executive director of the department of personnel shall establish any fees or cost allocation billing process necessary to pay for the direct and indirect costs of the office of administrative courts. The department of personnel shall not establish a fee for individuals or beneficiaries that have a right to an administrative hearing without prior approval of the associated state agency and formal rule-making related to the fee pursuant to article 4 of this title. All moneys collected shall be transmitted to the state treasurer, who shall credit the same to the administrative courts cash fund, which fund is hereby created. The moneys in the fund shall be subject to annual appropriation by the general assembly for the direct and indirect costs of the office of administrative courts. All interest derived from the deposit and investment of moneys in the fund shall be credited to the fund. Any unexpended and unencumbered moneys remaining in the fund at the end of a fiscal year shall remain in the fund and shall not be credited or transferred to the general fund or any other fund.
Source: L. 76: Entire part added, p. 585, § 19, effective May 24. L. 87: (1) amended, p. 936, § 2, effective March 13. L. 91: (3) added, p. 1338, § 56, effective July 1. L. 95: (1), (3)(a), and (3)(c) amended and (4) added, p. 645, § 43, effective July 1. L. 2005: Entire section R&RE, p. 851, § 2, effective June 1. L. 2009: (3) added, (HB 09-1150), ch. 309, p. 1665, § 2, effective August 5. L. 2022: (1) amended, (SB 22-162), ch. 469, p. 3420, § 193, effective August 10.
Cross references: (1) For the legislative declaration contained in the 1995 act amending subsections (1), (3)(a), and (3)(c) and adding subsection (4), see section 112 of chapter 167, Session Laws of Colorado 1995.
(2) For the short title (the "Debbie Haskins 'Administrative Organization Act of 1968' Modernization Act") in SB 22-162, see section 1 of chapter 469, Session Laws of Colorado 2022.
24-30-1002. Appropriation of moneys.
All moneys appropriated for expenditure by any state agency for administrative law judges appointed pursuant to this part 10 shall be appropriated to the department of personnel.
Source: L. 76: Entire part added, p. 585, § 19, effective May 24. L. 77: Entire section amended, p. 308, § 11, effective June 20. L. 87: Entire section amended, p. 936, § 3, effective March 13. L. 95: Entire section amended, p. 646, § 44, effective July 1.
Cross references: For the legislative declaration contained in the 1995 act amending this section, see section 112 of chapter 167, Session Laws of Colorado 1995.
24-30-1003. Administrative law judges - appointment - qualifications - standards of conduct.
(1) The executive director of the department of personnel may appoint administrative law judges, except those employed pursuant to sections 24-50-103 (7), 34-60-108, and 40-2-104, as may be necessary to provide services to each state agency; except that the state personnel board, the energy and carbon management commission, and the public utilities commission may use administrative law judges. Administrative law judges must be appointed in accordance with section 13 of article XII of the state constitution and the laws and rules governing the state personnel system.
(1.5) The director of the office of administrative courts shall appoint and assign administrative law judges to hear particular cases or classes of cases that come before the office of administrative courts in a manner that, in the discretion of such director, is necessary and appropriate to provide services to each state agency.
(2) Any administrative law judge shall meet the same qualifications as a district court judge as provided in section 11 of article VI of the state constitution.
(3) (Deleted by amendment, L. 91, p. 1340, § 57, effective July 1, 1991.)
(4) (a) Administrative law judges appointed pursuant to this section shall be subject to the standards of conduct set forth in the Colorado code of judicial conduct. The performance review plan for each administrative law judge shall include this Colorado code of judicial conduct.
(b) A complaint alleging a violation of the Colorado code of judicial conduct shall be referred to the executive director of the department of personnel who shall investigate the complaint and determine if the administrative law judge violated any canons of the code. Such administrative law judge shall be subject to the disciplinary procedures set forth in rules adopted by the state personnel board.
(c) If the decision is unsatisfactory to any party, an appeal may be made to the board of ethics for the executive branch of state government in the office of the governor.
(d) If the administrative law judge is found by the executive director or the board of ethics to have acted in violation of the canons of the Colorado code of judicial conduct, then the decision shall be made a part of the personnel file of the administrative law judge against whom the complaint was filed.
(5) In addition to the authority set forth in section 24-4-105 or as otherwise provided by law, administrative law judges in the office of administrative courts shall have the power to:
(a) Issue subpoenas, administer oaths, and control the course of trials and other proceedings before them; and
(b) Engage in or encourage the use of alternative dispute resolution as appropriate.
(6) Repealed.
Source: L. 76: Entire part added, p. 585, § 19, effective May 24. L. 87: Entire section amended, p. 937, § 4, effective March 13. L. 89: (3) added, p. 423, § 6, effective July 1. L. 90: (3) amended, p. 568, § 48, effective July 1. L. 91: Entire section amended, p. 1340, § 57, effective July 1. L. 94: (4) added, p. 1248, § 1, effective July 1. L. 95: (1), (4)(a), and (4)(b) amended, p. 646, § 45, effective July 1. L. 2000: (4) amended, p. 259, § 1, effective August 2. L. 2005: (1.5) and (5) added and (2) amended, p. 852, § 3, effective June 1. L. 2016: (6) added, (SB 16-106), ch. 290, p. 1175, § 2, effective August 10. L. 2019: (6) repealed, (SB 19-232), ch. 330, p. 3068, § 5, effective July 1. L. 2024: (1) amended, (HB 24-1346), ch. 216, p. 1342, § 12, effective May 21.
Cross references: For the legislative declaration contained in the 1995 act amending subsections (1), (4)(a), and (4)(b), see section 112 of chapter 167, Session Laws of Colorado 1995.
ANNOTATION
No unconstitutional disparity in treatment of civil court judges under § 24-6-202 and administrative law judges (ALJs) under this section. Although § 24-6-202 (1)(c) by its terms mentions only "[a] justice or judge of a court of record", ALJs must follow substantially similar rules of disclosure under this section and rule 3.15 of the Colorado Code of Judicial Conduct as do court judges under that section. Kilpatrick v. Indus. Claim Appeals Office, 2015 COA 30, 356 P.3d 1008.
PART 11
DIVISION OF CENTRAL SERVICES
24-30-1101. Legislative findings and declarations.
(1) The general assembly hereby finds, determines, and declares that:
(a) Services such as printing, document management, mail-related services, microfilm, graphic arts, fleet management, and other similar services are being widely used by the state of Colorado as a practical and economical means of improving administrative production and efficiency;
(b) and (c) (Deleted by amendment, L. 2004, p. 305, § 1, effective August 4, 2004.)
(d) Meeting the service needs of state departments, institutions, and agencies in efficient and economical ways within the resource capabilities of the state is the prime goal of the department of personnel policy;
(e) To most effectively utilize resources committed to existing services and to assure the best services at competitive costs to user agencies while preserving the managerial prerogatives and responsibilities assigned to department and agency heads by statute and otherwise, it is necessary to establish central planning, control, and coordination of service activities.
Source: L. 77: Entire part added, p. 1177, § 3, effective June 20. L. 2004: (1)(a), (1)(b), and (1)(c) amended, p. 305, § 1, effective August 4. L. 2018: (1)(d) amended, (HB 18-1375), ch. 274, p. 1706, § 38, effective May 29.
24-30-1102. Definitions.
As used in this part 11, unless the context otherwise requires:
(1) "Cost" means the direct cost of providing goods or services including, but not limited to, the total cost of labor and all related benefits, maintenance costs, materials, provisions, supplies, equipment rentals, equipment purchases, insurance, financing, supervision, engineering, clerical and accounting services, the value of the use of equipment, including its depreciation or replacement value, and an equitable share of other administrative costs not otherwise directly attributable to a particular good or service which may be reasonably apportioned to each particular service in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles and standards.
(2) "Director" or "executive director" means the executive director of the department of personnel.
(3) (Deleted by amendment, L. 96, p. 1497, § 8, effective June 1, 1996.)
(4) "Services" means printing, document management, mail-related services, microfilm, graphic arts, fleet management, and other similar support functions that are or may be used by the state of Colorado as a practical and economical means of improving administrative production and efficiency.
(5) "State agency" means this state or any department, board, bureau, commission, institution, or other agency of the state; except that "state agency" shall not include any state institution of higher education, the Auraria higher education center, or the state board of stock inspection commissioners, created pursuant to section 35-41-101, C.R.S.
(6) (a) "State-owned motor vehicle" means all motor vehicles owned by the state or any agency of the state that shall include all two- and four-wheel drive trucks, all passenger vehicles including cars, vans, station wagons and other similar passenger vehicles, and any other vehicle not described herein that may be designated as a state-owned motor vehicle if a state agency requests such designation; except that "state-owned motor vehicle" shall not include any vehicle rated at one ton or more that is:
(I) (Deleted by amendment, L. 2010, (SB 10-003), ch. 391, p. 1851, § 29, effective June 9, 2010.)
(II) A specialized vehicle used for the purposes of construction or maintenance, and owned, operated, or controlled by the department of transportation.
(b) "State-owned motor vehicle" shall not include any vehicle donated to a specific state agency.
Source: L. 77: Entire part added, p. 1178, § 3, effective June 20. L. 91: Entire section amended, p. 863, § 1, effective April 20. L. 92: (3), (4), (5), and (6) added, p. 999, § 1, effective July 1. L. 96: (2) and (3) amended, p. 1497, § 8, effective June 1. L. 2004: (4) amended, p. 305, § 2, effective August 4. L. 2006: (6) amended, p. 1071, § 1, effective August 7. L. 2007: (6) amended, p. 1260, § 1, effective May 25. L. 2010: (5) amended, (HB 10-1181), ch. 351, p. 1621, § 3, effective June 7; (5) and (6)(a)(I) amended, (SB 10-003), ch. 391, p. 1851, § 29, effective June 9.
Editor's note: (1) Section 5 of chapter 235, Session Laws of Colorado 2006, provides that the act amending subsection (6) applies to all motor vehicles owned by the executive branch of the state, including its departments, institutions, and agencies before August 7, 2006, and to all motor vehicles purchased by the state, including its departments, institutions, and agencies on or after August 7, 2006.
(2) Amendments to subsection (5) by Senate Bill 10-003 and House Bill 10-1181 were harmonized.
Cross references: For the legislative declaration in the 2010 act amending subsections (5) and (6)(a)(I), see section 1 of chapter 391, Session Laws of Colorado 2010.
24-30-1103. Central services.
(1) (Deleted by amendment, L. 96, p. 1497, § 9, effective June 1, 1996.)
(2) The powers, duties, and functions of the department of personnel include the powers, duties, and functions concerning central services, specified by this part 11.
Source: L. 77: Entire part added, p. 1178, § 3, effective June 20. L. 95: Entire section amended, p. 647, § 46, effective July 1. L. 96: Entire section amended, p. 1497, § 9, effective June 1. L. 2022: (2) amended, (SB 22-162), ch. 469, p. 3420, § 194, effective August 10.
Cross references: (1) For the legislative declaration contained in the 1995 act amending this section, see section 112 of chapter 167, Session Laws of Colorado 1995.
(2) For the short title (the "Debbie Haskins 'Administrative Organization Act of 1968' Modernization Act") in SB 22-162, see section 1 of chapter 469, Session Laws of Colorado 2022.
24-30-1104. Functions of the department - definitions - rules.
(1) Within the counties of Adams, Arapahoe, Boulder, Douglas, Pueblo, El Paso, and Jefferson, the city and county of Broomfield, and the city and county of Denver, and within any other areas in the state of Colorado where central services are offered, the department of personnel shall perform the following functions for the executive branch of the state of Colorado, its departments, institutions, and agencies, under the direction of the executive director:
(a) Formulate, in consultation with state departments, institutions, and agencies, recommendations for a strategic plan for approval of the executive director of the department of personnel and the governor no later than January 1 of 2005 and every five years thereafter;
(b) Review all existing and future services, service applications, software related to services, planning systems, personnel, equipment, and facilities and establish priorities for those that are necessary and desirable to accomplish the purposes of this part 11;
(c) Establish procedures and standards for management of service functions set forth in this part 11 for all state departments, institutions, and agencies;
(d) Establish and maintain facilities as needed to carry out the duties set forth in this part 11, including but not limited to those listed;
(e) (Deleted by amendment, L. 2004, p. 306, § 3, effective August 4, 2004.)
(f) Advise the governor and the general assembly on central services matters;
(g) Prepare and submit such reports as are required by this part 11 or which the governor or the general assembly may request;
(h) Approve or disapprove the acquisition of services, service equipment, and software related to services by any state department, institution, or agency and approve, modify, or disapprove the staffing pattern for service operations by any state department, institution, or agency in accordance with the approved plan;
(i) Continually study and assess service operations and needs of state departments, institutions, and agencies;
(j) Provide services, equipment, and facilities as required pursuant to this part 11 for state departments, institutions, and agencies according to their needs;
(k) Establish, in consultation with other state departments, institutions, and agencies, techniques and standards for microfilm, digital imaging, and digital conversion and evidentiary certification of photographs, microphotographs, or reproductions;
(l) Notify state agencies through written statements, which may include electronic statements, prepared by the department of personnel that state agencies may obtain goods and services directly from the private sector, if the cost and quality of such goods or services offered by the private sector are competitive with those provided by the department of personnel;
(m) Offer services to any state institution of higher education that chooses to purchase such services. When an institution of higher education intends to purchase a service provided by the department, the institution shall include the department in any solicitation or vendor qualification process for the service. Whenever practicable, institutions of higher education shall seek partnerships with the department for the purpose of procuring services at a cost savings to the institution and the state.
(1.5) The department of personnel shall establish a rule providing for a waiver to a state agency of subsection (1) of this section when the state agency can procure the services described in this part 11 at a net cost savings to the state.
(2) In addition to the county-specific functions set forth in subsection (1) of this section, the department of personnel shall take such steps as are necessary to fully implement a central state motor vehicle fleet system by January 1, 1993. The provisions of the motor vehicle fleet system created pursuant to this subsection (2) apply to the executive branch of the state of Colorado, its departments, its institutions, and its agencies; except that the governing board of each institution of higher education, by formal action of the board, and the Colorado commission on higher education, by formal action of the commission, may elect to be exempt from the provisions of this subsection (2) and may obtain a motor vehicle fleet system independent of the state motor vehicle fleet system. Under the direction of the executive director, the department of personnel shall perform the following functions pertaining to the motor vehicle fleet system throughout the state:
(a) Establish and operate a central state motor vehicle fleet system and such subsidiary-related facilities as are necessary to provide for the efficient and economical use of state-owned motor vehicles by state officers and employees;
(b) Establish and operate central facilities for the maintenance, repair, and storage of state-owned passenger motor vehicles for the use of state agencies; utilize any available state facilities for that purpose; and enter into contracts with such facilities as are necessary to carry out the provisions of this part 11;
(c) (I) Adopt uniform rules for motor vehicle acquisition, operation, maintenance, repair, and disposal standards. Uniform rules adopted by the executive director of the department of personnel pertaining to acquisition of motor vehicles by lease or purchase shall provide that low energy consumption shall be a favorable factor in determining the low responsible bidder. The size of any passenger motor vehicle shall not be greater than necessary to accomplish its purpose.
(II) By January 1, 2008, the executive director shall adopt a policy to significantly increase the utilization of alternative fuels and that establishes increasing utilization objectives for each following year. To encourage compliance with this policy, the rules promulgated pursuant to this subsection (2)(c) may establish progressively more stringent percentage mileposts and, for fiscal years commencing after July 1, 2004, require the collection of data concerning the annual percentage of state-owned bi-fueled vehicles that were fueled exclusively with an alternative fuel. For the years commencing on January 1, 2008, and January 1, 2009, the executive director shall purchase flexible fuel vehicles or hybrid vehicles, subject to availability, unless the increased cost of such vehicle is more than ten percent over the cost of a comparable dedicated petroleum fuel vehicle. Beginning on January 1, 2010, the executive director shall purchase motor vehicles that operate on compressed natural gas, plug-in hybrid electric vehicles, or vehicles that operate on other alternative fuels, subject to their availability and the availability of adequate fuel and fueling infrastructure, if either the increased base cost of such vehicle or the increased life-cycle cost of such vehicle is not more than ten percent over the cost of a comparable dedicated petroleum fuel vehicle. The executive director shall adopt a policy to allow some vehicles to be exempted from this requirement. Notwithstanding section 24-1-136 (11)(a)(I), the executive director or the director's designee shall submit an annual report to the transportation committees of the senate and the house of representatives, or any successor committees, and the joint budget committee of the general assembly, detailing the items specified in subsection (2)(c)(V) of this section. As used in this subsection (2)(c)(II):
(A) "Flexible fuel vehicle" means any dedicated flexible-fuel or dual-fuel vehicle designed to operate on at least one alternative fuel.
(B) "Hybrid vehicle" means a motor vehicle with a hybrid propulsion system that uses an alternative fuel by operating on both an alternative fuel, including electricity, and a traditional fuel.
(III) For purposes of this subsection (2)(c):
(A) "Alternative fuel" means compressed natural gas, propane, ethanol, or any mixture of ethanol containing eighty-five percent or more ethanol by volume with gasoline or other fuels, electricity, or any other fuels, which fuels may include, but are not limited to, clean diesel and reformulated gasoline so long as these other fuels make comparable reductions in carbon monoxide emissions and brown cloud pollutants as determined by the air quality control commission created in section 25-7-104. "Alternative fuel" does not include any fuel product, as defined in section 25-7-139 (3)(c), that contains or is treated with methyl tertiary butyl ether (MTBE).
(B) "Bi-fueled vehicle" means a motor vehicle, which may be purchased to comply with applicable federal requirements including, but not limited to, the federal "Energy Policy Act of 1992", 42 U.S.C. sec. 13257, and 42 U.S.C. sec. 7587, that can operate on both an alternative fuel and a traditional fuel or that can operate alternately on a traditional fuel and an alternative fuel.
(C) "Biodiesel" means fuel composed of mono-alkyl esters of long chain fatty acids derived from plant or animal matter that meet ASTM specifications and that is produced in Colorado.
(D) "Life-cycle cost" means the purchase cost of a vehicle minus the resale value at the end of the vehicle's expected useful life, in addition to the fuel, operating, and maintenance costs incurred during the vehicle's expected useful life. Fuel costs per mile traveled shall be calculated based on the reference case projections published by the United States energy information administration for the expected useful life of the vehicle. The expected useful life of a vehicle shall be the standard that is set by the state fleet management program for analysis and life-cycle costing purposes.
(IV) (A) By January 1, 2007, the director shall adopt a policy that all state-owned diesel vehicles and equipment shall be fueled with a fuel blend of twenty percent biodiesel and eighty percent petroleum diesel, subject to availability and so long as the price is no greater than ten cents more per gallon than the price of diesel fuel. The director shall provide for the proper administration, implementation, and enforcement of the policy.
(B) Repealed.
(V) Notwithstanding section 24-1-136 (11)(a)(I), on or before November 1, 2013, and each November 1 thereafter, the executive director or the director's designee shall submit a report to the general assembly as specified in subsection (2)(c)(II) of this section. The report must include, but need not be limited to, the following:
(A) The number of vehicles that the executive director or the director's designee purchased since January 1, 2008, for the motor vehicle fleet system that operate on compressed natural gas and other alternative fuels;
(B) An estimate of the number of dedicated petroleum fuel vehicles that the executive director or the director's designee purchased for the motor vehicle fleet system since January 1, 2008, instead of a vehicle that operates on compressed natural gas or other alternative fuel because the base cost or life-cycle cost of the compressed natural gas vehicle or other alternative fuel vehicle was more than ten percent over the cost of a comparable dedicated petroleum fuel vehicle;
(C) An explanation of the availability of adequate fuel and fueling infrastructure in the state for compressed natural gas vehicles and other alternative fuel vehicles and whether limited availability of fuel or fueling infrastructure contributes to the purchase of dedicated petroleum fuel vehicles for the motor vehicle fleet system instead of vehicles that operate on compressed natural gas and other alternative fuels;
(D) A summary of the policy that allows the executive director to exempt some vehicles from the requirement to purchase vehicles that operate on compressed natural gas and the percentage of dedicated petroleum fuel vehicles that the director purchased pursuant to this exemption;
(E) A summary of the administrative procedures or policies in place within the department, if any, that are intended to facilitate the purchase of vehicles that operate on compressed natural gas and other alternative fuels;
(F) The executive director's suggested changes to the requirements and limitations of subparagraph (II) of this paragraph (c) or other state law that would facilitate the gradual conversion of the motor vehicle fleet system to vehicles that operate on compressed natural gas and other alternative fuels, allow the state to account for the benefit of reduced emissions from vehicles that operate on compressed natural gas and other alternative fuels in its analysis regarding the purchase of such vehicles, and enable the department to provide the best value to the state in the motor vehicle fleet system while purchasing vehicles that operate on compressed natural gas and other alternative fuels; and
(G) A plan for putting in place the infrastructure necessary to support vehicles in the state's motor vehicle fleet system that operate on compressed natural gas and other alternative fuels.
(d) (I) Require that all state agencies transfer custody of certificates of title to all state-owned motor vehicles that are owned by such agencies to the department of personnel for the purpose of compiling complete data on all motor vehicles owned by the state;
(II) Require that all motor vehicles presently owned by state agencies be entered into the state fleet management program. Per-mile costs for the program shall be determined by criteria established by the department of personnel.
(III) (Deleted by amendment, L. 96, p. 1498, § 10, effective June 1, 1996.)
(IV) Require that any department, institution, or agency of the executive branch of the state that owns, operates, or controls vehicles that are not part of the central state motor vehicle fleet system provide the department of personnel with information requested by the department for the purpose of compiling complete data on all motor vehicles owned by the state.
(e) Require that all vehicles purchased after July 1, 1992, shall be owned by the department of personnel and leased and permanently assigned to state agencies. Purchases shall be based on specifications as requested by the state agency in cooperation and consultation with the department of personnel and the motor vehicle advisory council.
(f) Maintain, store, repair, dispose of, and replace state-owned motor vehicles under the control of the department of personnel. The department of personnel shall ensure that state-owned motor vehicles are not routinely replaced until they meet the replacement criteria relating to mileage, cost, safety, and other relevant factors established by the department.
(g) Establish and maintain a centralized record-keeping system for the acquisition, operation, maintenance, repair, and disposal of all motor vehicles in the fleet;
(h) Assign suitable transportation, either on a temporary or permanent basis to any state agency upon: Proper requisition; proper showing of need for use on authorized state business; or approved commuting as provided in section 24-30-1113;
(i) Establish and maintain a record-keeping system for the assignment and use of each vehicle in the motor fleet, which shall include:
(I) Verification from the executive director of a state agency or the executive director's designee that any employee driving a state vehicle has a valid driver's license;
(II) A statement of the authorized state business or other approved purpose for which the vehicle is assigned;
(III) Any other information which the director determines is necessary to carry out the purposes and provisions of this part 11;
(j) (Deleted by amendment, L. 2004, p. 306, § 3, effective August 4, 2004.)
(k) Allocate and charge against each state agency to which transportation or fueling infrastructure is furnished its proportionate part of the cost of maintenance and operation of the motor vehicle fleet and its supporting fueling infrastructure;
(l) Enforce such rules and regulations as may be adopted by the director pursuant to the provisions of this part 11;
(m) Delegate or conditionally delegate to the respective heads of agencies to which state-owned motor vehicles are permanently assigned such duties as may be designated by the director for the enforcement of all or part of the rules and regulations adopted by the department of personnel;
(n) Require state agencies, officers, and employees to keep all records and make all reports regarding state-owned motor vehicle use as provided in rules and regulations adopted by the department of personnel;
(o) (Deleted by amendment, L. 2004, p. 306, § 3, effective August 4, 2004.)
(p) Negotiate and enter into contracts for the purchase or lease of such personal property as is deemed necessary to achieve the purposes and provisions of this part 11;
(q) Adopt an annual operating budget;
(r) Supervise and be responsible for the expenditure of moneys appropriated to carry out the purposes and provisions of this part 11;
(s) Exercise any other powers or perform any other duties that are reasonably necessary for the fulfillment of the powers and duties assigned to the department of personnel pursuant to this part 11; and
(t) Require that the federal environmental protection agency mile-per-gallon rating for all motor vehicles purchased for the state-owned motor vehicle fleet on or after January 1, 2007, meet or exceed the average fuel efficiency standards as established pursuant to the federal "Energy Policy and Conservation Act", 15 U.S.C. sec. 2001, et seq., recodified as 49 U.S.C. sec. 32901 et seq.
(3) Repealed.
(4) In addition to any other duties imposed by this section, the department of personnel shall establish and maintain a program for parking permits and building and grounds maintenance for the state capitol buildings complex pursuant to part 1 of article 82 of this title 24.
Source: L. 77: Entire part added, p. 1178, § 3, effective June 20. L. 91: (1)(a) amended and (1)(l) added, p. 863, § 2, effective April 20. L. 92: (2) added, p. 1000, § 2, effective July 1. L. 93: (2)(i)(I) amended, p. 351, § 1, effective April 12; (3) added, p. 1829, § 1, effective July 1. L. 95: (2)(d)(III)(A) amended, p. 1104, § 38, effective May 31; IP(1), (1)(a), and (2) amended, p. 647, § 47, effective July 1. L. 96: IP(1), (1)(a), (1)(c) to (1)(f), (1)(j), IP(2), (2)(c) to (2)(f), (2)(m), (2)(n), (2)(s), and (3) amended, p. 1498, § 10, effective June 1. L. 2003: (3) amended, p. 984, § 1, effective April 17; (2)(c) amended, p. 1236, § 4, effective September 1. L. 2004: IP(2) amended, p. 602, § 1, effective July 1; (1)(a), (1)(b), (1)(e), (1)(h), (1)(k), (1)(l), (2)(d)(II), (2)(f), (2)(h), (2)(j), and (2)(o) amended and (4) added, p. 306, § 3, effective August 4. L. 2006: IP(2) and (2)(c)(III) amended and (2)(c)(IV) added, p. 152, § 1, effective July 1; (2)(d)(IV) and (2)(t) added, pp. 1071, 1072, §§ 2, 3, effective August 7. L. 2007: (2)(c)(II) amended, p.1758, § 1, effective June 1; (2)(t) amended, p. 2033, § 49, effective June 1. L. 2009: (2)(c)(II)(B) amended, (HB 09-1331), ch. 416, p. 2309, § 10, effective June 4; IP(1) amended, (HB 09-1150), ch. 309, p. 1666, § 3, effective August 5; IP(2)(c)(II) amended, (SB 09-092), ch. 142, p. 604, § 1, effective August 5. L. 2010: (1)(m) and (1.5) added, (HB 10-1181), ch. 351, p. 1621, §§ 4, 5, effective June 7. L. 2013: IP(2)(c)(II) amended and (2)(c)(III)(D) and (2)(c)(V) added, (SB 13-070), ch. 142, p. 459, § 1, effective April 26. L. 2017: IP(2), IP(2)(c)(II), and IP(2)(c)(V) amended, (HB 17-1058), ch. 18, p. 58, § 4, effective March 8. L. 2018: (1)(l) amended, (HB 18-1375), ch. 274, p. 1706, § 39, effective May 29. L. 2020: IP(2)(c)(III) and (2)(c)(III)(A) amended, (HB 20-1167), ch. 56, p. 191, § 1, effective September 14. L. 2026: (4) amended, (HB 26-1422), ch. 331, p. 1960, § 27, effective June 2; (2)(k) amended, (HB 26-1076), ch. 265, p. 1466, § 2, effective August 12.
Editor's note: (1) Amendments to subsection (2) by House Bill 95-1362 and House Bill 95-1212 were harmonized.
(2) Subsection (3)(b) provided for the repeal of subsection (3), effective July 1, 2004. (See L. 96, p. 1498.)
(3) Section 5 of chapter 235, Session Laws of Colorado 2006, provides that the act enacting subsections (2)(d)(IV) and (2)(t) applies to all motor vehicles owned by the executive branch of the state, including its departments, institutions, and agencies before August 7, 2006, and to all motor vehicles purchased by the state, including its departments, institutions, and agencies on or after August 7, 2006.
(4) Subsection (2)(c)(IV)(B) provided for its repeal, effective January 1, 2009. (See L. 2006, p. 152.)
Cross references: (1) For the legislative declaration contained in the 1995 act amending the introductory portion to subsection (1) and subsections (1)(a) and (2), see section 112 of chapter 167, Session Laws of Colorado 1995.
(2) For the definition of "ASTM", see § 8-20-201 (1.2).
24-30-1105. Powers of the executive director - penalties.
(1) In order to perform the duties and functions set forth in this part 11, the executive director of the department of personnel shall, in relation to departments, institutions, and agencies of the executive branch:
(a) Approve the equipment, software related to services, and facilities with which specific services shall be performed by or for any state department, institution, or agency in accordance with the approved plan;
(b) Prescribe standards governing the selection and operation of service equipment by or for any state department, institution, or agency;
(c) Adopt such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the purposes and provisions of this part 11;
(d) Contract for such services as the department of personnel may require for purposes of this part 11;
(e) Require such reports from other departments, institutions, and agencies as may be necessary;
(f) Recommend to the governor the transfer of funds, equipment, supplies, and personnel from existing departments, institutions, and agencies to the department of personnel or to such other agency as may be necessary to accomplish the purposes of this part 11, such transfer to be effective upon the approval by the governor;
(g) Certify for evidentiary purposes as true copies of the originals, before the originals are destroyed or lost, photographs, microphotographs, or reproductions on film created by the department of personnel. Such certified photographs, microphotographs, or reproductions shall have the same legal force and effect as if certified by the original custodian of the records.
(h) In performance of such microfilm services as may be requested by the custodians of the types of documents referred to in this paragraph (h):
(I) Have rights of reasonable access in person or through employees to all types of nonconfidential documents in the possession of the state of Colorado, its departments, institutions, or agencies;
(II) Have rights of reasonable access in person or through specifically designated employees to all types of confidential documents in the possession of the state of Colorado, its departments, institutions, or agencies;
(III) Assist custodians of documents upon which microfilm, digital imaging, and digital conversion services have been performed in the lawful disposition of such documents pursuant to section 24-80-103;
(i) Have power to enter into contracts with other governmental entities in the state of Colorado for the purpose of furnishing services;
(j) Establish policies jointly with the supreme court of the state of Colorado for the expungement and sealing of official state records with a view to the technical and evidentiary problems attendant to expungement or sealing of photographs, microphotographs, and reproductions.
(2) (a) Except in accordance with judicial order or as otherwise provided by law, the executive director or the employees of the department of personnel shall not divulge or make known in any way any information disclosed in any confidential document to which the employees have access in performing the duties specified in this part 11.
(b) Officials or employees of the state who violate this subsection (2) commit a class 2 misdemeanor. Such persons shall, in addition to these penalties, be subject to removal or dismissal from public service on grounds of malfeasance in office.
Source: L. 77: Entire part added, p. 1179, § 3, effective June 20. L. 95: IP(1) and (1)(f) amended, p. 648, § 48, effective July 1. L. 96: IP(1), (1)(d), (1)(f), (1)(g), and (2)(a) amended, p. 1500, § 11, effective June 1. L. 2004: (1)(a) and (1)(h)(III) amended, p. 307, § 4, effective August 4. L. 2021: (2)(b) amended, (SB 21-271), ch. 462, p. 3225, § 412, effective March 1, 2022.
Cross references: For the legislative declaration contained in the 1995 act amending the introductory portion to subsection (1) and subsection (1)(f), see section 112 of chapter 167, Session Laws of Colorado 1995.
24-30-1106. Appeal from decisions of director.
If any department, institution, or agency disagrees with any decision, plan, procedure, priority, standard, rule, or regulation or other act of the department of personnel, the head thereof shall notify the executive director of the basis for such disagreement, and the executive director may, at his or her discretion, uphold, modify, or reverse such decision, plan, procedure, priority, standard, rule, or regulation or other act; but no further action shall be taken by the department of personnel to implement any decision, plan, procedure, priority, standard, rule, or regulation or other act after such notice until the executive director has rendered his or her decision in the matter.
Source: L. 77: Entire part added, p. 1180, § 3, effective June 20. L. 95: Entire section amended, p. 648, § 49, effective July 1. L. 97: Entire section amended, p. 1015, § 25, effective August 6.
Cross references: For the legislative declaration contained in the 1995 act amending this section, see section 112 of chapter 167, Session Laws of Colorado 1995.
24-30-1107. Existing and new equipment, personnel, applications, and systems subject to approval of director.
On and after June 20, 1977, no services, service equipment, or software related to services shall be purchased, leased, or otherwise acquired by any department, institution, or agency, nor shall any new service personnel be added to the state personnel system, nor shall any new applications, systems, or programs begin except upon the written approval of the executive director, nor shall any service equipment leased or operated by any department, institution, or agency on June 20, 1977, continue to be so leased or operated after July 1, 1977, unless certified by the executive director to be in accordance with the approved plan.
Source: L. 77: Entire part added, p. 1181, § 3, effective June 20. L. 97: Entire section amended, p. 1015, § 26, effective August 6. L. 2004: Entire section amended, p. 307, § 5, effective August 4.
24-30-1108. Revolving fund - service charges - pricing policy.
(1) There is hereby created a department of personnel revolving fund for use in acquiring such materials, supplies, labor, and overhead as are required. Moneys collected and deposited in the fund shall be from state and local government user fees and from rebates, including, but not limited to, rebates from car rentals, travel agencies, lodging, and travel cards. The fund shall be under the direction of the executive director.
(2) Users of department services shall be charged the full cost of the particular service, which shall include the cost of all material, labor, and overhead.
(3) The executive director shall have a pricing policy of remaining competitive with or at a lower rate than private industry in the operation of any service function which the executive director establishes.
(4) The executive director shall keep a full, true, and accurate record of the costs of providing each particular service.
(5) Repealed.
(6) (a) (I) Repealed.
(II) Any uncommitted capital outlay reserves at the end of a given fiscal year may be used for capital outlay subject to an appropriation in the annual general appropriation act.
(b) For purposes of this subsection (6), unless the context otherwise requires:
(I) "Capital outlay" has the same meaning as set forth in section 24-75-112 (1)(a).
(II) "Capital outlay reserve" means any accumulated depreciation identified in fund balance reports prepared by the department of personnel.
Source: L. 77: Entire part added, p. 1181, § 3, effective June 20. L. 91: (4) added, p. 864, § 3, effective April 20. L. 96: (1) amended, p. 1544, § 141, effective June 1. L. 97: Entire section amended, p. 1016, § 27, effective August 6. L. 2009: (5) added, (SB 09-208), ch. 149, p. 622, § 17, effective April 20. L. 2010: (1) amended, (HB 10-1181), ch. 351, p. 1621, § 6, effective June 7. L. 2014: (5) repealed and (6) added, (SB 14-108), ch. 50, p. 230, § 1, effective March 20. L. 2015: (6)(a)(I) repealed, (HB 15-1280), ch. 176, p. 573, § 3, effective May 11.
24-30-1109. Reports. (Repealed)
Source: L. 77: Entire part added, p. 1181, § 3, effective June 20. L. 91: (1)(g) added, p. 864, § 4, effective April 20. L. 95: (2) amended, p. 648, § 50, effective July 1. L. 96: Entire section repealed, p. 1271, § 201, effective August 7.
Cross references: For the legislative declaration contained in the 1996 act repealing this section, see section 1 of chapter 237, Session Laws of Colorado 1996.
24-30-1110. Division subject to termination. (Repealed)
Source: L. 77: Entire part added, p. 1182, § 3, effective June 20. L. 81: Entire section amended, p. 1178, § 8, effective July 1. L. 83: Entire section repealed, p. 891, § 1, effective March 22.
24-30-1111. Postage meters - penalty for private use.
(1) Each state department, agency, division, board, commission, committee, and educational institution which has installed a postage meter shall place an imprint plate on such meter and a notice attached to the meter showing that the metered mail is official state of Colorado mail and that there is a penalty for the unlawful use of such postage meter for private purposes.
(2) Any person who uses a state-installed postage meter for private purposes commits a civil infraction and shall be punished as provided in section 18-1.3-503.
Source: L. 83: Entire section added, p. 892, § 1, effective June 20. L. 2002: (2) amended, p. 1532, § 245, effective October 1. L. 2021: (2) amended, (SB 21-271), ch. 462, p. 3226, § 413, effective March 1, 2022.
Cross references: For the legislative declaration contained in the 2002 act amending subsection (2), see section 1 of chapter 318, Session Laws of Colorado 2002.
24-30-1112. Permanent assignment of vehicles - state agency - verification of minimum mileage - revocation.
(1) A state-owned motor vehicle that is part of the state motor vehicle fleet established pursuant to section 24-30-1104 (2) may be assigned by the department of personnel to a state agency pursuant to this section. In addition, any state-owned motor vehicle that is assigned to a state agency may be further assigned by the executive director of the state agency or by the executive director's designee to an officer or employee of the state agency pursuant to section 24-30-1113.
(2) Unless a state agency can justify to the department of personnel the need for permanent assignment of a vehicle because of its unique use, the department of personnel may permanently assign a state-owned motor vehicle to a state agency only if the use of the vehicle by the state agency is likely to meet the minimum required mileage established by the department of personnel for the utilization classification associated with the vehicle's intended work function and the use of such vehicle by the state agency complies with any additional criteria established by the department of personnel in rules. A vehicle that is assigned to a state agency must be parked at a state facility, as defined by rule, when the vehicle is not in use unless the vehicle has been assigned to an officer or employee of the state agency pursuant to section 24-30-1113.
(3) The department of personnel shall establish a program and adopt rules providing for annual verification that each state-owned motor vehicle permanently assigned to a state agency has met the minimum required mileage based on the appropriate utilization classification. If verification establishes that a vehicle has not met the minimum annual mileage rate and other criteria established in rules and if the responsible state agency cannot justify such lower mileage or failure to meet other criteria, the department of personnel shall revoke the permanent assignment of the vehicle immediately.
(4) The department of personnel shall adopt rules governing the procedure for revocation of assignment of state-owned motor vehicles that have been permanently assigned to a state agency. Revocation of assignment shall occur when the department of personnel determines that:
(a) The vehicle has been used for other than official business or has been used for commuting without being assigned to an officer or employee of the state agency pursuant to section 24-30-1113;
(b) (I) The state agency has not submitted reports or other documentation to the department of personnel that it is required to submit pursuant to rules adopted by the department; or
(II) Any reports or other documentation that the state agency has submitted fail to meet the standards established in rules adopted by the department of personnel for the submission of such reports and documentation and the state agency has not cured the deficiencies within thirty days after receiving notification from the department of personnel of such deficiency;
(c) The state agency has knowingly and willfully supplied false information to the department of personnel regarding the permanent assignment of the motor vehicle to the state agency;
(d) A state-owned motor vehicle has been abused; or
(e) A violation of other rules promulgated by the department of personnel has occurred, which warrants revocation of assignment to the state agency as specified in the rules adopted by the department of personnel.
(5) The department of personnel shall not honor new requisitions for assignment of vehicle following the revocation of assignment until the department of personnel is assured that the violation for which a vehicle was previously revoked will not recur.
Source: L. 92: Entire section added, p. 1003, § 3, effective July 1. L. 2004: IP(1)(a), (2), and (3)(a) amended, p. 308, § 6, effective August 4. L. 2017: Entire section amended, (HB 17-1296), ch. 293, p. 1613, § 1, effective September 1. L. 2018: Entire section amended, (HB 18-1375), ch. 274, p. 1706, § 40, effective May 29.
24-30-1113. Assignment of vehicles to state agency officers or employees - report to legislative audit committee - definition.
(1) Notwithstanding section 24-30-1102 (5), as used in this section, unless the context otherwise requires, "state agency" means the state or any department, board, bureau, commission, institution, or other agency of the state; except that "state agency" does not include any state institution of higher education, the Auraria higher education center, or the legislative and judicial branches of state government. As used in this section, "state agency" does include the state board of stock inspection commissioners, created in section 35-41-101.
(2) (a) The executive director of a state agency or the executive director's designee may assign a state-owned motor vehicle that has been assigned to the state agency pursuant to section 24-30-1112 to an officer or employee of the state agency for conducting state business and commuting. Commuting includes traveling from an officer's or employee's personal residence to one or more regular places of business but does not include traveling away from home as defined by the federal internal revenue service. A state-owned motor vehicle may be parked at the personal residence of an officer or employee of a state agency for more than one day per month only if the state agency has assigned the vehicle to the officer or employee pursuant to this section or if the officer or employee is using the vehicle to travel away from home. An officer or employee shall not use a state-owned motor vehicle for commuting unless such use is authorized pursuant to this section. The assignment of a state-owned motor vehicle pursuant to this section must comply with the requirements of section 24-30-1112.
(b) The executive director of a state agency or the executive director's designee must authorize the assignment of a vehicle in writing and submit the authorization and any supporting documentation to the executive director of the department of personnel for final approval. The executive director of a state agency or the executive director's designee shall authorize the assignment of a vehicle only if:
(I) Assignment of the vehicle is necessary to conduct official and legitimate state business;
(II) Assignment of the vehicle satisfies at least one of the following requirements:
(A) The vehicle meets the federal internal revenue service definition of qualified nonpersonal use, as specified in 26 CFR 1.274-5 (k); or
(B) The assignment of the vehicle is the most cost-efficient means of transportation, as defined in rules adopted by the department of personnel, to the state agency; and
(III) Assignment of the vehicle complies with any additional criteria established in rules adopted by the department of personnel.
(c) An executive director of a state agency or the executive director's designee who authorizes the assignment of a state-owned motor vehicle to an officer or employee of the state agency shall maintain documentation of the assignment, including the executive director's justification for authorizing the assignment of the vehicle. At least annually, the executive director of a state agency or the executive director's designee shall review each assignment of a vehicle to ensure that the assignment complies with the requirements of this section.
(3) The executive director of the department of personnel or the state controller, or the designee of either official, as applicable, shall review any assignment of a state-owned motor vehicle to an officer or employee of a state agency. The executive director of the department of personnel or the state controller, or the designee of either official, as applicable, shall verify that the assignment of the vehicle complies with the requirements specified in subsection (2) of this section and the regulations of the federal internal revenue service. If the review establishes that the assignment of a vehicle does not comply with such requirements, the executive director of the department of personnel shall revoke the assignment of the vehicle.
(4) In addition to the initial approval required by subsection (3) of this section, the department of personnel shall establish a program and adopt rules providing for annual review and verification by the executive director of the department of personnel or the state controller, or the designee of either official, as applicable, that each state-owned motor vehicle assigned to an officer or employee of a state agency still complies with the requirements of subsection (2) of this section and the regulations of the federal internal revenue service. The requirements of this subsection (4) apply to all state-owned motor vehicles, whether they were assigned before, on, or after September 1, 2017. If the verification process establishes that the assignment of a vehicle no longer complies with subsection (2) of this section or the regulations of the federal internal revenue service, the department of personnel shall revoke the assignment of the vehicle.
(5) Any officer or employee of a state agency who is assigned a state-owned motor vehicle because it is the most cost-efficient means of transportation as specified in subsection (2)(b)(II)(B) of this section is required to pay income tax on the value of the fringe benefit of the vehicle. The state controller, or the state controller's designee, shall calculate and report as income the value of the fringe benefit of the vehicle in accordance with the regulations of the federal internal revenue service. The state controller shall promulgate rules regarding how the value of the fringe benefit will be calculated and reported.
(6) The executive director of the department of personnel, or the executive director's designee, and the state controller, or state controller's designee, shall promulgate rules as required in this section and may promulgate additional rules deemed necessary for the implementation of this section. Such rules shall be promulgated in accordance with article 4 of this title 24.
(7) Repealed.
Source: L. 92: Entire section added, p. 1004, § 3, effective July 1. L. 2004: (1) and (4) amended, p. 308, § 7, effective August 4. L. 2017: Entire section R&RE, (HB 17-1296), ch. 293, p. 1615, § 2, effective September 1. L. 2018: IP(2)(b), (3), (4), and (6) amended, (HB 18-1375), ch. 274, p. 1708, § 41, effective May 29. L. 2020: (2)(a) amended, (SB 20-071), ch. 5, p. 7, § 1, effective September 14.
Editor's note: Subsection (7)(b) provided for the repeal of subsection (7), effective July 1, 2020. (See L. 2017, p. 1615.)
24-30-1114. Restrictions on assignment of vehicles.
(1) Requisitions for assignment or reassignment of state-owned motor vehicles shall not be honored when the purpose of the assignment or reassignment is to provide a newer or lower mileage vehicle to a state officer or employee on the basis of rank, position, management authority, length of service, or other nonessential purpose.
(2) Special use vehicles, including but not limited to four-wheel drive and law enforcement vehicles, shall be assigned only to those agencies and individuals authorized or otherwise designated by the department of personnel to operate such vehicles.
Source: L. 92: Entire section added, p. 1005, § 3, effective July 1. L. 2018: (2) amended, (HB 18-1375), ch. 274, p. 1709, § 42, effective May 29.
24-30-1115. Motor fleet management fund - creation.
(1) There is hereby created a fund to be known as the motor fleet management fund, which shall be administered by the department of personnel and which shall consist of all moneys which may be transferred thereto in accordance with section 24-30-1104 (2)(k).
(2) The moneys in the fund shall be subject to annual appropriation by the general assembly for the purposes of this part 11. Any moneys not appropriated shall remain in the fund and shall not be transferred to or revert to the general fund of the state at the end of any fiscal year. Subject to severe budget constraints and annual appropriation, a portion of the state motor fleet shall be replaced each year. The number of motor vehicles to be replaced annually shall be based on a methodology provided by the department of personnel and approved by the general assembly.
(3) Notwithstanding any provision of this section to the contrary, on April 20, 2009, the state treasurer shall deduct one million dollars from the motor fleet management fund and transfer such sum to the general fund.
(4) Notwithstanding any provision of this section to the contrary, on April 15, 2010, the state treasurer shall deduct three hundred ninety-seven thousand one hundred forty-three dollars from the motor fleet management fund and transfer such sum to the general fund.
Source: L. 92: Entire section added, p. 1005, § 3, effective July 1. L. 96: Entire section amended, p. 1500, § 12, effective June 1. L. 2004: (2) amended, p. 309, § 8, effective August 4. L. 2009: (3) added, (SB 09-208), ch. 149, p. 623, § 18, effective April 20. L. 2010: (4) added, (HB 10-1327), ch. 135, p. 449, § 2, effective April 15. L. 2017: (1) amended, (HB 17-1296), ch. 293, p. 1617, § 3, effective September 1.
24-30-1116. Vanpooling - state-owned vehicles - revolving account. (Repealed)
Source: L. 92: Entire section added, p. 1005, § 3, effective July 1. L. 95: (6)(d) and (6)(e) amended, p. 648, § 51, effective July 1. L. 2004: Entire section repealed, p. 309, § 9, effective August 4.
24-30-1117. Exclusive authority to acquire state-owned motor vehicles.
The department of personnel shall have the exclusive authority to purchase, lease, and otherwise acquire motor vehicles for such use by state officers and employees as may be necessitated in the course and conduct of official state business. Except for any vehicles donated to specific state agencies, no motor vehicle shall be purchased, leased, or otherwise acquired by any state agency unless such vehicle is obtained through the department of personnel or under an express waiver granted by the department.
Source: L. 92: Entire section added, p. 1007, § 3, effective July 1. L. 96: Entire section amended, p. 1501, § 13, effective June 1. L. 2004: Entire section amended, p. 310, § 10, effective August 4.
24-30-1118. Statewide travel management program - creation - duties of department - mandatory use by state employees - repeal. (Repealed)
Source: L. 93: Entire section added, p. 1829, § 2, effective July 1. L. 95: IP(3) amended, p. 649, § 52, effective July 1. L. 96: (2), IP(3), IP(3)(e), IP(3)(e)(I), (3)(e)(I)(C), (3)(e)(I)(D), (3)(e)(II), and (3)(j) amended, p. 1501, § 14, effective June 1. L. 2003: (5) and (6) added, p. 984, § 2, effective April 17.
Editor's note: Subsection (6) provided for the repeal of this section, effective July 1, 2004. (See L. 2003, p. 984.)
PART 12
PRODUCTS AND SERVICES OF PERSONS WITH SEVERE DISABILITIES
24-30-1201. Definitions.
As used in this part 12, unless the context otherwise requires:
(1) "Direct labor" means all work required for preparing, processing, and packing products and all work required for providing services, but the term does not include supervision, administration, inspection, or shipment.
(2) "Nonprofit agency for persons with severe disabilities" means a private nonprofit organization established under the laws of the United States or this state which is operated in the interest of individuals who are severely impaired, the net income of which does not inure in whole or in part to the benefit of any shareholder, officer, or other individual, and which, in the production of commodities and in the provision of services, employs during its fiscal year severely impaired individuals for not less than seventy-five percent of the man-hours of direct labor required for the production of commodities or for the provision of services.
(3) "Public agency" means any public office, officer, department, commission, institution, or bureau, any agency, division, or unit within a department or office, or any other public authority of this state. "Public agency" shall not include any municipality, county, school district, special district, nor any other political subdivision of the state.
(4) "Severe disability" means one or more physical or mental disabilities which constitute a substantial impairment to employment and which are of such a nature as to require multiple vocational rehabilitation services over an extended period of time.
Source: L. 79: Entire part added, p. 876, § 1, effective July 1. L. 93: (2) and (4) amended, p. 1654, § 55, effective July 1.
24-30-1202. Central nonprofit agency - procurement list. (Repealed)
Source: L. 79: Entire part added, p. 877, § 1, effective July 1. L. 87: Entire section repealed, p. 349, § 4, effective July 1.
24-30-1203. Purchasing requirements.
(1) In order to provide preferential treatment to the products and services of nonprofit agencies for persons with severe disabilities, public agencies shall purchase such products and services directly from said agencies in accordance with applicable specifications of the department of personnel and of local purchasing officials for other public agencies. Whenever such products and services are available at a price determined to be reasonable by the appropriate purchasing official, the price shall recover for the nonprofit agency for persons with severe disabilities the cost of all materials, labor, and overhead, including delivery expenses, incurred in the production of products or the provision of services by such nonprofit agency.
(2) Notwithstanding any other provision of this part 12, no purchase shall be made of any product or service that does not conform to the standards and specifications necessary for the purpose for which the product or service is required.
Source: L. 79: Entire part added, p. 877, § 1, effective July 1. L. 93: (1) amended, p. 1654, § 56, effective July 1. L. 96: (1) amended, p. 1502, § 15, effective June 1.
24-30-1204. Cooperation between state agencies.
In furtherance of the purposes of this part 12 and in order to contribute to the economy of state government, it is the intent of the general assembly that there be close cooperation among the department of personnel, the division of correctional industries in the department of corrections, and any other agency of this state from which procurement of products or services is required under any law of this state. The committee, the division of correctional industries, and any other similar agency of this state are authorized to enter into such agreements, cooperative working relationships, or other arrangements as may be determined to be necessary for effective coordination and efficient realization of the objectives of this part 12 and any other similar procurement law of this state. The department of personnel may secure, directly from any agency, division, or department of this state, any information which is necessary to enable it to carry out the provisions of this part 12.
Source: L. 79: Entire part added, p. 878, § 1, effective July 1. L. 95: Entire section amended, p. 649, § 53, effective July 1.
Cross references: For the legislative declaration contained in the 1995 act amending this section, see section 112 of chapter 167, Session Laws of Colorado 1995.
PART 13
STATE BUILDINGS
24-30-1301. Definitions.
As used in this part 13, unless the context otherwise requires:
(1) (a) "Capital asset" means:
(I) Real property;
(II) Fixed equipment;
(III) Movable equipment; or
(IV) Instructional or scientific equipment with a cost that exceeds fifty thousand dollars; except that "capital asset" does not include instructional or scientific equipment purchased by a state institution of higher education if the institution uses moneys other than those appropriated pursuant to section 24-75-303. Instructional or scientific equipment does not include information technology.
(b) "Capital asset" does not mean information technology. All information technology budget requests must be presented as set forth in section 2-3-1704 (11), C.R.S.
(2) "Capital construction" means:
(a) Acquisition of a capital asset or disposition of real property;
(b) Construction, demolition, remodeling, or renovation of real property necessitated by changes in the program, to meet standards required by applicable codes, to correct other conditions hazardous to the health and safety of persons which are not covered by codes, to effect conservation of energy resources, to effect cost savings for staffing, operations, or maintenance of the facility, or to improve appearance;
(c) Site improvement or development of real property;
(d) Installation of the fixed or movable equipment necessary for the operation of new, remodeled, or renovated real property, if the fixed or movable equipment is initially housed in or on the real property upon completion of the new construction, remodeling, or renovation;
(e) Installation of the fixed or movable equipment necessary for the conduct of programs in or on real property upon completion of the new construction, remodeling, or renovation;
(f) Contracting for the services of architects, engineers, and other consultants to prepare plans, program documents, life-cycle cost studies, energy analyses, and other studies associated with capital construction and to supervise the construction or execution of such capital construction; or
(g) (Deleted by amendment, L. 2014.)
(3) (a) "Capital renewal" means a controlled maintenance project of real property or more than one integrated controlled maintenance project of real property with costs exceeding four million seven hundred thousand dollars in a fiscal year that is more cost effective or better addressed by corrective repairs or replacement to the real property rather than by limited fixed equipment repair, replacement, or smaller individual controlled maintenance projects.
(b) Beginning on January 1, 2029, and on January 1 of every three-year period thereafter, the department shall adjust the capital renewal cost threshold for inflation in accordance with the percentage change over the preceding three-year period in the United States department of labor bureau of labor statistics producer price index commodity data for final demand - construction for government, or its successor index. The department shall publish the adjusted capital renewal cost threshold on its website.
(4) "Controlled maintenance" means:
(a) Corrective repairs or replacement, including improvements for health, life safety, and code requirements, used for existing real property; and
(b) Corrective repairs or replacement, including improvements for health, life safety, and code requirements, of the fixed equipment necessary for the operation of real property, when such work is not funded in a state agency's or state institution of higher education's operating budget.
(c) "Controlled maintenance" may include contracting for the services of architects, engineers, and other consultants to investigate conditions and prepare recommendations for the correction thereof, to prepare plans and specifications, and to supervise the execution of such controlled maintenance projects as provided through an appropriation by the general assembly.
(5) "Department" means the department of personnel.
(6) "Economic life" means the projected or anticipated useful life of real property.
(7) "Executive director" means the executive director of the department of personnel.
(8) "Facility" means a state-owned building or utility. "Facility" does not include highways or publicly assisted housing projects as defined in section 24-32-718.
(9) "Fixed equipment" includes, but is not limited to, mechanical, electrical, or plumbing components built into real property that are necessary for the operation of the real property.
(10) (Deleted by amendment, L. 2014.)
(11) "Initial cost" means the required cost necessary to construct or renovate a facility.
(12) "Life-cycle cost" means the cost alternatives, over the economic life of a facility, including its initial cost, replacement costs, and the cost of operation and maintenance of the facility, such as energy and water.
(13) "Movable equipment" means:
(a) All equipment that is not defined as fixed equipment that is necessary for the conduct of a program in or on real property;
(b) The rolling stock and fixed stock necessary for running a state-owned railway; and
(c) Aircraft as defined in section 43-10-102 (1), C.R.S., that is used for state purposes.
(13.5) "Office of the state architect" or "office" means the office of the state architect created in section 24-30-1302.5.
(14) "Principal representative" means the governing board of a state agency or state institution of higher education, or the governing board's designee, or, if there is no governing board, the executive head of a state agency or state institution of higher education, as designated by the governor or the general assembly, or such executive head's designee.
(15) (a) "Real property" means a facility, state-owned grounds around a facility, a campus of more than one facility and the grounds around such facilities, state-owned fixtures and improvements on land, and every state-owned estate, interest, privilege, tenement, easement, right-of-way, and other right in land, legal or equitable, but not including leasehold interests.
(b) "Real property" does not include:
(I) Land or any interest therein acquired by the department of transportation and used, or intended to be used, for right-of-way purposes;
(II) Land or any interest therein held by the division of parks and wildlife and the parks and wildlife commission in the department of natural resources; and
(III) Public lands of the state or any interest therein that are subject to the jurisdiction of the state board of land commissioners.
(16) "State" means the government of this state, every state agency, and every state institution of higher education. "State" does not include a county, municipality, city and county, school district, special district, or any other kind of local government organized pursuant to law.
(17) "State agency" means any department, commission, council, board, bureau, committee, office, agency, or other governmental unit of the state.
(18) "State institution of higher education" means a state institution of higher education as defined in section 23-18-102 (10), C.R.S., and the Auraria higher education center created in article 70 of title 23, C.R.S.
Source: L. 79: Entire part added, p. 879, § 1, effective July 1. L. 80: (1)(b) and (1)(c) amended and (2) R&RE, p. 593, §§ 1, 2, effective July 1. L. 95: (3) and (6) amended, p. 649, § 54, effective July 1. L. 2007: (7.5) and (15) added and (13) amended, p. 484, § 1, effective September 1. L. 2008: (13)(b)(II) and (13)(b)(III) amended, p. 1307, § 1, effective August 5. L. 2011: (1)(f) amended, (HB 11-1301), ch. 297, p. 1431, § 30, effective August 10. L. 2012: (7) amended, (SB 12-040), ch. 118, p. 403, § 3, effective April 16. L. 2014: Entire section amended, (HB 14-1387), ch. 378, p. 1800, § 3, effective June 6; (1), (2)(g), and (10) amended, (HB 14-1395), ch. 309, p. 1308, § 6, effective June 6. L. 2015: (13.5) added, (SB 15-270), ch. 296, p. 1206, § 1, effective June 5. L. 2024: (3) amended, (HB 24-1422), ch. 137, p. 510, § 1, effective August 7.
Cross references: For the legislative declaration contained in the 1995 act amending subsections (3) and (6), see section 112 of chapter 167, Session Laws of Colorado 1995. For the legislative declaration in HB 14-1387, see section 1 of chapter 378, Session Laws of Colorado 2014.
24-30-1302. State buildings - transfer.
(1) The powers, duties, and functions of the department of personnel include the powers, duties, and functions relating to state buildings that were formerly vested in the office of state planning and budgeting.
(2) Effective July 1, 1979, the officers and employees of the office of state planning and budgeting engaged prior to such date in the performance of the powers, duties, and functions vested by this part 13 in the department shall become employees of the department and shall retain all rights to state personnel system and retirement benefits under the laws of this state, and their services shall be deemed to have been continuous. Effective July 1, 1979, all of the books, records, reports, equipment, property, accounts, liabilities, and funds of the office of state planning and budgeting which pertain to the powers, duties, and functions vested by this part 13 in the department shall be transferred thereto.
(3) Whenever the powers, duties, or functions vested by this part 13 are referred to in any other statute or in any contract or other document and designate the former division of public works, or its predecessor, or the office of state planning and budgeting, such designation shall be deemed to apply solely to the department of personnel.
Source: L. 79: Entire part added, p. 881, § 1, effective July 1. L. 95: (1) and (3) amended, p. 649, § 55, effective July 1. L. 2022: (1) amended, (SB 22-162), ch. 469, p. 3420, § 195, effective August 10.
Cross references: (1) For the legislative declaration contained in the 1995 act amending subsections (1) and (3), see section 112 of chapter 167, Session Laws of Colorado 1995.
(2) For the short title (the "Debbie Haskins 'Administrative Organization Act of 1968' Modernization Act") in SB 22-162, see section 1 of chapter 469, Session Laws of Colorado 2022.
24-30-1302.5. Office of the state architect.
(1) There is created within the department an office of the state architect, the head of which is the state architect. The state architect is designated by the executive director of the department, subject to the provisions of section 13 of article XII of the state constitution, and the state architect must be qualified by training in architecture and planning. The state architect shall appoint the necessary staff of the office of the state architect in accordance with the provisions of section 13 of article XII of the state constitution.
(2) The state architect shall exercise all powers necessary and proper for the discharge of his or her duties as specified in this part 13 and part 14 of this article.
Source: L. 2015: Entire section added, (SB 15-270), ch. 296, p. 1206, § 2, effective June 5.
24-30-1303. Office of the state architect - responsibilities.
(1) The office of the state architect shall:
(a) With the approval of the governor, negotiate and execute leases on behalf of the state for real property needed for state use and, as provided in section 24-82-102 (2), negotiate and execute leases of real property not presently needed for state use;
(a.5) Notwithstanding section 24-30-1301 (15)(a), with the approval of the governor, negotiate and execute leases on behalf of the state for privately owned property, including land, office space, buildings, and special use interests;
(b) With the approval of the governor, negotiate and approve easements and rights-of-way across nonstate land on behalf of the state and, as provided in section 24-82-202, negotiate and approve easements and rights-of-way across land owned by or under the control of the state;
(c) Repealed.
(d) Supervise and be responsible for the expenditure of funds appropriated by the general assembly for capital construction, capital renewal, and controlled maintenance projects for state agencies and state institutions of higher education;
(e) Maintain a current record of balances by project in the capital construction and controlled maintenance funds;
(f) Cause to be developed and enforced methods of internal control, on standardized basis within individual state agencies, that will assure compliance with appropriations provisions and executive orders;
(g) Repealed.
(h) Develop, or cause to be developed, with the approval of the governor, specific standards relating to office space, to architectural, structural, mechanical, and electrical systems in such office space, and to energy conservation in such office space, except in higher education as provided in section 23-1-106, C.R.S., which shall be the basis for approving facilities master plans, facility program plans, schematic designs, design development phases, and construction documents relating to the lease, acquisition, or construction of office space; except that such standards shall be approved by the president of the senate and the speaker of the house of representatives when they concern space, systems, or energy conservation in that portion of the capitol buildings group which is under the jurisdiction of the general assembly;
(i) Develop a construction procedures manual for real property, with the approval of the governor;
(j) Develop, or cause to be developed, standards of inspection, with the approval of the governor, which shall be the basis of all inspections and be responsible for assuring the uniform inspection of construction projects by the state agencies, utilizing such resources as may be locally available, in conjunction with the architect, engineer, or consultant;
(k) Coordinate initiation of budget requests for those capital construction or capital renewal projects for which the executive director shall be designated as principal representative by the governor;
(k.5) Coordinate initiation of budget requests for controlled maintenance projects and make recommendations concerning such requests to the capital development committee and to the office of state planning and budgeting. In the event that a controlled maintenance request exceeds approximately five hundred thousand dollars, the executive director may require the department making the request to prepare a feasibility study or program plan for the request. The executive director may establish guidelines or criteria for such feasibility study or program plan.
(l) and (m) Repealed.
(n) (I) (Deleted by amendment, L. 94, p. 567, § 20, effective April 6, 1994.)
(II) Develop, or cause to be developed, methods of control on a standardized basis for all state agencies and state institutions of higher education to ensure conformity of physical planning with approved building codes and of construction with approved physical planning.
(o) (Deleted by amendment, L. 94, p. 567, § 20, effective April 6, 1994.)
(p) Develop and maintain, or cause to be developed and maintained, at state agencies and state institutions of higher education approved lists of qualified architects, industrial hygienists, engineers, landscape architects, land surveyors, and consultants from which the principal representative shall make a selection, including therein such information as may be required by part 14 of this article;
(q) Develop and maintain, or cause to be developed and maintained, at state agencies and state institutions of higher education approved lists of qualified contractors to bid on construction projects and promulgate rules and regulations as may be necessary for contractor prequalification processes for bidding on construction projects;
(r) Promulgate rules for independent third-party review of facility program plans, schematic design, design development, and construction documents to assure compliance with appropriate building codes, approved construction standards, and the appropriation and to assure the review of cost estimates prior to authorization of the calling of bids for compliance with the appropriation. In the event the executive director or his designee, after such review, finds that facility program plans, schematic design, design development, or construction documents do not comply with approved construction standards and the appropriation or that cost estimates do not comply with the appropriation, he shall immediately notify the principal representative in writing of his findings and make appropriate recommendations. Upon receipt of such notice, the principal representative shall take action as necessary to implement the recommendations and bring the project into compliance, continuing or modifying plans, designs, construction documents, or cost estimates as the case may be.
(s) (I) Promulgate rules and regulations for the administration of the bid procedure and acceptable methods for determining the lowest responsible bidder;
(II) In cooperation with the project architect, engineer, or consultant, be responsible for the administration of the bid procedure for state agencies and state institutions of higher education without staff capability and perform such additional functions as the office may determine;
(III) When directly responsible for the bid procedure, recommend the lowest responsible bid to the principal representative, after consultation with the project architect, engineer, or consultant;
(IV) Promulgate, with the assistance of the attorney general and the state controller, standardized contract language for agreements between architects, engineers, or consultants and state agencies or state institutions of higher education and language for construction contracts between contractors or construction managers and state agencies or state institutions of higher education;
(V) Review and approve modifications to such standard contract language;
(s.5) Work with the office of state planning and budgeting, the Colorado commission on higher education, the department of higher education, and a representative from a state institution of higher education to develop and establish criteria for recommending capital construction projects;
(t) (I) Make recommendations on capital construction and capital renewal project requests made by each state agency after the requests have been reviewed by the office as specified in section 24-30-1311, and submit recommendations for the same to the office of state planning and budgeting in a timely manner so that the office of state planning and budgeting can meet the deadlines set forth in section 24-37-304 (1)(c.3). The state architect may not recommend capital construction project requests if such projects are not included in the state agency's facility program plan that is approved as required in section 24-30-1311, unless the state architect determines that there exists a sound reason why the requested project is not included in the facility program plan.
(II) Be responsible for the preparation of the state's controlled maintenance budget request and submit recommendations for the same to the office of state planning and budgeting and the capital development committee;
(u) and (v) Repealed.
(w) Develop and maintain, or cause to be developed and maintained, life-cycle cost analysis methods for real property and, prior to beginning construction, assure that such methods are reviewed by an independent third party to ensure compliance with sections 24-30-1304 and 24-30-1305. The office shall review and approve specific exceptions to systems selected for construction, which systems are not found to be the best choice on a life-cycle basis.
(x) and (y) Repealed.
(z) Establish minimum building codes, with the approval of the governor and the general assembly after the recommendations and review of the capital development committee, for all construction by state agencies and state institutions of higher education on real property or state lease-purchased buildings. At the discretion of the office, said codes may apply to state-leased buildings where local building codes may not exist.
(aa) Repealed.
(bb) Develop and maintain a list of the information required to be included in facility management plans and updates submitted pursuant to section 24-30-1303.5 (3.5);
(cc) Develop procedures for the submission of facility management plans and updates pursuant to section 24-30-1303.5 (3.5); and
(dd) Review facility management plans and updates submitted pursuant to section 24-30-1303.5 (3.5) and submit a report regarding such plans and updates to the office of state planning and budgeting and the capital development committee.
(ee) (Deleted by amendment, L. 2009, (SB 09-292), ch. 369, p. 1967, § 75, effective August 5, 2009.)
(ff) (I) (A) On or before January 1, 2025, adopt and enforce an energy code that achieves equivalent or better energy performance than the 2021 international energy conservation code and the model electric ready and solar ready code language developed for adoption by the energy code board pursuant to section 24-38.5-401 (5). This energy code must apply to all construction by state agencies on state-owned properties or facilities or on properties or facilities that are leased by the state under a financed purchase of an asset or certificate of participation agreement.
(B) On or before January 1, 2030, adopt and enforce an energy code that achieves equivalent or better energy and carbon emissions performance than the model low energy and carbon code developed for adoption by the energy code board pursuant to section 24-38.5-401 (6). This energy code must apply to all construction by state agencies on state-owned properties or facilities or on properties or facilities that are leased by the state under a financed purchase of an asset or certificate of participation agreement.
(II) Notwithstanding any other provision of this subsection (1)(ff), the office of the state architect may make any amendments to an energy code that the office of the state architect deems appropriate, so long as the amendments do not decrease the effectiveness or energy efficiency of the energy code.
(III) Nothing in this subsection (1)(ff) restricts the ability of an investor-owned utility with approval from the public utilities commission to:
(A) Provide incentives or other energy efficiency program services to help the office of the state architect or builders comply with the requirements of this subsection (1)(ff); or
(B) Earn shareholder incentives and claim credits toward its regulatory requirements for energy or greenhouse gas emission savings achieved as a result of incentives provided by the utility to help the office of the state architect or builders comply with the requirements of this subsection (1)(ff).
(IV) A utility not subject to regulation by the public utilities commission may provide incentives or other energy efficiency program services as they so choose to assist the office of the state architect or any builders in complying with the requirements of this subsection (1)(ff).
(V) (A) A utility shall be allowed to count mass-based emissions reductions associated with the requirements of this subsection (1)(ff) towards compliance with its requirements under section 25-7-105 (1)(e)(X.7) or (1)(e)(X.8), section 40-3.2-108 (3)(b), or any similar greenhouse gas emissions reduction program or set of requirements.
(B) A utility subject to regulation by the public utilities commission shall not be allowed to count energy savings or greenhouse gas emissions reductions achieved through the requirements of this subsection (1)(ff) for the purpose of calculating a shareholder incentive established pursuant to sections 40-3.2-103 (2)(d) and 40-3.2-104 (5) if the utility has not provided a financial investment for code adoption as documented in a plan approved by the commission.
(gg) Support and encourage the development and renovation of sustainable sites to maximize pollinator health on properties within the state capitol complex, other state buildings, and, where applicable, on leased property, including by:
(I) Maximizing the use of native plant material and pollinator-friendly plants in landscape design plans;
(II) Modifying the state's design guidelines to incorporate native plants and pollinator-friendly plants;
(III) Ensuring that state-funded projects use pesticide-free management practices to the extent practicable; and
(IV) To the extent practicable, ensuring that state contracts for the purchase of plants require such plants to not contain synthetic pesticides.
(2) The provisions of subsection (1) of this section shall not apply to lands under the jurisdiction of the state board of land commissioners or to leases of land held by the division of parks and wildlife.
(3) (a) All real property, except public roads and highways, projects under the supervision of the division of parks and wildlife, and real property under the supervision of the judicial department, erected for state purposes shall be constructed in conformity with a construction procedures manual for real property prepared by the office and approved by the governor. Such construction shall be made only upon plans, designs, and construction documents that comply with approved state standards and rules promulgated pursuant to this section.
(b) Projects under the supervision of the division of parks and wildlife that are excluded from paragraph (a) of this subsection (3), shall:
(I) Maintain a current record of balances by capital project, including but not limited to:
(A) Planned budgets, actual expenditures, and additions or deletions to and components of projects; and
(B) Items categorized for professional services, construction or improvement, contingencies, and moveable equipment.
(II) Notwithstanding section 24-1-136 (11)(a)(I), report the current record of balances by capital project on or before September 15, 2001, not less than one time annually on or before each September 15 thereafter to the office of state planning and budgeting, the joint budget committee, and the capital development committee.
(c) (I) All real property under the supervision of the judicial department erected for state purposes shall be constructed in conformity with a construction procedures manual for real property based on acceptable industry standards. Such construction shall be made only upon plans, designs, and construction documents that comply with approved state standards.
(II) The judicial department is authorized to hire private construction managers to supervise their capital construction, controlled maintenance, or capital renewal projects. The cost of such construction managers shall be paid for from moneys appropriated for the specific capital construction, controlled maintenance, or capital renewal project.
(III) The judicial department is authorized to perform the responsibilities and functions described in paragraph (a) of subsection (1) of this section for any real property under the supervision of the judicial department.
(4) When the principal representative is a legislative agency, the principal representative may request, and the office shall provide to the principal representative within five working days of such request, a progress report of the office's actions undertaken as of the date of the request towards completion of any of the office's duties set forth in subsection (1) of this section.
(5) (a) The office may delegate to state agencies or state institutions of higher education any or all of the responsibilities and functions outlined in this part 13 and the office's responsibilities and functions under part 14 of this article, pursuant to rules and regulations promulgated by the department, when the state agency or state institution of higher education has the professional or technical capability on staff to perform such functions competently.
(b) The office may authorize state agencies or state institutions of higher education to hire private construction managers to supervise the capital construction, controlled maintenance, or capital renewal projects. The cost of such construction manager shall be paid from moneys appropriated for the specific capital construction, controlled maintenance, or capital renewal projects. This paragraph (b) does not apply to projects under the supervision of the department of transportation.
(c) If the state architect determines that the governing board of a state institution of higher education has adopted procedures that adequately meet the safeguards set forth in the requirements of part 14 of this article and article 92 of this title, the state architect may exempt the institution from any of the procedural requirements of part 14 of this article and article 92 of this title in regard to a capital construction project to be constructed pursuant to the provisions of section 23-1-106 (9), C.R.S.; except that the selection of any contractor to perform professional services as defined in section 24-30-1402 (6) must be made in accordance with the criteria set forth in section 24-30-1403 (2).
(d) Upon application by any state agency or state institution of higher education that demonstrates internal expertise related to the leasing and acquisition of commercial real property, the office may delegate an individual employed by the state agency or state institution of higher education to act on behalf of the office in the performance of the responsibilities and functions described in paragraph (a) of subsection (1) of this section. The delegation authorized pursuant to this paragraph (d) may include, with the consent of the office, the authority to waive the use of the office-approved real estate lease form or real estate lease amendment form.
(6) Nothing in this article is intended to diminish the authority granted to the judicial department or the state court administrator in Senate Bill 08-206.
(7) By June 30, 2025, the office of the state architect shall develop, in coordination with the Colorado water conservation board in the department of natural resources, a floodplain management program for development, as defined in 44 CFR 59.1, on state-owned land located in counties or municipalities that do not participate in the federal emergency management agency's national flood insurance program or an equivalent program. The purpose of the floodplain management program is to ensure that all development, as defined in 44 CFR 59.1, on state-owned land located in such counties and municipalities is in compliance with the minimum floodplain management criteria required by the national flood insurance program, as well as the Colorado water conservation board's rules and regulations for regulatory floodplains in Colorado. At the discretion of the office of the state architect, the floodplain management program may also apply to state-leased properties located in counties or municipalities that do not participate in the federal emergency management agency's national flood insurance program or an equivalent program.
Source: L. 79: Entire part added, pp. 881, 894, §§ 1, 2, effective July 1. L. 83: (4) amended, p. 893 § 1, effective March 22; (1)(c) repealed, p. 896, § 3, effective June 1. L. 89: (5) added, p. 1026, § 1, effective April 27; (1)(k.5) added, p. 1028, § 1, effective June 1. L. 90: (1)(f), (1)(j), (1)(l), (1)(n) to (1)(r), (1)(w), (3), and (5) amended, (1)(g), (1)(m), (1)(u), (1)(x), and (1)(y) repealed, (1)(s) and (1)(t) R&RE, and (1)(z) added, pp. 1185, 1191, 1187, 1188, §§ 1, 8, 2, 3, effective April 18. L. 91: (5)(b) amended, p. 1058, § 16, effective July 1. L. 93: (1)(v) amended and (1)(aa) added, pp. 1654, 917, §§ 57, 2, effective July 1. L. 94: (1)(h), (1)(n), and (1)(o) amended, p. 567, § 20, effective April 6. L. 96: (1)(k.5) amended, p. 1519, § 57, effective June 1. L. 97: (1)(p) amended, p. 108, § 1, effective March 24. L. 2001: (3) amended, p. 227, § 1, effective March 28. L. 2003: (1)(v) repealed, p. 1421, § 2, effective April 29; (1)(ee) added, p. 2502, § 3, effective June 5; (1)(bb), (1)(cc), and (1)(dd) added, p. 962, § 2, effective July 1. L. 2007: (1)(k.5) amended, p. 868, § 2, effective May 14. L. 2009: (1)(cc), (1)(dd), and (1)(ee) amended, (SB 09-292), ch. 369, p. 1967, § 75, effective August 5; (5)(c) added, (SB 09-290), ch. 374, p. 2040, § 4, effective August 5. L. 2010: (5)(d) added, (HB 10-1181), ch. 351, p. 1622, § 7, effective June 7. L. 2014: (1)(a), (1)(b), (1)(d), (1)(i), (1)(k), (1)(l), (1)(n)(II), (1)(p), (1)(q), (1)(s)(II), (1)(s)(IV), (1)(t)(I), (1)(w), (1)(z), (3)(a), and (5) amended and (3)(c) and (6) added, (HB 14-1387), ch. 378, p. 1805, § 4, effective June 6. L. 2015: IP(1), (1)(s)(II), (1)(t)(I), (1)(w), (1)(z), (3)(a), (4), and (5) amended, (1)(l) repealed, and (1)(s.5) added, (SB 15-270), ch. 296, p. 1207, § 3, effective June 5. L. 2016: (5)(c) amended, (SB 16-204), ch. 222, p. 852, § 4, effective June 6. L. 2017: (3)(b)(II) amended, (HB 17-1257), ch. 254, p. 1063, § 1, effective August 9. L. 2021: (1)(a.5) added, (HB 21-1126), ch. 36, p. 141, § 1, effective April 15. L. 2022: (1)(ff) added, (HB 22-1362), ch. 301, p. 2179, § 4, effective June 2. L. 2024: (7) added, (SB 24-179), ch. 449, p. 3128, § 1, effective August 7. L. 2026: (1)(gg) added, (HB 26-1132), ch. 156, p. 884, § 3, effective August 12.
Editor's note: Subsection (1)(aa) provided for the repeal of subsection (1)(aa), effective January 1, 1996. (See L. 93, p. 917.)
Cross references: For the legislative declaration in HB 14-1387, see section 1 of chapter 378, Session Laws of Colorado 2014. For the legislative declaration in HB 26-1132, see section 1 of chapter 156, Session Laws of Colorado 2026.
24-30-1303.1. Code appeals board - creation - duties. (Repealed)
Source: L. 90: Entire section added, p. 1188, § 4, effective April 18. L. 2014: Entire section repealed, (HB 14-1387), ch. 378, p. 1855, § 71, effective June 6.
Cross references: For the legislative declaration in HB 14-1387, see section 1 of chapter 378, Session Laws of Colorado 2014.
24-30-1303.5. Office of the state architect to prepare and maintain inventory of state property - vacant facilities.
(1) The office shall obtain and maintain a correct and current inventory of all real property owned by or held in trust for the state or any state agency or state institution of higher education, and, in cooperation with the attorney general, correct any defects in title to said real property necessary to vest marketable title in the state.
(2) Such inventory must include sufficient information to identify such real property with respect to which unit of the state has control thereof, where such real property is located, and when and from what source the real property was acquired, including subsequent improvements. The office shall establish and maintain an accurate index system which will assure that inquiries as to the location and control of all such real property will be promptly answered.
(3) The office shall establish procedures whereby each state agency and state institution of higher education is required to report all acquisitions of real property, including improvements, and all dispositions thereof to the office to enable the inventory to be promptly and accurately maintained with respect to such changes. The report must include a copy of each purchase or sale agreement pertaining to the acquisition or disposition of real property, including improvements, or, if such agreements are not available, such other documents describing the terms and conditions of the transaction as the office finds to be appropriate in order to maintain the information required by subsection (2) of this section. For each transaction involving the acquisition or disposition of real property, the state agency or the state institution of higher education shall also provide to the department a copy of the deed pertaining to the real property after the deed has been recorded.
(3.5) (a) With respect to all real property owned by or held in trust for the state or any state agency or state institution of higher education, each state agency or state institution of higher education shall identify any vacant facility under its control. As used in this section, "vacant" means:
(I) Unoccupied;
(II) Unused in whole or in part for the purposes for which the improvement was designed, intended, or remodeled; or
(III) Without current defined plans by the state agency or state institution of higher education for the next fiscal year.
(b) A state agency or state institution of higher education must submit for the approval of the office a facility management plan for any vacant facility consistent with the procedures established by the office. The state agency or state institution of higher education must submit the facility management plan to the office within thirty days after the facility becomes vacant. In addition to any other information required by the office, the facility management plan must include the following:
(I) A financial analysis of the possible uses of the facility;
(II) Any plans for the disposal of the facility through sale, lease, demolition, or otherwise;
(III) If the state agency or state institution of higher education does not intend to dispose of the facility during the next fiscal year, a plan for the proposed controlled maintenance, if any, necessary to avoid the deterioration of the vacant facility; and
(IV) Whether the facility has or is eligible to receive a national, state, or local historic designation or listing.
(c) (I) For each year after the office approves a facility management plan, the state agency or state institution of higher education shall submit an annual facility management plan update consistent with the procedures established by the office. The update must be submitted on or before November 1 of the year following the approval of a facility management plan and each November 1 thereafter until such time that the facility is no longer vacant. In addition to any other information required by the office, the update must identify all actions taken by the state agency or state institution of higher education within the last year consistent with the facility management plan. If based on the update or on any other information known by the office, the office determines that the state agency or state institution of higher education has failed to comply with the provisions of an approved facility management plan, the office may revoke the approval of the facility management plan. If the office revokes approval of the facility management plan, a state agency or state institution of higher education is required to submit a new facility management plan for the vacant facility subject to the provisions of this subsection (3.5).
(II) In addition to any other requirements of subparagraph (I) of this paragraph (c), the facility management plan update must describe any changes proposed by the state agency or state institution of higher education to the facility management plan. Any proposed changes to the facility management plan are subject to the approval of the office, and any approved changes become part of the facility management plan for purposes of future updates.
(d) Any facility management plan or update required to be submitted by a state institution of higher education pursuant to this subsection (3.5) must be submitted to the Colorado commission on higher education instead of the office. The commission shall submit a copy of the facility management plan or update and the commission's recommendations regarding it to the office.
(e) Repealed.
(f) No state agency or state institution of higher education is eligible for any capital construction appropriations until the office approves a facility management plan for all vacant facilities controlled by the state agency or state institution of higher education; except that the capital development committee may exempt a state agency or state institution of higher education from the provisions of this paragraph (f).
(4) For purposes of maintaining a current inventory, no acquisition or disposition of real property may be made and no funds or other valuable consideration may be given by a state agency or state institution of higher education for such acquisition, nor may any final document of conveyance of real property be transmitted to a purchaser, until a complete report on such transaction as required pursuant to subsection (3) of this section has been filed with the office and the office has issued a written acknowledgment of the receipt of such report to the state agency or state institution of higher education. Such written acknowledgment must be issued without delay, and nothing in this section should be construed to give the office any power to approve or disapprove any acquisition or disposition of real property, improvements thereon, or other capital assets.
(5) (Deleted by amendment, L. 2014.)
(5.5) The office shall cause to be developed performance criteria for real property. An analysis must be made upon selected real property against the performance criteria to assess whether the selected real property should be considered for sale or other disposition if such real property is not performing and is determined not to be of sound investment value, or should be held for an identified future state need. The office may contract to maintain such inventories, develop such performance criteria, and perform such analysis and may enter exclusive brokerage agreements on behalf of state agencies and state institutions of higher education to the extent necessary to accomplish the maintenance of such inventory and such analysis. The office shall make recommendations to the capital development committee regarding various real property management strategies resulting from such analysis. This subsection (5.5) does not apply to property that is subject to the provisions of section 43-1-106 (8)(n), C.R.S.
(6) Notwithstanding section 24-1-136 (11)(a)(I), the office shall prepare an annual report of the acquisitions and dispositions of real property subject to this section and make the report available to the members of the capital development committee. Such report must include a description of the real property and its present use and value.
Source: L. 83: Entire section added, p. 894, § 1, effective June 6. L. 90: (6) amended, p. 1284, § 2, effective April 3; (5.5) added, p. 1190, § 5, effective April 18. L. 91: (1) and (5.5) amended, p. 1059, § 17, effective July 1. L. 99: (6) amended, p. 690, § 11, effective August 4. L. 2003: (3.5) added, p. 963, § 3, effective July 1. L. 2007: (3.5)(e) repealed, p. 757, § 6, effective May 10. L. 2014: Entire section amended, (HB 14-1387), ch. 378, p. 1808, § 5, effective June 6. L. 2015: (1), (2), (3), (3.5), (4), (5.5), and (6) amended, (SB 15-270), ch. 296, p. 1209, § 4, effective June 5. L. 2017: (6) amended, (HB 17-1058), ch. 18, p. 59, § 5, effective March 8.
Cross references: For the legislative declaration in HB 14-1387, see section 1 of chapter 378, Session Laws of Colorado 2014.
24-30-1303.7. Controlled maintenance projects - flexibility in administering appropriations.
(1) When the actual cost of a controlled maintenance project exceeds the amount specifically appropriated for such project in the annual general appropriation act or when an emergency need arises for a new controlled maintenance project, the executive director may eliminate one or more projects authorized by appropriation in the general appropriation act and utilize the savings to cover such additional cost or the cost of the emergency project. When the actual cost of a controlled maintenance project is less than the amount specifically appropriated for such project in the annual general appropriation act, the executive director may apply such savings to other appropriated controlled maintenance projects.
(2) and (3) Repealed.
Source: L. 86, 2nd Ex. Sess.: Entire section added, p. 62, § 1, effective August 25. L. 87: (3) repealed, p. 978, § 1, effective May 6. L. 99: (2) repealed, p. 690, § 12, effective August 4.
24-30-1303.8. Governor's mansion maintenance fund - creation - report.
(1) (a) The governor's mansion maintenance fund, referred to in this section as the "fund", is hereby created in the state treasury. The fund consists of money earned from the operation of the governor's mansion, such as rental fees, and any proceeds from the lease of the parking lot associated with the governor's mansion property, which money is credited to the fund by the state treasurer, and any other money that the general assembly may appropriate or transfer to the fund. The state treasurer shall credit all interest and income derived from the deposit and investment of money in the fund to the fund. Subject to annual appropriation by the general assembly, the governor's office may expend money from the fund for any operating costs for any governor's mansion activities and the department may expend money from the fund for controlled maintenance of the governor's mansion; except that the capital development committee shall review any appropriation requests for controlled maintenance and shall forward its recommendations to the joint budget committee.
(b) No later than December 1, 2018, and each December 1 thereafter, the department shall provide a report to the capital development committee regarding the fund balance and information regarding the controlled maintenance needs of the governor's mansion.
(2) If the money in the fund is insufficient to cover the cost of a controlled maintenance project, the department may submit a controlled maintenance budget request for the governor's mansion with the office of state planning and budgeting to be included with the office of state planning and budgeting's submission to the capital development committee made pursuant to section 24-37-304 (1)(c.3)(I)(D).
Source: L. 2018: Entire section added, (SB 18-208), ch. 292, p. 1796, § 1, effective August 8. L. 2021: (1)(a) amended, (HB 21-1274), ch. 263, p. 1535, § 2, effective September 7.
24-30-1303.9. Eligibility for state controlled maintenance funding - legislative declaration.
(1) The office of the state architect shall develop guidelines in order to establish when real property is eligible for controlled maintenance funding, subject to the limitations set forth in this section. The guidelines must address the timing of such eligibility with respect to the dates on which acquisition, construction, additions, renovations, or corrective repairs of real property occurred.
(2) The guidelines shall be annually reviewed and approved by the capital development committee.
(3) The guidelines shall provide for a waiver of eligibility requirements that a state agency or state institution of higher education may request in writing. If the state architect determines that special consideration is appropriate, he or she shall seek approval from the capital development committee.
(4) The guidelines shall be posted on the website of the office of the state architect.
(5) Notwithstanding the eligibility requirements specified in this section, if a need arises for emergency controlled maintenance funding, the state agency or state institution of higher education shall communicate such need to the state architect in writing, and the state architect, in his or her discretion, may use moneys in the emergency controlled maintenance account created in section 24-75-302 (3.2) to fund such emergency controlled maintenance need. The state architect shall annually provide an emergency controlled maintenance funding status report to the capital development committee that shows spending for emergency controlled maintenance projects from the emergency controlled maintenance account.
(6) Any corrective repairs or replacement as part of a controlled maintenance project must be suitable for retention or use for at least five years.
(7) (a) Controlled maintenance funds may not be used for:
(I) Corrective repairs or replacement of real property and replacement or repair of the fixed or movable equipment necessary for the operation of real property, when such work is funded in a state agency's or state institution of higher education's operating budget;
(II) Auxiliary facilities as defined in section 23-1-106 (10.3);
(III) Leasehold interests in real property;
(IV) Any work properly categorized as capital construction;
(V) Facilities described in section 23-1-106 (10.2)(a)(III); or
(VI) Any real property acquired by a state agency or a state institution of higher education through a financed purchase of an asset or certificate of participation agreement where the financed purchase of an asset or certificate of participation agreement requires authorization set forth in section 24-82-801.
(b) Minor maintenance items shall not be accumulated to create a controlled maintenance project, nor shall minor maintenance work be accomplished as a part of a controlled maintenance project unless the work is directly related to the project.
(8) Notwithstanding this section, controlled maintenance funds may be used for real property leased and operated by the department of human services or the department of corrections.
(9) Notwithstanding this section, controlled maintenance funds may be used for real property that is transferred from the San Juan basin area vocational school to Pueblo community college as part of a merger transaction between the San Juan basin area vocational school and Pueblo community college.
(10) Notwithstanding this section, controlled maintenance funds may be used for academic facility as defined in section 23-1-106 (10.3), C.R.S.
Source: L. 2012: Entire section added, (HB 12-1318), ch. 129, p. 446, § 1, effective August 8. L. 2014: (1) amended and (6) to (10) added, (HB 14-1387), ch. 378, p. 1811, § 6, effective June 6. L. 2017: (7)(a)(II), (7)(a)(III), and (7)(a)(IV) amended and (7)(a)(V) added, (SB 17-267), ch. 267, p. 1441, § 8, effective May 30. L. 2018: (7)(a)(IV) and (7)(a)(V) amended and (7)(a)(VI) added, (HB 18-1374), ch. 249, p. 1535, § 1, effective August 8. L. 2021: (7)(a)(VI) amended, (HB 21-1316), ch. 325, p. 2024, § 32, effective July 1.
Cross references: For the legislative declaration in HB 14-1387, see section 1 of chapter 378, Session Laws of Colorado 2014. For the legislative declaration in SB 17-267, see section 1 of chapter 267, Session Laws of Colorado 2017.
24-30-1304. Life-cycle cost - legislative findings and declaration.
(1) The general assembly hereby finds:
(a) That state-owned real property has a significant impact on the state's consumption of energy;
(b) That energy conservation practices adopted for the design, construction, and utilization of this real property will have a beneficial effect on the state's overall supply of energy;
(c) That the cost of the energy consumed by this real property over the life of the real property must be considered, in addition to the initial cost of constructing such real property; and
(d) That the cost of energy is significant, and facility designs must take into consideration the total life-cycle cost, including the initial construction cost, the cost, over the economic life of the real property, of the energy consumed, replacement costs, and the cost of operation and maintenance of the real property, including energy consumption.
(2) The general assembly declares that it is the policy of this state to ensure that energy conservation practices are employed in the design of state-owned real property. To this end the general assembly requires all state agencies and state institutions of higher education to analyze the life-cycle cost of all real property constructed or renovated, over its economic life, in addition to the initial construction or renovation cost.
Source: L. 79: Entire part added, p. 884, § 1, effective July 1. L. 2014: Entire section amended, (HB 14-1387), ch. 378, p. 1812, § 7, effective June 6.
Cross references: For the legislative declaration in HB 14-1387, see section 1 of chapter 378, Session Laws of Colorado 2014.
24-30-1305. Life-cycle cost - application - definitions.
(1) The general assembly authorizes and directs that state agencies and state institutions of higher education shall employ design and construction methods for real property under their jurisdiction, in such a manner as to further the policy declared in section 24-30-1304, insuring that life-cycle cost analyses and energy conservation practices are employed in new or renovated real property.
(2) The life-cycle cost analysis must include but not be limited to such elements as:
(a) The coordination, orientation, and positioning of the facility on its physical site;
(b) The amount and type of fenestration employed in the facility;
(c) Thermal performance and efficiency characteristics of materials incorporated into the facility design;
(d) The variable occupancy and operating conditions of the facility, including illumination levels; and
(e) Architectural features which affect energy consumption.
(f) (Deleted by amendment, L. 2014.)
(3) The life-cycle cost analysis performed for real property with a facility of twenty thousand or more gross square feet with significant energy demands must provide but not be limited to the following information:
(a) The initial estimated cost of each energy-consuming system being compared and evaluated;
(b) The estimated annual operating cost of all utility requirements, including consideration of possible escalating costs of energy. The office may rely on any national or locally appropriate fuel escalating methodology approved by the office of the state architect in performing life-cycle cost analyses.
(c) The estimated annual cost of maintaining each energy-consuming system;
(d) The average estimated replacement cost for each system expressed in annual terms for the economic life of the facility;
(e) The use of biofuel to provide supplemental or exclusive heating, power, or both for the facility. For a renovation of such a facility, the cost analysis regarding the use of biofuel must consider any stranded utility costs; and
(f) An energy consumption analysis of such real property's heating, ventilating, and air conditioning system, lighting system, and all other energy-consuming systems. The energy consumption analysis of the operation of energy-consuming systems in the real property should include but not be limited to:
(I) The comparison of two or more system alternatives;
(II) The simulation or engineering evaluation of each system over the entire range of operation of the real property for a year's operating period; and
(III) The engineering evaluation of the energy consumption of component equipment in each system considering the operation of such components at other than full or rated outputs.
(4) The life-cycle cost analysis shall be certified by a licensed architect or professional engineer, or by both architect and engineer, particularly qualified by training and experience for the type of work involved.
(5) In order to protect the integrity of historic buildings, no provision of section 24-30-1304 or this section should be interpreted to require such analysis with respect to any real property eligible for, nominated to, or entered in the national register of historic places, designated by statute, or included in an established list of places compiled by the state historical society.
(6) Selection of the optimum system or combination of systems to be incorporated into the design of real property must be based on the life-cycle cost analysis over the economic life of the real property, unless a request for an alternative system is made and approved by the office prior to beginning construction.
(7) The principal representatives of all state agencies and state institutions of higher education are responsible for implementing the provisions of this section and the policy established in section 24-30-1304.
(8) The provisions of section 24-30-1304 and this section shall not apply to municipalities or counties nor to any agency or department of any municipality or county.
(9) Repealed.
(10) As used in this section, unless the context otherwise requires:
(a) "Biofuel" means nontoxic plant matter consisting of agricultural or silvicultural crops or their byproducts, urban wood waste, mill residue, slash, or brush.
(b) "Energy consumption analysis" means the evaluation of all energy-consuming systems and components by demand and type of energy, including the internal energy load imposed on real property by its occupants, equipment, and components and the external energy load imposed on the real property by climatic conditions.
Source: L. 79: Entire part added, p. 884, § 1, effective July 1. L. 2004: (4) amended, p. 1311, § 55, effective May 28. L. 2006: (3)(e) added, p. 158, § 1, effective March 31. L. 2007: (9) added, p. 485, § 2, effective September 1. L. 2008: (3)(b) amended, p. 1307, § 2, effective August 5. L. 2013: (9)(b) amended and (9)(c)(IV) repealed, (SB 13-028), ch. 66, p. 218, § 2, effective March 22. L. 2014: (1), (2), (3), (5), (6), and (7) amended, (9) repealed, and (10) added, (HB 14-1387), ch. 378, pp. 1813, 1855, §§ 8, 71, effective June 6. L. 2015: (3)(b) and (6) amended, (SB 15-270), ch. 296, p. 1211, § 5, effective June 5.
Cross references: For the legislative declaration in the 2013 act amending subsection (9)(b) and repealing subsection (9)(c)(IV), see section 1 of chapter 66, Session Laws of Colorado 2013. For the legislative declaration in HB 14-1387, see section 1 of chapter 378, Session Laws of Colorado 2014.
24-30-1305.5. High performance standards - report - legislative declaration - definition.
(1) The office shall, in consultation with the Colorado commission on higher education, adopt and update from time to time a high performance standard certification program.
(2) A state agency or state institution of higher education controlling the substantial renovation, design, or new construction of a building shall, pursuant to the program adopted in subsection (1) of this section, perform the substantial renovation, design, or new construction to achieve the highest performance certification attainable as certified by an independent third party pursuant to the high performance standard certification program. A certification is attainable if the increased initial costs of the substantial renovation, design, or new construction, including the time value of money, to achieve the highest performance certification attainable can be recouped from decreased operational costs within fifteen years.
(3) (a) For all buildings that started the design process on or after January 1, 2010, each state agency or state institution of higher education shall monitor, track, and verify utility vendor bill data pertaining to the building and must annually report to the office. The annual report must also include information related to building performance based on the building's utility consumption.
(b) The general assembly hereby finds, determines, and declares that buildings that have achieved the highest performance certification attainable and started the design process prior to January 1, 2010, are strongly encouraged to monitor, track, and verify utility vendor bill data pertaining to such building in order to ensure that the increased initial costs to achieve the highest performance certification attainable are in fact recouped. If such data is monitored, tracked, and verified, then the state agency or state institution of higher education must annually report to the office. If such data is not monitored, tracked, and verified, then the state agency or state institution of higher education must provide the office, in writing, a reasonable explanation and also must work with the office to find a way to start monitoring, tracking, verifying, and reporting such data.
(c) The state agency or state institution of higher education, not a utility company, shall compile the utility vendor bill data.
(4) If the state agency or state institution of higher education estimates that the increased initial costs of the substantial renovation, design, or new construction, including the time value of money, to achieve the highest performance certification attainable will exceed five percent of the total cost of the substantial renovation, design, or new construction, the capital development committee shall specifically examine such estimate before approving any appropriation for the substantial renovation, design, or new construction.
(5) If a building undergoing substantial renovation cannot achieve high performance due to either the historical nature of the building or because the increased costs of renovating the building cannot be recouped from decreased operational costs within fifteen years, an accredited professional shall assert in writing that, as much as possible, the substantial renovation has been consistent with the high performance standard certification program.
(6) Any design or new construction of a building of less than five thousand square feet that is, but for its size, otherwise subject to this section and any minor renovation and controlled maintenance of a building that is subject to this section must be executed to the high performance standards adopted in the high performance standard certification program even if high performance certification is not sought at that time.
(7) Notwithstanding section 24-1-136 (11)(a)(I), the office shall report annually to the capital development committee regarding contracting documents, project guidelines, and reporting and tracking procedures related to the implementation of this section.
(8) As used in this section, unless the context otherwise requires:
(a) (I) "Building" means a facility that:
(A) Is substantially renovated, designed, or constructed with state moneys or with moneys guaranteed or insured by a state agency or state institution of higher education and such moneys constitute at least twenty-five percent of the project cost;
(B) Contains five thousand or more gross square feet;
(C) Includes a heating, ventilation, or air conditioning system; and
(D) Did not enter the design phase prior to January 1, 2008.
(II) "Building" includes an academic facility as defined in section 23-1-106 (10.3)(a), C.R.S., including an academic facility as defined in the guidelines described in section 23-1-106 (10.2)(b)(I), C.R.S.
(III) "Building" does not include:
(A) An auxiliary facility as defined in section 23-1-106 (10.3)(b), C.R.S., including an auxiliary facility as defined in the guidelines described in section 23-1-106 (10.2)(b)(I), C.R.S.; or
(B) A publicly assisted housing project as defined in section 24-32-718.
(b) "High performance standard certification program" means a real property renovation, design, and construction standard that:
(I) Is quantifiable, measurable, and verifiable as certified by an independent third party;
(II) Reduces the operating costs of real property by reducing the consumption of energy, water, and other resources;
(III) Results in the recovery of the increased initial capital costs attributable to compliance with the program over time by reducing long-term energy, maintenance, and operating costs;
(IV) Improves the indoor environmental quality of real property for a healthier work environment;
(V) Encourages the use of products harvested, created, or mined within Colorado, regardless of product certification status;
(VI) Protects Colorado's environment; and
(VII) Complies with the federal secretary of the interior's standards for the treatment of historic real property when such work will affect real property fifty years of age or older, unless the state historical society, designated in section 24-80-201, determines that such real property is not of historical significance as defined in section 24-80.1-102 (6).
(c) "Substantial renovation" means any renovation with a cost that exceeds twenty-five percent of the value of the building.
(d) "Utility vendor bill data" means information or data limited to the usage data measured by the state agency or state institution of higher education or the information or data required to meet minimum program standards by an independent third party pursuant to the high performance standard certification program.
Source: L. 2014: Entire section added, (HB 14-1387), ch. 378, p. 1815, § 9, effective June 6. L. 2015: (1), (3)(a), (3)(b), (7), and (8)(d) amended, (SB 15-270), ch. 296, p. 1212, § 6, effective June 5. L. 2017: (7) amended, (HB 17-1058), ch. 18, p. 59, § 6, effective March 8.
Cross references: For the legislative declaration in HB 14-1387, see section 1 of chapter 378, Session Laws of Colorado 2014.
24-30-1306. Acceptance of gifts and grants.
The department and the office, with the approval of the governor, are specifically empowered to receive and expend all grants, gifts, and bequests, where such grants, gifts, or bequests involve no state funds for acquisition, construction, or operation, including federal funds available for the purposes for which the department exists, and to contract with the United States and all other legal entities with respect thereto. The department and the office may provide, where such funds are specifically appropriated, matching funds wherever funds, grants, gifts, bequests, and contractual assistance are available on such basis. The department and the office shall provide such information, reports, and services as may be necessary to secure such financial aid.
Source: L. 79: Entire part added, p. 886, § 1, effective July 1. L. 2015: Entire section amended, (SB 15-270), ch. 296, p. 1212, § 7, effective June 5.
24-30-1307. Legislative declaration.
The purpose of this part 13 is to allow the office of the state architect to develop the policies and standards for state agencies and state institutions of higher education to follow for the major renovation or new construction of real property and to allow the office to delegate the authority to implement such policies and standards to the individual state agencies or state institutions of higher education. It is not the purpose of this part 13 to require state agencies or state institutions of higher education to add FTEs or incur additional expenditures to implement the provisions of this part 13.
Source: L. 90: Entire section added, p. 1190, § 6, effective April 18. L. 95: Entire section amended, p. 650, § 56, effective July 1. L. 2014: Entire section amended, (HB 14-1387), ch. 378, p. 1818, § 10, effective June 6. L. 2015: Entire section amended, (SB 15-270), ch. 296, p. 1213, § 8, effective June 5.
Cross references: For the legislative declaration contained in the 1995 act amending this section, see section 112 of chapter 167, Session Laws of Colorado 1995. For the legislative declaration in HB 14-1387, see section 1 of chapter 378, Session Laws of Colorado 2014.
24-30-1308. Controlled maintenance funds - leased or rented facilities - secure facilities. (Repealed)
Source: L. 2005: Entire section added, p. 1513, § 2, effective June 9. L. 2014: Entire section repealed, (HB 14-1387), ch. 378, p. 1818, § 11, effective June 6.
Cross references: For the legislative declaration in HB 14-1387, see section 1 of chapter 378, Session Laws of Colorado 2014.
24-30-1309. Eligibility of certain buildings for controlled maintenance. (Repealed)
Source: L. 2009: Entire section added, (SB 09-043), ch. 284, p. 1294, § 4, effective May 20. L. 2014: Entire section repealed, (HB 14-1387), ch. 378, p. 1818, § 12, effective June 6.
Cross references: For the legislative declaration in HB 14-1387, see section 1 of chapter 378, Session Laws of Colorado 2014.
24-30-1310. Funding for capital construction, controlled maintenance, or capital renewal - definitions. (Repealed)
Source: L. 2015: Entire section added, (SB 15-211), ch. 179, p. 584, § 2, effective May 11. L. 2016: Entire section amended, (SB 16-020), ch. 11, p. 25, § 1, effective March 9. L. 2017: (1)(d) and (2)(a) amended, (HB 17-1144), ch. 132, p. 445, § 1, effective August 9. L. 2018: (1)(d) amended, (HB 18-1372), ch. 279, p. 1753, § 1, effective August 8; (1)(d) amended, (SB 18-034), ch. 14, p. 245, § 30, effective October 1; (1)(d) amended, (HB 18-1027), ch. 31, p. 364, § 11, effective October 1. L. 2020: (1)(d) and IP(2) amended, (HB 20-1398), ch. 176, p. 806, § 1, effective June 29. L. 2021: IP(2)(c) amended, (HB 21-1316), ch. 325, p. 2025, § 33, effective July 1. L. 2022: (2) amended and (3) added, (SB 22-239), ch. 411, p. 2904, § 1, effective August 10. L. 2023: (2) amended, (SB 23-306), ch. 412, p. 2443, § 3, effective June 6. L. 2024: (1)(d)(IV), (1)(d)(V), and (3) amended and (1)(d)(VI) added, (HB 24-1423), ch. 138, p. 512, § 1, effective April 29; (2)(a)(II)(C) amended, (SB 24-206), ch. 455, p. 3152, § 1, effective August 7. L. 2025: (3) repealed, (SB 25-248), ch. 123, p. 488, § 1, effective April 25. L. 2026: (1)(d)(V) amended, (HB 26-1332), ch. 273, p. 1543, § 3, effective June 1; Entire section repealed, (HB 26-1406), ch. 286, p. 1574, § 1, effective June 1.
Editor's note: Subsection (1)(d)(V) was amended in HB 26-1332, effective June 1, 2026. Those amendments were superseded by the repeal of this section in HB 26-1406, effective June 1, 2026.
24-30-1311. Statewide planning function - responsibilities.
(1) (a) Commencing with the 2017-18 fiscal year, and each fiscal year thereafter, and in accordance with the office of state planning and budgeting's budget instructions, a state agency shall annually submit all capital construction budget requests, including any amended requests, to the office for review.
(b) Commencing with the 2016-17 fiscal year, and each fiscal year thereafter, and prior to the submission of a supplemental appropriations request to the office of state planning and budgeting, every state agency shall submit supplemental appropriations requests for capital construction to the office for review.
(2) The office shall review all the submissions it receives pursuant to subsection (1) of this section and make the recommendations required in section 24-30-1303 (1)(t)(I) in a timely manner to allow the office of state planning and budgeting to meet the deadlines specified in section 24-37-304 (1)(c.3).
(3) (a) Each state agency shall forward operational master plans, facilities master plans, facilities program plans, and five-year plans to the office. The office shall review operational master plans and approve the facilities master plans, facilities program plans, and five-year plans described in section 24-1-136.5.
(b) The office shall annually provide the capital development committee with a report on approved facility management plans and facility program plans, and shall also provide the committee with copies of approved five-year plans for each state agency.
(4) The office shall develop, or cause to be developed, after consultation with the office of state planning and budgeting pursuant to section 24-37-201, standards for the preparation of current facilities master plans coordinated with operational master plans, and facility program plans coordinated with operational program plans for each state agency, except state institutions of higher education as provided in section 23-1-106, C.R.S.
(5) The office shall coordinate the preparation and maintenance of long-range master plans pursuant to section 24-1-136.5 that recommend executive and legislative actions for achieving desired state objectives and that include recommended methods for evaluation.
(6) The office is authorized to accept and receive grants and services relevant to state planning from the federal government, other state agencies, local governments, and private and civic sources.
(7) It is the general assembly's intent that the office consult with all stakeholders in establishing new procedures related to its statewide planning functions and that the current process for review of any capital construction or capital renewal request for state institutions of higher education, aside from the changes set forth in Senate Bill 15-270, remain the same.
Source: L. 2015: Entire section added, (SB 15-270), ch. 296, p. 1213, § 9, effective June 5.
24-30-1312. Accessibility signage for facilities.
Instead of the international symbol of accessibility icon of a character in a wheelchair, any required accessibility signage in a facility must depict an accessible icon with a more dynamic character who leans forward in the wheelchair and who shows a sense of movement. This requirement applies to the construction, acquisition, or substantial renovation, as defined in section 24-30-1305.5 (8)(c), of any facility that contains five thousand or more gross square feet, undertaken on and after the date the state architect obtains approval from the United States department of justice that, on a statewide basis, the accessible icon provides equal or greater access to persons with disabilities and is thus an equivalent facilitation under the federal "Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990", 42 U.S.C. sec. 12101 et seq., as amended. The state architect shall, with assistance from the Colorado advisory council for persons with disabilities created in section 26-24-103, seek this approval no later than January 1, 2021.
Source: L. 2020: Entire section added, (SB 20-039), ch. 29, p. 100, § 2, effective September 14.
Cross references: For the legislative declaration in SB 20-039, see section 1 of chapter 29, Session Laws of Colorado 2020.
24-30-1313. Capitol complex renovation fund - created - repeal.
(1) The capitol complex renovation fund, referred to in this section as the "fund", is created in the state treasury. The fund consists of money that the general assembly may appropriate or transfer to the fund.
(2) The state treasurer shall credit all interest and income derived from the deposit and investment of money in the fund to the fund.
(3) Any unexpended and unencumbered money remaining in the fund at the end of a fiscal year remains in the fund.
(4) (a) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (4)(b) of this section, money in the fund is annually appropriated to the department of personnel for capital construction needs for existing state-owned buildings in the capitol complex as specified in subsection (5) of this section. Any unexpended and unencumbered money from an appropriation made from the fund remains available for expenditure by the department for the purposes specified in subsection (5) of this section for the next two fiscal years without further appropriation.
(b) Of the total amount of money appropriated to the department of personnel pursuant to this section, up to twenty-three million dollars shall be available for the general assembly to use for improvement projects in legislative spaces in the capitol complex, including the renovation of the space in the capitol building annex at 1375 Sherman street that is designated as legislative space pursuant to section 24-82-101 (4)(a), subject to approval of the executive committee of the legislative council.
(5) (a) The money in the fund shall be used to fund certain capital construction needs for existing state-owned buildings in the capitol complex, including:
(I) Renovations to the capitol building annex at 1375 Sherman street, the centennial building at 1313 Sherman street, and the state-owned building at 1570 Grant street;
(II) Installation of electric vehicle charging stations at the state-owned building at 1570 Grant street;
(III) LEED certification for the capitol building annex at 1375 Sherman street, the centennial building at 1313 Sherman street, and the state-owned building at 1570 Grant street;
(IV) Projects that address accessibility under the federal "Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990", 42 U.S.C. sec. 12101, and pursuant to section 24-34-802, improvements to the capitol complex and elements in the capitol, including the first floor, basement areas, and cafeteria, and the capitol building annex at 1375 Sherman street and wedge barriers at the capitol building parking circle entrance locations; and
(V) Improvement projects to the legislative spaces in the capitol building at the discretion of the general assembly.
(b) Any project pursuant to subsection (5)(a)(IV) or (5)(a)(V) of this section that will occur within the public and ceremonial areas of the state capitol building or the surrounding grounds of the state capitol building is subject to review by the capitol building advisory committee pursuant to section 24-82-108 and approval by the capital development committee created in section 2-3-1302.
(6) Repealed.
(6.5) On July 1, 2024, the state treasurer shall transfer:
(a) One million one hundred ninety-eight thousand two hundred twenty-four dollars from the fund to the wildlife cash fund created in section 33-1-112 (1)(a); and
(b) Two hundred seventy-three thousand two hundred four dollars from the fund to the division of parks and wildlife to be used by the division for the same purposes as other lottery proceeds distributions made pursuant to section 3 (1)(b)(II) of article XXVII of the state constitution.
(6.8) On June 30, 2026, the state treasurer shall transfer fifteen million two hundred sixty-three thousand dollars from the fund to the general fund.
(6.9) The state treasurer shall transfer the unexpended and unencumbered balance of the fund on June 30, 2027, to the general fund.
(7) This section is repealed, effective July 1, 2027.
Source: L. 2022: Entire section added, (SB 22-239), ch. 411, p. 2906, § 2, effective August 10. L. 2023: (1) and (4)(b) amended, (SB 23-306), ch. 412, p. 2445, § 4, effective June 6. L. 2024: (6.5) added, (HB 24-1423), ch. 138, p. 513, § 2, effective April 29; (5)(a)(IV) and (7) amended, (SB 24-206), ch. 455, p. 3152, § 2, effective August 7. L. 2026: (1) and (7) amended, (6) repealed, and (6.8) and (6.9) added, (HB 26-1406), ch. 286, p. 1574, § 2, effective June 1.
24-30-1314. Capitol complex renovation - report - repeal. (Repealed)
Source: L. 2022: Entire section added, (SB 22-239), ch. 411, p. 2908, § 2, effective August 10. L. 2025: (1)(b) repealed, (SB 25-248), ch. 123, p. 488, § 2, effective April 25. L. 2026: Entire section repealed, (HB 26-1406), ch. 286, p. 1575, § 3, effective June 1.
PART 14
NEGOTIATION OF CONSULTANTS' CONTRACTS
24-30-1401. Legislative declaration.
The purpose of this part 14 is to provide managerial control by the state over competitive negotiations for the acquisition of the professional services provided by architects, industrial hygienists, engineers, landscape architects, and land surveyors. It is hereby declared to be the policy of this state to publicly announce requirements for such professional services, to encourage all qualified persons to put themselves in a position to be considered for a contract, and to negotiate contracts for such professional services on the basis of demonstrated competence and qualification for the types of professional services required and on the basis of the furnishing of such professional services at fair and reasonable fees.
Source: L. 79: Entire part added, p. 890, § 1, effective July 1. L. 97: Entire section amended, p. 108, § 2, effective March 24.
24-30-1402. Definitions.
As used in this part 14, unless the context otherwise requires:
(1) "Certified industrial hygienist" means an individual that is certified by the American board of industrial hygiene or its successor.
(1.5) "Continuing contract" means a contract for professional services entered into pursuant to this part 14 between a state agency or state institution of higher education and a person, whereby the person provides professional services to the state agency or state institution of higher education for work of a specified nature as outlined in the contract required by the state agency or state institution of higher education with no specific time limitation. Any such contract shall provide a termination clause.
(2) "Department" means the department of personnel.
(2.2) "Industrial hygienist" means an individual who has obtained a baccalaureate or graduate degree in industrial hygiene, biology, chemistry, engineering, physics, or a closely related physical or biological science from an accredited college or university. The special studies and training of such individual shall be sufficient in the cognate sciences to provide the ability and competency to:
(a) Anticipate and recognize the environmental factors and stresses associated with work and work operations and to understand their effects on individuals and their well-being;
(b) Evaluate on the basis of training and experience and with the aid of quantitative measurement techniques the magnitude of such environmental factors and stresses in terms of their ability to impair human health and well-being;
(c) (I) Prescribe methods to prevent, eliminate, control, or reduce such factors and stresses and their effects.
(II) Any individual who has practiced within the scope of the meaning of industrial hygiene for a period of not less than five years immediately prior to July 1, 1997, is exempt from the degree requirements set forth in this subsection (2.2).
(III) Any individual who has a two-year associate of applied science degree in environmental science from an accredited college or university and in addition not less than four years practice immediately prior to July 1, 1997, within the scope of the meaning of industrial hygiene is exempt from the degree requirements set forth in this subsection (2.2).
(3) "Person" means an individual, a corporation, a limited liability company, a partnership, a business trust, an association, a firm, or any other legal entity.
(3.5) "Practice of industrial hygiene" means the performance of professional services, including but not limited to consulting, investigating, sampling, or testing in connection with the anticipation, recognition, evaluation, and control of those environmental factors or stresses arising in or from the workplace that may cause sickness, impaired health, or significant discomfort to workers or the public. "Practice of industrial hygiene" includes but is not limited to the identification, sampling, and testing of chemical, physical, biological, and ergonomic stresses and the development of physical, administrative, personal protective equipment, and training methods to prevent, eliminate, control, or reduce such factors and stresses and their effects. The term does not include the practice of architecture, as defined in section 12-120-402 (5), or the practice of engineering, as defined in section 12-120-202 (6).
(4) "Practice of landscape architecture" means the performance of professional services such as consultation, investigation, reconnaissance, research, planning, design, or responsible supervision in connection with the development of land areas or land use, where and to the extent that the dominant purpose of any such service is the preservation and development of existing and proposed land features, ground surface, planting, naturalistic features, and esthetic values. "Practice of landscape architecture" includes the design, location, and arrangement of such tangible objects and features as are incidental and necessary to the purposes outlined in this subsection (4), but the term does not include the making of land surveys or final engineered plats for official recording, integration of design of structures of earth, or other construction materials.
(5) "Principal representative" means the governing board of a state agency or state institution of higher education or, if there is no governing board, the executive head of a state agency or state institution of higher education, as designated by the governor or the general assembly.
(6) "Professional services" means those services within the scope of the following:
(a) The practice of architecture, as defined in section 12-120-402 (5);
(b) The practice of engineering, as defined in section 12-120-202 (6);
(c) The practice of professional land surveying, as defined in section 12-120-302 (5);
(d) The practice of landscape architecture, as defined in subsection (4) of this section;
(e) The practice of industrial hygiene, as defined in subsection (3.5) of this section.
(7) "State agency" has the same meaning as set forth in section 24-30-1301 (17).
(8) "State institution of higher education" has the same meaning as set forth in section 24-30-1301 (18).
Source: L. 79: Entire part added, p. 890, § 1, effective July 1. L. 85: (6)(b) amended, p. 484, § 3, effective May 24. L. 90: (3) amended, p. 447, § 11, effective April 18. L. 95: (2) amended, p. 650, § 57, effective July 1. L. 97: Entire section amended, p. 109, § 3, effective March 24. L. 2006: (3.5) and (6)(a) amended, p. 762, § 21, effective July 1. L. 2014: (1.5), (5), and (7) amended and (8) added, (HB 14-1387), ch. 378, p. 1838, § 37, effective June 6. L. 2019: (3.5), (6)(a), (6)(b), and (6)(c) amended, (HB 19-1172), ch. 136, p. 1687, § 126, effective October 1.
Editor's note: Subsection (2.2) was originally enacted as (1.2) by Senate Bill 97-119 but has been renumbered on revision in 2001 for ease of location.
Cross references: For the legislative declaration contained in the 1995 act amending subsection (2), see section 112 of chapter 167, Session Laws of Colorado 1995. For the legislative declaration in HB 14-1387, see section 1 of chapter 378, Session Laws of Colorado 2014.
24-30-1403. Professional services - listings - preliminary selections.
(1) Any person desiring to provide professional services to a state agency or a state institution of higher education shall annually submit to the office of the state architect a statement of qualifications and performance data and such other information as may be required by the office. The office may request such person to update such statement before the anniversary date in order to reflect changed conditions in the status of such person.
(2) (a) For each proposed project for which professional services are required and where the fee for such professional services is estimated to equal or exceed twenty-five thousand dollars, the principal representative of the state agency or state institution of higher education for which the project is to be done shall evaluate current statements of qualifications and performance data on file with the office of the state architect and shall conduct discussions with no less than three persons regarding their qualifications, approaches to the project, abilities to furnish the required professional services, anticipated design concepts, and use of alternative methods of approach for furnishing the required professional services. The principal representative shall then select, in order of preference, no less than three persons ranked in order and deemed to be most highly qualified to perform the required professional services after considering, and based upon, such factors as the ability of professional personnel, past performance, willingness to meet time and budget requirements, location, current and projected work loads, the volume of work previously awarded to the person by the state agency or state institution of higher education, and the extent to which said persons have and will involve minority subcontractors, with the object of effecting an equitable distribution of contracts among qualified persons as long as such distribution does not violate the principle of selection of the most highly qualified person. In selection pursuant to this section, Colorado firms shall be given preference when qualifications appear to be equal. All selections are subject to approval by the principal representative, and all contracts between the principal representative and such selected professionals shall be consistent with appropriation and legislative intent.
(b) The requirements of paragraph (a) of this subsection (2) shall not apply to the state board of land commissioners, established in article 1 of title 36, C.R.S., in connection with contract expenditures from the state board of land commissioners investment and development fund created in section 36-1-153, C.R.S., or the commercial real property operating fund created in section 36-1-153.7, C.R.S.
Source: L. 79: Entire part added, p. 891, § 1, effective July 1. L. 90: (2) amended, p. 1190, § 7, effective April 18. L. 2009: (2) amended, (SB 09-022), ch. 246, p. 1111, § 5, effective May 14. L. 2013: (2)(b) amended, (HB 13-1274), ch. 376, p. 2217, § 7, effective June 5. L. 2014: (1) and (2)(a) amended, (HB 14-1387), ch. 378, p. 1838, § 38, effective June 6. L. 2015: (1) and (2)(a) amended, (SB 15-270), ch. 296, p. 1218, § 17, effective June 5.
Cross references: For the legislative declaration in HB 14-1387, see section 1 of chapter 378, Session Laws of Colorado 2014.
24-30-1404. Contracts - definition.
(1) The principal representative shall negotiate a contract with the highest qualified person providing professional services for such services at compensation which the principal representative determines in writing to be fair and reasonable. In making such decision, the principal representative shall take into account the estimated value of the services to be rendered and the scope, complexity, and professional nature thereof. For all lump-sum or cost-plus-a-fixed-fee professional service contracts, the principal representative shall require the firm receiving the award to execute a certificate stating that wage rates and other factual unit costs supporting the compensation to be paid by the state agency or state institution of higher education for the professional services are accurate, complete, and current at the time of contracting. Any professional service contract under which such a certificate is required shall contain a provision that the original contract price and any additions thereto shall be adjusted to exclude any significant sums by which the principal representative determines the contract price had been increased due to inaccurate, incomplete, or noncurrent wage rates and other factual unit costs. All such contract adjustments shall be made within one year following the end of the contract.
(2) If the principal representative is unable to negotiate a satisfactory contract with the person considered to be the most qualified at a price the principal representative determines to be fair and reasonable, negotiations with that person shall be formally terminated. The principal representative shall then undertake negotiations with the second most qualified person. If the principal representative fails to negotiate a contract with the second most qualified person, the principal representative shall formally terminate such negotiations. The principal representative shall then undertake negotiations with the third most qualified person.
(3) Upon completion of negotiations with the third most qualified person, the principal representative shall be allowed to enter into renegotiations with any or all of the three most qualified persons to arrive at a satisfactory contractual arrangement, if possible. The principal representative shall have the authority to reject all bids and restructure or redesign the proposed project.
(4) Each contract for professional services entered into by the principal representative shall contain a prohibition against contingent fees as follows: The architect, or professional land surveyor, or professional engineer, or landscape architect, as applicable, warrants that he has not employed or retained any company or person, other than a bona fide employee working solely for him, to solicit or secure this contract and that he has not paid or agreed to pay any person, company, corporation, individual, or firm, other than a bona fide employee working solely for him, any fee, commission, percentage, gift, or other consideration contingent upon or resulting from the award or the making of this contract.
(5) Upon any violation of this section, the principal representative shall have the right to terminate the contract without liability and, at its discretion, to deduct from the contract price, or otherwise recover, the full amount of such fee, commission, percentage, or consideration.
(6) Nothing in this part 14 shall be construed to prohibit continuing contracts between state agencies or state institutions of higher education and persons providing professional services. All selections, contracts, and negotiations undertaken pursuant to this part 14 and all processes and procedures in connection with such matters shall be in conformity with this part 14.
(7) (a) Except as provided in subsections (7)(b), (7)(c), (7)(e), and (7)(f) of this section, any professional services contract entered into pursuant to this part 14 must be executed and encumbered within six months after the date on which the appropriation that includes the project for which the professional services are required becomes law or on or before November 1 of the state fiscal year for which the appropriation that includes the project for which the professional services are required is authorized, whichever is later. If no professional services contract is required for a particular project, the contract with the contractor for the project must be entered into within six months after the appropriation or on or before November 1 of the state fiscal year for which the appropriation is authorized, whichever is later. If a state agency or state institution of higher education determines that the nature of a particular project is such that the deadlines imposed by this section cannot be met, the state agency or state institution of higher education may request the capital development committee to recommend to the controller that the deadline be extended for that project; except that for fee title acquisitions by the division of parks and wildlife in the department of natural resources, the deadline may be waived. The controller, in consultation with the capital development committee, may grant an extension of the deadlines or a waiver, if applicable. An extension that is recommended or granted pursuant to this subsection (7)(a) shall not exceed six months.
(b) (I) This subsection (7) does not affect any priority established pursuant to section 44-40-111 (11) in the general appropriation act for expenditures for projects to be financed from net lottery proceeds appropriated for capital construction.
(II) For projects funded with net lottery proceeds, any professional services contract must be executed and encumbered and any contract with the contractor must be entered into within six months of when an agency receives a distribution from such proceeds for a particular project.
(c) This subsection (7) does not apply to:
(I) Maintenance, repair, and improvement projects included in the capital construction section of the general appropriation act or in any supplemental appropriation act for the division of parks and wildlife in the department of natural resources;
(II) The acquisition of any easement by the division of parks and wildlife in the department of natural resources;
(III) Grants for off-highway vehicle trail purposes made pursuant to section 33-14.5-106, C.R.S.;
(IV) Projects included in the capital construction section of the general appropriation act for the hazardous materials and waste management division in the department of public health and environment, or in any supplemental appropriation act, which projects are listed as remediation pursuant to the federal "Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980", 42 U.S.C. sec. 9601 et seq., as amended, brownfields redevelopment, or natural resource damage repair, replacement, or restoration.
(V) Projects under the supervision of the department of transportation;
(VI) A capital construction project at a state institution of higher education that is to be constructed solely with cash funds held by the institution, federal funds made available for the project, or a combination of both;
(VII) The state board of land commissioners, established in article 1 of title 36, in connection with contract expenditures from the state board of land commissioners investment and development fund created in section 36-1-153, or the commercial real property operating fund created in section 36-1-153.7; or
(VIII) Information technology projects that are overseen by the joint technology committee pursuant to part 17 of article 3 of title 2. As used in this subsection (7)(c)(VIII), "information technology" has the same meaning as set forth in section 2-3-1701 (7).
(d) The provisions of this subsection (7) shall not be construed to limit the authority of any state agency or state institution of higher education to amend a contract in order to provide for technical corrections, provision of unanticipated work, extensions of performance periods, or other modifications which are necessary to secure satisfactory completion of the work and provision of goods and services within the scope of the original contract.
(e) In the event that the governor restricts or delays the expenditure of money for a project for which a professional services contract is required pursuant to the authority granted to the governor in section 24-75-201.5 (2), the deadlines imposed in subsection (7)(a) of this section for the projects are tolled until such time as the restriction or delay is no longer in effect, at which time the professional services contract must be executed and encumbered and any contract with the contractor must be entered into within six months.
(f) In the event that an appropriation is made to a state agency or state institution of higher education for allocation to other state agencies or state institutions of higher education, the deadline to execute and encumber a contract by the agency or institution receiving the allocation is six months from the date of the allocation by the agency or institution that received the original appropriation. Nothing in this subsection (7)(f) is construed to extend the duration of any appropriation.
(g) and (h) Repealed.
Source: L. 79: Entire part added, p. 892, § 1, effective July 1. L. 81: (3) R&RE, p. 1165, § 1, effective January 1, 1982. L. 84: (4) amended, p. 1121, § 23, effective June 7. L. 89: (7) added, p. 1027, § 3, effective April 27. L. 90: (7) amended, p. 1192, § 1, effective April 12. L. 91: (7)(a) amended and (7)(e) added, p. 804, § 1, effective July 1; (7)(a) amended, p. 1059, § 18, effective July 1. L. 95: (7)(a) amended and (7)(f) added, p. 164, § 1, effective April 7. L. 2007: (7)(a) and (7)(c) amended, p. 494, § 1, effective August 3. L. 2008: (7)(c)(II) amended and (7)(c)(IV) added, p. 176, § 14, effective March 24; (7)(a) amended and (7)(g) added, p. 261, § 82, effective March 31. L. 2009: (7)(g) amended, (SB 09-096), ch. 60, p. 217, § 1, effective March 25; (7)(g) amended, (SB 09-022), ch. 246, p. 1112, § 6, effective May 14. L. 2010: (7)(c)(IV) amended, (HB 10-1422), ch. 419, p. 2083, § 62, effective August 11. L. 2012: (7)(g)(I) amended, (HB 12-1081), ch. 210, p. 903, § 5, effective August 8. L. 2013: (7)(g)(II) amended, (HB 13-1274), ch. 376, p. 2217, § 8, effective June 5. L. 2014: (1), (6), (7)(a), (7)(d), (7)(f), and (7)(g)(I) amended, (HB 14-1387), ch. 378, p. 1839, § 39, effective June 6. L. 2016: (7)(a) amended and (7)(h) added, (HB 16-1043), ch. 29, p. 66, § 1, effective August 10. L. 2018: (7)(a) amended, (HB 18-1027), ch. 31, p. 364, § 12, effective October 1. L. 2022: (7)(h) amended, (SB 22-113), ch. 463, p. 3294, § 8, effective August 10. L. 2025: (7)(a), (7)(b), IP(7)(c), (7)(e), and (7)(f) amended, (7)(c)(V), (7)(c)(VI), (7)(c)(VII), and (7)(c)(VIII) added, and (7)(g) and (7)(h) repealed, (HB 25-1313), ch. 405, p. 2311, § 5, effective August 6. L. 2025, 1st Ex. Sess.: (7)(e) amended, (SB 25B-001), ch. 11, p. 70, § 3, effective August 28.
Editor's note: (1) Amendments to subsection (7)(a) by Senate Bill 91-17 and House Bill 91-1198 were harmonized.
(2) Amendments to subsection (7)(g) by Senate Bill 09-022 and Senate Bill 09-096 were harmonized.
(3) Section 4 of chapter 11 (SB 25B-001), Session Laws of Colorado 2025, First Extraordinary Session, provides that the act changing this section applies to revenue estimates and interim revenue estimates presented, and executive orders issued, on or after August 28, 2025.
Cross references: For the legislative declaration in HB 14-1387, see section 1 of chapter 378, Session Laws of Colorado 2014.
24-30-1405. Public notice.
When professional services are required to be contracted for, public notice shall be given by the state agency or state institution of higher education if the basic construction cost of the project is estimated by the state agency or state institution of higher education to be more than one million dollars or if the fee for professional services is estimated to exceed one hundred thousand dollars. The public notice shall be given at least fifteen days prior to the selection of the three or more most highly qualified persons by the principal representative pursuant to section 24-30-1403 (2), and, except for projects under the supervision of the department of transportation, the public notice shall be given no later than eight weeks after the date on which the appropriation for the project becomes law. The public notice shall be given by publication at least once in one or more daily newspapers of general circulation in this state or in an electronic medium approved by the executive director of the department of personnel. The public notice shall contain a general description of the proposed project and shall indicate the procedure by which interested persons may apply for consideration for the contract.
Source: L. 79: Entire part added, p. 893, § 1, effective July 1. L. 89: Entire section amended, p. 1026, § 2, effective April 27. L. 91: Entire section amended, p. 814, § 1, effective July 1; entire section amended, p. 1060, § 19, effective July 1. L. 97: Entire section amended, p. 962, § 1, effective May 21. L. 2009: Entire section amended, (SB 09-290), ch. 374, p. 2040, § 5, effective August 5. L. 2010: Entire section amended, (HB 10-1181), ch. 351, p. 1622, § 8, effective June 7. L. 2014: Entire section amended, (HB 14-1387), ch. 378, p. 1840, § 40, effective June 6.
Editor's note: Amendments to this section by Senate Bill 91-28 and House Bill 91-1198 were harmonized.
Cross references: For the legislative declaration in HB 14-1387, see section 1 of chapter 378, Session Laws of Colorado 2014.
24-30-1406. Criminal liability.
(1) Any person, other than a bona fide employee working solely for a person providing professional services, who offers, agrees, or contracts to solicit or secure for any other person contracts for professional services with a state agency or state institution of higher education and who, in so doing, receives any fee, commission, gift, or other consideration contingent upon or resulting from the making of the contract commits a class 4 felony and shall be punished as provided in section 18-1.3-401.
(2) Any person providing professional services who offers to pay or does pay any fee, commission, gift, or other consideration contingent upon or resulting from the making of a contract for professional services with a state agency or state institution of higher education commits a class 2 misdemeanor and shall be punished as provided in section 18-1.3-501.
(3) Any state agency or state institution of higher education official or employee who solicits or secures or offers to solicit or secure a contract for professional services with a state agency or state institution of higher education and who is paid any fee, commission, gift, or other consideration contingent upon the making of such contract commits a class 2 misdemeanor and shall be punished as provided in section 18-1.3-501.
Source: L. 79: Entire part added, p. 893, § 1, effective July 1. L. 2002: Entire section amended, p. 1532, § 246, effective October 1. L. 2014: Entire section amended, (HB 14-1387), ch. 378, p. 1841, § 41, effective June 6. L. 2021: (2) and (3) amended, (SB 21-271), ch. 462, p. 3226, § 414, effective March 1, 2022. L. 2023: (1) amended, (HB 23-1293), ch. 298, p. 1796, § 63, effective October 1.
Cross references: For the legislative declaration contained in the 2002 act amending this section, see section 1 of chapter 318, Session Laws of Colorado 2002. For the legislative declaration in HB 14-1387, see section 1 of chapter 378, Session Laws of Colorado 2014.
24-30-1407. Prior existing design plans.
Notwithstanding any other provision of this part 14 or of part 13 of this article, there shall be no public notice requirement or utilization of the selection process as provided for in this part 14 or in part 13 of this article for projects in which the state agency or state institution of higher education is able to reuse existing drawings, specifications, designs, or other documents from a prior project.
Source: L. 79: Entire part added, p. 893, § 1, effective July 1. L. 2014: Entire section amended, (HB 14-1387), ch. 378, p. 1841, § 42, effective June 6.
Cross references: For the legislative declaration contained in the 2002 act amending this section, see section 1 of chapter 318, Session Laws of Colorado 2002. For the legislative declaration in HB 14-1387, see section 1 of chapter 378, Session Laws of Colorado 2014.
24-30-1408. Emergency contracts.
In a situation for which the principal representative determines it is necessary to make emergency contracts because there exists a threat to public health, welfare, or safety under emergency conditions, there is no requirement of public notice, or of compliance with the selection process pursuant to this part 14, but the principal representative shall document, in writing, the basis for the emergency and for the selection of the particular person to provide professional services.
Source: L. 83: Entire section added, p. 897, § 1, effective May 10.
PART 15
RISK MANAGEMENT
24-30-1501. Legislative declaration.
(1) The general assembly recognizes that the general liability and automobile liability insurance policies of the state of Colorado have been canceled, that no responsive bids were received, and that, as a direct result, the governor called an extraordinary session of the general assembly to address the need for a method to protect the state and its employees against claims brought under the "Colorado Governmental Immunity Act", article 10 of this title, and arising under federal law. The general assembly further recognizes that the consequences of uninsured liability of the state, including failure to respond to meritorious claims in a timely fashion and greater ultimate costs of settlement caused by failure to investigate claims in an orderly and timely manner, are undesirable. The general assembly hereby declares, therefore, that the appropriate remedy is to create a reserve fund for purposes of self-insurance of the state. The general assembly declares that the purpose of this part 15 is to create a self-insurance fund, provide a mechanism for claims adjustment, investigation, and defense, and authorize the settlement and payment of claims and the payment of judgments rendered against the state. The general assembly also recognizes that no responsible bids have been received for property insurance policies for the state of Colorado and that a method for covering loss or damage to state property is needed. The general assembly hereby declares that the appropriate remedy is to create a reserve for purposes of self-insurance of the state for loss or damage to state property. The general assembly declares that its intent is to explore, on an annual basis, the availability of commercial liability insurance policies and property damage insurance policies, considering the possibility that the insurance industry can provide coverage in the future that is less expensive than the costs of operating a risk management system and paying for claims out of the risk management fund and out of the self-insured property fund.
(2) The general assembly recognizes that liability claims arising prior to September 15, 1985, exist for which no commercial insurance coverage is available. The general assembly hereby finds and declares that the risk management system will provide an appropriate remedy for such claims and that the department of personnel should be authorized to administer such claims.
(3) The general assembly also recognizes that the provision of workers' compensation insurance for state employees has become expensive. The general assembly hereby finds and declares that the administration of workers' compensation for state employees out of a separate account in the risk management fund as a self-insurance measure is an appropriate response to the high cost of workers' compensation insurance.
Source: L. 85, 1st Ex. Sess.: Entire part added, p. 1, § 1, effective September 27. L. 86, 2nd Ex. Sess.: Entire section amended, p. 63, § 1, effective August 25. L. 90: Entire section amended, p. 1194, § 1, effective May 24. L. 96: (1) and (2) amended, p. 1502, § 16, effective June 1.
24-30-1502. Definitions.
As used in this part 15, unless the context otherwise requires:
(1) "Board" means the state claims board created in section 24-30-1508.
(2) Repealed.
(3) "Executive director" means the executive director of the department of personnel.
(4) "Final money judgment" means any judgment for monetary damages against the state after all appropriate appeals of such judgment have been exhausted.
(4.3) "Liability protection" means professional liability protection for damages from any negligent professional act, error, or omission on the part of the members of the board of supervisors of each local conservation district.
(4.5) "Property" means both real property as defined in section 39-1-102 (14) and personal property as defined in section 39-1-102 (11). For purposes of the self-insured property fund, "personal property" means personal property owned by the state of Colorado or personal property leased by the state of Colorado for which the state is required to provide insurance under the terms of a lease, financed purchase of an asset, or certificate of participation agreement. For purposes of the self-insured property fund, "personal property" does not include aircraft owned by the state of Colorado or vehicles licensed for use on highways or roads. For purposes of the self-insured property fund, "real property" means buildings owned by the state of Colorado or buildings leased by the state of Colorado for which the state is required to provide insurance under the terms of a lease or financed purchase of an asset agreement, or certificate of participation.
(5) (a) "State agency" means any principal department of the state, any state agency, institution, or hospital, any board, commission, advisory board, or other entity established by law within or as an advisory to any existing state department, institution, or agency, and any state-supported institution of higher education or other instrumentality thereof, except as provided in paragraph (b) of this subsection (5) and in section 24-30-1517 (2), and the legislative and judicial departments of the state. The term also includes the Colorado state fair authority created pursuant to section 35-65-401, C.R.S., and any conservation district organized and certified pursuant to article 70 of title 35, C.R.S.; except that, in the case of conservation districts, such inclusion under the risk management fund is only for the purpose of liability protection as defined in subsection (4.3) of this section.
(b) The governing board of each institution of higher education, including the Auraria higher education center established in article 70 of title 23, C.R.S., by formal action of the governing board, and the Colorado commission on higher education, by formal action of the commission, may elect to be excluded from the meaning of "state agency" pursuant to this subsection (5) and may obtain a risk management program independent of the program created pursuant to this part 15. Nothing in this paragraph (b) shall be construed to affect the exempt status of any institution in the university of Colorado system, including the university of Colorado at Boulder, Denver, and Colorado Springs, and the university of Colorado health sciences center, from the state risk management system pursuant to section 24-30-1517 (2), or to require the governing board of any such institution in the university of Colorado system to take formal action in order to be exempt from the definition of "state agency".
(6) "Workers' compensation" means protection afforded to a state employee pursuant to articles 40 to 47 of title 8, C.R.S.
Source: L. 85, 1st Ex. Sess.: Entire part added, p. 4, § 1, effective September 27. L. 86: (5) amended, p. 895, § 1, effective February 27; (4.5) added, p. 891, § 1, effective April 17; (5) amended, p. 536, § 40, effective July 1, 1987. L. 86, 2nd Ex. Sess.: (4.5) amended, p. 64, § 2, effective August 25. L. 87: (5) amended, p. 979, § 2, effective July 1; (4.3) added, p. 979, § 1, effective July 10. L. 90: (6) added, p. 1195, § 2, effective May 24. L. 91: (5) amended, p. 1913, § 25, effective June 1. L. 95: (3) amended, p. 650, § 58, effective July 1. L. 96: (2) repealed, p. 1503, § 17, effective June 1. L. 2000: (5) amended, p. 284, § 2, effective July 1. L. 2002: (4.3) and (5) amended, p. 516, § 10, effective July 1. L. 2004: (5) amended, p. 602, § 2, effective July 1. L. 2012: (5)(b) amended, (HB 12-1081), ch. 210, p. 903, § 6, effective August 8. L. 2021: (4.5) amended, (HB 21-1316), ch. 325, p. 2025, § 34, effective July 1.
Cross references: For the legislative declaration contained in the 1995 act amending subsection (3), see section 112 of chapter 167, Session Laws of Colorado 1995.
24-30-1503. Risk management system.
(1) Pursuant to section 13 of article XII of the state constitution, the executive director of the department of personnel shall appoint such personnel as may be necessary for the efficient operation of the risk management system.
(2) The powers, duties, and functions of the department of personnel include the powers, duties, and functions concerning risk management, specified by this part 15.
Source: L. 85, 1st Ex. Sess.: Entire part added, p. 4, § 1, effective September 27. L. 95: Entire section amended, p. 650, § 59, effective July 1. L. 96: Entire section amended, p. 1503, § 18, effective June 1. L. 2022: (2) amended, (SB 22-162), ch. 469, p. 3420, § 196, effective August 10.
Cross references: (1) For the legislative declaration contained in the 1995 act amending this section, see section 112 of chapter 167, Session Laws of Colorado 1995.
(2) For the short title (the "Debbie Haskins 'Administrative Organization Act of 1968' Modernization Act") in SB 22-162, see section 1 of chapter 469, Session Laws of Colorado 2022.
24-30-1503.5. Risk management system - independent program.
(1) If an institution of higher education, the Auraria higher education center established in article 70 of title 23, C.R.S., or the Colorado commission on higher education elects to be excluded from the meaning of "state agency" and to obtain an independent risk management program pursuant to section 24-30-1502 (5)(b), such institution, center, or commission shall conduct an analysis of the institution's, center's, or commission's ability to provide workers' compensation and the estimated property and liability losses, insurance costs, and administrative costs of risk management that the institution, center, or commission will incur by implementing an independent program.
(2) Before any institution of higher education, the Auraria higher education center established in article 70 of title 23, C.R.S., or the Colorado commission on higher education implements an independent risk management program, the institution, center, or commission, as applicable, shall submit a written report detailing the findings of the analysis conducted pursuant to subsection (1) of this section to the president of the senate, the speaker of the house of representatives, the majority and minority leaders of the senate and the house of representatives, the members of the joint budget committee, the members of the business affairs and labor committee in the house of representatives, or any successor committee, and the members of the business, labor, and technology committee in the senate, or any successor committee.
(3) In the event that an institution of higher education, the Auraria higher education center established in article 70 of title 23, C.R.S., or the Colorado commission on higher education implements an independent risk management program, the institution, center, or commission shall conduct the analysis and submit the report required pursuant to this section within the existing resources of the institution, center, or commission, as applicable.
Source: L. 2004: Entire section added, p. 603, § 3, effective July 1. L. 2007: (2) amended, p. 2034, § 50, effective June 1. L. 2012: Entire section amended, (HB 12-1081), ch. 210, p. 904, § 7, effective August 8.
24-30-1504. Powers and duties of the department.
(1) The department of personnel shall have the following powers and duties:
(a) To coordinate and administer a comprehensive risk management program that serves all state agencies;
(b) To administer, supervise, and manage the investigation and adjustment of claims brought against the state;
(c) To administer, supervise, and manage the legal defense of claims brought against the state;
(d) To recommend to the executive director those persons or parties who may contract with the state to provide claims investigation, claims adjustment, support services, or legal services;
(e) To assist and supervise any parties who have contracted with the state to provide claims investigation, claims adjustment, support services, or legal services pursuant to this part 15;
(f) To develop and administer a system that identifies the property and liability losses, insurance costs, and administrative costs of risk management incurred by each state agency;
(g) To establish and administer a program to reduce property and liability losses incurred by each state agency;
(h) To establish and administer a program of inspection of state property;
(i) To investigate and to direct or deny payment for claims for loss or damage to state property;
(j) To establish and administer a program for the payment or denial of liability claims arising prior to September 15, 1985, for which no commercial liability insurance exists;
(k) To establish and administer a workers' compensation self-insurance program for state employees or to procure commercial workers' compensation insurance therefor;
(l) To establish and administer a pilot program beginning July 1, 1999, for the purpose of developing a statewide database and uniform reporting system to track employment claims brought against state agencies and the losses incurred as a result of such claims. The pilot program shall include:
(I) A minimum of three agencies selected by the department of personnel, including at least one institution of higher education and one department of the executive branch other than the department of higher education; and
(II) Repealed.
(m) On and after July 1, 2001, to establish and administer a statewide database and uniform reporting system to track employment claims brought against state agencies and the losses incurred as a result of such claims, except as excluded pursuant to sections 24-30-1502 (5)(b) and 24-30-1517 (2).
Source: L. 85, 1st Ex. Sess.: Entire part added, p. 4, § 1, effective September 27. L. 86: (1)(d) amended, p. 891, § 2, effective April 17. L. 86, 2nd Ex. Sess.: (1)(i) amended, p. 64, § 3, effective August 25. L. 90: (1)(j) and (1)(k) added, p. 1195, § 3, effective May 24. L. 96: IP(1) amended, p. 1504, § 19, effective June 1. L. 99: (1)(l) and (1)(m) added, p. 29, § 1, effective March 10. L. 2002: (1)(l)(II) repealed, p. 882, § 21, effective August 7. L. 2004: (1)(m) amended, p. 604, § 4, effective July 1.
24-30-1505. Powers of the executive director.
(1) In order to perform the powers and duties set forth in this part 15, the executive director shall exercise the following powers:
(a) Supervise the development and administration of the following risk management programs:
(I) A comprehensive risk management program;
(II) A program identifying property and liability losses, insurance costs, and administrative costs of risk management incurred by each state agency;
(III) A program to reduce property and liability losses incurred by each state agency;
(IV) A program of inspection of state property;
(V) The pilot program described in section 24-30-1504 (1)(l) and the statewide database and uniform tracking system described in section 24-30-1504 (1)(m) for the purpose of tracking employment claims brought against state agencies and the losses incurred as a result of such claims, except as excluded pursuant to sections 24-30-1502 (5)(b) and 24-30-1517 (2). In developing and administering such programs, the executive director may:
(A) Adopt rules that define relevant terms including, but not limited to, "claims" and "losses"; and
(B) Require state agencies, including institutions of higher education, to submit such information as is necessary to implement the programs.
(b) Manage the investigation and adjustment of claims brought against the state;
(c) Manage the legal defense of claims brought against the state;
(d) Supervise any parties who have contracted with the state to provide claims investigation, claims adjustment, support services, or legal services pursuant to this part 15;
(e) Identify and evaluate the exposure of state agencies to claims for property and liability losses;
(f) Repealed.
(g) Assist state agencies to develop and use proper insurance and indemnity clauses in state contracts;
(h) Manage the investigation and adjustment of claims for loss or damage to state property;
(i) Investigate and direct or deny payment of liability claims arising prior to September 15, 1985, for which no commercial liability insurance exists;
(j) Manage the workers' compensation self-insurance program for state employees or the procurement of commercial workers' compensation insurance therefor.
(2) The executive director shall determine the need, if any, for procuring commercial insurance to protect the state against liability and the specifications for such insurance. The acquisition of any insurance shall be pursuant to the state "Procurement Code", articles 101 to 112 of this title 24. In the event that no responsible responses to an invitation for bids are received, the executive director may negotiate with any agent, broker, or insurance company to secure the required coverage or necessary coverage. Such negotiated policy or policies shall be subject to the approval of the board.
Source: L. 85, 1st Ex. Sess.: Entire part added, p. 5, § 1, effective September 27. L. 86: (1)(f) repealed and (2) added, pp. 894, 891, §§ 10, 3, effective April 17. L. 86, 2nd Ex. Sess.: (1)(h) added, p. 64, § 4, effective August 25. L. 90: (1)(i) and (1)(j) added, p. 1195, § 4, effective May 24. L. 96: IP(1), (1)(a), and (2) amended, pp. 1504, 1520, §§ 20, 58, effective June 1. L. 99: (1)(a)(V) added, p. 30, § 2, effective March 10. L. 2004: IP(1)(a)(V) amended, p. 604, § 5, effective July 1. L. 2017: (2) amended, (HB 17-1051), ch. 99, p. 350, § 65, effective August 9.
24-30-1506. Claims investigation, claims adjustment, and support services.
The executive director shall provide services for the investigation and adjustment of claims brought against the state or of any incident or occurrence likely to result in a claim against the state or of claims of state agencies for loss or damage to state property and for support services necessary for the processing of such claims. The executive director may purchase services for the investigation of claims, incidents, or occurrences, claims adjustment, and support services from any private agency, organization, or company recommended by the division.
Source: L. 85, 1st Ex. Sess.: Entire part added, p. 5, § 1, effective September 27. L. 86: Entire section amended, p. 892, § 4, effective April 17. L. 86, 2nd Ex. Sess.: Entire section amended, p. 64, § 5, effective August 25.
24-30-1507. Legal services.
The executive director shall provide legal services for the defense of claims brought against the state and may in his or her discretion employ legal counsel to coordinate, direct, supervise, or otherwise aid in the investigation of any incident or occurrence likely to result in a claim against the state. The executive director may provide for those legal services through the state attorney general's office or, with the concurrence of the state attorney general, may purchase such legal services from any private law firm or attorney.
Source: L. 85, 1st Ex. Sess.: Entire part added, p. 5, § 1, effective September 27. L. 86: Entire section amended, p. 892, § 5, effective April 17. L. 96: Entire section amended, p. 1520, § 59, effective June 1.
24-30-1508. State claims board - creation.
(1) There is hereby created the state claims board which shall consist of the executive director, the state treasurer, and the attorney general. The board may request the assistance of the commissioner of insurance on such occasions as it deems necessary.
(2) The state claims board is a type 1 entity, as defined in section 24-1-105, and exercises its powers and performs its duties and functions under the department of personnel.
Source: L. 85, 1st Ex. Sess.: Entire part added, p. 5, § 1, effective September 27. L. 95: (2) amended, p. 651, § 60, effective July 1. L. 2022: (2) amended, (SB 22-162), ch. 469, p. 3420, § 197, effective August 10.
Cross references: (1) For the legislative declaration contained in the 1995 act amending subsection (2), see section 112 of chapter 167, Session Laws of Colorado 1995.
(2) For the short title (the "Debbie Haskins 'Administrative Organization Act of 1968' Modernization Act") in SB 22-162, see section 1 of chapter 469, Session Laws of Colorado 2022.
24-30-1509. Powers and duties of the board.
(1) The board shall have the following powers and duties:
(a) To oversee the management of the risk management fund created in section 24-30-1510;
(b) To compromise or settle claims on behalf of the state in the amounts authorized in section 24-30-1515 (2)(a)(V) and pursuant to the procedures set forth in section 24-30-1515;
(c) To adopt rules to govern its own organization and proceedings;
(d) To determine whether to recommend to the general assembly that the general assembly, by bill, authorize all or any portion of an additional payment to a claimant in accordance with the provisions of section 24-10-114 (5)(b).
Source: L. 85, 1st Ex. Sess.: Entire part added, p. 6, § 1, effective September 27. L. 92: (1)(b) amended, p. 1083, § 2, effective July 1. L. 2012: (1)(d) added, (HB 12-1361), ch. 242, p. 1146, § 4, effective June 4.
24-30-1510. Risk management fund - creation - authorized and unauthorized payments.
(1) (a) There is hereby created in the state treasury a fund to be known as the risk management fund, which shall consist of all moneys that may be appropriated thereto by the general assembly or that may be otherwise made available to it by the general assembly. Moneys "otherwise made available" shall be deemed to include transfers of moneys to the fund authorized in the general appropriation act. All interest earned from the investment of moneys in the risk management fund shall be credited to the risk management fund and become a part thereof. The moneys in the fund are hereby continuously appropriated for the purposes of the risk management fund other than the direct and indirect administrative costs of operating the risk management system. The general assembly shall make annual appropriations from the fund for the direct and indirect administrative costs of operating the risk management system that are attributable to the operation of the risk management fund. At the end of any fiscal year, all unexpended and unencumbered moneys in the fund shall remain therein and shall not be credited or transferred to the general fund or any other fund.
(b) Notwithstanding any provision of this section to the contrary, on June 1, 2009, the state treasurer shall deduct ten million ten thousand five hundred ninety-nine dollars from the risk management fund and transfer such sum to the general fund.
(2) The risk management fund shall maintain reserves for incurred but unpaid claims, including general liability and automobile liability claims. The risk management fund shall maintain reserves to provide for the contingency that the reserves set aside in the fund to meet estimated expenses are inadequate to cover the actual expenses realized. The board after consultation with the executive director shall recommend the amount of money that is required to maintain adequate reserves. Adequate reserves shall be maintained in the risk management fund subject to available appropriations made by the general assembly in its discretion.
(3) Expenditures out of the risk management fund must be made in accordance with subsection (1) of this section and only for the following purposes:
(a) To pay liability claims and expenses related thereto, brought against the state, its officials, or its employees pursuant to the "Colorado Governmental Immunity Act", article 10 of this title; claims against the state, its officials, or its employees arising under federal law, which the state is legally obligated to pay and which are compromised or settled pursuant to section 24-30-1515 or in which a final money judgment against the state has been entered; or claims for compensatory damages against the state, its officials, or its employees pursuant to section 24-34-405;
(b) To pay the administrative costs of operating the risk management system and the costs of purchasing services pursuant to sections 24-30-1506, 24-30-1507, and 24-30-1513;
(c) To procure and pay premiums for one or more policies of insurance purchased pursuant to this part 15 to protect against all or any portion of the potential liabilities of the state of Colorado or of any state agency or its officers and employees;
(d) To pay any deductible or self-insured retention contained in any insurance policy purchased by or at the direction of the executive director;
(e) To pay liability claims and expenses related thereto when a state agency has contracted to defend and hold harmless the owner of property leased to the state agency for a state purpose if such contract limits the state's obligation to claims arising from alleged negligent acts or omissions of the state agency and of its public employees which occurred or are alleged to have occurred during the performance of their duties and within the scope of their employment, except where such acts or omissions are willful and wanton. Such claims shall be subject to the limitations of the "Colorado Governmental Immunity Act", article 10 of this title. No such contract shall be valid unless approved in writing by the executive director and meets the requirements of this paragraph (e).
(f) To make payments in accordance with section 24-30-1510.7;
(g) To fund an employee assistance program established and operated by the executive director pursuant to section 24-50-604 (1)(k);
(h) To pay the defense of liability claims and expenses related thereto, brought against an expert witness or consultant who has statutory immunity from civil suit and who has been retained by a board or commission within the department of regulatory agencies, to render expert testimony or expert opinion or provide consultative advice, in connection with a prospective or pending disciplinary action, and who does render expert testimony or expert opinion, or provide consultative advice, to a board or commission within the department of regulatory agencies in good faith and within the scope of his or her expertise;
(i) To pay liability claims and expenses incurred pursuant to section 24-82-1005 (2).
(4) Moneys in the risk management fund shall not be used to pay any of the following:
(a) Claims brought pursuant to the "Colorado Governmental Immunity Act", article 10 of this title, for which governmental immunity has not been waived pursuant to section 24-10-106;
(b) Claims which are actionable in contract except for claims relating to employment contracts and except for claims arising pursuant to paragraph (e) of subsection (3) of this section;
(c) Claims for liabilities or losses which are covered under commercial insurance policies purchased by the state;
(d) Expenses for complying with successful claims for injunctive relief;
(e) Any other claim or expense not set forth in subsection (3) of this section.
(5) As of July 1, 2000, Pinnacol Assurance created pursuant to section 8-45-101, C.R.S., is no longer included within, or part of, the risk management fund created pursuant to this section and the department of personnel assumes no responsibility and bears no financial obligation for the defense of, or liability for, any claims or lawsuits asserted against Pinnacol Assurance.
Source: L. 85, 1st Ex. Sess.: Entire part added, p. 6, § 1, effective September 27. L. 86: (2), (3)(a), and (3)(b) amended and (3)(c) and (3)(d) added, p. 892, § 6, effective April 17. L. 86, 2nd Ex. Sess.: (1) and (3)(c) amended, p. 65, § 6, effective August 25. L. 88: (3)(e) added and (4)(b) amended, p. 914, §§ 1, 2, effective April 20. L. 90: (3)(f) added, p. 1196, § 5, effective May 24. L. 96: (1), (2), (3)(b), (3)(d), and (3)(e) amended, pp. 1504, 1520, §§ 21, 60, effective June 1. L. 2000: (5) added, p. 285, § 3, effective July 1. L. 2002: (3)(g) added, p. 765, § 2, effective May 30; (5) amended, p. 1892, § 54, effective July 1. L. 2004: (3)(i) added, p. 1056, § 2, effective May 21; (3)(h) added, p. 620, § 1, effective July 1. L. 2009: (1) amended, (SB 09-279), ch. 367, p. 1927, § 8, effective June 1. L. 2013: (3)(a) amended, (HB 13-1136), ch. 168, p. 554, § 2, effective August 7. L. 2020: IP(3) and (3)(f) amended, (SB 20-136), ch. 70, p. 293, § 39, effective September 14.
Cross references: For the legislative declaration in SB 20-136, see section 1 of chapter 70, Session Laws of Colorado 2020.
ANNOTATION
The Colorado compensation insurance authority is a state agency only for the purposes of the risk management fund and the Colorado Governmental Immunity Act. Simon v. State Compensation Ins. Auth., 903 P.2d 1139 (Colo. App. 1994), rev'd on other grounds, 946 P.2d 1298 (Colo. 1997).
24-30-1510.3. Risk management fund - state employee workers' compensation account - assessment of risks to institutions of higher education.
In determining the amount of risk assessed to institutions of higher education for purposes of making recommendations to the joint budget committee on the amount of appropriations necessary to reflect the risks attributable to institutions of higher education for the risk management fund and for the state employee workers' compensation account in the risk management fund, the executive director shall base such assessments and recommendations on actuarially sound analyses that appropriately and fairly reflect the accurate risks and claim experience attributable to institutions of higher education.
Source: L. 95: Entire section added, p. 108, § 1, effective March 30. L. 96: Entire section amended, p. 1521, § 61, effective June 1.
24-30-1510.5. Self-insured property fund - creation - authorized and unauthorized payments - executive director authorized to make payments.
(1) (a) There is hereby created in the state treasury a fund to be known as the self-insured property fund, which shall consist of all moneys that may be appropriated thereto by the general assembly or which may be otherwise made available to it by the general assembly. Moneys "otherwise made available" shall be deemed to include transfers of moneys to the fund authorized in the general appropriation act. All interest earned from the investment of moneys in the self-insured property fund shall be credited to the self-insured property fund and become a part thereof. The moneys in the fund are hereby continuously appropriated for the purposes of the self-insured property fund other than the direct and indirect administrative costs of operating the risk management system. The general assembly shall make annual appropriations from the fund for the direct and indirect administrative costs of operating the risk management system that are attributable to the operation of the self-insured property fund. At the end of any fiscal year, all unexpended and unencumbered moneys in the fund shall remain therein and shall not be credited or transferred to the general fund or any other fund.
(b) Notwithstanding any provision of this section to the contrary, on June 1, 2009, the state treasurer shall deduct one million two hundred ninety-five thousand fifty-five dollars from the self-insured property fund and transfer such sum to the general fund.
(2) The self-insured property fund shall maintain reserves for incurred but unpaid loss or damage claims to state property. The self-insured property fund shall maintain reserves to provide for the contingency that the reserves set aside in the fund to meet estimated expenses are inadequate to cover the actual expenses realized. The executive director shall recommend the amount of money that is required to maintain adequate reserves. Adequate reserves shall be maintained in the self-insured property fund subject to available appropriations made by the general assembly in its discretion.
(3) Expenditures shall be made out of the self-insured property fund in accordance with subsection (1) of this section only for the following purposes:
(a) To pay claims for loss or damage to state property subject to the following conditions:
(I) Claims for loss or damage to real property shall be based on replacement cost;
(II) Claims for loss or damage to personal property shall be based on actual cash value;
(III) The loss or damage to property on which the claim is based shall have been caused by one or more of the hazards covered under the self-insured property fund as set forth in subsection (5) of this section;
(IV) The principal state department shall pay a five-thousand-dollar deductible for each occurrence;
(b) To procure and pay premiums for one or more policies of insurance purchased pursuant to this part 15 to protect against loss or damage to state property;
(c) To pay the administrative costs of operating the risk management system.
(4) Moneys in the self-insured property fund shall not be used to pay the following:
(a) Claims for loss or damage to state property which are specifically insured by a commercial insurance policy;
(b) Claims for extra expense and normal wear and tear.
(5) The self-insured property fund shall provide self-insurance for loss or damage to state property due to the following hazards:
(a) Fire and lightning; except that coverage shall not be provided if the state agency does not report such incident or occurrence to the appropriate fire department;
(b) Windstorm and hail;
(c) Debris removal in connection with a hazard that is covered under the self-insured property fund;
(d) Explosion;
(e) Sudden and accidental damage from smoke;
(f) Vandalism and malicious mischief;
(g) Theft of state-owned property; except that coverage shall not be provided if the state agency does not report such theft to the appropriate law enforcement agency;
(h) Damage from the weight of ice or snow; except that outdoor equipment, awnings, fences, pavements, patios, swimming pools, wharves, and docks are not covered;
(i) Flood;
(j) Earthquake;
(k) Business interruption if the state is obligated under the terms of a lease or bond issue to continue making payments on the state property after the loss or damage has occurred and if the business interruption is caused by a hazard that is covered under the self-insured property fund;
(l) Any other hazard that the executive director determines pursuant to rule and regulation is appropriate for inclusion under the self-insured property fund.
(6) The executive director or a designee of the executive director is authorized to pay property claims of a state agency subject to available funds in the self-insured property fund and subject to the limitations in this section. The executive director or a designee of the executive director is authorized to provide for the repair and replacement of property consistent with the provisions of this part 15 and is authorized to provide for the payment of the costs of such repair and replacement out of the self-insured property fund. Disbursements from the self-insured property fund for claims of state agencies for loss or damage to property shall be paid by the state treasurer upon warrants drawn in accordance with the law upon vouchers issued by the department of personnel.
(7) Repealed.
Source: L. 86, 2nd Ex. Sess.: Entire section added, p. 65, § 7, effective August 25. L. 88: (7) repealed, p. 914, § 3, effective April 20. L. 96: (1), (2), (3)(c), (5)(l), and (6) amended, pp. 1505, 1521, §§ 22, 62, effective June 1. L. 2009: (1) amended, (SB 09-279), ch. 367, p. 1927, § 9, effective June 1. L. 2010: (3)(a)(IV) amended, (HB 10-1181), ch. 351, p. 1622, § 9, effective June 7.
24-30-1510.6. Claims arising prior to September 15, 1985. (Repealed)
Source: L. 90: Entire section added, p. 1196, § 6, effective May 24.
Editor's note: Subsection (3)(b) provided for the repeal of this section, effective January 1, 1995. (See L. 90, p. 1196.)
24-30-1510.7. Workers' compensation for state employees - state employees' workers' compensation settlement agreements - definition.
(1) (a) There is hereby created, as a separate account in the risk management fund, the state employee workers' compensation account, which consists of all moneys that may be appropriated thereto by the general assembly and that may be otherwise made available to it by the general assembly for the purpose of establishing a workers' compensation self-insurance program for state employees or for the procurement of commercial workers' compensation insurance in accordance with subsection (2) of this section. Moneys "otherwise made available" include transfers of moneys to the account authorized in the general appropriation act. The moneys in the account are continuously appropriated for the purposes of the state employee workers' compensation account other than the direct and indirect administrative costs of operating the risk management system, including legal services, litigation expenses, and third-party administrator expenses. The general assembly shall make annual appropriations from the account for the direct and indirect administrative costs of operating the risk management system, including legal services, litigation expenses, and third-party administrator expenses, that are attributable to the operation of the state employee workers' compensation account. At the end of any fiscal year, all unexpended and unencumbered moneys in the account must remain in the account and may not be credited or transferred to the general fund or any other fund. All interest earned from the investment of moneys in the account pursuant to this section must be credited to and become part of the account.
(b) (Deleted by amendment, L. 2014.)
(2) Expenditures shall be made out of the state employee workers' compensation account in the risk management fund in accordance with subsection (1) of this section only for the following purposes:
(a) To pay workers' compensation benefits to state employees in accordance with articles 40 to 47 of title 8, C.R.S., and to pay the administrative costs of operating the department of personnel in relation to the workers' compensation self-insurance program for state employees;
(b) To pay the premium for commercial workers' compensation insurance, if the state elects not to be self-insured for workers' compensation purposes.
(3) Prior to July 1, 1990, nothing in this section shall apply to the department of institutions; but this section shall apply to the department of human services beginning on July 1, 1990.
(4) Amounts which are recorded in the state employee workers' compensation account as claims, including reserves, but which are not required to be paid in the current fiscal year shall not be considered as expenditures in excess of the amount authorized by an item of appropriation for purposes of section 24-75-109.
(5) (a) (I) Notwithstanding section 8-44-105, C.R.S., if the state elects to self-insure workers' compensation claims as authorized in this section or to insure for such claims through an entity other than Pinnacol Assurance, created in section 8-45-101, C.R.S., on and after the effective date of such election, the state shall be directly and primarily liable for all liabilities due on all workers' compensation claims after such election that arise on and after the beginning date of the initial policy period in the annually renewable memorandum of agreement containing a premium payment plan in effect between the state and Pinnacol Assurance.
(II) In no event shall the department of personnel elect to self-insure for workers' compensation claims prior to the beginning of a fiscal year in which the general assembly appropriates sufficient funds for such self-insurance.
(b) (I) Funding of the liability obligations assumed by the state from Pinnacol Assurance pursuant to paragraph (a) of this subsection (5) beyond a current fiscal year is contingent upon funds for that purpose being appropriated, budgeted, and otherwise made available.
(II) Nothing in this paragraph (b) shall be construed to relieve the state of any liability obligation if the state elects to self-insure or insure through an entity other than Pinnacol Assurance pursuant to paragraph (a) of this subsection (5).
(c) Notwithstanding the provisions of section 8-44-201 (1), C.R.S., if the state elects to self-insure workers' compensation claims as authorized in this section, the executive director of the department of labor and employment shall not prescribe or apply security requirements in granting or continuing permission for such state self-insurance program.
(6) When communicating with or reaching an agreement with a state employee about a workers' compensation claim, the state shall neither suggest nor require:
(a) That the state employee resign from state employment;
(b) That the state employee refrain from seeking or obtaining employment with the state in the future; or
(c) That any other restrictions be placed on the state employee's ability to work for the state.
(7) A provision of an agreement, contract, or arrangement that violates subsection (6) of this section is void and unenforceable, but all other provisions of such an agreement, contract, or arrangement remain enforceable unless otherwise prohibited by law.
(8) As used in this section, "state employee" means an individual who currently is or was in the past employed by the state, whether or not the individual is under the state personnel system or exempt from the state personnel system.
(9) Pursuant to the legislative intent to explore the availability of insurance policies as declared in section 24-30-1501 (1), if the state elects to self-insure workers' compensation claims, the department of personnel shall send or cause to be sent a request for interest to Pinnacol Assurance and at least five other insurance companies that provide workers' compensation insurance in Colorado; except that the department of personnel shall not send a request for interest to Pinnacol Assurance more than once every three years. The department shall send the requests for interest in accordance with this section in 2026 and at least once every three years thereafter. Each request for interest must request the following information from each responding insurance company for the following calendar year:
(a) An estimate of the total cost to the state to purchase workers' compensation insurance;
(b) The company's ability to provide workers' compensation insurance that would cover all state employees; and
(c) A detailed description of the workers' compensation coverage that the company would provide.
(10) For each request for interest obtained pursuant to subsection (9) of this section, the department of personnel shall prepare and submit a report to the general assembly no later than December 10 of each year. Each report must specify:
(a) The name of the responding insurance company, unless the department received only one response in which case the name of the sole responding insurance company will be redacted from the report;
(b) The total cost estimated by the responding insurance company to provide workers' compensation insurance coverage to the state;
(c) Whether purchasing workers' compensation insurance from the responding insurance company would require the state to contract with a third-party administrator, and what the additional cost to the state would be, if any;
(d) A detailed description of the workers' compensation coverage that the responding insurance company would provide;
(e) The costs associated with the self-insurance selected by the state for the current calendar year, including a breakdown of that cost which must include, but is not limited to, indemnity benefits; medical benefits; costs paid to third-party administrators and an identification of those third-party administrators; actuarial costs; premiums paid for out of state insurance; each state department's costs; actual or estimated costs of litigation; and other permits, fees, payments, and expenditures related to the state's self-insurance of workers' compensation claims; and
(f) Whether the state's costs related to self-insurance of workers' compensation claims increased or decreased compared to the previous calendar year.
(11) In addition to the report requirements specified in subsection (10) of this section, the first report must specify, over the previous three years, to which insurance companies the state sent requests of interest, the total number of insurance companies that responded to the requests, and the estimated cost reported in each received response, if any.
Source: L. 90: Entire section added, p. 1196, § 6, effective May 24. L. 93: (5) added, p. 1684, § 1, effective June 6. L. 94: (3) amended, p. 2694, § 231, effective July 1. L. 96: (2)(a) and (5)(a)(II) amended, p. 1521, § 63, effective June 1. L. 97: (5)(c) added, p. 51, § 2, effective July 1. L. 2002: (5)(a)(I) and (5)(b) amended, p. 1892, § 55, effective July 1. L. 2009: (1) amended, (SB 09-279), ch. 367, p. 1928, § 10, effective June 1. L. 2014: (1) amended, (SB 14-120), ch. 90, p. 338, § 1, effective March 27. L. 2024: (6), (7), (8), (9), (10), and (11) added, (SB 24-149), ch. 482, p. 3378, § 1, effective June 7.
24-30-1511. State treasurer to invest funds.
The state treasurer shall invest any portion of the risk management fund, including its reserves, which the executive director and the board determine is not needed for immediate use. The state treasurer shall invest any portion of the self-insured property fund, including its reserves, which the executive director determines is not needed for immediate use. The state treasurer shall invest any portion of the state employee workers' compensation account in the risk management fund, including its reserves, which the executive director determines is not needed for immediate use. Such moneys may be invested in the types of investments authorized in sections 24-36-109, 24-36-112, and 24-36-113.
Source: L. 85, 1st Ex. Sess.: Entire part added, p. 7, § 1, effective September 27. L. 86, 2nd Ex. Sess.: Entire section amended, p. 67, § 8, effective August 25. L. 90: Entire section amended, p. 1197, § 7, effective May 24. L. 96: Entire section amended, p. 1522, § 64, effective June 1. L. 97: Entire section amended, p. 1016, § 28, effective August 6.
24-30-1511.5. State self-insurance funds - transfers - definition.
(1) As used in this section, "state self-insurance fund" means the risk management fund created in section 24-30-1510 (1) excluding the state employee workers' compensation account; the self-insured property fund created in section 24-30-1510.5; or the state employee workers' compensation account in the risk management fund created in section 24-30-1510.7.
(2) If there is an insufficient cash balance in a state self-insurance fund for any allowable expenditure other than the direct and indirect administrative costs of operating the risk management system, then the executive director may request the state treasurer to transfer money from another state self-insurance fund's reserve balance to the fund with the deficiency. The amount of the requested transfer shall not exceed the amount of the deficiency. The state treasurer shall transfer the money between the state self-insurance funds as requested. In the next annual general appropriations act that is enacted after the transfer is made, the general assembly shall appropriate an amount equal to the transfer to the state self-insurance fund from which the money was deducted, in addition to any other amounts appropriated to the fund.
(3) The department of personnel may expend the money transferred in accordance with subsection (2) of this section for any purpose for which money in the state self-insurance fund is continuously appropriated but shall not expend any of the money for the direct and indirect administrative costs of operating the risk management system.
Source: L. 2017: Entire section added, (SB 17-175), ch. 11, p. 34, § 1, effective March 1.
24-30-1512. Risk management fund and self-insured property fund not subject to insurance laws.
The setting aside of reserves for self-insurance purposes in the risk management fund created in section 24-30-1510, in the self-insured property fund created in section 24-30-1510.5, and in the state employee workers' compensation account in the risk management fund created in section 24-30-1510.7, shall not be construed to be creating an insurance company, nor shall the risk management fund or the self-insured property fund otherwise be subject to the provisions of the laws of this state regulating insurance or insurance companies. The requirements of section 10-4-624, C.R.S., concerning motor vehicle self-insurance are not applicable to this part 15.
Source: L. 85, 1st Ex. Sess.: Entire part added, p. 7, § 1, effective September 27. L. 86, 2nd Ex. Sess.: Entire section amended, p. 67, § 9, effective August 25. L. 90: Entire section amended, p. 1197, § 8, effective May 24. L. 97: Entire section amended, p. 1016, § 29, effective August 6. L. 2003: Entire section amended, p. 1572, § 9, effective July 1.
24-30-1513. State auditor - examination - report.
(1) The state auditor or any person authorized by the state auditor shall conduct an examination in accordance with section 2-3-103 to determine that proper underwriting techniques, sound funding procedures, loss reserves, claims procedures, and accounting practices are being followed in the management and operation of the risk management fund, the self-insured property fund, and the state employee workers' compensation account in the risk management fund.
(2) The state auditor shall present a report of his or her findings concerning:
(a) The risk management fund to the board and to the general assembly; and
(b) The self-insured property fund and the state employee workers' compensation account to the general assembly.
Source: L. 85, 1st Ex. Sess.: Entire part added, p. 7, § 1, effective September 27. L. 86, 2nd Ex. Sess.: Entire section amended, p. 67, § 10, effective August 25. L. 90: Entire section amended, p. 1198, § 9, effective May 24. L. 2017: Entire section amended, (SB 17-294), ch. 264, p. 1401, § 69, effective May 25.
24-30-1514. Report. (Repealed)
Source: L. 85, 1st Ex. Sess.: Entire part added, p. 7, § 1, effective September 27. L. 86, 2nd Ex. Sess.: Entire section amended, p. 68, § 11, effective August 25. L. 96: Entire section repealed, p. 1270, § 200, effective August 7.
Cross references: For the legislative declaration contained in the 1996 act repealing this section, see section 1 of chapter 237, Session Laws of Colorado 1996.
24-30-1515. Compromise or settlement of claims - authority.
(1) A claim against the state or against a state official or employee whose defense has been assumed by the state may be compromised or settled on behalf of the state according to the requirements set forth in subsection (2) of this section. Prior to settling a claim of more than fifty thousand dollars, the board or the person authorized to settle the claim shall consult with the head of the affected state agency to assess the appropriateness of the proposed compromise or settlement amount. In settling a claim, the board or the person authorized to settle the claim may require the execution and presentation of those documents required by rule and regulation including those documents which discharge or hold harmless the state of all liability under the claim.
(2) (a) The following parties are authorized to make compromises or settlements on behalf of the state in the following amounts:
(I) A claims adjuster employed by the department of personnel or under contract with the department of personnel is authorized to settle claims for an amount not to exceed five thousand dollars;
(II) The claims manager of the department of personnel is authorized to settle and direct payment in settlement of claims for an amount not to exceed twenty-five thousand dollars;
(III) The state risk manager is authorized to settle and direct payment in settlement of claims for an amount not to exceed fifty thousand dollars;
(IV) The executive director is authorized to settle and direct payment in settlement of claims for an amount not to exceed one hundred thousand dollars;
(V) The board is authorized to settle and direct payment in settlement of claims for an amount of one hundred thousand dollars or more but not to exceed the maximum liability limits under the "Colorado Governmental Immunity Act", as set forth in section 24-10-114.
(b) The board is authorized to settle and direct payments in settlement of claims brought under federal law.
(3) Disbursements from the risk management fund for claims compromised or settled in accordance with this part 15 shall be paid by the state treasurer upon warrants drawn in accordance with law upon vouchers issued by the department of personnel upon order of the board or person authorized in subsection (2) of this section to make such compromise or settlement.
(4) The provisions of the "State Administrative Procedure Act", article 4 of this title, shall not be applicable to the payment or settlement of claims pursuant to this part 15. Any person or party adversely affected or aggrieved in compromising or settling a claim shall pursue such remedy in a district court of this state pursuant to the Colorado rules of civil procedure.
Source: L. 85, 1st Ex. Sess.: Entire part added, p. 7, § 1, effective September 27. L. 86: (1) and (2)(b) to (2)(e) amended, p. 893, § 7, effective April 17. L. 92: (2) amended, p. 1082, § 1, effective July 1. L. 96: (2)(a)(I), (2)(a)(II), and (3) amended, p. 1522, § 65, effective June 1.
24-30-1516. Rules and regulations.
(1) In order to carry out the purposes of this part 15, the executive director may promulgate reasonable rules and regulations governing the following:
(a) The administration of the programs authorized in this part 15;
(b) The management and administration of the investigation and adjustment of claims brought against the state, its officials, and its employees and of claims of state agencies for loss or damage to state property;
(c) The management and administration of legal defense of claims brought against the state, its officials, and its employees;
(d) The general supervision of parties who have contracted with the state to provide claims investigation, claims adjustment, support services, or legal services;
(e) Specifications on documents required to present a claim for compromise or settlement;
(f) Specifications on documents required to discharge or hold harmless the state from liability under a claim;
(g) Standards for compromising and settling claims brought against the state or against a state official or employee whose defense has been assumed by the state.
Source: L. 85, 1st Ex. Sess.: Entire part added, p. 8, § 1, effective September 27. L. 86: (1)(d) amended, p. 893, § 8, effective April 17. L. 86, 2nd Ex. Sess.: (1)(b) amended, p. 68, § 12, effective August 25. L. 96: (1) amended, p. 1522, § 66, effective June 1.
24-30-1517. Applicability.
(1) With respect to claims covered under the risk management fund, until January 1, 1995, section 24-30-1510 shall apply to claims arising on or after September 15, 1985, and on and after January 1, 1995, section 24-30-1510 shall apply to claims whenever arising. With respect to claims for loss or damage to state property covered under the self-insured property fund, this part 15 shall apply to claims arising on or after July 1, 1986. With respect to claims for workers' compensation made by state employees, other than employees of the department of human services, this part 15 shall apply to claims arising on or after May 24, 1990. With respect to claims for workers' compensation made by employees of the department of human services, this part 15 shall apply to claims arising on or after July 1, 1990.
(2) Nothing in this part 15 shall apply to the university of Colorado system, including the university of Colorado at Boulder, Denver, and Colorado Springs and the university of Colorado health sciences center.
Source: L. 85, 1st Ex. Sess.: Entire part added, p. 8, § 1, effective September 27. L. 86, 2nd Ex. Sess.: (1) amended, p. 68, § 13, effective August 25. L. 90: (1) amended, p. 1198, § 10, effective May 24. L. 94: (1) amended, p. 2694, § 232, effective July 1. L. 2004: (2) amended, p. 604, § 6, effective July 1.
24-30-1518. Repeal of part. (Repealed)
Source: L. 85, 1st Ex. Sess.: Entire part added, p. 9, § 1, effective September 27. L. 86: Entire section repealed, p. 894, § 10, effective April 17.
24-30-1519. Insurance policies.
The procurement of any property or liability insurance policy by any state agency shall be coordinated through and approved by the department of personnel. State agencies are encouraged to submit any other insurance policy to the department of personnel for review and evaluation.
Source: L. 86: Entire section added, p. 893, § 9, effective April 17. L. 96: Entire section amended, p. 1523, § 67, effective June 1.
24-30-1520. Authorization by law to settle claims or to pay judgments.
This part 15 is an authorization by law pursuant to section 33 of article V of the Colorado constitution to settle claims brought against the state, its officials, or its employees or to pay judgments against the state, its officials, or its employees. No moneys in the state treasury shall be disbursed therefrom for the settlement of a claim brought against the state, its officials, or its employees or for the payment of judgments against the state, its officials, or its employees except as provided in this part 15.
Source: L. 86: Entire section added, p. 894, § 9, effective April 17.
PART 16
GENERAL GOVERNMENT COMPUTER CENTER (GGCC)
24-30-1601 to 24-30-1608. (Repealed)
Source: L. 2008: Entire part repealed, p. 1131, § 18, effective May 22.
Editor's note: This part 16 was added in 1986. For amendments to this part 16 prior to its repeal in 2008, consult the Colorado statutory research explanatory note and the table itemizing the replacement volumes and supplements to the original volume of C.R.S. 1973 beginning on page vii in the front of this volume. Provisions of this part 16 were relocated to part 6 of article 37.5 of this title. For the location of specific provisions, see the editor's notes following those sections that were relocated in said part 6.
PART 17
COMMISSION ON INFORMATION MANAGEMENT
24-30-1701 to 24-30-1704. (Repealed)
Source: L. 99: Entire part repealed, p. 873, § 4, effective July 1.
Editor's note: This part 17 was added in 1987. For amendments to this part 17 prior to its repeal in 1999, consult the Colorado statutory research explanatory note and the table itemizing the replacement volumes and supplements to the original volume of C.R.S. 1973 beginning on page vii in the front of this volume.
PART 18
STATEWIDE TELECOMMUNICATIONS NETWORK
24-30-1801. Legislative declaration.
(1) The general assembly hereby finds and declares that there is a lack of coordination among the various state agencies regarding the utilization of telecommunications facilities and services. The general assembly further finds that better coordination of such facilities and services, particularly among the governing boards of the institutions of higher education, the department of higher education, the department of education, and the school districts across the state, would result in improved education programs and a more cost-effective telecommunications system. The use of telecommunications services and facilities to expand educational opportunity, however, does not mean that the role of the teacher in the classroom should be diminished.
(2) The general assembly hereby finds that the development and use of a statewide telecommunications network will accelerate economic development within the state. The general assembly further finds that cooperation and participation by medical and health facilities, public and private economic development organizations, the judicial system, and local governments in developing a statewide telecommunications network will facilitate expansion of such network to its full potential and encourage economic growth and development within Colorado.
Source: L. 89: Entire part added, p. 1029, § 1 effective April 15. L. 90: Entire section amended, p. 1136, § 3, effective May 23. L. 93: Entire section amended, p. 1700, § 1, effective June 6. L. 97: Entire part amended, p. 1017, § 30, effective August 6.
24-30-1801.5. Definitions. (Deleted by amendment)
Source: L. 93: Entire section added, p. 1701, § 3, effective June 6. L. 97: Entire part amended, p. 1017, § 30, effective August 6.
Editor's note: This section was deleted by amendment in 1997. (See L. 97, p. 1017.)
24-30-1802. Advisory commission on telecommunications. (Repealed)
Source: L. 89: Entire part added, p. 1029, § 1, effective April 15. L. 90: (1) amended, p. 1136, § 4, effective May 23. L. 91: (3)(a) amended, p. 696, § 12, effective April 20. L. 93: (3)(a) amended, p. 1701, § 2, effective June 6. L. 95: (1) amended, p. 653, § 67, effective July 1. L. 97: Entire part amended, p. 1017, § 30, effective August 6.
Editor's note: Subsection (3) provided for the repeal of this section, effective July 1, 1995. (See L. 93, p. 1701.) Although the section was repealed in 1995, it was contained in a 1997 act that amended the entire part.
24-30-1803. Telecommunications plan - staff. (Deleted by amendment)
Source: L. 89: Entire part added, p. 1030, § 1, effective April 15. L. 90: (1) amended and (3) and (4) added, p. 1136, § 5, effective May 23. L. 96: (1) amended, p. 1270, § 198, effective August 7. L. 97: Entire part amended, p. 1017, § 30, effective August 6.
Editor's note: This section was deleted by amendment in 1997. (See L. 97, p. 1017.)
24-30-1804. Institutions of higher education - statewide telecommunications network.
All institutions of higher education in this state which utilize telecommunications programs or operations shall cooperate in the establishment of a statewide telecommunications network. The Colorado commission on higher education shall facilitate the establishment of the statewide telecommunications network and, in the event that such a network is not established by July 1, 1992, the commission shall promulgate rules and regulations requiring such a network.
Source: L. 89: Entire part added, p. 1030, §1, effective April 15. L. 96: Entire section amended, p. 1270, § 199, effective August 7. L. 97: Entire part amended, p. 1018, § 30, effective August 6.
Cross references: For the legislative declaration contained in the 1996 act amending this section, see section 1 of chapter 237, Session Laws of Colorado 1996.
24-30-1805. Demonstration project. (Deleted by amendment)
Source: L. 93: Entire section added, p. 1701, § 3, effective June 6. L. 97: Entire part amended, p. 1019, § 30, effective August 6.
Editor's note: This section was deleted by amendment in 1997. (See L. 97, p. 1019.)
24-30-1806. Policy recommendations. (Deleted by amendment)
Source: L. 93: Entire section added, p. 1701, § 3, effective June 6. L. 97: Entire part amended, p. 1019, § 30, effective August 6.
Editor's note: This section was deleted by amendment in 1997. (See L. 97, p. 1019.)
PART 19
STATE BUILDING ENERGY MANAGEMENT PLANS
24-30-1901 to 24-30-1907. (Repealed)
Editor's note: (1) This part 19 was added in 1993. For amendments to this part 19 prior to its repeal in 1996, consult the Colorado statutory research explanatory note and the table itemizing the replacement volumes and supplements to the original volume of C.R.S. 1973 beginning on page vii in the front of this volume.
(2) Section 24-30-1907 provided for the repeal of this part 19, effective January 1, 1996. (See L. 93, p. 917.)
PART 20
UTILITY COST-SAVINGS MEASURES
24-30-2001. Definitions.
As used in this part 20, unless the context otherwise requires:
(1) "Energy cost-savings contract" means a utility cost-savings contract or a vehicle fleet operational and fuel cost-savings contract.
(1.3) "Energy cost-savings measure" means a utility cost-savings measure or a vehicle fleet operational and fuel cost-savings measure.
(1.5) "Energy performance contract" means a contract for evaluations, recommendations, or implementation of one or more energy cost-savings measures designed to produce utility cost savings, operation and maintenance cost savings, or vehicle fleet operational and fuel cost savings, which contract:
(a) Sets forth savings attributable to the calculated energy cost savings or operation and maintenance cost savings for each year during the contract period;
(b) Provides that the amount of actual savings for each year during the contract period shall exceed annual contract payments, including maintenance costs, to be made during such year by the state agency contracting for the energy cost-savings measures; except that, for the purposes of this part 20 only, the term "annual contract payments" does not include moneys received by the state from rebates, gifts, grants, or donations specifically designated by the gifting, granting, or donating party for the design or implementation of an energy cost-savings measure or state moneys that have been specifically appropriated in a distinct line item, or, in the case of the department of transportation, otherwise set aside in the department's budget, for the design or implementation of an energy cost-savings measure that is wholly addressed within the scope of the energy cost-savings contract;
(c) Requires the party entering into the energy performance contract with the state agency to provide a written guarantee that the sum of energy cost savings and operation and maintenance cost savings for each year during the first three years of the contract period shall not be less than the calculated savings for that year described in paragraph (a) of this subsection (1.5); and
(d) Requires payments by a state agency to be made within twelve years after the date of the execution of the contract; except that the maximum term of the payments shall be less than the cost-weighted average useful life of energy cost-savings equipment for which the contract is made, not to exceed twenty-five years.
(2) "Operation and maintenance cost savings" means a measurable decrease in operation and maintenance costs that is a direct result of the implementation of one or more utility cost-savings measures or one or more vehicle fleet operational and fuel cost-savings measures. Such savings shall be calculated in comparison with an established baseline of operation and maintenance costs.
(3) "Shared-savings contract" means a contract for one or more energy cost-savings measures that do not involve capital equipment projects, which contract:
(a) Provides that all payments to be made by the state agency contracting for the energy cost-savings measures shall be a stated percentage of calculated savings of energy costs attributable to such measures over a defined period of time and that such payments shall be made only to the extent that such savings occur; except that this paragraph (a) shall not apply to payments for maintenance and repairs and obligations on termination of the contract prior to its expiration;
(b) Provides for an initial contract period of no longer than ten years; and
(c) Requires no additional capital investment or contribution of funds.
(4) "State agency" means a department or institution of this state, including institutions of higher education.
(5) "Utility cost savings" means:
(a) A cost savings caused by a reduction in metered or measured physical quantities of a bulk fuel or utility resulting from the implementation of one or more energy conservation measures when compared with an established baseline of usage; or
(b) A decrease in utility costs as a result of changes in applicable utility rates or utility service suppliers. The savings shall be calculated in comparison with an established baseline of utility costs.
(6) "Utility cost-savings contract" means an energy performance contract or a shared-savings contract or any other agreement in which utility cost savings are used to pay for services or equipment.
(7) "Utility cost-savings measure" means any installation, modification, or service that is designed to reduce energy consumption and related operating costs in buildings and other facilities and includes, but is not limited to, the following:
(a) Insulation in walls, roofs, floors, and foundations and in heating and cooling distribution systems;
(b) Heating, ventilating, or air conditioning and distribution system modifications or replacements in buildings or central plants;
(c) Automatic energy control systems;
(d) Replacement or modification of lighting fixtures;
(e) Energy recovery systems;
(f) Renewable energy and alternate energy systems;
(g) Cogeneration systems that produce steam or forms of energy, such as heat or electricity, for use primarily within a building or complex of buildings;
(h) Devices that reduce water consumption or sewer charges;
(i) Changes in operation and maintenance practices;
(j) Procurement of low-cost energy supplies of all types, including electricity, natural gas, and other fuel sources, and water;
(k) Indoor air quality improvements that conform to applicable building code requirements;
(l) Daylighting systems;
(m) Building operation programs that reduce utility and operating costs including, but not limited to, computerized energy management and consumption tracking programs, staff and occupant training, and other similar activities;
(n) Services to reduce utility costs by identifying utility errors and optimizing existing rate schedules under which service is provided; and
(o) Any other location, orientation, or design choice related to, or installation, modification of installation, or remodeling of, building infrastructure improvements that produce utility or operational cost savings for their appointed functions in compliance with applicable state and local building codes.
(8) "Vehicle fleet operational and fuel cost savings" means a measurable decrease in the operation and maintenance costs of state vehicles that is associated with fuel or maintenance based on higher efficiency ratings or alternative fueling methods, including but not limited to savings from the reduction in maintenance requirements and a reduction in or the elimination of projected fuel purchase expenses as a direct result of investment in higher efficiency or alternative fuel vehicles or vehicle or charging infrastructure.
(9) "Vehicle fleet operational and fuel cost-savings contract" means an energy performance contract or shared-savings contract or any other agreement in which vehicle fleet operational and fuel cost savings are used to pay for the cost of the vehicle or associated capital investments.
(10) "Vehicle fleet operational and fuel cost-savings measure" means any installation, modification, or service that is designed to reduce energy consumption and related operating costs in vehicles and includes, but is not limited to, the following:
(a) Vehicle purchase or lease costs either in full or in part;
(b) Charging or fueling infrastructure to appropriately charge or fuel alternative fuel vehicles included in an energy cost-savings contract.
Source: L. 2001: Entire part added, p. 1088, § 1, effective August 8. L. 2010: (1)(b) and (7)(o) amended, (SB 10-207), ch. 410, p. 2027, § 2, effective June 10. L. 2013: (1), (2), IP(3), and (3)(a) amended and (1.3), (1.5), (8), (9), and (10) added, (SB 13-254), ch. 403, p. 2358, § 1, effective June 5.
24-30-2002. Contracts for energy analysis and recommendations.
(1) Subject to subsection (2) of this section, and in accordance with section 24-30-1104 (2), where applicable, a state agency may contract with any entity or person experienced in the design and implementation of energy conservation for an energy analysis and recommendations pertaining to measures that would significantly increase:
(a) Utility cost savings and operation and maintenance cost savings in buildings or other facilities owned or rented by the state agency; or
(b) Vehicle fleet operational and fuel cost savings in state fleet vehicles.
(2) The state personnel director or the state personnel director's designee may authorize a state agency to enter into such a contract. The contract shall be negotiated by the state agency pursuant to the negotiation requirements described in part 14 of this article; except that direct, indirect, overhead, and other costs and rates may be solicited and considered in the evaluation of qualifications and included in any resulting contract. The contract may include provisions that define the rate, amount, and nature of costs that may be proposed in any subsequent energy cost-savings contract, that describe the content of the analysis, and that reserve the option of the state agency to negotiate a suitable energy cost-savings contract.
(3) Such energy analysis and recommendations shall include the following, as applicable:
(a) Estimates of the amounts by which utility cost savings and operation and maintenance cost savings would increase and estimates of all costs of such utility cost-savings measures or energy-savings measures, including, but not limited to, itemized costs of design, engineering, equipment, materials, installation, maintenance, repairs, and debt service; or
(b) Estimates of the amounts by which vehicle fleet operational and fuel cost savings would increase and estimates of all costs of such vehicle fleet operational and fuel cost-savings measures.
(4) Payment by a state agency for an energy analysis and recommendations contract may be made from moneys appropriated to the state agency for operating expenses or utilities, as applicable, or payments may be deferred and incorporated into a subsequent energy cost-savings contract.
Source: L. 2001: Entire part added, p. 1090, § 1, effective August 8. L. 2013: Entire section amended, (SB 13-254), ch. 403, p. 2360, § 2, effective June 5.
24-30-2003. Energy cost-savings contracts.
(1) A state agency may enter into an energy cost-savings contract with any person or entity experienced in the design and implementation of utility cost-savings measures for buildings or other facilities, with any person or entity experienced in the calculation and analysis of vehicle fleet operational and fuel cost savings, or with the entity or person who performed the energy analysis and recommendations pursuant to section 24-30-2002 if:
(a) (I) In the case of a utility cost-savings contract, the energy analysis and recommendations made pursuant to section 24-30-2002 indicate that the expected annual contract payments required under the utility cost-savings contract and any additional maintenance costs for one or more utility cost-savings measures are expected to be equal to or less than the sum of the utility cost savings and operation and maintenance cost savings achieved by the implementation of such measures on an annual basis; or
(II) In the case of a vehicle fleet operational and fuel cost-savings contract, the energy analysis and recommendations made pursuant to section 24-30-2002 indicate that the expected annual contract payments required under the vehicle fleet operational and fuel cost-savings contract for one or more vehicle fleet operational and fuel cost-savings measures are expected to be equal to or less than the sum of the vehicle fleet cost savings achieved by the implementation of such measures on an annual basis; and
(b) The state personnel director or the director's designee, with input from the director of the state energy office, pursuant to criteria contained in procedures established by the state personnel director, approves the energy analysis and recommendations made pursuant to section 24-30-2002.
(2) (a) Except as provided in paragraph (b) of this subsection (2), an energy cost-savings contract shall be negotiated by the state agency pursuant to the negotiation requirements described in part 14 of this article.
(b) The negotiation requirements described in part 14 of this article and any other state competitive bidding or procurement provision shall not apply to a state agency that enters into an energy cost-savings contract with the entity or person who performed the energy analysis for and made recommendations to the state agency pursuant to section 24-30-2002.
(3) An energy cost-savings contract may include appropriate financed purchase of an asset or certificate of participation or other authorized financing agreements.
(4) The legislative authorization required by section 24-82-801 (1) shall not apply to a financed purchase of an asset or certificate of participation agreement in an energy cost-savings contract and no subsequent legislative authorization shall be required for any payment made pursuant to such an agreement.
(5) Payments by a state agency required under an energy cost-savings contract may be made from moneys appropriated to the state agency for operating expenses or utilities appropriations available to the state agency at the time the contract payments are due.
(6) The provisions of articles 91 and 92 of this title shall not apply to utility cost-savings contracts.
(7) Utility cost-savings contracts shall be subject only to the supervisory provisions of part 13 of this article.
(8) All savings realized as a result of an energy cost-savings contract that are in excess of the annual calculated savings by such contract may be utilized as provided in section 24-75-108 (3).
(9) The energy cost-savings contracts authorized by this section shall provide that all of the obligations of the state under such contracts shall be subject to the action of the general assembly in annually making moneys available for all payments thereunder and that the obligations shall not be deemed or construed as creating an indebtedness of the state within the meaning of any provision of the state constitution or the laws of the state concerning or limiting the creation of indebtedness by the state and shall not constitute a multiple fiscal-year direct or indirect debt or other financial obligation of the state within the meaning of section 20 (4) of article X of the constitution.
(10) The state personnel director may establish procedures containing criteria for authorization of energy cost-savings contracts.
Source: L. 2001: Entire part added, p. 1091, § 1, effective August 8. L. 2009: (4) amended, (HB 09-1218), ch. 132, p. 574, § 10, effective July 1. L. 2010: (1)(a) amended, (SB 10-207), ch. 410, p. 2028, § 3, effective June 10. L. 2013: (1), (2), (3), (4), (5), (8), (9), and (10) amended, (SB 13-254), ch. 403, p. 2361, § 3, effective June 5. L. 2021: (3) and (4) amended, (HB 21-1316), ch. 325, p. 2025, § 35, effective July 1.
PART 21
ADDRESS CONFIDENTIALITY PROGRAM
Editor's note: This part 21 was added with relocations in 2011. Former C.R.S. section numbers are shown in editor's notes following those sections that were relocated.
24-30-2101. Short title.
This part 21 shall be known and may be cited as the "Address Confidentiality Program Act".
Source: L. 2011: Entire part added with relocations, (HB 11-1080), ch. 256, p. 1108, § 2, effective June 2.
Editor's note: This section is similar to former § 24-21-201 as it existed prior to 2011.
24-30-2102. Legislative declaration.
(1) The general assembly finds and declares that a person attempting to escape from actual or threatened domestic violence, a sexual offense, human trafficking, or stalking frequently moves to a new address in order to prevent an assailant or potential assailant from finding the victim. This new address, however, is only useful if an assailant or potential assailant does not discover it. Additionally, people involved in the provision of reproductive health care are at a heightened risk of actual or threatened violence, stalking, or other social harms.
(1.5) Therefore, in order to help victims of domestic violence, a sexual offense, human trafficking, or stalking, and to assist and protect individuals involved in the provision of reproductive health care, it is the intent of the general assembly to establish an address confidentiality program, whereby the confidentiality of a victim's or an individual involved in the provision of reproductive health care's address may be maintained through, among other things, the use of a substitute address for purposes of public records and confidential mail forwarding.
(2) The general assembly further finds and declares that the desired result of the "Address Confidentiality Program Act" for the purpose of post-enactment review is to establish a substitute address for a program participant that is used by state and local government agencies whenever possible; to permit agencies to have access to the participant's actual address when appropriate; to establish a mail forwarding system for program participants; and to ensure that there is adequate funding to pay the program costs for all persons who apply to the program.
(3) The general assembly further declares that private entities, including but not limited to private businesses, can help protect program participants by seeking to prevent the disclosure of unique identifying information that could jeopardize the safety of program participants. The general assembly recognizes that a legitimate need for private entities to request and have access to an individual's actual address often exists and that the opportunity exists for private entities to partner with state and local governmental agencies in the effort to protect the safety of program participants.
Source: L. 2011: Entire part added with relocations, (HB 11-1080), ch. 256, p. 1108, § 2, effective June 2. L. 2015: (3) added, (HB 15-1174), ch. 42, p. 104, § 2, effective March 20. L. 2023: (1) amended and (1.5) added, (SB 23-188), ch. 68, p. 248, § 17, effective April 14. L. 2024: (1) and (1.5) amended, (HB 24-1345), ch. 317, p. 2123, § 4, effective May 31.
Editor's note: This section is similar to former § 24-21-202 as it existed prior to 2011.
Cross references: For the legislative declaration in SB 23-188, see section 1 of chapter 68, Session Laws of Colorado 2023.
24-30-2103. Definitions.
As used in this part 21, unless the context otherwise requires:
(1) "Actual address" means a residential, work, or school address as specified on the individual's application to be a program participant under this part 21, and includes the county, voting precinct number, and any unique identifying information related to the individual's residential, work, or school address.
(2) "Address confidentiality program" or "program" means the program created under this part 21 in the department to protect the confidentiality of the actual address of a relocated protected health-care worker or a relocated victim of domestic violence, a sexual offense, human trafficking, or stalking.
(3) "Applicant" means an individual identified as such in an application received by the executive director or his or her designee pursuant to section 24-30-2105.
(4) "Application assistant" means a person designated by the executive director or his or her designee to assist an applicant in the preparation of an application to participate in the address confidentiality program.
(5) "Department" means the department of personnel created in section 24-1-128.
(6) "Domestic violence" means an act described in section 18-6-800.3 (1), C.R.S.
(7) "Executive director" means the executive director of the department.
(7.5) "Human trafficking" means an act described in section 18-3-503 or 18-3-504.
(8) "Person" means any individual, corporation, limited liability company, partnership, trust, estate, or other association or any state, the United States, or any subdivision thereof.
(9) "Program participant" or "participant" means an individual accepted into the address confidentiality program in accordance with this part 21.
(9.5) "Protected health-care worker" means a reproductive health-care provider, or an employee, volunteer, patient, or immediate family member of a reproductive health-care provider, engaged in the provision, facilitation, or promotion of a legally protected health-care activity, as defined in section 12-30-121 (1)(d).
(10) "Public record" means all documents, papers, letters, maps, books, photographs, films, sound recordings, magnetic or other tapes, digital data, artifacts, or other documentary material, regardless of physical form or characteristics, made or received pursuant to law or ordinance in connection with the transaction of public business by a state or local government agency.
(11) "Sexual offense" means an act described in part 4 of article 3, or article 6 or 7 of title 18, C.R.S.
(12) "Stalking" means an act of harassment as described in section 18-9-111, C.R.S., or stalking as described in section 18-3-602, C.R.S.
(13) "State or local government agency" or "agency" means every elected or appointed state or local public office, public officer, or official; board, commission, bureau, committee, council, department, authority, agency, institution of higher education, or other unit of the executive, legislative, or judicial branch of the state; or any city, county, city and county, town, special district, school district, local improvement district, or any other kind of municipal, quasi-municipal, or public corporation.
(14) "Substitute address" means an address designated by the executive director or his or her designee under the address confidentiality program that is used instead of an actual address as set forth in this part 21.
Source: L. 2011: Entire part added with relocations, (HB 11-1080), ch. 256, p. 1109, § 2, effective June 2. L. 2015: (1) amended, (HB 15-1174), ch. 42, p. 104, § 3, effective March 20. L. 2023: (2) amended and (9.5) added, (SB 23-188), ch. 68, p. 248, § 18, effective April 14. L. 2024: (2) amended and (7.5) added, (HB 24-1345), ch. 317, p. 2123, § 5, effective May 31.
Editor's note: (1) This section is similar to former § 24-21-203 as it existed prior to 2011.
(2) Subsections (12) and (13) were numbered as subsections (13) and (12), respectively, in House Bill 11-1080 but were renumbered on revision to place defined terms in alphabetical order.
Cross references: For the legislative declaration in SB 23-188, see section 1 of chapter 68, Session Laws of Colorado 2023.
24-30-2104. Address confidentiality program - creation - substitute address - uses - service by mail - application assistance centers.
(1) There is created the address confidentiality program in the department to protect the confidentiality of the actual address of a relocated protected health-care worker or a relocated victim of domestic violence, a sexual offense, human trafficking, or stalking and to prevent the victim's assailants or potential assailants from finding the victim through public records. Under the program, the executive director or the executive director's designee shall:
(a) Designate a substitute address for a program participant that shall be used by state and local government agencies as set forth in this part 21; and
(b) Receive mail sent to a program participant at a substitute address and forward the mail to the participant as set forth in subsection (2) of this section.
(2) The executive director or his or her designee shall receive first-class, certified, or registered mail on behalf of a program participant and forward the mail to the participant for no charge. The executive director or his or her designee may arrange to receive and forward other classes or kinds of mail at the participant's expense. Neither the executive director nor his or her designee shall be required to track or otherwise maintain records of any mail received on behalf of a participant unless the mail is certified or registered mail.
(3) (a) Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary, a program participant may be served by registered mail or by certified mail, return receipt requested, addressed to the participant at his or her substitute address with any process, notice, or demand required or permitted by law to be served on the program participant. Service is perfected under this subsection (3) at the earliest of:
(I) The date the program participant receives the process, notice, or demand; or
(II) Five days after the date shown on the return receipt if signed on behalf of the program participant.
(b) This subsection (3) does not prescribe the only means, or necessarily the required means, of serving a program participant in the state.
(c) Whenever the laws of the state provide a program participant a legal right to act within a prescribed period of ten days or less after the service of a notice or other paper upon the participant and the notice or paper is served upon the participant by mail pursuant to this subsection (3) or by first-class mail as otherwise authorized by law, five days shall be added to the prescribed period.
(4) The executive director or the executive director's designee may designate as an application assistant any person who:
(a) Provides counseling, referral, or other services to victims of domestic violence, a sexual offense, human trafficking, or stalking, if applicable;
(b) Completes any training and registration process required by the executive director or the executive director's designee, if applicable; and
(c) Provides counseling, referrals, or other services to individuals accessing a legally protected health-care activity, as defined in section 12-30-121 (1)(d), if applicable.
(5) Any assistance and counseling rendered by the executive director or his or her designee or an application assistant to an applicant related to this part 21 shall in no way be construed as legal advice.
Source: L. 2011: Entire part added with relocations, (HB 11-1080), ch. 256, p. 1110, § 2, effective June 2. L. 2023: IP(1) and (4) amended, (SB 23-188), ch. 68, p. 248, § 19, effective April 14. L. 2024: IP(1) and (4)(a) amended, (HB 24-1345), ch. 317, p. 2124, § 6, effective May 31.
Editor's note: This section is similar to former § 24-21-204 as it existed prior to 2011.
Cross references: For the legislative declaration in SB 23-188, see section 1 of chapter 68, Session Laws of Colorado 2023.
24-30-2105. Filing and certification of applications - authorization card.
(1) On and after July 1, 2008, upon the recommendation of an application assistant, an individual may apply to the executive director or his or her designee to participate in the address confidentiality program. The following individuals may apply to the executive director or his or her designee to have an address designated by the executive director or his or her designee to serve as the substitute address of the individual and any individuals designated in paragraph (j) of subsection (3) of this section:
(a) An adult individual;
(b) A parent or guardian acting on behalf of a minor when the minor resides with the individual; or
(c) A guardian acting on behalf of an incapacitated individual.
(2) An application assistant shall assist the individual in the preparation of the application. The application shall be dated, signed, and verified by the applicant and shall be signed and dated by the application assistant who assisted in the preparation of the application. The signature of the application assistant shall serve as the recommendation by such person that the applicant have an address designated by the executive director or his or her designee to serve as the substitute address of the applicant. A minor or incapacitated individual on whose behalf a parent or guardian completes an application pursuant to the authority set forth in paragraph (b) or (c) of subsection (1) of this section shall be considered the applicant, but any statements that are required to be made by the applicant shall be made by the parent or guardian acting on behalf of the minor or incapacitated individual.
(3) The application must be on a form prescribed by the executive director or the executive director's designee and must contain the following:
(a) The applicant's name;
(b) A statement by the applicant that the applicant is a victim of domestic violence, a sexual offense, human trafficking, or stalking and that the applicant fears for the applicant's safety, if applicable;
(c) Evidence that the applicant is a victim of domestic violence, a sexual offense, human trafficking, or stalking, if applicable. This evidence may include any of the following:
(I) Law enforcement, court, or other state or local government agency or federal agency records or files;
(II) Documentation from a domestic violence program or facility, including but not limited to a battered women's shelter or safe house, if the applicant is alleged to be a victim of domestic violence;
(III) Documentation from a sexual assault program if the applicant is alleged to be a victim of a sexual offense; or
(IV) Documentation from a religious, medical, or other professional from whom the applicant has sought assistance in dealing with the alleged domestic violence, sexual offense, human trafficking, or stalking.
(d) A statement by the applicant that disclosure of the applicant's actual address would endanger the applicant's safety;
(e) A statement by the applicant that the applicant has confidentially relocated in the past ninety days or will confidentially relocate in the state;
(f) A designation of the executive director or his or her designee as an agent for the applicant for purposes of receiving certain mail;
(g) The mailing address and telephone number where the applicant can be contacted by the executive director or his or her designee;
(h) The actual address that the applicant requests not to be disclosed by the executive director or the executive director's designee that directly relates to the increased risk of domestic violence, a sexual offense, human trafficking, or stalking, or increased risk of actual or threatened violence, stalking, human trafficking, or other social harms due to the provision of a legally protected health-care activity, as defined in section 12-30-121 (1)(d);
(i) A statement as to whether there is any existing court order or court action involving the applicant or an individual identified in paragraph (j) of this subsection (3) related to dissolution of marriage proceedings, child support, or the allocation of parental responsibilities or parenting time and the court that issued the order or has jurisdiction over the action;
(j) The name of any person who resides with the applicant who also needs to be a program participant in order to ensure the safety of the applicant and, if the person named in the application is eighteen years of age or older, the consent of such person to be a program participant;
(k) A statement by the applicant, under penalty of perjury, that to the best of the applicant's knowledge, the information contained in the application is true; and
(l) A statement by the applicant, under penalty of perjury, that the applicant is a protected health-care worker or provides, refers, or assists patients in accessing a legally protected health-care activity, as defined in section 12-30-121 (1)(d), if applicable.
(4) Upon determining that an application has been properly completed, the executive director or his or her designee shall certify the applicant and any individual who is identified in paragraph (j) of subsection (3) of this section as a program participant. Upon certification, the executive director or his or her designee shall issue to the participant an address confidentiality program authorization card, which shall include the participant's substitute address. The card shall remain valid for so long as the participant remains certified under the program.
(5) Applicants and individuals identified in paragraph (j) of subsection (3) of this section shall be certified for four years following the date of filing unless the certification is withdrawn or canceled prior to the end of the four-year period. A program participant may withdraw the certification by filing a request for withdrawal acknowledged before a notary public. A certification may be renewed by filing a renewal application with the executive director or his or her designee at least thirty days prior to expiration of the current certification. The renewal application shall be dated, signed, and verified by the applicant. The renewal application shall contain:
(a) Any statement or information that is required by subsection (3) of this section that has changed from the original application or a prior renewal application; and
(b) A statement by the applicant, under penalty of perjury, that to the best of the applicant's knowledge, the information contained in the renewal application and a prior application is true.
Source: L. 2011: Entire part added with relocations, (HB 11-1080), ch. 256, p. 1111, § 2, effective June 2. L. 2023: IP(3), (3)(b), IP(3)(c), (3)(h), and (3)(k) amended and (3)(l) added, (SB 23-188), ch. 68, p. 249, § 20, effective April 14. L. 2024: (3)(b), IP(3)(c), (3)(c)(IV), and (3)(h) amended, (HB 24-1345), ch. 317, p. 2124, § 7, effective May 31.
Editor's note: This section is similar to former § 24-21-205 as it existed prior to 2011.
Cross references: For the legislative declaration in SB 23-188, see section 1 of chapter 68, Session Laws of Colorado 2023.
24-30-2106. Change of name, address, or telephone number.
(1) A program participant shall notify the executive director or his or her designee within thirty days after the participant has obtained a legal name change by providing the executive director or his or her designee a certified copy of any judgment or order evidencing the change or any other documentation the executive director or his or her designee deems to be sufficient evidence of the name change.
(2) A program participant shall notify the executive director or his or her designee of a change in address or telephone number from the address or telephone number listed for the participant on the application pursuant to the requirements set forth in section 24-30-2105 (3)(g) and (3)(h) no later than seven days after the change occurs.
Source: L. 2011: Entire part added with relocations, (HB 11-1080), ch. 256, p. 1113, § 2, effective June 2.
Editor's note: This section is similar to former § 24-21-206 as it existed prior to 2011.
24-30-2107. Certification cancellation - records.
(1) The certification of a program participant shall be canceled under any of the following circumstances:
(a) The program participant files a request for withdrawal of the certification pursuant to section 24-30-2105 (5).
(b) The program participant fails to notify the executive director or his or her designee of a change in the participant's name, address, or telephone number listed on the application pursuant to section 24-30-2106.
(c) The program participant or parent or guardian who completes an application on behalf of an applicant knowingly submitted false information in the program application.
(d) Mail forwarded to the program participant by the executive director or his or her designee is returned as undeliverable.
(2) If the executive director or his or her designee determines that there is one or more grounds for canceling certification of a program participant pursuant to subsection (1) of this section, the executive director or his or her designee shall send notice of cancellation to the program participant. Notice of cancellation shall set out the reasons for cancellation. The participant shall have thirty days to appeal the cancellation decision under procedures developed by the executive director or his or her designee.
(3) An individual who ceases to be a program participant is responsible for notifying persons who use the substitute address that the designated substitute address is no longer valid.
Source: L. 2011: Entire part added with relocations, (HB 11-1080), ch. 256, p. 1114, § 2, effective June 2.
Editor's note: This section is similar to former § 24-21-207 as it existed prior to 2011.
24-30-2108. Address use by state or local government agencies.
(1) The program participant, and not the executive director or his or her designee, is responsible for requesting that a state or local government agency use the participant's substitute address as the participant's residential, work, or school address for all purposes for which the agency requires or requests such residential, work, or school address.
(2) Except as otherwise provided in this section or unless the executive director or his or her designee grants a state or local government agency's request for a disclosure pursuant to section 24-30-2110, when a program participant submits a current and valid address confidentiality program authorization card to the agency, the agency shall accept the substitute address designation by the executive director or his or her designee on the card as the participant's address to be used as the participant's residential, work, or school address when creating a new public record. The substitute address given to the agency shall be the last-known address for the participant used by the agency until such time that the agency receives notification pursuant to section 24-30-2107 (3). The agency may make a photocopy of the card for the records of the agency and thereafter shall immediately return the card to the program participant.
(3) (a) A designated election official as defined in section 1-1-104 (8), C.R.S., shall use the actual address of a program participant for precinct designation and all official election-related purposes and shall keep the participant's actual address confidential from the public. The election official shall use the substitute address for all correspondence and mailings placed in the United States mail. The substitute address shall not be used as an address for voter registration.
(b) A state or local government agency's access to a program participant's voter registration shall be governed by the disclosure process set forth in section 24-30-2110.
(c) The provisions of this subsection (3) shall apply only to a program participant who submits a current and valid address confidentiality program authorization card when registering to vote.
(d) The provisions of this subsection (3) shall not apply to a program participant who registers to vote pursuant to section 1-2-213, C.R.S.
(4) Repealed.
(5) The substitute address shall not be used for purposes of listing, appraising, or assessing property taxes and collecting property taxes under the provisions of title 39, C.R.S.
(6) Whenever a program participant is required by law to swear or affirm to the participant's address, the participant may use his or her substitute address.
(7) The substitute address shall not be used for purposes of assessing any taxes or fees on a motor vehicle or for titling or registering a motor vehicle. Notwithstanding any provision of section 24-72-204 (7) to the contrary, any record that includes a program participant's actual address pursuant to this subsection (7) shall be confidential and not available for inspection by anyone other than the program participant.
(8) The substitute address shall not be used on any document related to real property recorded with a county clerk and recorder.
(9) A school district shall accept the substitute address as the address of record and shall verify student enrollment eligibility through the executive director or his or her designee. The executive director or his or her designee shall facilitate the transfer of student records from one school to another.
(10) Except as otherwise provided in this section, a program participant's actual address and telephone number maintained by a state or local government agency or disclosed by the executive director or his or her designee is not a public record that is subject to inspection pursuant to the provisions of part 2 of article 72 of this title. This subsection (10) shall not apply to the following:
(a) To any public record created more than ninety days prior to the date that the program participant applied to be certified in the program; or
(b) If a program participant voluntarily requests that a state or local government agency use the participant's actual address or voluntarily gives the actual address to the state or local government agency.
(11) For any public record created within ninety days prior to the date that a program participant applied to be certified in the program, a state or local government agency shall redact the actual address from a public record or change the actual address to the substitute address in the public record, if a program participant who presents a current and valid program authorization card requests the agency that maintains the public record to use the substitute address instead of the actual address on the public record.
Source: L. 2011: Entire part added with relocations, (HB 11-1080), ch. 256, p. 1114, § 2, effective June 2. L. 2019: (4) repealed, (SB 19-235), ch. 329, p. 3056, § 8, effective August 2.
Editor's note: This section is similar to former § 24-21-208 as it existed prior to 2011.
24-30-2109. Disclosure of actual address prohibited.
(1) The executive director or his or her designee is prohibited from disclosing any address or telephone number of a program participant other than the substitute address designated by the executive director or his or her designee, except under any of the following circumstances:
(a) The information is required by direction of a court order pursuant to section 24-30-2111. However, any person to whom a program participant's address or telephone number has been disclosed shall not disclose the address or telephone number to any other person unless permitted to do so by order of the court.
(b) The executive director or his or her designee grants a request by an agency pursuant to section 24-30-2110.
(c) The program participant is required to disclose the participant's actual address as part of a registration required by the "Colorado Sex Offender Registration Act", article 22 of title 16, C.R.S.
(2) The executive director or his or her designee shall provide immediate notification of disclosure to a program participant when disclosure is made pursuant to paragraph (a) or (b) of subsection (1) of this section.
(3) If, at the time of application, an applicant or an individual designated in section 24-30-2105 (3)(j) is subject to a court order related to dissolution of marriage proceedings, child support, or the allocation of parental responsibilities or parenting time, the executive director or his or her designee shall notify the court that issued the order of the certification of the program participant in the address confidentiality program and the substitute address designated by the executive director or his or her designee. If, at the time of application, an applicant or an individual designated in section 24-30-2105 (3)(j) is involved in a court action related to dissolution of marriage proceedings, child support, or the allocation of parental responsibilities or parenting time, the executive director or his or her designee shall notify the court having jurisdiction over the action of the certification of the applicant in the address confidentiality program and the substitute address designated by the executive director or his or her designee.
(4) No person shall knowingly and intentionally obtain a program participant's actual address or telephone number from the executive director or his or her designee or an agency knowing that the person is not authorized to obtain the address information.
(5) No employee of the executive director or his or her designee or of an agency shall knowingly and intentionally disclose a program participant's actual address or telephone number unless the disclosure is permissible by law. This subsection (5) only applies when an employee obtains a participant's actual address or telephone number during the course of the employee's official duties and, at the time of disclosure, the employee has specific knowledge that the actual address or telephone number disclosed belongs to a participant.
(6) Any person who knowingly and intentionally obtains or discloses information in violation of this part 21 shall be guilty of a class 1 misdemeanor and shall be punished as provided in section 18-1.3-501, C.R.S.
Source: L. 2011: Entire part added with relocations, (HB 11-1080), ch. 256, p. 1116, § 2, effective June 2. L. 2015: (1)(a) amended, (HB 15-1174), ch. 42, p. 104, § 4, effective March 20.
Editor's note: This section is similar to former § 24-21-209 as it existed prior to 2011.
24-30-2110. Request for disclosure.
(1) A state or local government agency requesting disclosure of a program participant's actual address pursuant to this section shall make such a request in writing on agency letterhead and shall provide the executive director or his or her designee with the following information:
(a) The name of the program participant for whom the agency seeks disclosure of the actual address;
(b) A statement, with explanation, setting forth the reason or reasons that the agency needs the program participant's actual address and a statement that the agency cannot meet its statutory or administrative obligations without disclosure of the participant's actual address;
(c) A particular statement of facts showing that other methods to locate the program participant or the participant's actual address have been tried and have failed or that the methods reasonably appear to be unlikely to succeed;
(d) A statement that the agency has adopted a procedure setting forth the steps the agency will take to protect the confidentiality of the program participant's actual address; and
(e) Any other information as the executive director or his or her designee may reasonably request in order to identify the program participant in the records of the executive director or his or her designee.
(2) (a) The executive director or his or her designee shall provide the program participant with notice of a request for disclosure received pursuant to subsection (1) of this section, and, to the extent possible, the participant shall be afforded an opportunity to be heard regarding the request.
(b) Except as otherwise provided in paragraph (c) of this subsection (2), the executive director or his or her designee shall provide the program participant with written notification whenever a request for a disclosure has been granted or denied pursuant to this section.
(c) No notice or opportunity to be heard shall be given to the program participant when the request for disclosure is made by a state or local law enforcement agency conducting a criminal investigation involving alleged criminal conduct by the participant or when providing notice to the participant would jeopardize an ongoing criminal investigation or the safety of law enforcement personnel.
(3) The executive director or his or her designee shall promptly conduct a review of all requests received pursuant to this section. In conducting a review, the executive director or his or her designee shall consider all information received pursuant to subsections (1) and (2) of this section and any other appropriate information that the executive director or his or her designee may require.
(4) The executive director or his or her designee shall grant a state or local government agency's request for disclosure and disclose a program participant's actual address pursuant to this section if:
(a) The agency has a bona fide statutory or administrative need for the actual address.
(b) The actual address will only be used for the purpose stated in the request.
(c) Other methods to locate the program participant or the participant's actual address have been tried and have failed or such methods reasonably appear to be unlikely to succeed.
(d) The agency has adopted a procedure for protecting the confidentiality of the actual address of the program participant.
(5) Upon granting a request for disclosure pursuant to this section, the executive director or his or her designee shall provide the state or local government agency with the disclosure that contains:
(a) The program participant's actual address;
(b) A statement setting forth the permitted use of the actual address and the names or classes of persons permitted to have access to and use of the actual address;
(c) A statement that the agency is required to limit access to and use of the actual address to the permitted use and persons set forth in the disclosure; and
(d) The date on which the permitted use expires, if expiration is appropriate, after which the agency may no longer maintain, use, or have access to the actual address.
(6) A state or local government agency whose request is granted by the executive director or his or her designee pursuant to this section shall:
(a) Limit the use of the program participant's actual address to the purposes set forth in the disclosure;
(b) Limit the access to the program participant's actual address to the persons or classes of persons set forth in the disclosure;
(c) Cease to use and dispose of the program participant's actual address upon the expiration of the permitted use, if applicable; and
(d) Except as otherwise set forth in the disclosure, maintain the confidentiality of a program participant's actual address.
(7) Upon denial of a state or local government agency's request for disclosure, the executive director or his or her designee shall provide prompt written notification to the agency stating that the agency's request has been denied and setting forth the specific reasons for the denial.
(8) A state or local government agency may file written exceptions with the executive director or his or her designee no more than fifteen days after written notification is provided pursuant to subsection (7) of this section. The exceptions shall restate the information contained in the request for disclosure, state the grounds upon which the agency asserts that the request for disclosure should be granted and specifically respond to the executive director's or his or her designee's specific reasons for denial.
(9) Unless the state or local government agency filing exceptions agrees otherwise, the executive director or his or her designee shall make a final determination regarding the exceptions within thirty days after the filing of exceptions pursuant to subsection (8) of this section. Prior to making a final determination regarding the exceptions, the executive director or his or her designee may request additional information from the agency or the program participant and conduct a hearing. If the final determination of the executive director or his or her designee is that the denial of the agency's request for disclosure was properly denied, the executive director or his or her designee shall provide the agency with written notification of this final determination stating that the agency's request has again been denied and setting forth the specific reasons for the denial. If the final determination of the executive director or his or her designee is that the denial of the agency's request for disclosure has been improperly denied, the executive director or his or her designee shall grant the agency's request for disclosure in accordance with this section. The final determination of the executive director or his or her designee shall constitute final agency action.
(10) The record before any judicial review of a final agency action pursuant to subsection (9) of this section shall consist of the state or local government agency's request for disclosure, the executive director's or his or her designee's written response, the agency's exceptions, the hearing transcript, if any, and the executive director's or his or her designee's final determination.
(11) During any period of review, evaluation, or appeal, the agency shall, to the extent possible, accept and use the program participant's substitute address.
(12) Notwithstanding any other provision of this section, the executive director or his or her designee shall establish an expedited process for disclosure to be used by a criminal justice official or agency for situations where disclosure is required pursuant to a criminal justice trial, hearing, proceeding, or investigation involving a program participant. An official or agency receiving information pursuant to this subsection (12) shall certify to the executive director or his or her designee that the official or agency has a system in place to protect the confidentiality of a participant's actual address from the public and from personnel who are not involved in the trial, hearing, proceeding, or investigation.
(13) Nothing in this section shall be construed to prevent the executive director or his or her designee from granting a request for disclosure to a state or local government agency pursuant to this section upon receipt of a program participant's written consent to do so.
Source: L. 2011: Entire part added with relocations, (HB 11-1080), ch. 256, p. 1117, § 2, effective June 2.
Editor's note: This section is similar to former § 24-21-210 as it existed prior to 2011.
24-30-2111. Disclosure of address or unique identifying information in criminal and civil proceedings.
A person shall not be compelled to disclose a program participant's actual address or any unique identifying information related to the participant's residence, work, or school during the discovery phase of or during a proceeding before a court of competent jurisdiction or administrative tribunal unless the court or administrative tribunal finds, based upon a preponderance of the evidence, that the disclosure is required in the interests of justice and that the potential harm to the program participant is substantially outweighed by the public interest in the disclosure and that no other alternative would satisfy that necessity. A court or administrative tribunal may seal the portion of any record that contains a program participant's actual address. Nothing in this section prevents a state or local government agency, in its discretion, from using a program participant's actual address in any document or record filed with a court or administrative tribunal if, at the time of filing, the document or record is not a public record.
Source: L. 2011: Entire part added with relocations, (HB 11-1080), ch. 256, p. 1120, § 2, effective June 2. L. 2015: Entire section amended, (HB 15-1174), ch. 42, p. 104, § 5, effective March 20.
Editor's note: This section is similar to former § 24-21-211 as it existed prior to 2011.
24-30-2112. Participation in the program - orders relating to allocation of parental responsibilities or parenting time.
(1) Nothing in this part 21, nor participation in the program, shall affect an order relating to the allocation of parental responsibilities or parenting time in effect prior to or during program participation.
(2) Program participation does not constitute evidence of domestic violence, a sexual offense, human trafficking, or stalking and shall not be considered for purposes of making an order allocating parental responsibilities or parenting time; except that a court may consider practical measures to keep a program participant's actual address confidential when making an order allocating parental responsibilities or parenting time.
Source: L. 2011: Entire part added with relocations, (HB 11-1080), ch. 256, p. 1120, § 2, effective June 2. L. 2024: (2) amended, (HB 24-1345), ch. 317, p. 2124, § 8, effective May 31.
Editor's note: This section is similar to former § 24-21-212 as it existed prior to 2011.
24-30-2113. Rule-making authority.
The executive director or his or her designee is authorized to adopt any rules in accordance with article 4 of this title deemed necessary to carry out the provisions of this part 21, excluding section 24-30-2114.
Source: L. 2011: Entire part added with relocations, (HB 11-1080), ch. 256, p. 1121, § 2, effective June 2.
Editor's note: This section is similar to former § 24-21-213 as it existed prior to 2011.
24-30-2114. Surcharge - collection and distribution - address confidentiality program surcharge fund - creation - definitions.
(1) On and after July 1, 2007, each person who is convicted of the crimes set forth in subsection (2) of this section shall be required to pay a surcharge of twenty-eight dollars to the clerk of the court for the judicial district in which the conviction occurs.
(2) The following crimes shall be subject to the surcharge set forth in subsection (1) of this section:
(a) Stalking;
(a.5) Human trafficking for involuntary servitude or human trafficking of a minor for involuntary servitude in violation of section 18-3-503;
(a.6) Human trafficking for sexual servitude or human trafficking of a minor for sexual servitude in violation of section 18-3-504;
(b) A crime, the underlying factual basis of which has been found by the court on the record to include an act of domestic violence; or
(c) Criminal attempt, conspiracy, or solicitation to commit the crimes set forth in subsections (2)(a), (2)(a.5), (2)(a.6), and (2)(b) of this section.
(3) The clerk of the court shall allocate the surcharge required by this section as follows:
(a) Five percent shall be retained by the clerk of the court for administrative costs incurred pursuant to this section. Such amount retained shall be transmitted to the state treasurer for deposit in the judicial stabilization cash fund created in section 13-32-101 (6), C.R.S.
(b) Ninety-five percent shall be transferred to the state treasurer, who shall credit the same to the address confidentiality program surcharge fund created pursuant to subsection (4) of this section.
(4) (a) There is hereby created in the state treasury the address confidentiality program surcharge fund, which shall consist of moneys received by the state treasurer pursuant to this section. The moneys in the fund shall be subject to annual appropriation by the general assembly to the department for the purpose of paying for the costs incurred by the executive director or his or her designee in the administration of the program. All interest derived from the deposit and investment of moneys in the fund shall be credited to the fund. Any moneys not appropriated by the general assembly shall remain in the fund and shall not be transferred or revert to the general fund at the end of any fiscal year.
(b) (Deleted by amendment, L. 2011, (HB 11-1080), ch. 256, p. 1121, § 2, effective June 2, 2011.)
(c) Repealed.
(5) The court may waive all or any portion of the surcharge required by this section if the court finds that a person subject to the surcharge is indigent or financially unable to pay all or any portion of the surcharge. The court may waive only that portion of the surcharge that the court finds that the person is financially unable to pay.
(6) As used in this section, "convicted" and "conviction" mean a plea of guilty accepted by the court, including a plea of guilty entered pursuant to a deferred sentence under section 18-1.3-102, C.R.S., a verdict of guilty by a judge or jury, or a plea of no contest accepted by the court.
Source: L. 2011: Entire part added with relocations, (HB 11-1080), ch. 256, p. 1121, § 2, effective June 2. L. 2013: (4)(c) repealed, (SB 13-271), ch. 299, p. 1590, § 1, effective May 28; (4)(a) amended, (HB 13-1300), ch. 316, p. 1682, § 52, effective August 7. L. 2024: (2)(a.5) and (2)(a.6) added and (2)(c) amended, (HB 24-1345), ch. 317, p. 2125, § 9, effective May 31.
Editor's note: This section is similar to former § 24-21-214 as it existed prior to 2011.
24-30-2115. Address confidentiality program fund - creation - appropriations.
(1) There is created in the state treasury the address confidentiality program fund, referred to in this section as the "fund". The fund consists of any gifts, grants, donations, or appropriations received by the department for the fund pursuant to subsection (2) of this section. The money in the fund shall be continuously appropriated by the general assembly to the department for the purpose of paying for the costs incurred by the executive director or the executive director's designee in the administration of the program. All interest derived from the deposit and investment of money in the fund shall be credited to the fund. Any money not appropriated by the general assembly shall remain in the fund and shall not be transferred or revert to the general fund at the end of any fiscal year.
(2) (a) The department is authorized to seek, accept, and expend gifts, grants, and donations from private or public sources for the implementation of the program. All private and public funds received through gifts, grants, and donations shall be transmitted to the state treasurer, who shall credit the same to the fund.
(b) The general assembly shall appropriate money from the economic recovery and relief cash fund, created in section 24-75-228, as enacted by Senate Bill 21-291, enacted in 2021, to the department to be used for the program, so long as the expenses such money is used for are for purposes or programs that also conform with the allowable purposes set forth in the federal "American Rescue Plan Act of 2021", Pub.L. 117-2, as the act may be subsequently amended. The department may use up to five percent of any money appropriated by the general assembly pursuant to this subsection (2)(b) for development and administrative costs incurred by the department pursuant to this subsection (2)(b).
Source: L. 2011: Entire section added, (HB 11-1080), ch. 256, p. 1122, § 3, effective June 2. L. 2021: Entire section amended, (SB 21-292), ch. 291, p. 1723, § 7, effective June 22.
Cross references: For the legislative declaration in SB 21-292, see section 1 of chapter 291, Session Laws of Colorado 2021.
PART 22
LAURA HERSHEY DISABILITY SUPPORT ACT
Editor's note: (1) This part 22 was added in 2011. It was amended with relocations in 2016, resulting in the addition, relocation, or elimination of sections as well as subject matter. For amendments to this part 22 prior to 2016, consult the 2015 Colorado Revised Statutes and the Colorado statutory research explanatory note beginning on page vii in the front of this volume. Former C.R.S. section numbers are shown in editor's notes following those sections that were relocated.
(2) (a) This part 22 was added in 2011. For amendments to this part 22 prior to its repeal in 2024, consult the 2023 Colorado Revised Statutes and the Colorado statutory research explanatory note beginning on page vii in the front of this volume.
(b) This part 22 was relocated to article 88 of title 8. Former C.R.S. section numbers are shown in editor's notes following those sections that were relocated. For a detailed comparison of this part 22, see the comparative tables located in the back of the index.
(3) Amendments to § 24-30-2205.5 (1) by SB 24-086 were harmonized with HB 24-1360 and relocated to § 8-88-205 (1).
Cross references: For the legislative declaration in HB 24-1360, see section 1 of chapter 324, Session Laws of Colorado 2024.
24-30-2201 to 24-30-2213. (Repealed)
Source: L. 2024: Entire part repealed, (HB 24-1360), ch. 324, p. 2166, § 3, effective July 1.
PART 23
OFFICE OF SUSTAINABILITY
24-30-2301. Legislative declaration.
The general assembly hereby finds and declares that:
(1) The state should be a leader in sustainability and should offer sustainable practices to state agencies as a core administrative service;
(2) Reducing the state's operating and energy costs supports a vibrant and diverse economy and saves taxpayers money;
(3) Ensuring state compliance with environmental mandates is critical to the future of our state and our nation;
(4) Sustainable state agency operations conserve water and offset the estimated future water needs of up to seven hundred forty thousand additional acre feet as outlined in the 2023 Colorado water plan adopted by the Colorado water conservation board; and
(5) Coordinating sustainable practices is best accomplished through the creation of an office focused on the state's operations, capital construction projects, and procurement.
Source: L. 2024: Entire part added, (SB 24-214), ch. 191, p. 1085, § 1, effective May 17.
24-30-2302. Definitions.
As used in this part 23, unless the context otherwise requires:
(1) "Department" means the department of personnel.
(2) "Elective pay application" means any application for elective pay funding available under the federal "Inflation Reduction Act of 2022", Pub.L. 117-169, 136 Stat. 1818 (2022).
(3) "Environmentally preferable products or services" means products or services that create fewer or less severe negative impacts on the natural environment when compared to similar products or services.
(4) "Office" means the office of sustainability created in section 24-30-2303 (1).
(5) "State agency" means a principal department as defined in section 24-1-110 and any division, office, board, commission, or enterprise within a principal department; except that "state agency" does not include an institution of higher education as defined in section 23-18-102 (7).
(6) "Sustainability" means the minimization of negative impacts on the natural environment, which include but are not limited to emissions of greenhouse gases, climate change, increased water consumption or water waste, pollution, nonrenewable energy usage, and over-consumption or waste of resources.
(7) "Sustainable practice" means a practice that increases sustainability by reducing one or more negative impacts on the natural environment.
Source: L. 2024: Entire part added, (SB 24-214), ch. 191, p. 1086, § 1, effective May 17.
24-30-2303. Office of sustainability - creation - duties.
(1) The office of sustainability is hereby created in the department. The office is a type 2 entity, as defined in section 24-1-105, and exercises its powers and performs its duties and functions under the department. The office shall work with state agencies to implement sustainable practices.
(2) The powers, duties, and functions of the office include:
(a) Providing leadership to and requiring accountability from state agencies regarding ongoing sustainability initiatives;
(b) Developing baseline metrics and goals for the reduction of negative environmental impacts and tracking state agencies' performance toward achieving those goals;
(c) Tracking the amount of money the state saves as a result of implementing sustainable practices;
(d) Seeking and applying for federal funding and other grant opportunities that would support state agencies' sustainable practices;
(e) Assisting state agencies in implementing sustainable procurement methods and introducing options for environmentally preferable products or services to state agencies;
(f) Assisting state agencies in installing energy-efficient equipment and fixtures;
(g) Assisting state agencies in meeting building performance standards such as those administered by the Colorado energy office;
(h) Coordinating and assisting in planning and constructing state agencies' electric vehicle charging infrastructure and ensuring utilization of such infrastructure;
(i) Instituting water reduction initiatives for state agencies, including but not limited to:
(I) The installation of water-conserving fixtures and water-wise plants on state property;
(II) The conversion of nonnative grasses to xeriscape in accordance with the principles of water-wise landscaping, with an emphasis on native plants, set forth in section 37-60-135 (2)(l); and
(III) The reduction of nonfunctional turf and encouragement of water-efficient sustainable landscaping practices at state facilities;
(j) Assisting state agencies in transitioning from gas-powered to electric equipment;
(k) Implementing statewide waste diversion practices to increase state agencies' recycling rates;
(l) Developing commuting opportunities for state employees that reduce greenhouse gas emissions and other pollution;
(m) Assisting state agencies in developing training programs to educate state employees on sustainable practices; and
(n) Conducting other activities as directed by the general assembly or the governor.
Source: L. 2024: Entire part added, (SB 24-214), ch. 191, p. 1086, § 1, effective May 17.
24-30-2304. Revolving fund - definition.
(1) The state agency sustainability revolving fund, referred to in this section as the "fund", is created in the state treasury. The fund consists of money that the general assembly may appropriate or transfer to the fund and any gifts, grants, or donations that the department credits to the fund pursuant to subsection (5) of this section.
(2) The office shall allocate the money in the fund to assist in replacing the state's gas and diesel-powered equipment that is located in ozone nonattainment areas as designated by the U.S. environmental protection agency with equivalent electric equipment, and to operate the office in accordance with this part 23.
(3) (a) Any unexpended and unencumbered money remaining in the fund at the end of a fiscal year shall remain in the fund.
(b) (I) For state fiscal years commencing on or before July 1, 2024, the state treasurer shall credit all interest and income derived from the deposit and investment of money in the fund to the fund.
(II) Notwithstanding subsection (3)(a) of this section, for state fiscal years commencing on and after July 1, 2025, in accordance with section 24-36-114 (1), the state treasurer shall credit all interest and income derived from the deposit and investment of money in the fund to the general fund.
(III) Repealed.
(4) Subject to annual appropriation by the general assembly, the department may expend money from the fund to be used for the purposes specified in subsection (2) of this section.
(5) The department may solicit, accept, and expend gifts, grants, and donations for the purposes of this part 23. The department shall credit any gifts, grants, and donations to the fund.
Source: L. 2024: Entire part added, (SB 24-214), ch. 191, p. 1087, § 1, effective May 17. L. 2025: (1) and (2) amended, (SB 25-249), ch. 124, p. 490, § 1, effective April 25; (3) amended, (SB 25-317), ch. 385, p. 2143, § 9, effective June 3; (4) amended, (SB 25-265), ch. 130, p. 512, § 6, effective July 1.
Editor's note: Subsection (3)(b)(III)(B) provided for the repeal of subsection (3)(b)(III), effective July 1, 2026. (See L. 2025, p. 2143.)
Cross references: For the legislative declaration in SB 25-317, see section 1 of chapter 385, Session Laws of Colorado 2025.
24-30-2305. Inflation reduction act elective pay - central submission of applications - cash fund - definition.
(1) In addition to the powers, duties, and functions of the office specified in section 24-30-2303, the office shall review and coordinate state agencies' elective pay applications and work with the office of the state controller to coordinate central submissions of elective pay applications. The office shall advise and provide technical assistance to state agencies on all aspects of elective pay to the extent feasible. State agencies shall submit elective pay applications directly to the office of the state controller.
(2) (a) The inflation reduction act elective pay cash fund, referred to in this section as the "cash fund", is created in the state treasury. The cash fund consists of money received by the state or state agencies pursuant to the elective pay provisions of the federal "Inflation Reduction Act of 2022", Pub.L. 117-169, 136 Stat. 1818 (2022), all of which must be deposited into the cash fund, and any other money that the general assembly may appropriate or transfer to the cash fund.
(b) The state treasurer shall credit all interest and income derived from the deposit and investment of money in the cash fund to the cash fund. Any unexpended and unencumbered money remaining in the cash fund at the end of a fiscal year shall remain in the cash fund.
(c) Money in the cash fund is continuously appropriated to the department to be used for the purposes specified in this part 23.
(3) The department may solicit, accept, and expend gifts, grants, and donations for the purposes specified in this part 23. The department shall credit any gifts, grants, and donations to the cash fund.
Source: L. 2024: Entire part added, (SB 24-214), ch. 191, p. 1088, § 1, effective May 17.
PART 24
PATHWAYS TO PUBLIC SERVICE PROGRAM
Cross references: For the legislative declaration in HB 26-1136, see section 1 of chapter 43, Session Laws of Colorado 2026.
24-30-2401. Definitions.
As used in this part 24, unless the context otherwise requires:
(1) "Department" means the department of personnel.
(2) "Postsecondary institution" means:
(a) An institution of higher education, as defined in section 23-18-102 (7);
(b) A branch campus of an institution of higher education;
(c) A local district college, as defined in section 23-71-102 (1); or
(d) An area technical college, as defined in section 23-60-103 (1).
(3) "Secondary school" means any school in the state that includes grade nine, ten, eleven, or twelve.
(4) "Skills-based hiring" has the meaning set forth in section 8-83-601 (12).
(5) "Work-based learning" has the meaning set forth in section 8-83-601 (15).
Source: L. 2026: Entire part added, (HB 26-1136), ch. 43, p. 199, § 2, effective August 12.
24-30-2402. Pathways to public service program - creation - purpose - duties of the department.
(1) The pathways to public service program is created in the department. The department shall administer the pathways to public service program using existing resources. Secondary schools and postsecondary institutions may elect, but are not required, to participate in the pathways to public service program.
(2) The purposes of the pathways to public service program are to:
(a) Demonstrate the value of a work-based government industry learning experience established through partnerships between state government and secondary schools, postsecondary institutions, and workforce centers that choose to participate in the program, by aligning skills-based hiring criteria with curricula and agency-defined work-based needs, and offering educational credit for work projects performed under the supervision of a qualified subject matter expert within Colorado state government;
(b) Encourage state governmental entities to work with secondary schools and postsecondary institutions to identify specific secondary and postsecondary courses and credentials that may qualify secondary and postsecondary students for specific entry-level public service roles that are performed by employees in the state personnel system;
(c) Encourage state governmental entities to work with Colorado career and technical education in the Colorado community college system to identify a pathway to state government employment with specific courses that may qualify program participants for certain public service roles that are performed by employees in the state personnel system;
(d) Create positive and affirmative connections that foster understanding and trust between Colorado residents and state agencies; and
(e) Reduce vacancies and improve retention in state government employment by establishing a reliable recruitment pool of candidates as well as a clear, accessible, and desirable career path in public service.
(3) In furtherance of the purposes of the pathways to public service program specified in subsection (2) of this section, the department shall:
(a) Work in partnership with the department of education, Colorado community college system, Colorado department of higher education, Colorado department of labor and employment, and Colorado workforce development council to facilitate alignment of statewide work-based learning strategies;
(b) Identify and develop targeted positions within state agencies as opportunities for the pathways to public service program, ensuring that graduates who meet curricular requirements established through formal interagency partnerships are prepared for public service roles that are performed by employees in the state personnel system;
(c) Adopt hiring policies that recognize work-based learning experiences as valid qualifications; and
(d) Collect data on individuals hired into state government positions through pathways identified and supported by the pathways to public service program, including demographic information, the educational or training pathway associated with the hire, and retention data. The department of higher education is not required to collect additional data related to this section. The department shall submit the data collected pursuant to this subsection (3)(d) to the Colorado workforce development council by June 30, 2027, and by June 30 each year thereafter to support inclusion in the Colorado talent pipeline report.
Source: L. 2026: Entire part added, (HB 26-1136), ch. 43, p. 200, § 2, effective August 12.
ARTICLE 31
Department of Law
PART 1
ATTORNEY GENERAL
24-31-101. Powers and duties of attorney general - services related to supporting outside counsel - rules - notice to the revisor of statutes - repeal.
24-31-102. Offices, boards, and divisions.
24-31-103. Chief deputy attorney general - powers.
24-31-103.5. Solicitor general - creation - powers.
24-31-104. Appointment of subordinate officers and employees. (Repealed)
24-31-104.5. Funding for insurance fraud investigations and prosecutions - creation of fund.
24-31-105. Criminal enforcement section. (Repealed)
24-31-106. Rights of crime victims - victims' services coordinator.
24-31-107. Applications for licenses - authority to suspend licenses - rules.
24-31-108. Receipt of money - subject to appropriation - exception for custodial money - legal services cash fund - creation - definition.
24-31-108.5. Use of funds for unanticipated legal needs.
24-31-109. Attorney general to provide identification cards to retired peace officers upon request - definitions. (Repealed)
24-31-110. Department of law - investigate prescription insulin drug pricing - report - repeal. (Repealed)
24-31-111. Legal services to state agencies - definitions.
24-31-112. No limitations on common law authority.
24-31-113. Public integrity - patterns and practices.
24-31-114. No-knock and forced entry study group - repeal. (Repealed)
24-31-115. Housing unit - powers of attorney general or district attorney - subpoenas - document production - remedies - injunctive relief - penalties.
24-31-116. Online fentanyl trafficking - study - report - appropriation - repeal. (Repealed)
24-31-117. Hiring committee when attorney general to operate district attorney's office due to a vacancy.
24-31-118. Jail standard assessments - repeal.
24-31-119. Factually inaccurate data prevention campaign - repeal. (Repealed)
24-31-120. Policy regarding the protection of personal identifying information.
PART 2
SOLICITOR GENERAL
24-31-201 to
24-31-206. (Repealed)
PART 3
PEACE OFFICERS STANDARDS AND TRAINING
24-31-301. Definitions.
24-31-302. Creation of board - members.
24-31-303. Duties - powers of the P.O.S.T. board - instructors - definition - repeal.
24-31-304. Applicant for training - fingerprint-based criminal history record check.
24-31-305. Certification - issuance - renewal - revocation - rules - definition.
24-31-306. Qualifications for peace officers. (Repealed)
24-31-307. Enforcement.
24-31-308. Reciprocity - provisional certificate.
24-31-309. Profiling - officer identification - training - definition.
24-31-310. Resources for the training of peace officers - peace officers in rural jurisdictions - legislative declaration.
24-31-311. DNA evidence - collection - retention.
24-31-312. School resource officer training.
24-31-313. Training concerning abuse and exploitation of at-risk elders.
24-31-313.5. Training concerning abuse and exploitation of at-risk adults with intellectual and developmental disabilities.
24-31-314. Advanced roadside impaired driving enforcement training.
24-31-315. Annual in-service training requirements.
24-31-316. Attorney general to provide identification cards to retired peace officers upon request - definitions.
24-31-317. Training requirements concerning peace officer interactions with persons with disabilities.
24-31-318. Administrative law judge appointment.
24-31-319. Training related to missing indigenous persons - development - missing persons alerts training.
24-31-320. Persons with deferred action for childhood arrivals status - rules - definition.
24-31-321. Peace officer conduct database - definition.
24-31-322. Authority to receive training or grants.
PART 4
ENFORCEMENT OF TOBACCO SETTLEMENT
24-31-401. Definitions.
24-31-402. Enforcement by attorney general.
24-31-403. Funding.
PART 5
PAYMENTS FOR KANSAS V. COLORADO LITIGATION
24-31-501 to
24-31-503. (Repealed)
PART 6
SAFE2TELL ACT
24-31-601. Short title.
24-31-602. Legislative declaration.
24-31-603. Definitions.
24-31-604. Administration of article.
24-31-605. Delegation of duties.
24-31-606. Safe2tell program - creation - duties.
24-31-607. In camera review - confidentiality of materials - criminal penalty.
24-31-608. Transfer of property.
24-31-609. License of intellectual property.
24-31-610. Safe2tell cash fund - creation.
24-31-611. Annual report.
PART 7
COLORADO DOMESTIC VIOLENCE FATALITY REVIEW BOARD
24-31-701. Definitions.
24-31-702. Colorado domestic violence fatality review board - creation - membership - purpose - duties.
24-31-703. Local and regional domestic violence fatality review teams - creation - membership - purpose - duties.
24-31-704. Access to records - confidentiality - public access - immunity.
24-31-705. Colorado domestic violence fatality review board contracts - grants - cash fund created. (Repealed)
24-31-706. Repeal of part.
PART 8
MEDICAID FRAUD CONTROL
24-31-801. Definitions.
24-31-802. Medicaid fraud control unit - creation - duties.
24-31-803. Medicaid fraud reporting.
24-31-804. Medicaid fraud control unit - displayed information.
24-31-805. Medicaid fraud control unit authority and responsibilities.
24-31-806. Civil investigative demands and subpoenas.
24-31-807. Provider applications - false statements - penalties.
24-31-808. Medicaid fraud and waste - penalties - definition.
24-31-809. Unlawful remuneration - penalties.
24-31-810. Other remedies available.
24-31-811. Limitation of action - three years.
PART 9
LAW ENFORCEMENT INTEGRITY
24-31-901. Definitions.
24-31-902. Incident recordings - release - tampering - fine.
24-31-903. Division of criminal justice report.
24-31-904. Peace officer certification discipline - definition.
24-31-905. Prohibited law enforcement action in response to protests.
24-31-906. Retaliation against whistleblower officers prohibited - private right of action - exemptions - procedures - definitions.
24-31-907. Prohibited use of "excited delirium" - definition.
24-31-908. Required notification of child sexual abuse - definition.
PART 10
COMMISSION ON IMPROVING FIRST RESPONDER INTERACTIONS WITH PERSONS WITH
DISABILITIES
24-31-1001 to
24-31-1007. (Repealed)
PART 11
FINANCIAL EMPOWERMENT FOR COLORADO RESIDENTS
24-31-1101. Financial empowerment office - creation - director.
24-31-1102. Financial empowerment office - purpose - duties.
PART 12
COLORADO FALSE CLAIMS ACT
24-31-1201. Short title.
24-31-1202. Definitions.
24-31-1203. False claims - civil liability for certain acts - penalty - exception.
24-31-1204. Civil actions for false claims - claims for retaliation - definitions.
24-31-1205. False claims action procedures - limitation on action - standard of proof.
24-31-1206. Jurisdiction.
24-31-1207. False claims civil investigation demands.
24-31-1208. Rule-making.
24-31-1209. Use of recoveries - false claims recovery cash fund - creation.
24-31-1210. No limitations on common law authority - medicaid fraud control.
24-31-1211. False claims act report.
PART 13
ENFORCEMENT OF WORKER PROTECTION LAWS
24-31-1301. Definitions.
24-31-1302. Worker and employee protection unit - creation - duties.
24-31-1303. Worker misclassification - wage determinations - investigation and enforcement by the unit - coordination with department of labor and employment.
PART 14
COLORADO SEXUAL ASSAULT FORENSIC MEDICAL EVIDENCE REVIEW BOARD
24-31-1401. Colorado sexual assault response review board - creation - membership - duties - report - short title - definitions - repeal.
PART 1
ATTORNEY GENERAL
24-31-101. Powers and duties of attorney general - services related to supporting outside counsel - rules - notice to the revisor of statutes - repeal.
(1) The attorney general:
(a) Shall act as the chief legal representative of the state and be the legal counsel and advisor of each department, division, office, board, commission, bureau, and agency of state government but shall not provide legal counsel to the legislative branch except for the state auditor in accordance with section 2-3-104.5;
(b) Shall appear for the state and prosecute and defend all actions and proceedings, civil and criminal, in which the state is a party or is interested when required to do so by the governor;
(c) Shall prosecute and defend for the state all causes in the appellate courts in which the state is a party or is interested;
(d) Shall give his or her opinion in writing upon all questions of law submitted to the attorney general by the:
(I) General assembly, or either the house of representatives or the senate;
(II) Governor;
(III) Lieutenant governor;
(IV) Secretary of state;
(V) State treasurer;
(VI) Executive director of the department of revenue; or
(VII) Commissioner of education.
(e) Shall have concurrent jurisdiction with the relevant district attorney over part 4 of article 120 of title 12;
(f) May appoint deputy attorneys general and assistant attorneys general for the efficient administration and supervision of department divisions and offices specified in section 24-31-102;
(g) May, at his or her sole discretion, appoint special assistant attorneys general to provide legal services to state agencies except as otherwise provided in section 24-31-111 (5);
(h) Shall, at the request of the governor, secretary of state, state treasurer, executive director of the department of revenue, or commissioner of education, prosecute and defend all suits relating to matters connected with their departments;
(i) May independently initiate and bring civil and criminal actions to enforce state laws, including actions brought pursuant to:
(I) The "Colorado Antitrust Act of 1992" or the "Colorado State Antitrust Act of 2023", article 4 of title 6;
(II) The "Colorado Consumer Protection Act", article 1 of title 6;
(III) The "Unfair Practices Act", article 2 of title 6;
(IV) Article 12 of title 6;
(V) Section 6-1-110;
(VI) Section 11-51-603.5;
(VII) Section 11-61-102;
(VIII) Section 24-34-505.5;
(IX) Section 25.5-4-306;
(X) Article 4 of title 8, subject to section 24-31-1303 (2);
(XI) The "Colorado Employment Security Act", articles 70 to 82 of title 8, subject to section 24-31-1303 (1);
(XII) The "Immigrant Tenant Protection Act" in part 12 of article 12 of title 38;
(XIII) The "Mobile Home Park Act" in part 2 of article 12 of title 38;
(XIV) The "Mobile Home Park Act Dispute Resolution and Enforcement Program" in part 11 of article 12 of title 38;
(XV) Part 1 of article 12 of title 38;
(XVI) Part 7 of article 12 of title 38;
(XVII) The "Rental Application Fairness Act", part 9 of article 12 of title 38;
(XVIII) The "Reproductive Health Equity Act", part 4 of article 6 of title 25;
(XIX) Part 15 of article 5 of title 25;
(XX) Part 5 of article 12 of title 38;
(XXI) Part 12 of article 4 of title 29;
(XXII) Part 14 of article 12 of title 38;
(XXIII) Section 24-34-806;
(XXIV) Section 13-1-140.1;
(XXV) Repealed.
(XXVI) Article 116 of title 24.
(XXVII) The "Colorado Voting Rights Act", article 47 of title 1.
(XXVIII) Beginning January 1, 2026, part 4 of article 12 of title 38;
(XXIX) Beginning January 1, 2026, part 8 of article 12 of title 38;
(XXX) Beginning January 1, 2026, part 10 of article 12 of title 38;
(XXXI) Section 13-16-126; and
(XXXII) Section 25-1.5-101 (1)(i)(I)(D) and (1)(dd).
(j) Shall have the powers, duties, and functions as are prescribed for heads of principal departments in the "Administrative Organization Act of 1968", article 1 of this title 24;
(k) May make rules, pursuant to section 24-4-103, as may be necessary to carry out the duties imposed upon him or her by law;
(l) When required, shall prepare drafts for contracts, forms, and other writings that may be required for the use of the state;
(m) Upon request of any employee in the state personnel system, shall represent such employee in any civil action or administrative proceeding instituted against such employee, either in the employee's official or individual capacity if the action or proceeding arises out of performance of the employee's official duties as determined by the attorney general and if the action or proceeding has not been brought by the state personnel director or the appointing authority of the employee seeking dismissal or other disciplinary action; except that the attorney general shall not represent any such employee in an action brought under section 24-50.5-105;
(n) Shall, pursuant to section 24-30-1507, represent expert witnesses and consultants described in section 24-30-1510 (3)(h);
(o) Shall keep in proper books a record of all official opinions and a register of all actions prosecuted or defended by him or her and of all proceedings had in relation thereto and the status of pending matters in his or her office, which books or registers the attorney general shall deliver to his or her successor. Publication of opinions or other material circulated in quantity outside the executive branch must be issued in accordance with section 24-1-136.
(p) May bring a civil action to enforce section 24-31-113;
(q) May bring a civil action to enforce section 24-31-307 (2) or a criminal action to enforce section 24-31-307 (3);
(r) May enter into interagency agreements pursuant to section 6-1-116 (4);
(s) May bring or intervene in a civil action, conduct investigations, and issue civil investigation demands pursuant to the "Colorado False Claims Act", part 12 of this article 31;
(t) May bring a civil action to enforce section 25-7-144;
(u) May, if the attorney general has reason to believe that a violation of a statute or rule is causing an imminent and substantive endangerment to the public health, water quality, or environment within a mobile home park, request a temporary restraining order, preliminary injunction, permanent injunction, or any other relief necessary to protect the public health, water quality, or environment;
(v) May expend money, manage staff, and perform other administrative functions essential for the operation of a district attorney's office when appointed by executive order of the governor;
(w) May conduct jail assessments in collaboration with the jail standards advisory committee, created pursuant to section 30-10-530, pursuant to section 24-31-118;
(x) (I) Shall submit to the peace officers standards and training board a proposal by December 31, 2030, to update current basic, reserve, and refresher law enforcement training academy programs and improve the peace officer performance of future academy graduates. If the P.O.S.T. board does not accept the proposal, the attorney general shall submit a new proposal within one year after the date the P.O.S.T. board did not accept the proposal.
(II) This subsection (1)(x) is repealed if:
(A) The peace officers standards and training board approves a comprehensive update to law enforcement training academy programs; and
(B) The chair of the peace officers standards and training board notifies the revisor of statutes in writing of the date when the conditions specified in this subsection (1)(x)(II) have occurred by emailing the notice to revisorofstatutes.ga@coleg.gov.
(III) This subsection (1)(x) is repealed, effective upon the date identified in the notice described in subsection (1)(x)(II) of this section or, if the notice does not specify a date, upon the date of the notice to the revisor of statutes.
(y) May bring a civil action to enforce section 8-2-128.5;
(z) (I) Shall review petitions relating to a rule adopted by the department of law in order to:
(A) Assess whether the rule comports with its statutory purpose;
(B) Understand the impact of the rule, including economic costs resulting from compliance with the rule;
(C) Assess the outreach process associated with the rule to ensure stakeholders are engaged in the rule-making process;
(D) Determine appropriate staffing; and
(E) Perform a cost-benefit analysis including indirect factors that affect health and safety.
(II) On and after January 1, 2027, the attorney general shall accept and review petitions requesting the attorney general to review or initiate a rule-making, subject to the rule-making authority granted to the attorney general or the department.
(III) On or before January 1, 2028, the attorney general shall adopt rules that govern the process for responding to or issuing opinion letters. The rules must include interpretive guidance and an operational framework, which framework includes a good faith reliance defense of an action that may otherwise constitute a violation of title 6.
(aa) May meet with the joint budget committee in an executive session to discuss potential budgetary impacts of current litigation, as described in section 2-3-211.
(2) The general assembly hereby recognizes and reaffirms that the attorney general has all powers conferred by statute and by common law in accordance with section 2-4-211 regarding all trusts established for charitable, educational, religious, or benevolent purposes.
(3) and (4) Repealed.
(5) The attorney general shall conduct enforcement actions authorized by Senate Bill 25-020, if any, within existing appropriations.
(6) Services, support, and infrastructure procured by the department of law to secure outside counsel or to support civil or criminal proceedings, civil or criminal enforcement, or other legal or litigation-related services, support, and infrastructure are not subject to section 24-30-202 (2) or articles 101 to 112 of this title 24.
(7) In any action brought by the attorney general in the attorney general's official capacity, or on the relation of the state of Colorado or the people of the state of Colorado, to enforce the law as authorized by statute or common law, the attorney general shall not be deemed to pursue an action on behalf of any other state officer or any state agency, department, office, board, commission, or enterprise and shall not be deemed in possession, custody, or control of any record that is made, kept, or maintained by any other state officer or any state agency, department, office, board, commission, or enterprise for the purpose of any discovery request directed at the attorney general in the attorney general's official capacity, or on the relation of the state of Colorado or the people of the state of Colorado, as a party to such action.
Source: L. 41: § 79, § 49. CSA: C. 3, § 49. CRS 53: § 3-9-1. C.R.S. 1963: § 3-9-1. L. 64: p. 119, § 15. L. 65: p. 144, § 1. L. 75: (1)(a) amended, p. 215, § 45, effective July 16. L. 77: (1)(e) added, p. 1183, § 1, effective May 26; (1)(a) and (1)(b) amended, p. 263, § 2, effective June 2. L. 79: (4) amended, p. 968, § 3, effective June 15. L. 81: (5) added, p. 1166, § 1, effective May 26; (1)(f) added, p. 671, § 3, effective July 1; (2) repealed, p. 339, § 2, effective July 1. L. 83: (1)(c) amended, p. 835, § 43, effective July 1. L. 94: (6) added, p. 565, § 11, effective April 6. L. 2004: (4.5) added, p. 620, § 2, effective July 1. L. 2006: (1)(f) amended, p. 762, § 22, effective July 1. L. 2014: (4.7) added, (HB 14-1380), ch. 376, p. 1794, § 4, effective July 1. L. 2016: (1)(a), (1)(b), (1)(c), (1)(d), (3), and (4) amended, (HB 16-1094), ch. 94, p. 263, § 1, effective August 10. L. 2019: (1)(f) amended, (HB 19-1172), ch. 136, p. 1688, § 127, effective October 1. L. 2020: (3) and (4) added, (SB 20-217), ch. 110, p. 457, § 9, effective June 19; entire section R&RE, (SB 20-063), ch. 12, p. 49, § 2, effective September 14. L. 2021: (1)(n) amended, (1)(p) and (1)(q) added, and (3) and (4) repealed, (HB 21-1250), ch. 458, p. 3065, § 10, effective July 6. L. 2022: (1)(i) amended, (SB 22-161), ch. 370, p. 2637, § 13, effective August 10; (1)(i) amended, (SB 22-228), ch. 407, p. 2883, § 2, effective August 10; (1)(i) amended, (HB 22-1082), ch. 166, p. 1026, § 2, effective August 10; (1)(p) and (1)(q) amended and (1)(r) added, (SB 22-157), ch. 154, p. 982, § 2, effective August 10; (1)(p) and (1)(q) amended and (1)(t) added, (SB 22-179), ch. 485, p. 3521, § 1, effective August 10; (1)(p) and (1)(q) amended and (1)(s) added, (HB 22-1119), ch. 394, p. 2778, § 1, effective August 10; (1)(i) amended, (HB 22-1287), ch. 255, p. 1855, § 1, effective October 1. L. 2023: (1)(i)(XVI) and (1)(i)(XVII) amended and (1)(i)(VXIII) added, (SB 23-188), ch. 68, p. 250, § 21, effective April 14; (1)(s) and (1)(t) amended and (1)(u) added, (HB 23-1257), ch. 376, p. 2257, § 4, effective June 5; (1)(i)(I) amended, (HB 23-1192), ch. 427, p. 2518, § 4, effective June 7; (1)(e) amended, (HB 23-1250), ch. 432, p. 2537, § 1, effective August 7; (1)(i)(XVII) amended, (HB 23-1099), ch. 151, p. 642, § 5, effective August 7. L. 2024: (1)(i)(XVII) and (1)(i)(XVIII) amended and (1)(i)(XX) added, (SB 24-094), ch. 158, p. 729, § 12, effective May 3; (1)(t) and (1)(u) amended and (1)(v) added, (HB 24-1118), ch. 73, p. 241, § 1, effective April 17; (1)(t) and (1)(u) amended and (1)(w) added, (HB 24-1054), ch. 328, p. 2218, § 5, effective June 3; (1)(i)(XVII) and (1)(i)(XVIII) amended and (1)(i)(XXII) added, (HB 24-1294), ch. 399, p. 2750, § 19, effective June 30; (1)(i)(XVII) and (1)(i)(XVIII) amended and (1)(i)(XIX) added, (HB 24-1081), ch. 72, p. 240, § 3, effective July 1; (1)(i)(XVII) and (1)(i)(XVIII) amended and (1)(i)(XXI) added, (HB 24-1175), ch. 286, p. 1918, § 2, effective August 7; (1)(i)(XVII) and (1)(i)(XVIII) amended and (1)(i)(XXIII) added, (HB 24-1342), ch. 477, p. 3344, § 3, effective January 1, 2025. L. 2025: (1)(i)(XXII) amended and (1)(i)(XXIV), (1)(i)(XXV), and (1)(i)(XXVI) added, (SB 25-129), ch. 96, p. 439, § 6, effective April 24; (1)(i)(XXII) and (1)(i)(XXIII) amended and (1)(i)(XXVII) added, (SB 25-001), ch. 178, p. 759, § 12, effective August 6; (1)(i)(XXII) amended and (1)(i)(XXVIII), (1)(i)(XXIX), (1)(i)(XXX), and (5) added, (SB 25-020), ch. 264, p. 1354, § 2, effective August 6; (1)(i)(XXII) and (1)(i)(XXIII) amended and (1)(i)(XXXI) added, (HB 25-1329), ch. 407, p. 2321, § 3, effective August 6; (1)(i)(XXV) repealed, (SB 25-300), ch. 428, p. 2449, § 30, effective August 6. L. 2026: (1)(v) and (1)(w) amended and (1)(y) added, (HB 26-1143), ch. 351, p. 2126, § 3, effective June 3; (1)(i)(XXX) and (1)(i)(XXXI) amended and (1)(i)(XXXII) added, (HB 26-1276), ch. 371, p. 2246, § 4, effective June 4; (1)(v) and (1)(w) amended and (1)(x) added, (HB 26-1312), ch. 367, p. 2229, § 1, effective August 12; (1)(v) amended and (1)(z), (1)(aa), and (6) added, (HB 26-1426), ch. 334, p. 2024, § 95, effective August 12; (6) added, (SB 26-137), ch. 132, p. 587, § 2, effective August 12.
Editor's note: (1) Amendments to this section by SB 20-063 and SB 20-217 were harmonized.
(2) Amendments to subsection (1)(i) by SB 22-161, SB 22-228, HB 22-1082, and HB 22-1287 were harmonized.
(3) Amendments to subsections (1)(p) and (1)(q) by SB 22-157, SB 22-179, and HB 22-1119 were harmonized.
(4) Amendments to subsection (1)(i)(XVII) by HB 23-1099 and SB 23-188 were harmonized.
(5) Subsections (1)(i)(XVII) and (1)(i)(XVIII) were amended in HB 24-1342, effective January 1, 2025. However, those amendments were superseded by the amendments to subsections (1)(i)(XVII) and (1)(i)(XVIII) in SB 24-094, effective May 3, 2024, HB 24-1294, effective June 30, 2024, HB 24-1081, effective July 1, 2024, and HB 24-1175, effective August 7, 2024.
(6) Section 4 of chapter 351 (HB 26-1143), Session Laws of Colorado 2026, provides that the act changing this section applies to contracts entered into and background checks requested on or after June 3, 2026.
(7) Subsection (7) was numbered as subsection (6) in SB 26-137 but was renumbered on revision for ease of location.
Cross references: (1) For legal services provided by the office of the attorney general to the board of assessment appeals, see § 39-2-127 (3); for the salary of the attorney general, see § 24-9-101; for discretionary funds of the attorney general, see § 24-9-105; for the election of the attorney general, see § 3 of art. IV, Colo. Const., and § 1-4-204.
(2) For the legislative declaration in SB 20-217, see section 1 of chapter 110, Session Laws of Colorado 2020. For the legislative declaration in HB 22-1082, see section 1 of chapter 166, Session Laws of Colorado 2022. For the legislative declaration in SB 23-188, see section 1 of chapter 68, Session Laws of Colorado 2023. For the legislative declaration in HB 24-1081, see section 1 of chapter 72, Session Laws of Colorado 2024. For the legislative declaration in HB 26-1143, see section 1 of chapter 351, Session Laws of Colorado 2026.
ANNOTATION
Law reviews. For article, "Administrative Law", see 59 Den. L.J. 173 (1982). For article, "New Law Gives Local Governments Rights to Purchase Multifamily Rental Properties", see 54 Colo. Law. 44 (Sept.-Oct. 2025).
Annotator's note. The following annotations include cases decided under this section as it existed prior to its 2020 repeal and reenactment.
Executive order that directs the attorney general to prosecute certain cases remains in effect until modified, rescinded, or superseded. Because an executive order is the mandate of the office of the governor, not the individual holding the title of governor when it issues, it remains in effect until modified, rescinded, or superseded and does not expire when the issuing governor leaves office. Neither this section nor any other legal authority requires an executive order to include a temporal or spatial framework or to expire after the lapse of some undefined period deemed sufficient by a court. People v. Salgado, 2019 COA 5, 444 P.3d 829.
Attorney general only has powers granted by the general assembly and common law unless the general assembly repeals a common law power. People ex rel. Tooley v. District Court, 190 Colo. 486, 549 P.2d 774 (1976); People ex rel. Salazar v. Davidson, 79 P.3d 1221 (2003).
Although the constitution recognizes the attorney general as being part of the executive branch of government, § 1 of art. IV, Colo. Const., the attorney general does not have powers beyond those granted by the general assembly. People ex rel. Tooley v. District Court, 190 Colo. 486, 549 P.2d 774 (1976).
No authority to prosecute criminal actions absent governor's command. In the absence of a command from the governor, the attorney general is not authorized to prosecute criminal actions. People ex rel. Tooley v. District Court, 190 Colo. 486, 549 P.2d 774 (1976).
However, this section does not limit the power of the attorney general to petition for the impanelment of a state grand jury. People v. Valdez, 928 P.2d 1387 (Colo. App. 1996).
Powers of attorney general are not enlarged by grand jury act. The statutory powers granted to the attorney general under this section are not enlarged by the statewide grand jury act, § 13-73-101 et seq. People ex rel. Tooley v. District Court, 190 Colo. 486, 549 P.2d 774 (1976).
Therefore, attorney general cannot prosecute all grand jury indictments. Neither by express provision nor by implication did the general assembly grant the attorney general the right to prosecute all indictments returned by a state grand jury. People ex rel. Tooley v. District Court, 190 Colo. 486, 549 P.2d 774 (1976).
Attorney general prosecuting case is exercising district attorney's powers. When the governor requires the attorney general to prosecute a criminal case in which the state is a party, he becomes to all intents and purposes the district attorney, and may in his own name and official capacity exercise all the powers of that officer. People v. Gibson, 53 Colo. 231, 125 P. 531 (1912); People ex rel. Witcher v. District Court, 190 Colo. 483, 549 P.2d 778 (1976).
This section and § 20-1-102 are not inconsistent. This section, permitting the governor to appoint the attorney general to prosecute cases in which the state is a party or is interested, and § 20-1-102, directing the district attorney to appear on behalf of the state or counties of his district where the state or the people thereof or any county may be a party, are not inconsistent. The specific duty imposed upon the district attorney in no way limits or excludes the general authority of the attorney general upon the same subject. People ex rel. Witcher v. District Court, 190 Colo. 483, 549 P.2d 778 (1976); People v. Vickers, 199 Colo. 305, 608 P.2d 808 (1980).
For history of statutes providing for prosecutions, see People v. Gibson, 53 Colo. 231, 125 P. 531 (1912).
Attorney general is authorized to sue to enjoin restraint of trade. The attorney general has jurisdiction, when ordered by the governor, to institute a suit on behalf of the people to enjoin a combination in restraint of trade. Denver Jobbers' Ass'n v. People ex rel. Dickson, 21 Colo. App. 326, 122 P. 404 (1912).
He is also statutory legal advisor of the legislative and executive departments. In re Interrogatories of House, 62 Colo. 188, 162 P. 1144 (1916) (decided under former law).
Including university board of regents. The attorney general is the legal adviser of the board of regents of the university, and it is his duty to institute, prosecute, and defend all suits in its behalf. People ex rel. Jerome v. Regents of State Univ., 24 Colo. 175, 49 P. 286 (1897).
But he is not "ex officio" counsel for state treasurer and state officers; however, when requested to do so, it is his duty to appear for such officers in actions brought against them in their official capacity. Nance v. People ex rel. Sheedy, 25 Colo. 252, 54 P. 631 (1898).
Executive order authorizing representation of state department required. In a proceeding in the county court by the department of public welfare (now department of social services) against the estate of a pensioner, the attorney general is required to obtain an executive order from the governor authorizing and directing him to represent the department; if he fails to do so, the agency is without representation in the trial court, and is without representation to sue out a writ of error in the supreme court. Dunbar v. County Court, 131 Colo. 483, 283 P.2d 182 (1955) (decided under former law).
The duty of the attorney general to represent the state in civil actions extends only to situations in which the attorney general's participation is required by the governor. Bd. of Soc. Serv. v. Dept. of Soc. Serv., 902 P.2d 407 (Colo. App. 1994).
Employees of county department of social services are not entitled to representation by the attorney general because such employees are not in the state personnel system. Gilman v. State, 932 P.2d 832 (Colo. App. 1996), rev'd on other grounds, 949 P.2d 565 (Colo. 1997).
Executive order as command. An executive order may constitute the requisite express command from the governor to authorize the attorney general to bring an action on the state's behalf. State of Colo. v. ASAR Co., Inc., 616 F. Supp. 822 (D. Colo. 1985).
State did not waive sovereign immunity where record does not reveal and county does not assert that there has been a determination by the governor that there has been a failure or refusal to provide legal services. Bd. of Soc. Serv. v. Dept. of Soc. Serv., 902 P.2d 407 (Colo. App. 1994).
Presumption that attorney general is authorized to appear. Where the attorney general appears for the state treasurer in an action brought against him, he is presumed to have been authorized to do so. Nance v. People ex rel. Sheedy, 25 Colo. 252, 54 P. 631 (1898).
Attorney general's permissive intervention under C.R.C.P. 24(b)(2) held improper. Gillies v. Schmidt, 38 Colo. App. 233, 556 P.2d 82 (1976); People ex rel. Brown v. District Court, 196 Colo. 359, 585 P.2d 593 (1978).
The attorney general has avoided violating due process and avoided the appearance of impropriety by establishing an internal system that allows the office to act as both an advocate and an advisor to the decision-making body in the same administrative case. People ex rel. Woodard v. Brown, 770 P.2d 1373 (Colo. App. 1989).
Executive order is not a legislative act violating separation of powers. Because an executive order that requires the office of the attorney general to investigate and prosecute Medicaid fraud and patient abuse cases does not create any new offenses or establish penalties for any act, but instead merely instructs an executive branch agency to prosecute certain offenses already established by the general assembly, it is not a legislative act. People v. Salgado, 2019 COA 5, 444 P.3d 829.
24-31-102. Offices, boards, and divisions.
(1) The department of law, the chief executive officer of which is the attorney general, includes the following:
(a) The office of the attorney general;
(b) The office of the solicitor general;
(c) The division of consumer protection;
(d) The division of criminal justice;
(e) The division of civil protections and rights;
(f) The administrator of the uniform consumer credit code, created in section 5-6-103;
(g) The medicaid fraud control unit, created in section 24-31-802;
(h) The peace officers standards and training board, created in section 24-31-302;
(i) The financial empowerment office, created in part 11 of this article 31;
(j) The fair housing unit;
(k) The worker and employee protection unit, created in part 13 of this article 31; and
(l) Notwithstanding section 24-1-107, any other division, office, or unit established by the attorney general or by law.
(2) The division of criminal justice, established under this section, or any attorney in the department authorized by the attorney general, shall prosecute all criminal cases for the attorney general and shall perform other functions as may be required by the attorney general. The attorney general shall appoint a deputy attorney general as chief of the division, who must be a licensed attorney with a minimum of two years of criminal experience as a trial or appellate prosecutor.
Source: L. 41: p. 79, § 49. CSA: C. 3, § 49. CRS 53: § 3-9-2. C.R.S. 1963: § 3-9-2. L. 67: p. 433, § 15. L. 68: pp. 126, 143, §§ 132, 181. L. 73: pp. 174, 1476, §§ 1, 38. L. 84: (1)(c) added, p. 1047, § 3, effective July 1. L. 92: IP(1) amended and (1)(d) added, p. 1091, § 2, effective March 6. L. 93: (1)(c) repealed, p. 975, § 3, effective July 1. L. 94: IP(1) and (1)(d) amended, p. 1725, § 2, effective May 31. L. 2020: Entire section amended, (SB 20-063), ch. 12, p. 50, § 3, effective September 14. L. 2021: (1)(g) and (1)(h) amended and (1)(i) added, (SB 21-148), ch. 315, p. 1949, § 2, effective July 1. L. 2022: (1)(h) amended, (1)(i) repealed, and (1)(j) and (1)(k) added, (SB 22-161), ch. 370, p. 2638, § 14, effective August 10; (1)(h) and (1)(i) amended and (1)(k) added, (HB 22-1082), ch. 166, p. 1026, § 3, effective August 10. L. 2023: (1) amended, (SB 23-247), ch. 359, p. 2145, § 1, effective August 7.
Editor's note: Amendments to subsection (1)(i) by SB 22-161 and HB 22-1082 were harmonized.
Cross references: For the legislative declaration in HB 22-1082, see section 1 of chapter 166, Session Laws of Colorado 2022.
24-31-103. Chief deputy attorney general - powers.
The attorney general shall appoint a chief deputy attorney general, who has the authority to act for the attorney general in all matters except in respect to such duties as devolve upon the attorney general by virtue of the state constitution.
Source: L. 05: p. 156, § 1. R.S. 08: § 2563. C.L. § 7918. CSA: C. 66, § 56. CRS 53: § 3-9-3. C.R.S. 1963: § 3-9-3. L. 2020: Entire section amended, (SB 20-063), ch. 12, p. 51, § 4, effective September 14.
ANNOTATION
No authority of attorney general or designee to confer full grand jury subpoena power on police officers. Authority to appoint deputies pursuant to this section combined with the responsibility to present evidence to statewide grand jury pursuant to § 13-73-106 does not give the attorney general or his designee authority to confer full grand jury subpoena power on police officers by naming them as strike force investigators. People v. Corr, 682 P.2d 20 (Colo. 1984).
24-31-103.5. Solicitor general - creation - powers.
(1) The attorney general shall appoint a solicitor general, who has the authority to represent the state in matters before the courts under the attorney general's supervision. The solicitor general must be an attorney-at-law in good standing, and must have been an active and licensed attorney in Colorado for at least five years preceding his or her appointment by the attorney general.
(2) The solicitor general, with the consent of the attorney general, may appoint assistant solicitors general as deemed necessary by the solicitor general.
Source: L. 2020: Entire section added, (SB 20-063), ch. 12, p. 51, § 5, effective September 14.
24-31-104. Appointment of subordinate officers and employees. (Repealed)
Source: L. 41: p. 81, § 50. CSA: C. 3, § 50. CRS 53: § 3-9-4. C.R.S. 1963: § 3-9-4. L. 2020: Entire section repealed, (SB 20-063), ch. 12, p. 57, § 14, effective September 14.
24-31-104.5. Funding for insurance fraud investigations and prosecutions - creation of fund.
(1) (a) For the purpose of providing adequate funds to the Colorado department of law for the investigation and prosecution of allegations of insurance fraud, in addition to any other fee collected pursuant to section 10-3-207 (1), C.R.S., each entity regulated by the division of insurance shall pay to the division a nonrefundable annual fee. Based upon the appropriations made to the department of law from the insurance fraud cash fund and the recommendation of the attorney general, the commissioner of insurance shall set the fee so that the revenue generated from the fee approximates the direct and indirect costs of the investigation and prosecution of allegations of insurance fraud. The fee shall not exceed three thousand dollars and is payable on or before March 1 of each year.
(b) The commissioner of insurance shall establish a tiered fee schedule that sets the annual fee required by paragraph (a) of this subsection (1) based upon the prior year's direct written premiums, gross contract funds, or charges received in Colorado by each regulated entity. The regulated entities with direct written premiums, gross contract funds, or charges received in Colorado in excess of one million dollars shall pay one fee, and the regulated entities with one million dollars or less shall pay a lesser fee.
(2) The division of insurance shall transmit fees collected pursuant to subsection (1) of this section to the state treasurer for deposit in the insurance fraud cash fund, which fund is hereby created in the state treasury. The fund consists of fees collected pursuant to this section and any other moneys deposited into the fund. Interest derived from the deposit and investment of moneys in the fund shall be credited to the fund. The moneys in the fund are subject to annual appropriation by the general assembly to the department of law for use in investigating and prosecuting allegations of insurance fraud. Any unexpended and unencumbered moneys remaining in the fund at the end of any fiscal year remain in the fund and do not revert to the general fund.
(3) Repealed.
Source: L. 2012: Entire section added, (SB 12-110), ch. 158, p. 559, § 1, effective July 1. L. 2017: (3) amended, (SB 17-233), ch. 175, p. 637, § 2, effective August 9. L. 2024: (3) repealed, (SB 24-135), ch. 34, p. 111, § 15, effective March 22.
Editor's note: This section is similar to former § 10-3-207.5 as it existed prior to 2012.
24-31-105. Criminal enforcement section. (Repealed)
Source: L. 83: Entire section added, p. 903, § 2, effective July 1. L. 96: Entire section amended, p. 737, § 9, effective July 1. L. 2020: Entire section repealed, (SB 20-063), ch. 12, p. 57, § 14, effective September 14.
24-31-106. Rights of crime victims - victims' services coordinator.
(1) To ensure that the constitutional and statutory rights of victims are preserved in criminal cases being prosecuted or defended by the department, the attorney general may appoint, in accordance with section 13 of article XII of the state constitution, a victims' services coordinator.
(2) The victims' services coordinator shall perform such services as designated by the attorney general to ensure that victims of crime are afforded the rights described in section 24-4.1-302.5 with regard to criminal cases being prosecuted or defended by the department.
(3) The attorney general may further direct the victims' services coordinator to provide appropriate services to the victims of crime, as defined by section 18-1-104 (1), whose cases are being handled on appeal by the department.
(4) The position of victims' services coordinator is subject to the state personnel system and shall be properly classified under the state personnel director's classification system.
Source: L. 95: Entire section added, p. 529, § 1, effective May 16. L. 2020: Entire section amended, (SB 20-063), ch. 12, p. 52, § 6, effective September 14.
24-31-107. Applications for licenses - authority to suspend licenses - rules.
(1) Every application by an individual for a license issued by the department of law or any authorized agent of such department shall require the applicant's name, address, and social security number.
(2) The department of law or any authorized agent of the department shall deny, suspend, or revoke any license pursuant to the provisions of section 26-13-126, C.R.S., and any rules promulgated in furtherance thereof, if the department or agent thereof receives a notice to deny, suspend, or revoke from the state child support enforcement agency because the licensee or applicant is out of compliance with a court or administrative order for current child support, child support debt, retroactive child support, child support arrearages, or child support when combined with maintenance or because the licensee or applicant has failed to comply with a properly issued subpoena or warrant relating to a paternity or child support proceeding. Any such denial, suspension, or revocation shall be in accordance with the procedures specified by rule of the department of law, rules promulgated by the state board of human services, and any memorandum of understanding entered into between the department of law or an authorized agent thereof and the state child support enforcement agency for the implementation of this section and section 26-13-126, C.R.S.
(3) (a) The department of law shall enter into a memorandum of understanding with the state child support enforcement agency, which memorandum shall identify the relative responsibilities of the department of law and the state child support enforcement agency in the department of human services with respect to the implementation of this section and section 26-13-126, C.R.S.
(b) The appropriate rule-making body of the department of law is authorized to promulgate rules to implement the provisions of this section.
(4) For purposes of this section, "license" means any recognition, authority, or permission that the department of law or any authorized agent of such department is authorized by law to issue for an individual to practice a profession or occupation or for an individual to participate in any recreational activity. "License" may include, but is not necessarily limited to, any license, certificate, certification, letter of authorization, or registration issued for an individual to practice a profession or occupation or for an individual to participate in any recreational activity.
Source: L. 97: Entire section added, p. 1279, § 21, effective July 1.
Editor's note: Section 51(2) of chapter 236, Session Laws of Colorado 1997, provides that the act enacting this section applies to all orders whether entered on, before, or after July 1, 1997.
24-31-108. Receipt of money - subject to appropriation - exception for custodial money - legal services cash fund - creation - definition.
(1) Any money received by the attorney general belonging to the state or received by the attorney general in his or her official capacity must be paid as soon as practicable to the department of the treasury and, generally, the attorney general has such legal duties in regard to the activities of the state and its various departments, boards, commissions, bureaus, and agencies as are imposed by law.
(2) (a) Except as otherwise provided in this section, any money received by the attorney general and paid to the department of the treasury pursuant to subsection (1) of this section is subject to annual appropriation by the general assembly.
(b) The department may solicit, accept, and expend gifts, grants, and donations from public and private sources for the purpose of this article 31; except that the department may not accept a gift, grant, or donation that is subject to conditions inconsistent with this article 31 or any other law of the state. The department shall transmit all money it collects pursuant to this subsection (2)(b) to the state treasurer to be credited to the particular fund the department deems most appropriate. Gifts, grants, or donations that are credited to a fund under this subsection (2)(b) and that qualify as state money are continuously appropriated to the department for the purposes of this article 31.
(3) Any money received by the attorney general as an award of attorney fees or costs that is not custodial money must be placed in a separate attorney fees and costs account and is subject to annual appropriation by the general assembly for legal services provided by the department.
(4) There is hereby created in the state treasury the legal services cash fund, also referred to in this subsection (4) as the "fund". The department shall transmit all money received from state agencies as payment for legal services to the state treasurer, who shall credit the same to the fund. The money in the fund and all interest earned on such money is subject to annual appropriation by the general assembly to the department for the direct and indirect costs associated with providing legal services to state governmental entities and for any of the department's litigation expenses. Any unexpended money in the fund at the end of the fiscal year remains in the fund and shall not be credited or transferred to any other fund.
(4.5) Repealed.
(5) If all or a portion of any money received by the attorney general and paid to the department of the treasury pursuant to subsection (2) of this section is custodial money, the attorney general shall direct the state treasurer in writing to place such custodial money in a separate account. Any custodial money placed in a separate account pursuant to this subsection (5) is not subject to annual appropriation by the general assembly. A copy of the written direction to the state treasurer must be delivered to the joint budget committee. Such written direction must set forth the basis for the attorney general's determination that the money is custodial money and must specify the manner in which the money will be expended. Such written direction must be given to the state treasurer within thirty days after the date the money is paid to the department of the treasury. Any custodial money placed in a separate account pursuant to this subsection (5) must be expended only for the purposes for which the money has been provided. The department shall provide with its annual budget request an accounting of how custodial money has been or will be expended. For informational purposes, the expenditure of such money may be indicated in the annual general appropriation act.
(6) (a) As used in this section, unless the context otherwise requires, "custodial money" means money received by the attorney general:
(I) That originated from a source other than the state of Colorado;
(II) That is awarded or otherwise provided to the state for a particular purpose;
(III) For which the state is acting as a custodian or trustee to carry out the particular purpose for which the money has been provided.
(b) Notwithstanding subsection (6)(a) of this section, "custodial money" does not include the following:
(I) Money in the tobacco litigation settlement cash fund created in section 24-22-115; or
(II) Tobacco litigation settlement money subject to appropriation or expenditure pursuant to section 24-22-115.6.
Source: L. 2000: Entire section added, p. 257, § 1, effective March 31. L. 2012: (1) amended and (2.5) added, (HB 12-1248), ch. 37, p. 133, § 1, effective July 1. L. 2014: (1)(b) amended, (SB 14-107), ch. 49, p. 228, § 1, effective August 6. L. 2016: IP(4)(b) and (4)(b)(I) amended and (4)(b)(II) repealed, (HB 16-1408), ch. 153, p. 464, § 8, effective July 1. L. 2020: Entire section amended, (SB 20-063), ch. 12, p. 52, § 7, effective September 14. L. 2024: (4.5) added, (HB 24-1425), ch. 139, p. 514, § 1, effective April 29.
Editor's note: Subsection (4.5)(b) provided for the repeal of subsection (4.5), effective July 1, 2025. (See L. 2024, p. 514.)
24-31-108.5. Use of funds for unanticipated legal needs.
The department may use money appropriated to the department for litigation management to address unanticipated state legal needs that arise during the state fiscal year for which the money is appropriated; except that the department shall not use the money reallocated in accordance with this section for any type of salary increase, promotion, reclassification, or bonus related to any present or future department employee, or to offset present or future personal services deficits in any division in the department.
Source: L. 2023: Entire section added, (SB 23-235), ch. 97, p. 364, § 1, effective April 20.
24-31-109. Attorney general to provide identification cards to retired peace officers upon request - definitions. (Repealed)
Source: L. 2013: Entire section added, (HB 13-1118), ch. 81, p. 257, § 2 effective August 7. L. 2020: Entire section repealed, (SB 20-063), ch. 12, p. 57, § 14, effective September 14.
Cross references: For current provisions relating to the attorney general providing identification cards to retired peace officers, see § 24-31-316.
24-31-110. Department of law - investigate prescription insulin drug pricing - report - repeal. (Repealed)
Source: L. 2019: Entire section added, (HB 19-1216), ch. 248, p. 2419, § 3, effective August 2.
Editor's note: Subsection (5) provided for the repeal of this section, effective December 1, 2020. (See L. 2019, p. 2419.)
Cross references: For the legislative declaration in HB 19-1216, see section 1 of chapter 248, Session Laws of Colorado 2019.
24-31-111. Legal services to state agencies - definitions.
(1) The attorney general shall provide legal services for each state agency as provided in section 24-31-101. The attorney general shall assign one or more deputy attorneys general or assistant attorneys general to perform legal services for each state agency requiring such services.
(2) No state agency shall appoint, solicit, or employ any person to perform legal services except in accordance with this part 1.
(3) Legal services provided to state agencies are subject to supervision of the attorney general and must be rendered in accordance with the legal policies of the state as determined by the attorney general.
(4) No assistant solicitor general, deputy attorney general, or assistant attorney general may appear in any court of this state or of the United States on behalf of a state agency unless specifically authorized to so appear by the attorney general.
(5) Whenever the attorney general is unable, has failed, or refuses to provide legal services to a state agency, as determined by the governor if the agency is in the executive branch, or by the chief justice if the agency is in the judicial branch, or by the state auditor if the agency is the office of the state auditor, the agency may employ counsel of its choosing to provide such legal services. Any expense incurred due to the employment of counsel pursuant to this subsection (5) is a lawful charge against appropriations for this purpose made by the general assembly to the department of law.
(6) As used in this section:
(a) "Legal services" means providing legal counsel by an attorney-at-law for a state agency, including representation in court, providing legal advice, and issuance of formal and informal legal opinions.
(b) "State agency" means any department, division, section, unit, office, officer, commission, board, institution, institution of higher education, or other agency of the executive department and judicial department of state government. "State agency" does not mean the legislative department except for the state auditor in accordance with section 2-3-104.5.
Source: L. 2020: Entire section added, (SB 20-063), ch. 12, p. 54, § 8, effective September 14.
24-31-112. No limitations on common law authority.
Nothing in Senate Bill 20-063, enacted in 2020, is to be construed as affecting, limiting, or supplanting the common law authority of the attorney general or the department of law.
Source: L. 2020: Entire section added, (SB 20-063), ch. 12, p. 55, § 9, effective September 14.
24-31-113. Public integrity - patterns and practices.
(1) It is unlawful for a governmental authority, an agent of a governmental authority, or a person acting on behalf of a governmental authority to engage in a pattern or practice of conduct by peace officers or by officials or employees of a governmental agency that deprives persons of rights, privileges, or immunities secured or protected by the constitution or laws of the United States or the state of Colorado.
(2) Whenever the attorney general has reasonable cause to believe that a violation of this section has occurred, the attorney general, for or in the name of the state, may obtain in a civil action appropriate relief to eliminate the pattern or practice. Before filing suit, the attorney general shall notify the governmental authority or any agent thereof and provide the authority or agent with the factual basis that supports the attorney general's reasonable cause to believe a violation occurred. Upon receipt of the factual basis, the governmental authority, or any agent thereof, has sixty days to change or eliminate the identified pattern or practice. If the identified pattern or practice is not changed and permanently eliminated after sixty days, the attorney general may file a civil action. The attorney general may issue subpoenas for any purpose in conducting an investigation under this section.
(3) If a governmental authority, an agent thereof, or a person acting on behalf of a governmental authority fails to obey a subpoena issued pursuant to this section, the attorney general may apply to the appropriate district court for an appropriate order to effect the purposes of this section. The application must state that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the order is necessary to investigate a deprivation of an individual's rights, privileges, or immunities secured or protected by the United States constitution, the state constitution, or the laws of the United States or the state of Colorado. If the court is satisfied that reasonable grounds exist, the court in its order may:
(a) Require the attendance of the person, the production of documents by the person, or both; and
(b) Grant such other relief as may be necessary to obtain the person's compliance.
Source: L. 2020: Entire section added, (SB 20-217), ch. 110, p. 458, § 13, effective June 19. L. 2021: Entire section amended, (HB 21-1250), ch. 458, p. 3065, § 12, effective July 6. L. 2026: Entire section amended, (HB 26-1426), ch. 334, p. 2025, § 96, effective August 12.
Cross references: For the legislative declaration in SB 20-217, see section 1 of chapter 110, Session Laws of Colorado 2020.
ANNOTATION
Whether this section bars intervention is a question of law reviewed de novo. State ex rel. Weiser v. City of Aurora, 2023 COA 52, 535 P.3d 988.
Nothing in this section limits intervention to entities that could have been parties at the start of the legal action. State ex rel. Weiser v. City of Aurora, 2023 COA 52, 535 P.3d 988.
24-31-114. No-knock and forced entry study group - repeal. (Repealed)
Source: L. 2021: Entire section added, (HB 21-1250), ch. 458, p. 3070, § 21, effective July 6.
Editor's note: Subsection (6) provided for the repeal of this section, effective June 30, 2022. (See L. 2021, p. 3070.)
24-31-115. Housing unit - powers of attorney general or district attorney - subpoenas - document production - remedies - injunctive relief - penalties.
(1) When there is reason to believe that there is a potential violation of law that risks harm to a consumer, public health, or public safety, that is based on a substantiated complaint, the attorney general may investigate any person or organization subject to this article 31. A complaint is not necessary if the information is provided by an agency of the federal, state, or a local government that regulates or provides protections for consumers, tenants, and mobile home residents. The attorney general may direct or subpoena any person whose testimony may be required about potential violations of law and may direct or subpoena the person to produce records the attorney general considers relevant to the inquiry. Nothing in this section limits the scope of the attorney general's authority to review and investigate potential violations of law or harm discovered in the course of an investigation.
(2) Nothing in this section impacts or affects banking examinations and regulations promulgated by primary federal and state banking authorities, notwithstanding the authority that may be exercised by the attorney general under section 11-51-603.5.
(3) Venue for actions. Until the Colorado supreme court adopts a venue provision relating to this article 31, actions instituted pursuant to this article 31 may be brought in any county in which:
(a) An alleged violation occurred or in which any portion of a transaction involving an alleged violation occurred;
(b) The principal place of business of any defendant is located; or
(c) Any defendant resides.
(4) Powers.
(a) When the attorney general has reasonable cause to believe that any person, whether in this state or elsewhere, has engaged in or is engaging in a violation of any of the provisions listed in section 24-31-101, the attorney general may:
(I) Request the person to file a statement or a report in writing, under oath or otherwise, on forms prescribed by the attorney general, with respect to all facts and circumstances concerning the advertisement of property by the person and any other data and information the attorney general deems necessary;
(II) Examine under oath any person in connection with the sale or advertisement of any property;
(III) Examine any property or sample thereof, record, book, document, account, or paper the attorney general deems necessary; and
(IV) Make true copies, at the expense of the attorney general, of any record, book, document, account, or paper examined pursuant to subsection (4)(c) of this section, which copies may be offered into evidence in lieu of producing the originals in any actions brought by the attorney general.
(b) For purposes of this section, "reasonable cause" is based upon a complaint concerning a potential violation of the law when the attorney general believes the alleged violation may affect more than one person or be part of a series of related violations affecting multiple persons.
(c) Any request for personally identifiable information made pursuant to this subsection (4) is subject to the requirements of subsection (5) of this section.
(5) Subpoenas - production of documents.
(a) When the attorney general has reasonable cause to believe that a person, whether in this state or elsewhere, has engaged in or is engaging in a violation of any of the provisions listed in section 24-31-101, the attorney general, in addition to any other powers conferred upon the attorney general by this article 31, may issue subpoenas to require the attendance of witnesses or the production of documents, administer oaths, conduct hearings in aid of any investigation or inquiry, and prescribe such forms and promulgate such rules as may be necessary to administer the provisions of this article 31.
(b) Service of any notice or subpoena must be made in the manner prescribed by law or as provided in rule 4 of the Colorado rules of civil procedure.
(c) If the records of a person who has been issued a subpoena are located outside this state, the person shall either:
(I) Make them available to the attorney general at a convenient location within this state; or
(II) Pay the reasonable and necessary expenses for the attorney general or district attorney, or the attorney general's or district attorney's designee, to examine the records at the location at which the documents are maintained.
(d) The attorney general or district attorney may designate representatives, including comparable officials of the state in which the records are located, to inspect the records on behalf of the attorney general or district attorney.
(6) Inadmissible testimony.
(a) Any testimony obtained by the attorney general pursuant to compulsory process under this article 31 or any information derived directly or indirectly from such testimony shall not be admissible in evidence in any criminal prosecution against the person so compelled to testify. This subsection (6) shall not be construed to prevent any law enforcement officer from independently producing or obtaining the same or similar facts, information, or evidence for use in any criminal prosecution.
(b) Subject to subsection (8) of this section, the records of investigations or intelligence information of the attorney general obtained under this article 31 may constitute public records available for inspection by the public at the sole discretion of the attorney general. This subsection (6)(b) shall not be construed to prevent the attorney general from issuing public statements describing or warning of any course of conduct or any conspiracy that constitutes a violation of any of the provisions listed in section 24-31-101, whether on a local, statewide, regional, or nationwide basis.
(7) Remedies. If any person fails to cooperate with any investigation pursuant to this article 31 or fails to obey any subpoena pursuant to this article 31, the attorney general may apply to the applicable district court for an appropriate order to effect the purposes of this article. The application must state that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the order applied for is necessary to investigate a violation of this article 31. If the court is satisfied that reasonable grounds exist, the court in its order may:
(a) Grant injunctive relief restraining the advertisement of any property by such person;
(b) Require the attendance of or the production of documents by such person, or both; or
(c) Grant such other or further relief as may be necessary to obtain compliance by such person.
(8) Injunctive authority - assurances of discontinuance.
(a) Whenever the attorney general has cause to believe that a person has engaged in or is engaging in a violation of any of the provisions listed in section 24-31-101, the attorney general may apply for and obtain, in an action in the appropriate district court of this state, a temporary restraining order or injunction, or both, pursuant to the Colorado rules of civil procedure, prohibiting the person from continuing or engaging in such practices, or doing any act in furtherance of such practices. The court may make such orders or judgments as is necessary to:
(I) Prevent the use or employment by such person of any such practices;
(II) Completely compensate or restore the original position of any person injured by means of any such practice; or
(III) Prevent any unjust enrichment by any person through the use or employment of any practice that is in violation of any of the provisions listed in section 24-31-101.
(b) Where the attorney general has authority to institute a civil action or other proceeding pursuant to the provisions of this article, the attorney general may accept, in lieu thereof or as a part thereof, an assurance of discontinuance of any practice that constitutes a violation of any of the provisions that are listed in section 24-31-101. Any such assurance of discontinuance may include a stipulation for the voluntary payment by the alleged violator of the costs of investigation and the costs of any action or proceeding by the attorney general or a district attorney and any amount necessary to restore to any person any money or property that may have been acquired by the alleged violator by means of a violation of any of the provisions that are listed in section 24-31-101. Any such assurance or discontinuance accepted by the attorney general and any such stipulation filed with the court as a part of any such action or proceeding is a matter of public record unless the attorney general determines, in the attorney general's sole discretion, that the assurance of discontinuance and any stipulation are confidential to the parties to the action or proceeding and to the court and its employees. Upon the filing of a civil action by the attorney general alleging that a confidential assurance of discontinuance or stipulation accepted pursuant to this subsection (8)(b) has been violated, the assurance of discontinuance or stipulation is deemed a public record and open to inspection by any person. Proof by a preponderance of the evidence of a violation of any such assurance or stipulation constitutes prima facie evidence of a deceptive trade practice for the purposes of any civil action or proceeding brought thereafter by the attorney general, whether a new action or a subsequent motion or petition in any pending action or proceeding.
(9) Penalties. In order to enforce the provisions of this article 31, in addition to any penalties stated in this article 31, the attorney general may seek any of the penalties or other enforcement mechanisms specified in article 12 of title 38, including any penalties available to aggrieved tenants or other aggrieved persons under these provisions, along with costs to enforce these provisions.
(10) Limitations. All actions brought under this article 31 must be commenced within three years after the date on which a violation occurred or the date on which the last in a series of such acts or practices occurred or within three years after the consumer discovered or in the exercise of reasonable diligence should have discovered the violation. The period of limitation provided in this section may be extended for a period of one year if the attorney general proves that failure to timely commence the action was caused by the defendant engaging in conduct calculated to induce the attorney general to refrain from or postpone the commencement of the action.
Source: L. 2022: Entire section added, (HB 22-1082), ch. 166, p. 1027, § 4, effective August 10. L. 2025: IP(4)(a), (5)(a), (6)(b), IP(8)(a), (8)(a)(III), (8)(b), and (9) amended, (SB 25-020), ch. 264, p. 1355, § 3, effective August 6.
Cross references: For the legislative declaration in HB 22-1082, see section 1 of chapter 166, Session Laws of Colorado 2022.
24-31-116. Online fentanyl trafficking - study - report - appropriation - repeal. (Repealed)
Source: L. 2022: Entire section added, (HB 22-1326), ch. 225, p. 1661, § 39, effective July 1.
Editor's note: Subsection (7) provided for the repeal of this section, effective July 1, 2023. (See L. 2022, p. 1661.)
24-31-117. Hiring committee when attorney general to operate district attorney's office due to a vacancy.
If, during the course of performing the attorney general's duties pursuant to section 24-31-101 (1)(v), it is essential for the attorney general to hire personnel at the district attorney's office, the attorney general shall establish a hiring committee consisting of the attorney general, a representative from the Colorado district attorneys' council, and the highest ranking attorney or official at the district attorney's office to make recommendations regarding hiring decisions. The committee may recommend that the hiring of personnel by the attorney general is conditional upon the review and approval of the person appointed to fill the vacant district attorney position. The attorney general retains the ultimate authority regarding hiring decisions while acting pursuant to section 24-31-101 (1)(v) but must consider the recommendations of the committee in making hiring decisions.
Source: L. 2024: Entire section added, (HB 24-1118), ch. 73, p. 241, § 2, effective April 17.
24-31-118. Jail standard assessments - repeal.
(1) (a) The attorney general, in collaboration with the advisory committee, pursuant to section 30-10-530 (5)(d), may conduct assessments of each county jail and municipal jail to identify gaps and deficiencies based on the jail standards.
(b) Starting July 1, 2025, the governor or the oversight committee may make a written request to the attorney general to conduct a special assessment of a jail, and the attorney general may conduct the special assessment of the jail.
(c) An elected sheriff or a keeper of a municipal jail may request that the attorney general conduct a special assessment of a jail that the sheriff or keeper of the municipal jail oversees to determine whether the jail meets the jail standards. The attorney general may conduct the special assessment if the attorney general has sufficient appropriations to cover the costs. The attorney general may request an appropriation during the figure setting process to conduct special assessments.
(d) The attorney general may enter into a memorandum of understanding, collaborate, or enter into an agreement with a county sheriff or keeper of a municipal jail, except for a county sheriff or keeper of a municipal jail whose jail is being evaluated, or establish some other peer review group structure to assist in conducting the assessments and reports described in this subsection (1) and subsection (2) of this section.
(2) The attorney general's office shall create a report for each of the jails assessed by the attorney general's office and provide the report to the sheriff or keeper of a municipal jail whose jail was assessed; the oversight committee; the board of county commissioners in the county where the jail is located or, for a municipal jail, the governing body in the city where the jail is located; the county sheriffs of Colorado; and the governor. The report may include methodology, relevant data, recommendations, and technical assistance to meet the jail standards. A report produced pursuant to this section is not subject to the "Colorado Open Records Act", part 2 of article 72 of this title 24. The attorney general may release a report at the attorney general's discretion, and a county sheriff or keeper of the municipal jail may release a report relating to the county sheriff's or keeper of the municipal jail's jail after consent from the attorney general's office.
(3) Following a jail assessment or special assessment, the attorney general may provide technical assistance and recommendations to meet the jail standards and address any deficiencies.
(4) (a) The attorney general's office, during its "SMART Act" hearing, as required by section 2-7-203, shall include in its report the total number of complaints received through the complaint process as designated by the attorney general's office regarding jail standards violations and the number of complaints received per topic and provide a summary of the assessments and special assessments completed in the previous year.
(b) This subsection (4) is repealed, effective September 1, 2033.
(5) Sections 2-3-1901, 2-3-1901.5, 24-31-118, and 30-10-530 do not in any way limit or restrict the attorney general's authority to investigate patterns or practices pursuant to section 24-31-113, including but not limited to any noncompliance with jail standards that constitutes a pattern or practice of conduct that deprives persons of rights, privileges, or immunities secured or protected by the constitution or laws of the United States or the state of Colorado.
(6) As used in this section:
(a) "Advisory committee" means the jail standards advisory committee created pursuant to section 30-10-530.
(b) "Jail standards" means the jail standards adopted by the legislative oversight committee concerning Colorado jail standards pursuant to section 2-3-1901 (2) and any subsequent revisions to the standards.
(c) "Oversight committee" means the legislative oversight committee for Colorado jail standards created in section 2-3-1901.
Source: L. 2024: Entire section added, (HB 24-1054), ch. 328, p. 2218, § 6, effective June 3. L. 2026: (1)(a), (1)(c), (1)(d), and (2) amended, (HB 26-1039), ch. 75, p. 296, § 6, effective August 12.
24-31-119. Factually inaccurate data prevention campaign - repeal. (Repealed)
Source: L. 2024: Entire section added, (SB 24-084), ch. 412, p. 2841, § 1, effective June 5.
Editor's note: Subsection (2) provided for the repeal of this section, effective July 1, 2026. (See L. 2024, p. 2841.)
24-31-120. Policy regarding the protection of personal identifying information.
No later than September 1, 2026, the office of the attorney general shall develop and make available to the entities that are subject to article 74.1 of this title 24 a model policy that aligns with the requirements of article 74.1 of this title 24.
Source: L. 2026: Entire section added, (HB 26-1276), ch. 371, p. 2247, § 6, effective June 4.
PART 2
SOLICITOR GENERAL
24-31-201 to 24-31-206. (Repealed)
Source: L. 2020: Entire part repealed, (SB 20-063), ch. 12, p. 57, § 14, effective September 14.
Editor's note: This part 2 was numbered as article 9 of chapter 3, C.R.S. 1963. For amendments to this part 2 prior to its repeal in 2020, consult the 2019 Colorado Revised Statutes and the Colorado statutory research explanatory note beginning on page vii in the front of this volume.
PART 3
PEACE OFFICERS STANDARDS AND TRAINING
Cross references: For the legislative declaration contained in the 1992 act enacting this part 3, see section 12 of chapter 167, Session Laws of Colorado 1992.
24-31-301. Definitions.
As used in this part 3, unless the context otherwise requires:
(1) "Applicant" means any person seeking certification to serve as a peace officer or a reserve peace officer.
(1.5) "Basic training" means the basic law enforcement training received by a peace officer at any approved law enforcement training academy.
(2) "Certification" means the issuance to an applicant of a signed instrument evidencing that such applicant has met the requirements imposed by this part 3 and the P.O.S.T. board. Certification includes "basic certification" and "provisional certification" that shall be issued to peace officers, "reserve certification" that shall be issued to reserve peace officers, and such additional certifications as the board may approve for peace officers.
(3) (Deleted by amendment, L. 94, p. 1725, § 3, effective May 31, 1994.)
(3.5) Repealed.
(4) "Local government representative" means a member of a board of county commissioners, member of a city or town council or board of trustees, or mayor of a city or town or city and county.
(5) "Peace officer" means any person described in section 16-2.5-101, C.R.S., and who has not been convicted of a felony or convicted on or after July 1, 2001, of any misdemeanor as described in section 24-31-305 (1.5), or released or discharged from the armed forces of the United States under dishonorable conditions.
(5.3) "P.O.S.T. board" means the peace officers standards and training board created within the department of law in section 24-31-302.
(5.5) "Reserve peace officer" means any person described in section 16-2.5-110, C.R.S., and who has not been convicted of a felony or convicted on or after July 1, 2001, of any misdemeanor as described in section 24-31-305 (1.5), or released or discharged from the armed forces of the United States under dishonorable conditions.
(6) "Training academy" means any school approved by the P.O.S.T. board where peace officers and reserve peace officers receive instruction and training.
(7) "Training program" means a course of instruction approved by the P.O.S.T. board for peace officer or reserve peace officer certification and other peace officer training programs.
Source: L. 92: Entire part added, p. 1091, § 3, effective March 6. L. 94: Entire section amended, p. 1725, § 3, effective May 31. L. 96: (5) amended, pp. 1349, 1477, §§ 1, 42, effective June 1. L. 98: (2) and (5) amended, p. 749, § 1, effective May 22. L. 2003: (5) and (5.5) amended, p. 1619, § 29, effective August 6. L. 2005: (2), (5), (5.5), and (7) amended and (3.5) added, p. 112, § 1, effective August 8. L. 2012: (2) amended and (3.5) repealed, (HB 12-1163), ch. 50, p. 182, § 1, effective August 8. L. 2025: (5.3) added, (SB 25-275), ch. 377, p. 2060, § 139, effective August 6.
24-31-302. Creation of board - members.
(1) There is hereby created, within the department of law, the peace officers standards and training board.
(2) The P.O.S.T. board is a type 2 entity, as defined in section 24-1-105, and exercises its powers and performs its duties and functions under the department of law.
(3) (a) The P.O.S.T. board consists of twenty-eight members. The chair of the P.O.S.T. board is the attorney general or the attorney general's designee, and the board shall annually elect from its members a vice-chair. The chair and vice-chair may solicit additional expertise and participation from nonvoting persons as may further the duties of the P.O.S.T. board. The other members are:
(I) (Deleted by amendment, L. 2026.)
(II) The executive director of the department of public safety or the executive director's designee;
(III) The following members appointed by the governor for terms of three years:
(A) One local government representative;
(B) Five active chiefs of police from municipalities of this state or state institutions of higher education of which one must be from an urban municipality, one must be from a suburban municipality, one must be from a college or university police department, and one must be from a rural municipality, after the governor consults with a statewide organization representing chiefs of police;
(C) Five active sheriffs from counties of this state of which one must be from an urban county, one must be from a suburban county, and one must be from a rural county, after the governor consults with a statewide organization representing sheriffs;
(D) Six active peace officers with a rank of sergeant or below, after the governor consults with a statewide organization representing line-level peace officers;
(E) One representative of a statewide organization representing peace officers with a rank of sergeant or below;
(F) Two active P.O.S.T.-certified peace officers with a nonexecutive rank from state law enforcement agencies;
(G) Three non-law-enforcement members;
(H) One training academy director representing a community-college-operated peace officer training academy;
(I) One training academy director representing a law-enforcement-operated peace officer training academy; and
(J) One executive from an organization representing reserve peace officers.
(b) If any chief of police, sheriff, peace officer, non-law enforcement member, or local government representative vacates such office during the term for which the member was appointed to the P.O.S.T. board, a vacancy on the board exists. Any vacancy shall be filled by appointment by the governor for the unexpired term.
(c) In order to create a diversified board, the governor shall consider an applicant's age, gender, race, professional experience, and geographic location when making appointments to the board.
(d) In order to create diversified subject matter expertise committees, the chair of the P.O.S.T. board shall consider an applicant's age, gender, race, professional experience, and geographic location when making appointments to the committees.
(e) A person who has had their P.O.S.T. certification revoked shall not be appointed to serve on the P.O.S.T. board.
(4) The members of the P.O.S.T. board shall receive no compensation for their services but may be reimbursed for actual and necessary expenses incurred in the performance of their official duties.
Source: L. 92: Entire part added, p. 1093, § 3, effective March 6. L. 94: (1) and (3) amended and (4) added, p. 1727, § 4, effective May 31. L. 2003: (3) amended, p. 1715, § 1, effective May 14. L. 2008: (3) amended, p. 89, § 12, effective March 18. L. 2015: (3) amended, (HB 15-1287), ch. 213, p. 777, § 1, effective May 20. L. 2022: (3) amended, (SB 22-013), ch. 2, p. 47, § 59, effective February 25; (2) amended, (SB 22-162), ch. 469, p. 3353, § 9, effective August 10. L. 2025: (1) amended, (SB 25-275), ch. 377, p. 2060, § 140, effective August 6. L. 2026: (3)(a) amended and (3)(e) added, (HB 26-1312), ch. 367, p. 2230, § 2, effective August 12.
Cross references: For the short title (the "Debbie Haskins 'Administrative Organization Act of 1968' Modernization Act") in SB 22-162, see section 1 of chapter 469, Session Laws of Colorado 2022.
ANNOTATION
Denver deputy sheriffs are peace officers within definition of "peace officer, level I", in § 18-1-901. Fraternal Order, No. 27 v. Denver, 914 P.2d 483 (Colo. App. 1995).
For purposes of the reference to § 18-1-901(3)(l)(I) made in subsection (5) of this section, the certification requirement does not constitute a part of that definition. Fraternal Order, No. 27 v. Denver, 914 P.2d 483 (Colo. App. 1995).
Because the constitution grants Denver the power to control the qualifications, as well as the powers, duties, and terms or tenure, of its deputy sheriffs, it necessarily follows that the P.O.S.T. Act is in conflict with the constitution to the extent that it purports to require Denver deputy sheriffs to be certified by the P.O.S.T. board. Fraternal Order, No. 27 v. Denver, 914 P.2d 483 (Colo. App. 1995).
24-31-303. Duties - powers of the P.O.S.T. board - instructors - definition - repeal.
(1) The P.O.S.T. board has the following duties:
(a) To approve and to revoke the approval of training programs and training academies, and to establish reasonable standards pertaining to such approval and revocation;
(b) To conduct periodic evaluations of training programs and inspections of training academies;
(c) To establish procedures for determining whether or not an applicant has met the standards which have been set;
(d) To certify qualified applicants and withhold, suspend, or revoke certification;
(e) To certify inspectors of vehicle identification numbers, promulgate rules deemed necessary by the board for certification of inspectors of vehicle identification numbers, and approve related training courses;
(f) To require a background investigation of each applicant by means of fingerprint checks through the Colorado bureau of investigation and the federal bureau of investigation or such other means as the P.O.S.T. board deems necessary for such investigation;
(g) To promulgate rules and regulations deemed necessary by such board for the certification of applicants to serve as peace officers or reserve peace officers in the state pursuant to the provisions of article 4 of this title;
(h) To establish standards for training in bail recovery practices;
(i) To promulgate rules and regulations that establish the criteria that shall be applied in determining whether to recommend peace officer status for a group or specific position as provided in section 16-2.5-201 (4), C.R.S.;
(j) To establish standards for training of school resource officers, as described in section 24-31-312;
(k) To establish training standards to prepare law enforcement officers to recognize and address incidents of abuse and exploitation of at-risk elders, as described in sections 18-6.5-102 (1) and (10), C.R.S.;
(l) To promulgate rules deemed necessary by the board concerning annual in-service training requirements for certified peace officers, including but not limited to evaluation of the training program and processes to ensure substantial compliance by law enforcement agencies, departments, and individual peace officers;
(m) In addition to all other powers conferred and imposed upon the board in this article, the board has the power and duty to adopt and promulgate, under the provisions of section 24-4-103, rules as the board may deem necessary or proper to carry out the provisions and purposes of this article, which rules must be fair, impartial, and nondiscriminatory;
(n) To complete a review and evaluation of the basic academy curriculum, including using community outreach as a review and evaluation component, by July 1, 2016, and every five years thereafter;
(o) (I) To establish, add, and remove, as necessary, subject matter expertise committees to:
(A) Develop skills training programs, academic curriculums, and P.O.S.T. board rules;
(B) Review documents for and approve or deny academy programs, lesson plans, training sites, and skills instructors; and
(C) Assist P.O.S.T. board staff with academy inspections and skills test-outs;
(II) (A) In order to create diversified subject matter expertise committees, the chair of the P.O.S.T. board shall consider an applicant's age, gender, race, professional experience, and geographic location when making appointments to the committees.
(B) If available, each subject matter committee shall include at least two non-law enforcement members who have law enforcement expertise or expertise in providing effective training through professional experience or subject matter training.
(p) To develop a community outreach program that informs the public of the role and duties of the P.O.S.T. board;
(q) To develop a recruitment program that creates a diversified applicant pool for appointments to the P.O.S.T. board and the subject matter expertise committees; and
(r) Subject to available appropriations, beginning on January 1, 2022, to create and maintain a database related to a peace officer's conduct pursuant to the provisions of section 24-31-321.
(s) To collaborate with the commission on improving first responder interactions with persons with disabilities, in the manner described in part 10 of this article 31.
(t) By January 1, 2022, to adopt procedures to allow a peace officer to seek review of the peace officer's status in the database created pursuant to subsection (1)(r) of this section based on the peace officer's presentation of new evidence to show the peace officer's record may be removed from the database.
(u) To develop a live virtual training program for peace officers on the implementation of section 19-2.5-203 (8) to ensure uniform enforcement of the law. The state shall provide this training on at least ten different dates prior to February 28, 2024. The state shall cover any reasonable direct costs to local law enforcement agencies associated with the training. Notwithstanding section 24-31-310 (3), the general assembly may appropriate money from the general fund to carry out the purposes of this subsection (1)(u). The training must include, at a minimum, education for peace officers on:
(I) Understanding juvenile development and culture and their impact on interviews of juveniles and custodial interrogations of juveniles;
(II) Interpreting juvenile behavior during an interview or custodial interrogation;
(III) Techniques for building and establishing rapport with juveniles;
(IV) Alternative communication methods for juveniles with intellectual and developmental disabilities, as required by the federal "Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990", 42 U.S.C. sec. 12101 et seq., as amended;
(V) Constructing age-appropriate statements and questions for interviews of juveniles and custodial interrogations of juveniles; and
(VI) Cautions and considerations for interviewing and interrogating juveniles in custody, including how to reduce the likelihood of false or coerced confessions.
(v) (I) To establish training standards related to peace officer compliance with section 24-76.6-102.
(II) (A) An individual who is a certified peace officer as of July 1, 2026, shall complete the training standards established pursuant to this subsection (1)(v) before December 31, 2027.
(B) This subsection (1)(v)(II) is repealed, effective July 1, 2028.
(2) (a) The P.O.S.T. board may charge the following fees, the proceeds of which may be used to support the certification of applicants pursuant to this part 3:
(I) For the manuals or other materials that the board may publish in connection with its functions, an amount not to exceed twenty dollars per publication; and
(II) For the administration of certification and skills examinations, an amount not to exceed one hundred fifty dollars per examination per applicant.
(b) There is hereby created in the state treasury a P.O.S.T. board cash fund. The fees collected pursuant to paragraph (a) of this subsection (2) and pursuant to section 42-3-304 (24), C.R.S., shall be transmitted to the state treasurer who shall credit such revenue to the P.O.S.T. board cash fund. It is the intent of the general assembly that the fees collected shall cover all direct and indirect costs incurred pursuant to this section. In accordance with section 24-36-114, all interest derived from the deposit and investment of moneys in the P.O.S.T. board cash fund shall be credited to the general fund. All moneys in the P.O.S.T. board cash fund shall be subject to annual appropriation by the general assembly and shall be used for the purposes set forth in this subsection (2) and in section 24-31-310. At the end of any fiscal year, all unexpended and unencumbered moneys in the P.O.S.T. board cash fund shall remain in the fund and shall not revert to the general fund or any other fund.
(3) The P.O.S.T. board may make grants to local governments, any college or university, or any nonprofit for the purpose of funding the training programs required by this section.
(4) (Deleted by amendment, L. 98, p. 749, §2, effective May 22, 1998.)
(5) It is unlawful for any person to serve as a peace officer, as described in section 16-2.5-102, C.R.S., or a reserve peace officer as defined in section 16-2.5-110, C.R.S., in this state unless such person:
(a) Is certified pursuant to this part 3; and
(b) Has undergone both a physical and a psychological evaluation to determine such person's fitness to serve as a peace officer or a reserve peace officer. Such evaluations shall have been performed within one year prior to the date of appointment by a physician and either a psychologist or psychiatrist licensed by the state of Colorado.
(6) Repealed.
(7) In carrying out its duties pursuant to subsection (1) of this section, the P.O.S.T. board shall not approve as a skills instructor a person whose peace officer certification has been revoked by the P.O.S.T. board and shall not approve a training academy if an instructor of the training academy is a person whose peace officer certification has been revoked by the P.O.S.T. board after September 1, 2026.
Source: L. 92: Entire part added, p. 1093, § 3, effective March 6. L. 94: (1) and (2) amended, p. 1727, § 5, effective May 31. L. 96: (2)(a) and (3) amended and (4) and (5) added, p. 1571, § 1, effective June 3. L. 98: (4) and IP(5) amended, p. 749, § 2, effective May 22; (1)(h) added, p. 962, § 6, effective May 27. L. 2001: (2)(a)(II) amended, p. 1449, § 1, effective July 1. L. 2002: (6) added, p. 840, § 3, effective May 30. L. 2003: (2)(b) amended, p. 2114, § 1, effective May 22; (1)(f) amended, p. 2184, § 2, effective June 3; IP(5) amended, p. 1622, § 39, effective August 6. L. 2004: (1)(i) added, p. 1898, § 2, effective June 4. L. 2006: (2)(b) amended, p. 1500, § 34, effective June 1. L. 2012: (1)(i) amended and (1)(j) added, (HB 12-1345), ch. 188, p. 746, § 31, effective May 19; (1)(h) amended, (HB 12-1266), ch. 280, p. 1530, § 49, effective July 1. L. 2013: (1)(i) and (1)(j) amended and (1)(k) added, (SB 13-111), ch. 233, p. 1125, § 8, effective May 16. L. 2014: (1)(e), (1)(j), (2)(a)(II), and (3) amended and (1)(l) and (1)(m) added, (SB 14-123), ch. 246, p. 945, § 1, effective August 6. L. 2015: (1)(l) amended and (1)(n), (1)(o), (1)(p), and (1)(q) added, (HB 15-1287), ch. 213, p. 778, § 2, effective May 20. L. 2020: (1)(l), (1)(p), and (1)(q) amended and (1)(r) added, (SB 20-217), ch. 110, p. 457, § 10, effective June 19. L. 2021: (1)(s) added, (HB 21-1122), ch. 405, p. 2690, § 2, effective June 30; (1)(r) amended and (1)(t) added, (HB 21-1250), ch. 458, p. 3066, § 13, effective July 6; IP(1)(r), (1)(r)(III), and (1)(r)(IV) amended and (1)(r)(V) added, (SB 21-174), ch. 420, p. 2787, § 2, effective September 7. L. 2023: (1)(u) added, (HB 23-1042), ch. 221, p. 1147, § 2, effective August 7. L. 2025: (1)(r) amended, (HB 25-1136), ch. 333, p. 1723, § 1, effective May 31; (1)(r)(IV) repealed, (SB 25-300), ch. 428, p. 2449, § 31, effective August 6. L. 2026: (1)(v) added, (HB 26-1276), ch. 371, p. 2247, § 5, effective June 4; (7) added, (HB 26-1312), ch. 367, p. 2231, § 3, effective August 12.
Editor's note: (1) Subsection (6)(b) provided for the repeal of subsection (6), effective July 1, 2003. (See L. 2002, p. 840.)
(2) Amendments to subsection (1)(r) by HB 21-1250 and SB-174 were harmonized. In connection, subsection (1)(r)(I)(H) was numbered as subsection (1)(r)(V) in SB 21-174 but was renumbered on revision for ease of location. Subsections (1)(r)(III) and (1)(r)(IV) were amended in SB 21-174, but those amendments were superseded by the amendment of subsection (1)(r) in HB 21-1250.
(3) Amendments to subsection (1)(r)(IV) by SB 25-300 and HB 25-1136 were harmonized.
Cross references: For the legislative declaration in the 2013 act amending subsections (1)(i) and (1)(j) and adding subsection (1)(k), see section 1 of chapter 233, Session Laws of Colorado 2013. For the legislative declaration in SB 20-217, see section 1 of chapter 110, Session Laws of Colorado 2020.
ANNOTATION
The peace officer standards and training (P.O.S.T.) board is a "criminal justice agency" as defined by § 24-72-302 (3) due to its collection and storage of arrest and criminal records information when it revokes peace officer certifications. Gazette v. Bourgerie, 2023 COA 37, 533 P.3d 597, aff'd on other grounds, 2024 CO 78, 560 P.3d 964.
24-31-304. Applicant for training - fingerprint-based criminal history record check.
(1) For purposes of this section, "training academy" means a basic or reserve peace officer training program approved by the P.O.S.T. board that is offered by a training academy, community college, college, or university.
(2) A training academy shall not enroll as a student a person who has been convicted of an offense that would result in the denial of certification pursuant to section 24-31-305 (1.5).
(3) (a) A person seeking to enroll in a training academy shall submit a set of fingerprints to the training academy prior to enrolling in the academy. The training academy shall forward the fingerprints to the Colorado bureau of investigation for the purpose of obtaining a fingerprint-based criminal history record check. Upon receipt of fingerprints and payment for the costs, the Colorado bureau of investigation shall conduct a state and national fingerprint-based criminal history record check utilizing records of the Colorado bureau of investigation and the federal bureau of investigation. The P.O.S.T. board is the authorized agency to receive information regarding the result of a national criminal history record check. The P.O.S.T. board shall notify the training academy if the fingerprint-based criminal history record check indicates that the person is prohibited from enrolling in the training academy pursuant to subsection (2) of this section. The person seeking to enroll in the training academy shall bear only the actual costs of the state and national fingerprint-based criminal history record check.
(b) When the results of a fingerprint-based criminal history record check of a person seeking to enroll in a training academy performed pursuant to this section reveal a record of arrest without a disposition, the P.O.S.T. board shall require that person to submit to a name-based judicial record check, as defined in section 22-2-119.3 (6)(d).
(4) (a) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (2) of this section and section 24-31-305 (1.5) to the contrary, if the person anticipates that he or she will be prohibited from enrolling in the training academy on the grounds that the person has been convicted on or after July 1, 2001, of one or more of the misdemeanors described in section 24-31-305 (1.5), the person may, at the time of applying for admission to the training academy, notify the P.O.S.T. board of the conviction or convictions and request the P.O.S.T. board to grant the person permission to enroll in the training academy.
(b) The P.O.S.T. board shall promulgate rules deemed necessary by the board concerning the procedures for the granting of permission to enroll in a training academy pursuant to this subsection (4). The P.O.S.T. board, in promulgating the rules, shall take into consideration the procedures for the granting of exemptions to denials of certification and the withdrawal of denials of certification described in section 24-31-305 (1.6). The P.O.S.T. board, in promulgating the rules, may specify that an applicant for certification pursuant to section 24-31-305 need not submit a set of fingerprints at the time of applying for the certification if the applicant has already submitted a set of fingerprints pursuant to this section.
Source: L. 92: Entire part added, p. 1094, § 3, effective March 6. L. 94: Entire section amended, p. 1729, § 6, effective May 31. L. 96: Entire section amended, p. 1572, § 2, effective June 3. L. 2003: Entire section R&RE, p. 2183, § 1, effective June 3. L. 2019: (3) amended, (HB 19-1166), ch. 125, p. 550, § 30, effective April 18. L. 2022: (3)(b) amended, (HB 22-1270), ch. 114, p. 522, § 32, effective April 21.
24-31-305. Certification - issuance - renewal - revocation - rules - definition.
(1) (a) Basic peace officer certification requirements must include:
(I) Successful completion of a high school education or its equivalent;
(II) Successful completion of basic training approved by the P.O.S.T. board;
(III) Passage of examinations administered by the P.O.S.T. board;
(IV) Current first aid and cardiopulmonary resuscitation certificates or their equivalents; and
(V) That the certified peace officer is at least twenty-one years old or older.
(b) The training required for basic certification may be obtained through a training program conducted by a training academy approved by the P.O.S.T. board or completion of requirements of another state, federal, or tribal jurisdiction having standards deemed at least equivalent to those established pursuant to this part 3.
(c) Repealed.
(1.3) Reserve peace officer certification requirements shall include:
(a) Successful completion of a high school education or its equivalent;
(b) Successful completion of reserve training approved by the P.O.S.T. board; and
(c) Current first aid and cardiopulmonary resuscitation certificates or their equivalents.
(1.5) (a) The P.O.S.T. board shall deny certification to any person who has been convicted of:
(I) A felony;
(II) Any misdemeanor in violation of sections 18-3-204, 18-3-402, 18-3-404, 18-3-405.5, and 18-3-412.5, C.R.S.;
(III) Any misdemeanor in violation of sections 18-7-201, 18-7-202, 18-7-203, 18-7-204, 18-7-302, and 18-7-601, C.R.S.;
(IV) Any misdemeanor in violation of any section of article 8 of title 18, C.R.S.;
(V) Any misdemeanor in violation of sections 18-9-111 and 18-9-121, C.R.S.;
(VI) Any misdemeanor in violation of sections 18-18-404, 18-18-405, 18-18-406, and 18-18-411, C.R.S.;
(VII) Any misdemeanor in violation of section 18-6-403 (3)(b.5), C.R.S., as it existed prior to July 1, 2006;
(VIII) Any misdemeanor in violation of federal law or the law of any state that is the equivalent of any of the offenses specified in subparagraphs (I) to (VII) of this subsection (1.5)(a); or
(IX) Any local municipal ordinance that is the equivalent of any of the offenses specified in subparagraphs (I) to (VII) of this subsection (1.5)(a).
(b) The P.O.S.T. board must deny certification to any person who entered into one of the following for a crime listed in paragraph (a) of this subsection (1.5) if the P.O.S.T. board determines that certification is not in the public interest:
(I) A deferred judgment and sentencing agreement or deferred sentencing agreement, whether pending or successfully completed;
(II) A deferred prosecution agreement, whether pending or successfully completed; or
(III) A pretrial diversion agreement, whether pending or successfully completed.
(1.6) (a) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (1.5) of this section, if an applicant anticipates prior to the denial of certification that he or she will be denied certification on the ground that the applicant has been convicted on or after July 1, 2001, of any misdemeanor or misdemeanors described in subsection (1.5) of this section, the applicant or the chief law enforcement officer of the agency, if any, employing such applicant may, at the time of the application for certification, notify the P.O.S.T. board of such conviction or convictions and request the board to grant the applicant an exemption from denial of certification.
(b) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (1.5) of this section, if an applicant is denied certification on the ground that the applicant has been convicted on or after July 1, 2001, of any misdemeanor or misdemeanors described in subsection (1.5) of this section, the applicant or the chief law enforcement officer of the agency, if any, employing such applicant may, within thirty days after the effective date of denial, request that the P.O.S.T. board withdraw the denial of certification.
(c) The P.O.S.T. board shall promulgate rules and regulations deemed necessary by the board concerning the procedures for the granting of exemptions to denials of certification and the withdrawal of denials of certification under this subsection (1.6).
(1.7) (a) Unless revoked or voluntarily surrendered, a basic certification or reserve certification issued pursuant to this part 3 is valid as long as the certificate holder is continuously serving as a peace officer, reserve peace officer, or works for a law enforcement agency in a non-peace-officer role and maintains annual training requirements established by the P.O.S.T. board.
(b) If a basic or reserve certificate holder has not served as a peace officer or reserve peace officer for a total of at least six months during any consecutive three-year period, the certification automatically expires at the end of such three-year period, unless the certificate holder is then serving as a peace officer or reserve peace officer or had previously voluntarily surrendered their certificate or then works for a law enforcement agency in a non-peace-officer role.
(c) The P.O.S.T. board may adopt rules for the renewal of certification that expired pursuant to subsection (1.7)(b) of this section.
(2) (a) A certification issued pursuant to subsection (1) or (1.3) of this section or section 24-31-308 shall be suspended or revoked by the P.O.S.T. board if the certificate holder has been convicted of a felony at any time, or has been convicted on or after July 1, 2001, of any misdemeanor or misdemeanors described in subsection (1.5) of this section, or has otherwise failed to meet the certification requirements established by the board.
(b) (I) Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph (a) of this subsection (2), if the certification of a certificate holder is revoked pursuant to paragraph (a) of this subsection (2) on the ground that the certificate holder has been convicted on or after July 1, 2001, of any misdemeanor or misdemeanors described in subsection (1.5) of this section, the certificate holder or the chief law enforcement officer of the agency, if any, employing such certificate holder may, within thirty days after the effective date of the revocation, request the P.O.S.T. board to reinstate the certification.
(II) The P.O.S.T. board shall promulgate rules and regulations deemed necessary by the board concerning the procedures for the reinstatement of revocations of certification.
(2.5) (a) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (2) of this section, the P.O.S.T. board shall revoke a certification issued to a person pursuant to subsection (1) or (1.3) of this section or section 24-31-308 if:
(I) The law enforcement agency that employs or employed the certificate holder notifies the P.O.S.T. board that, on or after August 2, 2019, the certificate holder knowingly made an untruthful statement concerning a material fact or knowingly omitted a material fact on an official criminal justice record, while testifying under oath, or during an internal affairs investigation or administrative investigation and disciplinary process; and
(II) The law enforcement agency certifies that:
(A) It completed an administrative process defined by a published policy of the law enforcement agency, which policy was in effect at the time that the alleged untruthful statement concerning a material fact or knowing omission of material fact occurred;
(B) Through that administrative investigation and disciplinary process, the law enforcement agency determined by a clear and convincing standard of the evidence that, on or after August 2, 2019, the certificate holder knowingly made an untruthful statement concerning a material fact or knowingly omitted a material fact on an official criminal justice record, while testifying under oath, or during an internal affairs investigation or comparable administrative investigation; and
(C) The certificate holder has elected not to exercise, or has exhausted, the internal disciplinary appeal rights provided by the officer's employer; and
(III) The certificate holder, after receiving the notice from the P.O.S.T. board described in subsection (2.5)(e) of this section, either does not request a hearing, or requests a hearing and the hearing officer has determined, after conducting the hearing pursuant to the rules of the P.O.S.T. board and in compliance with sections 24-4-104 and 24-4-105, that the certificate holder knowingly made an untruthful statement concerning a material fact or knowingly omitted a material fact on an official criminal justice record, while testifying under oath, or during an internal affairs investigation or administrative investigation and disciplinary process.
(b) A law enforcement agency that makes a determination described in subsection (2.5)(a)(II) of this section shall report such fact to the P.O.S.T. board on a form that is prescribed by the P.O.S.T. board. The form must require the official submitting the form to attest, under penalty of perjury, that, to the best of the official's knowledge and belief, the statements on the form are true, correct, and complete, and that any false statement, misstatement, or inaccuracy may result in revocation of the official's certification as well as criminal prosecution.
(c) If a certificate holder who is the subject of an investigation described in subsection (2.5)(a)(II) of this section resigns or refuses to cooperate in the investigation, the investigating law enforcement agency shall complete the investigation with or without the subject's participation. If the results of the investigation demonstrate by a clear and convincing standard of the evidence that, on or after August 2, 2019, the certificate holder knowingly made an untruthful statement concerning a material fact or knowingly omitted a material fact on an official criminal justice record, while testifying under oath, or during an internal affairs investigation or administrative investigation and disciplinary process, the law enforcement agency shall notify the P.O.S.T. board and request revocation of the certificate holder's certification on a form prescribed by the P.O.S.T. board.
(d) The records of any law enforcement agency that are submitted for review by the P.O.S.T. board for the purposes of this subsection (2.5) remain the property of the reporting law enforcement agency and are not subject to public release by the P.O.S.T. board.
(e) Upon receipt of the form from a law enforcement agency pursuant to subsection (2.5)(b) of this section, the P.O.S.T. board shall notify the certificate holder of the certificate holder's right to request a show cause hearing pursuant to the rules of the P.O.S.T. board and in compliance with sections 24-4-104 and 24-4-105.
(f) A person who has had his or her P.O.S.T. certification revoked pursuant to this subsection (2.5) may appeal the decision to the full P.O.S.T. board pursuant to the rules of the P.O.S.T. board and section 24-4-105, and may seek judicial review pursuant to the provisions of section 24-4-106.
(g) If a certificate holder's certificate is revoked pursuant to this section and a court of record subsequently reverses or vacates the finding that, on or after August 2, 2019, the certificate holder knowingly made an untruthful statement concerning a material fact or knowingly omitted a material fact on an official criminal justice record, while testifying under oath, or during an internal affairs investigation or administrative investigation and disciplinary process, the certificate holder may request reinstatement of his or her certificate by providing documentation of the court's ruling to the P.O.S.T. board within forty-five days after the court's ruling.
(h) If a law enforcement agency is notified that a peace officer who is employed or who was employed by the agency is alleged to have knowingly made an untruthful statement concerning a material fact or knowingly omitted a material fact on an official criminal justice record, while testifying under oath, or during an internal affairs investigation or administrative investigation and disciplinary process, on or after August 2, 2019, the agency employing the peace officer, or the last law enforcement agency to employ the peace officer, shall investigate the allegation unless the accused peace officer has not been employed by the agency for at least six months preceding the date upon which the agency is notified of the allegation, in which case the agency may investigate the allegation.
(i) Nothing in this section prohibits the lawful use of deception or omission of facts by a peace officer while he or she is conducting an investigation of criminal activity.
(j) For the purposes of this subsection (2.5), "administrative investigation and disciplinary process" means an employer's formal process of internal control that assures that an allegation of violation of employer rules, policy, procedure, or other misconduct or improper actions by an employee are subject to a complete and objective investigation resulting in findings of fact and disciplinary action for any substantiated violation.
(k) The P.O.S.T. board may promulgate rules for the implementation of this subsection (2.5).
(2.7) The P.O.S.T. board may revoke the certification of a peace officer who fails to satisfactorily complete peace officer training required by the P.O.S.T. board. Prior to revoking the peace officer's certification, the P.O.S.T. board shall notify the peace officer of his or her failure to complete the training required by the P.O.S.T. board and give the peace officer thirty calendar days to satisfactorily complete the peace officer training required by the P.O.S.T. board.
(3) Certification shall not vest tenure or related rights. The policies, if any, of the employing agency shall govern such rights. Additional certification reflecting higher levels of proficiency may, at the discretion of the employing agency, be required in hiring, retaining, or promoting peace officers.
(4) The P.O.S.T. board may grant variances from the requirements of this section to any individual, including any individual called to active duty by the armed forces of the United States, if strict application thereof would result in practical difficulty or unnecessary hardship and where the variance would not conflict with the basic purposes and policies of this part 3. The P.O.S.T. board shall promulgate rules regarding the procedure for applying for and granting variances pursuant to this subsection (4).
(5) If a law enforcement agency hires a new employee, appoints a new employee, or transfers an existing employee to a position requiring P.O.S.T. certification, prior to such hire, appointment, or transfer the law enforcement agency shall determine if the person has a record contained in the database created in section 24-31-303 (1)(r). If the person is listed in the database and the law enforcement agency proceeds to employ the person in a position requiring P.O.S.T. certification, the agency shall notify the P.O.S.T. board of the hire, appointment, or transfer in a format determined by the P.O.S.T. board.
Source: L. 92: Entire part added, p. 1094, § 3, effective March 6. L. 94: Entire section amended, p. 1729, § 7, effective May 31. L. 96: Entire section amended, p. 1572, § 3, effective June 3. L. 98: (1.7)(a), (1.7)(b), and (2) amended and (4) added, p. 750, § 3, effective May 22. L. 2000: (1.7)(c) amended, p. 42, § 2, effective March 10. L. 2001: (1.5) and (2) amended and (1.6) added, p. 1449, § 2, effective July 1. L. 2005: (1)(b), (1.5)(g), and (4) amended and (1)(c) and (1.5)(h) added, p. 113, §§ 2, 3, effective August 8. L. 2006: (1.5)(g) amended, p. 2044, § 5, effective July 1. L. 2012: (1)(c) repealed, (HB 12-1163), ch. 50, p. 182, § 2, effective August 8. L. 2013: (1.5)(g) amended, (HB 13-1166), ch. 59, p. 196, § 4, effective August 7. L. 2014: (1.5)(g) and (1.5)(h) amended and (1.5)(i) added, (SB 14-123), ch. 246, p. 946, § 2, effective August 6. L. 2016: (1.5) amended, (HB 16-1262), ch. 339, p. 1386, § 6, effective June 10. L. 2019: (1.5)(a)(VIII) and (1.5)(a)(IX) amended, (SB 19-241), ch. 390, p. 3469, § 27, effective August 2; (2.5) added, (SB 19-166), ch. 249, p. 2422, § 1, effective August 2. L. 2020: (2.7) added, (SB 20-217), ch. 110, p. 458, § 14, effective June 19. L. 2021: (1.7)(a) and (1.7)(b) amended and (5) added, (HB 21-1250), ch. 458, pp. 3067, 3065, §§ 14, 11, effective July 6. L. 2025: (1.7) amended, (HB 25-1136), ch. 333, p. 1728, § 5, effective May 31. L. 2026: IP(1)(a), (1)(a)(III), and (1)(a)(IV) amended and (1)(a)(V) added, (HB 26-1312), ch. 367, p. 2231, § 4, effective August 12.
Cross references: For the legislative declaration in SB 20-217, see section 1 of chapter 110, Session Laws of Colorado 2020.
ANNOTATION
Because the constitution grants Denver the power to control the qualifications, as well as the powers, duties, and terms or tenure, of its deputy sheriffs, it necessarily follows that the P.O.S.T Act is in conflict with the constitution to the extent that it purports to require Denver deputy sheriffs to be certified by the P.O.S.T. board. Fraternal Order, No. 27 v. Denver, 914 P.2d 483 (Colo. App. 1995).
Because the state's interest under the Peace Officers Standards and Training Act was not sufficient to outweigh Denver's home rule authority, the provisions of this section supersede the conflicting provisions of the P.O.S.T. Act. Fraternal Order of Police, Lodge 27 v. Denver, 926 P.2d 582 (Colo. 1996).
The qualification and certification of Denver deputy sheriffs is a local concern, specifically, where it was shown that there was no need for statewide uniformity of training that would include Denver deputy sheriffs; that the extraterritorial impact of Denver deputy sheriffs is, at best, de minimis; that Denver deputy sheriffs do not substantially impact public safety beyond the boundaries of Denver; and Denver's interest in the training and certification of its deputy sheriffs is substantial and has direct textual support in the Colorado Constitution and in case law precedent. Fraternal Order of Police, Lodge 27 v. Denver, 926 P.2d 582 (Colo. 1996).
The holding regarding the training and certification under the P.O.S.T. Act is limited to Denver deputy sheriffs since Colorado Constitution article XX, § 2, pertains only to the City and County of Denver. Fraternal Order of Police, Lodge 27 v. Denver, 926 P.2d 582 (Colo. 1996).
24-31-306. Qualifications for peace officers. (Repealed)
Source: L. 92: Entire part added, p. 1095, § 3, effective March 6. L. 94: (1) and (7) amended, p. 1730, § 8, effective May 31. L. 96: (7.5) added, p. 1349, § 2, effective June 1; (4), (5), (6), and (7) repealed and (8) added, p. 1574, §§ 4, 5, effective June 3. L. 98: (7.5)(c) and (9) added, p. 750, §§ 4, 5, effective May 22.
Editor's note: Subsection (1)(b) provided for the repeal of subsection (1), effective January 1, 1995. (See L. 94, p. 1730.) Subsection (2)(b) provided for the repeal of subsection (2), effective January 1, 1995. (See L. 92, p. 1095.) Subsection (3)(b) provided for the repeal of subsection (3), effective January 1, 1995. (See L. 92, p. 1095.) Subsection (8)(b) provided for the repeal of subsection (8), effective January 1, 1997. (See L. 96, p. 1574.) Subsection (7.5)(c) provided for the repeal of subsection (7.5), effective January 1, 1999. (See L. 98, p. 750.) Subsection (9)(c) provided for the repeal of subsection (9), effective January 1, 1999. (See L. 98, p. 750.)
24-31-307. Enforcement.
(1) The P.O.S.T. board shall have the power to promulgate rules for enforcement of this part 3.
(2) The attorney general may enforce the provisions of this part 3 through an action in district court for injunctive or other appropriate relief against:
(a) Any individual undertaking or attempting to undertake any duties as a peace officer or a reserve peace officer in this state in violation of this part 3; and
(b) Any agency permitting any individual to undertake or attempt to undertake any duties as a peace officer or a reserve peace officer in this state under the auspices of such agency in violation of this part 3.
(3) The attorney general may bring criminal charges for violations of this part 3 if the violation is knowingly or intentional, or impose fines, as set in P.O.S.T. board rule, upon any individual officer or agency for failure to comply with this part 3 or any rule promulgated under this part 3.
(3.5) Any person or law enforcement agency that knowingly or intentionally provides inaccurate data for the database created pursuant to section 24-31-303 (1)(r) is subject to a fine set in rule by the P.O.S.T. board, and, if the person is a P.O.S.T. certified peace officer, the officer is subject to revocation or suspension of the officer's P.O.S.T. certification by the P.O.S.T. board. A person or law enforcement agency that truthfully and accurately reports information pursuant to section 24-31-303 (1)(r) in good faith is not liable under this subsection (3.5).
(4) The attorney general shall be entitled to recover reasonable attorney fees and costs against the defendant in any enforcement action under this part 3, if the attorney general prevails.
Source: L. 94: Entire section added, p. 1731, § 9, effective May 31. L. 2020: Entire section amended, (SB 20-217), ch. 110, p. 459, § 15, effective June 19. L. 2021: (3) amended and (3.5) added, (HB 21-1250), ch. 458, p. 3067, § 15, effective July 6.
Cross references: For the legislative declaration in SB 20-217, see section 1 of chapter 110, Session Laws of Colorado 2020.
24-31-308. Reciprocity - provisional certificate.
(1) The P.O.S.T. board is authorized to grant a provisional certificate to a person who:
(a) Has been authorized to act as a peace officer in another state or federal jurisdiction within the preceding three years and has served as a certified law enforcement officer in good standing in the other state or federal jurisdiction for more than one year;
(b) Passes the certification examination required pursuant to this part 3; and
(c) Possesses current first aid and cardiopulmonary resuscitation certificates or their equivalent.
(2) (a) The P.O.S.T. board is authorized to grant a basic certification to a person who meets the criteria established for basic certification by rule of the P.O.S.T. board.
(b) Any rule of the P.O.S.T. board establishing the criteria for basic certification shall provide that a basic certification will be issued only after an applicant has successfully demonstrated to the P.O.S.T. board a proficiency in all skill areas as required by section 24-31-305.
(3) (a) A provisional certificate shall be valid for six months.
(b) Upon a showing of good cause, the P.O.S.T. board may renew a provisional certificate once for a period not to exceed an additional six months.
Source: L. 98: Entire section added, p. 751, § 7, effective May 22. L. 2000: (1)(a) and (2) amended, p. 43, § 3, effective March 10. L. 2012: (1)(a) amended, (HB 12-1163), ch. 50, p. 182, § 3, effective August 8. L. 2024: IP(1) and (1)(a) amended, (HB 24-1093), ch. 37, p. 135, § 1, effective August 7.
24-31-309. Profiling - officer identification - training - definition.
(1) (a) The general assembly finds, determines, and declares that profiling is a practice that presents a great danger to the fundamental principles of our constitutional republic and is abhorrent and cannot be tolerated.
(b) The general assembly further finds and declares that motorists who have been stopped by peace officers for no reason other than the color of their skin or their apparent race, ethnicity, age, or gender are the victims of discriminatory practices.
(c) The general assembly further finds and declares that Colorado peace officers risk their lives every day. The people of Colorado greatly appreciate the hard work and dedication of peace officers in protecting public safety. The good name of these peace officers should not be tarnished by the actions of those who commit discriminatory practices.
(d) It is therefore the intent of the general assembly in adopting this section to provide a means of identification of peace officers who are engaging in profiling, to underscore the accountability of those peace officers for their actions, and to provide training to those peace officers on how to avoid profiling.
(2) Definitions. For purposes of this section:
(a) "Legal basis" means any basis authorized by statute or that the Colorado supreme court or United States supreme court has determined is lawful pursuant to section 7 of article II of the state constitution or the fourth amendment to the United States constitution.
(b) "Profiling" means the practice of relying solely on race, ethnicity, gender, national origin, language, religion, sexual orientation, gender identity, gender expression, age, or disability in:
(I) Determining the existence of probable cause to place in custody or arrest an individual or in constituting a reasonable and articulable suspicion that an offense has been or is being committed so as to justify the detention of an individual or the investigatory stop of a vehicle; or
(II) Determining the scope, substance, or duration of an investigation or law enforcement activity to which a person will be subjected.
(3) Profiling practices prohibited. Profiling as defined in subsection (2) of this section is prohibited; except that a peace officer may use age when making law enforcement decisions if the peace officer is investigating a juvenile status offense.
(3.5) A peace officer, as defined in section 24-31-901 (3), shall have a legal basis for making a contact, as defined in section 24-31-901 (1), whether consensual or nonconsensual, with a member of the public for purposes of enforcing the law or investigating possible violations of the law. After making a contact, a peace officer, as defined in section 24-31-901 (3), shall report to the peace officer's employing agency:
(a) The perceived demographic information of the person contacted, provided that the identification of these characteristics is based on the observation and perception of the peace officer making the contact and other available data;
(b) Whether the contact was a traffic stop;
(c) The time, date, and location of the contact;
(d) The duration of the contact;
(e) The reason for the contact;
(f) The suspected crime;
(g) The result of the contact, such as:
(I) No action, warning, citation, property seizure, or arrest;
(II) If a warning or citation was issued, the warning provided or violation cited;
(III) If an arrest was made, the offense charged;
(IV) If the contact was a traffic stop, the information collected, which is limited to the driver;
(h) The actions taken by the peace officer during the contact, including but not limited to whether:
(I) The peace officer asked for consent to search the person, vehicle, or other property, and, if so, whether consent was provided;
(II) The peace officer searched the person, a vehicle, or any property, and, if so, the basis for the search and the type of contraband or evidence discovered, if any;
(III) The peace officer seized any property, and, if so, the type of property that was seized and the basis for seizing the property;
(IV) A peace officer unholstered or brandished a weapon during the contact, and, if so, the type of weapon; and
(V) A peace officer discharged a weapon during the contact.
(4) (a) A peace officer certified pursuant to this part 3 shall provide, without being asked, the peace officer's business card to any person whom the peace officer has detained in a traffic stop but has not cited or arrested. The business card must include identifying information about the peace officer, including but not limited to the peace officer's name, division, precinct, and badge or other identification number; a telephone number that may be used, if necessary, to report any comments, positive or negative, regarding the traffic stop; and information about how to file a complaint related to the contact. The identity of the reporting person and the report of any such comments that constitute a complaint must initially be kept confidential by the receiving law enforcement agency, to the extent permitted by law. The receiving law enforcement agency shall be permitted to obtain some identifying information regarding the complaint to allow initial processing of the complaint. If it becomes necessary for the further processing of the complaint for the complainant to disclose the complainant's identity, the complainant shall do so or, at the option of the receiving law enforcement agency, the complaint may be dismissed.
(b) The provisions of paragraph (a) of this subsection (4) shall not apply to authorized undercover operations conducted by any law enforcement agency.
(c) Each law enforcement agency in the state shall compile on at least an annual basis any information derived from telephone calls received due to the distribution of business cards as described in paragraph (a) of this subsection (4) and that allege profiling. The agency shall make such information available to the public but shall not include the names of peace officers or the names of persons alleging profiling in such information. The agency may also include in such information the costs to the agency of complying with the provisions of this subsection (4).
(5) The training provided for peace officers shall include an examination of the patterns, practices, and protocols that result in profiling and prescribe patterns, practices, and protocols that prevent profiling. On or before August 1, 2001, the P.O.S.T. board shall certify the curriculum for such training.
(6) No later than six months after June 5, 2001, each law enforcement agency in the state shall have written policies, procedures, and training in place that are specifically designed to address profiling. Each peace officer employed by such law enforcement agency shall receive such training. The written policies and procedures shall be made available to the public for inspection during regular business hours.
Source: L. 2001: Entire section added, p. 934, § 2, effective June 5. L. 2016: (2) and (3) amended, (HB 16-1263), ch. 340, p. 1388, § 2, effective June 10. L. 2020: (3.5) added and (4)(a) amended, (SB 20-217), ch. 110, p. 459, § 16, effective June 19. L. 2021: (2), IP(3.5), (3.5)(h)(II), (3.5)(h)(IV), and (3.5)(h)(V) amended, (HB 21-1250), ch. 458, p. 3067, § 16, effective July 6; IP(2) amended, (HB 21-1108), ch. 156, p. 894, § 31, effective September 7.
Editor's note: Amendments to subsection IP(2) by HB 21-1108 and HB 21-1250 were harmonized and amendments made to subsection IP(2) by HB 21-1108 were relocated to subsection IP(2)(b) on revision.
Cross references: For the legislative declaration in HB 16-1263, see section 1 of chapter 340, Session Laws of Colorado 2016. For the legislative declaration in SB 20-217, see section 1 of chapter 110, Session Laws of Colorado 2020.
ANNOTATION
Law reviews. For article, "House Bill 1114: Eliminating Biased Policing", see 31 Colo. Law. 127 (July 2002).
24-31-310. Resources for the training of peace officers - peace officers in rural jurisdictions - legislative declaration.
(1) The general assembly hereby finds and declares that Colorado peace officers risk their lives every day in the normal course of their duties. On the roads and highways and throughout the state, peace officers are expected to make quick and difficult decisions that concern both public and officer safety. The general assembly further finds and declares that good training is crucial for peace officers to make decisions that are in the best interests of the health and safety of the citizens of Colorado. The general assembly recognizes that the P.O.S.T. board oversees peace officer training programs and that in the past the state has provided funding for such training programs. The general assembly further recognizes that the state has not provided funding for peace officer training programs since 1992, and that the lack of state funding has had a significant impact on the training of peace officers in the state. Therefore, it is the intent of this section to reimplement state funding for peace officer training programs and to enable the P.O.S.T. board to provide substantial training for peace officers who serve the citizens of Colorado.
(2) The money collected and transferred to the P.O.S.T. board cash fund pursuant to section 42-3-304 (24) must be used to provide training programs for peace officers, especially peace officers in rural and smaller jurisdictions that have limited resources due to the size or location of such jurisdictions. The money must be used and distributed pursuant to subsection (3) or (4) of this section.
(3) The money collected and transferred to the P.O.S.T. board cash fund pursuant to section 42-3-304 (24) must be used and distributed as determined by the P.O.S.T. board. The money in the fund must be used to pay the salary and benefits of any employee hired by the department of law in order to administer the peace officer training programs and to cover any other costs incurred by the P.O.S.T. board in connection with such programs. Under no circumstance shall general fund money be used to cover such costs incurred by the department of law or the P.O.S.T. board.
(4) (a) Subject to the available money collected, transferred to, and remaining in the P.O.S.T. board cash fund, the P.O.S.T. board may establish a scholarship program for law enforcement agencies in rural and smaller jurisdictions with limited resources due to their size or location to assist the agencies with the payment of tuition costs for peace officer candidates to attend an approved basic law enforcement training academy. A person whose tuition costs to attend an approved basic law enforcement training academy were paid for pursuant to this subsection (4) must be employed for at least three years by a law enforcement agency in a rural and small jurisdiction after attending the approved basic law enforcement training academy or the person shall reimburse the cost of attending the basic law enforcement training academy to the P.O.S.T. board.
(b) The P.O.S.T. board shall promulgate rules as may be necessary to implement and administer the scholarship program.
(c) As used in this subsection (4), unless the context otherwise requires, "rural" means an area defined or designated as rural by the federal office of management and budget.
Source: L. 2003: Entire section added, p. 2114, § 2, effective May 22. L. 2006: (2) and (3) amended, p. 1500, § 35, effective June 1. L. 2020: (2) and (3) amended and (4) added, (HB 20-1229), ch. 147, p. 635, § 1, effective September 14.
24-31-311. DNA evidence - collection - retention.
(1) The training provided for peace officers shall include proper collection and retention techniques, practices, and protocols for evidence that may contain biological or DNA evidence. On or before August 1, 2009, the P.O.S.T. board shall certify the curriculum for the training. After August 1, 2009, the training shall be provided to persons who enroll in a training academy for basic peace officer training and to all peace officers described in section 16-2.5-101, C.R.S., who are certified by the P.O.S.T. board pursuant to this part 3 prior to August 1, 2009.
(2) The P.O.S.T. board may develop a specialized certification program that concentrates on the proper techniques, practices, and protocols for evidence collection with emphasis on evidence that may contain biological or DNA evidence.
Source: L. 2008: Entire section added, p. 848, § 4, effective May 14.
Cross references: For the legislative declaration contained in the 2008 act enacting this section, see section 1 of chapter 223, Session Laws of Colorado 2008.
24-31-312. School resource officer training.
(1) On or before January 1, 2014, the P.O.S.T. board shall identify a school resource officer training curriculum to prepare peace officers.
(2) To the extent practicable, the training curriculum described in subsection (1) of this section shall incorporate the suggestions of relevant stakeholders and advocates.
(3) (a) In assigning peace officers to serve as school resource officers pursuant to section 22-32-146, C.R.S., each law enforcement agency is encouraged to ensure that such peace officers have successfully completed the school resource officer training curriculum described in subsection (1) of this section, or will complete said training within six months after beginning the assignment.
(b) On and after January 1, 2015, each county sheriff and each municipal law enforcement agency of the state shall employ at least one peace officer who has successfully completed the training curriculum described in subsection (1) of this section.
(4) For the purposes of section 22-32-146, C.R.S., the training curriculum provided pursuant to subsection (1) of this section shall include a means of recognizing and identifying peace officers who successfully complete the training curriculum.
(5) In providing the training curriculum described in subsection (1) of this section, the P.O.S.T. board may include provisions to allow for the awarding of credit to a peace officer who has successfully completed a school resource officer certification curriculum offered by one or more public or private entities, which entities shall be identified by the P.O.S.T. board.
(6) The P.O.S.T. board may charge a fee to each peace officer who enrolls in the training curriculum described in subsection (1) of this section. The amount of the fee shall not exceed the direct and indirect costs incurred by the P.O.S.T. board in providing the curriculum.
(7) The P.O.S.T. board, with respect to the hiring, training, and evaluation of school resource officers and professionalizing a school-police partnership, shall create a model policy for selecting school resource officers pursuant to the general duties and responsibilities granted to the P.O.S.T. board pursuant to section 24-31-303. The P.O.S.T. board shall consult with school board members, school resource officers, K-12 advocates, and other relevant stakeholders, including student groups, in the development of the model policy. The department of education shall post the model policy on its website and distribute the policy to school districts, charter schools, and institute charter schools for consideration and possible adoption. The model policy may be used by school districts, charter schools, institute charter schools, and police departments. The model policy must, at a minimum, require that:
(a) Once selected, school resource officers must be fully trained in standard best practices, as set forth by a national association of school resource officers;
(b) A candidate demonstrate, whenever possible, a record of experience developing positive relationships with youth, which may include participation in youth or community policing programs;
(c) A candidate voluntarily apply to serve as a school resource officer; and
(d) The employing law enforcement agency and school district jointly create an evaluation process to evaluate school resource officers.
Source: L. 2012: Entire section added, (HB 12-1345), ch. 188, p. 746, § 32, effective May 19. L. 2022: (7) added, (HB 22-1376), ch. 243, p. 1804, § 7, effective May 26.
24-31-313. Training concerning abuse and exploitation of at-risk elders.
(1) On or before January 1, 2014, the P.O.S.T. board shall create and implement a training curriculum to prepare peace officers to recognize and address incidents of abuse and exploitation of at-risk elders, as described in sections 18-6.5-102 (1) and (10), C.R.S.
(2) On and after January 1, 2015, each county sheriff and each municipal law enforcement agency of the state shall employ at least one peace officer who has successfully completed the training curriculum described in subsection (1) of this section.
(3) The training curriculum provided pursuant to subsection (1) of this section shall include a means of recognizing and identifying peace officers who successfully complete the training curriculum.
(4) In providing the training curriculum described in subsection (1) of this section, the P.O.S.T. board may include provisions to allow for the awarding of credit to a peace officer who has successfully completed a similar training curriculum offered by one or more public or private entities, which entities shall be identified by the P.O.S.T. board.
(5) The P.O.S.T. board may charge a fee to each peace officer who enrolls in the training curriculum described in subsection (1) of this section. The amount of the fee shall not exceed the direct and indirect costs incurred by the P.O.S.T. board in providing the curriculum.
Source: L. 2013: Entire section added, (SB 13-111), ch. 233, p. 1126, § 9, effective May 16.
Cross references: For the legislative declaration in the 2013 act adding this section, see section 1 of chapter 233, Session Laws of Colorado 2013.
24-31-313.5. Training concerning abuse and exploitation of at-risk adults with intellectual and developmental disabilities.
On or before June 30, 2016, the P.O.S.T. board shall create and implement a training curriculum to prepare peace officers to recognize and address incidents of abuse and exploitation of at-risk adults with intellectual and developmental disabilities, as described in section 18-6.5-102 (2.5) and (10), C.R.S.
Source: L. 2016: Entire section added, (HB 16-1254), ch. 6, p. 12, § 1, effective March 9.
24-31-314. Advanced roadside impaired driving enforcement training.
(1) On and after October 1, 2013, the P.O.S.T. board is encouraged to include advanced roadside impaired driving enforcement training as an elective to basic field sobriety test training recertification.
(2) Subject to the availability of sufficient moneys, the P.O.S.T. board shall arrange to provide drug recognition expert training to certified peace officers who will act as trainers in advanced roadside impaired driving enforcement for all peace officers described in section 16-2.5-101, C.R.S.
Source: L. 2013: Entire section added, (SB 13-283), ch. 332, p. 1892, § 8, effective May 28. L. 2014: Entire section amended, (SB 14-129), ch. 387, p. 1937, § 2, effective June 6.
24-31-315. Annual in-service training requirements.
(1) (a) The annual in-service training programs must include proper restraint and holds training, a two-hour anti-bias training program, a two-hour training to improve a peace officer's understanding of the impact of trauma on victim-survivors of crimes and the optimal way for a peace officer to respond to victim-survivors who are experiencing or responding to trauma, and, in alternating years, either a two-hour community policing and community partnerships training program or a two-hour situation de-escalation training program. The programs and curriculum may include interactive web-based training. Each certified peace officer shall satisfactorily complete the training by July 1, 2017, and shall satisfactorily complete the training at least once every five years thereafter.
(b) Subject to available appropriations, beginning July 1, 2022, the annual in-service training programs must include the in-service curriculum for training concerning interactions with persons with disabilities recommended by the commission on improving first responder interactions with persons with disabilities pursuant to section 24-31-1004.
(2) (a) The P.O.S.T. board shall suspend a peace officer's certification if the peace officer fails to comply with the training requirements in subsection (1) of this section. The P.O.S.T. board shall reinstate a peace officer's certification that was suspended pursuant to this paragraph (a) upon completion of the training requirements in subsection (1) of this section.
(b) Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph (a) of this subsection (2), the P.O.S.T. board shall not suspend a peace officer's certification if the peace officer has not complied with the training requirements of subsection (1) of this section because the officer is not serving as a full-time peace officer. When the officer returns to his or her full-time peace-officer duties, he or she shall have six months to complete the training required by subsection (1) of this section.
(c) Prior to suspension of a peace officer's certification pursuant to paragraph (a) of this subsection (2), the peace officer must be afforded due process to the extent required by law.
Source: L. 2015: Entire section added, (HB 15-1287), ch. 213, p. 778, § 3, effective May 20. L. 2021: (1) amended, (HB 21-1122), ch. 405, p. 2691, § 3, effective June 30. L. 2026: (1)(a) amended, (SB 26-095), ch. 133, p. 595, § 7, effective May 19.
24-31-316. Attorney general to provide identification cards to retired peace officers upon request - definitions.
(1) As used in this section, unless the context otherwise requires:
(a) "Peace officer" means a certified peace officer described in section 16-2.5-102.
(b) "Photographic identification" means a photographic identification that satisfies the description at 18 U.S.C. sec. 926C (d).
(2) Except as described in subsection (3) of this section, on and after August 7, 2013, if the department had a policy in effect as of August 7, 2013, of issuing photographic identification to peace officers who have retired from the department, and the department discontinues said policy after August 7, 2013, the department shall continue to provide such photographic identification to peace officers who have retired from the department if:
(a) The peace officer requests the identification;
(b) The peace officer retired from the department before the date upon which the department discontinued the policy; and
(c) The peace officer is a qualified retired law enforcement officer, as defined in 18 U.S.C. sec. 926C (c).
(3) Before issuing or renewing a photographic identification to a retired law enforcement officer pursuant to this section, a law enforcement agency of the state shall complete a criminal background check of the officer through a search of the national instant criminal background check system created by the federal "Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act" , Pub. L. 103-159, the relevant portion of which is codified at 18 U.S.C. sec. 922 (t), and a search of the state integrated criminal justice information system. If the background check indicates that the officer is prohibited from possessing a firearm by state or federal law, the law enforcement agency shall not issue the photographic identification.
(4) The department may charge a fee for issuing a photographic identification to a retired peace officer pursuant to subsection (2) of this section, which fee shall not exceed the direct and indirect costs assumed by the department in issuing the photographic identification.
(5) Notwithstanding any other provision of this section, the department shall not be required to issue a photographic identification to a particular peace officer if the attorney general elects not to do so.
(6) If the department denies a photographic identification to a retired peace officer who requests a photographic identification pursuant to this section, the department shall provide the retired peace officer a written statement setting forth the reason for the denial.
Source: L. 2020: Entire section added, (SB 20-063), ch. 12, p. 55, § 10, effective September 14.
24-31-317. Training requirements concerning peace officer interactions with persons with disabilities.
(1) Subject to available appropriations, beginning July 1, 2022, the basic academy curriculum must include the curriculum for training concerning interactions with persons with disabilities recommended by the commission on improving first responder interactions with persons with disabilities pursuant to section 24-31-1004.
(2) The annual in-service training programs must include the in-service curriculum for training concerning interactions with persons with disabilities, as described in section 24-31-315 (1)(b).
Source: L. 2021: Entire section added, (HB 21-1122), ch. 405, p. 2691, § 4, effective June 30.
24-31-318. Administrative law judge appointment.
The P.O.S.T. board chairperson may appoint an administrative law judge or hearing officer pursuant to article 4 of this title 24 to conduct hearings, administer oaths, take affirmations of witnesses, issue subpoenas compelling the attendance of witnesses and production of records, rule on evidence, make findings, and report the findings to the P.O.S.T. board for any proceedings or actions authorized under this part 3.
Source: L. 2021: Entire section added, (HB 21-1250), ch. 458, p. 3068, § 17, effective July 6.
24-31-319. Training related to missing indigenous persons - development - missing persons alerts training.
(1) The P.O.S.T. board shall work with the office of liaison for missing and murdered indigenous relatives created in section 24-33.5-2603 to develop and facilitate training for peace officers on issues relating to missing or murdered indigenous persons investigations.
(2) Beginning January 1, 2023, the basic academy curriculum and annual in-service training programs must include training concerning issues relating to missing or murdered indigenous persons.
(3) The P.O.S.T. board shall include in the basic or reserve peace officer training curriculum, and the training required to renew a peace officer certification that expired, training concerning missing persons alerts created by the department of public safety pursuant to section 24-33.5-416.3.
Source: L. 2022: Entire section added, (SB 22-150), ch. 466, p. 3316, § 3, effective June 8. L. 2026: (3) added, (SB 26-120), ch. 145, p. 816, § 2, effective August 12.
Cross references: For the legislative declaration in SB 22-150, see section 1 of chapter 466, Session Laws of Colorado 2022.
24-31-320. Persons with deferred action for childhood arrivals status - rules - definition.
(1) The P.O.S.T. board may promulgate rules for the administration of or compliance with requirements for an eligible immigrant who is seeking a certificate issued pursuant to this part 3.
(2) For purposes of this section, unless the context otherwise requires, "eligible immigrant" means a person who has been formally granted and maintains a valid deferred action for childhood arrivals status by the federal immigration and naturalization service, or any successor agency, or a person who has applied to obtain asylum status.
Source: L. 2023: Entire section added, (HB 23-1143), ch. 121, p. 451, § 1, effective August 7.
24-31-321. Peace officer conduct database - definition.
(1) The P.O.S.T. board shall create and maintain a database in a searchable format to be published on its website containing information related to a peace officer's:
(a) Untruthfulness;
(b) Three or more failures to follow P.O.S.T. board training requirements within ten consecutive years;
(c) Revocation of the certification by the P.O.S.T. board, including the basis for the revocation;
(d) Termination for cause by the peace officer's employer;
(e) Resignation or retirement while under investigation by the peace officer's employing organization or another law enforcement agency in which the alleged misconduct, if sustained, would more likely than not result in being entered into the database pursuant to this section;
(f) Resignation or retirement following an incident that leads to the opening of an investigation by the peace officer's employing organization or another law enforcement agency in which the alleged misconduct, if sustained, would more likely than not result in being entered into the database pursuant to this section, within six months after the peace officer's resignation or retirement;
(g) Resignation in lieu of termination for cause;
(h) Being charged with a crime that could result in revocation or suspension of certification pursuant to section 24-31-305 or 24-31-904. The employing organization shall notify the P.O.S.T. board of the filing of criminal charges as soon as practicable, in a manner prescribed in P.O.S.T. board rule.
(i) Actions as described by the applicable statutory provision identifying the basis for the credibility disclosure notification as set forth in section 16-2.5-502 (2)(c)(I).
(2) If a law enforcement agency reports a peace officer pursuant to either subsection (1)(e) or (1)(f) of this section, the peace officer, upon request, is entitled to a show cause hearing with the director of the P.O.S.T. board or their designee. The P.O.S.T. board shall obtain records from the reporting organization for the purpose of the show cause hearing and shall provide all records provided by the reporting organization to the appellant peace officer. Pursuant to the requirements of this section, the records of any employing organization, or former employing organization, that are submitted for review by the P.O.S.T. board and the appellant peace officer for the purposes of this show cause hearing remain the property of the reporting organization and are not subject to public release.
(3) (a) Law enforcement agencies shall report to the P.O.S.T. board the information required in subsection (1) of this section in a format determined by the P.O.S.T. board. The P.O.S.T. board shall not include information in the database if the information is received from an agency that does not employ or has not employed the peace officer who is the subject of the information. Notwithstanding any other provision to the contrary, the P.O.S.T. board may enter reports into the database on behalf of an organization. The head of the law enforcement agency providing the report shall certify the accuracy of the information in the report. A knowing or willful failure to submit the information or certification or a knowing or willful submittal of false or inaccurate information is subject to a fine imposed by the P.O.S.T. board. When a failure to submit the information or certification or submittal of false or inaccurate information is determined, the P.O.S.T. board shall refer the matter to the appropriate district attorney and request the district attorney to conduct a criminal investigation.
(b) After receiving a notification and upon request of the P.O.S.T. board, the law enforcement agency providing the report shall provide the P.O.S.T. board with all documents relevant to the investigation or cause for which the officer was placed in the database. If a law enforcement agency refuses to provide the records pursuant to this subsection (3), the P.O.S.T. board may subpoena the records. If the court or administrative law judge grants the subpoena, and subsequently does not grant a motion to quash the subpoena, the court may order the law enforcement agency to pay the P.O.S.T. board's attorney fees, costs, and fees related to the subpoena.
(c) If the P.O.S.T. board received information regarding an incident involving a peace officer that would require a report pursuant to subsection (1) of this section, the organization employing the peace officer shall provide the P.O.S.T. board with all documents relevant to the incident upon request of the P.O.S.T. board. If a law enforcement agency refuses to provide the records pursuant to this subsection (3), the P.O.S.T. board may subpoena the records. If the court or administrative law judge grants the subpoena, and subsequently does not grant a motion to quash the subpoena, the court may order the law enforcement agency to pay the P.O.S.T. board's attorney fees, costs, and fees related to the subpoena.
(d) The records of any law enforcement agency that are submitted for review by the P.O.S.T. board for the purposes of this subsection (3) remain the property of the reporting law enforcement agency and are not subject to public release by the P.O.S.T. board.
(4) (a) The P.O.S.T. board shall create an appeal process for a peace officer to appeal the officer's inclusion in the database created in this section. The appeal must be conducted pursuant to the provisions of this section and P.O.S.T. board rules. The P.O.S.T. board shall give consideration to an officer's whistle blower status during the appeal. When a peace officer is added to the database, the P.O.S.T. board shall provide the peace officer with information about how to appeal that action on its website. If a peace officer initiates an appeal pursuant to this subsection (4), the reporting agency shall provide the P.O.S.T. board with all documents relevant to the discipline for which the officer was placed in the database upon request of the P.O.S.T. board. If a law enforcement agency refuses to provide the records pursuant to this subsection (4), the P.O.S.T. board may subpoena the records. If the court or administrative law judge grants the subpoena, and subsequently does not grant a motion to quash the subpoena, the court may order the law enforcement agency to pay the P.O.S.T. board's attorney fees, costs, and fees related to the subpoena.
(b) The records of any law enforcement agency that are submitted for review by the P.O.S.T. board for the purposes of subsection (4)(a) of this section remain the property of the reporting law enforcement agency and are not subject to public release by the P.O.S.T. board.
(c) If a peace officer appeals inclusion in the database pursuant to either subsection (1)(e) or (1)(f) of this section and the peace officer's organization completed its investigation of the officer's conduct after the officer resigned and the organization cleared the officer, the officer may use that determination in their appeal.
(5) If a law enforcement agency reports information required pursuant to subsection (1) of this section and subsequently determines the entry was in error and informs the P.O.S.T. board of the error regardless of when the error occurred, the P.O.S.T. board shall remove the entry from the database after the P.O.S.T. board determines the entry was in error.
(6) For purposes of this section, "untruthfulness" means a peace officer knowingly made an untruthful statement concerning a material fact or knowingly omitted a material fact on an official criminal justice record, while testifying under oath, or during an internal affairs investigation or administrative investigation and disciplinary process.
Source: L. 2025: Entire section added, (HB 25-1136), ch. 333, p. 1724, § 2, effective May 31.
24-31-322. Authority to receive training or grants.
A training academy full-time instructor is eligible to attend P.O.S.T. certification classes that are funded or hosted using grant funding, but are not eligible to receive individual grant funding from the P.O.S.T. board. This section does not prohibit a training academy full-time instructor from receiving individual grant funding from an entity that is not the P.O.S.T. board.
Source: L. 2026: Entire section added, (HB 26-1312), ch. 367, p. 2232, § 5, effective August 12.
PART 4
ENFORCEMENT OF TOBACCO SETTLEMENT
24-31-401. Definitions.
As used in this part 4, unless the context otherwise requires:
(1) "Smokeless tobacco settlement" means the settlement agreement between the state of Colorado and various domestic smokeless tobacco products manufacturers, dated November 23, 1998, which was approved by the district court of the city and county of Denver as part of a consent decree dated November 25, 1998, in the case denominated State of Colorado, ex rel. Gale A. Norton, Attorney General v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.; American Tobacco Co., Inc.; Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.; Liggett & Myers, Inc.; Lorillard Tobacco Co., Inc.; Philip Morris, Inc.; United States Tobacco Co.; B.A.T. Industries, P.L.C.; The Council For Tobacco Research--U.S.A., Inc.; and Tobacco Institute, Inc., Case No. 97 CV 3432.
(2) "Tobacco settlement" means the settlement agreement between the state of Colorado and various domestic tobacco products manufacturers, dated November 23, 1998, which was approved by the district court of the city and county of Denver as part of a consent decree dated November 25, 1998, in the case denominated State of Colorado, ex rel. Gale A. Norton, Attorney General v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.; American Tobacco Co., Inc.; Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.; Liggett & Myers, Inc.; Lorillard Tobacco Co., Inc.; Philip Morris, Inc.; United States Tobacco Co.; B.A.T. Industries, P.L.C.; The Council For Tobacco Research--U.S.A., Inc.; and Tobacco Institute, Inc., Case No. 97 CV 3432.
Source: L. 2000: Entire part added, p. 628, § 20, effective May 18.
24-31-402. Enforcement by attorney general.
(1) The general assembly hereby finds that both the tobacco settlement and the smokeless tobacco settlement impose numerous duties and obligations on the parties to those settlement agreements relating to the marketing and advertising of tobacco products and the payment of damages to the state. The general assembly further finds that most of these duties and obligations continue for a minimum of twenty-five years from the dates of the settlement agreements. Therefore, the attorney general shall oversee and take the necessary actions to enforce compliance with the provisions of the tobacco settlement agreement and the smokeless tobacco settlement agreement, consistent with the duties and obligations set forth in said settlement agreements and with Colorado law.
(2) The enforcement duty specified in subsection (1) of this section is in addition to and does not limit the authority of the attorney general otherwise existing under common law or the statutes of this state.
Source: L. 2000: Entire part added, p. 629, § 20, effective May 18.
24-31-403. Funding.
The attorney general may use any custodial funds recovered as costs and attorney fees under the tobacco settlement agreement to offset any costs incurred in overseeing and enforcing the tobacco settlement agreement and the smokeless tobacco settlement agreement.
Source: L. 2000: Entire part added, p. 629, § 20, effective May 18.
PART 5
PAYMENTS FOR KANSAS V. COLORADO LITIGATION
24-31-501 to 24-31-503. (Repealed)
Editor's note: (1) This part 5 was added in 2005 and was not amended prior to its repeal in 2007. For the text of this part 5 prior to 2007, consult the 2006 Colorado Revised Statutes.
(2) Section 24-31-503 provided for the repeal of this part 5, effective July 1, 2007. (See L. 2005, p. 413.)
PART 6
SAFE2TELL ACT
24-31-601. Short title.
This part 6 shall be known and may be cited as the "Safe2tell Act".
Source: L. 2014: Entire part added, (SB 14-002), ch. 241, p. 889, § 2, effective August 6.
24-31-602. Legislative declaration.
(1) The general assembly hereby finds and declares that:
(a) The purpose of this part 6 is to empower students and the community by offering a comprehensive program of education, awareness, and training and a readily accessible tool that allows students and the community to easily provide anonymous information about unsafe, potentially harmful, dangerous, violent, or criminal activities in schools, or the threat of these activities, to appropriate law enforcement and public safety agencies and school officials; and
(b) The ability to anonymously report information about unsafe, potentially harmful, dangerous, violent, or criminal activities in schools before or after they have occurred is critical in reducing, responding to, and recovering from these types of events in schools.
(2) The general assembly therefore finds that it is appropriate and necessary to provide for the anonymity of a person who provides information to law enforcement and public safety agencies and school officials and to provide for the confidentiality of associated materials.
Source: L. 2014: Entire part added, (SB 14-002), ch. 241, p. 889, § 2, effective August 6.
24-31-603. Definitions.
As used in this article, unless the context otherwise requires:
(1) "Department" means the department of law.
(2) "In camera review" means an inspection of materials by the court, in chambers, to determine what, if any, materials are discoverable.
(3) "Materials" means any records, reports, claims, writings, documents, or information anonymously reported or information related to the source of materials.
(4) "Program" means the safe2tell program.
Source: L. 2014: Entire part added, (SB 14-002), ch. 241, p. 890, § 2, effective August 6.
24-31-604. Administration of article.
The attorney general shall administer the provisions of this part 6.
Source: L. 2014: Entire part added, (SB 14-002), ch. 241, p. 890, § 2, effective August 6.
24-31-605. Delegation of duties.
The powers and duties vested in the attorney general by this part 6 may be delegated to qualified employees of the department.
Source: L. 2014: Entire part added, (SB 14-002), ch. 241, p. 890, § 2, effective August 6.
24-31-606. Safe2tell program - creation - duties.
(1) There is created, within the department, the safe2tell program.
(2) The program must:
(a) Establish and maintain methods of anonymous reporting concerning unsafe, potentially harmful, dangerous, violent, or criminal activities in schools or the threat of those activities;
(b) Establish methods and procedures to ensure that the identity of the reporting parties remains unknown to all persons and entities, including law enforcement officers and employees operating the program;
(c) Establish methods and procedures so that information obtained from a reporting party who voluntarily discloses his or her identity and verifies that he or she is willing to be identified may be shared with law enforcement officers, employees operating the program, and school officials;
(d) Establish methods and procedures to ensure that a reporting party's identity that becomes known through any means other than voluntary disclosure is not further disclosed;
(e) Promptly forward information received by the program to the appropriate law enforcement or public safety agency or school officials. The program is not required to forward information if the call was transferred to the statewide behavioral crisis response system created pursuant to section 27-60-103.
(f) Train law enforcement dispatch centers, school districts, individual schools, and other entities determined by the attorney general on appropriate awareness and response to safe2tell tips. Training materials outlining appropriate response to safe2tell tips may be developed in collaboration with stakeholders to ensure standardized messaging.
(g) Provide safe2tell awareness and educational materials to all elementary and secondary schools in Colorado with a primary focus on targeting marketing materials to Colorado school-age children, teachers, administrators, education professionals, and, subject to available funds, other youth-related organizations, including boys and girls clubs and 4-H extension offices, at no charge to the school or recipient. The materials described in this subsection (2)(g) and subsection (2)(h) of this section must include an explanation of the circumstances pursuant to section 24-31-607 (3) or (4) when a student's report may not remain anonymous.
(h) Provide safe2tell awareness and education materials to Boys & Girls Clubs and 4-H extension offices in Colorado at no charge to the Boys & Girls Clubs and 4-H extension offices on or before June 30, 2017, and annually each fiscal year thereafter;
(i) Develop training curriculum and teaching materials for a train the trainer program;
(j) Annually organize, host, and conduct training in all geographic regions of the state and provide related materials to persons who attend the training at no charge to the attendee;
(k) Provide training and support to all elementary and secondary schools and school districts in Colorado regarding school safety related to the safe2tell program, including answering questions and discussing reports received by the program;
(l) Provide educational materials to all elementary and secondary schools in Colorado aimed at preventing misuse of the program;
(m) Provide technical assistance and support to law enforcement officials and school officials when there is misuse of the program; and
(n) Analyze and follow up with law enforcement and schools to determine the outcome of a report made to the program, including actions taken on the report.
(3) On or before February 1, 2021, the department, in collaboration with stakeholders, shall devise a process and develop standardized protocols so that any communication related to mental health or substance use received by safe2tell, including any communication related to another person, may be transferred, as appropriate, to the statewide behavioral crisis response system created pursuant to section 27-60-103.
(4) Beginning on or before August 1, 2024, the department shall annually convene a training meeting for school resource officers, as described in section 22-32-146, and school officials to discuss best practices in responding to safe2tell reports, including defining roles, communication about a report, outcome reporting, and training resources to improve school resource officers' support of students and school staff. Safe2tell may conduct a survey to collect data and discussions regarding safe2tell operations.
Source: L. 2014: Entire part added, (SB 14-002), ch. 241, p. 890, § 2, effective August 6. L. 2016: (2)(f) and (2)(g) amended and (2)(h), (2)(i), and (2)(j) added, (SB 16-193), ch. 227, p. 867, § 1, effective June 6. L. 2018: (2)(i) amended and (2)(k), (2)(l), (2)(m), and (2)(n) added, (HB 18-1434), ch. 235, p. 1474, § 1, effective August 8. L. 2020: (2)(e), (2)(f), (2)(g), (2)(k), and (2)(l) amended and (3) added, (HB 20-1113), ch. 259, p. 1252, § 1, effective July 8. L. 2021: (2)(g) amended, (SB 21-081), ch. 390, p. 2602, § 2, effective June 30. L. 2023: (4) added, (SB 23-070), ch. 116, p. 421, § 1, effective April 27.
ANNOTATION
A search and seizure of a student by school officials may be reasonable in the context of the fourth amendment if the search and seizure is justified at its inception and conducted in a manner reasonably related in scope to the circumstances that justified the interference in the first place. People in Interest of C.C-S., 2021 COA 127, 503 P.3d 152.
A stale and uncorroborated Safe2Tell tip, however, does not justify the unlawful detention of a student. A court may not rely on admissions made during an unlawful detention of a student and may not uphold the search of a student's backpack if the detention is not supported by reasonable suspicion. People in Interest of C.C-S., 2021 COA 127, 503 P.3d 152.
The exclusionary rule applies in the context of school searches and extends to the actions of school officials to deter fourth amendment violations. People in Interest of C.C-S., 2021 COA 127, 503 P.3d 152.
24-31-607. In camera review - confidentiality of materials - criminal penalty.
(1) (a) The safe2tell program and persons implementing and operating the program shall not be compelled to produce any materials except on the motion of a criminal defendant to the court in which the offense is being tried, supported by an affidavit establishing that the materials contain impeachment evidence or evidence that is exculpatory to the defendant in the trial of that offense.
(b) If the defendant's motion is granted, the court shall conduct an ex parte in camera review of materials produced under the defendant's subpoena.
(c) If the court determines that the produced materials contain impeachment evidence or evidence that is exculpatory to the defendant, the court shall order the materials to be produced to the defendant pursuant to a protective order that includes, at a minimum, the redaction of the reporting party's identity and limitations on the use of the materials, as needed, unless contrary to state or federal law. Any materials excised pursuant to a judicial order following the in camera review shall be sealed and preserved in the records of the court, to be made available to the appellate court in the event of an appeal. After the time for appeal has expired, the court shall return the materials to the program.
(2) (a) Materials created or obtained through the implementation or operation of the program are confidential, and a person shall not disclose the material. The program and persons implementing or operating the program may be compelled to produce the materials only before a court or other tribunal and only pursuant to court order for an in camera review. Any such review shall be limited to an inspection of materials that are material to the specific case pending before the court. The attorney general acting on behalf of the safe2tell program shall have standing in any action to oppose the disclosure of materials in the custody of the safe2tell program.
(b) A person who knowingly discloses materials in violation of the provisions of this subsection (2) commits a class 1 misdemeanor.
(3) Notwithstanding any provision to the contrary, upon request by a law enforcement agency, the attorney general may disclose to law enforcement personnel any materials or information obtained through the implementation or operation of the program if the attorney general reasonably deems such disclosure necessary for the prevention of imminent physical harm or serious bodily injury to one or more persons.
(4) (a) (I) Notwithstanding subsections (2)(a) and (2)(b) of this section, a court may issue a court order for production of records, under seal, on request of a law enforcement agency, public safety agency, or district attorney, for program materials identifying a reporting party if the court, following an in-camera review of an affidavit and any other relevant material or evidence provided under seal by the requesting party, determines probable cause exists that a reporting party to the program knowingly used the program in the commission of false reporting of an emergency, as defined in section 18-8-111 (2), and that release of program materials is justified on balance in view of the probable violation and the program purpose of anonymity.
(II) Any such request for a court order for production of records may be filed only after reasonable notice is provided to the attorney general. The requesting party shall note any response from the attorney general in the affidavit and the court shall consider the note in reviewing any application for a court order under this section.
(b) (I) A court shall order that a warrant issued pursuant to subsection (4)(a) of this section, and any related evidence used to obtain such warrant, be sealed. The program and any law enforcement agency, public safety agency, or district attorney that receives information pursuant to subsection (4)(a) of this section shall keep the information confidential.
(II) (A) A court may lift the sealing and confidentiality of the information, prior to the filing of charges, only on a motion of a district attorney upon showing of good cause following an in-camera review of the information. The district attorney shall provide reasonable notice and the opportunity to respond to the department of any motion to lift the seal filed pursuant to this section, prior to filing a motion pursuant to this section.
(B) Upon filing of charges against any person for charges that rely on information provided pursuant to a court order under this section, any sealing order will immediately expire and the information is subject to discovery obligations and necessary protective orders to preclude further dissemination of the material.
(c) If a district attorney is considering filing any criminal charges as a result of a production of records issued pursuant to subsection (4)(a) of this section, the district attorney shall first consider referring the alleged responsible person for an assessment for suitability to participate in restorative justice practices.
Source: L. 2014: Entire part added, (SB 14-002), ch. 241, p. 891, § 2, effective August 6. L. 2021: (3) and (4) added, (SB 21-081), ch. 390, p. 2601, § 1, effective June 30.
24-31-608. Transfer of property.
(1) On June 30, 2014, all items of property, real and personal, including office furniture and fixtures, books, documents, and records of safe2tell, as it existed prior to said date, may be transferred to the department of law and become the property thereof; except that safe2tell, inc., shall maintain ownership of all intellectual property, including trademarks and service marks, owned by it prior to such date subject to the provisions of section 24-31-609.
(2) On June 30, 2014, any moneys held by the safe2tell nonprofit may be transferred to the safe2tell cash fund created pursuant to section 24-31-610.
Source: L. 2014: Entire part added, (SB 14-002), ch. 241, p. 892, § 2, effective August 6. L. 2015: (2) amended, (SB 15-264), ch. 259, p. 959, § 65, effective August 5.
24-31-609. License of intellectual property.
Commencing on June 30, 2014, all intellectual property of safe2tell, inc., including trademarks and service marks, is licensed to the department of law on a nonexclusive, perpetual, paid-up basis for use by the department of law in connection with the program, including all trademarks or service marks developed by safe2tell, inc., at any point in the future.
Source: L. 2014: Entire part added, (SB 14-002), ch. 241, p. 892, § 2, effective August 6.
24-31-610. Safe2tell cash fund - creation.
(1) There is created in the state treasury the safe2tell cash fund, referred to in this section as the "fund". Moneys in the fund are subject to annual appropriation. The fund consists of:
(a) Fees charged by the department of law to cover the actual costs of producing and distributing manuals and other public awareness materials;
(b) Any revenues received pursuant to section 24-31-108 (2)(b);
(c) Any moneys held by the safe2tell nonprofit as of June 30, 2014, that are transferred to the fund pursuant to section 24-31-608 (2); and
(d) Any moneys that may be appropriated by the general assembly.
(2) All interest derived from the deposit and investment of moneys in the fund are credited to the fund. At the end of each fiscal year, all unexpended and unencumbered moneys in the fund remain in the fund and shall not be credited or transferred to the general fund or any other fund.
Source: L. 2014: Entire part added, (SB 14-002), ch. 241, p. 892, § 2, effective August 6. L. 2015: (1)(c) amended, (SB 15-264), ch. 259, p. 959, § 66, effective August 5. L. 2020: (1)(b) amended, (SB 20-063), ch. 12, p. 56, § 11, effective September 14.
24-31-611. Annual report.
(1) On or before December 1, 2018, and on or before December 1 of each year thereafter, the program shall analyze data from the preceding fiscal year and prepare a written report. The program shall post the report on the program's website and shall submit the report to the education and judiciary committees of the house of representatives and the senate, or any successor committees, by January 1 of the year following publication of the report. The report must include data from the preceding fiscal year concerning the following and any recommendations concerning the following to the extent the information is available:
(a) A summary of outcomes and actions taken on reports made to the program;
(b) The number of safe2tell reports by category, broken down by month;
(c) The total number of incidents of misuse of the program, broken down into categories;
(d) The number of reports received involving a single incident;
(e) The number of times safe2tell was used by a reporting party to make a threat against or otherwise harm another person;
(f) The number of times a reporting party was in crisis and was reporting to the program to obtain assistance and the time it took to identify the reporting party and respond;
(g) The effectiveness of the safe2tell dispatch center in the department of public safety; and
(h) Recommendations regarding how to improve the program based on the available data.
(2) Notwithstanding the provisions of section 24-1-136 (11)(a)(I), the requirement for the report in subsection (1) of this section continues indefinitely.
Source: L. 2018: Entire section added, (HB 18-1434), ch. 235, p. 1475, § 2, effective August 8.
PART 7
COLORADO DOMESTIC VIOLENCE FATALITY REVIEW BOARD
Cross references: For the legislative declaration in SB 17-126, see section 1 of chapter 400, Session Laws of Colorado 2017.
24-31-701. Definitions.
As used in this part 7, unless the context requires otherwise:
(1) "Department" means the department of law.
(2) Repealed.
(3) "Review board" means the Colorado domestic violence fatality review board created in section 24-31-702.
(4) "Review team" means a local or regional domestic violence fatality review team.
Source: L. 2017: Entire part added, (SB 17-126), ch. 400, p. 2082, § 2, effective August 9. L. 2022: (2) repealed, (SB 22-100), ch. 143, p. 941, § 5, effective May 2.
24-31-702. Colorado domestic violence fatality review board - creation - membership - purpose - duties.
(1) The Colorado domestic violence fatality review board is established in the department to:
(a) Examine data collected by review teams during the preceding year;
(b) Identify measures to help prevent domestic violence fatalities and near-death incidents;
(c) Establish uniform methods for collecting, analyzing, and storing data relating to domestic violence fatalities and near-death incidents; and
(d) Make annual policy recommendations concerning domestic violence to the general assembly.
(2) (a) The review board includes the attorney general or his or her designee, who shall act as chair, and at least seventeen but not more than twenty other members, to be appointed by the attorney general on or before October 1, 2017, as follows:
(I) A medical professional with forensic experience;
(II) A domestic violence advocate representing a shelter or other domestic violence service organizations, who may not testify without consent of a victim pursuant to section 13-90-107 (1)(k)(II);
(III) A criminal defense attorney;
(IV) A representative of a law enforcement agency;
(V) The executive director of the department of public health and environment, or his or her designee;
(VI) A representative of a city attorney's office in Colorado who has experience working with victims of domestic violence or prosecuting domestic violence offenders;
(VII) A representative of a statewide nonprofit organization that offers training and expert advice to domestic violence programs that serve survivors of domestic violence, dating violence, and stalking;
(VIII) A representative of the department of human services' adult protection services;
(IX) A representative of the department of human services' child protection services;
(X) A representative of a probation, parole, or community corrections program;
(XI) A representative designated by the Colorado district attorneys' council;
(XII) A representative of a domestic violence treatment provider specializing in offender treatment;
(XIII) Two domestic violence survivors;
(XIV) A representative of the domestic violence offender management board created in section 16-11.8-103;
(XV) A representative of the Denver metro domestic violence fatality review committee;
(XVI) A judge or magistrate; and
(XVII) Such other members as the attorney general may determine, whose contributions would be valuable to the work of the review board; except that the attorney general may not appoint more than two members pursuant to this subsection (2)(a)(XVII).
(b) The review board must, to the extent practicable:
(I) Include members from throughout the state;
(II) Include members with disabilities;
(III) Reflect the ethnic diversity of the state; and
(IV) Include members who have knowledge of and experience with domestic violence.
(c) Members of the review board, other than the attorney general, serve for four-year terms and are eligible for reappointment no more than two times at the expiration of a four-year term.
(d) Members of the review board serve without compensation but may receive per diem and reimbursement for costs, subject to the availability of funds.
(e) The attorney general may fill any vacancies on the review board at any time.
(f) Before commencing service on the review team, each member shall submit the member's fingerprints to the Colorado bureau of investigation for the purposes of a criminal background check. The bureau shall forward the results of each background check to the attorney general. When the results of a fingerprint-based criminal history record check of a member performed pursuant to this section reveal a record of arrest without a disposition, the attorney general shall require that member to submit to a name-based judicial record check, as defined in section 22-2-119.3 (6)(d).
(3) The review board shall convene its first meeting on or before November 1, 2017, and shall meet thereafter as determined by the membership.
(4) Repealed.
(5) Case review data will be stored in the manner determined by the review board. The review board shall work with review teams to incorporate and maintain existing data collection methods.
(6) In addition to collaborating with review teams, the review board may collaborate with other agencies or organizations to fulfill its duties pursuant to this part 7.
(7) Notwithstanding any provision of this section, the review board is authorized to review case data only from cases that have been closed by each law enforcement agency that investigated or prosecuted each such case.
(8) The review board shall provide technical assistance and training to local governments as needed to help establish and maintain a review team and shall provide technical assistance and training to existing review teams as needed.
(9) The review board shall pursue implementation of any review board recommendations pertaining, but not limited to:
(a) Improving communication and information-sharing between public and private organizations and agencies as to domestic violence incidents and risk;
(b) Reducing the incidence of domestic violence and domestic violence fatalities in the state; and
(c) Improving responses to domestic violence incidents.
(10) The review board shall provide any necessary coordination between local governments and organizations to assist with domestic violence prevention and responses to fatalities.
(11) The review board shall make a recommendation in its 2022 annual written report whether and how diversity, equity, and inclusion training could be provided for individuals who provide initial call response functions and could be provided for local boards who may conduct a fatality review to create greater trust between local agencies and victims of domestic violence.
(12) (a) The review board shall coordinate with stakeholders to develop best practices for collecting data on domestic violence-related fatalities.
(b) The review board and local review teams shall coordinate to implement effective information-sharing related to identified domestic violence fatalities.
(13) (a) The review board shall perform outreach to local governments and organizations to promote the development of local review teams.
(b) The review board shall prioritize development and support of local review teams in underserved and rural communities.
Source: L. 2017: Entire part added, (SB 17-126), ch. 400, p. 2082, § 2, effective August 9. L. 2019: (2)(f) amended, (HB 19-1166), ch. 125, p. 550, § 31, effective April 18. L. 2022: (2)(f) amended, (HB 22-1270), ch. 114, p. 522, § 33, effective April 21; (8), (9), (10), (11), (12), and (13) added, (SB 22-100), ch. 143, p. 939, § 1, effective May 2. L. 2026: (4) repealed, (HB 26-1295), ch. 121, p. 521, § 12, effective August 12.
24-31-703. Local and regional domestic violence fatality review teams - creation - membership - purpose - duties.
(1) A city, county, or district court may establish a review team to review fatal and near-fatal incidents of domestic violence, related domestic violence matters, and suicides related to domestic abuse.
(2) In establishing a review team, a city, county, or district court, to the extent practicable, shall select team members with subject-matter expertise from the following entities, with an attempt to reflect the racial and ethnic makeup of the city, county, or judicial district:
(a) Appropriate county departments;
(b) Domestic violence service providers;
(c) Law enforcement agencies;
(d) Prosecutors' offices;
(e) One or more county departments of public health;
(f) One or more county departments of human or social services;
(g) One or more coroner's offices or county medical examiner's offices or designees thereof;
(h) Batterer intervention services providers;
(i) The local parole division of the state board of parole;
(j) The local probation department;
(k) Hospitals;
(l) Judges of the county and district courts;
(m) Clerks of the county and district courts; and
(n) Survivors of domestic violence.
(3) (a) Each review team shall collect data on domestic violence fatalities and near-death incidents, conduct individual case reviews of domestic violence fatalities and near-death incidents, document case characteristics of those case reviews, and report this information to their communities and to the review board.
(b) Each review team shall determine its own structure and activities; except that, to ensure statewide consistency, each review team shall use any uniform method for collecting, analyzing, or storing data that is established by the review board pursuant to section 24-31-702 (1)(c).
(c) Each review team shall determine which incidents to review. A review by a review team may include examination and consideration of:
(I) Events leading up to the domestic violence incident;
(II) Available resources of the criminal legal system and community;
(III) Current laws and policies;
(IV) Actions taken by individuals and agencies, including individuals and agencies of the criminal justice and human services systems, related to the incident and the parties; and
(V) Any other information or action deemed relevant by the review team, including a review of public records and records for which public records exemptions are granted.
(4) Each review team shall submit data and recommendations to the review board:
(a) On or before September 1 of each year following the year in which the review team was established; or
(b) In the case of a review team in existence on August 9, 2017, on or before September 1, 2018, and on or before September 1 each year thereafter.
(5) (a) Notwithstanding subsection (1) of this section, no more than one review team may be created in any judicial district. Review teams in existence on August 9, 2017, are recognized as review teams under this part 7.
(b) Nothing in this section requires the formation of a review team.
(6) If a local or regional child fatality prevention review team is created in a judicial district pursuant to section 25-20.5-404, it may operate as a domestic violence review team pursuant to this section, so long as it:
(a) Uses a uniform method for collecting, analyzing, or storing data that is established by the review board pursuant to section 24-31-702 (1)(c); and
(b) Includes domestic violence expertise from entities described in subsection (2) of this section.
(7) Notwithstanding any provision of this section, a local or regional child fatality prevention review team is authorized to review case data only from cases that have been closed by each law enforcement agency that investigated or prosecuted each such case.
Source: L. 2017: Entire part added, (SB 17-126), ch. 400, p. 2085, § 2, effective August 9.
24-31-704. Access to records - confidentiality - public access - immunity.
(1) (a) Notwithstanding any other state law to the contrary, but subject to the requirements of applicable provisions of federal law, the review board and review teams have access to records and information that are relevant to a review of a domestic violence fatality and that are in the possession of a state or local governmental agency.
(b) The review board and review teams may access mental health and substance abuse treatment records only with the written consent of appropriate parties in accordance with applicable federal and state law.
(2) (a) All review board and review team meetings; activities of the review board and review teams, including activities of any issue-specific panel or ad hoc subcommittee formed by the review board or by review teams; review board and review team meeting notes and statements; health information and medical records obtained by the review board or by review teams; and any information obtained by the department in connection with the review board or review teams are confidential and are not subject to:
(I) The open meetings provisions of the "Colorado Sunshine Act of 1972" set forth in section 24-6-402;
(II) The "Colorado Open Records Act", part 2 of article 72 of title 24; or
(III) Subpoena, discovery, or introduction into evidence in any civil or criminal proceeding, unless the information was obtained from another source that is separate and apart from the review board or review teams.
(b) Each member of the review board, each member of a review team, and each invited participant at a meeting shall sign a statement indicating an understanding of and adherence to confidentiality requirements. A person who knowingly violates confidentiality requirements commits a petty offense and, upon conviction, shall be punished as provided in section 18-1.3-503.
(c) A member of the review board, a member of a review team, a person who attends a review team meeting, and a person who presents information to a review team are not subject to examination in any civil or criminal proceeding concerning information presented to members of the review team or opinions formed by the review team based on that information. A person may, however, be examined concerning information reviewed by the review board or a review team that is otherwise available to the public or that is required to be revealed by that person in an official capacity.
(d) Information, documents, records, notes, memoranda, and data of the review board and the review teams are not subject to subpoena, discovery, or introduction into evidence in any action in any court or before any tribunal, board, agency, or person and may not be exhibited or disclosed in any way by any person unless the information was obtained from another source that is separate and apart from the review board or review teams, except as may be necessary for furthering the duties of the review board or the review teams or in response to an alleged violation of a confidentiality agreement pursuant to subsection (2)(b) of this section.
(3) A member of the review board, a member of a review team, and any person acting as a witness to, incident reporter to, or investigator for the review board or a review team is not liable for any act or proceeding undertaken or performed within the scope of the functions of the review board or review team unless he or she acted in bad faith, with malicious purpose, or in a manner exhibiting wanton and willful disregard of human rights, safety, or property.
Source: L. 2017: Entire part added, (SB 17-126), ch. 400, p. 2087, § 2, effective August 9. L. 2021: (2)(b) amended, (SB 21-271), ch. 462, p. 3226, § 415, effective March 1, 2022.
24-31-705. Colorado domestic violence fatality review board contracts - grants - cash fund created. (Repealed)
Source: L. 2017: Entire part added, (SB 17-126), ch. 400, p. 2088, § 2, effective August 9. L. 2022: Entire section repealed, (SB 22-100), ch. 143, p. 940, § 3, effective May 2.
24-31-706. Repeal of part.
This part 7 is repealed, effective September 1, 2027. Prior to the repeal of this part 7, the domestic violence fatality review board must be reviewed as provided for in section 2-3-1203.
Source: L. 2017: Entire part added, (SB 17-126), ch. 400, p. 2089, § 2, effective August 9. L. 2022: Entire section amended, (SB 22-100), ch. 143, p. 940, § 2, effective May 2.
PART 8
MEDICAID FRAUD CONTROL
Cross references: For the legislative declaration in HB 18-1211, see section 1 of chapter 159, Session Laws of Colorado 2018.
24-31-801. Definitions.
As used in this part 8, unless the context otherwise requires:
(1) "Abuse" means willful infliction of injury, unreasonable confinement, intimidation, or punishment with resulting physical or financial harm or pain or mental anguish, including any acts or omissions that constitute a criminal violation under state law.
(2) "Beneficiary" means any individual who receives goods or services from a provider under the medicaid program.
(3) "Benefit" means any benefit authorized under the "Colorado Medical Assistance Act".
(4) "Claim" means any communication submitted to the medicaid program or to a person that has contracted with the medicaid program, whether oral, written, electronic, or magnetic, that identifies a good, item, or service as reimbursable under the medicaid program; is used to authorize the provision of services under the medicaid program; serves as an invoice for services provided under contract with the medicaid program; or states income or expense and is or may be used to determine a rate of payment under the medicaid program.
(5) "Colorado Medical Assistance Act" means articles 4 to 6 of title 25.5.
(6) "Exploitation" means the wrongful taking or use of funds or property of a patient residing in a health-care facility or board and care facility that constitutes a criminal violation under state law.
(7) "Knowingly" and "willfully" have the same meaning as set forth in section 18-1-501 (6).
(8) "Material information" means an assertion or information directly pertaining to a claim, record, statement, or representation that a reasonable person knows or should know will affect the action, conduct, or decision of the person who receives or is intended to receive the asserted information in a manner that would directly or indirectly benefit the person making the assertion.
(9) "Medicaid fraud and waste" means any act, by commission or omission, as described in section 24-31-808.
(10) "Medicaid program" means the medical assistance program authorized by Title XIX of the federal "Social Security Act" and implemented by the "Colorado Medical Assistance Act".
(11) "Neglect" means willful failure to provide goods and services necessary to avoid physical harm, mental anguish, or mental illness, including any neglect that constitutes a criminal violation under state law.
(12) "Person" means an individual, public or private institution, corporation, partnership, association, or managed care entity.
(13) "Provider" means any person, employee, agent, representative, contractor, or subcontractor of a person:
(a) Who has entered into a provider agreement with the department of health care policy and financing to provide goods or services pursuant to the medicaid program;
(b) Who has entered into an agreement with a party to such a provider agreement under which the person agrees to provide goods or services that are reimbursable under the medicaid program;
(c) Who is reimbursed or receives compensation for delivering, purporting to deliver, or arranging for the delivery of health-care goods or services from the medicaid program;
(d) Who is defined as such in section 25.5-4-103 (19); or
(e) Who is defined as such in section 25.5-4-416 (1).
(14) "Records" means any medical, professional, or business records relating to the treatment or care of any beneficiary, to goods or services provided to any beneficiary, or to rates paid for goods or services provided to any beneficiary and any records that are required to be kept by the rules of the medicaid program.
(15) "Statement or representation" means any oral, written, or electronic communication that is used to identify an item of goods or a service for which reimbursement may be made under the medicaid program or that states income and expense and is or may be used to determine a rate of reimbursement under the medicaid program, that may serve as the basis for the calculation of a payment to a provider, or that may serve as a basis for receiving payment.
(16) "Unit" means the medicaid fraud control unit created in section 24-31-802.
Source: L. 2018: Entire part added, (HB 18-1211), ch. 159, p. 1113, § 2, effective January 1, 2019.
24-31-802. Medicaid fraud control unit - creation - duties.
There is created within the department of law and under the control of the office of the attorney general the medicaid fraud control unit. The unit shall investigate and prosecute fraud, misuse, waste, and abuse committed by medicaid providers and investigate and prosecute cases of patient abuse, neglect, and exploitation.
Source: L. 2018: Entire part added, (HB 18-1211), ch. 159, p. 1114, § 2, effective January 1, 2019.
24-31-803. Medicaid fraud reporting.
The department of health care policy and financing; the department of public health and environment; managed care entities; and their fiscal agents, contractors, or subcontractors, shall refer all cases where the agency or entity has reasonable cause to believe that there is suspected medicaid fraud and waste as well as patient abuse, neglect, and exploitation to the unit for the purpose of investigation, civil action, or criminal action. Nothing contained in this part 8 prohibits the attorney general from pursuing cases of suspected medicaid fraud and waste or patient abuse, neglect, and exploitation cases absent such a referral.
Source: L. 2018: Entire part added, (HB 18-1211), ch. 159, p. 1115, § 2, effective January 1, 2019.
24-31-804. Medicaid fraud control unit - displayed information.
The department of health care policy and financing may require that a notification be included in any explanation of benefits provided to a beneficiary that explains the process and contact information for reporting to the unit suspected medicaid fraud and waste as well as patient abuse, neglect, and exploitation. Any notification required pursuant to this section must be placed in a conspicuous location within the explanation of benefits and must include a statement that all reports to the unit may be filed anonymously by persons suspecting fraudulent activity.
Source: L. 2018: Entire part added, (HB 18-1211), ch. 159, p. 1115, § 2, effective January 1, 2019.
24-31-805. Medicaid fraud control unit authority and responsibilities.
(1) In carrying out the responsibilities of this section, the unit has the authority to:
(a) Investigate and prosecute civil actions and proceedings, pursuant to section 25.5-4-301 (2) or sections 25.5-4-303.5 to 25.5-4-310;
(b) Investigate and prosecute criminal medicaid fraud and waste pursuant to this part 8 and title 18;
(c) Investigate and prosecute patient abuse, neglect, or exploitation provided that prior to the filing of any criminal charges involving patient abuse, neglect, or exploitation by either complaint or grand jury indictment the unit shall first consult with the district attorney of the judicial district where the prosecution would be initiated. If after such consultation the district attorney agrees with the filing of charges, the unit shall cross-designate the district attorney or his or her designated assistant or deputy district attorney as a special assistant attorney general on the case. If after such consultation the district attorney does not agree with the filing of charges, the unit may file the case independently.
(d) Issue or cause to be issued civil investigative demands and subpoenas or other process in aid of investigations and prosecutions;
(e) Administer oaths and take sworn statements under penalty of perjury; and
(f) Serve and execute, in any county, search warrants that relate to investigations.
Source: L. 2018: Entire part added, (HB 18-1211), ch. 159, p. 1115, § 2, effective January 1, 2019.
24-31-806. Civil investigative demands and subpoenas.
(1) Civil investigative demands issued pursuant to this part 8 are subject to the requirements of section 25.5-4-309.
(2) Subpoenas issued pursuant to this part 8 must comply with the provisions of article 90 of title 13 and any court rule.
(3) Any testimony obtained pursuant to a civil investigative demand issued pursuant to this section is not admissible in evidence in any criminal prosecution against the person compelled to testify pursuant to the civil investigative demand. The provisions of this subsection (3) do not prevent the attorney general from independently producing or obtaining the same or similar facts, information, or evidence for use in any criminal prosecution.
Source: L. 2018: Entire part added, (HB 18-1211), ch. 159, p. 1116, § 2, effective January 1, 2019.
24-31-807. Provider applications - false statements - penalties.
(1) Each application to participate as a provider in the medicaid program, including amendments, updates, renewals, or revalidations thereof; each report stating income or expense upon which rates of payment are or may be based; and each invoice for payment for a good or service provided to a beneficiary must contain a statement that all matters stated therein are true and accurate, and the statement must be signed by the individual authorized by the provider.
(2) An application under subsection (1) of this section is a public record or instrument as described in section 18-5-102 (1)(d).
Source: L. 2018: Entire part added, (HB 18-1211), ch. 159, p. 1116, § 2, effective January 1, 2019.
24-31-808. Medicaid fraud and waste - penalties - definition.
(1) A person commits medicaid fraud and waste when that person knowingly and willfully:
(a) With intent to defraud, makes a claim, or causes a claim to be made, knowing the claim contains material information that is false, in whole or in part, by commission or omission;
(b) With intent to defraud, makes a statement or representation, or causes a statement or representation to be made, for use in obtaining or seeking to obtain authorization to provide a good or a service, knowing the statement or representation contains material information that is false, in whole or in part, by commission or omission;
(c) With intent to defraud, makes a statement or representation, or causes a statement or representation to be made, for use by another in obtaining a good or a service under the medicaid program, knowing the statement or representation contains material information that is false, in whole or in part, by commission or omission;
(d) With intent to defraud, makes a statement or representation, or causes a statement or representation to be made, for use in qualifying as a provider of a good or service under the medicaid program, knowing the statement or representation contains material information that is false, in whole or in part, by commission or omission;
(e) With intent to defraud, signs or submits, or causes to be signed or submitted, a statement described in section 24-31-807 with the knowledge that the application, report, claim, or invoice for services provided under contract contains material information that is false, in whole or in part, by commission or omission;
(f) Except as authorized by law, and without consent of the beneficiary, charges any beneficiary money or other consideration in addition to or in excess of rates of remuneration established under the medicaid program for the services provided to the beneficiary;
(g) Having submitted a claim for or received payment for a good or a service under the medicaid program:
(I) With the intent to prevent their disclosure and review by representatives of the state or their designees, alters, falsifies, or conceals any records that are necessary to fully disclose the nature of all goods or services for which the claim was submitted, or for which reimbursement was received; destroys or removes such records; or fails to maintain such records as required by law or the rules of the department of health care policy and financing for a period of at least six years following the date on which payment was received; or
(II) Alters, falsifies, or conceals any records that are necessary to disclose fully all income and expenditures upon which rates of reimbursements were based, or destroys or removes such records with the intent to prevent their review by representatives of the state or their designees;
(h) Makes or causes to be made a statement or representation for use in qualifying as a provider of a good or service under the medicaid program stating that he or she is in compliance with all provisions of section 25.5-4-416, knowing that the statement or representation contains material information that is false, in whole or in part, through commission or omission; or
(i) Except as authorized by law, and without consent of the beneficiary, recovers or attempts to recover payment from a beneficiary under the medicaid program or from the beneficiary's family or fails to credit the state for payments received from other sources.
(2) Absent knowing or willful conduct, a provider is not liable for medicaid fraud and waste committed by a third party. A provider does not knowingly and willfully violate a requirement, standard, or directive contained in written materials issued by the department of health care policy and financing that was not promulgated in accordance with the "State Administrative Procedure Act", article 4 of title 24, unless the provider has actual knowledge of such requirement, standard, or directive at the time of the violation.
(3) Medicaid fraud in violation of subsections (1)(a) to (1)(c) or (1)(f) of this section is:
(a) A petty offense if the aggregate amount of payments illegally claimed or received is less than three hundred dollars;
(b) Repealed.
(c) A class 2 misdemeanor if the aggregate amount of payments illegally claimed or received is three hundred dollars or more but less than one thousand dollars;
(d) A class 1 misdemeanor if the aggregate amount of payments illegally claimed or received is one thousand dollars or more but less than two thousand dollars;
(e) A class 6 felony where the aggregate amount of payments illegally claimed or received is two thousand dollars or more but less than five thousand dollars;
(f) A class 5 felony where the aggregate amount of payments illegally claimed or received is five thousand dollars or more but less than twenty thousand dollars;
(g) A class 4 felony where the aggregate amount of payments illegally claimed or received is twenty thousand dollars or more but less than one hundred thousand dollars;
(h) A class 3 felony where the aggregate amount of payments illegally claimed or received is one hundred thousand dollars or more but less than one million dollars; and
(i) A class 2 felony where the aggregate amount of payments illegally claimed or received is one million dollars or more.
(4) Medicaid fraud as a violation of subsection (1)(d), (1)(e), (1)(g), (1)(h), or (1)(i) of this section is a class 5 felony and shall be punished as provided in section 18-1.3-401.
(5) A person may not be convicted of medicaid fraud and waste in addition to theft or forgery with respect to the same transaction.
Source: L. 2018: Entire part added, (HB 18-1211), ch. 159, p. 1116, § 2, effective January 1, 2019. L. 2021: (3)(a), (3)(c), and (3)(d) amended (SB 21-271), ch. 462, p. 3226, § 416, effective March 1, 2022; (3)(b)(II) added by revision (SB 21-271), ch. 462, pp. 3226, 3331, §§ 416, 803.
Editor's note: Subsection (3)(b)(II) provided for the repeal of subsection (3)(b), effective March 1, 2022. (See L. 2021, p. 3226.)
24-31-809. Unlawful remuneration - penalties.
(1) Except as provided in subsection (2) of this section, it is unlawful for any person to knowingly offer, pay, solicit, or receive any remuneration including, but not limited to, any kickback, bribe, or rebate, directly or indirectly, overtly or covertly, in cash or in kind:
(a) In return for the referral of an individual to a person for the furnishing or arranging of any good or service for which payment may be made in whole or in part pursuant to the "Colorado Medical Assistance Act"; or
(b) In return for purchasing, leasing, ordering, or arranging for or recommending the purchase, lease, or ordering of any good, facility, service, or item for which payment may be made in whole or in part pursuant to the "Colorado Medical Assistance Act".
(2) It shall not be unlawful under subsection (1) of this section if the remuneration obtained by the provider or other entity is:
(a) Permitted pursuant to section 25.5-4-414 or any statutory exceptions or safe harbor regulations under the federal "Anti-Kickback Statute", 42 U.S.C. sec. 1320a-7b (b), as amended;
(b) Properly disclosed and appropriately reflected in the claims or cost documents submitted under the "Colorado Medical Assistance Act";
(c) Paid by an employer to an employee who has a bona fide employment relationship with such employer for employment in providing the service; or
(d) Paid by a vendor of goods or services to a person authorized to act as a purchasing agent for a group of providers, and:
(I) The person has a written contract with the providers that specifies the amount to be paid to the person, which amount may be a fixed amount or a fixed percentage of the value of the purchase made by the person; or
(II) In the case of a provider of services, the person discloses, in such form and manner as the department of health care policy and financing requires, to the provider and, upon request, to the department of health care policy and financing the amount received from each such vendor with respect to purchases made by or on behalf of the provider.
(3) A violation of this section is a class 2 misdemeanor and shall be punished as provided in section 18-1.3-501.
Source: L. 2018: Entire part added, (HB 18-1211), ch. 159, p. 1118, § 2, effective January 1, 2019. L. 2021: (3) amended, (SB 21-271), ch. 462, p. 3227, § 417, effective March 1, 2022.
24-31-810. Other remedies available.
(1) The provisions of this part 8 are not intended to be exclusive remedies and do not preclude the use of any other criminal prosecution directly related to criminal medicaid fraud and waste, as well as criminal patient abuse, neglect, and exploitation, or any other civil remedy for any act that is in violation of this part 8.
(2) In addition to any penalties provided for in this part 8, a claim under the "Colorado Medical Assistance Act" that includes items or services resulting from a violation of this part 8 or the federal "Anti-Kickback Statute", 42 U.S.C. 1320a-7b (b), as amended, constitutes a false claim for purposes of the "Colorado Medicaid False Claims Act", sections 25.5-4-303.5 to 25.5-4-310.
Source: L. 2018: Entire part added, (HB 18-1211), ch. 159, p. 1119, § 2, effective January 1, 2019.
24-31-811. Limitation of action - three years.
An action brought under this part 8 must be commenced within three years after the date of discovery of the commission of the offense, but no later than six years after the date of the commission of the offense. When a violation of this section is based on a series of acts performed at different times, the limitation period starts at the time the last act in the series is discovered.
Source: L. 2018: Entire part added, (HB 18-1211), ch. 159, p. 1120, § 2, effective January 1, 2019.
PART 9
LAW ENFORCEMENT INTEGRITY
Cross references: For the legislative declaration in SB 20-217, see section 1 of chapter 110, Session Laws of Colorado 2020.
24-31-901. Definitions.
As used in this part 9, unless the context otherwise requires:
(1) "Contact" means an in-person interaction with an individual, whether or not the person is in a motor vehicle, initiated by a peace officer, whether consensual or nonconsensual, for the purpose of enforcing the law or investigating possible violations of the law. "Contact" does not include routine interactions with the public at the point of entry or exit from a controlled area; a non-investigatory and consensual interaction with a member of the public, initiated by a member of the public, unless and until the interaction progresses into an investigation of a possible violation of the law; a motorist assist; undercover interactions; or routine interactions with persons detained in a jail or detention facility.
(1.5) "Decedent" means a person whose death is caused by a peace officer's use of force.
(1.7) "Decedent's immediate family" means the spouse, a child by birth or adoption, a stepchild, the parent, the stepparent, a sibling, a legal guardian, a significant other, or a lawful representative of the decedent.
(2) "Demographic information" means race, ethnicity, sex, and approximate age.
(2.5) "Exonerated" means dismissal of charges by the court or appropriate prosecutor or a not guilty verdict in a criminal prosecution, a finding of no liability in a civil action, a finding of no culpability or no liability or similar determination in an administrative proceeding, or a finding of not sustained in an internal investigation; except that a finding of no culpability or no liability in an administrative proceeding or a finding of not sustained in an internal investigation does not mean "exonerated" if the officer is found guilty in a subsequent criminal prosecution for the same conduct or found liable for the same conduct in a civil action.
(2.8) "Lawful representative" means a person who is designated by a decedent or appointed by the court to act in the best interests of the decedent.
(3) "Peace officer" means any person employed by a political subdivision of the state required to be certified by the P.O.S.T. board pursuant to section 16-2.5-102, a Colorado state patrol officer as described in section 16-2.5-114, and any noncertified deputy sheriff as described in section 16-2.5-103 (2).
(4) "Physical force" means the application of physical techniques or tactics, chemical agents, or weapons to another person.
(4.5) "P.O.S.T. board" means the peace officers standards and training board created in section 24-31-302.
(5) "Serious bodily injury" has the same meaning as in section 18-1-901 (3)(p).
(5.5) "Significant other" means a person who is in a family-type living arrangement with a decedent and who would constitute a spouse of the decedent if the decedent and the person were married.
(6) "Tamper" means to intentionally damage, disable, dislodge, or obstruct the sight or sound or otherwise impair functionality of the body-worn camera or to intentionally damage, delete, or fail to upload some or all portions of the video and audio.
(7) "Weapon" means a firearm, long gun, taser, baton, nun chucks, or projectile.
Source: L. 2020: Entire part added, (SB 20-217), ch. 110, p. 445, § 2, effective June 19. L. 2021: (1) amended and (2.5), (4.5), and (7) added, (HB 21-1250), ch. 458, p. 3054, § 1, effective July 6. L. 2026: (1.5), (1.7), (2.8), and (5.5) added, (SB 26-190), ch. 337, p. 2047, § 2, effective June 3.
Cross references: For the legislative declaration in SB 26-190, see section 1 of chapter 337, Session Laws of Colorado 2026.
24-31-902. Incident recordings - release - tampering - fine.
(1) (a) (I) By July 1, 2023, all local law enforcement agencies in the state and the Colorado state patrol shall provide body-worn cameras for each peace officer of the law enforcement agency who interacts with members of the public. Law enforcement agencies may seek funding pursuant to section 24-33.5-519.
(II) (A) Except as provided in subsection (1)(a)(II)(B) or (1)(a)(II)(C) of this section, a peace officer shall wear and activate a body-worn camera or dash camera, if the peace officer's vehicle is equipped with a dash camera, when responding to a call for service, entering into a premises for the purposes of enforcing the law or in response to a call for service, during a welfare check except for a motorist assist, or during any interaction with the public initiated by the peace officer, whether consensual or nonconsensual, for the purpose of enforcing the law or investigating possible violations of the law. The body-worn camera or dash camera does not need to be on when en route to a call for service, but should be turned on shortly before the vehicle approaches the scene.
(B) A peace officer may turn off a body-worn camera to avoid recording personal information that is not case related; when working on an unrelated assignment; when there is a long break in the incident; and in administrative, tactical, and management discussions when civilians are not present.
(C) A peace officer does not need to wear or activate a body-worn camera if the peace officer is working undercover.
(D) The provisions of this subsection (1)(a)(II) do not apply to jail peace officers or staff of a local law enforcement agency working in any place in the jail that has functioning video cameras; except that this subsection (1)(a)(II) applies to jail peace officers when performing a task that requires an anticipated use of force, including cell extractions and restraint chairs. The provisions of this subsection (1)(a)(II) also do not apply to the civilian or administrative staff of the Colorado state patrol or a local law enforcement agency, the executive detail of the Colorado state patrol, and peace officers working in a courtroom.
(E) Notwithstanding any other provision of this section, a peace officer shall not activate a body-worn camera or dash camera and capture, view, or otherwise record the defense viewing, inspecting, or discussing the viewing or inspection of a tangible object held in connection with a criminal case. When the defense views or inspects evidence pursuant to section 16-9-801, it is not an interaction with the public initiated by the peace officer, and the defense, including members of the defense team, are not members of the public. It is also not for the purpose of enforcing the law or investigating possible violations of the law.
(III) If a peace officer fails to activate a body-worn camera or dash camera as required by this section or tampers with body-worn- or dash-camera footage or operation when required to activate the camera, there is a permissive inference in any investigation or legal proceeding, excluding criminal proceedings against the peace officer, that the missing footage would have reflected misconduct by the peace officer. If a peace officer fails to activate or reactivate his or her body-worn camera as required by this section or tampers with body-worn- or dash-camera footage or operation when required to activate the camera, any statements or conduct sought to be introduced in a prosecution through the peace officer related to the incident that were not recorded due to the peace officer's failure to activate or reactivate the body-worn camera as required by this section or if the statement or conduct was not recorded by other means creates a rebuttable presumption of inadmissibility. Notwithstanding any other provision of law, this subsection (1)(a)(III) does not apply if the body-worn camera was not activated due to a malfunction of the body-worn camera and the peace officer was not aware of the malfunction, or was unable to rectify it, prior to the incident, provided that the law enforcement agency's documentation shows the peace officer checked the functionality of the body-worn camera at the beginning of his or her shift.
(IV) (A) In addition to any criminal liability and penalty under the law, if a court, administrative law judge, hearing officer, or a final decision in an internal investigation finds that a peace officer intentionally failed to activate a body-worn camera or dash camera or tampered with any body-worn or dash camera, except as permitted in this section, the peace officer's employer shall impose discipline up to and including termination, to the extent permitted by applicable constitutional and statutory personnel laws and case law.
(B) In addition to any criminal liability and penalty under the law, if a court, administrative law judge, hearing officer, or a final decision in an internal investigation finds that a peace officer intentionally failed to activate a body-worn camera or dash camera or tampered with any body-worn or dash camera, except as permitted in this section, with the intent to conceal unlawful or inappropriate actions or obstruct justice, the P.O.S.T. board shall suspend the peace officer's certification for a period of not less than one year and the suspension may only be lifted within the period of the suspension if the peace officer is exonerated by a court, administrative law judge, or internal affairs investigation.
(C) In addition to any criminal liability and penalty under the law, if a court, administrative law judge, hearing officer, or a final decision in an internal investigation finds that a peace officer intentionally failed to activate a body-worn camera or dash camera or tampered with any body-worn or dash camera, except as permitted in this section, with the intent to conceal unlawful or inappropriate actions, or obstruct justice, in an incident resulting in a civilian death or serious bodily injury, the P.O.S.T. board shall permanently revoke the peace officer's certification and the revocation may only be overturned if the peace officer is exonerated by a court, administrative law judge, or internal affairs investigation.
(b) A local law enforcement agency and the Colorado state patrol shall establish and follow a retention schedule for body-worn camera recordings in compliance with Colorado state archives rules and direction.
(2) (a) (I) For all incidents in which there is a complaint to the law enforcement agency involved in alleged misconduct of peace officer misconduct that does not result in a decedent's death, the law enforcement agency that employs the peace officer shall release, upon request of any person, all unedited video and audio recordings of the incident, including those from body-worn cameras, dash cameras, or otherwise collected through investigation, to the person who made the request within twenty-one days after the request.
(II) For all incidents in which there is a complaint of peace officer misconduct to the law enforcement agency involved in the alleged misconduct arising from a peace officer's use of force that results in a decedent's death, the law enforcement agency that employs the peace officer shall release, upon request of any person, all unedited video and audio recordings of the incident, including those from body-worn cameras, dash cameras, or otherwise collected through investigation, to the person who made the request following the expiration of the twenty-one-day period described in subsection (2)(b)(I) of this section.
(III) Upon completion of an internal investigation, including any appeals process, that examines an incident of use of force by a peace officer that results in death; the completion of the investigation of a use of force by a peace officer that results in death by the multi-agency team described in section 16-25-302 and the issuance of the report required by section 20-1-114; and the completion of a criminal case arising from the incident, including any appeals, the video and audio recordings depicting the death shall be released to the decedent's immediate family and a person designated by the decedent's immediate family, upon request, notwithstanding the requirements of section 24-31-902 (2)(b)(III) and section 24-31-902 (2)(c).
(b) (I) For all incidents in which the use of force by a peace officer results in a decedent's death, the law enforcement agency that employs the peace officer shall make reasonable efforts to identify the decedent's immediate family and provide all video and audio recordings depicting the decedent's death to each identified member of the decedent's immediate family and a person designated by the decedent's immediate family, unless the family member or designated person declines, within twenty-one days after the incident. The person shall be notified of their right, pursuant to section 24-4.1-302.5 (1)(j.8), to receive and review the recording at least seventy-two hours prior to a public disclosure made pursuant to subsection (2)(a)(II) of this section.
(II) (A) Notwithstanding any other provision of this section, any video that raises substantial privacy concerns for criminal defendants, victims, witnesses, juveniles, or informants, including video depicting nudity; a sexual assault; a medical emergency; private medical information; a mental health crisis; a victim interview; a minor, including any images or information that might undermine the requirement to keep certain juvenile records confidential; any personal information other than the name of any person not arrested, cited, charged, or issued a written warning, including a government-issued identification number, date of birth, address, or financial information; significantly explicit and gruesome bodily injury, unless the injury was caused by a peace officer; or the interior of a home or treatment facility, shall be blurred to protect the substantial privacy interest while still allowing public release. Unblurred footage shall not be released without the written authorization of the victim or, if the victim is deceased or incapacitated, the written authorization of the victim's next of kin. A person seventeen years of age and under is considered incapacitated, unless legally emancipated. This subsection (2)(b)(II)(A) does not permit the removal of any portion of the video.
(B) If blurring is insufficient to protect the substantial privacy interest, the local law enforcement agency or the Colorado state patrol shall, upon request, release the video to the victim or, if the victim is deceased or incapacitated, to the victim's spouse, parent, legal guardian, child, sibling, grandparent, grandchild, significant other, or other lawful representative within twenty days after receipt of the complaint of misconduct. In cases in which the recording is not released to the public pursuant to this subsection (2)(b)(II)(B), the local law enforcement agency shall notify the person whose privacy interest is implicated, if contact information is known, within twenty days after receipt of the complaint of misconduct, and inform the person of his or her right to waive the privacy interest.
(C) A witness, victim, or criminal defendant may waive in writing the individual privacy interest that may be implicated by public release. Upon receipt of a written waiver of the applicable privacy interest, accompanied by a request for release, the law enforcement agency may not redact or withhold release to protect that privacy interest.
(III) Any video that would substantially interfere with or jeopardize an active or ongoing investigation may be withheld from the public; except that the video shall be released no later than forty-five days from the date of the allegation of misconduct; except that in a case in which the only offenses charged are statutory traffic infractions, the release of the video may be delayed pursuant to rule 8 of the Colorado rules for traffic infractions. In all cases when release of a video is delayed in reliance on this subsection (2)(b)(III), the prosecuting attorney shall prepare a written explanation of the interference or jeopardy that justifies the delayed release, contemporaneous with the refusal to release the video. Upon release of the video, the prosecuting attorney shall release the written explanation to the public.
(c) If criminal charges have been filed against any party to the incident, that party must file any constitutional objection to release of the recording in the pending criminal case before the twenty-one-day period expires. Only in cases in which there is a pending criminal investigation or prosecution of a party to the incident, the twenty-one-day period shall begin from the date of appointment of counsel, the filing of an entry of appearance by counsel, or the election to proceed pro se by the defendant, receipt of the criminal complaint, and the defendant's receipt of the video in discovery in the criminal prosecution made on the record before a judge. If the defendant elects to proceed pro se in the criminal case, the court shall advise the defendant of the twenty-one-day deadline for the defendant to file any constitutional objection to release of the recording in the pending criminal case as part of the court's advisement. The court shall hold a hearing on any objection no later than seven days after it is filed and issue a ruling no later than three days after the hearing. The hearing is considered a critical stage as defined in section 24-4.1-302 and gives victims the right to be heard pursuant to section 24-4.1-302.5.
(3) Subsection (1)(a)(III) of this section, as it relates to only an officer tampering with body-worn or dash-camera footage or operation, and subsection (2) of this section apply on and after July 6, 2021, when a peace officer is wearing a body-worn camera or the officer's vehicle is equipped with a dash camera. If a peace officer is wearing a body-worn camera or the officer's vehicle is equipped with a dash camera, the remaining portions of this section apply on and after July 1, 2022. This section does not require a law enforcement agency to provide its law enforcement officers with body-worn cameras prior to July 1, 2023.
Source: L. 2020: Entire part added, (SB 20-217), ch. 110, p. 446, § 2, effective July 6, 2021. L. 2021: (1)(a)(I), (1)(a)(II)(A), (1)(a)(II)(B), (1)(a)(II)(D), (1)(a)(III), (1)(a)(IV)(B), (1)(a)(IV)(C), (2)(a), (2)(b)(II), (2)(b)(III), and (2)(c) amended and (3) added, (HB 21-1250), ch. 458, p. 3055, § 2, effective July 6. L. 2025: (1)(a)(II)(E) added, (HB 25-1114), ch. 34, p. 175, § 2, effective July 1. L. 2026: (2)(a) and (2)(b)(I) amended, (SB 26-190), ch. 337, p. 2048, § 3, effective June 3.
Editor's note: Section 23 of House Bill 21-1250 changed the effective date of this section, as enacted in Senate Bill 20-217, from July 1, 2023, to the effective date of House Bill 21-1250, July 6, 2021. (See L. 2021, p. 3074.)
Cross references: For the legislative declaration in SB 26-190, see section 1 of chapter 337, Session Laws of Colorado 2026.
ANNOTATION
The prosecution should have the opportunity to present evidence explaining an officer's failure to activate their body-worn camera. People v. Havens, 2025 CO 65, 580 P.3d 1179.
Subsection (2) required the release of body-worn camera footage to a media company, where footage was blurred to protect the substantial privacy rights of the minor shown in the footage as required by subsection (2)(b)(II)(A).The privacy interests of the minor shown in the footage could be adequately protected by blurring the minor's head, including her distinctive and identifying hair color, and muting the audio footage was not required. The substantial privacy interests at issue included the individual's status as a minor, the depiction of gruesome bodily injury, and the inherent privacy interests associated with dying. Ion Media Networks, Inc. v. West, 2025 COA 66, 576 P.3d 225.
This section, rather than § 19-1-304, controls release of body-worn camera footage showing a minor. Body-worn camera footage is not a juvenile record under § 19-1-304. Ion Media Networks, Inc. v. West, 2025 COA 66, 576 P.3d 225.
24-31-903. Division of criminal justice report.
(1) Beginning July 1, 2023, the division of criminal justice in the department of public safety shall create an annual report including all of the information that is reported to the division pursuant to subsection (2) of this section, aggregated and broken down by the law enforcement agency that employs peace officers, along with the underlying data.
(2) Beginning April 1, 2022, the Colorado state patrol and each local law enforcement agency that employs peace officers shall report to the division of criminal justice the following using data-collection methods developed for this purpose by the division of criminal justice in conjunction with the Colorado bureau of investigation and local law enforcement agencies:
(a) All use of force by its peace officers that results in death or serious bodily injury or that involves the use of a weapon, including:
(I) The date, time, and location of the use of force;
(II) The perceived demographic information of the person contacted, provided that the identification of these characteristics is based on the observation and perception of the peace officer making the contact and other available data;
(III) The names of all peace officers who were at the scene, identified by whether the peace officer was involved in the use of force or not; except that the identity of other peace officers at the scene not directly involved in the use of force shall be identified by the officer's identification number issued by the P.O.S.T. board unless the peace officer is charged criminally or is a defendant to a civil suit as a result arising from the use of force;
(IV) The type of force used, the severity and nature of the injury, whether the peace officer suffered physical injury, and the severity of the peace officer's injury;
(V) Whether the peace officer was on duty at the time of the use of force;
(VI) Whether a peace officer unholstered or brandished a weapon during the incident, and, if so, the type of weapon;
(VII) Whether a peace officer discharged a weapon during the incident;
(VIII) Whether the use of force resulted in a law enforcement agency investigation and the result of the investigation;
(IX) Whether the use of force resulted in a civilian complaint and the resolution of that complaint;
(X) Whether an ambulance was called to the scene and whether a person was transported to a hospital from the scene whether in an ambulance or other transportation; and
(XI) Whether the person contacted exhibited a weapon during the interaction leading up to the injury or death, and, if so, the type of weapon and whether it was discovered before or after the use of force;
(b) All instances when a peace officer resigned while under investigation for violating department policy;
(c) All data relating to contacts and entries into a residence, including a forcible entry, conducted by its peace officers, including:
(I) The perceived demographic information of the person contacted provided that the identification of these characteristics is based on the observation and perception of the peace officer making the contact and other available data; except that this subsection (2)(c)(I) does not apply to a person contacted who is a witness to a crime or a survivor of a crime;
(II) Whether the contact was a traffic stop;
(II.5) Whether the contact was a showup, as defined in section 16-1-110 (1)(b);
(III) The time, date, and location of the contact;
(IV) The duration of the contact;
(V) The reason for the contact;
(VI) The suspected crime;
(VII) The result of the contact, such as:
(A) No action, warning, citation, property seizure, or arrest;
(B) If a warning or citation was issued, the warning provided or violation cited;
(C) If an arrest was made, the offense charged;
(D) If the contact was a traffic stop, the information collected, which is limited to the driver;
(E) If the contact was a showup, the information collected pursuant to section 16-1-109 (6) for the eyewitness and the subject.
(VIII) The actions taken by the peace officer during the contact, including but not limited to whether:
(A) The peace officer asked for consent to search the person, and, if so, whether consent was provided;
(B) The peace officer searched the person, a vehicle, or any property, and, if so, the basis for the search and the type of contraband or evidence discovered, if any;
(C) The peace officer seized any property and, if so, the type of property that was seized and the basis for seizing the property;
(D) A peace officer unholstered or brandished a weapon during the contact, and, if so, the type of weapon; and
(E) A peace officer discharged a weapon during the contact;
(d) All instances of unannounced entry into a residence, with or without a warrant, including:
(I) The date, time, and location of the use of unannounced entry;
(II) The perceived demographic information of the subject of the unannounced entry, provided that the identification of these characteristics is based on the observation and perception of the peace officer making the entry and other available data;
(III) Whether a peace officer unholstered or brandished a weapon during the unannounced entry, and, if so, the type of weapon; and
(IV) Whether a peace officer discharged a weapon during the unannounced entry.
(e) The number of officer-involved civilian deaths.
(3) The Colorado state patrol and local law enforcement agencies shall not report the name, address, social security number, or other unique personal identifying information of the subject of the use of force, victim of the official misconduct, eyewitness or subject in a showup, or persons contacted, searched, or subjected to a property seizure. Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary, the data reported pursuant to this section is available to the public pursuant to subsection (4) of this section.
(4) The division of criminal justice shall maintain a statewide database with data collected pursuant to this section, in a searchable format, and publish the database on its website.
(5) The Colorado state patrol and any local law enforcement agency that fails to meet its reporting requirements pursuant to this section is:
(a) Subject to the suspension of its funding by its appropriating authority; and
(b) Unless the Colorado state patrol or local law enforcement agency is working with the division of criminal justice to meet its reporting requirements pursuant to this section, not eligible to be awarded grants under the multidisciplinary crime prevention grant program in section 24-33.5-527, the law enforcement workforce recruitment, retention, and tuition grant program in section 24-33.5-528, or the state's mission for assistance in recruiting and training (SMART) policing grant program in section 24-33.5-529.
Source: L. 2020: Entire part added, (SB 20-217), ch. 110, p. 449, § 2, effective June 19. L. 2021: IP(2), IP(2)(a), (2)(a)(VI), (2)(a)(VII), (2)(a)(VIII), (2)(a)(IX), IP(2)(c), (2)(c)(I), (2)(c)(VIII)(B), (2)(c)(VIII)(D), (2)(c)(VIII)(E), (2)(d)(III), (2)(d)(IV), and (2)(e) amended and (2)(a)(X) and (2)(a)(XI) added, (HB 21-1250), ch. 458, p. 3058, § 3, effective July 6; (2)(c)(II.5) and (2)(c)(VII)(E) added and (3) amended, (HB 21-1142), ch. 312, p. 1906, § 4, effective September 7. L. 2024: (5) amended, (HB 24-1421), ch. 125, p. 416, § 1, effective July 1 (see editor's note).
Editor's note: Section 6 of HB 24-1421 (L. 2024, ch. 125) was amended by section 1 of SB 24-215 (L. 2024, ch. 164) to change the effective date of HB 24-1421 from April 29, 2024, to July 1, 2024.
Cross references: For the legislative declaration in HB 21-1142, see section 1 of chapter 312, Session Laws of Colorado 2021.
24-31-904. Peace officer certification discipline - definition.
(1) (a) Notwithstanding any provision of law, the P.O.S.T. board shall permanently revoke a peace officer's certification if:
(I) The P.O.S.T. certified peace officer is convicted of or pleads guilty or nolo contendere to a crime involving the unlawful use of physical force or a crime involving the failure to intervene in the use of unlawful force and the incident resulted in serious bodily injury or death to another person;
(II) Repealed.
(III) An administrative law judge, hearing officer, or internal investigation finds that a peace officer used unlawful physical force, failed to intervene, or violated section 18-1-707, and the incident resulted in serious bodily injury or death to another person;
(IV) An administrative law judge, hearing officer, or internal investigation finds that a peace officer failed to intervene pursuant to section 18-8-805 (5) and the incident resulted in death to another person;
(V) An administrative law judge, hearing officer, or internal investigation finds that a peace officer violated section 18-8-805 (1) or (2)(a)(I) and the incident resulted in death to another person; or
(VI) An administrative law judge, hearing officer, or internal investigation finds that a peace officer perpetrated an act that constitutes sexual assault, as described in section 18-3-402; unlawful sexual contact, as described in section 18-3-404; or invasion of privacy for sexual gratification, as described in section 18-3-405.6, and the act involved a person in the custody of a local detention facility.
(b) The P.O.S.T. board shall not, under any circumstances, reinstate the peace officer's certification or grant new certification to the peace officer unless the peace officer is exonerated by an administrative law judge, hearing officer, or court. The P.O.S.T. board shall record each peace officer whose certification is revoked pursuant to this section in the database created pursuant to section 24-31-303 (1)(r).
(1.5) The P.O.S.T. board may permanently revoke a peace officer's certification if the P.O.S.T.-certified peace officer is found civilly liable for the use of excessive or unconstitutional physical force or is found civilly liable for failure to intervene in the use of excessive or unconstitutional force, and the incident resulted in serious bodily injury or death to another person.
(2) (a) Notwithstanding any provision of law, the P.O.S.T. board shall suspend a peace officer's certification for at least a year if:
(I) The P.O.S.T. certified peace officer is convicted of or pleads guilty or nolo contendere to a crime involving the unlawful use or threatened use of physical force or a crime involving the failure to intervene in the use of unlawful force and the incident did not result in serious bodily injury or death to another person;
(II) Repealed.
(III) An administrative law judge, hearing officer, or internal investigation finds that a peace officer used or threatened to use unlawful physical force, failed to intervene, or violated section 18-1-707, and the incident did not result in serious bodily injury or death to another person; or
(IV) An administrative law judge, hearing officer, or internal investigation finds that a peace officer failed to intervene pursuant to section 18-8-805 (5), or violated section 18-8-805 (1) or (2)(a)(I), and the incident did not result in death to another person.
(b) The P.O.S.T. board shall reinstate the peace officer's certification if the peace officer is exonerated by an administrative law judge, hearing officer, or court.
(2.5) The P.O.S.T. board may suspend a peace officer's certification for at least one year if the P.O.S.T.-certified peace officer is found civilly liable for the use of excessive or unconstitutional physical force or is found civilly liable for failure to intervene in the use of excessive or unconstitutional force, and the incident did not result in serious bodily injury or death to another person.
(3) Notwithstanding this section, the P.O.S.T. board shall not suspend or revoke a peace officer's certification based on a final decision of an internal investigation unless and until subsections (3)(a) and (3)(b) of this section are complied with, no later than one hundred eighty days after the date the law enforcement agency reports an incident to the P.O.S.T. board:
(a) The law enforcement agency that employs or employed the peace officer shall notify the P.O.S.T. board upon any sustained findings of subsection (1)(a)(III) or (2)(a)(III) of this section, in a manner designated by the P.O.S.T. board. Upon receipt of the notification, the P.O.S.T. board shall notify the certificate holder of the certificate holder's right to request a hearing. Upon request of the P.O.S.T. board, the reporting agency shall provide relevant documents related to the sustained findings of subsection (1)(a)(III) or (2)(a)(III) of this section. For the purposes of this subsection (3), the records of any law enforcement agency that are submitted for review by the P.O.S.T. board remain the property of the reporting law enforcement agency and are not subject to public release by the P.O.S.T. board.
(b) The certificate holder must request a hearing within thirty days after receipt of the P.O.S.T. board's notification. Upon the request by the certificate holder, the P.O.S.T. board shall refer the matter to an administrative law judge, who shall conduct a hearing in compliance with sections 24-4-104 and 24-4-105 to determine if the officer engaged in the alleged conduct.
(c) If the certificate holder either does not request a hearing or requests a hearing and the administrative law judge determines, after conducting the hearing pursuant to the rules of the P.O.S.T. board and in compliance with sections 24-4-104 and 24-4-105, that the certificate holder violated subsection (1)(a)(III) or (2)(a)(III) of this section, the P.O.S.T. board shall revoke or suspend the peace officer's certification pursuant to subsection (1)(a) or (2)(a) of this section.
(4) The P.O.S.T. board has the authority to permanently revoke or suspend the certification of any peace officer who enters into a deferred judgement, deferred prosecution, or diversion agreement for a crime involving the unlawful use of physical force or a crime involving the failure to intervene in the unlawful use of force.
(5) If a law enforcement agency is investigating a peace officer for an incident that could result in a report pursuant to section 24-31-321 (1), the law enforcement agency shall inform the peace officer of the agency's duty to report that information and the consequences of the reporting.
(6) An employer shall not agree to a settlement with a peace officer that includes the employing organization agreeing to not report the information required pursuant to section 24-31-321 (1).
(7) As used in this section, unless the context otherwise requires, "local detention facility" means a county jail as described in section 17-26-101 or municipal jail as described in section 31-15-401 (1)(j).
Source: L. 2020: Entire part added, (SB 20-217), ch. 110, p. 452, § 2, effective June 19. L. 2021: Entire section amended, (HB 21-1250), ch. 458, p. 3059, § 4, effective July 6; entire section amended, (HB 21-1251), ch. 450, p. 2962, § 6, effective July 6. L. 2025: (1)(a)(II) and (2)(a)(II) repealed and (1.5), (2.5), (5), and (6) added, (HB 25-1136), ch. 333, p. 1727, § 3, effective May 31. L. 2026: (1)(a)(IV) and (1)(a)(V) amended and (1)(a)(VI) and (7) added, (HB 26-1123), ch. 159, p. 950, § 5, effective May 27.
Editor's note: Amendments to this section by HB 21-1250 and HB 21-1251 were harmonized.
24-31-905. Prohibited law enforcement action in response to protests.
(1) In response to a protest or demonstration, a law enforcement agency and any person acting on behalf of the law enforcement agency shall not:
(a) Discharge kinetic impact projectiles and all other non- or less-lethal projectiles in a manner that targets the head, pelvis, or back;
(b) Discharge kinetic impact projectiles indiscriminately into a crowd; or
(c) Use chemical agents or irritants, including pepper spray and tear gas, prior to issuing an order to disperse in a sufficient manner to ensure the order is heard and repeated if necessary, followed by sufficient time and space to allow compliance with the order.
Source: L. 2020: Entire part added, (SB 20-217), ch. 110, p. 452, § 2, effective June 19.
24-31-906. Retaliation against whistleblower officers prohibited - private right of action - exemptions - procedures - definitions.
(1) (a) Due to the strong public policy interests protected by prohibiting unlawful retaliation against whistleblowers, a peace officer's employer or the employer's agent shall not discharge, discipline, demote, deny a promotion to, transfer or reassign, discriminate against, harass, suspend, create a hostile work environment for, subject to corrective action or reprimand, issue an employment rating that results in the loss of pay or adversely affects eligibility for promotion or for an assignment for, lay off, reduce work hours for, knowingly provide false information regarding a peace officer for the purpose of negatively affecting future employment opportunities for, or threaten any such actions against a peace officer, or otherwise discriminate against a peace officer in terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because the peace officer disclosed in good faith information to the proper supervising authority that the peace officer reasonably believes shows:
(I) A danger to public health or safety; or
(II) An alleged violation of law committed by another peace officer.
(b) Departmental administrative procedures, such as suspension during an investigation, or departmental objective procedures used to distribute assignments or duties or meet the operational needs of the employer do not violate subsection (1)(a) of this section.
(c) A peace officer who discloses information pursuant to subsection (1)(a) of this section in good faith is engaging in a protected activity.
(d) This subsection (1) does not prevent an employer from complying with any disclosure requirements required by law or court rule or procedure.
(2) No later than January 1, 2022, all law enforcement agencies that employ P.O.S.T.-certified peace officers shall provide a training available to employees, a workplace posting, or both regarding the requirements of this section. If the law enforcement agency provides a posting, the law enforcement agency shall place the posting in an area that is readily accessible to all employees and printed in a readable format. For new employees hired after the date of the training for existing employees, the law enforcement agency shall provide the training during the employee's orientation.
(3) An employee aggrieved by a violation of subsection (1) of this section has a private right of action against the employer that violated subsection (1) of this section after the employee exhausts the internal administrative procedures pursuant to subsection (9) of this section.
(4) An employee whose protected activity pursuant to subsection (1) of this section was a contributing factor in the employer's action described in subsection (1) of this section may be awarded all relief necessary to make the employee whole, including, but not limited to:
(a) (I) Reinstatement, with the same seniority status that the employee would have had but for the violation of subsection (1) of this section; and
(II) The amount of back pay with interest;
(b) Any other equitable relief the court deems appropriate;
(c) Compensatory damages for other pecuniary losses, emotional pain and suffering, inconvenience, mental anguish, loss of enjoyment of life, and other nonpecuniary losses;
(d) Reasonable attorney fees and costs; and
(e) Any request for reinstatement or for an award of reasonable attorney fees shall be made to the court after a judgment is entered in favor of the employee. The parties are entitled to a hearing on the request prior to the court's determination.
(5) It is an affirmative defense to an action brought pursuant to this section if the employer shows by a preponderance of the evidence that the employer would have taken the action that forms the basis of the suit against the employee based on a legitimate nonretaliatory basis.
(6) An action brought pursuant to this section is not subject to the "Colorado Governmental Immunity Act", article 10 of this title 24.
(7) An action brought pursuant to this section must be brought within two years after the date of the most recent adverse employment action described in subsection (1) of this section.
(8) (a) This section does not apply to an employee who discloses information that the employee knows to be false, who discloses information with disregard for the truth, or who discloses information without fully complying with subsection (9) of this section.
(b) An employee's disclosure of the employee's own act of negligence, unprofessional conduct, breach of a P.O.S.T. certification requirement, or violation of any local, state, or federal law is not a protected activity pursuant to this section and does not provide the employee with immunity related to the activity subject to the disclosure.
(c) This section does not prevent an employer from taking disciplinary action against an employee for reasons other than those specified in subsection (1) of this section.
(9) (a) When making a good faith report or disclosure protected by this section, an employee shall follow the internal reporting and internal administrative procedures of the employee's employer, to the extent the procedures exist and are provided to the employee in writing, and shall exhaust the procedures prior to initiating a private right of action pursuant to subsection (3) of this section. If the internal reporting procedure requires an employee to report to the individual who committed the act described in subsection (1)(a) of this section, the procedure must provide an alternative reporting procedure. The limitations period in subsection (7) of this section is tolled until the internal administrative process is complete.
(b) (I) A law enforcement agency shall complete the internal administrative procedure within one hundred eighty days after a report or disclosure.
(II) If a law enforcement agency does not adopt an internal administrative procedure or does not complete the internal administrative procedure within one hundred eighty days after a report or disclosure, this subsection (9) is deemed complied with and an employee may file a private right of action in any court of competent jurisdiction pursuant to subsection (3) of this section. If the law enforcement agency's internal administrative procedure has not been completed when an employee initiates a private right of action pursuant to subsection (3) of this section for reasons beyond the control of the law enforcement agency, including but not limited to the existence of an open criminal proceeding or an open critical incident response team investigation, the law enforcement agency may seek a stay of the private right of action pending resolution of the source of the delay.
(10) No later than January 1, 2026, all law enforcement agencies that employ P.O.S.T.-certified peace officers shall provide a training to employees or a workplace posting, or both, regarding the requirements of this section. If the law enforcement agency provides a workplace posting, the law enforcement agency shall place the posting in an area that is readily accessible to all employees and print the posting in a readable format. If the agency provides a training for new employees hired after the date of the training for existing employees, the law enforcement agency shall provide the training during the employee's orientation.
(11) As used in the section, unless the context otherwise requires:
(a) "Employee" means a peace officer as described in section 16-2.5-102 and a noncertified deputy sheriff as described in section 16-2.5-103 (2) who is employed by an employer and who has engaged in protected activity.
(b) "Employer" means any political subdivisions of the state, including, but not limited to, a county, city and county, municipality, public school district, or special-purpose district or authority; and its agents, employees, or assigns.
(c) "Proper supervising authority" means the person or department designated in the peace officer's employing law enforcement agency to investigate allegations of internal misconduct. If the employer does not have a policy designating a person or department to investigate allegations of misconduct, the proper supervising authority is the highest-ranking peace officer.
Source: L. 2021: Entire section added, (HB 21-1250), ch. 1250, p. 3061, § 5, effective July 6. L. 2025: (1) and (3) amended and (4), (5), (6), (7), (8), (9), (10), and (11) added, (HB 25-1031), ch. 389, p. 2190, § 1, effective June 3.
24-31-907. Prohibited use of "excited delirium" - definition.
(1) (a) A person or entity conducting a training program for peace officers, as described in section 16-2.5-101 (1), or other first responders shall not include any training on or reference to the term "excited delirium" in any training program. A peace officer, as described in section 16-2.5-101 (1), law enforcement agency, or other organization shall not report to the P.O.S.T. board, created in section 24-31-302, a course that contains the concept of excited delirium for credit toward any training required by sections 24-31-303 (1), 24-31-315, or any rule promulgated by the P.O.S.T. board. Nothing in this section prohibits the instruction of, or reporting to the P.O.S.T. board for training credit, courses that include the safe and effective interaction with individuals exhibiting an altered mental state, including symptomatology of a state of agitation, excitability, paranoia, extreme aggression, physical violence, and apparent immunity from pain.
(b) A peace officer shall not use the term "excited delirium" to describe an individual in an incident report completed by a peace officer. A peace officer may describe the characteristics of an individual's conduct but shall not generally describe the individual's demeanor, conduct, or physical or mental condition at issue as "excited delirium".
(2) For purposes of this section, "excited delirium" means a term used to describe a person's state of agitation, excitability, paranoia, extreme aggression, physical violence, and apparent immunity to pain that is not listed in the most recent version of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders. "Excited delirium" also includes excited delirium syndrome, hyperactive delirium, agitated delirium, and exhaustive mania.
Source: L. 2024: Entire section added, (HB 24-1103), ch. 47, p. 166, § 1, effective August 7.
24-31-908. Required notification of child sexual abuse - definition.
(1) When a local law enforcement agency, the Colorado state patrol, or the Colorado bureau of investigation, or a peace officer thereof, takes a report alleging an offense listed in section 18-3-411 (1) and conducts a minimal facts interview with the alleged victim, the law enforcement entity or peace officer shall, within one week after conducting the minimal facts interview, notify the following of the allegation:
(a) A child advocacy center located within the judicial district where the alleged crime occurred; or
(b) If the alleged offense occurred in a jurisdiction other than the jurisdiction in which it was reported, the child advocacy center in the appropriate jurisdiction, as determined by the receiving law enforcement entity or peace officer. In all cases, a law enforcement entity or peace officer shall notify a child advocacy center within the state.
(2) A law enforcement entity or peace officer shall include the following information when notifying a child advocacy center regarding an allegation pursuant to this section:
(a) The child's name;
(b) The child's family member or guardian's contact information;
(c) The alleged offender's name;
(d) The approximate date of the alleged offense; and
(e) A summary of the alleged incident.
(3) If extenuating circumstances exist that prohibit the law enforcement entity or peace officer from notifying the child advocacy center of the allegation within one week, the law enforcement entity or peace officer must provide information about the extenuating circumstances to the child advocacy center when the entity or officer reports the allegation.
(4) A local law enforcement agency, the Colorado state patrol, or the Colorado bureau of investigation, or a peace officer thereof, shall, in collaboration with the child advocacy center that the law enforcement entity or peace officer reported the alleged offense to, coordinate a forensic interview pursuant to the requirements set forth in section 19-3-308.5 for the alleged victim, if the law enforcement entity or peace officer deems a forensic interview necessary and appropriate.
(5) As used in this section, unless the context otherwise requires, "minimal facts interview" means a short, limited conversation with a child conducted by a law enforcement officer in the field to gather basic facts necessary to determine whether abuse or neglect may have occurred, assess immediate safety concerns, and decide whether a forensic interview or further investigation is needed.
Source: L. 2026: Entire section added, (HB 26-1103), ch. 91, p. 368, § 2, effective May 4.
Cross references: For the legislative declaration in HB 26-1103, see section 1 of chapter 91, Session Laws of Colorado 2026.
PART 10
COMMISSION ON IMPROVING FIRST RESPONDER INTERACTIONS WITH PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES
Editor's note: (1) Section 24-31-1007 provided for the repeal of this part 10, effective December 31, 2023. (See L. 2021, p. 2690.)
(2) This part 10 was added in 2021 and was not amended prior to its repeal in 2023. For the text of this part 10 prior to its repeal in 2023, consult the 2022 Colorado Revised Statutes.
24-31-1001 to 24-31-1007. (Repealed)
PART 11
FINANCIAL EMPOWERMENT FOR COLORADO RESIDENTS
24-31-1101. Financial empowerment office - creation - director.
(1) There is hereby created in the department of law the financial empowerment office, the head of which is the director of the office. The financial empowerment office and the director of the office shall exercise their powers and perform their duties and functions under the department of law as if transferred to the department by a type 2 transfer, as such transfer is defined in the "Administrative Organization Act of 1968", article 1 of this title 24.
(2) The director of the financial empowerment office shall be appointed by the attorney general. The director may hire staff as necessary to perform the duties and functions of the office. The office shall also consist of a manager who shall be appointed by the director.
Source: L. 2021: Entire part added, (SB 21-148), ch. 315, p. 1946, § 1, effective July 1.
24-31-1102. Financial empowerment office - purpose - duties.
(1) The purpose of the financial empowerment office is to grow the financial resilience and well-being of Coloradans through community-derived goals and strategies, including but not limited to:
(a) Expanding access to safe and affordable banking;
(b) Increasing access to safe, affordable, low-cost credit offered at costs that do not exceed the finance charges permitted by Colorado law;
(c) Expanding access to free individual financial counseling and coaching;
(d) Expanding community wealth-building strategies; and
(e) Identifying barriers to financial empowerment and financial stability.
(2) The financial empowerment office may partner with state and federal agencies, local governments, tribal nations, community organizations, financial institutions, local service providers, philanthropic organizations, and other organizations as necessary to achieve the purposes of the office. In furtherance of achieving the purposes of the office, subject to available appropriations, the office may develop or promote new or existing:
(a) Methods, programs, and policies to increase access to safe and affordable financial products;
(b) Tools and resources that advance, increase, and improve Colorado residents' financial management, including strategies for debt management and reduction, increasing savings, and creating and retaining assets that promote personal financial stability;
(c) Community-informed strategies that dismantle systemic barriers to building ownership and wealth for all, especially low-income communities and communities of color; and
(d) Tools that promote financial stability such as those that assist with service navigation, eviction avoidance, or connections to income supports.
(3) The financial empowerment office shall, subject to available appropriations:
(a) Support the organization of local community efforts to define and lead tailored financial resilience strategies based on local context, priorities, and expertise from those serving these communities. Stakeholders may include but are not limited to representatives of older adults, younger adults, communities of color, underbanked and unbanked Coloradans, immigrants, Coloradans of low income, banks, credit unions, local service providers, local government agencies, and philanthropic organizations.
(b) Align, support, and build ties among the numerous and diverse efforts to build financial education and well-being in communities across Colorado;
(c) Establish a council comprised of financial institutions, the office of the state treasurer, local and state officials, tribal nations, philanthropic and community organizations, and other organizations or persons determined by the director to assist the director in defining, identifying, creating, expanding, and increasing access to ownership, financial well-being, and safe and affordable banking and financial services that help improve the financial stability of unbanked and underbanked individuals and families and to assist the director in identifying products and practices that may undermine financial stability. At no point shall the majority of council members be representative of or have ties to the financial services industry and every effort shall be made to include representatives of under-represented communities.
(d) Work with stakeholders to increase access to safe and affordable credit-building loans and financial products;
(e) Work with state authorities and other stakeholders to expand access to safe and affordable banking products with low fees and easy account access, as well as safe and affordable credit-building loans offered by financial service providers licensed in Colorado at costs that do not exceed the finance charges permitted by Colorado law;
(f) Work with stakeholders to identify products and practices that may undermine financial stability;
(g) Develop technical assistance to launch or expand financial coaching and counseling efforts locally;
(h) Track community feedback on consumer financial abuses permitting the accused business thirty days to respond prior to any public disclosure, and coordinate with the consumer protection division within the department of law and the department of regulatory agencies to connect consumers with existing resources and educate the public on their related consumer rights.
(4) The financial empowerment office has no independent examination or regulatory authority, but nothing in this part 11 shall be construed to limit the authorities of the attorney general, the administrator designated in section 5-6-103, or the department of regulatory agencies.
(5) The department of law shall annually report on the state of affordable banking access in Colorado, the activities of the office of financial empowerment, and local partnerships in implementing the objectives of the office as a part of its presentation to its committee of reference at a hearing held pursuant to section 2-7-203 (2)(a) of the "State Measurement for Accountable, Responsive, and Transparent (SMART) Government Act". The report shall address access to secure, safe, and affordable financial products, including:
(a) Geographic and racial equity considerations;
(b) An examination of existing financial products regulated by the state of Colorado and other financial products that are being offered within Colorado;
(c) Recommendations for reforms that would encourage greater access to secure, safe, and affordable financial products or would provide better protections to consumers; and
(d) An examination of local financial empowerment work and the impact on economic security and mobility of residents.
Source: L. 2021: Entire part added, (SB 21-148), ch. 315, p. 1946, § 1, effective July 1.
PART 12
COLORADO FALSE CLAIMS ACT
24-31-1201. Short title.
The short title of this part 12 is the "Colorado False Claims Act".
Source: L. 2022: Entire part added, (HB 22-1119), ch. 394, p. 2778, § 2, effective August 10.
24-31-1202. Definitions.
As used in this part 12, unless the context otherwise requires:
(1) (a) "Claim" means a request or demand, whether under a contract or otherwise, for money or property and whether or not the state or a political subdivision has title to the money or property, that is:
(I) Presented to an officer, employee, or agent of the state or political subdivision; or
(II) Made to a contractor, grantee, or other recipient, if the money or property is to be spent or used on the state's or political subdivision's behalf or to advance a government program or interest, and if the state or political subdivision:
(A) Provides or has provided any portion of the money or property requested or demanded; or
(B) Will reimburse such contractor, grantee, or other recipient for any portion of the money or property that is requested or demanded.
(b) "Claim" includes the failure to pay or the underpayment of an obligation owed to the state.
(c) "Claim" does not include a request or demand for money or property that the state or a political subdivision has paid:
(I) To an individual as compensation for employment by the state or political subdivision;
(II) As an income subsidy with no restrictions on that individual's use of the money or property;
(III) To an individual as part of a government assistance program in an amount less than ten thousand dollars in a calendar year; or
(IV) To a person under the "Colorado Medical Assistance Act", articles 4, 5, and 6 of title 25.5.
(2) "Department" means the department of law.
(3) "Fund" means the false claims recovery cash fund created in section 24-31-1209.
(4) (a) "Knowing" or "knowingly" mean that a person, with respect to information about a claim:
(I) Has actual knowledge of the falsity of the information;
(II) Acts in deliberate ignorance of the truth or falsity of the information; or
(III) Acts in reckless disregard of the truth or falsity of the information.
(b) "Knowing" or "knowingly" does not require proof of specific intent to defraud. A person who acts merely negligently with respect to information is not deemed to have acted knowingly, unless the person acts with reckless disregard of the truth or falsity of the information.
(5) "Material" means having a natural tendency to influence, or be capable of influencing, the payment or receipt of money or property.
(6) "Obligation" means an established duty, whether or not fixed, arising from an express or implied contractual, grantor-grantee, or licensor-licensee relationship; from a fee-based or similar relationship; from statute or regulation; or from the retention of any overpayment.
(7) "Person" means any individual, corporation, business trust, estate, trust, limited liability company, partnership, association, or other nongovernmental legal entity.
(8) "Political subdivision" has the same meaning as set forth in section 24-72-202.
(9) "Proceeds" means all money, property, damages, double damages, treble damages, civil penalties, and payments for costs of compliance, including reasonable costs and attorney fees, realized by the state whether as a result of any settlement of or judgment entered in any action brought pursuant to this part 12.
Source: L. 2022: Entire part added, (HB 22-1119), ch. 394, p. 2778, § 2, effective August 10.
24-31-1203. False claims - civil liability for certain acts - penalty - exception.
(1) Subject to subsection (2) of this section and except as otherwise provided in subsection (5) of this section, a person is liable to the state for a civil penalty of not less than eleven thousand eight hundred dollars and not more than twenty-three thousand six hundred dollars per violation, plus three times the amount of damages that the state sustains because of the act of that person, if that person:
(a) Knowingly presents, or causes to be presented, a false or fraudulent claim for payment or approval;
(b) Knowingly makes, uses, or causes to be made or used a false record or statement material to a false or fraudulent claim;
(c) Has possession, custody, or control of property or money used, or to be used, by the state or political subdivision and knowingly delivers, or causes to be delivered, less than all of the money or property;
(d) Authorizes the making or delivery of a document certifying receipt of property used, or to be used, by the state or political subdivision and, with the intent to defraud the state or political subdivision, makes or delivers the receipt without completely knowing that the information on the receipt is true;
(e) Knowingly buys, or receives as a pledge of an obligation or debt, public property from an officer or employee of the state or political subdivision who lawfully may not sell or pledge the property;
(f) Knowingly makes, uses, or causes to be made or used a false record or statement material to an obligation to pay or transmit money or property to the state or political subdivision, or knowingly conceals or knowingly and improperly avoids or decreases an obligation to pay or transmit money or property to the state or political subdivision;
(g) Knowingly makes, uses, or causes to be made or used, a false record or statement resulting in the underpayment of premiums owed to the unemployment compensation fund established in section 8-77-101 or in the payment of unemployment insurance benefits of more than fifteen thousand dollars in a calendar year; or
(h) Conspires to commit a violation of subsections (1)(a) to (1)(g) of this section.
(2) (a) Notwithstanding the amount of damages authorized in subsection (1) of this section, for a person who violates subsection (1) of this section, the court may assess reduced damages and penalties as described in subsection (2)(b) or (2)(c) of this section if the court finds that:
(I) The person who committed the violation furnished to the officials of the state or political subdivision responsible for investigating false claims violations all information about the violation known to the person and furnished said information within thirty days after the date on which the person first learned of a potential violation;
(II) At the time the person furnished the information about the violation to the officials of the state or political subdivision, the person did not have actual or constructive knowledge of the existence of an investigation into the violation; and
(III) The person fully cooperated with any investigation of the violation by the state.
(b) If a person described in subsection (2)(a) of this section furnished information about the violation to the officials of the state or political subdivision before a criminal prosecution, civil action, or administrative action was commenced with respect to the violation, the court shall assess one and one-half the amount of actual damages resulting from the false claim, including interest from the date of the fraud to the date of full repayment of all damages, that the state or political subdivision sustains because of the violation and a civil penalty of not less than five thousand nine hundred dollars and not more than eleven thousand eight hundred dollars per violation.
(c) If a person described in subsection (2)(a) of this section furnished information about the violation to the officials of the state while a criminal prosecution, civil action, or administrative action concerning the violation was under seal pursuant to section 24-31-1204 (3)(b), the court shall assess double the amount of actual damages resulting from the false claim, including interest from the date of the fraud to the date of full repayment of all damages, that the state or political subdivision sustains because of the violation and a civil penalty of not less than seven thousand eight hundred dollars and not more than fifteen thousand seven hundred dollars per violation.
(d) The attorney general may determine whether a person meets the criteria described in subsection (2)(a) of this section and submit the determination and reasoning to the court, which the court may consider when making a finding as to whether the person satisfies the criteria described in subsection (2)(a) of this section.
(3) Any information furnished pursuant to subsection (2) of this section is exempt from disclosure pursuant to the "Colorado Open Records Act", part 2 of article 72 of this title 24.
(4) A person who violates this section is also liable to the state for reasonable attorney fees and the costs incurred during the enforcement of this part 12.
(5) This section does not apply to claims, records, or statements made pursuant to title 39.
(6) (a) The maximum and minimum amounts for the civil penalties described in this section must be adjusted for inflation on July 1, 2023, and each July 1 thereafter. The adjustment made pursuant to this subsection (6) must be rounded upward or downward to the nearest ten-dollar increment. The secretary of state shall certify the adjusted maximum and minimum amounts for civil penalties within fourteen days after the appropriate information is available.
(b) For each action brought pursuant to this part 12, the applicable minimum and maximum amounts for a civil penalty are the amounts in effect on the date the cause of action accrues.
(c) As used in this section, "inflation" means the annual percentage change in the Denver-Aurora-Lakewood consumer price index, or its applicable successor index, published by the United States department of labor bureau of labor statistics.
(7) For accounting purposes, a fine or penalty received by the state pursuant to this part 12 is a damage award.
(8) (a) Subject to section 24-31-1204 (4)(e), if the attorney general has authority to bring or intervene in a civil action pursuant to this part 12, the attorney general may accept from a person alleged to have violated subsection (1) of this section, in lieu of or as a part of a civil action, an assurance of discontinuance or a consent order approved by a court of competent jurisdiction of the alleged violation of this part 12. The assurance or consent order may include a stipulation for the voluntary payment by the alleged violator of any relief authorized by this part 12, including payment for investigation and litigation costs incurred by the attorney general or private person who brought an action pursuant to section 24-31-1204 (3), and actual damages resulting from the false claim plus any authorized multiplier, interest, and civil money penalty.
(b) An assurance of discontinuance or consent order accepted by the attorney general precludes a separate action pursuant to section 24-31-1204 (3) by any person based on the same factual circumstances, except for an action based on a violation of the assurance of discontinuance or consent order.
(c) An assurance of discontinuance accepted by the attorney general and any consent order filed with the court as a part of an action is a matter of public record unless the attorney general determines, at the attorney general's discretion, that it is confidential to the parties to the action or proceeding and to the court and its employees. Upon the filing of a civil action or a motion or petition in a pending civil action by the attorney general alleging that a person has violated a confidential assurance of discontinuance or consent order accepted pursuant to this subsection (8), the assurance of discontinuance or consent order is a public record and open to inspection by any person.
(d) Proof by a preponderance of the evidence of a violation of an assurance or stipulation or consent order is prima facie evidence of a violation for the purposes of any civil action or proceeding brought by the attorney general after the alleged violation of the assurance or stipulation or consent order, whether a new action or a motion or petition in a pending action or proceeding.
Source: L. 2022: Entire part added, (HB 22-1119), ch. 394, p. 2780, § 2, effective August 10.
24-31-1204. Civil actions for false claims - claims for retaliation - definitions.
(1) Responsibility of attorney general.
(a) The attorney general shall diligently investigate a violation of section 24-31-1203. If the attorney general finds that a person has violated or is violating section 24-31-1203, the attorney general may bring a civil action against the person pursuant to this section.
(b) In any action brought pursuant to this part 12 in which the attorney general is a party, either as the plaintiff or as an intervenor, the court may dismiss the action upon motion of the attorney general following the notice and opportunity for a hearing pursuant to subsection (4)(b)(I) of this section. In determining whether to file a motion to dismiss, the attorney general shall consider the severity of the false claim, program or population impacted by the false claim, duration of the fraud, weight and materiality of the evidence, other means to make the program whole, and other factors the attorney general deems relevant. The attorney general's decision-making process concerning a motion to dismiss and any records related to the decision-making process are not discoverable in any action.
(2) Role of the office of the state auditor.
(a) Notwithstanding any other state law requiring the state auditor to keep information confidential, if in the course of its audit authority, the office of the state auditor identifies information of potential false claims submitted to the state or a political subdivision, the state auditor may share any information with the attorney general or the political subdivision. The state auditor may participate, with the consent of the attorney general, in any subsequent investigation or prosecution of that false claim.
(b) If the state auditor elects to participate in any investigation and prosecution of a false claim, the state auditor's interests will be represented by the attorney general.
(3) Actions by private persons.
(a) A person may bring a civil action for a violation of section 24-31-1203 for the person and for the state. The action must be brought in the name of the state. The court shall not dismiss an action upon motion of the private person who brought the action unless the attorney general gives written consent to the dismissal and reasons for consenting.
(b) (I) A person who brings an action shall serve on the state, pursuant to rule 4 of the Colorado rules of civil procedure, a copy of the complaint and written disclosure of substantially all material evidence and information the person possesses; except that the person shall not disclose any evidence or information that the person reasonably believes is protected by the defendant's attorney-client privilege unless the privilege was waived, inadvertently or otherwise, by the person who holds the privilege; an exception to the privilege applies; or disclosure of the information is permitted by an attorney pursuant to 17 CFR 205.3 (d)(2), the applicable Colorado rules of professional conduct, or otherwise. The complaint must be filed in camera, must remain under seal for at least sixty-three days, and must not be served on the defendant until the court so orders. The state may elect to intervene and proceed with the action within sixty-three days after it receives both the complaint and the material evidence and information.
(II) In determining whether to intervene and proceed with an action pursuant to this subsection (3)(b), the attorney general shall consider the factors described in subsection (1)(b) of this section. The attorney general's decision-making process concerning whether to intervene and any records related to the decision-making process are not discoverable in any action.
(c) The state may, for good cause shown, move the court for extensions of the time during which the complaint remains under seal pursuant to subsection (3)(b) of this section. The motion may be supported by affidavits or other submissions in camera. The defendant is not required to respond to any complaint filed pursuant to this section until twenty-one days after the complaint is unsealed and served upon the defendant pursuant to rule 4 of the Colorado rules of civil procedure.
(d) Before the expiration of the sixty-three-day period pursuant to subsection (3)(b) of this section and any extensions obtained pursuant to subsection (3)(c) of this section, the state shall:
(I) Proceed with the action, in which case the state shall conduct the action; or
(II) Notify the court that it declines to take over the action, in which case the person who brought the action has the right to continue the action.
(e) When a person brings an action pursuant to this subsection (3), only the state may intervene or bring a related action based on the facts underlying the pending action.
(f) Any information provided by a person to the state pursuant to this subsection (3) is exempt from disclosure pursuant to the "Colorado Open Records Act", part 2 of article 72 of this title 24.
(4) Rights of parties to private actions.
(a) If the state proceeds with an action brought pursuant to subsection (3) of this section, it has the primary responsibility for prosecuting the action and is not bound by an act of the person who brought the action. The person has the right to continue as a party to the action, subject to the limitations set forth in subsection (3)(b) of this section.
(b) (I) The state may, at any time, dismiss the action, in whole or in part, notwithstanding the objections of the person who brought the action if the person has been notified by the state of the filing of the motion and the court has provided the person with an opportunity for a hearing on the motion.
(II) The state may settle the action with the defendant notwithstanding the objections of the person who brought the action if the court determines, after a hearing, that the proposed settlement is fair, adequate, and reasonable under all the circumstances. Upon a showing of good cause, the court may hold the hearing in camera.
(III) Upon a showing by the state that unrestricted participation during the course of the litigation by the person who brought the action would interfere with or unduly delay the state's prosecution of the case, or would be repetitious, irrelevant, or for purposes of harassment, the court may, in its discretion, impose limitations on the person's participation, including but not limited to:
(A) Limiting the number of witnesses the person may call;
(B) Limiting the length of the testimony of the witnesses called by the person;
(C) Limiting the person's cross-examination of witnesses; and
(D) Otherwise limiting the participation by the person in the litigation.
(IV) Upon a showing by the defendant that unrestricted participation during the course of the litigation by the person who brought the action would be for purposes of harassment or would cause the defendant undue burden or unnecessary expense, the court may limit the participation by the person in the litigation as described in subsection (4)(b)(III) of this section.
(c) The fact that the state has elected not to proceed with an action is not a basis for a motion to dismiss, motion for determination of a question of law, or motion for summary judgment, nor is it a basis to deny the court jurisdiction over the action, but if the attorney general submits to the court the attorney general's reasons for not proceeding with the action, the court may consider the reasons when deciding a motion or whether the court has jurisdiction. If the state so requests, it must be served with copies of all pleadings filed in the action and, at the state's expense, be supplied with copies of all deposition transcripts. When the person proceeds with the action, the court, without limiting the status and rights of the person, may nevertheless permit the state to intervene at a later date upon a showing of good cause.
(d) Regardless of whether the state proceeds with the action, upon a showing by the state or political subdivision that certain actions of discovery by the person who brought the action would interfere with the state's investigation or prosecution of a criminal or civil matter arising out of the same facts, the court may stay the discovery for a period of not more than sixty-three days. The showing by the state must be conducted in camera. The court may extend the sixty-three-day period upon a further showing that the state has pursued the criminal or civil investigation or proceedings with reasonable diligence and that any proposed discovery in the civil action will interfere with the ongoing criminal or civil investigation or proceedings.
(e) Notwithstanding subsection (3) of this section, the state may elect to pursue its claim through any alternate remedy available to the state. If an alternate remedy is pursued in another proceeding, the person who brought the action pursuant to subsection (3) of this section has the same rights in that proceeding as the person would have had if the action had continued pursuant to this section. Any finding of fact or conclusion of law made in the other proceeding that has become final is binding on all parties to an action brought pursuant to this section. For purposes of this subsection (4)(e), a finding or conclusion is final if it has been finally determined on appeal to the appropriate court of the state, if all time for filing such an appeal with respect to the finding or conclusion has expired, or if the finding or conclusion is not subject to judicial review.
(5) Award to a person who brings an action.
(a) (I) Subject to subsection (5)(a)(II) of this section, if the state proceeds with an action brought by a person pursuant to subsection (3) of this section, the court shall award the person at least fifteen percent but not more than twenty-five percent of the proceeds received from the action or settlement of the claim, depending upon the extent to which the person substantially contributed to the investigation and prosecution of the action.
(II) If the court finds the action to be based primarily on disclosures of specific information, other than information provided by the person who brought the action, relating to allegations or transactions in a criminal, civil, or administrative hearing; in a legislative, administrative, or formal audit report, hearing, or investigation; or from the news media, the court may award to the person such sums as it considers appropriate but in no case more than ten percent of the proceeds. In making its determination, the court shall consider the significance of the information provided by the person and the role of the person in advancing the case to litigation.
(III) Any payment to a person made pursuant to this subsection (5)(a) must be made from the proceeds. In addition to an award made pursuant to subsection (5)(a)(I) or (5)(a)(II) of this section, the court shall award the person an amount for reasonable expenses that the court finds to have been necessarily incurred, plus reasonable attorney fees and costs. The court shall award all of the expenses, fees, and costs against the defendant.
(IV) If the person who brought the action is a government employee who, in the course of the person's work for the state gains knowledge of any information that forms, in whole or in part, the basis of the person's claim, the court shall award to the state that employs the person the amount that would otherwise be awarded to the person pursuant to this subsection (5).
(b) If the state does not intervene in and proceed with an action pursuant to subsection (3)(b) of this section, the person prevailing in the action or settling the claim must receive an amount that the court decides is reasonable for collecting the civil penalty and damages. The amount must be at least twenty-five percent but not more than thirty percent of the proceeds received from the action or settlement and must be paid out of the proceeds. The court shall award the person an amount for reasonable expenses that the court finds to have been necessarily incurred, plus reasonable attorney fees and costs. The court shall award all of the expenses, fees, and costs against the defendant.
(c) Regardless of whether the state intervenes in and proceeds with an action pursuant to subsection (3)(b) of this section, if the court finds that the action was brought by a person who planned and initiated the violation of section 24-31-1203 upon which the action was brought, the court may, to the extent the court considers appropriate, reduce the share of the proceeds of the action that the person would otherwise receive pursuant to this subsection (5), taking into account the role of the person in advancing the case to litigation and any relevant circumstances pertaining to the violation. If the person is convicted of criminal conduct arising from his or her role in the violation of section 24-31-1203, the court shall dismiss the person from the civil action and the person must not receive any share of the proceeds of the action. Such dismissal does not prejudice the right of the state to continue the action.
(d) If the state does not intervene in and proceed with an action pursuant to subsection (3)(b) of this section and the person who brought the action pursues the action, the court may award to the defendant reasonable attorney fees and expenses if the defendant prevails in the action and the court finds that the claim of the person was clearly frivolous, clearly vexatious, or brought primarily for purposes of harassment.
(6) Certain actions barred.
(a) A court does not have jurisdiction over an action brought pursuant to this section:
(I) Against a serving member of the general assembly, a member of the state judiciary, an executive director of a state agency, or an elected official in the executive branch of the state of Colorado acting in the member's, executive director's, or official's official capacity;
(II) Against a serving elected official of a political subdivision, a member of a political subdivision's judiciary, or an appointed official of a political subdivision acting in the member's or official's official capacity; or
(III) If the action is brought by a person pursuant to subsection (3) of this section and is based on evidence or information known to the state when the action was brought.
(b) A person may not bring an action pursuant to subsection (3) of this section that is based upon allegations or transactions that are the subject of a civil suit in a court of this state or an administrative civil money penalty proceeding in which the state is already a party.
(c) (I) A court shall dismiss an action or claim brought pursuant to subsection (3) of this section if the action pursued by the person is based upon substantially the same allegations or transactions publicly disclosed in a criminal, civil, or administrative hearing; in a legislative, administrative, or formal audit report, hearing, or investigation; or from the news media, unless:
(A) The state intervenes and prosecutes the action pursuant to subsection (3)(b) of this section;
(B) The state opposes dismissal; or
(C) The person who brought the action is an original source of the information that is the basis for the action.
(II) As used in this subsection (6)(c), "original source" means an individual who:
(A) Prior to public disclosure pursuant to subsection (6)(c)(I) of this section, has voluntarily disclosed to the state the information on which the allegations or transactions in a claim are based; or
(B) Has knowledge that is independent of and materially adds to the publicly disclosed allegations or transactions and has voluntarily provided the information to the state before filing an action pursuant to subsection (3) of this section.
(7) State not liable for certain expenses. The state is not liable for expenses that a person incurs in bringing an action pursuant to subsection (3) of this section.
(8) Private action for retaliation.
(a) As used in this subsection (8), unless the context otherwise requires:
(I) "Confidential information" includes documents; emails and other electronic data; medical records; financial records; trade secret information; intellectual property; or information that is subject to an employment agreement, confidentiality agreement, or nondisclosure agreement or for which the person who brought the action pursuant to subsection (3) of this section has a fiduciary obligation to maintain as confidential. Confidential information does not include information that is protected by the defendant's attorney-client privilege unless the privilege was waived, inadvertently or otherwise, by the person who holds the privilege; an exception to the privilege applies; or disclosure of the information is permitted by an attorney pursuant to 17 CFR 205.3 (d)(2), the applicable Colorado rules of professional conduct, or otherwise.
(II) "Lawful acts" includes, but is not limited to, the following:
(A) Conducting or assisting with an investigation for, initiation of, testimony for, or assistance in an action filed or to be filed pursuant to this section, or conducting or assisting with an investigation when there is a reasonable belief of a potential violation of this section;
(B) Meeting with potential or retained counsel or agents or representatives of the state about the matter that is the subject of an action filed or to be filed pursuant to this section;
(C) Providing the individual's counsel or agents or representatives of the state with confidential information; or
(D) Filing an action pursuant to this section.
(b) An employee, contractor, or agent is entitled to all relief necessary to make that individual whole if the individual is discharged, demoted, suspended, threatened, harassed, intimidated, sued, defamed, blacklisted, or in any other manner retaliated against or discriminated against in the terms and conditions of the individual's employment, contract, business, or profession by the defendant or by any other person because of lawful acts done by the individual or associated others in furtherance of an action brought pursuant to this section or in furtherance of an effort to stop any violation, or what the individual reasonably believes to be a violation, of section 24-31-1203.
(c) (I) If the disclosure of confidential information is in furtherance of an action brought pursuant to this section or in furtherance of an effort to stop any violation, or what the individual reasonably believes to be a violation, of section 24-31-1203, an individual has a privilege to disclose the confidential information to:
(A) The individual's counsel;
(B) A person with whom the individual has a statutory or common law privilege; or
(C) An agent or authorized representative of the state.
(II) The individual's disclosure of confidential information to the individual's counsel or to an agent or authorized representative of the state does not constitute a waiver by a defendant of any right or privilege that the defendant may be entitled to invoke.
(d) (I) An individual seeking relief pursuant to this subsection (8) may seek relief by:
(A) Filing a motion in the action brought pursuant to subsection (3) of this section; or
(B) Bringing a separate action in an appropriate court of the state for the relief provided pursuant to this subsection (8).
(II) An individual who seeks relief pursuant to this subsection (8) is entitled to all relief necessary to make the individual whole. The relief must include, but is not limited to:
(A) If the individual is an employee, reinstatement with the same seniority status the individual would have had but for the discrimination, twice the amount of back pay, and interest on the back pay;
(B) If the individual is a contractor, subcontractor, or independent contractor, reinstatement of a contract or subcontract that was canceled, nonrenewed, or modified because of retaliation, with all compensation or contractual consideration that the individual would have received had the contract or subcontract not been canceled, nonrenewed, or modified; and
(C) Compensation for any special damages sustained as a result of the discrimination or retaliation, including litigation costs and reasonable attorney fees.
(e) (I) The court shall award the individual not less than the damages described in subsection (8)(d)(II) of this section if a defendant, employer, or other person retaliates against an individual by bringing another action against the individual for:
(A) Acts later determined to be lawful acts;
(B) Disclosure of confidential information to counsel or an agent or representative of the state pursuant to this subsection (8);
(C) Violating an employment contract, confidentiality agreement, nondisclosure agreement, or other agreement; or
(D) Committing any other tort or breach of duty and the court hearing the action determines by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant, employer, or other person brought the lawsuit against the individual for the purpose of retaliating against the individual.
(II) In addition to any other remedy or share of the proceeds of the action to which the individual is entitled pursuant to this subsection (8) and regardless of whether the individual is determined to be entitled to share in the proceeds of the action or claim filed pursuant to subsection (3) of this section, in addition to any other consequential damages permitted by law, the damages for a violation of this subsection (8)(e) must be not less than:
(A) Twice the individual's actual attorney fees and costs if the defendant, employer, or other person brought the lawsuit against the individual in a court in the state of Colorado; or
(B) Three times the individual's actual attorney fees and costs if the defendant, employer, or other person brought the lawsuit in a jurisdiction outside of Colorado.
(f) (I) The court hearing the action brought pursuant to subsection (3) of this section has jurisdiction to hear a private action or motion for retaliation brought pursuant to this subsection (8).
(II) Upon motion by the individual, the venue of an action filed in another court of the state of Colorado against the individual by the defendant, the employer of the person who brought the action pursuant to subsection (3) of this section, or other person arising out of the subject matter of the action brought pursuant to subsection (3) of this section must be changed to the court hearing the action brought pursuant to subsection (3) of this section.
(9) Discovery in other actions.
(a) If a person who brings an action pursuant to subsection (3) of this section is a party to or witness in an action other than an action brought pursuant to subsection (3) of this section, referred to in this subsection (9) as an "other action", and a party in the other action seeks discovery from the person of information about other lawsuits, which discovery would require the person to disclose information about an action filed pursuant to subsection (3) of this section while that action is still under seal, the person shall:
(I) Within a reasonable time, notify the state investigating the action brought pursuant to subsection (3) of this section of the pending discovery request; and
(II) Respond to the discovery request by stating only that the matter is confidential, without further elaboration, and shall maintain that response until the state elects to proceed or not proceed with the action brought pursuant to subsection (3) of this section or until the court lifts the seal.
(b) If necessary, in any other action, a person who brought the action pursuant to subsection (3) of this section or the attorney general may file an ex parte motion, in camera and under seal, seeking a protective order or an extension of time for the person to respond to a discovery request. If a party in the other action moves to compel an answer to the discovery, the person who brought the action pursuant to subsection (3) of this section shall file, ex parte and in camera, a response to the motion to compel, in which the attorney general may join. The response to the motion to compel must remain under seal until such time as the state elects to proceed or not proceed with the action or until such time as the court lifts the seal.
(c) Notwithstanding any provision of this subsection (9) to the contrary, information about an action filed pursuant to subsection (3) of this section that is protected by the defendant's attorney-client privilege is not discoverable in any other action unless the privilege was waived, inadvertently or otherwise, by the person who holds the privilege; an exception to the privilege applies; or disclosure of the information is permitted by an attorney pursuant to 17 CFR 205.3 (d)(2), the applicable Colorado rules of professional conduct, or otherwise.
Source: L. 2022: Entire part added, (HB 22-1119), ch. 394, p. 2783, § 2, effective August 10. L. 2023: (3)(b)(II) amended, (HB 23-1301), ch. 303, p. 1825, § 32, effective August 7.
24-31-1205. False claims action procedures - limitation on action - standard of proof.
(1) A civil action pursuant to section 24-31-1204 may not be brought after the later of:
(a) More than six years after the date on which the violation of section 24-31-1203 is committed or the date on which the last in a series of such acts or practices occurred, whichever is later; or
(b) More than three years after the date on which facts material to the right of action are known or reasonably should have been known by the official of the state charged with responsibility to act in the circumstances, but in no event more than ten years after the date on which the violation of section 24-31-1203 was committed.
(2) (a) If the state elects to intervene and proceed with an action brought pursuant to section 24-31-1204, the state may file its own complaint or amend the original complaint to:
(I) Clarify and add detail, and add additional defendants, to the claims in which the state is intervening; and
(II) Add any additional claims and defendants with respect to which the state contends it is entitled to relief.
(b) For statute of limitations purposes, any pleadings by the state relate back to the filing date of the original complaint filed by a person pursuant to section 24-31-1204 (3), to the extent that the state's claim arises out of the conduct, transactions, or occurrences set forth, or attempted to be set forth, in the original complaint.
(3) In an action brought pursuant to section 24-31-1204, the state or person who brought the action pursuant to section 24-31-1204 (3) must prove all essential elements of the cause of action, including damages, by a preponderance of the evidence.
(4) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the Colorado rules of criminal procedure, or the Colorado rules of evidence, a final judgment rendered in favor of the state in a criminal proceeding charging fraud or false statements, whether upon a verdict after trial or upon a plea of guilty or nolo contendere, shall estop the defendant from denying the essential elements of the offense in any action that involves the same transaction as in the criminal proceeding and that is brought pursuant to section 24-31-1204.
Source: L. 2022: Entire part added, (HB 22-1119), ch. 394, p. 2792, § 2, effective August 10.
24-31-1206. Jurisdiction.
An action described in this part 12 may be brought in any judicial district in which the defendant or, in the case of multiple defendants, any one defendant can be found, resides, or transacts business, or in which an act proscribed by section 24-31-1203 occurred. A person bringing an action pursuant to this part 12 shall file the complaint in a district court or a federal court with jurisdiction over the action and shall not file the complaint in any other court. The appropriate district court shall issue a summons as required by the Colorado rules of civil procedure and serve the summons at any place.
Source: L. 2022: Entire part added, (HB 22-1119), ch. 394, p. 2793, § 2, effective August 10.
24-31-1207. False claims civil investigation demands.
(1) When the attorney general has reasonable cause to believe that any person, whether in this state or elsewhere, has engaged in or is engaging in any violation of section 24-31-1203, the attorney general may:
(a) Request the person file a statement or report in writing under oath or otherwise, on forms prescribed by the attorney general, as to all facts and circumstances concerning the alleged violations by the person and any other data and information the attorney general deems necessary; except that the person is not required to disclose any information that is protected by the person's attorney-client privilege unless the privilege was waived, inadvertently or otherwise, by the person who holds the privilege; an exception to the privilege applies; or disclosure of the information is permitted by an attorney pursuant to 17 CFR 205.3 (d)(2), the applicable Colorado rules of professional conduct, or otherwise.
(b) Examine under oath any person in connection with the alleged violations;
(c) Examine any property or sample thereof, or any nonprivileged record, book, document, account, or paper the attorney general deems necessary;
(d) Make true copies, at the expense of the attorney general, of any nonprivileged record, book, document, account, or paper examined pursuant to subsection (1)(c) of this section, which copies may be offered into evidence in lieu of the originals thereof in an action brought pursuant to this part 12; and
(e) Pursuant to any order of any district court, impound any sample of property that is material to any alleged violation of this part 12 and retain the same in the attorney general's possession until completion of all proceedings undertaken pursuant to this part 12. A district court shall not issue an order described in this subsection (1)(e) without giving full opportunity to the accused to be heard and unless the attorney general has proven by clear and convincing evidence that the order will not impair the business activities of the person to whom the order is directed.
(2) When the attorney general has reasonable cause to believe that a person, whether in this state or elsewhere, has engaged in or is engaging in a violation of section 24-31-1203, the attorney general may issue subpoenas to require the attendance of witnesses or the production of documents, administer oaths, conduct hearings in aid of any investigation or inquiry, and prescribe such forms as may be necessary to administer this part 12.
(3) The attorney general may issue subpoenas to any public or private corporation or partnership or association or governmental entity to produce witnesses to appear and give oral testimony at investigative hearings. The subpoenas may designate with reasonable particularity the matters on which examination is requested. In response to the subpoena, the entity shall designate one or more officers, directors, or managing agents, or designate other persons, to testify on its behalf.
(4) A notice or subpoena may be served in the manner prescribed by law or as provided in rule 4 of the Colorado rules of civil procedure.
(5) (a) If the records of a person who has been issued a subpoena are located outside this state, the person shall either:
(I) Make them available to the attorney general either electronically or at a convenient location within this state; or
(II) Pay the reasonable and necessary expenses for the attorney general, or the attorney general's designee, to examine the records at the place where they are maintained.
(b) The attorney general may designate representatives, including comparable officials of the state in which the records are located, to inspect the records on behalf of the attorney general.
(6) If any person fails to cooperate with any investigation pursuant to this section or fails to obey any subpoena issued pursuant to this section, the attorney general may apply to the appropriate district court for an appropriate order to effectuate the purposes of this part 12. At the request of the attorney general, the application may be filed in camera and kept confidential to maintain the confidentiality of the attorney general's investigation. The application must state that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the order applied for is necessary to investigate a violation of this part 12. If the court is satisfied that reasonable grounds exist, the court in its order may:
(a) Grant appropriate injunctive relief;
(b) Require attendance of or the production of documents by the person, or both;
(c) Grant other or further relief as may be necessary to obtain compliance by the person.
Source: L. 2022: Entire part added, (HB 22-1119), ch. 394, p. 2793, § 2, effective August 10.
24-31-1208. Rule-making.
The attorney general may promulgate rules necessary to implement this part 12.
Source: L. 2022: Entire part added, (HB 22-1119), ch. 394, p. 2795, § 2, effective August 10.
24-31-1209. Use of recoveries - false claims recovery cash fund - creation.
(1) The state treasurer shall transfer all proceeds retained by the state from a false claims action brought pursuant to this part 12 to the false claims recovery cash fund, which is hereby created.
(2) Any money in the fund not expended for the purpose of this section may be invested by the state treasurer as provided by law. All interest and income derived from investment and deposit of money in the fund shall be credited to the fund.
(3) (a) Subject to annual appropriation by the general assembly, the department may expend money from the fund for necessary actual costs of carrying out its duties pursuant to this part 12.
(b) (I) When proceeds retained by the state from a false claims action are deposited into the fund, the attorney general shall determine the amount of the proceeds that should remain in the fund for use by the department for the costs of carrying out its duties pursuant to this part 12 and the amount of any proceeds deposited into the fund that are attributable to a political subdivision.
(II) If the amount of the proceeds is equal to or exceeds the amount of the false claim plus the department's costs, the attorney general shall direct the state treasurer to transfer to the original fund from which the false claim was paid an amount equal to the false claim. If all or part of the proceeds are attributable to a political subdivision, the attorney general shall direct the treasurer to pay to the political subdivision, as described in subsection (3)(c) of this section, an amount equal to the false claim.
(III) If the amount of the proceeds is less than the amount of the false claim plus the department's costs, the attorney general shall direct the state treasurer to transfer to the original fund from which the false claim was paid a pro-rated amount based on the actual recovery. If all or part of the proceeds are attributable to a political subdivision, the attorney general shall direct the treasurer to pay to the political subdivision, as described in subsection (3)(c) of this section, a pro-rated amount based on the actual recovery.
(IV) For the purposes of a false claims action involving a violation of section 24-31-1203(1)(g), the relevant fund is the unemployment compensation fund established in section 8-77-101.
(c) No later than seven days after the attorney general directs the state treasurer to make a payment to a political subdivision pursuant to subsection (3)(b) of this section, the state treasurer shall issue a warrant to be paid upon demand from the fund to the political subdivision in the amount specified by the attorney general.
(4) Any unexpended and unencumbered money remaining in the fund at the end of a fiscal year shall remain in the fund and shall not be credited or transferred to another fund.
Source: L. 2022: Entire part added, (HB 22-1119), ch. 394, p. 2795, § 2, effective August 10.
24-31-1210. No limitations on common law authority - medicaid fraud control.
Nothing in this part 12 affects, limits, or supplants the common law authority of the attorney general or the department to investigate and prosecute medicaid fraud pursuant to part 8 of this article 31.
Source: L. 2022: Entire part added, (HB 22-1119), ch. 394, p. 2796, § 2, effective August 10.
24-31-1211. False claims act report.
(1) On or before January 15, 2024, and on or before each January 15 thereafter, the attorney general shall submit a written report to the house of representatives business affairs and labor committee, the house of representatives judiciary committee, the senate business, labor, and technology committee, and the senate judiciary committee, or their successor committees, concerning claims brought pursuant to this part 12 during the previous fiscal year. The report must include, but is not limited to:
(a) The number of actions brought by the attorney general and the disposition of the actions;
(b) The amount of proceeds recovered by the state through settlement or judgment in an action brought pursuant to this part 12, including:
(I) The case number and parties for each action in which proceeds were recovered;
(II) The amount of proceeds recovered in each case, categorized by the amount recovered as damages, penalties, and litigation costs; and
(III) If applicable, the percentage of the proceeds recovered and the total amount awarded to a private person who brought the action.
(c) The number of actions brought by a person other than the attorney general in which the attorney general did not intervene, whether the actions were continued by the other person, and the disposition of the actions;
(d) The amount of proceeds, including any litigation costs and attorney fees, recovered through settlement or judgment in actions brought by a person other than the attorney general; and
(e) The amount expended by the state for investigation and litigation of false claims pursuant to this part 12 and all other costs related to this part 12.
(2) Notwithstanding section 24-1-136 (11)(a)(I), the reporting requirement described in this section continues indefinitely.
Source: L. 2022: Entire part added, (HB 22-1119), ch. 394, p. 2796, § 2, effective August 10.
PART 13
ENFORCEMENT OF WORKER PROTECTION LAWS
24-31-1301. Definitions.
As used in this part 13, unless the context otherwise requires:
(1) "Division of labor standards and statistics" means the division of labor standards and statistics in the department of labor and employment created pursuant to section 8-1-103.
(2) "Division of unemployment insurance" means the division of unemployment insurance in the department of labor and employment created pursuant to section 8-71-101.
(3) "Unit" means the worker and employee protection unit created in section 24-31-1302.
Source: L. 2022: Entire part added, (SB 22-161), ch. 370, p. 2638, § 15, effective August 10.
24-31-1302. Worker and employee protection unit - creation - duties.
(1) There is created within the department of law and under the control of the office of the attorney general the worker and employee protection unit.
(2) In addition to any other authorities granted by law, the unit has the following powers and duties:
(a) Issue or cause to be issued civil investigative demands and subpoenas or other process in aid of investigations and prosecutions;
(b) Administer oaths and take sworn statements under penalty of perjury; and
(c) Serve and execute, in any county, search warrants that relate to investigations.
Source: L. 2022: Entire part added, (SB 22-161), ch. 370, p. 2639, § 15, effective August 10.
24-31-1303. Worker misclassification - wage determinations - investigation and enforcement by the unit - coordination with department of labor and employment.
(1) (a) The unit may investigate alleged violations of, and bring an action against an employer to enforce, section 8-72-114, regardless of whether a complaint is filed against the employer pursuant to said section, to enforce that section if the division of unemployment insurance directly refers a finding of misclassification to the unit to pursue further remedies.
(b) The unit may investigate and enforce an alleged misclassification that is not described in subsection (1)(a) of this section if the unit provides written notice to the division of unemployment insurance of the unit's intent to pursue a misclassification investigation and the division of unemployment insurance:
(I) Declines to investigate the matter;
(II) Has investigated the matter and made a formal determination; or
(III) Fails to respond to the unit within thirty days after the date of the notice.
(2) (a) The unit may enforce wage determinations made by the division of labor standards and statistics pursuant to article 4 of title 8 if the division of labor standards and statistics refers the wage determination to the unit for enforcement.
(b) If the division of labor standards and statistics has not referred a wage determination to the unit, the unit may enforce the wage determination if the unit provides written notice to the division of labor standards and statistics of the unit's intent to enforce the wage determination and the division of labor standards and statistics:
(I) Declines to pursue enforcement of the wage determination;
(II) Has attempted to pursue enforcement of the wage determination and has been unsuccessful in enforcing the determination in full after the later of twelve months after the determination or the conclusion of any appeals;
(III) Fails to respond to the unit within thirty days after the date of the notice; or
(IV) Has not initiated an investigation.
Source: L. 2022: Entire part added, (SB 22-161), ch. 370, p. 2639, § 15, effective August 10.
PART 14
COLORADO SEXUAL ASSAULT FORENSIC MEDICAL EVIDENCE REVIEW BOARD
24-31-1401. Colorado sexual assault response review board - creation - membership - duties - report - short title - definitions - repeal.
(1) As used in this section, unless the context otherwise requires:
(a) "Department" means the department of law.
(b) "Review board" means the Colorado sexual assault response review board, established in subsection (2) of this section.
(2) The Colorado sexual assault response review board is established in the department to carry out the duties described in subsection (6) of this section and submit the report described in subsection (7) of this section.
(3) The board consists of:
(a) The attorney general, or their designee, who is the chair of the review board;
(b) The executive director of the Colorado district attorneys' council or their designee;
(c) The following members, appointed by the attorney general:
(I) A representative of a statewide nonprofit organization that offers training and expert advice to sexual assault programs;
(II) A representative of a statewide nonprofit organization that provides legal assistance to victims of sexual assault;
(III) A representative of a statewide organization that provides training and technical assistance for medical forensic exams;
(IV) A representative of a statewide association of chiefs of police;
(V) A representative of a statewide association of sheriffs;
(VI) Three representatives from organizations that provide services or advocate for communities that experience disproportionate rates of sexual assault;
(VII) Up to three members, at the discretion of the attorney general, whose contributions the attorney general determines would be valuable to the work of the review board;
(VIII) A representative of a municipal crime laboratory; and
(IX) Two victim-survivors, one representing a rural community and one representing a metro area or urban community; and
(d) The following members, appointed by the governor:
(I) A representative of the division of criminal justice in the department of public safety who has oversight of the statewide sexual assault evidence collection kit tracking system created in section 24-33.5-113.5;
(II) A representative of the division of criminal justice in the department of public safety who has oversight of federal and state victim service funding and victim rights compliance; and
(III) A representative of the crime laboratory operated by the Colorado bureau of investigation.
(4) (a) The attorney general and governor shall appoint the members to the review board on or before August 1, 2025.
(b) The attorney general is strongly encouraged to appoint review board members who represent as fully as possible Colorado's diversity with regard to race, ethnicity, disability status, sexual orientation, and geography.
(c) Except for the attorney general and director of the Colorado district attorneys' council, or their designees, review board members serve four-year terms and are eligible for reappointment no more than two times at the expiration of a four-year term.
(d) Review board members serve without compensation but may receive per diem and reimbursement for costs, subject to the availability of funds.
(e) The appointing authority shall appoint a member to fill a vacancy, as necessary.
(5) The review board shall convene on or before August 1, 2025, and shall meet thereafter as determined necessary by the review board.
(6) The review board shall:
(a) Review and monitor the effectiveness of the current protocols, standards, and training practices for the medical, law enforcement, and criminal-legal system response to sexual assault;
(b) Develop recommendations to improve specific protocols, standards, and training practices for the medical, law enforcement, and criminal-legal system response to sexual assault;
(c) Ensure victim-centered implementation of provisions regarding medical forensic exams for victims of sexual assault in the federal "Violence Against Women Act of 1994", title IV of Pub. L. 103-322, including provisions in reauthorizations of the federal act, and state law provisions for forensic medical exams;
(d) Provide ongoing review of data and information regarding the needs, priorities, and services for responding to sexual assault throughout the state;
(e) Monitor the effectiveness of laws concerning sexual assault and make recommendations to the general assembly to improve their effectiveness; and
(f) Make recommendations to the general assembly concerning the response to sexual assault, including medical forensic evidence, law enforcement reporting, and victim experience.
(7) (a) (I) On or before December 15, 2025, the review board shall submit a preliminary report to the general assembly. The preliminary report must include the review board's recommendations described in subsection (6) of this section.
(II) This subsection (7)(a) is repealed, effective June 30, 2027.
(b) (I) On or before November 1, 2026, and on or before each November 1 thereafter, the review board shall submit a report to the general assembly. The report must include the review board's recommendations described in subsection (6) of this section.
(II) Notwithstanding section 24-1-136 (11)(a)(I), the requirement to submit the report described in this subsection (7)(b) continues indefinitely.
(8) The short title of this part 14 is the "Miranda Gordon Justice for Survivors Act of 2025".
Source: L. 2025: Entire part added, (SB 25-304), ch. 414, p. 2349, § 1, effective June 3. L. 2026: (1)(b), (2), (3)(c)(VI), (3)(c)(VII), and (3)(d) amended and (3)(c)(VIII) and (3)(c)(IX) added, (SB 26-095), ch. 133, p. 595, § 8, effective May 19.
ARTICLE 32
Department of Local Affairs
PART 1
DIVISION OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT
24-32-101. Legislative declaration.
24-32-102. Definitions.
24-32-103. Division of local government - created.
24-32-104. Functions of the division - interconnectivity grant program - interconnectivity grant program fund - reporting - definition.
24-32-105. Limitation of authority of division.
24-32-106. Powers of the director.
24-32-107. Payment of expenses and salaries.
24-32-108. Establishment of a file.
24-32-109. Notice of change - failure to file - effect.
24-32-110. Report of district or municipal officials. (Repealed)
24-32-111. Statewide program for identification of matters of state interest as part of local land use planning. (Repealed)
24-32-112. County powers relating to matters of local concern - report. (Repealed)
24-32-113. Transfer of functions and property - contracts - continuation of regulations. (Repealed)
24-32-114. Cleanup of illegally disposed of waste tires - waste tire cleanup fund - legislative declaration - repeal. (Repealed)
24-32-115. Economic self-sufficiency - development of standards - rules - fund - legislative declaration.
24-32-116. Inventory of local governmental entities - information required - definitions.
24-32-117. Retail marijuana impact grants - program - creation - definitions - repeal. (Repealed)
24-32-118. Military and community partnerships.
24-32-118.5. Mobile veterans-support unit grant program - fund created - report - definitions - repeal. (Repealed)
24-32-119. Gray and black market marijuana enforcement grant program - report - definition - repeal. (Repealed)
24-32-120. Justice reinvestment crime prevention initiative - program - rules - cash funds - reports - definitions - repeal.
24-32-121. Colorado resiliency office - creation - director - repeal.
24-32-122. Colorado resiliency office - duties and powers - repeal.
24-32-123. Defense counsel on first appearance grant program - rules - report - definition - repeal.
24-32-124. Law enforcement community services grant program - committee - policies and procedures - fund - rules - report - definitions.
24-32-125. Census outreach grant program - creation - committee - legislative declaration - definitions - repeal. (Repealed)
24-32-126. Strategic action plan for upcoming decennial census.
24-32-127. Community substance use and mental health services grant program - creation - legislative intent.
24-32-128. Rural economic development initiative grant program - creation - report - definitions.
24-32-129. Small business relief program - address negative effects of capacity limits due to COVID-19 pandemic - distribution through local governments - definitions - report - repeal. (Repealed)
24-32-130. Local government affordable housing development incentives grant program - local government planning grant program - creation - definitions.
24-32-131. Best practices in policing study. (Repealed)
24-32-132. Small community-based nonprofit infrastructure grant program - creation - legislative declaration - definitions - repeal.
24-32-133. Infrastructure and strong communities grant program - creation - fund - reporting - definitions - repeal.
24-32-134. Disaster resilience rebuilding program - fund - creation - policies - report - definitions.
24-32-135. Community schoolyards grant program - creation - report - rules - definitions - repeal.
PART 2
DIVISION OF PLANNING
24-32-201. Legislative declaration. (Repealed)
24-32-201.5. Definitions.
24-32-202. Division of planning - creation - director duties.
24-32-203. Duties of the division of planning.
24-32-204. Population statistics, estimates, and projections.
24-32-205. Assistance to local planning agencies.
24-32-206. Executive director - final authority. (Repealed)
24-32-207. Reference in contracts, documents.
PART 3
DIVISION OF COMMERCE AND DEVELOPMENT
24-32-300.3. Definitions.
24-32-301. Division of commerce and development - creation - director - assistants.
24-32-302. Purpose.
24-32-303. Authority and responsibility of the director.
24-32-304. Advisory committee - responsibilities - sunset review. (Repealed)
24-32-305. Offices of division - expenses and salaries - reports and publications.
24-32-306. Matching funds - gifts - bequests.
24-32-307. Reference in contracts, documents.
24-32-308. Motion picture and television advisory commission abolished - reestablished. (Repealed)
24-32-309. Functions of commission - legislative declaration. (Repealed)
24-32-310. Tourism information and promotion program. (Repealed)
24-32-311. Foreign trade office within division. (Repealed)
PART 4
COLORADO BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
24-32-401 to
24-32-423. (Repealed)
PART 5
DIVISION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE
24-32-501 to
24-32-509. (Repealed)
PART 6
LAW ENFORCEMENT TRAINING ACADEMY AND PEACE OFFICERS' STANDARDS AND TRAINING
24-32-601 to
24-32-613. (Repealed)
PART 7
DIVISION OF HOUSING - COLORADO HOUSING ACT OF 1970
24-32-701. Short title.
24-32-702. Legislative declaration.
24-32-703. Definitions.
24-32-704. Division of housing - director.
24-32-705. Functions of division.
24-32-705.5. Annual public report on funding of affordable housing preservation and production - definitions.
24-32-705.7. Application process for all affordable housing programs administered by the division of housing - rules - definitions.
24-32-706. State housing board.
24-32-707. Powers of board.
24-32-708. Annual report. (Repealed)
24-32-708.5. Compliance with national standards. (Repealed)
24-32-709. Certification of factory-built housing - factory-built nonresidential units. (Repealed)
24-32-710. Rules - enforcement - advisory committee. (Repealed)
24-32-711. Recognition of similar standards. (Repealed)
24-32-712. Noncompliance with standards. (Repealed)
24-32-713. Violation - penalty. (Repealed)
24-32-714. Local enforcement. (Repealed)
24-32-715. Inspection of mobile homes and records. (Repealed)
24-32-715.5. Inspections of electrical work - manufactured housing units. (Repealed)
24-32-716. Notification and correction of defects. (Repealed)
24-32-717. Housing investment trust fund - loans - definitions.
24-32-718. Publicly assisted housing - notice of termination - database - high energy performance building standard program - definitions.
24-32-719. Foreclosure prevention - outreach efforts - grant fund - creation - administration - repeal. (Repealed)
24-32-720. Property foreclosure reports - official state statistics - repeal. (Repealed)
24-32-721. Colorado affordable housing construction grants and loans - housing development grant fund - creation - housing assistance for persons with behavioral, mental health, or substance use disorders - cash fund - appropriation - report to general assembly - rules - definitions.
24-32-721.3. Middle income access program - contract with Colorado housing and finance authority for administration of funds - appropriation.
24-32-721.5. Emergency direct assistance grant program - created - purposes of grants - rules - applications - fund created - report - definition - repeal. (Repealed)
24-32-721.7. Affordable housing guided toolkit and local officials guide program - creation.
24-32-722. Consolidation of public housing agencies for low- and moderate-income households and persons with disabilities into the division - legislative declaration - repeal. (Repealed)
24-32-723. Office of homeless youth services - creation - function - duties - definitions.
24-32-724. Fort Lyon property - supportive residential community - definitions - repeal.
24-32-725. Fort Lyon supportive residential community - study - advisory committee - creation - definitions - repeal. (Repealed)
24-32-726. Financial literacy and exchange program - creation - FLEX accounts - FLEX cash fund - transfer - short title - legislative declaration - definitions - repeal. (Repealed)
24-32-727. Denver-metropolitan regional navigation campuses grant - regional navigation campuses cash fund - creation - definitions.
24-32-728. Mobile home park resident empowerment loan program - fund - creation - policies - report - legislative declaration - definitions - repeal.
24-32-729. Transformational affordable housing through local investments - grant program - investments eligible for funding - report - definitions - repeal.
24-32-730. Ridge View Supportive Residential Community at the Ridge View campus - report - legislative declaration.
24-32-731. Revolving loan fund - eligible projects - report - definitions - legislative declaration.
24-32-732. Connecting Coloradans experiencing homelessness with services, recovery care, and housing supports grant program - funding - report - definitions - repeal.
24-32-733. Task force on corporate housing ownership - creation - membership - issues of study - additional duties - report - compensation - staff support - definitions - repeal.
24-32-734. Task force on mobile home ownership and taxation - creation - duties - report - definitions - repeal. (Repealed)
24-32-735. Pet-inclusive publicly financed housing - definitions - rules.
PART 8
OFFICE OF RURAL DEVELOPMENT
24-32-801. Legislative declaration.
24-32-801.5. Definitions.
24-32-802. Office of rural development created - coordinator appointed.
24-32-803. Duties of the office.
24-32-804. Transfer of property and records. (Repealed)
PART 9
STANDARDS FOR CAMPER TRAILERS AND CAMPER COACHES
24-32-901. Legislative declaration.
24-32-902. Definitions.
24-32-903. Rules - advisory committee - sunset review - enforcement. (Repealed)
24-32-904. Certification of camper trailers and camper coaches. (Repealed)
24-32-904.5. Compliance with national standards - recreational park trailers - recreational vehicles.
24-32-905. Fees. (Repealed)
24-32-906. Recognition of similar standards. (Repealed)
24-32-907. Injunctive relief.
24-32-908. Cooperation with department of revenue. (Repealed)
24-32-909. Violation - penalty.
PART 10
COLORADO LITTER CONTROL ACT - DIVISION OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT
24-32-1001 to
24-32-1015. (Repealed)
PART 11
VOLUNTARY CERTIFICATION PROGRAM FOR FIREFIGHTERS
24-32-1101 to
24-32-1106. (Repealed)
PART 12
STATE CLEARINGHOUSE
24-32-1201. Legislative declaration.
24-32-1202. Definitions.
24-32-1203. State clearinghouse designated - duties - limitations.
PART 13
COLORADO TOURISM BOARD
24-32-1301 to
24-32-1308. (Repealed)
PART 14
PRIVATE ACTIVITY BONDS
24-32-1401 to
24-32-1412. (Repealed)
PART 15
COLORADO OFFICE OF VOLUNTEERISM
24-32-1501 to
24-32-1508. (Repealed)
PART 16
UNIFIED BOND CEILING ALLOCATION
24-32-1601. Short title. (Repealed)
24-32-1602. Legislative declaration. (Repealed)
24-32-1603. Definitions. (Repealed)
24-32-1604. Allocation of unified volume ceiling. (Repealed)
24-32-1605. Allocations to state issuing authorities. (Repealed)
24-32-1606. Allocations to local issuing authorities. (Repealed)
24-32-1607. Statewide balance. (Repealed)
24-32-1608. Reporting requirements. (Repealed)
24-32-1609. Application for allocation from statewide balance. (Repealed)
24-32-1610. Notification and validity of allocations from the statewide balance. (Repealed)
24-32-1611. Thirty-day extension. (Repealed)
24-32-1612. Statewide balance carryforward allocations. (Repealed)
24-32-1613. Time period must end on business day. (Repealed)
24-32-1614. Effect of issuance of bonds without allocations. (Repealed)
24-32-1615. Operative dates - provisional repeal. (Repealed)
24-32-1616. Conformity with federal legislation. (Repealed)
24-32-1617. Severability. (Repealed)
24-32-1618. Agreement with bond owners. (Repealed)
24-32-1619. Repeal of sections. (Repealed)
24-32-1620. Effect of repeal of sections.
PART 17
PRIVATE ACTIVITY BOND CEILING ALLOCATION
24-32-1701. Short title.
24-32-1702. Legislative declaration.
24-32-1703. Definitions.
24-32-1704. Allocation of state ceiling.
24-32-1705. Allocations to state issuing authorities.
24-32-1706. Allocations to designated local issuing authorities.
24-32-1707. Statewide balance.
24-32-1708. Bond issuance and mortgage credit certificate election - reporting requirement.
24-32-1709. Application for allocation from statewide balance.
24-32-1709.5. Administrative costs of the department - private activity bond allocation fund - creation.
24-32-1710. Notifications and validity of allocations from the statewide balance.
24-32-1711. Statewide balance carryforward allocations.
24-32-1712. Time period must end on business day.
24-32-1713. Effect of mortgage credit certificate election or issuance of bonds without allocation.
24-32-1714. Severability.
24-32-1715. Agreement with bond owners.
PART 18
SITE ACQUISITION FOR SUPERCONDUCTING SUPER COLLIDER PROJECT
24-32-1801 to
24-32-1811. (Repealed)
PART 19
REGULATION OF FACTORY-BUILT NONRESIDENTIAL STRUCTURES
24-32-1901 to
24-32-1912. (Repealed)
PART 20
COLORADO YOUTH CONSERVATION AND SERVICE CORPS
24-32-2001. Legislative declaration.
24-32-2002. Definitions.
24-32-2003. Colorado youth conservation and service corps council - creation - membership - duties.
24-32-2004. Colorado youth service corps established - director's duties.
24-32-2005. Duties and functions of the youth service corps.
24-32-2006. Colorado youth service corps - criteria for enrollment.
24-32-2007. Local youth employment opportunities.
24-32-2008. Placement under work agreements.
24-32-2009. Youth service corps members - compensation - scholarship.
24-32-2010. Youth service corps members not to displace current workers.
24-32-2011. Acceptance and utilization of funds.
24-32-2012. Colorado youth service corps fund - created.
24-32-2013. Conflict with federal requirements.
PART 21
OFFICE OF DISASTER EMERGENCY SERVICES
24-32-2101 to
24-32-2116. (Repealed)
PART 22
COMPENSATION BENEFITS TO VOLUNTEER CIVIL DEFENSE WORKERS
24-32-2201 to
24-32-2228. (Repealed)
PART 23
CIVIL DEFENSE LIABILITY - PUBLIC OR PRIVATE
24-32-2301 to
24-32-2304. (Repealed)
PART 24
EVACUATION OF SCHOOL BUILDINGS FOR CIVIL DEFENSE
24-32-2401 to
24-32-2405. (Repealed)
PART 25
DISASTER RELIEF
24-32-2501 to
24-32-2509. (Repealed)
PART 26
COLORADO EMERGENCY PLANNING COMMISSION
24-32-2601 to
24-32-2607. (Repealed)
PART 27
COOPERATIVE HEALTH CARE AGREEMENTS INVOLVING HOSPITALS
24-32-2701 to
24-32-2715. (Repealed)
PART 28
COMMUNITY-BASED YOUTH CRIME PREVENTION AND INTERVENTION
24-32-2801 to
24-32-2806. (Repealed)
PART 29
MOFFAT TUNNEL
24-32-2901 to
24-32-2906. (Repealed)
PART 30
COMMUNITY-BASED ACCESS GRANT PROGRAM
24-32-3001. Community-based access grant program - powers and duties of department of local affairs - definitions - legislative declaration.
PART 31
MANUFACTURED HOME INSTALLATION
24-32-3101 to
24-32-3110. (Repealed)
PART 32
OFFICE OF SMART GROWTH
24-32-3201. Legislative declaration.
24-32-3202. Definitions.
24-32-3203. Office of smart growth - creation - powers and duties of executive director.
24-32-3204. Powers and duties of the office of smart growth.
24-32-3205. Qualifications.
24-32-3206. Reporting. (Repealed)
24-32-3207. Colorado heritage communities fund - creation - source of funds.
24-32-3208. Additional sources of funding.
24-32-3209. Comprehensive planning disputes - development plan disputes - mediation - list of qualified professionals to assist in mediating land use disputes - definitions.
PART 33
REGULATION OF FACTORY-BUILT STRUCTURES, MULTI-FAMILY STRUCTURES WHERE NO
STANDARDS EXIST, MANUFACTURED HOME INSTALLATIONS, AND SELLERS OF MANUFACTURED
HOMES
24-32-3301. Legislative declaration.
24-32-3302. Definitions.
24-32-3303. Division of housing - powers and duties - rules.
24-32-3304. State housing board - powers and duties - rules.
24-32-3305. Rules - advisory committee - enforcement - regional building codes - study.
24-32-3306. Recognition of similar standards - compliance with standards.
24-32-3307. Noncompliance with standards.
24-32-3308. Violation - penalty.
24-32-3309. Fees - building regulation fund - rules.
24-32-3310. Local enforcement - notice to revisor of statutes.
24-32-3311. Certification of factory-built structures - rules - notice to revisor of statutes.
24-32-3312. Notification and correction of defects.
24-32-3313. Injunctive relief. (Repealed)
24-32-3314. Cooperation with department of revenue.
24-32-3315. Installers of manufactured homes and tiny homes - registration - fees - educational requirements - rules.
24-32-3315.5. Contract for the installation of manufactured homes and tiny homes - requirements.
24-32-3316. Compliance with manufacturer's installation instructions.
24-32-3317. Installation of manufactured homes and tiny homes - authorization - certificates - inspections - inspector qualification and education requirements - rules.
24-32-3318. Local installation standards preempted - notice to revisor of statutes.
24-32-3319. Prohibited acts.
24-32-3320. Penalty for violation.
24-32-3321. Investigations of consumer complaints.
24-32-3322. Training of inspectors - acceptance of gifts, grants, and donations. (Repealed)
24-32-3323. Sellers of manufactured homes and tiny homes - registration.
24-32-3324. Escrow and bonding requirements - rules.
24-32-3325. Contract for sale of manufactured home or tiny home - requirements.
24-32-3326. Unlawful sales practices - manufactured homes and tiny homes - fines.
24-32-3327. Inspections.
24-32-3328. Tiny homes - standards - rules.
24-32-3329. Local governments inspections of tiny homes - connection to utilities - rules.
PART 34
COMPREHENSIVE STRATEGIC ACTION PLAN ON AGING POPULATION IN COLORADO
24-32-3401 to
24-32-3408. (Repealed)
PART 35
PEACE OFFICERS MENTAL HEALTH SUPPORT GRANT PROGRAM
24-32-3501. Peace officers behavioral health support and community partnerships grant program - created - report - rules - fund - definitions - repeal.
24-32-3502. Public defender and prosecutor behavioral health support program - policies - report - fund - repeal.
PART 36
RURAL ECONOMIC ADVANCEMENT OF COLORADO TOWNS
24-32-3601. Short title.
24-32-3602. Legislative declaration.
24-32-3603. Definitions - rules.
24-32-3604. Rural economic advancement of Colorado towns - coordination of nonmonetary assistance - application - rules.
24-32-3605. Repeal of part. (Repealed)
PART 37
HOUSING NEEDS PLANNING
24-32-3701. Definitions.
24-32-3702. Housing needs assessment methodology - statewide housing needs assessment - displacement risk guidance.
24-32-3703. Local housing needs assessments - procedure - exempt local governments.
24-32-3704. Regional housing needs assessments.
24-32-3705. Housing action plan.
24-32-3706. Directories of housing and land use strategies - development of housing and increasing housing affordability - displacement impact mitigation.
24-32-3707. Statewide strategic growth report.
24-32-3708. Natural land and agricultural interjurisdictional opportunities report.
24-32-3709. Technical assistance.
24-32-3709.5. Regional planning roundtable commission - establishment - facilitating - notice to revisor - definition.
24-32-3710. Prioritization for conformity with planning expectations.
24-32-3711. Neighborhood centers - grant program prioritization.
PART 38
PROGRAMS FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF CHILD CARE FACILITIES
24-32-3801. Definitions.
24-32-3802. Child care facility development toolkit and technical assistance program - creation - report - definitions - repeal.
24-32-3803. Child care facility development planning grant program - created - report - definitions - repeal.
24-32-3804. Child care facility development capital grant program - creation - report - definitions - repeal.
24-32-3805. Child care facility development cash fund - definitions - repeal.
PART 39
STATEWIDE STRATEGY FOR HOMELESSNESS PREVENTION AND RESOLUTION
24-32-3901. Legislative declaration.
24-32-3902. Proposal for a statewide strategy on homelessness prevention and resolution - definitions.
PART 1
DIVISION OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT
24-32-101. Legislative declaration.
(1) The general assembly finds and declares that:
(a) Strong local government has been a major factor in the political and economic development of the state;
(b) The future welfare of the state depends, in large measure, on local leadership and the effectiveness of local government;
(c) Population shifts and other economic and social trends have brought new problems to local government in growing metropolitan areas and throughout the state; and
(d) The state has primary responsibility for strengthening local government, encouraging local initiative, and providing coordination of state services and information to assist local government in effectively meeting the needs of Colorado citizens.
(2) The general assembly further finds and declares that:
(a) The provision of high-speed broadband plays a critical role in enhancing local government and community development efforts;
(b) Regional, multijurisdictional, and coordinated approaches to broadband planning are critical to achieving the efficient deployment of broadband infrastructure and technology; and
(c) Public-private partnerships help leverage resources of both private broadband providers and local governments to achieve statewide broadband deployment.
Source: L. 66: p. 120, § 1. C.R.S. 1963: § 3-22-1. L. 2021: (2) added, (HB 21-1289), ch. 371, p. 2459, § 11, effective June 28.
Cross references: For the legislative declaration in HB 21-1289, see section 1 of chapter 371, Session Laws of Colorado 2021.
24-32-102. Definitions.
As used in this part 1, unless the context otherwise requires:
(1) "Broadband facility" means any infrastructure used to deliver broadband or provide broadband.
(2) "Community anchor institution" has the meaning set forth in section 24-37.5-902 (2).
(3) "Division" means the division of local government created in section 24-32-103.
(4) "Interconnectivity grant program" means the grant program created in section 24-32-104 (7)(a).
(5) "Interconnectivity grant program fund" means the fund created in section 24-32-104 (7)(c).
(6) "Last-mile broadband infrastructure" means broadband infrastructure that delivers an internet connection to an end user.
(7) (a) "Local government" means a statutory or home rule municipality, county, city and county, council of governments, or metropolitan district that lies wholly within the unincorporated part of a county.
(b) "Local government" includes all quasi municipalities and local improvement and service districts of this state.
(8) "Metropolitan district" has the meaning set forth in section 32-1-103 (10).
Source: L. 66: p. 120, § 2. C.R.S. 1963: § 3-22-2. L. 2021: Entire section amended, (HB 21-1289), ch. 371, p. 2459, § 12, effective June 28.
Cross references: For the legislative declaration in HB 21-1289, see section 1 of chapter 371, Session Laws of Colorado 2021.
24-32-103. Division of local government - created.
There is created, as a division of the department of local affairs, the division of local government. The executive director of the department shall appoint a director to be the head of the division. The director, and any assistants and employees of the division, are appointed pursuant to section 13 of article XII of the state constitution. The division and the office of the director are type 2 entities, as defined in section 24-1-105.
Source: L. 66: p. 121, § 3. C.R.S. 1963: § 3-22-3. L. 68: p. 132, § 150. L. 2022: Entire section amended, (SB 22-162), ch. 469, p. 3413, § 173, effective August 10.
Cross references: For the short title (the "Debbie Haskins 'Administrative Organization Act of 1968' Modernization Act") in SB 22-162, see section 1 of chapter 469, Session Laws of Colorado 2022.
24-32-104. Functions of the division - interconnectivity grant program - interconnectivity grant program fund - reporting - definition.
(1) The division shall perform the following functions:
(a) Assist the governor in coordinating the activities and services of those departments and agencies of the state having relationships with units of local government in order to provide more effective services to units of local government and to simplify procedures with respect thereto;
(b) Advise the governor and the general assembly of the problems of local government;
(c) Serve as a clearing house, for the benefit of local government, of information relating to the common problems of local government and of state and federal services available to assist in the solution of those problems;
(d) Refer local government to appropriate departments and agencies of the state and federal government for advice, assistance, and available services in connection with specific problems;
(e) Perform such research as is necessary to carry out the functions of the division, including the study of local government, intergovernmental relations, the structure and powers of local government units and their relationships to each other, local government finance, services, management, and functions;
(f) Encourage and when so requested assist cooperative efforts among the officials of local government units toward the solution of common problems;
(g) Encourage and cooperate in training institutes, conferences, and programs for local government officials and employees;
(h) Publish an annual compendium of local government fiscal data beginning with calendar year 1968 and publish from time to time other statistical and research reports of interest to local government, the general assembly, and the general public;
(i) Upon request by local government officials, provide technical assistance in defining their local government problems and developing solutions thereof;
(j) Provide technical assistance to district attorneys, including, but not limited to, coordinating educational grants;
(k) Repealed.
(l) Administer emergency services provided by the state;
(m) (I) Annually distribute to each local governmental entity informational materials relating to federal student loan repayment programs and student loan forgiveness programs, including updated materials, received from the department of personnel pursuant to section 24-5-102. The division may distribute the informational materials to each local governmental entity through an email or as part of a mailing or regular communication to local governmental entities. The division shall encourage each local governmental entity to annually distribute the informational materials, including any updated materials, to each employee of the local governmental entity, and to include the informational materials as part of the local governmental entity's new employee orientation process.
(II) For purposes of subsection (1)(m)(I) of this section, a "local governmental entity" means a city, county, city and county, special district, or other unit of local government for which the division has received information pursuant to section 24-32-116.
(n) Submit to the Colorado broadband office created in section 24-37.5-903 (1) for the broadband office's review and recommendations a copy of each application that the division receives in which an applicant seeks grant money for broadband planning or infrastructure, which grant the division awards from the interconnectivity grant program fund. The Colorado broadband office shall review each application submitted and provide the division its recommendations regarding the application as soon as practicable but no later than thirty days after the division has furnished a copy of the application to the Colorado broadband office.
(2) No later than July 1, 2015, the division shall formally announce, on its website and by letter to the state's local governments, an initiative from the local government mineral impact fund created in section 34-63-102 (5), C.R.S., or the local government severance tax fund created in section 39-29-110, C.R.S., of one million dollars per year for three years for grant funding to local governments for planning, analyses, public engagement, and coordination and collaboration with federal land managers and stakeholders, or for similar or related local government processes needed by local governments for engagement in federal land management decision-making.
(3) Repealed.
(4) The division shall administer the local government affordable housing development incentives grant program created in section 24-32-130 (2) and the local government planning grant program created in section 24-32-130 (5).
(5) The division shall consult with the division of housing created in section 24-32-704 in connection with the creation and administration of the housing toolkit program in accordance with section 24-32-721.7 (2)(a).
(6) The division shall consult with the creative industries division within the Colorado office of economic development created in section 24-48.5-301 in connection with the administration of the community revitalization grant program in accordance with section 24-48.5-317.
(7) (a) As part of the division's work to improve broadband service to its local government constituents, the division shall implement the interconnectivity grant program, which is hereby created, to award grant money to local governments for proposed projects that:
(I) Engage in regional planning among multiple local governments to:
(A) Identify regional broadband infrastructure needs;
(B) Determine optimal regional configurations of broadband infrastructure; and
(C) Identify potential public-private partnerships to achieve optimal regional broadband deployment; or
(II) Provide or enhance the network connection between communities, including the interconnection between community anchor institutions.
(b) A recipient of money under the grant program:
(I) Shall not use the money to deploy last-mile broadband infrastructure or to provide broadband internet service as defined in section 40-15-102 (3.5); except that an Indian tribe or nation awarded grant money may use the grant money to deploy last-mile broadband infrastructure; and
(II) Is encouraged to contract with the owner of:
(A) Any existing broadband infrastructure located in the area to be served by the recipient's proposed project to lease any excess capacity or obtain a right-of-way from the owner in order to attach the recipient's own broadband facilities in the right-of-way; or
(B) Any existing electric easement, as that term is defined in section 40-15-601 (5), located in the area to be served by the recipient's proposed project to lease any excess capacity or install a broadband facility in the electric easement pursuant to part 6 of article 15 of title 40.
(c) The interconnectivity grant program fund is hereby created in the state treasury and consists of money the state received from the federal coronavirus state fiscal recovery fund created in the federal "American Rescue Plan Act of 2021", Pub.L. 117-2; money transferred to the fund from the ARPA refinance state money cash fund pursuant to section 24-75-226.5; and any money that the general assembly may appropriate to the fund. Within three days after June 28, 2021, the state treasurer shall transfer five million dollars from the economic recovery and relief cash fund created in section 24-75-228 (2)(a) to the fund for use by the division for the purpose of reviewing and awarding grants under the grant program. The money in the fund is subject to appropriation by the general assembly.
(d) With respect to grants awarded from money transferred to the interconnectivity grant program fund from the economic recovery and relief cash fund created in section 24-75-228 (2)(a) or from the ARPA refinance state money cash fund created in section 24-75-226.5, grants may only be awarded for broadband projects that, pursuant to treasury department interim regulations implementing the federal "American Rescue Plan Act of 2021", Pub.L. 117-2, provide broadband infrastructure that is designed to provide service to unserved or underserved households and businesses and that is designed to, upon completion:
(I) Reliably meet or exceed symmetrical one hundred megabits per second download and upload speeds; or
(II) In cases where it is not practicable, because of the excessive cost of the project or geography or topography of the area to be served by the project, provide service meeting the standards set forth in subsection (7)(d)(I) of this section that:
(A) Reliably meets or exceeds one hundred megabits per second download speed and is between at least twenty megabits per second and one hundred megabits per second upload speed; and
(B) Is scalable to a minimum of one hundred megabits per second download speed and one hundred megabits per second upload speed.
(e) If the treasury department modifies its interim regulations implementing the federal "American Rescue Plan Act of 2021", Pub.L. 117-2, grants awarded pursuant to subsection (7)(d) of this section may only be awarded for broadband projects that comply with the modified federal regulations.
(f) As used in subsection (7)(d) of this section, "unserved or underserved households and businesses" means one or more households or businesses that are not currently served by a wireline connection that reliably delivers at least twenty-five megabits per second downstream and three megabits per second upstream.
(g) On or before January 1, 2022, and within six months after a state fiscal year in which the division awards one or more grants for broadband deployment, whether or not awarded under the grant program, the division shall submit a report to the Colorado broadband office regarding grants awarded in the most recent state fiscal year. Reports submitted under this subsection (7)(g) must include:
(I) For each project awarded grant money:
(A) A description of the project, including a description of the use of the grant money in providing broadband;
(B) A summary of the progress made on the project;
(C) The estimated completion date for the project or, if already completed, the date of completion;
(D) A map of the areas to be served or already served by the project; and
(E) The type of technology deployed or used for broadband provided through the project;
(II) The number of grant applicants, the amounts of grant money requested by each applicant, the number of grants awarded, and the amounts of grant money awarded to each applicant that receives an award; and
(III) The amount of money expended for grant awards versus the amount of money obligated but not yet expended for grant awards.
(8) The division shall administer the infrastructure and strong communities grant program created in section 24-32-133. In connection with the administration of the grant program, the division shall consult with the Colorado energy office created in section 24-38.5-101 (1) and the department of transportation created in section 43-1-103 (1).
Source: L. 66: p. 121, § 4. C.R.S. 1963: § 3-22-4. L. 68: p. 34, § 1. L. 77: (1)(j) added, p. 1034, § 2, effective July 1. L. 81: (1)(k) added, p. 1395, § 4, effective June 19. L. 92: (1)(j) and (1)(k) amended and (1)(l) added, p. 1011, § 3, effective March 12. L. 93: (1)(k) repealed, p. 1784, § 55, effective June 6. L. 2015: (2) added, (HB 15-1225), ch. 187, p. 622, § 3, effective May 13. L. 2019: (1)(m) added, (SB 19-057), ch. 35, p. 115, § 10, effective August 2. L. 2020: (3) added, (HB 20-1019), ch. 9, p. 25, § 4, effective March 6. L. 2021: (6) added, (SB 21-252), ch. 242, p. 1300, § 2, effective June 16; (4) and (5) added, (HB 21-1271), ch. 356, p. 2317, § 2, effective June 27; (1)(n) and (7) added, (HB 21-1289), ch. 371, p. 2460, § 13, effective June 28. L. 2022: (8) added, (HB 22-1304), ch. 290, p. 2084, § 6, effective June 1. L. 2023: (5) amended, (HB 23-1301), ch. 303, p. 1825, § 33, effective August 7. L. 2024: (7)(c) and IP(7)(d) amended, (HB 24-1466), ch. 429, p. 2937, § 17, effective June 5. L. 2026: (3) repealed, (HB 26-1295), ch. 121, p. 521, § 13, effective August 12.
Cross references: For the legislative declaration in HB 15-1225, see section 1 of chapter 187, Session Laws of Colorado 2015. For the legislative declaration in HB 21-1289, see section 1 of chapter 371, Session Laws of Colorado 2021. For the legislative declaration in HB 21-1271, see section 1 of chapter 356, Session Laws of Colorado 2021. For the legislative declaration in HB 22-1304, see section 1 of chapter 290, Session Laws of Colorado 2022. For the legislative declaration in HB 24-1466, see section 1 of chapter 429, Session Laws of Colorado 2024.
24-32-105. Limitation of authority of division.
Nothing in this part 1 shall give to the division any power of control or supervision over any unit of local government.
Source: L. 66: p. 122, § 5. C.R.S. 1963: § 3-22-5.
24-32-106. Powers of the director.
(1) In order to perform the functions and duties of the division expressly set forth in this part 1, the director, acting under the authority of the executive director of the department of local affairs, has the following powers:
(a) To employ assistants and personnel as may be appropriate to the functions of the division within the appropriation given by the general assembly;
(b) To contract for services and materials required by the division;
(c) To receive and expend gifts, grants, and bequests, subject to approval of the governor, and to expend state funds which are appropriated by the general assembly;
(d) To contract with the federal government or any agency or instrumentality thereof and to receive any grants or moneys therefrom for purposes not inconsistent with the purposes set forth in this part 1;
(e) To exercise any other authority consistent with the purposes for which the division is created which is reasonably necessary for the fulfillment of assigned responsibilities;
(f) Repealed.
(g) To award grants for water and sewer emergencies of local governments. Such grants shall be made based upon financial need as determined by the director, and the director may require that such grants be contingent on repayment by the local government.
Source: L. 66: p. 122, § 6. C.R.S. 1963: § 3-22-6. L. 68: p. 133, § 6. L. 83: (1)(g) added, p. 898, § 1, effective March 29; (1)(f) amended, p. 835, § 44, effective July 1. L. 99: (1)(f) repealed, p. 690, § 14, effective August 4.
24-32-107. Payment of expenses and salaries.
Vouchers covering expenses and salaries of the division shall be signed by the director, and warrants shall be drawn by the controller in payment thereof as provided by law.
Source: L. 66: p. 122, § 7. C.R.S. 1963: § 3-22-7.
24-32-108. Establishment of a file.
The division of local government, with the cooperation of the secretary of state, shall promptly establish and maintain on a current basis, as a public record, a file listing by name all incorporated towns, cities, or cities and counties of the state, referred to in this part 1 as "municipalities", with the date of incorporation of each municipality, recording by legal description all changes in the boundaries of such municipalities, and accompanied by a map of the same. The division of local government shall maintain such a current and revised list for public inspection. Within thirty days after July 1, 1967, each municipality shall submit to the division of local government a description of its current legal boundaries, accompanied by a map, and the date of its municipal incorporation.
Source: L. 67: p. 820, § 1. C.R.S. 1963: § 3-22-8.
24-32-109. Notice of change - failure to file - effect.
No annexation, consolidation, merger, detachment of any area, new incorporation, or dissolution of an existing municipality shall be effective until notice of the completion of such action with a legal description accompanied by a map of the area concerned is filed in duplicate by the municipality with the county clerk and recorder of the county in which the annexation, consolidation, merger, detachment, incorporation, or dissolution takes place. In case such action effects a change in county boundaries, the same shall be filed with the county clerk and recorder of each county affected. A certified duplicate copy of any annexation, consolidation, merger, detachment, incorporation, or dissolution shall be filed with the division of local government by the county clerk and recorder of the county.
Source: L. 67: p. 820, § 2. C.R.S. 1963: § 3-22-9. L. 75: Entire section amended, p. 1269, § 3, effective July 1.
Cross references: For effect of failure to file, see § 31-12-113 (2).
ANNOTATION
Filing requirements of this section and § 31-12-113 (2)(a)(II)(A) not satisfied by mere substantial compliance. There are several clear indications in these statutory provisions that substantial compliance with filing requirements is insufficient. Both statutes plainly declare that the consequence of noncompliance is that annexation shall not become effective. Unlike statutes governing annexations by petition, this section and § 31-12-113 do not expressly allow for substantial compliance. Presence of an explicit good cause exception in § 31-12-113 (2)(c) suggests general assembly intended that only a showing of good cause would excuse strict compliance. Grandote Golf & Ctry. Club v. Town of La Veta, 252 P.3d 1196 (Colo. App. 2011).
Even assuming that substantial compliance with § 31-12-313 and the requirements of this section may render an annexation effective, there was no substantial compliance with additional requirement that a certified copy of the annexation ordinance and map be filed with division of local government. This requirement cannot be deemed a mere formality; excusing noncompliance with this requirement would not result in fulfillment of the relevant statutes' purposes. Grandote Golf & Ctry. Club v. Town of La Veta, 252 P.3d 1196 (Colo. App. 2011).
Because required filings of annexation ordinance did not occur, and because no good cause was shown or even alleged for the failure, the annexation contemplated by the ordinance did not become effective. Grandote Golf & Ctry. Club v. Town of La Veta, 252 P.3d 1196 (Colo. App. 2011).
24-32-110. Report of district or municipal officials. (Repealed)
Source: L. 67: p. 820, § 3. C.R.S. 1963: § 3-22-10. L. 2011: Entire section repealed, (SB 11-239), ch. 218, p. 949, § 1, effective August 10.
24-32-111. Statewide program for identification of matters of state interest as part of local land use planning. (Repealed)
Source: L. 74: Entire section added, p. 351, § 2, effective May 17. L. 2002: (1) amended, p. 1023, § 41, effective June 1. L. 2006: Entire section repealed, p. 142, § 12, effective August 7.
24-32-112. County powers relating to matters of local concern - report. (Repealed)
Source: L. 88: Entire section added, p. 916, § 2, effective April 14. L. 91: Entire section repealed, p. 884, § 6, effective June 5.
24-32-113. Transfer of functions and property - contracts - continuation of regulations. (Repealed)
Source: L. 92: Entire section added, p. 1011, § 4, effective March 12. L. 2004: (1), (3), and (4) amended and entire section repealed, pp. 1177, 1183, §§ 3, 20, effective August 4.
Editor's note: Subsections (1), (3), and (4) were amended in section 3 of Senate Bill 04-236. Those amendments were superseded by the repeal of this section in section 20 of Senate Bill 04-236.
24-32-114. Cleanup of illegally disposed of waste tires - waste tire cleanup fund - legislative declaration - repeal. (Repealed)
Source: L. 95: Entire section added, p. 1113, § 4, effective May 31. L. 96: (3)(b) amended, p. 814, § 2, effective May 23. L. 98: (1)(a), (1)(b), (3)(a), (3)(d), (4), (6), and (7) amended and (6.5) added, p. 1064, § 1, effective June 1. L. 99: (1)(a)(II) amended, p. 884, § 10, effective July 1; (5) amended, p. 690, § 15, effective August 4. L. 2000: (1) R&RE, (1.5) and (8) added, and (3)(b), (3)(c), and (4) amended, pp. 807, 809, §§ 2, 3, effective May 24. L. 2001: IP(1), (1)(a), (1)(b)(I), (1)(c), (1)(d), and (6) amended and (1)(f) added, p. 798, § 2, effective June 1. L. 2002: (1.3) added, p. 153, § 10, effective March 27; (1.3) repealed, p. 673, § 6, effective May 28; (1)(c) and (1)(d) amended, p. 234, § 1, effective July 1; (5) repealed, p. 882, § 22, effective August 7. L. 2003: (1.4) added, p. 457, § 14, effective March 5. L. 2006: (1)(b)(I) amended, p. 1254, § 1, effective May 26; (1)(e) and (1)(f) amended and (1.1) and (1.2) added, p. 1500, § 36, effective June 1; (7) amended, p. 175, § 4, effective July 1. L. 2009: (1.6) added, (SB 09-279), ch. 367, p. 1928, § 11, effective June 1. L. 2010: (1.7) added, (HB 10-1327), ch. 135, p. 449, § 3, effective April 15; entire section repealed, (HB 10-1018), ch. 421, p. 2163, § 2, effective June 10.
24-32-115. Economic self-sufficiency - development of standards - rules - fund - legislative declaration.
(1) The general assembly hereby finds and declares that:
(a) Most state public assistance programs are calibrated to the federal poverty line, a one-size-fits-all national standard designed in the 1960s that is calculated largely on the cost of food and has only been updated for inflation;
(b) The standard is outdated and virtually irrelevant to the actual costs families face today, such as child care, health care, and transportation;
(c) A self-sufficiency standard measures how much income is needed for a family of a given composition in a given place to adequately meet its basic needs without public or private assistance;
(d) A self-sufficiency standard provides a more accurate assessment of the economic well-being of Colorado families;
(e) A self-sufficiency standard is an excellent tool that could be used in many ways, including:
(I) Creating a benchmark for measuring the effects of programs and policies;
(II) Economic development;
(III) Targeting higher-wage jobs for Coloradans;
(IV) Enhancing education, job training, and skills development programs; and
(V) Counseling clients transitioning from welfare to workforce development programs.
(2) (a) On or before January 1, 2008, the executive director of the department of local affairs shall make available on the website of the department of local affairs a standard to measure the self-sufficiency of Colorado families. The standard shall take into account regional and county variations in the costs of housing, child care, health care, food, and transportation and miscellaneous costs, and the effect of existing tax laws, including state sales tax, payroll taxes, federal and state income tax, child care tax credits, and the earned income tax credit.
(b) The standard required pursuant to paragraph (a) of this subsection (2) shall:
(I) Rely to the extent possible, on data reported by the United States census bureau, United States department of housing and urban development, and on other data reported to state and federal agencies using standardized methodology;
(II) Determine housing costs using fair market rents for apartments as reported by the United States department of housing and urban development;
(III) Determine child care costs using average costs for licensed child care facilities, including but not limited to family day care, as reported to the state's child care resource and referral agencies for children of different ages in different areas of the state;
(IV) Determine food costs using the United States department of agriculture low-cost food plan; and
(V) In health-care costs, include insurance premium costs and out-of-pocket expenses based upon the medical expenditure panel survey and adjusted for inflation using the medical consumer price index.
(3) The department of local affairs is authorized to seek and accept gifts, grants, or donations from private or public sources for the purposes of this section. All private and public funds received through gifts, grants, or donations shall be transmitted to the state treasurer, who shall credit the same to the self-sufficiency standard fund, which fund is hereby created and referred to in this section as the "fund". The moneys in the fund shall be continuously appropriated for the direct and indirect costs associated with the implementation of this section. Any moneys in the fund not expended for the purpose of this section may be invested by the state treasurer as provided by law. All interest and income derived from the investment and deposit of moneys in the fund shall be credited to the fund. Any unexpended and unencumbered moneys remaining in the fund at the end of a fiscal year shall remain in the fund and shall not be credited or transferred to the general fund or another fund.
Source: L. 2007: Entire section added, p. 964, § 1, effective July 1, 2007. L. 2010: (1)(a) amended, (HB 10-1422), ch. 419, p. 2083, § 63, effective August 11.
24-32-116. Inventory of local governmental entities - information required - definitions.
(1) As used in this section, unless the context otherwise requires:
(a) "Agent" means:
(I) For a special district created pursuant to title 32, C.R.S., the special district's designated local government contact person, as reported annually by the special district and included in the database by the department; or
(II) For all other local governmental entities, a person designated by a local governmental entity to receive a filing of a notice of claim pursuant to section 24-10-109 (3).
(b) "Department" means the department of local affairs.
(c) "Inventory" means the online database of active local governments maintained by the department as of August 8, 2012.
(d) "Local governmental entity" means a city, county, city and county, special district, school district, including a charter school as defined in section 22-30.5-104.9, or other unit of local government.
(2) (a) The department shall update and expand the inventory and any associated forms or documents as necessary to obtain and integrate, for each local governmental entity, the information described in subsection (3) of this section.
(b) Nothing in this section precludes the department from including additional information in the inventory.
(3) (a) No later than twelve months after August 8, 2012, each local governmental entity in the state shall provide the following information to the department, which shall include the same in the inventory:
(I) The official name of the local governmental entity;
(II) The principal address of the local governmental entity;
(III) If other than the principal address, the mailing address of the local governmental entity;
(IV) The name of the local governmental entity's agent; and
(V) The mailing address of the agent.
(b) A local governmental entity shall update any information provided pursuant to paragraph (a) of this subsection (3) as required by the department. Failure to update the information provided pursuant to paragraph (a) of this subsection (3) renders any notice of a claim pursuant to section 24-10-109 to the last local governmental entity's agent in the inventory valid as a matter of law.
(c) Notwithstanding the date specified in subsection (3)(a) of this section, a local governmental entity that is a charter school shall submit the information required in subsections (3)(a)(I) to (3)(a)(V) of this section to the department of local affairs no later than the date specified in section 22-30.5-104.9 or no later than ninety days after becoming a charter school pursuant to section 22-30.5-104.9 (7) and shall update such information pursuant to subsection (3)(b) of this section.
(4) The department shall make the inventory accessible from the department's website.
(5) Nothing in this section precludes the filing of a notice of claim or the service of process on any person authorized by law.
Source: L. 2012: Entire section added, (HB 12-1244), ch. 172, p. 616, § 2, effective August 8. L. 2023: (1)(d) amended and (3)(c) added, (SB 23-287), ch. 189, p. 934, § 20, effective May 15.